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Introduction: The Stories of State Constitutional Law
Robert F. Williams*
Federal and state bills of rights thus serve distinct but comple-
mentary purposes. The Federal Bill of Rights facilitates political and
philosophical homogeneity among the basically heterogeneous states by
securing, as a uniform minimum, the highest common denominator of
freedom that can prudently be administered throughout all fifty states.
The state bills of rights, on the other hand, express the ultimate breadth
of the common yearnings for freedom of each insular state population
within our nation....
When called upon to decide matters of fundamental rights,
Florida's state courts are bound under federalist principles to give
primacy to our state Constitution and to give independent legal import
to every phrase and clause contained therein. We are similarly bound
under our Declaration of Rights to construe each provision freely in
order to achieve the primary goal of individual freedom and autonomy.
Chief Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr.
Supreme Court of Florida'
* Profiessor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A., 1967, Florida
State University; J.D., 1969, University of Florida College of Law; LL.M., 1971, New York
University School of Law; LL.M., 1980, Columbia University School of Law. The author
served as a legislative aide during the drafting of the Florida Constitution of 1968 and
represented clients before the 1978 Florida Constitution Revision Commission. He teaches
State Constitutional Law at Rutgers, and is the author of STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d. ed. 1993) published by the Michie Company, and THE NEW
JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1990) published by Greenwood Press.
I. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962-63 (Fla. 1992). 1 have referred elsewhere to
Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Traylor as "a primer on independent state constitutional
analysis." Robert F. Williams, Review Essay: A Generation of Change in Florida State
Constitutional Law, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 133, 143 (1992).
For an exhaustive treatment of Florida state constitutional rights cases, see David C.
Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: 1991 Survey of the State Bill of Rights, 16 NOVA L.
REV. 167 (1991); David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law. 1990 Survey of State Bill
of Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1049 (1991); David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law:
A Ten-Year Retrospective on the State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV. 693 (1990). For a
broader view, see Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial Federalism: Current Trends and Long
Term Prospects, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1053 (1992).
For a detailed study of the evolution of the text of Florida's rights protections, see
Joseph W. Little & Steven E. Lohr, Textual History of the Florida Declaration of Rights, 22
STETSON L. REV. 549 (1993) and see generally JOHN F. COOPER & THOMAS C. MARKS, JR.,
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 381-508 (1992).
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Given the willingness of the legislature to propose amendments, the
availability of the initiative process to the citizenry, and the frequent
review by appointed commissions, it is clear that this history of the
Florida Constitution will continue to be written in virtually every
election.
Sandy D'Alemberte2
These twin perspectives, the protection of individual rights under state
constitutions described by Chief Justice Shaw, and the relative ease of
amending state constitutions described by Sandy D'Alemberte, create a
paradox for state constitutional law.3 Harry Witte described this paradox
using the example of Pennsylvania:
Two fundamental principles were set down in the 1776 Constitution; the
inviolability of basic, individual rights and the inherent right of the
people to control, reform or abolish their government as they saw fit.
While each principle may be seen as critical to one or another ideal of
democracy, together they placed in potential opposition the right of the
majority to govern and the right of minorities to be free of certain
reaches of government.'
This paradox is one of the stories of state constitutional law that makes
it different from federal constitutional law. There are many other stories,
both about state constitutional law generally, and specifically about Florida
constitutional law.'
The Florida Supreme Court has become one of the leading examples
of the "changing faces of Southern courts."6 The article by Justice Gerald
2. TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
16 (1991).
3. See Hary L. Witte, Rights, Revolution and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The
Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383 (1993).
4. Id. at 384.
5. For each provision in a state constitution, no matter how seemingly trivial, there is
a story to be told. It may be a political story rather than a lofty, "constitutional" story. As
Lawrence Friedman stated:
There was a point to every clause in these inflated constitutions. Each one
reflected the wishes of some faction or interest group, which tried to make its
policies permanent by freezing them into the charter. Constitutions, like treaties,
preserved the terms of compromise between warring groups.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 119 (2d ed. 1985).
6. Mark Curriden, The Changing Faces of Southern Courts, 79 A.B.A. J. 68 (June
1993).
Vol. 18
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Kogan and Robert Craig Waters presents an invaluable look into the court's
inner working, as well as both its adjudicatory and nonadjudicatory powers,
which are constitutionally assigned.7
The court has included, although she has recently been nominated to
the federal court of appeals, Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett, whose opinions
join the "voices of ... prominent state supreme court justices, each the first
woman on her court and each an important contributor to her court in the
development of state constitutional law."8  As Chief Justice Barkett has
observed: "It is, of course, axiomatic that Florida can interpret its
constitution independently of the federal courts."9 She has certainly made
a mark on Florida's state constitutional jurisprudence. Professor Daniel
Gordon's article in this Symposium traces the Florida Court's recent
approach to state constitutional rights cases,'" which is part of a national
debate about methodology in such cases."
7. Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida
Supreme Court, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1151 (1994); see also John E. Fennelly, ELM Street
Revisited: The Florida Supreme Court's Rulemaking Authority and the Circuit Court's
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act-Real
or Imagined, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1289 (1994); Brian E. Mattis & B. Taylor Mattis, Erie and
Florida Law Conflict at the Crossroads: The Needfor Statewide Stare Decisis, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 1333 (1994). See generally Joseph W. Little, An Overview of the Historical Develop-
ment of the Judicial Article of the Florida Constitution, 19 STETSON L. REV. I (1989); John
M. Scheb, Florida's Courts of Appeal: Intermediate Courts Become Final, 13 STETSON L.
REV. 479 (1984).
8. Linda B. Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of Justices Durham, Kaye, and
Abrahamson in Shaping the "New Judicial Federalism, "2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST.
L. 239, 240.41 (1989).
9. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 974 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Gore v. State, 599 So. 2d 978, 988 n. 12 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 610 (1992).
In Gore, Chief Justice Barkett stated:
I use the terms "Fifth" and "Sixth" Amendment, as opposed to "article I, section
9" and "article 1, section 16" for purposes of consistency with the majority
opinion. I note that under the doctrine of primacy announced in Traylor v. State,
596 So. 2d 957, 962-963 (Fla. 1992), 1 would have first analyzed Gore's rights
under the Florida Constitution before turning to federal constitutional law.
Id. (Barkett, J., concurring); see also Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256, 1262-64 (Fla. 1993)
(Barkett, C.J., dissenting); State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185, 189-90 (Fla. 1987) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting).
10. Daniel Gordon, Good Intentions--Questionable Results: Florida Tries the Primacy
Model, 18 NOVA L. REV. 759 (1994); see also Harry Lee Anstead, Florida's Constitution:
A View from the Middle, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1277 (1994); AlIred v. State, 622 So. 2d 984, 986
(Fla. 1993).
II. See, e.g., Paul Bender & Earl M. Maltz, JudicialActivism Under State Constitutions:
Boon or Bane?, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 1113 (1990); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court
19941
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Most of the current, fashionable stories about state constitutional law
have to do with state judicial enforcement of rights protections found in the
state constitutions. There are, however, a number of other important state
constitutional law stories in Florida and the nation which do not involve
adjudication of rights cases, nor do they involve adjudication at all. A
striking example is the Florida Supreme Court's exercise, under the
leadership of Chief Justice Arthur England, of its power to regulate the
practice of law to create the Interest on Trust Accounts Program.' 2 This
has been, quite simply, one of the most spectacularly successful Brandeisian
"state laboratory" experiments 3 of our time, now copied by all of the
states but one. 14  Possibly the same will be true of the court's current
innovations with respect to the pro bono obligations of lawyers.' 5
Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985); Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-
Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1153
(1992); Robert F. Utter, Swimming In the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1985).
12. For the early history of this program, see generally In re Interest on Trust Accounts,
402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 396 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1981);
In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1979); In re Interest on Trust Accounts,
356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978). The program is discussed in Randall C. Berg, Jr., A Significant
New Revenue Source for Legal Services Begins: Interest on Trust Accounts, 15 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 1015 (1982); Taylor S. Boone, Comment, A Source of Revenue for the
Improvement of Legal Services, Part II: A Recommendation for the Use of Client's Funds
Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Texas
Bar Ass 'n and an Analysis of the Federal Income Tax Ramifications, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113
(1979); Taylor S. Boone, Comment, A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal
Services, Part I: An Analysis of the Plans in Foreign Countries and Fla. Allowing the Use
of Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest Bearing Trust Accounts to Support
Programs of the Organized Bar, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539 (1979). The Internal Revenue
Service approved the Program in Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16.
13. Justice Brandeis was, of course, referring to state legislatures when he made his
famous observation: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes referred to
"social experiments ... in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states .... " Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. The only state to refuse to adopt the program is Indiana. See In re Public Law No.
154-1990, 561 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1990).
15. Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar--3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial
Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 18 Fla. L. Weekly S348 (Fla. June 23, 1993); In re
Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar--3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Administra-
tion-2.065 (Legal Aid), 598 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1992); In re Amendments to Rules Regulating
Vol. 18
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In Indiana, the one state still without an Interest on Trust Accounts
Program, Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard recently stated:
Fifty state supreme courts have examined the questions about
which my colleagues write today and forty-nine of them have reached
the opposite conclusion. The fact that Indiana stands alone on this issue
does not mean that we are wrong, but it certainly does not prove we are
right. Instead, I think it suggests that this might be a moment to heed
the advice we often give to juries: "Re-examine your views in light of
the opinions of others."
Let there be no mistake: interest is being earned on "non-interest-
bearing" Indiana lawyer trust accounts. This Court can choose to
continue directing that interest to the financial institutions holding the
accounts or it can choose to direct it to help people too poor to hire
counsel or to underprivileged or minority students seeking a legal
education. 6
Recent years in Florida have seen the relative "rush" to constitutiona-
lize a number of rights and powers. While most of these state constitutional
developments are viewed as unqualifiedly "good," care must be taken by the
Legislature, 7 the supporters of initiative petitions," the Constitution
Revision Commission, 9 constitutional conventions,20 and the voters2 to
evaluate the relative merits and demerits of treating a topic in the state
constitution. As Professor Frank P. Grad observed a generation ago:
This brings us to a consideration of the significance of treating a
subject in the state constitution rather than leaving it to be dealt with by
ordinary law. The significance is simply this: (1) it places the matter
included in the constitution beyond change by normal lawmaking
processes, and (2) it places it at the highest level of the legal authority
of the state....
the Fla. Bar--l-3. l(a) and Rules of Judicial Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 573 So. 2d
800 (Fla. 1990), An important aspect of the regulation of law practice is admission to the
Bar. See Thomas A. Pobjecky, The Florida Board of Bar Examiners: The Constitutional
Safeguard Between Attorney Aspirants and the Public, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1313 (1994).
16. In re Ind. State Bar Ass'n, 550 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Ind. 1990) (Shepard, C.J.,
dissenting).
17. FLA. CONST. art. Xi, § 1.
18. Id. § 3.
19. Id. § 2.
20. Id. 4.
21. Id. § 5.
1994]
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Without anticipating the detailed consideration of the matter, it
must be recognized at the outset that the twin effects of constitutional
treatment have consequences which, depending on the circumstances,
may be considered beneficial or harmful. The enduring quality of a
provision of the state constitution may protect a desirable policy from
frivolous changes by the legislature, or it may delay or prevent the
change to a new and better policy from one embedded in the constitu-
tion which is no longer responsive to current needs.... It ought to be
added, too, that the beneficial consequences are usually intended,
whereas the harmful ones are, more often than not, unintended and the
result of changed circumstances.22
It is clear that the criteria proposed will require difficult judgments
of degree, and the factors taken into consideration may be evenly
balanced. But in view of the fact that all of the provisions in a state
constitution operate as limitations on the legislature and on the govern-
ment as a whole, and in view of the fact that the cost of including a
proposal is likely to be high in the terms described, the burden of proof
concerning the need for inclusion should be squarely on its proponent,
and any doubts on the issue should be resolved against inclusion and in
favor of the freedom of government to respond to emerging problems
without constitutional limitations, express or implied. 3
The constitutionalization of such matters as victims' rights,24 bans on
local mandates,2" privacy,2 6 and open goverment and records require-
ments" indicates the ability, noted by Sandy D'Alemberte above, of
22. Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form For Our Time, 54
VA. L. REV. 928, 946 (1968).
23. Id. at 972.
24. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16(b); Patrick B. Calcutt, Comment, The Victims Rights
Act of 1988, the Florida Constitution, and the New Strugglefor Victims' Rights, 16 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 811 (1988).
25. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18; Nancy Perkins Spyke, Florida's Constitutional
Mandate Restrictions, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1403 (1994); Eric B. Smith & Kraig A. Conn,
Amendment 3: A Proposition to Limit Unfunded State Mandates, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1990, at
72.
26. See John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and the
Reality Falls the Shadow, 18 NOVA L. REV. 775 (1994).
27. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24, art. III, § 4(c); Patricia A. Gleason & Joslyn Wilson,
The Florida Constitutional Open Meetings Amendments; Article I, Section 24 and Article III,
Section 4(e), Florida Constitution, Let the Sunshine In, 18 NOVA L. REV. 973 (1994).
Florida's reputation for state constitutional protection of open government is
nationwide. See, e.g., In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 450 n.l (Pa. 1978). The
court stated:
Vol. 18
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Florida's citizens to change the "history of the Florida Constitution ... in
virtually every election."28  By the same token, the comparably easy
amendment to Florida's state constitutional search and seizure protection,29
requiring "forced linkage" with interpretations of the Federal Fourth
Amendment, 3° reflects the relatively unstable nature of such rights under an
easily changeable constitution. This leads to the paradox described by
Professor Witte above.3' People in Florida must be careful not to "love the
state constitution to death."
Still, as noted by Professor Grad, even the best state constitution will
''occasionally require amendment and revision ... to enable the constitution
to develop in response to changing needs. 3' A good example of this
It is of particular interest that Florida, the state which moved earliest and
which is generally regarded as the most progressive in the area of expansive
Open Meeting Laws, has itself excluded the judiciary from the scope of its act's
coverage. And the Supreme Court of Florida has suggested that this exclusion
is mandated by the separation of powers doctrine.
Id. at 450 n. 11 (citations omitted).
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
29. FLA. CONST. art 1, § 12.
30. See generally Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1993); John C. Cooper, Beyond
the Federal Constitution: The Status of State Constitutional Law in Florida, 18 STETSON L.
REV. 241, 275-79 (1989); Paul R. Joseph, No Different Drummer: The Effect of the 1983
Amendment to Article I, § 12 of the Florida Constitution, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 101 (1992);
Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's
"Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653 (1987).
31. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; see also John C. Van Gieson, Gay
Ballot is Focus'of Court, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 8, 1994, at D-1.
32. Grad, supra note 22, at 972. For an argument that the Florida Constitution is too
easy to amend, see Joseph W. Little & Julius Medenblik, Restricting Legislative Amendments
to the Constitution, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1986, at 43; see also Jim Smith, So You Want to Amend
the Florida Constitution? A Guide to Initiative Petitions, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1509 (1994).
Justice Parker Lee McDonald recently noted that the Florida Constitution "is one of the
most easily amended constitutions in the country," primarily through the initiative. Advisory
Opinion to the Attorney General-Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla.
1993) (McDonald, J., concurring).
The legal principles in the state constitution inherently command a higher
status than any other legal rules in our society. By transcending time and
changing political mores, the constitution is a document that provides stability
in the law and society's consensus on general, fundamental values. ...
The power to change both the constitution and statutory law is, theoretical-
ly, vested in the people. The power to amend the constitution is implicit in the
declaration in article 1, section 1, Florida Constitution, that "[a]ll political power
is inherent in the people." The 1968 revision of the state constitution adopted
the Revision Commission's recommendation to include a section explicitly
1994]
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needed flexibility is Florida's recent budget amendment,33 overruling a
Florida Supreme Court separation of powers decision.34 The budget
amendment was proposed directly to the electorate from the appointed Tax
and Budget Reform Commission.35 Taking a longer view, state constitution-
al flexibility in Florida also has permitted the gradual, piecemeal adoption
of many of the progressive recommendations of the 1978 Constitution
Revision Commission, despite the defeat of all of its proposals in 1978.36
The article in this Symposium by Thomas C. Marks, Jr. and Alfred A.
Colby makes perceptive and well reasoned recommendations for state
constitutional change in the future.37
Florida's recent term limit amendment,3 8 part of a larger national state
constitutional movement, 39 represents the most important fundamental
dealing with the initiative process .... Recognizing the sovereignty of the
people, I still feel compelled to express my view that the permanency and
supremacy of state constitutional jurisprudence is jeopardized by the recent
proliferation of constitutional amendments....
... At this juncture, rather than espouse any particular solution as to how
to prevent such abuse, I merely express my thought that some issues are better
suited as legislatively enacted statutes than as constitutional amendments. It is
my hope that the next Revision Commission will have the opportunity to
establish some criteria regarding the subject matter of initiatives that will
preserve the constitution as a document of fundamental laws, while still
preserving the popular power of the people.
Id. at 1000 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). For a theoretical and philosophical
discussion of the issue of amending a constitution's provisions for its own amendment, see
PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPO-
TENCE, AND CHANGE (1990).
33. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 19; see also Jon Mills, Battle of the Budget: The Legislature
and the Governor Fight for Control, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1101 (1994).
34. Chiles v. Children A,B,C,D,E & F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
35. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6; see also Donna Blanton, Note, The Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission: Florida's Best Hope for the Future, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437
(1991).
36. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 2, at 15; Steven J. Uhlfelder & Robert A. McNeely, The
1978 Constitution Revision Commission: Ahead of Its Time, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1489 (1994);
Williams, supra note 1, at 139-40. See generally Symposium on the Proposed Revisions to
the Florida Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 565 (1978).
37. Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Alfred A. Colby, Some Proposed Changes in the Florida
Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1519 (1994).
38. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; see also P.C. Doherty, A Quodlibet, A Mumpsimus, and
the Rule of Infield Flies: The Unfinished Business of Term Limits in Florida, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 921 (1994).
39. See Doherty, supra note 38, at 921; see also Legislature of the State of Cal. v. Eu,
816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992); LIMITING LEGISLATIVE
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change in state legislative structure since the reapportionment mandated by
the federal one-person-one-vote decisions. Florida's amendment, as well,
applies to the Cabinet.4 ° Actually, the term limit movement revives a
fundamental feature of Revolutionary period state constitutions-rotation in
office.4  The problems with the modem version in Florida, described by
Dr. Doherty,42 sound like the type of "unintended consequences" about
which Frank Grad warned. 3
There are many stories about Florida constitutional law, going back
over a century and a half. Some, in retrospect, are not so pleasant. For
example, Eric Foner described the 1868 Reconstruction state constitutional
processes in Florida:
Florida's convention, controlled after a series of complex maneuvers by
a coalition of business-oriented white Republicans and Whiggish
Conservatives .... skewed legislative representation in favor of white
counties, gave the governor "imperial" powers of appointment, and
authorized the legislature to establish an educational qualification for
voting. Designed to attract white voters to a moderate Republican party
devoted to Florida's economic development, the constitution, comment-
ed The Nation, "surpasses in conservatism that of any State in the
Union.""
More appealing is the story of Governor LeRoy Collins' apparently
unsuccessful efforts to secure reapportionment through state constitutional
TERMS, (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992); Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer,
Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477 (1992); Erik H. Corwin, Recent Developments, Limits on
Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 569 (1991); Gary
F. Moncrief et al., For Whom the Bell Tolls: Term Limits and State Legislatures, 17 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 37 (1992).
40. See Stephen T. Maher, The Florida Cabinet: Is It Time for Remodeling? 18 NOVA
L. REV. 1123 (1994). Also on Florida's Cabinet, see Malcomb B. Johnson, Why We Should
Keep Florida 's Elected Cabinet, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603 (1978); Joseph W. Landers, Jr.,
The Myth of the Cabinet System: The Need to Restructure Florida's Executive Branch, 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089 (1992); Jon C. Moyle, Why We Should Abolish Florida's Elected
Cabinet, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (1978).
41. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787 521-22 (1969).
42. Doherty, supra note 38, at 921.
43. See supra note 22, 23 and accompanying text.
44. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION, 1863-1877
323 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (citing Richard L. Hume, Membership of the Florida
Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican Factionalism in the
Reconstruction South, 51 FLA. HIST. Q. 5-7, 15-16 (July 1992)).
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amendment in Florida. Sandy D'Alemberte and Frank Sanchez recount the
story:
Years later, after Collins left the Governor's Office, he attended a
dinner in Washington in which he sat next to Justice Hugo Black.
Justice Black asked Governor Collins if he had experienced any serious
failures as governor. Collins responded that his biggest failure was his
inability to achieve fair legislative apportionment. Justice Black
responded, "That was not a failure," and explained that Florida's
inability to resolve the reapportionment issue had played an important
role in the Court's deliberations in the Tennessee case and in the other
cases that followed. The fight for fair apportionment that Collins
started was finally won almost a year after he left office.45
Of course, it was reapportionment mandated by the United States
Supreme Court that led to state constitutional modernization in Florida in
1968.46 The 1968 state constitution was the result of what Justice E.
Harris Drew called the "long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and
women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 . . . .,4 Still, however, the Florida Constitution
retains the process of legislative reapportionment each decade, which as
demonstrated by George Waas,48 is fraught with problems. 49
Florida is one of only a few states5" to constitutionalize the right to
collective bargaining. 1  Dean Roger I. Abrams' article reflects the
application of this state constitutional provision, implemented by statute, in
the context of public sector arbitration. 2 Richard Sicking's piece fills out
45. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte & Frank Sanchez, A Tribute to a Great Man: LeRoy
Collins, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 262 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
46. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 2, at 12; Williams, supra note I, at 135-36.
47. Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 832 (Fla. 1970).
48. George L. Waas, The Process and Politics of Legislative Reapportionment and
Redistricting Under the Florida Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1001 (1994).
49. The 1978 Constitution Revision Commission proposed the establishment of a
Reapportionment Commission to take the politically charged matter of legislative
reapportionment out of the Legislature. See Alaine S. Williams, A Summary and Background
Analysis of the Proposed 1978 Constitutional Revisions, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. Il15, 1126-
30 (1978).
50. Richard A. Goldberg & Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers' Organizational and
Collective Bargaining Rights in New Jersey: Implementing Self-Executing State Constitution-
al Rights, 18 RUTGERs L.J. 729, 731-32 (1987).
51. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
52. Roger I. Abrams, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: An Arbitrator's View of the
State Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 733 (1994); see also D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 2, at
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the picture with respect to the funding of public employee pensions and the
enforceability of negotiated pay raises. 3
All of the articles in this Symposium tell stories of, and about, state
constitutional law. State constitutional stories of the militia,54 gambling,"
the state flag,56 homestead exemption,57 and municipal home rule5 8 are
also told here. These stories are, almost exclusively, legal stories about
Florida constitutional law. This is, of course, to be lauded and encour-
aged. 9 But, a fully developed study of state constitutional law should also
be interdisciplinary and comparative, and include state constitutional history
and theory.6" As I continue to argue:
Many common themes appear in the constitutional law of all states.
They share many of the same issues, despite differences in how such
issues may be resolved in each state .... [Study should] focus on these
common themes and issues, which are likely to arise in any jurisdiction.
24; Alaine S. Williams, Alternatives to the Right to Strike for Public Employees: Do They
Adequately Implement Florida's Constitutional Right to Collectively Bargain?, 7 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 475 (1979).
53. Richard A. Sicking, Shoot the Patient or Find the Cure: The Florida Constitutional
Requirement ihat Increases in Public Employee Pensions Be Funded on a Sound Actuarial
Basis, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1465 (1994).
54. Anthony J. Scaletta, Note, The Governor's Troops Under the Florida Constitution,
18 NOVA L. REV. 1133 (1994).
55. Eugene Bardakjy, Note, Is There a Lucky Seven in Florida's Future?, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 1065 (1994). On gambling and state constitutions, see generally Robert Blakey,
Gaming, Lotteries, and Wagering: The Pre-Revolutionary Roots of the Law of Gambling, 16
RUTGERS L.J. 211 (1985); Grad, supra note 22, at 950 n.66, 955-56.
56. Robert M. Jarvis, The History of Florida's State Flag, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1037
(1994).
57. Donna Litman Seiden, There's No Place Like Home(stead) in Florida-Should it
Stay that Way?, 18 NOVA L. REV. 801 (1994).
58. llene S. Lieberman & Harry Morrison, Jr., WARNING: Municipal Home Rule is in
Danger of Being Expressly Preempted by. . ., 18 NOVA L. REV. 1437 (1994).
59. After all, as Professor Richard Kay has observed:
The transformation of a law school from an institution of vocational competence
into one of intellectual excellence is often associated with an increased attention
to legal subjects that are national in scope .... It is also true, however, that this
broadening of interest need not be accompanied by an abandonment of a special
concern for the legal issues and problems that are peculiar to a law school's
home.
Richard S. Kay, The Jurisprudence of the Connecticut Constitution, 16 CONN. L. REV. 667,
667 (1984).
60. Robeti F. Williams, Foreword: A Research Agenda in State Constitutional Law,
66 TEMPLE L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1993).
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This will, in turn, accent the importance of the unique language and
judicial interpretation of the constitutions of the states in the resolution
of specific issues.6
Attention to "horizontal federalism,"6 or the treatment of issues in the
constitutional texts or judicial interpretations of other states, is a central
feature of state constitutional law. As Justice Hans A. Linde of Oregon
noted: "Diversity is the price of a decentralized legal system, or its
justification, and guidance on common issues may be found in the decisions
of other state courts as well as in those of the United States Supreme
Court."63 It is in this sense that state constitutional law must be compara-
tive."
Many of the current topics of interest in Florida constitutional law are
national in scope. I noted this with respect to the term limit movement,65
but it is true as well in the areas of, for example, victims' rights,66
limitations on state legislative mandates to local governments,67 and English
61. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2d
ed. 1992); see also Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and Scholarship,
41 J. LEGAL ED. 243, 246-47 (1991); Robert F. Williams & Earl M. Maltz, Introduction,
Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 877, 878-79 (1989); Robert F.
Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes,24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 172-73 (1983).
62. This is a term from MARY C, PORTER & G. ALAN TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS:
POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xxi-xxii (1982).
63. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983). Former Justice Linde has
cautioned, however, that state constitutions are not all alike and cannot be treated simply as
"common law." See generally Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34
ARIZ. L. REV. 215 (1992).
64. In the words of New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart G. Pollock, "[H]orizontal
federalism, a federalism in which states look to each other for guidance, may be the hallmark
of the rest of the century." Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as
a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV.
977, 992 (1985).
65. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Thomas B. Dixon, Comment,
Arizona Criminal Procedure After the Victims' Bill of Rights Amendment: Implications of
a Victims'Absolute Right to Refuse a Defendant's Discovery Request, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 831
(199 1); Don Siegelman & Courtney Tarver, Victims'Rights in State Constitutions, EMERGING
ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 163 (1988).
67. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at
789-92; Joseph F. Zimmerman, The State Mandate Problem, 19 STATE AND LOCAL GOV'T
REV. 78 (Spring 1987).
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language amendments. 6 Budget control, and legislative-executive clashes
with the judiciary as arbiter, occur in many states.69 State constitutional
amendments, some of which require "forced linkage"7 or lockstep with
federal constitutional interpretation, are a national phenomenon." Further,
the process of state constitutional change, particularly through the initiative,
is the topic of an important national debate.72 Other aspects of the
processes of state constitutional change, such as periodic revision, are also
of national interest.73
Without both deeper and broader views of state constitutional law,
encompassing constitutional theory74 and history," as well as comparing
68. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; Donna M. Greenspan, Note, Florida's Official English
Amendment, 18 NOVA L. REV. 891 (1994); see also D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 2, at 41;
WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 1003; Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269
(1992).
69. See supra notes 33-34; see also Judy v. Schaefer, 627 A.2d, 1039 (Md. 1993); Louis
Fisher, The Effects of a Balanced Budget Amendment on Political Institutions, 9 J. LAW &
POL. 89 (1992).
70. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also BARRY LATZER, STATE
CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7, 37-38 (1991).
71. For literature on this phenomenon, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance
on State Constitutions-Beyond the "New Federalism, " 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi, x-xi
(1985); James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State
Constitutional Jurisprudence, I I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43 (1983); JoAnne Frankfurt &
Amy Rodney, California's Anti-Busing Amendment: A Perspective on the Now Unequal
Equal Protection Clause, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 611 (1980); Janice C. May,
Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIUS 153, 169-79 (Winter 1987);
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss.
L.J. 223 (1984); Witte, supra note 3.
72. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distrust: The
Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State Constitutional Amendment By Initiative
Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 3 (1992); Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and
Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707 (1991); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV.
1 (1978); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government:" The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993); Witte, supra note 3.
73. See, e.g., Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473
(1987); Francis H. Heller, Limiting a Constitutional Convention: The State Precedents, 3
CARDOZO L. REV. 563 (1982); Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum on Calling
a State Constitutional Convention: Enforcing the People's Right to Reform Their Govern-
ment, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 421 (1970).
74. As G. Alan Tarr described it:
[O]ne might have expected a lively dialogue between constitutional theorists and
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state constitutional texts and judicial interpretations, the discourse about the
topic will continue to be "impoverished and inadequate to the tasks that any
constitutional discourse is designed to accomplish."76
Academic commentators and state courts must begin to engage in what
Professor Paul Kahn recently described as "a process of giving voice to the
state court's understanding of the values and principles of the national
community."77 Kahn concluded that constitutional discourse, both state and
federal, will be "enriched because fifty different courts will talk with each
other, as well as with the federal courts, about the meaning of a common
enterprise."78  Having due regard for textual differences, the judicial
interpretation of state constitutions can be part of a "common enterprise."'79
He elaborated this point as follows:
Just as his contemporaries looked to the case law from different
jurisdictions to find the common principles of tort or contract, Cooley
aimed to describe an American constitutionalism that was the common
object of each state court's interpretive effort. The diversity of state
state constitutional scholars. However, no such dialogue has developed. Indeed,
what is striking is how little attention scholars and jurists have paid to the
relationship between constitutional theory and state constitutional law.
G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J.
841, 842 (199 1) (footnotes omitted); see also G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitu-
tions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1169 (1992).
75. As Stephen E. Gottlieb stated:
Constitutional history is valuable whether or not one subscribes to a jurispru-
dence of original intent. For those who do, history becomes controlling -
important because it does, or should, determine constitutional interpretation. For
those who reject a jurisprudence of original intent, constitutional history
nevertheless helps us to preserve the lessons embodied in the drafting of the
provisions at issue and to explore the consequences of the language chosen.
State constitutional history has become more important as the United States
Supreme Court has become less protective of individual rights.
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Foreword: Symposium on State Constitutional History: In Search of
a Usable Past, 53 ALB. L. REV. 255, 258 (1989); see generally TOWARD A USABLE PAST:
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
76. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 761, 766 (1992). Professor Gardner mounts a broad critique of state constitutional
law itself. For responses, and Gardner's defense, see Roundtable on James Gardner's Failed
Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 907-1056 (1993).
77. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1147, 1168 (1993) (emphasis added).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 1168.
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courts, each claiming a unique authority, did not prevent their engage-
ment in a common interpretive enterprise.80
Fortunately, there are a number of new materials available to aid in this
broader, and deeper, common enterprise. Jennifer Friesen's State Constitu-
tional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims and Defenses was
published by Matthew Bender in 1992.8" This is the most important new
treatise on state constitutional law since Cooley's Constitutional Limita-
tions.82 Barry Latzer's State Constitutions and Criminal Justice, providing
a comprehensive national treatment of state constitutional criminal procedure
decisions, was published in 1991 by Greenwood Press. Rutgers Law
Journal publishes an Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, now in its
fifth year, which includes a comprehensive national survey of all state
constitutional decisions. Various bibliographies have been published.83
State-specific studies such as this Symposium, when linked with other
regional and national perspectives on state constitutions, and their interpreta-
tion, will contribute to the common enterprise of understanding the full
reaches of American constitutionalism.
80. Id. at 1163.
81. See Michael Libonati, Book Review, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1329 (1993).
82. See Williams, supra note 60, at 1148.
83. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY TO CURRENT SCHOLARLY RESEARCH (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Stuart D.
Yoak eds., 1988); TIM J. WATTS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1992); Earl M. Maltz et al., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional
Law, 1980-1989, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (1989).
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PART I
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
No aspect of the Florida Constitution has received greater
judicial scrutiny, or more scholarly attention, than those provisions
that create explicit individual rights, for it is in these sections of our
Constitution that the difference between being a Floridian and being
a New Yorker, or a Texan, or an Alaskan, is clearest.
Dean Roger I. Abrams begins this part of our Symposium with a
provocative look at the constitutional right of public employees to
bargain collectively. Professors Daniel Gordon and John Sanchez
next examine, from two very different perspectives, the constitution's
promise that the private lives of our citizens will remain free from
governmental intrusion. Professor Donna Litman Seiden then
presents an exhaustive summary of one of the most important rights
enjoyed by Floridians. the protection of their homes from creditors.
Finally, Nova Law Review staff member Donna M Greenspan reviews
one of the ugliest incidents in Florida's individual rights history. the
attempt to ban the speaking of languages other than English.
1994
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Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A Labor Arbitrator's
View of the Florida Constitution
Roger I. Abrams*
Legal scholars analyze judicial opinions from the top down. They start
with the constitutional text. They examine how the courts-most likely the
Supreme Court-twist and turn the words of that text to fit their notions of
ordered liberty. They critique the products of this process in an effort to
make the next run of cases purer.
Labor arbitrators start from the bottom and work up, finding a source
of law in the practices of the shop floor, in the habits and customs of the
trade, and, most importantly, in the terms of the collective bargaining
agreements reached by labor and management.' Those agreements
normally provide for arbitration of disputes that arise during their terms.2
In some instances, the worlds of the scholars and the arbitrators
intersect. Grievance disputes in the public sector may involve issues of
"external law," i.e., statutory law and administrative regulations not
embodied in the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements.3 On
very rare occasions, labor arbitrators must face-or as courts often do, try
to avoid facing-constitutional issues.
The Florida Constitution contains a provision that protects the right of
public employees to bargain collectively.4 The Florida Legislature enacted
* Dean, Rutgers School of Law-Newark: Dean, Nova University School of Law (1986-
1993); B.A., 1967, Cornell University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School. The author would
like to express his appreciation to the men and women of the Nova law community for their
support during his seven years as Dean of this fine institution.
I. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. In its survey of major collective bargaining agreements, the Bureau of National
Affairs reported that 98% of its sample contained arbitration provisions. 2 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 51:4 (1989).
3. Roger I. Abrams, The Power Issue in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 261 (1982).
4. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, section 6 states as follows:
Right to work.-The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged
on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor
organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to
bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not
have the right to strike.
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comprehensive legislation to regulate the operation of public sector labor
relations.' These can be analyzed "from the top down," but it might be
more interesting to see how the legal and constitutional issues arise in the
workplace.
In 1991, the City Commission of Lake Worth, Florida decided not to
fund the third year wage and merit increases for its unionized workers set
forth in their collective bargaining agreements. The four unions represent-
ing the workers filed grievances protesting the City's actions. The parties
arbitrated the disputes during the winter of 1992-93. Here is the last of the
four arbitration opinions that were rendered.
5. Ch. 74-100, §1, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.301 (1991)).
[Vol. 18
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
In the Matter of an Arbitration
- between -
CITY OF LAKE WORTH
- and -
* No. 32 300 00135 91
* Lieutenants - Failure to
* Pay Increases
PALM BEACH COUNTY POLICE *
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION *
* ** ** ** * * ** ** * * **** * ** ** * * *** ** * ***
ARBITRATOR'S OPINION AND AWARD
Alan Fallik
For the City
Mary Jill Hanson
For the Union
June 22, 1993 Roger I. Abrams
Arbitrator
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On October 28, 1991, the Palm Beach County Police Benevolent
Association (Lieutenants) filed a class grievance regarding the City of Lake
Worth's failure to pay wage increases in accordance with the Agreement.
On November 4, 1991, the Chief of Police denied the grievance because
Florida state law, section 447.309(2), "operates to make the collective
bargaining agreement subject to the approval, through the medium of
appropriations, of the City Commission." The Union processed the matter
to the Acting City Manager, who denied the grievance. The Union has now
brought the unresolved dispute to arbitration.
A hearing was held in Lake Worth, Florida, on April 29, 1993. During
the course of the hearing, both parties presented the Arbitrator with oral
testimony and documentary proof. A transcript was taken. Both parties
filed briefs with the Arbitrator. The American Arbitration Association
declared the hearing closed upon direction of the Arbitrator on June 11,
1993.
1. ISSUES
At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the following statement of the
issues to be resolved:
Did the City violate the Agreement when it failed to pay wage
increases due under Article 27 for fiscal year 91-92? If so, what
shall the remedy be?
II. PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND STATE LAW
ARTICLE 1: PREAMBLE
Section 2. The purpose of this Agreement is to promote and maintain
harmonious and cooperative relationships between the employer and
employees, both individually and collectively, and to provide an orderly and
peaceful means for resolving differences which arise concerning the
interpretation or application of this agreement, and to set forth herein the
agreement between the parties pertaining to wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment.
[Vol. 18
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ARTICLE 4: MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Section 3. If in the sole discretion of the Mayor or the Mayor's designee,
it is determined that civil emergency conditions exist, including but not
limited to riots, civil disorders, hurricane conditions, similar catastrophes, or
exigencies, the provisions of this agreement may be suspended by the Mayor
or the Mayor's designee during the time of the declared emergency,
provided that rates and monetary fringe benefits shall not be suspended.
ARTICLE 27: PAY PLAN
Section 1. This Article establishes the wage rates to be paid to unit
employees during the term of the Agreement. ...
Section 2. Effective October 1, 1991, all Lieutenants will receive an
increase of five percent (5%) over hourly rates in effect on September 30,
1991.
Section 3. Effective October 1, 1991, any Lieutenant whose performance
evaluation justifies it will receive a three percent (3%) merit increase.
ARTICLE 31: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
In a mutual effort to provide harmonious relations between the parties
of this Agreement, it is agreed and understood by both parties that there
shall be a procedure in this Department for the resolution of grievances or
misunderstandings between the parties arising from the application or
interpretation of this Agreement. ...
ARBITRATION REFERRAL
3. The arbitrator shall not have the power to add to, subtract from,
modify, or alter the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in arriving
at a decision on the issue or issues presented and shall confine his decision
solely to the interpretation and application of the agreement.
4. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the
aggrieved employee and the employer.
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ARTICLE 32: SEVERABILITY CLAUSE
Section 1. If any article or section of this agreement should be found
invalid, unlawful, or not enforceable, by reason of any existing or subse-
quently enacted Federal or State legislation or by judicial authority, all other
articles and sections of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect
for the duration of this Agreement.
Section 2. In the event of the invalidation of any article or section, both the
City and the PBA shall reconvene within sixty (60) days of such determina-
tion for the purpose of arriving at a mutually satisfactory replacement for
such article or section.
ARTICLE 33: SAVINGS CLAUSE
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the PBA and
the City .... This Agreement will not be interpreted so as to deprive any
employee of any benefits or protections granted by the laws of the State of
Florida, ordinances of the City of Lake Worth, or personnel rules and
regulations of the Lake Worth Civil Service Board.
FLORIDA STATE STATUTE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
447.309 Collective bargaining; approval or rejection.
(1) After an employee organization has been certified pursuant to the
provisions of this part, the bargaining agent for the organization and the
chief executive officer of the appropriate public employer or employers,
jointly, shall bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment of the public employees within the
bargaining unit. The chief executive officer or his representative and the
bargaining agent or its representative shall meet at reasonable times and
bargain in good faith. In conducting negotiations with the bargaining agent,
the chief executive officer or his representative shall consult with, and
attempt to represent the views of, the legislative body of the public
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employer. Any collective bargaining agreement reached by the negotiators
shall be reduced to writing, and such agreement shall be signed by the chief
executive officer and the bargaining agent. Any agreement signed by the
chief executive officer and the bargaining agent shall not be binding on the
public employer until such agreement has been ratified by the public
employer and by public employees who are members of the bargaining unit,
subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3). However, with respect
to statewide bargaining units, any agreement signed by the Governor and the
bargaining agent for such a unit shall not be binding until approved by the
public employees who are members of the bargaining unit, subject to the
provisions of subsections (2) and (3).
(2) Upon execution of the collective bargaining agreement, the chief
executive shall, in his annual budget request or by other appropriate means,
request the legislative body to appropriate such amounts as shall be
sufficient to fund the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. If
less than the requested amount is appropriated, the collective bargaining
agreement shall be administered by the chief executive officer on the basis
of the amounts appropriated by the legislative body. The failure of the
legislative body to appropriate funds sufficient to fund the collective
bargaining agreement shall not constitute, or be evidence of, any unfair
labor practice.
III. BACKGROUND FACTS
The Police Benevolent Association of Palm Beach County represents
a bargaining unit of six Lieutenants who work for the Police Department of
the City of Lake Worth.' In 1989, the parties agreed to a three-year col-
lective bargaining agreement, providing for a five (5%) percent across-the-
board annual increase and a three (3%) percent merit increase. The Union
had wanted a one-year contract, but the City insisted on a multi-year
agreement to achieve labor stability. The City Manager recommended City
Lieutenant Jack Elliott Garson, the Union's representative to the Palm
Beach County P.B.A., explained that the bargaining unit was established in
1988 after City Manager John Kelly told the Lieutenants that he "did not
negotiate pay with his employees," unless they joined a union. The
Lieutenants proceeded to do just that, form the small union that is party to
the present arbitration.
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Commission approval of the three-year contract for the Union police officers
in order to set "the necessary labor perimeters." The City Manager
explained that the three-year contract achieved the goal of "stabilizing the
floundering" labor relationship.
During the spring of 1991, the Union learned that the City was
preparing not to fund the third year of the negotiated wage increase for
Union members and for the other unionized City employees. City Manager
John Kelly sought to reopen the collective bargaining agreement with the
Lieutenants. Garson refused to do so. He and other union leaders later met
with Kelly. When Kelly said he would not recommend to the City that they
fund the pay raises, Garson said it was "kind of a shock to me."
The entire negotiated third year pay increase for the Lieutenants
bargaining unit totalled $21,000. Kelly said the choice was to renegotiate
or lay off employees, because the City had just purchased new police cars.
(Garson pointed out in his testimony that the wage increase for the
Lieutenants equaled the cost of just one of those cars). Garson wrote to
Kelly explaining why the Union would not reopen the Agreement. City
Manager Kelly responded that not giving the raises "is not a matter of
money." He needed to "have a tool to have the other unions give up their
pay raises."
Lieutenant Robert Walton, who had negotiated the first contract
between the Union and the City, testified concerning his dealings with the
City during 1991. Kelly told Walton the State Legislature gave him the
authority not to fund pay raises. Kelly offered options, such as reopening
the Agreement, waiving the pay increase for six months, or just trusting that
he would work things out. The Union was not receptive and felt intimidat-
ed. After consulting with attorneys and the PBA president, the Union
rejected the option of reopening. At one afterwork meeting at the Police
Department, Kelly told Walton: "If you guys leave the union, maybe we
can work something out."'
Former City Commissioner Michael Coonerty testified that in May
1991 John Kelly notified the Commissioners of a budget problem. Kelly
recommended that the Commission cut back some City services and that it
not fund the contractual wage increases for unionized employees. Coonerty
testified: "We knew we were in trouble." None of the Commissioners
suggested not funding the contractual wage increases. It was the City
Manager's idea. In an executive session, Kelly said: "There is a state law
2 Although the lieutenants did not abandon their Union, soon the City
abandoned John Kelly. He was fired in September 1991.
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that specifically states that we do not have to fund a contract if there is not
enough funds." The Commission acted based on Kelly's advice.
On cross-examination, Coonerty said he voted not to fund the increases
"in the best interest of the City." He acknowledged he did consider the
effect on collective bargaining: "I'm a politician after all!" He said this
was the hardest decision he ever had to make, and "I knew it was going to
hurt." He said that they had to look at the broader picture. They thought
the choice was either to fund the contracts or lay off employees. He knew
that the unions would never trust the City again and the union-management
relationship would never be the same. He acknowledged that the City
Commission could have raised taxes, but he felt that that was not in the best
interest of the citizens of the City. If taxes went up, he said, it "can hurt my
political career."
3
The record includes the prior testimony and reports of Union expert,
Dr. Marshall Barry.4 In sum, that information demonstrates that the City
had available other funding sources for the contractual wage increases.5
The record also contains minutes of various City Commission meetings.
After the Commission's action contested here, the City spent funds for
various purposes, including a ten percent (10%) salary increase to the Acting
City Manager. When the City Commission terminated City Manager John
Kelly, Walton expressed his disgust when he heard the Commissioners
decide to pay Kelly the severance pay required under his contract. One
Commissioner said: "After all, a contract is a contract." Walton could not
understand why that did not apply to the Union's contract.
Charles Z. Powers, the City's Finance Director, testified concerning the
budget process which led to the decision by the City Commission not to
fund the Contract increases. The Finance Department prepared work sheet
forms and the budget manual, then submitted proposed budgets to the City
Manager. A series of meetings were then held between the departments, the
City Manager, and the Finance Department. Finally, a tentative millage was
set by the end of July, workshops were held through August, public hearings
were held in September, and, after a final hearing, the City Commission set
Mr. Coonerty is no longer on the Lake Worth City Commission.
4 This is the fourth arbitration to raise that same issue. Prior cases
involved firefighters represented by the I.A.F.F., rank and file police
represented by the P.B.A., and utility workers represented by the I.B.E.W.
' It is the City's position, as shall be explained below, that the City
Commission had the power simply to decide not to fund the third year of
the contracts even if it had alternative funding sources.
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the millage and adopted the budget. The submitted budget included the
proposed increase based on the Union Agreement which was then deleted
by City Commission vote.
Powers explained that as early as December 1990 or January 1991
before the budget process began, the City Manager received advice from
City Attorney Alan Fallik that one option available to the City was not to
fund the Union Contract increases under state law. Mr. Power testified that
the City Manager was required to propose a budget that included the
Contract increases, but Kelly did not want his proposal accepted. The City
Manager explained to the Commission: "I had to fund those things. You
don't." The City Commission did not.
IV. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The Union's Argument
The City should be collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue
because two prior arbitration awards involving the City have covered this
precise matter. In any case, the City clearly breached the Agreement by
failing to pay the contractually agreed upon wage increase, and the
Arbitrator's inquiry should stop there. The Arbitrator should follow the
established arbitral practice and not examine external law.
Moreover, the contract itself shows that external law does not apply.
It provides that the contract is the "entire agreement," that the adoption of
the Agreement "resolves all open issues for the period of the Agreement,"
and that Management retains only such rights as are "not officially abridged,
delegated, or modified by this Agreement." The Arbitrator "should not start
up the slippery slope of consideration of the interpretation and applicability
of section 447.309(2)." (Union brief, p. 12).
Even applying the state statute does not help the City because the City
did not comply with the provision. In the very least, the City Manager must
make his initial budget submission in good faith. That clearly was not the
case here. Moreover, the statute talks only of unfair labor practice liability,
not contractual obligations. In any case, this was a multi-year contract that
the Commission had ratified and agreed to fund. If the statute did apply, it
would impair a contract in violation of both the State and Federal Constitu-
tions. The statute, as read by the City, would also violate a Florida
Constitution provision by abridging the right of public employees to bargain
collectively.
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"Clearly, what occurred here was the worst sort of political expedien-
cy." (Union brief, p. 24) There was no compelling governmental interest.
The City did not employ the least restrictive means to accomplish its goal.
The City disturbed "the delicate balance" that is the public policy in Florida.
Therefore, the grievance must be granted. The Arbitrator should award back
pay with interest.
B. The City's Argument
The City relies totally on Florida law which it argues supports its
failure to pay the wage increase. Section 447.309(2) gives the City the
"option of underfunding" the agreement. Court decisions plainly support
this analysis, including the most recent supreme court decisions and a
Second District Court of Appeal decision in Sarasota County School
District. In that latter case, the District Court said that "[u]nfortunately" for
public employees, the school board had the right not to fund the contract.
As a practical matter, unfair labor practice case law must apply in grievance
arbitrations or the state statute would be rendered a nullity.
The constitutional right to bargain must be balanced with the constitu-
tional obligation of municipal bodies to act as guardians of the public funds.
The City Commission here acted in two separate steps -- ratification and
appropriation. Although it ratified the three-year agreement, it had the right
not to appropriate the funds. "In summary, there is no logical basis and no
legal authority to support an argument that the powers of a municipal
legislative body regarding appropriations are more limited than those of the
state legislature, even though the municipal legislative body is the same
body that ratified the agreement." (City brief, p. 11). The supreme court's
most recent decision does not require a contrary result. There was no
impairment of contract here because state laws are a part of every Florida
contract.
The Arbitrator must apply external law, as is the rule. The parties'
Agreement points to the use of external law. In any case, the parties need
not agree in writing to incorporate external law because they know that the
law is automatically a part of every contract. The Contract allows an
arbitrator to find a provision invalid using external law. "To the extent the
City Commission underfunded Article 27, Pay Plan, that article became
invalid" under the law. (City brief, pp. 18-19).
The three prior arbitration awards involving the City and one involving
a nearby municipality were wrong. They ignored the fact that law is part
of every contract. It is "most unfortunate that arbitrators see fit to deprive
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public employers of fundamental rights of government and to grant public
employees the unconditional right to receive funding in direct violation of
law." (City brief, p. 22). This Arbitrator wrongly stated in his earlier
decision that the City claims it had the right only to breach union contracts
but must fulfill all other contracts with vendors. In fact, the City has the
right not to fulfill any contract it wants. This Arbitrator questioned the
good faith of City Manager Kelly. The statute does not require the City
Manager to have acted in good faith. For all these reasons, the Arbitrator
should deny the grievance.
V. DISCUSSION AND OPINION
A. Introduction
The City Commission of the City of Lake Worth, Florida, made a
decision during 1991 not to appropriate the funds needed to meet its
contract obligations with its unions, including the small P.B.A. Lieutenants
Union. The increases were mandated under the respective binding and
enforceable collective bargaining agreements. Three arbitrators, including
the undersigned, have previously ruled on grievances protesting the City's
action. This case completes the quartet. In the prior cases, the arbitrators
ruled the City violated its contracts. As shall be explained below, the City's
action here violated its Agreement as well.
In its brief, the Union argues that the Arbitrator must follow the earlier
arbitration opinions and that the City is "collaterally estopped" from
rearguing the issues. Arbitrators Brown, Hoffman and this Arbitrator have
resolved disputes between the same employer and different unions.6 Those
opinions are of great assistance in resolving this dispute, but they are not
controlling unless the parties' Agreement makes them so.
The resolution of the merits of this dispute does parallel this Arbi-
trator's analysis in the I.B.E.W. case. Much of the reasoning and some of
the language used in that opinion is usefully applied here. The City makes
many of the same arguments. It makes no pretense about its contractual
6 Arbitrator Susan Brown's decision involving rank and file police
officers was based on a collective bargaining agreement that contained many
of the same provisions as this contract.
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obligations. It again claims that under state law it was not required to live
up to its Agreement.7
The Arbitrator wrote in the I.B.E.W. case that the City was claiming
that it must fulfill every contract it has with every vendor, except one -- the
contract with unionized employees who sell their labor to the City.
Apparently, the Arbitrator was wrong. The City now retorts in its brief with
one of the most breathtaking arguments ever made to this Arbitrator. The
City claims that under the Florida Constitution it has the right not to honor
any and all contracts it has executed simply by not appropriating the
required funds, including, presumably, those contracts that have been
partially performed, such as the present Agreement.8 That would make
doing business with a governmental entity a matter of roulette. Will it pay?
Will it not? It depends on how its feels at the moment. That cannot
possibly be the way the business of government is to be conducted in the
State of Florida.9 The Florida Constitution does not allow a municipality
to create a "shell game" when dealing with its vendors."°
' In the I.B.E.W. case, the Arbitrator termed that "a remarkable claim,"
and the City criticizes the use of the adjective in its current brief. It remains
a "remarkable claim," however, to suggest that every contract promise with
financial implications -- virtually every provision in the collective bargaining
agreement -- is voidable at will by the public employer without the need to
demonstrate a compelling reason.
8 In fact, former City Commissioner Michael Coonerty who was on the
Commission during 1991 stated that this was the only contract that the City
had not fulfilled. The City lives up to its obligations, except when it comes
to its unionized employees.
' If that were the case, every vendor would add a premium on to the
cost of its product or service as insurance against non-payment by a
government purchaser.
" Article VII, section 1(c) of the Florida Constitution, which provides
that no money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of
appropriation made by law, requires a municipality to conduct local
government in a responsible manner. The money in the public treasury does
not belong to the City Manager or the City Commissioners; it belongs to the
City and the people of Lake Worth. It is to be used to provide the goods
and services the people of Lake Worth need, including police, fire and
utility services. The Florida Constitution does not allow a municipality to
get something for free by not paying for what it buys. It does not allow a
municipality to agree to purchase a commodity for a certain price and then
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There are also some unique facts in this case that require a slightly
different analysis and at least one new court decision that must be addressed.
Here the uncontradicted evidence shows that the City Manager requested a
reopening of the Agreement. He wanted to renegotiate the third year wage
increase. The City Manager's request to renegotiate shows the City knew
that the Contract must stand unless mutually amended. Otherwise, why
would he bother to request further negotiations? If the City really believed
it had the right under Florida law to ignore agreements with impunity, a
reopening would not have been necessary.
B. Analysis of External Law
The City says the Arbitrator must apply external law and the Union
insists to the contrary. That disagreement threads through this series of
disputes between the City and its unions. Each arbitrator has determined
that external law does not apply. Everyone agrees that an arbitrator's job
is to resolve grievances in accordance with the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.
The Agreement here provides: "The arbitrator shall not have the power
to add to, subtract from, modify, or alter the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement in arriving at a decision on the issue or issues
presented and shall confine his decision solely to the interpretation and
application of the agreement." (emphasis added). The direction to the
arbitrator is clear: Look "solely" at the terms of the Agreement.
There really can be no question that the Agreement required the City
to pay wage increases and merit increases during its third year. The City
admits as much. For good reason or bad reason or for no reason at all, the
City Commission decided not to live up to those promises. There was
evidence in the record from the Union expert's testimony in other proceed-
ings that the increases could have been funded through a variety of sources
without affecting services at all. The City says that is all beside the point.
It could decide it did not want to pay what it promised it would pay. The
City does not claim that the external law allows it to nullify contract clauses
pay less than the agreed price. Article VII, section l(c) requires that the
formalities of government be followed so that the business of government
might proceed in an orderly manner. It is not an excuse for nonpayment or
underpayment.
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only for good reasons. Its argument is broader than that. The City says it
can decide not to fulfill its financial obligations for any reason at any time.
The basis for the City's claim is Florida Statutes section 447.309(2),
quoted above, which addresses collective bargaining in the public sector.
As applied to a municipality such as the City of Lake Worth, section
447.309(2) would require the City Manager to request that the City
Commission appropriate money to fund the provisions of the Agreement.
(The evidence shows that the City Manager John Kelly did that, although
he hoped the City Commission would not follow his request and worked to
make sure it would not.) The statute then says "if less than the requested
amount is appropriated, the collective bargaining agreement shall be
administered by the [City Manager] on the basis of the amounts appropriated
by the legislative body." Did the Florida Legislature intend to allow
municipalities, such as Lake Worth, to jettison their contract promises?
The City relies on three court decisions that apply the provision. In
United Faculty of Florida v. Board of Regents, 365 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the First District Court of Appeal denied a union
request for full funding of its contract with the Board when the State
Legislature only partially funded it. In State v. P.B.A., 613 So. 2d 415 (Fla.
1992), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that public employees do not have
the right to demand that the State Legislature appropriate funds under a
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the Governor. Most recently,
in Sarasota County School Board v. Sarasota Classified Teachers Ass'n, 614
So. 2d 114.3 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the Second District Court of
Appeals reversed a PERC decision, ruling that a school board did not
commit an unfair labor practice when it failed to appropriate funds needed
to cover step increases for teachers after the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement."
In its brief, the City attempts to explain away the most recent Florida
Supreme Court decision involving legislative underfunding of a collective
bargaining agreement. In Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida, 615 So. 2d
" It might be argued that two of these state cases arise under a very
different bargaining relationship. In the First District Court of Appeal's
United Faculty of Florida case and the Florida Supreme Court's P.B.A. case,
the Board of Regents and the Governor had negotiated the contracts. The
only opportunity the State Legislature had to approve or disapprove the
agreements was through the appropriation process. Here, by comparison,
the Lake Worth City Commission had ratified the Agreement, then two
years later reneged on its promise.
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671 (Fla. 1993), Justice Gerald Kogan addressed "a matter of great public
importance." The State Legislature had resolved a bargaining impasse by
authorizing a three (3%) percent raise for various classes of public
employees. Because of a projected budget shortfall, it then postponed and
finally eliminated the planned pay raises. The unions representing the
affected employees sued based on the constitutional protection of the right
to bargain collectively contained in the Florida Constitution. The court
distinguished the P.B.A. case, decided less than three months earlier, based
on the fact that here "an agreement was reached and funded, then unilateral-
ly modified by the legislature, and finally unilaterally abrogated by the
legislature." The court rejected the State's argument that public employee
bargaining agreements cannot ever constitute fully binding contracts: "The
right to contract is one of the most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by our
fundamental law." In dictum, the court said that the Legislature does have
the right "to reduce previously approved appropriations to pay public
workers' salaries made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, but
only where it can demonstrate a compelling state interest .... Before that
authority can be exercised, however, the legislature must demonstrate that
[there are] no other reasonable alternative means of preserving its contract
with public workers, either in whole or in part." The court suggested that
if the employer could void a promise at will "we necessarily would be
required to conclude that there was no contract here at all for lack of
mutuality. " The court ordered the Legislature to implement the pay
raise.
The City argues that in the Chiles case appropriations were actually
made for the raises in question, then postponed, while here the City
Commission refused to make the appropriations required in the third year
of the Agreement. That ignores the fact that the.City Commission here had
ratified the three-year agreement as a whole. The City and the Union then
performed under that three-year Agreement (not a series of one-year
agreements) for two full years before the City reneged on its promise. The
City actually received a substantial part of its bargain, the extended stability
in labor relations that the City Manager used as the rationale for the three-
year contract demand.
As the most recent word from the supreme court, Chiles stands
generally for the proposition that promises made by a legislative body are
enforceable. As applied here, that means that once the City Commission
ratified the three-year Agreement and enjoyed the benefits of that Agree-
ment, it was bound to fulfill its obligations. As the supreme court said in
Chiles: "The right to contract is one of the most sacrosanct rights guaran-
teed by our fundamental law." The City cannot take advantage of that right
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when it suits its purpose, and then vitiate that right without compelling
reason when its decides it no longer wants to keep its word.
The recent Sarasota case relied upon by the City involved a school
board, not a state instrumentality. It warrants closer attention. In that case,
the collective bargaining agreement between the school board and the
teachers union expired. The consistent prior practice had been for the
school board to continue to pay step increases while new contracts were
negotiated. This time, as a result of an extreme financial emergency, the
school board did not do so. PERC found this an unfair labor practice, but
the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 407.309-
(2) applied after the expiration of an agreement.
The Sarasota case involved unfair labor practice liability, not liability
under a contract. There, the legislative body had never promised to pay the
step increases after the expiration of the agreement. By comparison, the
City of Lake Worth's "legislative body" had promised pay increases. 3
There is language in Sarasota that suggests that public sector collective
bargaining agreements are not as good as private sector contracts, and that
public employees "unfortunately" are disfavored. This language sounds like
the old, discredited cases that talked about public employment as a
"privilege," revocable at will without due process, opinions that long
preceded Florida's Constitutional amendment protecting public employee
collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining in the public sector is certainly more complicated
than its private sector counterpart. In many instances, public sector
contracts are negotiated by the executive branch and later approved (or not
approved) by the legislative branch. As co-equal branches, each should
have its say. Once a contract is fully approved, as was the case here by the
City Commission, the contract should be enforceable by its terms in
arbitration.
2 We should remember that the City of Lake Worth does not claim a
financial basis for its failure to pay the agreed raises.
"3 The Second D.C.A. states that the school board had promised
payment during the term of the agreement, and it would have been required
to fulfill its undertaking: "Since the agreements were fully funded during
the three year period, barring any exceptional circumstances such as exigent
circumstances or waiver, an unfair labor practice would have been
committed if the school board had unilaterally discontinued step increases."
614 So. 2d at 1143.
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The Union argues that the City cannot rely upon section 447.309(2)
even if it did apply because it must be read to require the City Manager to
submit an adequate budget in good faith. The Union argues that City
Manager Kelly did not act in good faith and there is evidence in the record
to support that claim. Unlike the record in the I.B.E.W. case, here we have
the direct testimony of a former City Commissioner that City Manager Kelly
in fact recommended that the Commission not fund the contractual wage
increases. In executive session, Kelly said: "There is a state law that
specifically states that we do not have to fund a contract if there is not
enough funds." The Commission acted based on Kelly's advice.
There are no court decisions that speak directly to the issue of whether
the City Manager must subjectively want and hope that the City Commission
approves his proposed budget in order for a public entity to avoid unfair
labor practice liability under section 407.309(2). Here the evidence points
beyond subjective intent, however. The uncontradicted evidence shows that
the City Manager worked actively to nullify the budget he had submitted.
That may be significant under section 447.309(2) because it raises questions
concerning whether the Employer fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good
faith.
None of the opinions addressing on section 447.309(2) offer a
definitive reading of the legislative intent, in particular with regard to
contract liability as determined in arbitration. The last sentence in the
section 447.309(2) paragraph does clarify the purpose of the provision,
however. The statute says that the failure of the legislative body to
appropriate sufficient funds "shall not constitute, or be evidence of, any
unfair labor practice." The provision appears to have been designed to keep
the State Public Relations Commission out of the business of second
guessing the legislative judgments of local municipalities. 4 It does not
14 The unfair labor practice cases cited by the City demonstrate this
legislative judgment at work. In Martin County Educ. Ass'n v. School
Board, 18 FPER para. 23167 (PERC 1992), for example, the agency that
administers the statute stated that the "legislative body [has] unfettered
discretion to underfund a collective bargaining agreement." (at 290). This
is the case, however, only with regard to disputes within PERC's iurisdic-
tion, that is, unfair labor practice cases. PERC is not charged with the
responsibility of interpreting the parties' Agreement. Its expansive dictum
cannot bind an arbitrator who does have that responsibility. It is important
to focus carefully on the jobs of the respective adjudicators.
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free the City from its contract obligations that might be perfected in another
forum, such as arbitration.
The City argues that section 447.309(2) cannot be limited to unfair
labor practice cases because otherwise it would be a nullity. If an employer
is still bound by its promises, the City says, what good is it to relieve it
from ULP liability? The argument ignores issues of institutional compe-
tence, allocation of decisional power, and the intent of the negotiating
parties. The Legislature might have wanted to keep PERC out of intra-
governmental funding disputes. It might have thought that arbitrators were
better able to resolve these types of disputes. It might have allowed the
parties' intentions to control with regard to the appropriate forum for
resolution. In any case, the Section talks about unfair labor practice
liability. That was the Legislature's plain intention, even if it did not totally
free municipalities from fulfilling their promises.
As the Arbitrator stated in the I.B.E.W. case, reading section 447.309-
(2) as the City suggests would make collective bargaining a cruel joke. The
heart of negotiations is the wage promise. The City pressed the Union for
a three-year contract. The Union wanted a one-year deal, but finally agreed
to the City's demand. The length of the contract is also a crucial element
in bargaining. The two provisions -- wage increases and length of the
contract -- are interrelated. A three-year contract may provide the labor
stability management seeks, but it creates risks for a union. It is "betting"
that inflation will not render the negotiated wage increase a mirage, 5 With
a one-year agreement, the union can attempt to recalibrate the wage scale
annually. When the Union here agreed to the City's demand for a three-
year agreement, it had good reason to trust that the quid pro quo would
follow, the payment of the negotiated wage increase over the three
years. 16
If one party to the Agreement can ignore its promises for any reason
or no reason at all, was there ever any real collective bargaining? We must
remember that public employees enjoy the protection of a Florida Constitu-
'" Of course, under any contract a union must contend with unforeseen
emergency situations. Financial distress might well be an excusing
circumstance, but the City claims nothing of the sort here.
16 The City suggests that, in fact, because the City decides to fund
contracts on an annual basis, that the three-year agreement is really a
collection of three one-year contracts. (City brief, p. 27). If that is so, then
why did it insist on a single three-year contract in its negotiations with the
Union? Why then did it ratify a three-year agreement?
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tional provision, article I, section 6; which expressly supports collective
bargaining. Section 447.309(2) should not be read in a way that would
render it subject to constitutional question. The Legislature should be
presumed to have enacted a constitutional statute. There is no evidence in
the record or in any available research that demonstrates that it was the State
Legislature's intention to permit Constitutionally-protected collective
bargaining to be destroyed by legislative bodies at the local level.
17
C. Applicability of External Law
Although the external law on its face and as interpreted by the courts
does not excuse the City's action, in order to resolve this dispute the
Arbitrator need not look to external law. Nothing in the parties' Agreement
requires the contract arbitrator to read, interpret and apply enacted legisla-
tion. The City argues that all state laws are part of the Agreement. Where
does it say that in the Agreement? The City points to Article 4 that protects
management rights. If the decision to underfund is an inherent management
right, then the City does not need external law. It would have this right by
contract. Obviously, this is not an inherent management function. Other-
wise, the wage promise would be a sham. That could not have been what
the parties intended.
The City also argues that the Agreement "specifically recognizes the
possibility that portions of the agreement may be found invalid by reason
of State law." (City brief, p. 1) The reference is to Article 32, section 1,
that provides:
If any article or section of this agreement should be found invalid,
unlawful, or not enforceable, by reason of any existing or
subsequently enacted Federal or State legislation or by judicial
" The City's argument concerning the effect of section 447.309(2) is
brought to the extreme towards the end of its brief when it argues that not
only does this provision override the constitutional right of public employees
to bargain collectively, but the City doubts that it could even waive the
"right to underfund" if it wanted to. (City brief, p. 26). That means that the
parties to a public sector labor relationship in Florida cannot reach a binding
agreement. Even if the public employer expressly agrees not to nullify the
terms of an agreement, it is incapable of keeping that promise. According
to the City's argument, there can be no real public sector collective
bargaining in Florida.
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authority, all other articles and sections of this Agreement shall
remain in full force and effect for the duration of this Agreement.
This typical savings clause is a "shield" and not a "sword," although the City
tries to use it offensively. It allows the parties to protect the integrity of
their agreement were some entity to find a provision invalid. No provision
of the Agreement is invalid, unlawful, or unenforceable, however.
The City does not claim the wage provision, standing alone, is illegal
or invalid. After all, it paid raises under the provision for two years! The
City's claim is that it has the unrestricted right to nullify the wage provision
and that makes the provision invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable. That has
nothing to do with the purpose of the savings clause, which does not really
help the City's case. The City's argument is simply a brazen claim to
unfettered, unilateral power.
A careful reading of the Agreement demonstrates that the parties did
not intend to incorporate external law. The parties expressly provided in
Article 4, section 3, that in case of civil emergency the Mayor may suspend
the provisions of the Agreement "provided that rates and monetary fringe
benefits shall not be suspended." This is the clearest evidence that the
parties intended that employees would be paid in accordance with the terms
of the Agreement throughout the term of the Agreement. Even in the case
of a civil emergency, "rates shall not be suspended." This must mean that
the City cannot suspend wage increases when there is no civil emergency."s
Reviewing the parties' Agreement, we can see that they knew how to
cite and refer to enacted legislation and external law. Article 5 requires the
City to comply with the Police Officer's Bill of Rights, "Section 112.531 et.
" The City argues that this provision is inapplicable because the right
to ignore certain provisions in a civil emergency is lodged in the Mayor or
Mayor's designee and the "right to underfund is a right of the legislative
body." (City brief, p. 25). That misses the point. The Agreement, which
binds the Mayor, the City Manager and the City Commission, as well as the
Union and its members, states that even in the most extraordinary domestic
crises, the wage clause cannot be suspended. How then could the City
Commission, which never has the power to suspend any provision of the
Agreement, nullify the wage provision, when it does not even claim there
is a crisis? And why would the parties even put in a provision regarding
suspension of contractual provisions if the City had the inherent right to
suspend any money-related provision in any case based on section
447.309(2)?
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seq., Florida Statutes." Article 20 provides that the City must pay
employees who are required to attend conferences "as provided in Section
112.061, Florida Statutes." Article 25 defines "the course of employment
as provided by section 440.091, Florida Statutes (1987)" as the standard for
payment of workers compensation. Article 35 prohibits participation in a
strike and then states that the parties "agree to comply with the provisions
of Florida Statutes 447.505 and Florida Statutes 447.507."
Obviously, these particular bits and pieces of external law are used in
the parties' Agreement. Nowhere does the Agreement talk about the general
use of external law, except in the savings clause, Article 33, where we are
told that employee "benefits or protections granted by the laws of the State
of Florida" are not to be deprived by any interpretations of the Agreement.
The City's claimed option to negate the wage promise, of course, does not
appear in the Agreement. Section 407.309(2) is not mentioned. It is
appropriate to apply the interpretive .maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.'9 Article
33 provides that the terms of the Agreement "constitute the entire agree-
ment." The entire agreement does not include an option to negate the wage
promise.
D. The Contract
The Agreement requires the payment of wages at certain rates.
Nothing in the Agreement excuses that payment.2" As a legislative body,
the City Commission approved the collective bargaining agreement. That
action contemplated three years of wage and merit increases. The City has
not offered any reason that would justify underfunding because of a
financial emergency situation, and the Arbitrator need not address such
hypothetical circumstances. The Agreement is plain on its face. The wage
increases should have been paid.
'9 The parties "expressed" many statutory provisions. They should be
held to have intended to exclude the operation of those not expressed,
especially when their application could render the entire wage promise a
nullity.
20 Article 34 does allow for reopening of the agreement "[s]hould the
people of the State of Florida approve a Constitutional Amendment which
reduces the funding of local governments." That did not happen here.
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Other arbitrators have reached the same result. No arbitrators have
allowed employers to nullify their agreements. Arbitrator Charles Frost in
City of Deerfield Beach, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1189 (1992), rejected
any consideration of external law when that South Florida municipality
reneged on its contract promise. As might be imagined, the City of Lake
Worth argues that Frost was wrong. Frost appropriately focuses on the
parties' contract, the source of his power, and finds a clear violation.
Similarly, the three arbitration decisions involving the City of Lake Worth
have found violations. In the January 6, 1993, unreported decision
involving the City and the Palm Beach County P.B.A., Arbitrator Susan
Brown rejected the City's reliance on external law, reciting the agreement's
zipper and entire agreement clauses, the grievance definition, the limitation
on the arbitrator's power, and other provisions. This Arbitrator, in an
unreported decision involving the City and the I.B.E.W. on April 30, 1993,
found a contract violation for many of the same reasons explained in this
decision. Finally, Arbitrator Robert B. Hoffman in a May 7, 1993,
unreported decision involving the City and the I.A.F.F., relied on the
supreme court's Chiles opinion, rejected the City's reliance on a claimed
right to underfund based on the management rights clause, and noted the
importance of the zipper clause. He too found a contract violation in the
failure to pay the wage increases.
The City argues that it is "most unfortunate that arbitrators see fit to
deprive public employers of fundamental rights of government and to grant
public employees the unconditional right to receive funding in direct
violation of law." The arbitrators do not "deprive" parties of rights or
"grant" parties rights. They read, interpret and apply contracts. It is "most
unfortunate" that the City does not appreciate the binding nature of its
obligations.
E. Final and Binding Decision
Although the citizens may be the ultimate judge of the actions of their
elected officials, the parties have provided for a private, self-contained, and
final-and-binding system for resolving disputes concerning alleged violations
of their Agreement through arbitration. The Arbitrator's power is to enforce
the Agreement, a binding pact between the City and the Union. The
Arbitrator's power comes from the Contract and the power of his decisions
depends upon fidelity to the terms of the Agreement.
One would have hoped now that the City has arbitrated and lost four
virtually identical cases that it would turn its course of action towards
1994]
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rebuilding its relationship with its employees and their unions. Regretfully,
it is likely to continue to fight this battle in court. It persists in the belief
that its word is good for as long as it wants to keep it and no longer.
The court's scope of review of an arbitrator's decision is very limited.
See, e.g., City of Miami v. Aparicio, 503 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987). As the Florida Supreme Court emphasized in Schnurmaching
Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 1989), there is a need
to "preserve the integrity of the arbitration process."'2 A court is in the
business of enforcing promises, not allowing parties to break them.
Courts will not allow public employers to destroy the constitutionally-
based right to bargain with broad claims of inherent governmental power.
"The right to bargain collectively is a fundamental right and as such, it is
subject to official abridgement only upon a showing of a compelling state
interest." School Board of Seminole County v. Morgan, 582 So. 2d 787,
788, n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (enforcing arbitration award).
In this situation, the parties sought a decision by an arbitrator about
their contract responsibilities. That is what they received. They agreed that
this decision would be final and binding. No court should disturb that
decision because, after all, it was the parties' bargain. Otherwise, all
promises are worthless and society loses the glue of trustworthiness that
holds it together.
The City of Lake Worth will undoubtedly reargue in court the same
points it has made here regarding section 407.309(2). The unions will
respond, explaining that it was not the intent of the State Legislature in
providing legislation to foster collective bargaining to allow the public
employer to renege on its promises more than halfway through a contract
term. The statute must be read in a manner consistent with Florida's
constitutional protection of the right of public employees to bargain
collectively.
The term "to bargain collectively" has a well understood meaning. It
means to give-and-take across the negotiation table, reach agreement (if you
can), and then keep your promises. To read section 407.309(2) to allow the
public employer to escape from its promises in the absence of the most
compelling circumstances would make a mockery of collective bargaining.
As Lewis Carroll wrote in Alice in Wonderland: "Everything's got a moral,
21 The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently relied upon and quoted at
length from this opinion in a public sector labor case, enforcing an
arbitrator's award. City of Mount Dora v. Central Florida P.B.A., 600 So.
2d 520 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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if you can only find it." Here the moral is: "When you make a deal, you
live by it."
The Agreement controls, and it was violated here.
VI. AWARD
The City violated the Agreement when it failed to pay wage increases
due under Article 27 for fiscal year 91-92. By way of remedy, the
employees should be made whole with all legal interest paid.
Roger I. Abrams
Arbitrator
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
June 22, 1993
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I. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT DISCOVERS
THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Twenty-five years after the adoption of the modem Florida Constitu-
tion,' the Florida Supreme Court recognizes the state constitution as a
primary protection of individual rights for people in Florida. In 1989, the
Florida Supreme Court recognized that the state constitution should be
utilized first in an analysis involving assertions about violations of basic
individual rights.' The court prioritized the Florida Constitution over the
United States Constitution.3 First, attomeys and the Florida courts should
look to the Florida Constitution to protect individual rights, and only if the
state constitution fails to protect individual rights should attomeys and the
Florida courts apply the Federal Constitution to the issues involved in any
case.
The Florida Supreme Court joins courts in other states that utilize their
state constitutions as primary protection of individual rights including
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, B.A. Haverford
College, J.D. Boston College Law School.
1. The modem Florida Constitution is the result of major revisions to the 1885
Constitution approved by the Florida electorate in 1968.
2. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d. 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989).
3. Id.
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Oregon,4 New Hampshire,5 New Jersey,6 Washington,7 Texas,8 Michi-
gan, 9 and Vermont."
The Florida Supreme Court signaled strongly that Florida constitutional
practice should reflect the primacy model of constitutional application in
which the state constitution is relied upon first to resolve individual rights
problems." Under the primacy model, state courts avoid utilizing the
Federal Constitution until the state constitution fails to protect an activity
protected by the Federal Constitution.12 State courts that utilize a primacy
approach wean themselves away from relying on the Federal Constitution
as the basic protector of individual rights, thereby avoiding the relegation
of state constitutions to the level of protecting rights only when the Federal
Constitution fails to do so."
The Florida Supreme Court has just begun the process of converting
the Florida Constitution into the primary protection of individual rights. In
1989 and 1990 the court recognized the primary strength and application of
the Florida Constitution, but the court never developed a primacy model in
4. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Or. 1983).
5. See New Hampshire v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (N.H. 1983).
6. See New Jersey v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 953 (N.J. 1982).
7. See Washington v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986); Washington v.
Langland, 711 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
8. See Heitman v. Texas, 815 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
9. See Michigan v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1992).
10. See Vermont v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 1985).
11. See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State 's Bills ofRights, 9
U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 383 (1980); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1985).
12. See Robert F. Utter and Sanford E. Pitler, Presentinga State ConstitutionalLaw
Argument: Commenton Theory and Technique,20 IND. L. REV. 635,647-48 (1987); Charles
G. Douglas, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV. 127, 140-42 (1988); Ronald
K. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of
State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 333-39 (1986);
Stephen F. Aton, State ConstitutionsRealigning Federalism: A Special Look at Florida, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 733, 768-73 (1987).
13. David J. Fine, Project Report: Toward An Activist Role for State Bills of Rights,
8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 286-90 (1973); Wallace P. Carson, "Last Things Last: "A
AethodologicalApproach to Legal Arguments in State Courts, 19 WlLLAMETrE L. REV. 641,
650-52 (1983); Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State
Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 435-37 (1988); Ronald K. Collins,
Reliance On State Constitutions-Awayfrom a ReactionaryApproach, 9 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1, 14-15 (1981); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 500-02 (1977).
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a meaningful fashion. 4 In 1992, the court finally faced the task of
developing the intricacies of a primacy model,' 5 but the court subsequently
failed to apply its own interpretive methodology forcefully, 6
II. PRIVACY AND THE INITIATION OF PRIMACY
Abortion and death provided the Florida Supreme Court with
opportunities to recognize the primacy application of article I of the Florida
Constitution. In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court in In re T. W 7 recog-
nized the right of a female minor to obtain an abortion without the consent
of the minor's parent. The T. W court struck down a Florida statute that
required minors to obtain parental consent for an abortion, 8 finding that
the statute violated the Florida constitutional privacy provision.19 A year
later, the Florida Supreme Court held in In re Browning that a surrogate for
an incompetent patient suffering from an incurable terminal disease could
order life-prolonging medical procedures withheld from the patient.2" The
surrogate attempted to follow a written directive from the patient requesting
discontinuation of nutrition and hydration provided by medical technological
means.2 The court allowed surrogates for incompetent, terminal patients
to discontinue life prolonging procedures when the patient expressed orally
or by a written directive her or his will to die.22 The Florida Supreme
Court based its decision on the Florida constitutional right to privacy,23 just
as it had done the previous year in T. W
The T. W court adopted a primacy approach for the application of the
Florida Constitution by utilizing a two-step analysis for cases involving a
constitutional issue.24 First, the court examined the parental consent statute
14. See discussion infra part II.
15. See discussion infra part III.
16. See discussion infra part IV.
17. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1988).
19. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23(1980)). Article I,
section 23 provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
government intrusion into his private life except as provided herein." FLA. CONST. art. I, §
23 (1980).
20. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id. at 10; see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190.
24. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190.
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in the context of the Florida Constitution.25 If the court had found that the
Florida Constitution faile to protect a minor's fight to choose an abortion
without parental consent, the court would have moved to the second level
of the analysis and applied the Federal Constitution.26 The Browning
opinion followed the lead of the T. W opinion. Although the T W court
explicitly described a primacy approach composed of a two-step, state first,
federal second, constitutional analysis, the Browning court only implicitly
utilized a primacy approach by focusing solely on the state constitutional
fight to privacy as a source of rights protective law. 8
While T. W and Browning utilized the Florida Constitution as the
primary basis for individual rights analysis and protection, neither case
provided any depth into the primacy approach for applying the Florida
Constitution. At best, both cases merely mouthed or pretended a primacy
approach, creating a veneer of importance for the Florida Constitution.
Neither case truly relied on a Florida-based legal analysis. Although T. W
explicitly stated that the parental consent statute would be examined first by
the court under the Florida Constitution, the court actually based its analysis
on an amalgam of federal constitutional legal doctrine and the national
privacy policy.29 The heart of the T. W analysis relied on Roe v. Wade.3"
When the T W court defined the scope of the fight to choose an abortion in
Florida, the court utilized the trimester system developed in Roe.31
In the first pages of the T W opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
outlined the history of federal abortion law relating to minors, describing the
elements of the trimester system.32 When the court finally defined the
scope of Florida law, the court copied the basics of the Roe approach
finding that until the end of the first trimester, women in Florida remain free
to decide whether to abort a fetus free of state restriction.33 After the end
of the first trimester, the State of Florida may impose regulations safeguard-
ing the health of the mother.34 However, when the fetus becomes viable,
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1190, 1196.
27. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
28. Id.
29. See Daniel R. Gordon, One Privacy Provision, Two Privacy Protection: The Right
to Privacy In Florida After Roe v. Wade, 5 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 111-20 (1990).
30. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
32. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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the state may restrict all abortions to protect potential life.35 The Florida
Supreme Court differed with the Roe court on a definition of viability. The
Florida Supreme Court viewed the Roe court as defining viability as the
time at which the fetus becomes capable of meaningful life with artificial
medical aid.36 The T W. court proceeded to define viability as meaningful
life outside the womb through standard medical measures.37 The court
never explained the difference between artificial aid to a fetus and standard
medical procedures for a fetus.38 The court's utilization of Roe to define
abortion rights in Florida occurred in the context of a discussion about
general privacy policy.
The T' W. court set the stage for defining Florida abortion law by
reviewing general privacy policy. Instead of focusing on the importance of
privacy to Floridians and state policy, the T. W court meshed Florida
constitutional doctrine with national privacy norms. The court viewed the
concept of privacy as deeply rooted in the nation's political system and
heritage,39 relying on Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United
States4" to emphasize the importance of the right to be let alone." The
Florida court observed that a wide scope of federal privacy protection
shields individual autonomy in personal decisions involving marriage,
procreation., contraception, family relations, child rearing and education.42
The T W. court defined the Florida constitutional privacy law43 by quoting
from Professor Larry Tribe's works on national constitutional policy44 and
federal abortion cases such as Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists.4"
The Browning opinion paralleled the T W. opinion. The court in
Browning also asserted that the Florida Constitution provides the basic
individual rights for people within the state.46 The court relied heavily on
the Florida constitutional privacy provision as the primary source of legal
35. Id. at 1193.
36. Id.
37. In re 7.W., 551 So. 2d at 1194.
38. See id,
39. Id. at 1191.
40. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See generally LAWRENCE L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
45. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
46. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
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authority for its decision.." At the same time, the Browning court recog-
nized little Florida public policy reflected in Florida constitutional privacy
law.18 Unlike T. W, Browning failed to rely heavily on federal constitu-
tional law and vague national privacy philosophy referring sparingly to some
federal constitutional law such as Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health.49 Some of Browning's procedural requirements for determining
when a surrogate may order the end of life prolonging treatment paralleled
aspects of Cruzan, such as the requirement of clear and convincing evidence
of a patient's wishes.5"
The Browning court, for the most part, avoided relying heavily on
Cruzan or any other federal constitutional law. Instead, the Browning court
utilized a universal or global analysis to determine the privacy rights of
terminally ill patients. This global or universal analysis was intended to
support the application of a state constitutional privacy provision, but more
closely resembled a generalized common law analysis which reviewed a
variety of cases across a spectrum of jurisdictions in order to synthesize a
transcendent set of principles."
The Browning court utilized cases from New York,52 California,53
and a number of other states54 to develop a general theory of Florida
constitutional law. The Browning court even bolstered its common law style
analysis by referring to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.55 Florida
cases were utilized but only in tandem with case law from other states56 or
after the court laid a general policy foundation involving case law from
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
50. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
51. For more on the common law, see generally JAMES R. STONER, COMMON LAW AND
LIBERAL THEORY (1992); RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN
ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY (1987); ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE
COMMON LAW (1985).
52. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10 (citing Shloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)).
53. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 n.8 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct: App. 1986)).
54. Id. at 12 nn.7, 8.
55. Id. at 10.
56. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261, where Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96
(Fla. 1989), and other Florida cases implicating the right to refuse treatment are discussed
either along with, or in the context of, cases from other states.
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other states. 7
The T. W. court also utilized Florida law but did so more broadly than
the Browning court. The T W. court surveyed the decisions of Florida cases
that implicated the right to privacy under Florida law.58 However, the
court failed to clarify whether all of the cases mentioned involved the
Florida constitutional right to privacy. For example, Satz v. Perlmutter9
was decided prior to the effective date of the state constitutional privacy
provision.6" Even when the Florida Supreme Court relied on Florida case
law to develop Florida constitutional policy, the court interjected federal
constitutional law.61
The T. W. and Browning opinions supposedly reflected a commitment
by the Florida Supreme Court to a primacy approach to the application of
the Florida Constitution. In T Wi. and Browning, the supreme court looked
to Florida constitutional law as the first source of constitutional protection
for individual rights in Florida. However, the court never followed through
in developing primary Florida constitutional doctrines for the right to choose
an abortion or the right to die. Instead, the court relied on federal constitu-
tional law, national legal policy and philosophy, and an out-of-state based
common law style analysis. This analysis has not only prevented the
Florida Constitution from being the primary protection of individual rights,
but also has effectively relegated the privacy provision to the least important
source of legal protection for individuals.
The half-hearted nature of the primacy model adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court in T. W. and Browning was particularly peculiar given the
context of the state constitutional privacy provision. The Florida Supreme
Court developed Florida constitutional policy for a privacy provision that the
court in T W itself acknowledged was unusual. Only three other state
constitutions contain an express, free standing privacy provision.62 At the
same time, the court found that the Florida constitutional privacy section
provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution,63 and should be
read more expansively than any sections of the Federal Constitution which
57. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12-14, where the court focuses primarily on
Florida cases which have surveyed federal law and laws of other states.
58. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192.
59. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
60. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
61. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192 n.5, 1193.
62. Id. at 1190 n.4.
63. Id. at 1191-92 (citing Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d
544, 548 (Fla. 1985)).
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only implicitly protect privacy.64 It is unclear why the Florida Supreme
Court avoided developing a doctrine based analysis and doctrine based on
an analysis of Florida law and public policy considerations. Such a Florida-
based analysis seems natural for a Florida constitutional provision not found
in many other constitutions, federal or state. By relying in T W and
Browning on federal constitutional policy, national privacy policy and a
common law type analysis based on out of state cases, the Florida Supreme
Court defied the unique nature of the Florida constitutional right to privacy.
The closest the T. W court came to utilizing a Florida policy analysis
was its application of a statute providing that unwed pregnant minors and
unwed mothers may obtain medical care for their fetuses or children without
obtaining permission from an unwed pregnant minor's parents.65 The court
viewed this statute as evidence of Florida's public policy to empower
pregnant minors with the authority to choose treatment for their fetuses or
children. The court found lacking the state's contention that a minor's
procurement of an abortion implicated a compelling state interest, a position
seemingly inconsistent with Florida's public policy of favoring the
empowerment of unwed pregnant minors.6 6 The Florida Supreme Court
in T. W. and Browning in 1989 and 1990 avoided the expansive use of such
a Florida based analysis.
III. THE MATURATION OF THE PRIMACY APPROACH
The Florida Supreme Court in T. W and Browning established a bare
skeleton for a primacy application of the Florida Constitution. The Florida
Supreme Court utilized a two-step approach for analyzing constitutional
issues. First, the court applied the Florida Constitution-the Federal
Constitution would only be applied if the Florida Constitution failed to
provide individual rights protection. In doing so, the court utilized federal
constitutional law, national policy, and a common law analysis based on
non-Florida cases when applying the Florida Constitution, rendering TW.
and Browning primacy cases in name only. In 1992, the Florida Supreme
Court in Traylor v. State67 placed some Florida meat on the primacy
skeleton erected in T. W and Browning.
In Traylor, a convicted murderer complained that police obtained
64. Id. at 1192.
65. Id. at 1195; see FLA. STAT. § 743.065 (1979).
66. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195.
67. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
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murder confessions in violation of his right to counsel and his right against
self-incrimination.6" The Florida Supreme Court not only decided the
criminal procedure issues against the convicted murderer,69 but also
engaged in an extensive discussion of how the Florida Bill of Rights7" must
be utilized in Florida litigation involving constitutional issues.] As it
explicitly stated in T. W., the Florida Supreme Court declared that the
primacy model of applying a state constitution is now the law in Florida.72
What distinguished Traylor from T. W and Browning was the supreme
court's recognition that the primacy model must be utilized for every phrase
and clause of the Florida Constitution.73 T. W and Browning involved the
Florida constitutional privacy provision-which few other state constitutions
include." Traylor, conversely, involved Florida due process rights,75
rights to counsel and confrontation,76 and the equal protection clause.77
The rights to due process, 8 equal protection,79 confrontation, 0 and
counsel8" also comprise substantial portions of the United States Constitu-
tion's Bill of Rights. Traylor decisively concluded that the primacy model
adopted in T. W and Browning applied to more than just Florida constitu-
tional provisions that differed substantially from the United States Constitu-
tion. After Traylor, the primacy model applies even where the words of
Florida Constitution are similar to those of a federal constitutional provision.
The Traylor court's use of the primacy model differed from the T. W.
and Browning approach in a more significant way. The Traylor court
developed an explicit methodology for construing the Florida Bill of Rights
provisions which require Florida's courts to primarily focus on factors
unique to the Florida state experience.82 The Traylor court never listed
68. Id. at 960.
69. Id. at 970-73.
70. FLA. CONST. art. I.
71. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 961-70.
72. See id. at 962; see also Robert F. Williams, Review Essay: A Generation of Change
in Florida State ConstitutionalLaw, 5 ST. THOMAS U. L. REV. 133, 142-43 (1992).
73. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962-63.
74. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
75. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
76. Id. § 16.
77. Id. § 2.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. Id. amend. VI.
81. Id.
82. Travlor, 596 So. 2d at 962.
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some of the factors which demonstrated the uniqueness of the Florida
experience. Those factors listed were:
1. Express language of the constitutional provision.
2. The formative history of a constitutional provision.
3. Preexisting and developing state law.
4. Evolving customs, traditions, and attitudes within the state.
5. The general history of Florida.
6. External influences that may have shaped state law. 8'
This utilization of factors involving the Florida experience differed
markedly from the court's approach in T. W. and Browning, where the court
utilized at most the last factor listed by the Traylor court (external
influences that may have shaped state law) to the exclusion of all other
factors. The TW. and Browning courts focused exclusively on federal
constitutional, national privacy policy, and non-Florida based common law
analyses.8
The Traylor court rationalized its adoption of a comprehensive primacy
application of the Florida Constitution by providing a federalistic, philosoph-
ical context for its decision. The Florida Supreme Court conceived of state
constitutions in classical textbook federalism terms.85 The court observed
that the federal constitution provides the floor for basic freedoms, while
state constitutions represent the ceiling.86 The federal constitutional floor
allows the United States to find an individual rights common ground or
common denominator, facilitating homogeneity in a pluralistic polity.87
The state constitutional ceiling provides the opportunity for each state to
express a deeper commitment to freedom and individual rights. 88 The state
constitutions allow for flexibility and elasticity unavailable in a constitution
which protects people uniformly throughout the fifty states.89 Because the
states provide a wider spectrum of individual rights opportunities, state
protected individual rights must be the primary rights for Americans,
especially when American govemment is conceived as a limited government
which maximizes individual freedom and minimizes government interfer-
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
85. See William F. Swindler, Minimum Standards of Constitutional Justice: Federal
Floors and State Ceilings, 49 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1984).
86. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 961.
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The court in Traylor remained true to its federalist philosophy and its
own primacy model when it analyzed whether the state had violated the due
process and equal protection rights of the convicted murderer in Traylor.
The Traylor court stayed close to the factors developed by the court to
reflect the unique Florida experience in a Florida constitutional analysis. 9'
The court thoroughly toured Florida legal history to investigate the scope of
Florida confession law utilizing cases from 1853,92 1889, 93 1898, 94 and
19259' in an attempt to explore the common law roots of the law.
Common law principles goveming Florida confession law became subsumed
in 1896 under the Florida constitutional protection against compelled self-
incrimination.96 The Traylor court also focused on the simple and direct
language of the right to counsel provision, recognizing historical contexts
for the Florida language.97 The court looked to historical and modem state
legislation to understand right to counsel policy in Florida, finding such
policy reflected in the right to counsel provision.98 Even court promulgat-
ed rules were utilized by the Traylor court to find evidence of basic Florida
policy reflected in the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution.99
Tray/or provided substance to the application by the T W and
Browning courts of a primacy model for individual protection under the
Florida Constitution. Whether the Traylor court established an enduring and
meaningful primacy role for the Florida Constitution will have to be tested.
IV. PRIMACY AFTER TRAYLOR: JOHN DOE: BACK TO
THE FUTURE OR ON TO THE FUTURE?
The Traylor court mandated that the Florida courts utilize the Florida
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights, in a comprehensive fashion.'
The Florida constitutional analysis model adopted by the Traylor court
90. Id.
91. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962.
92. Simon v. State, 5 Fla. 285 (1853).
93. Coffee v. State, 6 So. 493 (Fla. 1889).
94. Green v. State, 24 So. 537 (Fla. 1898).
95. Nickels v. State, 106 So. 479 (Fla. 1925).
96. See Ex parte Senior, 19 So. 652 (Fla. 1896).
97. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 967.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 969.
100. Id. at 962-63.
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included the in-depth utilization of factors that developed the unique Florida
policy interests reflected in and by the Florida Constitution. Five months
after Traylor was decided, the Florida Supreme Court tested its new
commitment to the comprehensive Florida constitutional primacy model
when the court decided Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida Inc. v. Doe.101
Doe involved criminal charges against an alleged prostitute and her
deputy sheriff husband who were charged with prostitution," 2 living off
of the proceeds of prostitution,'0 3 and illegal wiretapping.' °4  As part of
the investigation of the criminal defendants, the police raided the accused's
home, seizing cassette tapes containing recorded telephone conversations,
business cards of alleged customers, and a Rolodex with names and
addresses of customers in it.' °5 When the state decided to disclose the
seized infonnation to the accused in accordance with discovery rules,
individuals, John Does, mentioned or listed in the cassette tapes, business
cards, or Rolodex, moved to deny public access to the pretrial discovery
materials."0 6 The John Does had not been charged with any crimes and
moved to deny public access because criminal investigative information
becomes public information when the state provides requested information
to a defendant."0 7 The John Does lost their fight to keep their names and
addresses from becoming public."°8 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the decisions of the courts below, allowing the names and addresses of the
John Does who did not face criminal charges to become public." 9
The Florida Supreme Court in Doe utilized a primacy approach
focusing almost exclusively on the Florida constitutional right to privacy as
the basis of the individual rights analysis. 1 The court applied some
federal constitutional law principles involving privacy,"' but the court
spent most of its efforts discussing Florida common law principles and
101. 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
102. Id. at 550; see also FLA. STAT. § 796.07 (1991).
103. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 550; see also FLA. STAT. § 796.05 (1991).
104. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 550; see also FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (1991).
105. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 550.
106. Id.
107. See FLA STAT. § 119.011(3)(c)(5)(1991); Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1988).
108. Doe v. State, 587 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
109. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 553.
110. Id. at 552.
111. Id. at 552-53 n.3.
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Florida public policy considerations." 2 The court's analysis involved
Florida public policy balancing of conflicting interests. The court balanced
the policy impacts of allowing criminal discovery to be utilized by the press
to gather information against the Florida tradition of open records."' The
court expressed concern that allowing the media to utilize criminal discovery
to gather news information could dissuade witnesses and victims from
divulging investigatory information to law enforcement authorities in an
effort to avoid personal information from being publicly disclosed." 4 The
court opted to give the greater weight to legislative policy involving open
records, finding that in camera inspections by trial judges would be
sufficient to protect private information."'
The court utilized its Florida public policy analysis to support its
finding that the names and addresses failed to be protected by the Florida
constitutional right to privacy." 6 The John Doe's privacy rights, at least
in terms of names and addresses, were not implicated when the information
involved their own criminal activity." 7  The Florida Supreme Court
followed the primacy model that the court developed in Traylor, but the
court failed to utilize extensively the factors indicating unique Florida
interests."' Overall, the court's analysis was curt and conclusory, over-
looking factors such as the language of and the formative history of the state
constitutional right to privacy. The court overlooked the following
important indicators of Florida policy:
1. The language of the Florida constitutional privacy provision
states explicitly that the privacy provision "shall not be construed [by the
courts] to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings
as provided by law.""' 9 Those words need to be read within the context
of the historical developments of that provision.
2. The legislative history121 for the current privacy provision
placed on the 1980 ballot121 is sparse, but does indicate that the privacy
112. Id. at 552 (citing Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113
(Fla. 1988).
113. Id. at 552-53.
114. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 553.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980).
120. Conference Comm. Rep. on Fla. CS for HJR 386 (1980 Sess.) (on file with
committee)
121. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
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provision created a general right to be let alone from government interfer-
ence'22 that is experimental in scope. 23 The privacy provision em-
barked Florida into uncharted territory for privacy protection. The people
of Florida took the opportunity to provide themselves with a broad and
general privacy protection. The Doe court failed to take the broad and
experimental nature of the privacy provision into consideration in its policy
balancing analysis. 24  The court gave preference to public record poli-
cy.125 This was clearly required, given the explicit words in privacy
provision concerning public records. However, the court neglected the
strong privacy concerns implicated in the privacy provision.
3. The court also overlooked formative history of the privacy
provision.'26 The privacy provision was first considered by the 1977-78
Constitutional Revision Commission where concerns about increasing
governmental encroachment on private information were expressed. The
principal aim of the privacy provision was to afford individuals protection
against collection, retention, and use of information about personal
information' 27 The privacy provision reflected the fears of citizens about
potentially abusive powers of the State of Florida to invade and expose
private lives. 28 The Doe court minimized such concerns. Doe involved
the sex lives of individuals not charged with sex crimes. The sensitive
nature of a name, which had been included in a prostitute's records, was
overlooked by the Doe court when it focused on the alleged criminal activity
of the John Does. The court implied that involvement in criminal activity
somehow ended the protection against public exposure, but the court
neglected to recognize that the John Does remained uncharged at the time
of the disclosure. In the context of the early supporters' concerns for a
Florida constitutional privacy provision, such an oversight by the court
122. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Gov'tl Ops. for CS/HJR 387 (Feb. 7, 1980) (on
file with committee).
123. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com., CS for HJR 387 (1980) Staff Analysis and
Memorandum from S. Staff to S. President (Oct. 22, 1980) (on file with committee).
124. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 551.
125. Id. at 552.
126. See generally Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right
to Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673 (1978); Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Toward a Right of
Privacy as a AMatterof State ConstitutionalLaw, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 633'(1977); Joseph
S. Jackson, Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy, 33 U. FLA. L.
REv. 565 (1981).
127. See Rasmussenv. South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987).
128. See, e.g., 1978 Fla. Constitution Revision Comm'n proceedings at 6387, vol. 26
(March 8, 1978) (comments by Commissioner Douglas about 1984 approaching).
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seems odd. The Doe court concluded that the mere appearance of an
individual's name in records of an accused places the individual beyond
Florida constitutional privacy protection."' Such a result runs counter to
earlier concerns by privacy provision supporters about the prevention of a
"1984" govermflental information collection environment, because those
charged with crimes become information collectors for Florida government
on behalf of the media.
4. The Doe court also neglected to read the Florida provision
within the context of policies reflected in other sections of the Florida
Constitution. By allowing the names and addresses of the John Does to be
exposed as public information, the court allowed individuals to be character-
ized through court proceedings as clients of a prostitute. The John Does
would be branded as participating in criminal activity without being afforded
the right to be free of such taint until the state proved wrongdoing. The
formalities involved in the right to due process,"3° confrontation,"' and
counsel 32 remained overlooked by the supreme court as the court viewed
the state right to privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
The future of the primacy model which evolved in T. W., Browning, and
Traylor remains unclear. The Doe court applied the basics of the Traylor
state constitutional interpretive model, but overlooked significant aspects of
the model. The comprehensive nature of the Traylor court's thinking failed
to be reflected in Doe. As the Florida Constitution of 1968 heads toward
its thirtieth anniversary, doubt about the role of the Florida Constitution in
protecting basic human rights of Floridians continues to exist.
129. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 553.
130. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
131. Id. § 16, cl. (a).
132. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of privacy is a patchwork of disparate doctrines that resembles
Dr. Johnson's definition of metaphysical poetry: "the most heterogeneous
of ideas yoked by violence together." The right to be let alone, as coined
by Judge Cooley, covers tort-based privacy, constitutional privacy embody-
ing personal autonomy and search and seizure. The lines are blurred and
each shades into the other. As a result, it is not surprising to find that the
law has trouble keeping them straight.a
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center. Special thanks to
Scott Solkoffs singular research skills.
I. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); Milton R. Konvitz, Privacyand the Law:
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Florida's Constitution first embraced a right to privacy in its search and
seizure provision.' Article I, section 12 was amended in 1968 (by referend-
um), adding private communications to the interests protected by the
clause.3 In 1983, Florida's protection of privacy ebbed after voters amend-
ed section 12 to conform with United States Supreme Court interpretations
of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In Bernie v. State,4
the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the conformity amendment binds
Florida courts to follow future decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.5 In this regard, Florida's conformity clause chilled individual
liberties and placed federalism in a deep freeze.
In November of 1980, Florida voters adopted a freestanding constitu-
tional amendment protecting privacy. Section 23 of the Florida Constitution
provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of
access to public records and meetings as provided by law."6  On the
surface, section 23 seemed to offer the public more blanket privacy
protection while artfully upholding Florida's strong presumption of access
to public records. The amendment was hailed as a giant step forward in
safeguarding individual privacy.7
From the distance of fourteen years, a key question is whether Florida's
constitutional privacy protection has made a difference? Gathering
countervailing forces have cast a shadow on section 23 and put privacy's
promise on hold. In part, blame lies with the overabundance of caution by
Florida courts which seem reluctant to take section 23's straightforward
command at face value; however, blame also lies with the turning tide of the
law, leaving privacy by the wayside. For example, the United States
A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966); William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
2. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
3. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1968 revision).
4. 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
5. Id. at 991.
6. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (added Nov. 4, 1980).
7. E.g., Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 673 (1978) [hereinafter Cope, To Be Let Alone] ("Ratification
would place Florida among the national leaders in an emerging trend to protect individual
privacy."). Cope's article traces proposals of the 1978 Constitutional Revision Commission,
and weighs how constitutional privacy would reshape Florida privacy law. Id.; see also
Gerald B. Cope, Jr. Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 631 (1977).
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Supreme Court of the 1980's sharply pulled back on the use of privacy and
scholars have noted how competing constitutional interests are strongly
contesting-, privacy's turf..
Hopes ran high when section 23 took effect, reflecting as it did a strong
commitment to the right to be let alone. Unlike the unwritten and fragile
federal privacy dimly perceived in the penumbras of the United States
Constitution, Florida enshrined the principle that privacy is an interest in its
own right, entitled to a prominent position in the state constitution. In
sifting through section 23's legacy, performance should be measured by
reach as well as by grasp.
If section 23 was more or less modeled along the lines of federal
constitutional privacy, thus inheriting its metes and bounds, it would serve
little purpose. However, the language of several leading section 23 cases
claim that Florida's zone of privacy was designed to sweep wider than its
federal counterpart. Yet, in the wake of fourteen years of scorekeeping, it's
open to question whether section 23's salutary impact outweighs its
shortcomings.
Enlarging the state zone of privacy might have meant that section 23
would fill in the blanks left by United States Supreme Court rulings.
Measured by this principle, section 23 comes up empty. Another yardstick
of its performance is to ask whether section 23's track record could have
been achieved under alternative legal lines of reasoning. For example,
Jehovah Witnesses are entitled to refuse blood transfusions in Florida, not
by virtue of the right to privacy, but as a by-product of the free exercise of
religion guaranteed under the federal charter. 9 Likewise, without invoking
privacy, victimless crimes have been challenged under free speech and due
process grounds and a gay parent's right to adopt children can be grounded
on an equal protection footing.
Even when measured against the level of privacy protection prevailing
when section 23 was adopted, the picture is mixed. For example, Florida's
sodomy statute fell in 1971 before a First Amendment challenge.'0 With
8. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (striking down Florida's statutory ban
on publication of name of rape victims in face of the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem For A Heavyweight: A Farewell To
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORN. L. REV. 291 (1983) (mapping out how the
First Amendment defers to media definition of newsworthy and how this has eroded the
privacy tort of disclosure of private facts).
9. See In re Dubreuil, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S575 (Fla. Nov. 4, 1993).
10. While section 800.01 wasoverturned, section 800.02 may still be read to bar private
consensual sodomy. See Mohammed v. State, 561 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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the possible exception of cases covering the right to die, Florida's privacy
provision has made little dent in the state of the law.
If section 23 sweeps no wider than federal constitutional privacy, it
serves little purpose save symbolism. The record of several states adopting
constitutional privacy protection offers a window on section 23's untapped
wealth. For example, Califomia ensures bank depositors protection against
subpoenas. 1 For a while, Alaskans could smoke pot at home under
privacy's umbrella.12 Some states outpace Florida even without tapping
privacy. For example, Massachusetts and New Jersey relied on equal
protection grounds to enable poor women to obtain free abortions. 13 While
it's true that Congress' refusal to fund abortions was sustained in Harris v.
McRae,4 individual states are free to strike a different balance. This is
one area where section 23 might have left its mark-a dramatic departure
from federal law that would hammer home the fact that Florida's privacy
protection is more than a prop, that it pays more than lip service to the right
to be let alone.
To complicate matters, section 23's reach has been checked by voters.
In the overlap where Griswoldprivacy shades into the Fourth Amendment's
turf, the conformity amendment has placed a constitutional straitjacket on
efforts to enlist privacy in the fight against undue searches and seizures.
Simply put, Florida must ape United States Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment rulings. Despite short-lived artful dodges by Florida courts to
sneak section 23 in through the back door, search and seizure law stands
undisturbed by section 23.
Privacy is left in limbo in light of other legal developments. All too
often, the right to be let alone loses out to competing constitutional claims
like the First Amendment. For example, the right of "John Does,"
uncharged of any crime, to preserve their anonymity in the Willets
prostitution case was outweighed by the press' First Amendment right of
access to "public records." 5 When Florida's Legislature tried, in the name
of privacy, to bar the publication of the names of rape victims, the United
States Supreme Court upended the statute under the banner of freedom of
11. See, e.g., Burrows v. People, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974).
12. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); ALASKA CONST. art. 1,
§ 22.
13. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 222 (D. Mass. 1978); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
14. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
15. Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla. Inc., v. Doe, 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
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the press." In Atwell v. Sacred Heart Hospital,7 the natural mother's
stake in preserving her anonymity had to give way to her child's right to
know. 8
Section 23 contains a built-in limitation that serves to blunt its impact.
Unlike the broad reach of California's state constitutional privacy provision,
section 23 governs only intrusions laid to the state. 9 While breaches of
privacy are on the rise in private employment, remediable only under the
largely orphaned tort of privacy, section 23 stands idly by. If the federal
stance on narrowing state action is any guide, section 23 can be further
weakened by rendering it harder to show state action. In doing so, worthy
claims are discarded at the outset without reaching the merits. Finally, state
action can serve as a double bind. By virtue of governing only public
employment, section 23's privacy cases run the risk of being framed as
search and seizure cases, thus lowering the iron curtain of the conformity
amendment.
However, the picture is not altogether grim. Florida is probably as far-
reaching as any state in empowering the dying with some measure of control
over their fate. But one can conceive of a truly brilliant stroke: extending
the right to die to authorizing doctor-assisted suicide.2°
II. FLORIDA PRIVACY LAW
A. Public Records
Although Florida's public records law clings to the presumption of
access to all governmental records, 2' there have always been exceptions
16. The Fla. Star v. B.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)
17. 520 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1988).
18. Id. at 31; see also FLA. STAT. § 395.017 (1991) (Florida's hospital record statute).
19. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
20. While many claim doctor-assisted suicide is a matter of policy best left to the
Legislature, some cast the right to die as a constitutional right. For example, Dr. Kevorkian's
lawyer argues that a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide exists despite Michigan's
February 1993 law banning assisted suicide. Michigan's law was enacted in response to nine
suicides assisted by Kevorkian. See Dr. Death Ordered to Stand Trial, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 1993, at A3. Michigan's ban on doctor-assisted suicides was deemed unconstitutional,
but the appeals process has yet to run its course.
21. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1991). For a treatment of Florida's constitutional mandates
on public records law, see Patricia A. Gleason & Joslyn Wilson, The Florida Constitutional
Open Government Amendments: Article 1, Section 24 and Article 3, Section 4(e), Florida
Constitution, Let the Sunshine In, 18 NOVA L. REv. 973 (1993).
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designed to protect privacy rights that may otherwise be invaded.22 The
second sentence of article I, section 23 recites that "[t]his section shall not
be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and
meetings as provided by law." As case law on section 23 has developed,
it has become evident that it is on a collision course with Florida's Public
Records Act.23 How to read the two together has been drawn into question
in a number of cases, including one of the key section 23 cases to date.
Privacy loomed as the key issue in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering,24 where the Florida Supreme Court held that the subpoena of
bank records without notice to the account holders does not sacrifice their
privacy interests.23 Of more enduring value than the sundry facts or
holding of the case, however, was what the court had to say about the
footing and reach of the infant privacy provision.
When it comes to bank records, in other words, the right to privacy
does not command notice to a bank depositor so long as the subpoena serves
a state interest of the highest order. The opinion comes to this conclusion
after sounding a clear standard of judicial review and a ringing declaration
that Florida's right to privacy leaves its federal cousin in the dust.
Or does it? In California Bankers Ass 'n v. Shulti 6 and United States
v. Miller,27 the United States Supreme Court held that a federal investiga-
tive agency may subpoena bank records without notifying the depositor.28
In California, where the right of privacy looms larger than under the Federal
Constitution,29 the courts and Legislature have rejected the federal rule,
thereby framing a procedure whereby a depositor may quash the subpoe-
na.3" Even though other states have also rejected the California Bank-
22. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 382.025 (birth records); 393.13 (retarded persons); 394.459
(clinical records of mental patients); 396.112 (alcohol treatment); 397.053, 397.096 (drug
abuse); 400.321 (nursing home ombudsman committees), 827.07 (child abuse) (1979).
23. See Cope, To Be Let Alone, supra note 7, at 675.
24. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
25. Id. at 548.
26. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
27. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
28. Miller, 425 U.S. at 455; Shultz, 416 U.S. at 68.
29. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES 9-1I
(1977). The Commission was created by the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5,
88 Stat. 1896, reproduced in comment to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. 1975).
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7460 (Deering 1982); PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES, supra
note 29, at 12-13; cf Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975) (civil
discovery).
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ers/Miller rule,31 Florida has not-despite section 23.
Among the earliest of "public records" cases is Florida Board of Bar
Examiners re: Applicant.32 In that case, a budding lawyer complained
about questions posed by the Bar application calling for disclosure of
psychiatric counseling-information which falls into the public domain. The
court ruled that section 23 renders psychiatric counseling answers to bar
application questions beyond the reach of public scrutiny.33
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ferre,34 the court underscored that
section 23 governs state and not private acts. In an abuse of process claim
brought by a mayor against a private citizen who petitioned for disclosure
of public records, the court ruled that absent state action, the mayor could
not enlist the support of section 23. The court seemed to say that it was the
party to the lawsuit who abused process, not the state which framed the law
on which the underlying claim rested. Section 23 may be brought to bear
only against governmental intrusions, not those undertaken by private
parties.35
Section 23 may also yield at times to the public's right of access to
court records. In Goldberg v. Johnson,36 the court let the light in on the
terms of a settlement agreement and guardianship documents detailing the
estate of Shepard Broad Law Center benefactor, Leo Goodwin, Sr.,
31. In Alaska, bank records are confidential and shall not be made public without notice
to the depositor, unless disclosure is sought under a valid search warrant. ALASKA STAT. §
06.05.175 (1993). In California, a bank customer is entitled to ten days notice before a state
investigator can obtain access to his or her depositor records. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7460
(Deering 1982). In Maryland, the customer must be given twenty-one days notice prior to
disclosure. MD. CODE ANN., § 225 (1990). There is a fourteen day notice requirement in
Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 2201-2206 (1984).
32. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
33. See Cope, To Be Let Alone, supra note 7, at 712 n.253, 713 n.254 (citing pre-section
23 Bar application question cases: Florida Bar v. Hefty, 213 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1968)
(questions about sex with a minor-opinion did not address privacy, but Ervin, J., did in
dissent); Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978) (Florida
Supreme Court under rational basis analysis held being gay does not render one unfit for Bar)
and cases addressing the standards for disbarment: Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla.
1970) (disbarment for public gay conduct-Ervin, J., claims this amounts to invasion of
privacy)).
34. 636 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
35. Compare California's Constitutional privacy provision which, alone among the states,
entails no state action requirement. In other words, the conduct of purely private actors falls
within the reach of the privacy provision.
One way to limit the reach of section 23 would be to follow the much debated example
set by the United States Supreme Court of narrowing the definition of state action.
36. 485 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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overriding claims of privacy." Unlike Goldberg, the court in Sentinel
Communications Co. v. Smith" enlisted privacy in the service of barring
newspaper access to sealed court records in a domestic relations case.39
While the husband-father in the case happened to be a judge, this public
office did not turn this private litigant into a public figure thereby strength-
ening the case for media access. Invoking privacy found under the Federal
Constitution as well as section 23, the court noted that "if the privacy rights
of the litigants and third persons in this case are not recognized and
respected, then no citizen has any right of privacy in private litigation."4
The court records remained under lock and key.
In light of Smith, it seems the law balances the nature of the records
under review with privacy. Such delicate balancing was at work in
Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc.41 where the privacy
interests of blood donors outweighed an AIDS victim's claim to subpoena
names and addresses of blood donors who may have contributed the tainted
blood. 2
In another leading case, Florida Freedom Newspapers, -Inc. v.
Sirmons,43 the court found that section 23 does not foreclose the press from
obtaining court records shedding light on a state senator's divorce." The
court ruled that section 23 does not create a right to private judicial
proceedings, unlike the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Sentinel Communi-
cations Co. v. Smith.45 In concurring, Justice Nimmons added that
"[w]hile I agree with the majority's statement that Article I, section 23 does
not create a right to private judicial proceedings, it seems to me that such
Florida constitutional provision deserves to be weighed as a significant
factor in civil cases, particularly those in which the public's interests are not
37. Id. at 1390.
38. 493 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 503 So. 2d 328 (Fla.
1987) and disapprovedby Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla.
1988).
39. Id. at 1049.
40. Id.
41. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
42. Cf FLA. STAT. § 627.429 (1991) (insurance companies may inquire about positive
HIV test results, but may not disclose the information.).
43. 508 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987), affd sub nom. Barron v. Florida
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988).
44. Id. at 465.
45. 493 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), reviewdenied, 503 So. 2d 328 (Fla.
1987).
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involved."46  While confining its ruling to the underlying merits, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed in Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers,
Inc., 7 holding that "[a]ll trials, civil and criminal, are public events and
there is a strong presumption of public access to these proceedings and their
records, subject to certain narrowly' defined exceptions., 4' The right to
privacy, in other words, must yield in the face of a key tenet of our system
of government: the presumption that all trials are public.
Echoing Winfield, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held that Florida's right of privacy does not foreclose a
foreign government from reaching the American bank records of persons
suspected of crime.49 In their efforts to trace funds allegedly embezzled
from the Haitian government during the Duvalier regime, a subpoena, issued
on behalf of the new Haitian government, directed an American bank to turn
over records of a depositor who was a Duvalier ally. The court held that
Florida's right of privacy did not stand in the way."
In Atwell v. Sacred Heart Hospital,5' the Supreme Court of Florida
found itself in the thankless position of having to balance a child's right to
know against the rights of his natural parents. The court held that the na-
tural parent's stake in keeping their own medical records and, in turn, their
identities, under wraps did not rule out their natural child, reared by foster
parents, from prying the information out of its own medical records. 2
In Williams v. Minneola,53 police officers unthinkingly circulated
photographs and a videotape of an autopsy. The decedent's mother and
sister brought an array of tort claims against the police, who raised the
Public Records Act as a shield of immunity.54 Moreover, the defendants
46. Sirmons, 508 So. 2d at 465 (Nimmons, J., concurring).
47. 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988), affg sub nom. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
Sirmons, 508 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
48. Id. at 114.
49. In re Letter of Request for Judicial Assistance from Tribunal Civil de Port-Au-
Prince, Republic of Haiti, 669 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
50. For a discussion of pre-section 23 bank depositor's records cases, see Cope, supra
note 7, at 691-693. Florida's law in this area reflects federal law while California offers
depositors broader protection. Id.
51. 520 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1988).
52. See Paul J. Tartanella, Note, Sealed Adoption Records & the Constitutional Right
of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 451 (1982) (biological parents
decision to bring the child to term and place the baby for adoption instead of having an
abortion may rest on State's firm assurance that her identity will not be divulged).
53. 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 589 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1991).
54. FLA. STAT. §119 (1991).
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enlisted section 23, attempting to stretch its last sentence to embody a grant
of immunity for the disclosure of public records. The court took issue with
this reading, ruling
that neither the Public Records Act nor the Florida Constitution grants
a custodian protection against tort liability resulting from that person's
intentionally communicating public records or their contents to someone
outside the agency which is responsible for the records unless (1) the
person inspecting the records has made a bona fide request to inspect
them, in accordance with the Public Records Act, or (2) it is necessary
to the agency's transaction of its official business to reveal the records
to a person who has not requested to see them.5
In Glatthar v. Hoequist,56 family members, thinking the aging testator
wrote them out of his will, sought access to the document in the face of the
testator's straightforward instructions preserving his will from their prying
eyes while he lived.57 When the trial court took custody of the will, the
guardian of the now infirm testator sought to divulge the will's contents by
asserting his ward's (the testator's) right to privacy. The court ruled that a
mentally unfit person has not lost the right to privacy and that a guardian
cannot defeat the ward's undelegable stake in privacy.
The privacy interests of minors has also been endorsed under section
23. In A.J. v. Times Publishing Co.,58 thirty children and their school
sought to enjoin the release of police records detailing neglect and abuse.
The court concluded the privacy interests of the children and school
outweighed unfettered access to public records. The court backed its
general constitutional privacy protection by enlisting public policy reflected
in the Public Records Act's exemption for child abuse records.59
The Florida Supreme Court, following a growing number of states,
relied on privacy to strike down a state statute compelling minors seeking
abortions to obtain either parental consent or court approval. In its
sweeping opinion in In re T.W.,6° the court confirmed that the right of
privacy under the Florida Constitution was broader than federal privacy
55. Williams, 575 So. 2d at 687.
56. 600 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
57. Id. at 1207.
58. 605 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, cause remanded, 626 So.
2d 1314 (Fla. 1993).
59. See FLA. STAT. §§ !19.07(3)(a), 415.51(1)(a), 39.411(4) (1991).
60. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). But see State v. Avila, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d 131 (6th Cir.
Ct. 1990).
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protection. Given that a minor is deemed fit to consent to any other medical
procedure tied to her pregnancy, the court assumed the girl could be
entrusted with this decision as well.
61
Florida is not alone in wielding its privacy law to combat restrictive
anti-abortion-rights laws. In 1981, the California Supreme Court relied upon
its privacy provision to strike down restrictions on state funded abortions.62
States without written privacy protection have fallen back on equal
protection.63 It is unclear whether the court in T. W would have reached
the same outcome without section 23.
Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida Inc. v. Doe64 arose after Sheriff
Deputy Jeffrey Willets and his wife, Kathy, were charged with mastermind-
ing a prostitution ring. Among discovery materials were lists of clients who
paid for Kathy Willets' sexual favors. These clients - "John Does" - sought
to defeat the public disclosure of their names and addresses. The -court
weighed the public's statutory right of access to pretrial discovery informa-
tion against the interests of these partners in crime to preserve their
anonymity. Mindful of a media feeding frenzy, the Florida Supreme Court
soberly ruled that the seal on identity must be lifted once a person is
accused of a crime. In lone dissent, Justice Kogan chided the court for
watering down privacy in the face of mere allegations of wrongdoing.
B. Medical Decisions
Among the most high-profile of the privacy cases are those governing
medical decision-making. An earlier case sets the stage. In Satz v.
Perlmutter,65 the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the right of privacy
distilled from the United States Constitution affords competent, terminally
ill adults the right to turn down or stop undue medical treatments if family
members do not object.66 The decision meshes with Florida's enlightened
61. Though not ruling them out altogether, the United States Supreme Court had
already held certain parental/judicial consent statutes to be unconstitutional. See Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979) (Bellotti 11); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). But see
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
62. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
63. Right To Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Moe v. Secretary of Admin.
& Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
64. 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
65. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
66. Id.
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rule that even infirm persons may lay claim to privacy.67 The harder ques-
tion is whether a guardian can ever embody that same right and refuse
treatment on behalf of the ward.
The issue came to the fore in In re Barry,68 where a district court
decided that the right of privacy, embodied in both federal and state
constitutions, entitles a guardian of an encephalitic infant to put a stop to
artificial life support. Florida's Supreme Court has since revisited this
Gothic theme. In In re T.A.C.P.,69 the court defined an anencephalitic
child as legally alive, despite the absence of any higher brain stem
activity."° In light of this finding, the court cast grave doubts on the
parent's harvesting of organs of their anencephalitic baby while she still
breathed. A Nova attorney representing the parents vainly claimed that
Florida's right to privacy enables parents to make such decisions. The court
ruled privacy played no role: "We also do not agree that a parental right of
privacy is implicated here, because privacy does not give parents the right
to donate the organs of a child born alive who is not yet legally dead."'"
However, in J.F.K. Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth,72 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal relied upon the patient's right of privacy in
protecting the right to die. Yet, in its next breath the court conceded that
the comatose patient subjudice had no stake in the matter. Recognizing that
"a terminally ill comatose patient . . . has a right to refuse medical treat-
ment,"" the court nonetheless reckoned that the direct beneficiaries of the
patient's death, the family, had the only tangible stake-financial savings
and ending the emotional drain.74 While Bludworth purports to recognize
a right to die, its dicta seems to question that very holding.
The pace of right to die cases picked up once the Second District Court
of Appeal decided Corbett v. D'Alessandro.7 s Drawing into question both
the Florida and federal rights of privacy, the court enabled guardians to put
a stop to forced feedings of comatose wards, notwithstanding Florida law
67. SeeFLA. STAT. § 744.3215(1)(o) (1991); Glatthar v. Hoequist, 600So. 2d 1205 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
68. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
69. 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 593 n.9.
'72. 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), certifiedquestion answered, quashed,
452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 619.
75. 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
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that left rio doubt that living wills cannot govern this form of life support.76
When the Supreme Court of Florida handed down its decision in State
v. Powell," supporters of privacy had good reason to fear that the court
was scaling back privacy protection. Powell left intact state law78 entitling
coroners to preserve corneal tissue over objections lodged by decedent's
family. Justice Shaw fired off a withering dissent, claiming that the
offending law should yield before the legitimate privacy objection of
decedent's kin. 79 Battle lines were forming.
If doubts were gathering about Florida's commitment to privacy, In re
Browning"° dispelled them. Estelle Browning, while competent, framed a
living will detailing her objections to life supports if she were rendered
unconscious.8 Some time later, a stroke rendered her unable to talk, and,
while not comatose, she endured Job-like afflictions. Unable to swallow,
she was fied by a nasogastric tube. Upsetting the lower court's ruling that
state law 82 vested control over feeding tubes beyond the reach of patients
or their guardians, 83 the high court summoned up Florida's right of
privacy, holding foresquare that section twenty-three embodies a "right of
self-determination," enabling guardians to duly carry out a ward's instruc-
tions to terminate all forms of sustenance.84 The court declared that the
"right of privacy requires that we must safeguard an individual's right to
chart his or her own medical course in the event of later incapacity. 85 In
challenging a patient's right of self-determination, the State must show it has
"a compelling interest great enough to override this constitutional
right" 6-no easy task.
76. FLA. STAT. § 765.03(3)(b) (1991).
77. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
78. FLA. STAT. § 732.9185 (1991).
79. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1194 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
80. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
81. Id. at 8; see also FLA. STAT. § 765.05 (1991) (suggesting identical language).
82. Life.-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01-765.15 (1991).
83. The Act was amended prior to the Browning decision but after the cause of action
arose to include the provision of sustenance in the definition of "life-prolonging procedure."
84. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 4.
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id. at 14.
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C. Blood Testing
State v. Brewster,87 posed the question whether a sexually abused
child could be forced to undergo AIDS testing. Balancing competing
interests, the victim's privacy right to fend off governmental intrusion easily
won out over the defendant's right to know, absent evidence of compelling
need.88 The case, meanwhile, leaves open the ripe question whether one
may be pressed to undergo AIDS testing in the face of telltale signs that he
or she carries the virus.
The Florida Supreme Court in Fraternal Order of Police v. Miami89
approved drug testing9" police officers in light of evidence of drug use,
notwithstanding silence on the issue in the collective bargaining agreement.
In concurring, Justice Kogan noted that the case "raises distinct problems"
under section 23 and that those concerns will not go away.
The right to refuse a blood test is yet another by-product of section 23.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Privette91 embodies the
principle that a putative father may object to blood tests without weighing
the child's best interest or the rights of the child's legal father. 92 Raising
a privacy interest under section 23, the father called into question the best
interests of the child. Therefore, whether the father has standing to raise the
interests of the child is far from clear. 93 As stated by the court:
[A] compelling interest does not come into existence in the abstract but
must be based on adequate factual allegations and a record establishing
that the test itself is in the child's best interests. Absent that, the State's
interest does not reach the threshold of being 'compelling': The blood
test thus would be an improper intrusion into the putative father's
privacy, if he has properly asserted this right. Art. 1, § 23, FLA.
CONST. However, any such privacy claim is merely collateral to the
overriding concern in the case: the child's best interests.94
87. 601 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Id.
89. 609 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1992).
90. See also Wn. Andrew Hamilton, Note, Constitutional Law-Drug Testing of
Florida's Public Employees: When May a Public Employer Require Urinalysis?-City of
Palm Beachv. Bauman, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101 (1987); Stephen M. Fogel et al., Survey
of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553 (1988).
91. 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 309.
94. Id.
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In dissent, Justice Grimes observed that "[t]o suggest that Florida's constitu-
tional right to privacy permits a putative father to refuse a blood test in
order to avoid the possibility of having to support his child offends ordinary
principles of justice. 95
The religious-grounded refusal of a life-saving blood transfusion has
been upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in Public Health Trust v.
Wons.96 Although the same outcome could be reached on privacy grounds,
the court held that a Jehovah's Witness was entitled to turn down a blood
transfusion, even at the risk of leaving minor children motherless. This
decision goes further than many states in striking the balance on the side of
personal autonomy, despite the specter of minor children ending up as wards
of the state.
97
D. Publication of Ads About Convicts
In Lindlsay v. State,9" a court measured section 23 against a county's
policy of publishing drunk drivers' mug shot, name and the caption "DUI--
Convicted" in local newspapers. So long as the conditions of probation bear
on the probationer's past or future criminality or relate to the rehabilitative
purposes of probation, the court reasoned, even constitutional rights can be
trimmed, including the right of privacy.99
E. Marijuana Possession
Marijuana possession is one area where section 23 has not made a dent
in the law. Unlike Alaska, which applied its state constitutional privacy
provision to safeguard marijuana use in the home,' °0 Florida courts have
consistently ruled out any legal footing for marijuana use, twice before
95. Id. at 310 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
96. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
97. See also St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(adults without dependents entitled to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds).
98. 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 618 So. 2d 209 (Fla.
1993).
99. Id. at .356-57; see Scott Michael Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA L. REv.
1441 (1993) (weighing the abridgment of Fifth Amendment rights in the service of rehabilita-
tion).
100. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (invalidated statute barring possession
of marijuana in home; privacy in the home enjoyed constitutional status as part of the right
of privacy in the Alaska Constitution).
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section 23, in Borras v. State'' and in Laird v. State.'o2  At the time of
its conception, conservative critics of the proposed section held up legalizing
marijuana use as one of the parade of horribles the constitutional provision
would unleash upon an unwary public. They needn't have worried. Maisler
v. State °3 affirmed Florida's longstanding article of faith that the right of
privacy does not sanction the personal possession of marijuana.
F. Sexual Matters
Privacy plays a supporting role in state obscenity prosecutions. In
Parnell v. St. Johns County, °4 a dancer challenged the constitutionality of
a county ban on nudity in public places or in any establishment serving
alcohol.' The court did not reach the merits of the claim, dismissing the
case on procedural grounds. However, the ruling left dicta indicating that
privacy's protective shield covers only natural persons-it cannot be raised
by one's corporate employer in a pending federal suit." 6
In Schmitt v. State,' °7 the district court found that section 23 does not
stand in the way of prosecuting a father for snapping nude pictures of his
daughter, videotaping his daughter and another teenage girl dancing topless,
and other "lewd and lascivious" activities.0 8
Similarly, in Stall v. State,10 9 the State enlisted Florida's RICO Act
in charging individuals for violations of state obscenity laws, as reflected in
the rental, sale, and showing of "obscene" videos and publications. "0 The
trial court struck down the obscenity statute, citing section 23. The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that section 23 does not shield
obscenity."' Affirming the Second District, the Florida Supreme Court
101. 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808
(1970).
102. 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
103. 425 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), reviewdenied, 434 So. 2d 888 (Fla.
1983).
104. 603 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 57.
107. 563 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), approved in part and quashed in
part, 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1572 (1992).
108. Id. at 1100.
109. 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Long v. State, 111 S. Ct. 2888
(1991).
110. Id. at 257.
11l. State v. Long, 544 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), approved sub nom.
Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2888 (1991).
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underscored that section 23 does not protect purveyors of sexually explicit
products--there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sale or
purchase of such prurient products."12  However, taking its cue from
federal law, the court left little doubt, in dicta, that purely private possession
of obscenity comes under section 23's protective umbrella." 3
G. Search and Seizure
In Katz v. United States,"4 the Supreme Court said that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."' Moreover, it warned against
translating the Fourth Amendment into a general constitutional right of
privacy."'6
One way of setting search and seizure cases apart from Griswold
privacy is to focus on the nature of the interest at stake in each. In the
Fourth Amendment setting, privacy targets unfair and intrusive methods,
processes, and procedures, while Griswold privacy entails substantive rights,
like the right to an abortion.
A running theme in many criminal search and seizure cases in Florida
is the weight due section 23 in light of section 12's "conformity amend-
ment." Alone among the fifty states, Florida constitutionally commands its
courts to count United States Supreme Court rulings as governing precedent
when it comes to search and seizure. Since section 23 embodies wider
protection of an individual's right to be let alone than does federal law, the
privacy provision runs up against strict conformity with federal search and
seizure law. Four Florida Supreme Court cases frame this theme.
In Riley v. State,"7 the Florida Supreme Court enlisted section 23 in
striking down a warrantless helicopter search of a greenhouse. Sounding a
bold note, Justice Barkett announced that "[o]ur own right to privacy
amendment, article I, section 23, Florida Constitution, was meant to protect
against governmental encroachments on privacy made possible by increas-
ingly sophisticated investigative techniques.""'  By invoking section 23,
the court widened the protections against search and seizure, perhaps in
defiance of the conformity amendment. On appeal, the United States
112. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied. II1 S. Ct. 2888 (1991).
113. Id. at 261; see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
114. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
115. Id. at 351.
116. Id. at 350.
117. 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987), rev d, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
118. Id. at 288.
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Supreme Court, noting the waiver of federalism embodied in section 12's
conformity amendment, reversed, holding that such warrantless searches do
not tread on federal search and seizure law." 9 Some might say that Riley
ironed out too many wrinkles.
This stinging rebuke has rendered Florida's Supreme Court's liberal
wing slow to broaden search and seizure law in light of section 12 and
Riley. In State v. Wells, 2 ' the court deemed inadmissible marijuana
cigarettes left in an automobile's ashtray as well as a garbage bag of
marijuana sealed inside a locked suitcase in the car's trunk. In that case, the
DUI suspect consented only to a search of the trunk and the police fell short
of legal grounds to open the telltale containers.
Without putting too fine a point on it, the court warily tapped section
23 to take exception to the "zone of privacy" framework. The same year
as Wells, the court decided Shaktman v. State,' holding that although
section 23 is triggered by the warrantless use of PEN registers, the
compelling state interest test is met, thus putting to rest section 23
concerns. 122 When Shaktman is read alongside Riley and the conformity
clause, it raises the specter that section 23 may still play a supporting role
in Florida search and seizure cases, so long as the outcome squares with
federal search and seizure law. Shaktman also sheds light on the history and
footing of section 23. State v. Jimeno'23 underscores the tension between
section 23 and section 12's conformity clause. Until then, the Florida
Supreme Court had ruled that general consent to a car search did not cover
the opening of a closed paper bag lying inside the vehicle. The United
States Supreme Court reversed. Swallowing its pride, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled section 12's conformity clause trumps section 23.124 This
uneasy "accommodation" of two clashing constitutional themes seems settled
for the time being.
One interesting case recounts how Doreen Heller and her passenger
were pulled over by police after a tag check matched the registration with
119. State v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
120. 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989), affd, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
121. 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989).
122. Id. at 151; see Baird v. State, 553 So. 2d 187 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same
facts), quashed, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990); Hastetter v. Behan, 639 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1982)
(toll records of telephone subscribers are protected by Montana's constitutional guaranty of
privacy); see also Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985)
(setting up strict scrutiny analysis).
123. 588 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1991).
124. Madsen v. State, 502 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 521 So. 2d
110 (Fla. 1988).
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a different vehicle.'25 With license and registration in hand, it finally
dawned on the officers that they had called in the wrong tag ID. Duly
corrected, Heller was told she was free to go. Before pulling out, however,
one officer noticed "track marks" on the passenger's arms. Heller was
instructed to leave the car for questioning. In due course, Heller confessed
that illegal drugs were in the car. The ensuing search yielded the contra-
band. 12
6
The Fifth District Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court's admission
of the drugs into evidence, grounded its ruling upon scant "founded
suspicion" to warrant the second "Terry" stop.' 27 Breaking new ground
(or digging a ditch) in light of the conformity amendment, the court relied
on section 23 to defeat the search and seizure. 2
One case shedding light on the turf war waged by section 12 and
section 23 is Forrester v. State, 29 in which the district court compared a
section 12 analysis with a section 23 analysis. 3 ° The court did not rule
on the merits of the section 23 claim since it was not raised below. The
court did, however, map out a helpful comparison of the burdens of proof
between section 23 and search and seizure law, hinting at the proper role
section 23 might play.' 3' In addressing the interplay between section 12
and 23, the court casts some role for section 23. But why lay out two
competing tests of search and seizure law if one, section 12, governs?
125. Heller v. State, 576 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
126. Id.
127. Id at 399; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
128. Heller, 576 So. 2d at 400 (citing the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution).
129. 565 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
130. Id
131. The Forrester court stated:
In the search-and-seizure context, once a defendant has established that he or she
had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and that a
warrantless search and seizure occurred, the burden shifts to the state to
demonstrate that the search was reasonable-that the state was not required to
obtain a warrant under the circumstances .... In comparison, when a defendant
raises a privacy challenge, the defendant must first show that the government has
intruded into an area encompassed within the 'zone of privacy' protected by
section 23. Only then does the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that the
challenged intrusion "serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal
through the use of the least intrusive means." Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547. The
state's burden in the search and seizure context is far less stringent than that
under article I, section 23.
Forrester, 565 So. 2d at 393 (some citations omitted).
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In State v. Kerwick,'32 the court enlisted section 23 in finding that
police overstepped the bounds of Fourth Amendment propriety. The case
arose after officers cornered Kerwick's car, flashed their badges, and then
"asked" if they could pick through her luggage as she awaited a bus.
Feeling trapped, Kerwick consented to a search. Officers found a locked
container inside her suitcase and sliced it open with a knife, revealing a bag
of cocaine.13  While paying lip service to the Fourth Amendment, the
court embraced section 23 to find that Kerwick did not knowingly and
voluntarily consent to the search.134
On the other hand, Madsen v. State13 brings home the limited role
section 23 plays in search and seizure cases. Federal opinions premised on
section 12's conformity clause, have sustained the admissibility of an
unauthorized tape recording capturing Madsen's complicity in drug
trafficking. The court noted that absent the conformity amendment, the tape
could not be tapped, but that now they were duty-bound to leave intact the
trial judge's ruling of admissibility. 3 6  Madsen weighed in that the
recording tread on his right of privacy as embodied in section 23. The court
rejected the claim, lamenting, "[i]f we were to apply the right to privacy in
the manner proposed by appellant, we would effectively nullify the
constitutional amendment to section 12, and this is obviously not an
appropriate judicial prerogative."' 37  It is helpful to contrast the Madsen
case with that of State v. Calhoun3 1 in which the same court upheld a
similar suppression order on grounds of section 12 and 23 violations.
139
In Calhoun, law enforcement intercepted jailhouse conversations between
the suspect and his brother after assurances that their talks were private.
The court cast aside governing case law owing that "none of those control-
ling decisions discussed the Article 1, sections 12 and 23, protections of the
Florida Constitution cited above, but were decided on Fourth and Fifth
Amendment principles."' 4 ° To be sure, the two decisions clash over the
footing of section 23 on search and seizure matters. The only way to meld
the two opinions may be that, over time, the clout of section 23 has
132. 512 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 348; see also Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1993).
135. 502 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), affid, 521 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1988).
136. Madsen, 502 So. 2d at 950.
137. Id. at 950; see also State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1991); State v. Hume,
512 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1987).
138. 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
139. Id. at 245.
140. Id. at 244.
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gathered force, though, of course, both opinions were rendered well before
Riley.14
1
H. Parents' Stake in Children's Lives
Can grandparents win visitation rights over the objections of the child's
parents? In Sketo v. Brown, 142 the appellate court brushed aside privacy
claims raised by the parents, and instead adopted the "best interest of the
child" test.'43 This standard measures the clashing interests between
parents and grandparents, including the state's freestanding stake in the
welfare of children. 14
4
Whenever one person makes decisions for another person, a shift of
privacy rights takes place. In the field of parental rights, the childrens' right
to privacy is often subordinated to the parents or to the State. 45  For
example, the privacy rights of "immature" minors may give way to the
power of the parent or the State. 146  Similarly, a child's right to self
determination yields to the State's power to compel education.
47
I. Victim Examinations
In State v. Drab,4 ' the district court would not order a second
gynecological examination of an eight-year-old child allegedly abused by
her father, unless the test was necessary to insure that the due process rights
of the accused were not violated. 149 In framing the issue in these terms,
the court sidestepped the privacy issue. 5° The court does not say why the
privacy rights of the child or complaining witness do not figure into the
legal equation. Perhaps because the compelling state interest test of
14 1. See also Adams v. State, 436 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (audio and
video recordings of a storefront "sting operation" did not violate defendant's right of
privacy).
142. 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Id. at 382.
144. Id.
145. See generally Privacy in Family and Home, in 3 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE
22 (George B. Trubow, ed., 1991).
146. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
147. Pierce v, Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
148. 546 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 553 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.
1989).
149. Id. at 55.
150. Id.
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Winfield yields the same outcome.151
In State v. Brewster,"' a sexually abused child was free to forgo
AIDS testing. 153 The appellate court reasoned that the victim's right to be
let alone far outweighed the defendant's poorly articulated need for the
information.'54
J. Victimless Crimes
To some there is no such animal as a victimless crime. Even those
crimes which have no "direct" victim often leave indirect victims in their
wake. This does not, however, put to rest the rather convincing argument
that government should not police an individual's action when that act falls
short of harming others. Section 23 may serve as a useful vehicle for those
challenging governmental control over their private affairs.t'" To date,
however, the Amendment has been rendered toothless. Case in point is the
handling of the personal possession laws. In Maisler v. State,15 6 the
district court held its ground that Florida's right of privacy may not serve
to strike down laws criminalizing the personal possession of marijuana. 57
In State v. Phillips,'58 Phillips and Williams were charged with
statutory rape. The trial judge struck down, as unconstitutional, the
governing statute that barred consent as a defense. 59 The trial court held
that the statute "violated the minor's right of privacy guaranteed by Article
1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. .. ,,60 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed, finding that Phillips and Williams lacked standing
to assert the "victim's" right of privacy. 16' The appellate court did not tip
its hand, however, regarding how a minor might ever challenge the statute's
constitutionality, thus enabling a third party to assert the claim.
62
151. See also State v. Diamond, 553 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
152. 601 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1291.
155. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
156. 425 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 434 So. 2d 888 (Fla.
1983).
157. Id.
158. 575 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 589 So. 2d 292 (Fla.
1991).
159. Id. at 1314.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
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In Wyche v. Florida,63 the court construed a Tampa ordinance
prohibiting loitering. The statute prohibited loitering
while a pedestrian or in a motor vehicle, in or near any thoroughfare or
place open to the public in a manner and under circumstances manifest-
ing the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting, or procuring another to
commit an act of prostitution, sodomy, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturba-
tion for hire, pandering, or other lewd or indecent act. Among the
circumstances which may be considered in determining whether this
purpose is manifested are: that such person ... repeatedly beckons to,
stops or attempts to stop, or engages passers-by in conversation, or
repeatedly stops, or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by hailing,
waving of arms or any bodily gesture. . 64
The Florida Supreme Court struck the ordinance down as unconstitutionally
vague, among other grounds. 65 In dicta, the court noted that "many of
the activities implicated by the ordinance fall into the realm of personal
autonomy that is protected by article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitu-
tion. ',
166
K. Commercial Speech
Another hotbed of privacy litigation on a national scale is the
permissible bounds of commercial speech. Florida's privacy right has come
into play only once in this area. In State v. Rampell,167 the court mea-
sured the First Amendment against the right of privacy in upholding the
constitutionality of a state statute. 68 The statute barred uninvited, in-
person, direct solicitation of clients by certified public accountants. 69 The
court found the minimal right of free commercial speech to be outweighed
by the right of the citizenry to be let alone. 7°
163. 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993).
164. Id. at 233 (quoting TAMPA, FLA. CODE § 24-61A10 (1987)).
165. Id. at 234.
166. Id at 235 n.5 (citing In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1990)).
167. 589 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), approved in part and quashed in
part, 621 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1993).
168. Id. at 1353.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1360.
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L. Vagueness Doctrine
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Wyche v. Florida,17" ' holds
promise for privacy in its dicta.' The case concerned a City of Tampa
ordinance prohibiting loitering.'73 The Florida Supreme Court ruled the
ordinance unconstitutional on vagueness and other grounds. 74 In dicta,
the court noted that "many of the activities implicated by the ordinance fall
into the realm of personal autonomy that is protected by article I, section 23
of the Florida Constitution."' 75 In time, this decision may prove a potent
weapon to test the constitutionality of arguably over-broad statutes.1
76
M. Cable Television
Florida privacy law has never addressed privacy concerns attending
cable television. California, by contrast, makes it illegal for a cable
television provider to use any electronic device to record, transmit, or
observe any events inside a subscriber's premises.'77 In the District of
Columbia, a cable franchisee must exercise "the highest possible standard
of care" in not disseminating its subscriber's viewing selections, financial
transactions, and/or the utilization of other cable-related interactive
services.7  This information may not be released even upon a valid
subpoena or search warrant.' 79 Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin have similar laws. 8°
171. 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993).
172. See also discussion supra part II.J.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 234.
175. Id. at 235 (citing In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9-10).
176. See Nan Feyler, Note, The Use of the State Constitutional Right of Privacy to
Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 973 (1986); Yao Apasu-
Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1986) (federal and state cases). A few states have relied
on state constitutional privacy provisions to strike down their sodomy statutes. E.g.,
Michigan Organization for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County 1990) (covering both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy), Kentucky v.
Wasson, No. 86-X-48 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Fayette County, 1990) (covering only homosexual
sodomy).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5 (West 1993).
178. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-1845 (1992).
179. Id.
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-333 (West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, § 87-2
(Smith-Hurd 1993); N.J. REV. STAT. § 48:5A-1 (1992); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 134.43,
968.27(1) (West 1992).
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III. PRIVACY STATUTES OR CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS IN OTHER STATES
Florida aside, other states have raised privacy to the level of constitu-
tional codification, though with uneven results. In Alaska, as of 1972,
"[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed."'' In Arizona, "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."'812 In California,
"[a]ll people are by their nature free and independent," and among their
inalienable rights are "pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and priva-
cy."' 83 Hawaii's search and seizure law adds some interesting language
to the familiar formula: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures,
and invasions ofprivacy shall not be violated. . ."' " Article one, section
twelve of the Illinois Constitution provides that there shall be "prompt" and
"certain" relief for "injuries and wrongs" to one's privacy. ' 15  Like
Hawaii, Louisiana explicitly adds the right of privacy to its search and
seizure provision.'86 In Montana, it is recognized that "[tihe right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."' 87
In New York, the states' search and seizure provision is identical to its
federal counterpart, except that the state adds language strengthening the
sanctity of private communications.'88
Other states, while not elevating their concerns to constitutional
dimensions, have made provisions by legislative enactment. In Delaware,
for example, violation of privacy is a Class A misdemeanor.'89 In Georgia
and Louisiana, it is illegal to invade one's privacy or to be a "peeping
Tom."' 90 In Maine, a person is guilty of invasion of privacy if, under
certain circumstances, he or she trespasses with the intent to eavesdrop or
installs or uses any device that can transmit or record sounds or images.91
181. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
182. ARIz. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
183. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I.
184. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
185. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
186. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
187. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
188. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1993).
189. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 1335 (1992).
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3002 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (West 1992).
191. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511 (West 1992).
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In Massachusetts, "a person shall have a right against unreasonable,
substantial or serious interference with his privacy." '192  Rhode Island
enumerates Prosser's four traditional categories of tort privacy after its
declaration that "It is the policy of this state that every person in this state
shall have a right to privacy .. ."193 Utah's privacy protections are
specifically strengthened in the area of eavesdropping and the misuse of
listening or recording devices.'94
In the area of tort privacy, most states recognize the traditional torts at
common law, with the apparent exception of Minnesota, Nevada, North
Dakota, and Wyoming. 95 It should also be understood that those states
which have constitutionalized their right to privacy, often pass more specific
legislation.'96
IV. CONCLUSION
Thirteen years of parsing section 23 have taken the luster off privacy's
promise. So far, hopes outrun reality. The cases bring sharply into focus
that all too often privacy plays second banana to competing interests.
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West 1989).
193. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1992).
194. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-401 (1993).
195. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS
(1992).
196. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 455.241 (Supp. 1992) (disclosure of medical records); 559.72
(Supp. 1992) (release of credit information); 659.062 (protection of social security numbers)
(1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39.2-304 (1992) (polygraphs).
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I. SUMMARY OF PRESENT LAW AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Summary of Present Homestead Exemption Law
Florida's homestead law contains a unique combination of provisions
providing an owner with significant exemptions from creditors and
restrictions on transfer. This law is contained primarily within the Florida
Constitution. These provisions affect the owner and the owner's spouse
during their lifetimes. They also affect the owner's descendants and heirs
after the owner's death.
The provisions relating to the exemption have several components.'
The first relates to what qualifies as a homestead. The qualification
requirements include ownership requirements, a residential use requirement,
and an acreage limitation. The second relates to the scope of the exemption,
whereby most liens cannot attach to the homestead or force its sale, with
limited exemptions provided under constitutional, federal and judicial law.
The provisions relating to transfer apply to inter vivos transactions and
to testamentary dispositions. The transfer restrictions relate to the right to
give, sell, mortgage, or otherwise alienate the homestead during lifetime,
and the right to devise it by will, as well as the right to benefit from the
owner's exemption at his or her death.
This article will explore the exemption provisions and the transfer
provisions in depth. This article will consider the present law, its history,
I. See FLA. CONST. art X, § 4.
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exemptions in other states, and potential areas and recommendations for
constitutional or other reform.
1. Exemption Provisions
The present exemption contains the following qualification require-
ments and limitations: ownership requirements, a residential/use require-
ment and an acreage limitation. Article X, section 4(a) of the Florida
Constitution exempts:
the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of
one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon,
which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of
subsequent inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipal-
ity, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the
exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner or his family
a. Qualification Requirements and Limitations
The qualification requirements relate to who may own the homestead
and what interest may be owned (the ownership requirements), how the
property may be used (the residential/use requirement) and how much
acreage the homestead may encompass (the acreage limitation). There is no
limit on the value of the property that can qualify as a homestead.2
i. Ownership Requirements
First, any natural person may own the homestead interest. A corpora-
tion cannot claim the exemption for property that it owns.' The owner
need not be married or have a family. If the owner has a family, the owner
need not be the head of that family.
Second, the interest owned must be an interest in an estate in land
located in the State of Florida. The homestead interest may be the fee
2. See id.
3. See In re Duque, 33 B.R. 201, 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983). But see Manda v.
Sinclair, 278 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960) (shareholder could claim
exemption for equitable interest in homestead owned by corporation).
4. Coleman v. Williams, 200 So. 207, 207 (Fla. 1941) (exemption "'may attach to any
estate in land ... whether it is a freehold or less estate"'); Menendez v. Rodriguez, 143 So.
223, 226 (Fla. 1932) (Whitfield, J., concurring).
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simple interest of the sole owner, the interest of a tenant in common5 or the
interest of a joint tenant with right of survivorship.6 The homestead may
be owned as a tenancy by the entirety.' It may be an equitable interest
owned via a purchase money resulting trust 8 or a constructive trust. It may
5. Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 75 So. 614 (Fla. 1917) (son's undivided one-third interest
in property owned as a tenant in common qualified as homestead upon his death so that his
interest passed to his mother free of his creditors); Milton v. Milton, 58 So. 718 (Fla. 1912)
(son's undivided one-fourth interest in property inherited from mother qualified as son's
homestead, immediately after her death, because son occupied it within a reasonable time
under the circumstances after her death). Each tenant's interest should be tested separately
to see if it qualifies as homestead. Grant v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 402 So. 2d 486
(Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (former husband's interest was subject to sale, but former wife
claimed her interest as homestead). If one tenant has the exclusive right to possess the
property, a sale of the other tenant's interest would be subject to that right. Barnett Bank v.
Osborne, 349 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 709 (Fla.
1978).
If homestead property is owned as tenants in common or joint tenants with right of
survivorship, the property may be partitioned at a tenant's request. If neither is entitled to
exclusive possession of the property and the property cannot be divided in a manner that
preserves the homestead, a sale may be required to protect the owners' beneficial enjoyment
of the property. Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1978) (a partition sale is not a forced
sale prohibited by the constitution).
6. Ajoint tenancy with right of survivorship may qualify for the exemption for forced
sale but may not be subject to the restriction on devisee. See Ostyn v. Olympic, 455 So. 2d
1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (husband's interest in property owned as joint tenants with
right of survivorship with sister, sister's daughter, and sister's husband was not subject to
restriction on devise, even though husband and wife resided on property and wife survived
husband). In Ostyn, the right of survivorship was acquired prior to the marriage. Id. at
1137.
7. See Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1953).
8. A purchase money resulting trust arises when one person purchases property and has
the title placed in another person's name without intending to make a gift to the title holder.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 443 (1957). See Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble,
27 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1946) (husband purchased land in wife's name and constructed home on
it and paid for insurance, upkeep and taxes). In Bessemer, the court stated that the husband's
"contributions to his wife's separate property gave him an equitable interest on the basis of
which he could claim his homestead exemption. It was not essential that he hold legal title
to the land." Id. at 833. See also Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1945) (husband
can claim his equitable interest in a home titled in his wife's name as his homestead when
he used his own funds to purchase it in his wife's name).
In these cases, the head of the family argued that he was the equitable owner because
the legal owner was not the head of the family and could not qualify for the exemption.
Gamble, 27 So. 2d at 833; Beall, 150 F.2d at 470. Under today's constitutions, where family
hardship is not required, this argument could be used if the legal owner did not reside on the
property but the "equitable owner" did.
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be a beneficial interest held by the settlor of a revocable trust. 9 The home-
stead interest also may be a life estate held by a surviving spouse, but it
cannot be a future interest, until the interest becomes possessory."0 For
example, a remainder interest cannot qualify as a homestead interest until
the life estate terminates." The homestead interest may be an interest in
a duplex house 2 or a condominium. 3 It may be an ownership interest
in a mobile home and in land to which the mobile home is attached.
Leasehold interests generally do not qualify as a sufficient estate in
land.' 4  Cooperatives do not qualify for the constitutional exemption,
9. In re Estate of Johnson, 397 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (devise
restrictions applied to homestead owned by grantor, as trustee of revocable trust, where
grantor was lifetime beneficiary and retained "all equitable right, title, possession and
interest" in homestead); Johns v. Bowden, 66 So. 155 (Fla. 1914) (decedent who could not
directly devise homestead could not indirectly devise homestead through provisions of
revocable trust he created and under which he had the right to occupy and use the homestead
during his lifetime).
10. Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969). In LaGasse, when the father
died, his wife received a life estate in his homestead and his daughter received the vested
remainder. The father's homestead exemption inured to both of them to protect them from
his creditors. The daughter resided with mother on the property, but daughter could not
qualify for homestead exemption on her remainder interest even though she was head of the
family. Id. at 728. The "surviving mother had the right of occupancy and use essential to
a homestead claim .... " Id. at 729. See also Anamaet v. Martin-Senour Co., 114 So. 2d
23 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
I1. See LaGasse, 223 So. 2d at 728.
12. See In re Kuver, 70 B.R. 190 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986). In Kuver, a duplex was
homestead even though a portion was rented out. The land and improvements were owned
in fee simple. The duplex was capable of being divided by a vertical or horizontal line but
could not be divided for purposes of sale under existing zoning laws. The duplex was
considered comparable to condominium ownership. Id. at 192-93
13. See In re Estate of Hill, 552 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (condomini-
um was homestead, but devise of homestead was not prohibited because decedent was not
survived by a spouse or minor child).
14. See In re Tenorio, 107 B.R. 787 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (where year to year lease
of condominium did not satisfy ownership requirement nor was it a permanent place
residence, and thus could only qualify for the personalty exemption); see also Freedom
Properties v. Alderman, 589 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (resident's contractual
license to occupy given room in retirement center was continuing contract under Florida
Statutes chapter 651 but was not legal or equitable interest for claiming exemption for
purposes of taxing any portion of real property containing center). There is some question
whether leasehold improvements made by the lessee on leased property could qualify as a
sufficient real estate interest for the lessee. See Anderson Mill & Lumber Co. v. Clements,
134 So. 588 (Fla. 1931). In Clements, a portion of land owned and used by a father-in-law
as a homestead was treated as abandoned and not exempt when the father allowed the son-in-
law to build a home on that portion of the land. The son-in-law had lawful possession of the
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because the tenant of the cooperative apartment has no proprietary interest
in his or her apartment, the apartment building, or the underlying land."5
Mobile homes on leased land also should not qualify for the constitutional
exemption. The Legislature has attempted to create a statutory exemption
when the mobile home owner has the lawful right to possess the land.' 6
The fact that property is taxed as real estate for property tax purposes is not
determinative.' 7  Furthermore, the fact that property qualifies for the
homestead tax exemption is not determinative, because some of the
land and resided there, yet a creditor of the father-in-law was able to place a lien against that
portion of the land. That portion of the land was not considered part of the father-in-law's
homestead. It is unclear whether the son-in-law tried to claim it as his homestead, but the
court did not treat that portion of the land as the son-in-law's exempt homestead. Id. at 590.
But see Harold B. Crosby & George J. Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead
Exemption: I-I11, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 64 (1949), which states:
Since the Supreme Court of Florida has committed itself to the principle that the
homestead provisions apply to any interest that the head of a family residing in
Florida may have in a dwelling, it is reasonable to infer that leasehold interests
for less than one year may be subject to the homestead laws ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
15. In Wartels v. Wartels, 357 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1978), the supreme court held that the
shareholder of a cooperative apartment who died January 2, 1975, survived by his wife, could
devise his shares because they were not homestead property. Id. at 709. The court noted that
the corporation held title to the land on which the cooperative apartment building was
constructed and leased the shareholder his individual cooperative apartment unit. The court
noted that the "purchaser of a cooperative apartment unit does not hold any type of
proprietary interest in either the apartment itself or the apartment building containing the
apartment unit, or the land upon which the building is situated." Id. This opinion also noted
that a cooperative unit may be subject to property taxes and qualify for a homestead tax
exemption. Id. at 710-11. However, the Florida Constitution provides that for purposes of
the homestead tax exemption, legal or equitable title to real estate "may be held . . .
indirectly by stock ownership or membership representing the owner's or member's
proprietary interest in a corporation owning a fee or a leasehold initially in excess of ninety-
eight years." FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
A cooperative is a "form of ownership of real property wherein legal title is vested in
a corporation or other entity and the beneficial use is evidenced by an ownership in the
association and a lease or other muniment of title or possession granted by the association
as the owner of all the cooperative property." FLA. STAT. § 719.103(9) (Supp. 1992). A
cooperative parcel is "the shares or other evidence of ownership in a cooperative representing
an undivided share in the assets of the association, together with the lease or other muniment
of title or possession." Id. § 719.103(11) (emphasis added); see also id. § 719.105(1)(b).
A unit is "a part of the cooperative property which is subject to exclusive use and possession"
and may be "improvements, land, or land and improvements together." Id. § 719.103(15).
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 222.02, 222.05 (1991); see infra text accompanying notes 232-37.
17. See FLA. STAT. § 719,114 (1991) (real estate taxes assessed against individual
cooperative parcels rather than cooperative property as a whole).
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requirements for the homestead tax exemption differ from the requirements
for the homestead creditor exemption.13
ii. Residency/Use Requirements and Acreage Limitations
Third, the homestead must be the permanent place of residence of the
owner or his or her family. 9  This requirement applies expressly to
homesteads within a municipality and, by implication, to homesteads outside
a municipality. The permanent residency requirement cannot be satisfied
unless the owner or family member residing in the homestead is a citizen or
has a permanent visa.2" Once residency is established, the exemption
remains until the property is abandoned. 21 A temporary absence from the
homestead is not an abandonment. Intent to permanently reside in the
homestead, rather than physical presence is determinative. 23 As a result, a
contract to sell does not necessarily result in an abandonment of the
homestead. 24 There is some question whether one person who owns two
homes can claim more than one homestead exemption if one is used as his
18. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6 with id. art. X, § 4. The homestead tax
exemption is beyond the scope of this article.
19. Cooke v. Uransky, 412 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1982) (Canadian citizen or family needed
permanent visa and to register as resident alien to be able to establish permanent residence
in Florida).
20. See id.; see also Raheb v. DiBattisto, 513 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that foreign nationals of Iran with no permanent resident alien status in the United
Status could not establish homestead in Florida).
21. Marsh v. Hartley, 109 So. 2d 34, 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
22. E.g., Collins v. Collins, 7 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1942) (temporary rental of homestead
during tourist season was not abandonment, when owners were temporarily absent but
intended to return); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Marshall, 4 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1941)
(homestead not abandoned even though owner and family temporarily lived in non-homestead
farm during several seasons).
23. Engel v. Engel, 97 So. 2d 140, 142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ("[P]ermanency
does not mean ... that there must be an avowed and conclusive intent to forever remain in
a given place of abode, eternally or even 'until death do us part.' The only proper concept
of permanency ... means the presence of the intention to reside at that particular place for
an indefinite period of time.").
24. In re Estate of Skuro, 487 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1986) (homestead was not abandoned
when owner resided there at time of his owner's death, even though owner had entered into
a contract to sell the homestead because the sale had not been consummated at the time of
his death; thus, devise of homestead was restricted because of minor children); Brown v.
Lewis, 520 F. Supp. 1114 (M.D. Fla. 1981); Beensen v. Burgess, 218 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1969). For a discussion of these two cases, see infra text accompanying notes
283-84.
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or her personal residence and another is used as the residence of his or her
family.25
The exemption can extend to up to one-half an acre within a municipal-
ity (an urban homestead) and up to 160 acres in unincorporated areas (a
rural homestead). The acreage must be contiguous to the acreage containing
the residence. 6 The urban homestead is limited to residential use; it does
not extend to a business home. The urban homestead can be used for a
residence as well as a farm, or business, or for other purposes,2" so long
as the acreage is contiguous to the residence. Once a rural homestead has
been established it will not be subject to the more restrictive urban acreage
limitations if the property thereafter is incorporated into a municipality
unless the owner consents. 8 In addition, a homestead owner can purchase
additional acreage contiguous to the homestead of up to the maximum
acreage and exempt it from existing judgments against the owner.29
b. Scope of Exemption and Exceptions
The scope of the exemption is extensive. The homestead is exempt
from liens and forced sale, with several exceptions provided by the Florida
Constitution and the judiciary as well as by federal law. Article X, section
4(a) of the Florida Constitution provides:
There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court,
and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for
the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for
25. See Donna Litman Seiden, An Update on the Legal Chameleon: Florida's
Homestead Exemption and Restrictions, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 919, 930-31 (1988). The
constitution exempts a homestead that is either the owner's residence or his or her family's
residence.
26. Acreage is considered contiguous even if various parcels are separated by streets or
easements.
27. Armour & Co. v. Hulvey, 74 So. 212 (Fla. 1917) (rural homestead not limited to
residence, subsidiary building, and business house-six acres of land, including buildings and
property used as preparatory school for students and cadets was exempt homestead). The
rural homestead may include growing crops. See Adams v. Adams, 28 So. 2d 254 (Fla.
1946) (relating to devise and descent of homestead). But see Gentile Bros., Inc. v. Bryan,
133 So. 630 (Fla. 1931) (relating to mortgage on citrus crops).
28. Similarly, once a homestead qualifies as a rural homestead, it will not be limited by
the urban use restrictions, unless the land is incorporated into a municipality and the owner
consents to the reduction.
29. See Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla.), cert. denied,
210 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1968).
1994]
101
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted
for house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the following
property owned by a natural person ...
The homestead is protected from most debts because they cannot
become liens upon the property. In addition, the homestead is protected
from forced sale through foreclosure of a lien or other court process, except
for certain liens and obligations. If the owner voluntarily sells the
homestead, the net proceeds from the sale will retain their exempt status so
long as the seller intends to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead
within a reasonable time, keeps the funds separate, and actually reinvests
them.30 The same rule applies to insurance proceeds from a casualty, such
as fire damage to the homestead, or proceeds from an involuntary conver-
30. Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. LaCroix, 137 So. 2d 201, 205-06 (Fla.
1962). In LaCroix, the court held that proceeds of a voluntary sale of a homestead are
exempt
if and only if, the vendor shows, by a preponderance of the evidence an abiding
good faith intention prior to and at the time of the sale of the homestead to
reinvest the proceeds thereof in another homestead within a reasonable time.
Moreover, only so much of the proceeds of the sale as are intended to be
reinvested in another homestead may be exempt under this holding. Any surplus
over and above that amount should be treated as general assets of the debtor.
We further hold that in order to satisfy the requirements of the exemption the
funds must not be commingled with other monies of the vendor but must be
kept separate and apart and held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home.
The proceeds of the sale are not exempt if they are not reinvested in another
homestead in a reasonable time or if they are held for the general purposes of
the vendor.
Id. at 206. See also In re McDonald, 100 B.R. 598 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (portion of
proceeds from sale of first home that were not reinvested in purchase of less expensive
second home were not exempt, even though seller separately invested them, for the one year
period after the sale, because court found facts did not support seller's contention that the
second home was temporary purchase until he could find more expensive home in future);
McGuire v. Manufactures & Traders Trust Co., 37 B.R. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (debtor,
through his widow, was unable to prove any intent on the part of the debtor to purchase or
build a new residence to replace the sale of the old residence, nor was she able to prove the
proceeds were segregated for this purpose); Havee v. Rodriguez, 24 B.R. 12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1982) (proceeds from sale of first home so commingled with income and funds from
corporate loans that purchase of some home not treated as made from exempt proceeds from
first home; therefore, second home not continuation of first homestead); Sun First Nat'l Bank
v. Gieger, 402 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (purchase money mortgage received
by seller from sale of homestead could qualify as exempt non-cash proceeds to extent sellers
intended to reinvest new homestead proceeds).
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sion of the homestead.3 If the sale of a homestead is forced to satisfy a
valid lien, the excess proceeds would be exempt;32 however, if the
proceeds are not reinvested within a reasonable time they should lose their
exempt status by analogy to the rule for a voluntary sale.
Some creditors have priority over the exemption. These creditors have
liens or claims that are superior to the exemption. In some cases the express
provisions of the Florida Constitution create the priority. In other cases, the
superior nature of the claim or lien is a product of judicial doctrine, a
Florida court's equitable powers, or federal law.
The homestead is not exempt from a lien for an obligation contracted
to purchase, improve, or repair it.3  If a buyer wants to retain the full
benefit of the exemption, the buyer must pay the seller the full purchase
price for his or her homestead. Otherwise, the seller can force the sale of
the homestead.34 Similarly, the owner must pay for the costs he or she
incurs to repair the homestead or to add to or improve it. The owner also
must pay fir labor provided to the home and yard or field.35 Construction
costs, including labor and materials, may be supported by a construction
lien," or in some cases, an equitable lien, on the homestead.
3 7
31. See Kohn v. Coats, 138 So. 760 (Fla. 1931) (insurance proceeds for homestead
destroyed by fire were exempt); see also Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 So. 190 (Fla. 1920)
(amounts recovered as damages resulting from unlawful levy and sale of exempt homestead
were exempt).
32. Scull v. Beatty, 9 So. 4 (Fla. 1891) (excess proceeds from foreclosure of mortgage
homestead after owner's death were payable to decedent's children and were exempt from
decedent's creditors).
33. Platt v. Platt, 39 So. 536 (Fla. 1905) (holding that one partner's agreement to assume
the payment of certain partnership indebtedness when he purchased the homestead property
was an obligation contracted for the purchase of the homestead).
34. See Arko Enters., Inc. v. Wood, 185 So. 2d 734 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (seller
had vendor's lien for purchase price under contract to sell).
35. Although an urban homestead can include a farm, the homestead may be protected
against debts incurred in connection with that farm, unless those debts fit within one of the
exceptions, such as for "house, field or other labor." Lamb v. Ralston Purina Co., 21 So. 2d
127, 132 (Fla. 1945) (homestead owned by wife was small farm where she resided and
engaged in business of raising and selling poultry and eggs could not be liened to for debt
for chicken feed and insecticide because bill for feed and insecticide was not "'for house,
field or other labor."').
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001-713.37 (1991 & Supp. 1992); see also Wood v. Wilson, 84
So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1955) ("absent special or peculiar equities justifying the imposition of an
equitable lien as typified by the case of Jones v. Carpenter, [106 So. 127 (Fla. 1925)] an
action to enforce a materialman's or mechanic's lien must be brought within the period of
limitation stipulated in the applicable statute.").
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Further, the homestead is not exempt from a lien for taxes or assess-
ments on the homestead. Accordingly, the owner must pay the property
taxes assessed against the homestead by the county or other state municipali-
ty to protect his or her homestead. This includes assessments, such as
special assessments for roads or other improvements that benefit the home
and the neighborhood in which the homestead is located.
A Florida homestead is not exempt from a federal tax lien.38 Thus,
the owner must pay his or her federal tax liability; otherwise, the federal
government can obtain a tax lien against the homestead. Although a lien
can attach to a homestead for a federal estate tax, Florida law places the
burden of paying the federal estate tax on beneficiaries other than persons
receiving an interest in the homestead.39
The owner can mortgage his or her homestead, provided that if the
owner is married, the spouse joins in the mortgage." If the owner defaults
on a valid mortgage, the mortgage holder can force the sale of the
homestead. Thus, a creditor can protect itself when extending credit to a
homestead owner by obtaining a valid consensual lien on the homestead,
before extending credit.4
37. Florida Statutes section 713.30 provides that "nothing contained in part I of this
chapter [chapter 713-Construction Lien Law] shall be construed to prevent any lienor or
assignee under any contract from maintaining an action thereon at law in like manner as if
he had no lien for the security of his debt." FLA. STAT. § 713.30 (1991) (emphasis added).
See also Wood v. Wilson, 84 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1955) and ch. 17097-326, § 32, 1935 Fla. Laws
718, 744, which contained comparable language to that quoted from Florida Statutes section
731.30 (1991).
38. See Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert denied, 372 U.S.
913 (1963) (homestead subject to tax liens for owner's liability for federal income taxes); see
also United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983) (regarding federal liens against Texas
homestead).
39. FLA. STAT. § 733.817(1)(d) (Supp. 1992); see also Smith v. Unkefer, 515 So. 2d
757 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (court apportioned tax on property in which decedent
retained life estate as his homestead, because remainder interest was transferred by intervivos
deed and life estate that qualified for exemption terminated on decedent's death).
40. A spouse must join in the mortgage; however in some cases, the spouse may be
estopped from contesting the validity ofjoinder. See New York Life Ins. v. Oates, 192 So.
637 (Fla. 1939) (deciding when law required mortgage to be duly executed). To assure
proper joinder, the mortgagee should see the spouse execute the mortgage. Palm Beach Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993) (wife's failure to join in mortgage
rendered mortgage invalid, and bank did not have right to rely on wife's signature, forged
by husband). Under present law, a mortgage does not require two witnesses. Moxley v.
Wickes Corp., 356 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1978).
41. A waiver of the exemption in a note is not enforceable; a valid mortgage is required.
Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1956).
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A homestead is not exempt from pre-existing liens.42 A lien can
attach to property before it attains its homestead status.43 When the owner
qualifies for the exemption, that pre-existing lien has priority over the
exemption. 4 In some cases, the owner can avoid that lien in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 45 By contrast, if a person acquires homestead property when
he or she is subject to a judgment, the homestead exemption is superior so
that the lien cannot attach.46
A pre-existing lien also can arise from a provision in a declaration of
restrictions or declaration of condominium applicable to the property. For
example, these liens may arise for nonpayment of an assessment for a
recreational lease for a subdivision47 or an assessment for maintenance for
a condominium.
Generally, the homestead exemption is liberally construed and the
exceptions are narrowly construed. Nevertheless, the exemption laws will
not be interpreted or applied "to make them instruments of fraud or unjust
impositions upon the rights of creditors., 48  Accordingly, equity will
protect a creditor by granting the creditor an equitable lien upon the
property, which limits the effect of the exemption. 49  Equitable liens are
imposed under very limited circumstances. These liens are imposed when
embezzled funds are used to satisfy an obligation that could create a valid
42. See, e.g., Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980); Giddens v. McFarlan,
10 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1943).
43. Lyon v. Arnold, 46 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1931) (lien attached to property prior to the
time it was occupied).
44. Pasco v. Harley, 75 So. 30 (Fla. 1917) (lien attached to property when unmarried
owner was not head of family and constituted an interest in property that was not considered
to be owned by him, when he married and because head of family exemption was superior
to lien).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1988); Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991); see also
Hershey v. Linzer, 50 B.R. 329 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (judicial lien that attached to
property in 1982 when debtor was not head of family was avoidable by debtor because it
impaired his homestead exemption in 1983 when he was head of family).
46. Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431 (Fla.), cert. denied, 210 So.
2d 869 (Fla. 1968) (judgment did not become lien on additional acreage acquired contiguous
to existing homestead property); see also In re Krueger, 90 B.R. 553 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
47. Bessemer,381 So. 2d at 1348 (lien created under recreational lease for subdivision
was part of affirmative covenant created when owners accepted their deed to their lot in
subdivision, related back to time when declaration of restrictions were filed and attached prior
to time owners acquired their homestead interest in property).
48. Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 13 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1943).
49. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d at 270; see also Sonneman v. Tuszynski, 191 So. 18 (Fla.
1939) (court granted equitable lien on homestead for moneys advanced and for labor and
services).
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lien against the homestead property. For example, an equitable lien would
be imposed when funds are wrongfully obtain and used to purchase or
improve" the homestead, to satisfy certain tax obligations, or to pay off
an existing valid mortgage.5 If a person wrongfully obtained title to
property, that transfer can be set aside 52 or a constructive trust imposed
under equitable principles.53 Imposition of a constructive trust deprives the
50. See Jahn v. Purvis, 199 So. 340 (Fla. 1940). In Purvis, the surviving widow with
dower interest "sold" the entire property to a purchaser for valuable consideration. The
"purchaser" paid the purchase price and made substantial improvements which enhanced the
value of the property. Id. at 344. This was known to the decedent's children, the true
owners, and the court imposed an equitable lien for the value of the improvements. Id. at
342-43. The children did not receive the purchase price and they were liable for its
repayment and no lien was impressed upon the land for that amount. Id. See also La Mar
v. Lechlider, 185 So. 833 (Fla. 1939) (equitable lien imposed to support agreement that
Lechliders would pay for cost of addition to be added to the La Mar's homestead for Lech-
liders' use and that existing mortgage on homestead would be assigned to Lechliders rather
than satisfied with funds from Lechliders); Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127 (Fla. 1925)
(equitable lien imposed on homestead in favor of trustee in bankruptcy for corporation, when
corporate funds were used to improve homestead of president of corporation).
51. See Fishbein, 619 So. 2d at 270. In Fishbein, the court imposed an equitable lien
on homestead property for moneys advanced, to the extent the loan proceeds were used to
satisfy valid mortgages or taxes. Id. at 270-71. The husband obtained the loan by forging
his wife's signature on the mortgage. Id. at 268. The mortgage was invalid and the lender
did not receive a lien for all of the funds advanced (only approximately $930,000 of the
$1,200,000 loan was used to satisfy three existing mortgages and taxes). Id. See also In re
Fischer, 129 B.R. 285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (debtor's homestead was subject to equitable
lien in favor of former husband for funds he contributed to prevent foreclosure of property
when it was their marital home); Craven v. Hartley, 135 So. 899 (Fla. 1931) (equitable lien
granted against homestead for funds borrowed to satisfy existing mortgage on homestead).
In Friedman v. Luengo, 104 B.R. 489, 491 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989), the bankruptcy
court imposed an equitable lien under the authority of Florida law in favor of the bankruptcy
trustee for funds improperly withdrawn from corporate the account to satisfy the mortgage.
See Ryskind v. Robinson, 302 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
52. Regero v. Daugherty, 69 So. 2d 178, 181 (Fla. 1953) ("conveyance may be subject
to attack by homestead beneficiaries unless it is free from fraud, deceit, undue influence or
duress..."); see also Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1961) (deed to son, with retained
life estate in parents, void because father lacked capacity to execute deed at time of execution
of deed; in addition, adult children contested invalid creation of tenancy by entirety of
homestead property: case was decided when parent could not devise homestead if survived
by adult children); Graessle v. Schultz, 90 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1956) (daughter from first
marriage claimed that mother's transfer of homestead to mother plus second husband, as
tenancy by the entirety, was obtained through false representations; however, daughter failed
to meet burden of proof).
53. See Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1957). In Edwards, the wife would
have been entitled to a constructive trust being imposed on the homestead in the husband's
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owner of equitable ownership and thus negates any exemption claim the
owner otherwise might have. 4 The exemption cannot attach to bare legal
title.
There is some question whether the courts have the latitude to craft a
remedy, other than an equitable lien or a constructive trust to prevent such
fraud or abuse of the exemption. 5 In egregious cases, bankruptcy courts
have denied a claim for exemption. 6
In addition, the federal Bankruptcy Code provides that certain creditors
can reach exempt property, regardless of a state law exemption. 7 At
present, these creditors are limited to those with certain claims for taxes,
alimony, maintenance, or support, including child support, and certain
claims for fiduciary fraud or willful injury caused by a debtor to an insured
financial institution, such as a federally insured savings and loan associa-
tion. 8
In general, the attachment of a valid lien grants the holder the right to
name when her funds were used to purchase the homestead, and the husband took title in his
name against her will and without her consent; however, she was barred by laches, having
waited over 20 years after her husband's death to assert her claim. Id. at 631.
54. Havee v. Rodriguez, 24 B.R. 12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). In Rodriguez, the court
imposed a constructive trust on the home owned by Rodriguez in favor of a corporation,
when he raised his position as director and officer to benefit himself by having the
corporation transfer the home to him at the corporation's expense. Id. at 14. The court then
imposed an equitable lien on the home in favor of debtor's successor, the bankruptcy trustee,
for funds debtor contributed to corporation to purchase home. Id. See also First Fin.
Planning Corp. of S. Fla., Inc. v. Gherman, 103 B.R. 326 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (construc-
tive trust imposed on three residences owned by debtor's wife, child and in-law where
residences were purchased with funds embezzled by debtor).
55. Compare Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (court
forced debtor to sell homestead in order to satisfy alimony) with Butterworth v. Caggiano,
605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992) (regarding no RICO forfeiture of homestead).
56. See In re Gherman, 101 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); see also Govaert v.
Primack, 89 B.R. 954, 958 n.5 (Fla. 1988). In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Britton
stated the following:
There are holdings by both Florida and federal courts subjecting homesteads to
creditors' claims. . . . After practicing 40 years with these holdings, I humbly
suggest that when the conduct of the debtor so offends the sensibility of a court
that it cannot accept the exemption, that court presumes an exception to the
constitutional provision that is completely contrary to its plain language.
Because the factual permutations are infinite and the sensibility levels of courts
nearly so, I do not see the emergence of a definitive rule anytime soon.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1), (3) (Supp. III 1991); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(I), (3), (4), (5)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991).
58. II U.S.C. § 522(c) (Supp. II 1991).
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force a sale of the homestead. In some cases, the property consists of
homestead and nonhomestead interests and the asserted lien is against the
nonhomestead interest. For example, the exempt homestead may be a life
estate. A lien can attach to the remainder interest, and the remainder
interest is subject to levy.59  If the lienholder forces the sale of the
remainder interest, while the life estate is possessory, the sale of that interest
would be subject to the life estate. Most creditors, however, wait to force
a sale until the remainder interest becomes possessory.6"
Similarly, a lien can attach to an interest of a co-tenant if it does not
qualify for homestead. The lienholder can force a sale of that interest; 6'
however, a partition of the property can not be forced on the homestead
interest if the owner of the homestead interest has the exclusive right to
possession, unless the property can be divided in a manner that would
preserve the homestead interest.62
In the case of a marital dissolution, the applicable state court can award
ownership of the marital home or exclusive possession 63 or require its
sale. 64  The courts exercise this power, notwithstanding the homestead
exemption. In some cases, ownership is awarded based on special
equitiesO and proceeds may be allocated as alimony.66  Sometimes, the
court awards one spouse a lien against the other's interest in the homestead
in order to secure payment of a property settlement or other amount.67
59. Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1969), rev'g 213 So. 2d 454
(2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
60. Id. (judgment against LaGasse attached as lien to the remainder interest she received
when her father died, and lienholder levied on property after mother died). But see Anemaet
v. Martin-Senour Co., 114 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (execution on remainder
interest attempted while life tenant was alive).
61. But see Daniels v. Katz, 237 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that
mortgage lien created by former husband with respect to his undivided interest was not
enforceable while former wife had exclusive possession and her interest qualified as
homestead and where mortgagee was attorney with knowledge of these facts).
62. Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1978).
63. McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283, 1284 (Fla. 1979) ("[t]he court has
inherent authority to award exclusive possession of a jointly owned marital home to the party
having custody of children .... ").
64. Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983) (court affirmed order directing sale of
marital home and division of proceeds, part of which was payable as alimony).
65. See, e.g., Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1983) (tenancy by entirety
converted to tenancy in common upon dissolution; however, wife was entitled to more than
one-half because of special equity in other half).
66. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d at 203.
67. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
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No other persons or valid creditors can obtain a lien against the
homestead or force the sale of the homestead to satisfy a debt. This is true
whether the debt arises out of a contract, a tort,68 or any other wrongdoing.
The exemption is superior to a claim for alimony or child support,69
although dicta in old cases suggest otherwise.7" There is one recent,
questionable case where a former husband was directed to sell his home to
satisfy an alimony obligation because the court would not allow him to use
the homestead exemption as an instrument to defraud his former wife.7
The constitutional exemption is so broad that the Florida government cannot
use the Florida RICO Act to seize the owner's homestead if the homestead
is used for illegal activities.72 An equitable lien or Florida RICO action
could result, however, if that person used illegally obtained funds to
purchase the homestead.73 In these instances, forfeiture under the federal
RICO Act is a separate matter.
68. Olesky v. Nicholas, 82 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1955) (udgment for malicious prosecution
not lien against homestead); see Downing v. State, 593 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (court could not require owner of homestead to execute mortgage on homestead to
secure obligation for restitution for damage caused by burning trash).
69. See Graham v. Azar, 204 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1967) ($1000 of personal property exempt
from claim for child support); see also Isaacson v. Isaacson, 504 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to grant a former spouse an equitable lien for alimony arrearage in
excess of $15,000 because of absence of fraud or other egregious conduct on the part of the
former husband who resided in former marital home with new wife).
70. E.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1950) (dicta that even if the
father had been head of a family "his interest in the homestead would still have been subject
to sale for the purpose of providing support money for his children.").
71. See Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). But see
Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 60 n.5 (Fla. 1992) (noting that "[v]irtually all of the
relevant [fraud exception] cases involve situations that fell within one of the three stated
exceptions to the homestead provision.").
72. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 57. In Caggiano, an owner's homestead was protected
from forfeiture and sale under the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act, chapter 895, Florida Statutes, even though three bookmaking incidents occurred at his
home.
Forfeiture under the Federal RICO Act is a separate matter. It would appear that a
person's homestead could be subject to forfeiture and forced sale under the Federal RICO
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988) by analogy to the federal tax lien cases and 18 U.S.C. §
1963(a) (1988), which provides that a violator "shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective
of any provision of state law . . ." certain interests and property. See United States v.
Martenson, 780 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. I1. 1991) (RICO forfeiture of Minnesota homestead);
supra note 38 (regarding federal tax liens).
73. In Caggiano, the court noted that "no illicit proceeds were used to purchase, acquire,
or improve Caggiano's property." Id. at 61 n.5.
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2. Transfer Provisions
The transfer provisions affect transfers made during the owner's
lifetime as well as upon his or her death. The inter vivos provisions restrict
the owner's right to transfer any interest in the homestead while married.
The transfer provisions also affect the owner's right to devise the homestead
upon death, if married or survived by a minor child. Upon death, the
exemption inures to certain persons, so that in some cases the homestead
descends or is devised, exempt from the deceased owner's creditors.
a. Inter Vivos Alienation
The constitution restricts a married owner's right to alienate his or her
homestead. Article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution provides in
part:
The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married,
may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married,
may be deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the
spouse. If the owner of spouse is incompetent, the method of alienation
or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.
Thus, if the owner of a homestead is married, he or she cannot sell, give,
mortgage or otherwise alienate any interest in the homestead without the
spouse's consent. One exception to this rule is that the owner may convey
title to the owner and his or her spouse as tenants by the entirety, without
the spouse joining in the conveyance. In addition, the Legislature authorizes
a conveyance from one spouse to another without the joinder of the grantee
spouse; and the constitutionality of this statute has been upheld on other
grounds.74
74. Florida Statutes section 689.11(1) currently provides: "A conveyance of real estate,
including homestead, made by one spouse to the other shall convey the legal title to the
grantee spouse in all cases in which it would be effectual if the parties were not married, and
the grantee need not execute the conveyance." See also Williams v. Foerster, 335 So. 2d 810
(Fla. 1976) (upholding constitutionality of Florida Statutes section 689.11 (1975), holding
deed from husband as tenant by the entirety to wife was not invalid because the wife did not
join but was invalid because it was not properly witnessed and husband lacked intent to
convey when he executed it); seealso Jameson v. Jameson, 387 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1980) (deed
from husband to husband and wife as tenants by the entirety was valid even though wife did
not join). The court in Jameson stated,
In our opinion the provision ['joined by the spouse'] is more logically and
reasonably interpreted if the joinder requirement is applied only to the alienation
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The homestead provisions do not guarantee the spouse the right to
reside on the homestead while the owner is alive. The joinder requirement
merely protects the future right that a surviving spouse has to receive an
interest in the homestead. If the spouse survives, then the surviving spouse
would be assured the right to reside in the homestead via a life estate or fee
simple interest.
If the owner is married, there is some question as to whether the legal
requirement for joinder can be waived if the owner's spouse has waived
homestead rights in another document, such as an antenuptial agreement.
The constitution does not restrict the right of a parent with a minor child to
alienate homestead. The only protection a minor has occurs indirectly if the
minor's parent is married and the spouse refuses to join in an alienation.
b. Devise Restrictions
There are some restrictions on an owner's right to devise the home-
stead. These provisions affect whether the owner has the right to devise the
property, or whether the homestead descends by statutory mandate. Article
X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution provides in part:
The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived
by spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to the
owner's spouse if there be no minor child.
If the owner is survived by a minor child, the owner cannot devise the
homestead." This restriction applies whether the owner is married or not.
The owner cannot devise the homestead in trust for the benefit of the
clause. In our view, a requirement of spousal joinder when that spouse is the
grantee was not intended by the constitutional drafters, and is neither rational nor
necessary to protect the homestead heirs.
Id. at 354. Another theory that has been raised for this conclusion is that when "the non-
owning spouse is a party to the transaction (grantee) the spouse has effectively 'joined' in
the transfer by acquiescence and participation, although no formal execution was made." Id.
at 353 (quoting Star Project Commentary submitted to 1978 Constitution Revision Commis-
sion).
75. This includes an afterbom or posthumous child. FLA. STAT. § 732.106 (1991);
Shone v. Bellnore, 78 So. 605 (Fla. 1918). It also includes an adopted child. See FLA.
STAT. § 732.108(1) (1991); Church v. Lee, 136 So. 242 (Fla. 1931). It also should include
a child born out of wedlock when that child is considered the child of the owner under
section 732.108(2). See FLA. STAT. § 732.108(2) (1991).
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minor.76
If the owner is married but has no minor children, the owner can devise
the homestead to the surviving spouse. The devise cannot be of a life
estate; it must be of a fee simple interest. 77 The devise may be accom-
plished by a specific or residuary devise to the surviving spouse.7' The
owner cannot devise the homestead to anyone other than the surviving
spouse, unless the surviving spouse has waived his or her homestead
rights.79
If the owner has no spouse or minor child, the owner is free to devise
the homestead to whomever he or she pleases. This is true even if the
owner has adult children, who might inherit the property if he or she did not
devise it.
The constitution does not provide who will receive the homestead. If
the owner cannot devise the property," does not devise it properly or can
but chooses not to devise it, the Florida Probate Code determines the
homestead's descent. Under the present Florida Probate Code, the following
applies:
I. If there is a surviving spouse and descendants, the
homestead descends, with a life estate to the spouse and the vested
remainder to the descendants, per stirpes.
2. If there is a spouse but no descendants, the homestead
descends to the spouse. 2
3. If there are descendants, but no spouse, the homestead
descends to the owner's descendants, per stirpes.83
4. If there are no descendants and no spouse, the homestead
76. See Beck v. Wylie, 60 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1952) (devise in trust for adult child was
invalid when constitution prohibited devise if owner were survived by minor or adult
children).
77. In re Estate of Finch, 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981).
78. See Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1976).
79. See City Nat'l Bank v. Tescher, 578 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1991) ("[W]hen a
decedent is survived by no minor children and the surviving spouse has waived homestead
rights, there is no constitutional restriction on devising homestead property."); Hartwell v.
Blasingame, 584 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1991) (waiver of wife was binding on husband's children).
80. FLA. STAT. § 732.4015 (Supp. 1992).
81. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (1991). This statute has been declared to be constitutional.
The predecessor statute was declared constitutional when the existence of children, adult or
minor, prohibited devise. See FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1941); see also Nesmith v. Nesmith, 21
So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1945).
82. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401, 732.102(a) (1991).
83. Id. §§ 732.401, 732.103(l), 732.104.
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descends to the nearest heirs under the intestacy statute.84
If the spouse waives his or her homestead rights, the spouse is not treated
as surviving, 5 so that the third or fourth rule applies.
The restrictions on devise do not apply to a homestead interest held as
a tenant by the entirety or a joint tenant with right of survivorship.86 This
is because the tenant does not have any devisable interest in the homestead.
When one spouse dies, the tenancy by the entirety passes to the surviving
spouse by operation of law. When a joint tenant dies, the joint tenancy by
right of survivorship passes to the surviving tenant or tenants. Many
spouses choose to own their home in a tenancy by the entirety. This
effectively avoids the surviving spouse receiving only a life estate, even if
the first spouse to die is survived by a minor child. The minor child is not
protected even when the surviving spouse is not the other parent of the
minor child. The restrictions also do not apply to life estates or certain
interests in irrevocable trusts." The restrictions do apply to beneficial
interests in a revocable trust.88
c. Inurement of Owner's Exemption Upon Owner's Death
The Florida Constitution also determines who receives the owner's
exemption when he or she dies. This affects whether the persons to whom
the homestead is devised or descends will receive the homestead free from
the claims of the deceased owner's creditors. The Florida Constitution
provides that the exemption "shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of
the owner."8 9 A persons's heirs are defined under the intestacy statutes. 90
The exemption inures to the heirs, even if they were not dependent on the
84. Id. § 732.103.
85. Tescher, 578 So. 2d at 703.
86. FLA. STAT. § 732.401(2) (1991).
87. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
88. In re Estate of Johnson, 397 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Johns v.
Bowden, 66 So. 155, 159 (Fla. 1914) (grantor retained life estate in trust and power to direct
trustee to convey homestead during life; court held trust provision was "in the nature of a
testamentary disposition ... forbidden by law when the testator leaves a wife or a child").
Section 732.4015 of the Florida Statutes, has been amended to allow the grantor of a
revocable trust to dispose of his or her equitable interest in homestead to his or her spouse,
through a disposition in the trust, if there are no minor children. See FLA. STAT. § 732.4015
(Supp. 1992). The constitutionality of this statute has not been tested.
89. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b).
90. Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 951 n.6 (Fla. 1988).
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homestead owner.91
The exemption does not necessarily inure to the benefit of the same
persons who receive the homestead. If it does, inurement of the exemption
is significant. If the same persons do not receive both, the inurement of the
exemption is meaningless.
The owner's exemption and the homestead may converge in the same
persons under the following circumstances:
1. If the owner- is married and has no children or other
descendants and the surviving spouse has not waived his or her
homestead rights, then the surviving spouse will receive the
homestead and the exemption. 92
2. If the owner is married and has only adult children and
the surviving spouse has not waived his or her homestead rights,
either the surviving spouse will receive the entire homestead by
devise or will receive a life estate, with all of the owner's
descendants, per stirpes, receiving vested remainder interests. The
exemption will inure to the benefit of the surviving spouse and the
descendants.
3. If the owner is not married, but is survived by at least
one minor child, all of the owner's descendants, per stirpes, will
receive the homestead and the exemption. If the owner is
married, but the surviving spouse waived his or her homestead
rights, the same result will occur.
4. If the owner is not married (or is married but the
surviving spouse waived his or her homestead rights) and has no
minor children, the following applies:
a. If the property is devised to the owner's living children,
with grandchildren or other descendants receiving an interest only
if his or her parent predeceased the owner, the exemption will
inure to those devises, because they qualify as heirs.93
91. Id. at 949.
92. The spouse will receive the homestead by devise or descent. If the homestead is
owned as tenancy by the entirety, the spouse receives the property free and clear of the
other's creditors (other than those creditors with valid liens) because the property is entireties
property.
93. HCA Gulf Coast Hosp. v. Estate of Downing, 594 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) ("[tlhe benefit of the homestead forced sale exemption inures to a spendthrift
beneficiary who would be otherwise entitled to claim homestead protection had title passed
directly to her by devise or intestacy."); Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (footnote omitted) ("[w]hen the decedent's homestead is devised to his son-
a member of the class of persons who are the decedent's 'heirs'-the constitutional
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1. If the property is devised to other individuals who would
not be heirs, they will receive the homestead, but not the exemp-
tion. This means that before the non-heirs receive the homestead,
it should be subject to administration (and claims of creditors) in
the hands of the decedent's personal representative. 94  A post-
death sale by the heirs will not subject the proceeds to claims of
creditors of the decedent. 95 A sale directed by the will with a
devise of the proceeds may.96
B. History of Present Homestead Exemption Law
The exemption is over 200 years old. The first constitution for the
State of Florida, the Florida Constitution of 1868, provided the basic
framework for the present exemption. Some of the exemption components
and the transfer provisions were amended in 1885, 9' 1968, 1972 and 1984.
The 1968 revision was effective January 7, 1969, the 1972 amendment
January 2, 1973, and the 1984 amendment January 8, 1985. The appendix
contained the complete text of the respective homestead exemption
provisions in the Florida Constitutions of 1868, 1885, and 1968, as well as
the 1972 and 1984 amendments. The additions and changes in each
subsequent text are underlined. An historical summary of these changes
with respect to the exemption components (the qualification requirements
exemption from forced sale by the decedent's creditors found in Article X, Section 4(b) of
the Florida Constitution, inures to that son."). But see In re Estate of Hill, 552 So. 2d 1133
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (exemption does not inure to devises-life estate in homestead
was devised to stepdaughter, with proceeds upon sale distributed to stepdaughter and son).
94. But see Fla. Stat. § 733.608 (1991) (providing that: "All real and personal property
of the decedent, except the homestead . . . shall be assets in the hands of the personal
representative: (I) For the payment of devises, debts, family allowance, estate and
inheritance taxes, claims, charges, and expenses of administration.") (emphasis added).
95. Adams v. Clark, 37 So. 734 (Fla. 1904); see also Tudhope v Rudkin, 595 So. 2d
312 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (sale of homestead by guardian of decedent's minor
children was made after homestead descended to them and exemption from decedent's
creditors inured to them, so that decedent's creditors could not reach proceeds in hands of
guardian).
96. See Estate of Price v. West Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (direction in will to sell home and divide proceeds between adult children was treated
as devise of non-exempt proceeds, so that proceeds were subject to claims of creditors).
Some also argue that if there is no spouse or minor child, a direction in the will to pay
expenses from the residuary may result in a residuary devise of the homestead being subject
to claims, even if the homestead is devised to an heir to whom the exemption inures.
97. For an extensive discussion of the homestead issues under the 1885 Constitution
through 1949, see Crosby & Miller, supra note 14.
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and limitations and the scope of the exemption, including exceptions) and
the transfer provisions (inter vivos, devise and survival of the exemption)
follows.
1. Exemption Provisions
a. Qualification Requirements and Limitations
i. Florida Constitution of 1868
The Florida Constitution of 1868 established the homestead exemption
with restrictive ownership and residency requirements. The exemption also
was subject to acreage limitations substantially similar to the present law.
Only the head of a family residing in Florida could qualify for the
exemption, if he or she owned an interest in an estate in land. The
homestead must have been the owner's permanent residence.
The owner could be the head of a family at law or a family in fact.9"
The homestead included any improvements on the real estate of up to 160
acres in an unincorporated town or city or up to one-half an acre within an
incorporated town or city. The rural homestead was required, by interpreta-
tion, to be the owner's permanent residence, although there was no
restriction on the use of the other acreage. The urban homestead in a town
or city was limited to the residence and business house of the owner. The
exemption was not limited by a dollar amount.
The provisions for up to 160 acres paralleled the federal homestead
law, under which a head of a family could purchase 160 acres of land for
a nominal fee, if they settled and cultivated the land and lived on it for five
years. The federal homestead law protected the owner from pre-existing
debts; whereas the Florida Constitution could exempt debts incurred before
or after the homestead was acquired.
98. Holden v. Gardner, 420 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982). In Holden, the court stated:
In determining whether a person is the head of a family, Florida courts have
long used a test which requires a showing of either: (1) a legal duty to support
which arises out of a family relationship, or (2) continuing communal living by
at least two individuals under such circumstances that one is regarded as in
charge. While the former requirement looks to a "family in law," the latter
looks to a "family in fact," which arises out of a moral obligation to support.
Id. at 1083 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 18
116
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Seiden
ii. Florida Constitution of 1885
In 1885, the qualification requirements were amended in one aspect.
The constitution provided that the acreage requirement applicable to a
homestead could not be reduced if the homestead was subsequently included
within the limits of an incorporated city or town, unless the owner
consented. Thus, once a homestead qualified for the exemption of up to
160 acres, it could not then be reduced to only one-half an acre or to only
the residence and business home of the owner without the owner's consent.
iii. Florida Constitution of 1968
In 1968, the qualification requirements were amended with respect to
the residency requirement and the urban use restriction. In addition, an
acreage contiguity requirement was affirmatively stated in the constitution
and the acreage nomenclature was changed from incorporated cities and
towns to municipalities.
After the 1968 revision, a person still needed to be the head of a family
in order to qualify for the exemption. The residency requirement for the
urban homestead was expanded in part and reduced in part. The urban
homestead could extend to the residency of the owner or his or her family,
but no longer could include a business house. Thus, the head of a family
who did not reside in Florida could own a homestead in Florida, if it were
the residence of his or her family. Similarly, the head of a family residing
in Florida with his or her family could establish a homestead. The courts
had held that there could be only one head of one family, so that it was
generally understood that one family could have only one homestead.99
The residency requirement for the rural homestead was not stated but
was inferred. The constitution limits the urban homestead to "the residence
of the owner or his family;"' ° the implication being that the urban
homestead includes, but is not limited to, that residence. In addition,
residency is considered to be an inherent component of the term "home-
stead," which is used but not defined in the constitution.
99. There were no reported cases under which one person claimed to own two homes
and to be the head of two different families, one residing in each home. See First Fin.
Planning Corp. of S. Fla., Inc. v. Gherman, 103 B.R. 326 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (although
constructive trusts were imposed on three residences owned by wife or child or in-law of
debtor, exemption would not have been granted to debtor, because funds used to purchase
all three homesteads were embezzled); In re Gherman, 101 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989)
(debtor's exemption for life estate denied).
100. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (amended 1984).
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In 1968, the constitution also was amended to provide that the rural
homestead applied to up to 160 acres of "contiguous land and improvements
thereon" and the urban homestead was limited to one-half acre of "contigu-
ous land."'' Prior to 1968, there were some questions as to whether the
acreage always had to be contiguous to qualify for the homestead exemp-
tion."' The 1968 revision also reflected the changes in terminology from
incorporated cities and towns to municipalities; however, the same acreage
limitations were retained.0 3
iv. 1984 Amendment to Florida Constitution of 1968
In 1984, the ownership requirement was significantly expanded. This
amendment deleted the head of the family requirement. The ownership
requirement was changed so that any "natural person" owning a homestead
could qualify for the exemption. 4 This change expanded the exemption
to single or married persons who do not head a family. Thus, a person who
owns a home and resides there with his or her family can qualify for the
exemption, even if he or she is not the head of the family. In addition, a
person who is not married and has no family is entitled to the exemption for
his or her residence.
b. Scope of Exemption and Exceptions
i. Florida Constitution of 1868
The Florida Constitution of 1868 contained some of the basic
framework of the present scope of the exemption. It contained the
exemption from forced sale, with some of the present exceptions. The
original 1868 homestead provisions exempted the homestead "from forced
sale under any process of law."' 5 It did not provide protection from lien
attachment, but it did prevent forced sale by reason of such liens.
Some of the present exceptions were contained in the 1868 homestead
101. Id.
102. Clark v. Cox, 85 So. 173, 174 (1920) ("the question whether actual contiguity is
required must be determined in each case on its peculiar facts."). In Cox, the conveyance of
a 100-foot strip across the homestead for use as a public railroad right of way did not deprive
land on both sides of easement from constituting homestead. Id.
103. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (amended 1984).
104. Id.
105. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § I.
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provisions.' °6 The homestead was exempt from forced sale for taxes. It
was exempt from the payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of
the homestead or for the erection of improvements thereon. It also was
exempt for house, field, or other labor performed on the homestead
premises.
ii. Florida Constitution of 1885
In 1885, the scope of the exemption, and the exceptions from the
exemption were expanded. The exemption protected the homestead from
forced sale under process of any court. °7 In addition, the exemption
provided that no judgment, decree or execution was a lien upon the
exempted property, unless the debt was specifically excepted from the
exemption."'
The exceptions were expanded to include assessments, as well as
taxes.'0 9  There was some question as to whether the homestead was
exempt from liens for any other state, county or municipal tax liability that
did not relate to the homestead. Further, the homestead was not exempt
from forced sale for obligations contracted to erect or repair improvements
on the real estate. Thus, the exceptions covered taxes, assessments,
obligations contracted to purchase the property or erect or repair improve-
ments, as well as for house, field, and labor. In all other respects, the
homestead was protected from liens and forced sale. In 1962, the Fifth
Circuit confirmed that federal tax liens also were an exception, so that a
Florida homestead could be liened and a sale forced to pay a federal tax
obligation."0
iii. Florida Constitution of 1968
In 1968, the exceptions were revised in minor detail; otherwise, the full
scope of the exemption was retained."' The homestead remained exempt
106. Id.
107. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1 ($1000 personalty exemption); West Fla.
Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 77 So. 209, 212 (1918) (the court interpreted meaning
of phrase "process of any court" with respect to $1000 personalty exemption, to apply "not
only to formal and technical process, but to any .judicial proceedings, of law or in equity,
which seek the appropriation of the property to the payment of debts.").
108. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1.
109. Id.
I10. Weilzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962).
111. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) (amended 1984).
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from forced sale under process of any court and was protected from any
judgment, decree or execution becoming a lien on the homestead, except for
certain superior debts. The exceptions were reorganized so that they were
more parallel in construction. The exception for taxes and assessments was
changed to "taxes and assessments thereon.""'  This was significant to the
extent that the exception was limited to property taxes and assessments on
the homestead property and could not include other state taxes, such as state
income taxes, that had no relationship to the homestead property. The last
time the scope of the exemption or the exceptions were amended was in
1885."'
2. Transfer Provisions
The homestead transfer provisions of the homestead exemption affect
a married owner's ability to transfer the homestead during the owner's
lifetime. They also affect whether an owner who is married or has minor
children can designate, by last will and testament, who will receive the
homestead upon the owner's death. These provisions also affect whether the
exemption inures to the benefit of the persons who receive the homestead
upon the owner's death. The original constitutional provisions and the
revisions and amendments reflect some of the changes in the rights of men
and women with respect to property ownership, as well as other changes.
a. Inter Vivos Alienation
i. Florida Constitution of 1868
The Florida Constitution of 1868 did not contain any restrictions on the
right of the head of a family to alienate any or all of his or her interest in
the homestead during the owner's lifetime." 4 Generally, the head of the
family was the man and the wife had a dower interest in the homestead.
Dower rights applied to the homestead because it was real property.
ii. Florida Constitution of 1885
In 1885, the constitution was revised to provide that the homestead did
not prevent the owner from alienating his or her homestead by deed or
112. Id.
113. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1.
114. See FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX.
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mortgage, provided that the owner duly executed the deed or mortgage." 5
In addition, if the owner were married, the owner's husband or wife was
required to duly execute the deed or mortgage." 16
iii. Florida Constitution of 1968
In 1968, the inter vivos transfer provisions were revised." 7  Gifts
were added to the list of permitted alienation, so that the owner could
alienate his or her homestead by mortgage, sale, or gift. This eliminated
any judicially imposed requirement of consideration. If the owner was
married, the owner could not alienate the homestead unless the spouse
joined. The requirement that an alienation be duly executed was deleted;
thus, a contract to sell a homestead and a mortgage is enforceable even if
it is not witnessed." 8  In addition, a provision was added so that an
incompetent owner could alienate the homestead or an incompetent spouse
could join as provided by law (whether judicial or statutory).
b. Devise upon Death
i. Florida Constitution of 1868
The Florida Constitution of 1868 contained no reference to the owner's
right to dispose of the homestead by will, or any restrictions on that
right. 9  The courts inferred from the text of the constitution that the
homestead descended to the owner's heirs and could not be devised. 2'
115. A deed or mortgage was duly executed if it was executed in accordance with
statutes requiring deeds and mortgages to be executed. Oates v. New York Life Ins. Co., 152
So. 671 (Fla. 1934). At that time, due execution by a married couple required a mortgage
to be signed by husband and wife under seal, in the presence of two witnesses, to be
acknowledged by the wife that she executed the mortgage freely and voluntarily, to contain
a certificate of the officer, and for delivery to occur. Id. at 673. See Abercrombie v.
Eidschun, 66 So, 2d 875 (Fla. 1953) (contract to sell homestead required due execution-two
witnesses); see also Crosby & Miller, supra note 14, at 63.
116. See supra note 115.
117. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (amended 1972).
118. Moxley v. Wickes Corp., 356 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1985) (relating to mortgage);
Rosenthal v. Finger & Margolis, P.A., 460 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (relating
to contract to sell).
119. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX.
120. Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461 (1882) (holding that a husband could not devise
homestead because devise would be incompatible with the constitutional provision accruing
the exemption to his heirs).
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Further, if the owner was a married man, his wife was protected by
dower. 121
ii. Florida Constitution of 1885
In 1885, the Florida Constitution was revised to provide that nothing
in the homestead provisions prevented the head of a family from disposing
of his or her homestead by will if the "holder be without children."'22 By
implication, when the holder had children, he or she was prohibited from
disposing of his or her homestead by will.'23 If there were a child or
children, the homestead descended to his or her heirs, subject to a claim of
dower if survived by a wife. If there were no children, the owner could
devise the homestead; but if the owner were a married man, that devise
would be subject to the widow's right to dower.'24 In 1899, a statute was
enacted prohibiting the head of the family who was survived by a wife from
devising the homestead.'25 The wife was entitled to dower or a child's
share.' 26 By contrast, if the wife was the head of the family, she could
devise it if she chose and could disinherit her husband from receiving the
homestead.
In 1933, the descent provisions were changed when the head of the
family was survived by a widow and lineal descendants. In that case, the
wife received a life estate and the descendants the vested remainder.'27
Dower no longer applied to homestead, except for preexisting dower
rights. 2 ' If the wife was the head of the family, her husband was not
entitled to a life estate; instead he was entitled to a child's share.'29
Further, if there were no descendants, a wife/head of the family could
disinherit her husband from the homestead, but a husband/head of the family
could not disinherit his wife. The courts never decided whether this violated
the United States Constitution or the Florida Constitution.
121. Id. at 467.
122. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 4.
123. Palmer v. Palmer, 35 So. 983 (Fla. 1904).
124. Purnell v. Reed, 13 So. 874, 876 (Fla. 1893).
125. Ch. 4730-69, § 1, 1899 Fla. Laws 119, 119-20; see also FLA. STAT. § 731.05
(1933) (regarding the prohibition on devise).
126. GENERAL STATUTES OF STATE OF FLORIDA, Devolution by Dower, ch. 3, § 2308
(1872).
127. FLA. STAT. § 731.05 (1931).
128. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1933).
129. Id. § 731.23(1).
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iii. Florida Constitution of 1968
In 1968, the constitution affirmatively prohibited devise in certain
circumstances.' 30 The constitution provided that the homestead could not
be devised if the owner were survived by a spouse or minor child. This
represented two substantial departures from the prior law. First, surviving
husbands and wives were both protected. Thus, if the wife were the head
of the family, she could not devise her homestead if her husband survived
her.
Second, only the existence of minor children prohibited the head of a
family from devising the homestead. If the family head was survived by
children, all of whom were adults, but no spouse, the owner could devise
the homestead freely, even if those children comprised the family of which
the owner was the head.
Although the constitution was revised in 1968, the Florida probate law
continued to prohibit devise if the head of the family was survived by any
lineal descendant, whether or not a minor.' In 1971, this statute was
declared unconstitutional to the extent it prohibited devise when the owner
was survived by an adult child, but not a spouse or a minor child. 3 '
The constitutional distinction between a surviving minor child and an
adult child creates an unusual aspect to the prohibition on devise, because
minority is; a temporary condition. Further, the constitution does not
guarantee the minor the right to reside in the homestead. The existence of
a minor prohibits devise,'33 but the Florida Probate Code does not neces-
sarily provide the minor with a residence during his or her minority. If the
owner is survived by a spouse and a minor child, the surviving spouse
receives a life estate in the homestead.' 34 If that spouse is also the
minor's parent or guardian, the minor child can reside with the surviving
spouse. Otherwise, the minor will reside with his or her surviving parent
or guardian. If there is no surviving spouse, the minor child will receive a
present, possessory interest in the homestead. If there are other surviving
children or descendants, the minor child must share ownership with the
other children and descendants. Thus, if there are other children, the minor
is not provided exclusive possession of the homestead. Further, the minor
will reside there only if his or her surviving parent can live there too.
130. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
131. FLA. STAT. § 731.05(I) (1931).
132. In re Estate of McGinty, 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1971).
133. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
134. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (1991).
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iv. 1972 Amendment to Florida Constitution of 1968
In 1972, the Florida Constitution of 1968 was amended to allow the
owner to devise to his or her spouse if there was no minor child.' This
devise may be accomplished by a specific devise or a residuary devise to the
spouse; 36 however, the devise must be of a fee interest. 137 Clearly, a
specific devise of the owner's entire interest to the surviving spouse will be
effective if there are no minor children, even if the owner only owns an
undivided one-half interest.' It is questionable whether a devise to the
spouse of an undivided one-half interest in the homestead will qualify if the
owner is the sole owner of the entire property. 39
The restriction on devise applies if the homestead is owned by a
revocable trust created by the owner. 40  The restriction should not apply
to the beneficial interest owned by a beneficiary of an irrevocable trust, even
if the beneficiary was the settlor of the trust, so long as the transfer into the
trust was a valid inter vivos transfer and the beneficiary had no power to
135. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
136. Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1976).
137. In re Estate of Finch, 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981).
138. See In re Estate of Donovan v. Hendrickson, 550 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (devise to wife of decedent's entire undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common
was valid-devise was through residuary clause and revocable trust).
139. In In re Estate of Ritz v. Ritz, 385 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the
court approved a devise of homestead by a husband of a life estate in his homestead to his
wife and a power to sell. The wife was entitled to 80% of the proceeds upon sale during her
life or upon her death. The other 20% of the proceeds was payable to two sons of his. The
supreme court overruled Ritz in In re Estate of Finch, 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981).
In two cases after Finch, the district court of appeal ruled that the devise to the
surviving spouse and another as tenants in common was invalid in its entirety, so that the
wife received a life estate and the remainder vested in the lineal descendants, per stirpes.
Jewett v. Sun Bank, 509 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (devise to wife and adult
son); landoli v. landoli, 504 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 513 So. 2d
1061 (Fla. 1987) (devise to wife and adult daughter).
It is arguable that the devise to the spouse should qualify, even if it is less than a fee,
and only the devise to the nonspouse should fail. This result is unwieldy; so that few
testators would choose this option if they understood the result. For example, a devise of a
one-half interest to the spouse would result in the spouse owing one-half outright and a life
estate in the other half if there were lineal descendants.
140. In re Estate of Johnson, 397 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Johns v.
Bowden, 66 So. 155 (Fla. 1914); see also FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(2) (Supp. 1992) (defining
a devise to include "a disposition by trust of that portion of the trust estate which, if titled
in the name of the settlor of the trust, would be the settlor's homestead.").
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dispose of the homestead interest upon his or her death.'41
The devise restrictions do not apply if the homestead is owned by both
spouses, as tenants by the entirety, even if there is a minor child.'42 It
also does not apply if the homestead is co-owned with another as joint
tenants with right of survivorship and the joint tenancy was created before
the owner married or had a child.'43 Similarly, the restrictions do not
apply to a life estate. If the homestead is co-owned as tenants in common,
the restrictions on devise apply to each owner's undivided interest.
In addition, if the spouse waives his or her homestead rights, the owner
is not treated as survived by a spouse. Thus, the owner can devise the
homestead to any one he or she chooses, so long as the owner is not
survived by a minor child.
c. Inurement of Exemption
i. Florida Constitution of 1868
The Florida Constitution of 1868 contained some of the basic
framework of the provisions for the survival of the exemption. The first
constitution provided that the exemption from forced sale for the owner's
debts would "accrue to the heirs of the party having enjoyed or taken the
benefit of such exemption."' 44 Under the laws of descent, the homestead
would descend to the owner's heirs. The owner's exemption also would
accrue to those heirs. Thus, the heirs received the homestead free of any
threat of a forced sale. However, this did not mean that the heirs could
continue to own the homestead free from the reach of their own creditors.
An heir would be entitled to his or her own homestead exemption only if
that heir was the head of the family residing in Florida and the property
became that heir's residence.
ii. Florida Constitution of 1885
In 1885, the constitution expanded the group that could benefit from
the owner's exemption. The constitution was revised so that the exemption
would "inure" to the surviving widow and heirs of the party entitled to the
141. The retention of other rights by the grantor/beneficiary of an irrevocable trust may
be treated comparable to outright ownership in certain cases, so as to preclude disinheritance
of a surviving spouse or minor child.
142. See Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1953).
143. See Ostyn v. Olympic, 455 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
144. FLA CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 3 (1868).
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exemption.'45 This guaranteed the surviving widow the benefit of her
husband's exemption from the reach of his creditors. In the special case
where the wife was the head of the family, the exemption would not inure
to her surviving husband as an heir.
iii. Florida Constitution of 1968
The Florida Constitution of 1968 treats surviving husbands and wives
similarly. After this revision, the exemption inures "to the surviving spouse
or heirs of the owner."' 46 It is unclear why the disjunctive "or" was used.
The term "heir" is sufficient to include a surviving spouse. In addition,
sometimes the homestead descends to the surviving spouse and descendants.
The exemption should inure to the benefit of all of these new owners, so
that the life estate and vested remainder interests can receive the benefit of
the exemption from the decedent's creditors.
When the Florida Constitution was amended in 1984 to extend the
exemption from the head of the family to all natural persons,'47 the
provision regarding inurement was not changed. Nevertheless, the
amendment changed the scope of the inurement provision. The effect of the
amendment is that more residences can qualify as homesteads, and thus
more exemptions can inure to more heirs.'48
In 1968, Florida Supreme Court interpreted the term "heirs" to mean
those persons who would inherit the property if the owner died intestate.'49
After the 1968 amendment, a parent living alone can qualify for the
exemption without being the head of a family. That parent can devise the
homestead to his or her adult children and they will receive the homestead
property and the exemption. Thus, adult children can qualify as heirs,
regardless of whether the owner has an obligation to support them or his or
her adult children and they would receive the homestead and the exemption.
Thus, adult children would qualify as heirs, regardless of whether the owner
had an obligation to support them or was in fact supporting them. 5° Fur-
ther, the exemption accrues even if the heirs have no intention of using the
decedent's homestead as their own. This results more frequently now that
145. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 2.
146. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b).
147. Id. § 4(a) (amended 1984).
148. Id.
149. Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 950 n.6 (Fla. 1988).
150. This was true under the prior law also. Dependence was not a prerequisite to
inurement. See, e.g., Cumberland & Liberty Mills v. Keggin, 190 So. 492 (Fla. 1939); Miller
v. Finegan, 7 So. 140 (Fla. 1890).
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potentially more homestead exemptions can inure to more heirs of deceased
homeowners.
II. ANALYSIS OF NEED FOR REFORM
This portion of the article will explore the need for reform with respect
to the exemption provisions and the transfer provisions.
A. Exemption Provisions
The constitution was amended in 1984 to expand the class of persons
who could qualify for the homestead exemption to any natural person.'
This expansion resolved many of the inequities arising from the outdated
concepts of each family having one head and only the head of the family
being entitled to the homestead exemption.
The homestead exemption is important to married couples as well as
single individuals (whether divorced, widowed or never married). In some
cases, it is more important to the single individual. A married couple can
choose to own their property as tenants by the entirety. A tenancy by
entirety property is subject only to debts for which both spouses are liable,
regardless of whether it qualifies as a homestead. When the tenancy by
entirety property is a homestead, the property gets added protection because
it is not liable for most joint debts. The homestead is liable only for those
joint debts that are superior to the exemption, such as debts relating to the
purchase, repair, or improvement of the homestead or taxes thereon.
The qualification requirements and limitations of the homestead
exemption will be addressed first. Particular emphasis will be given to
whether the homestead exemption should be extended to cover interests that
do not qualify as a present estate in land, such as cooperatives and vested
remainders. Next, the scope of the exemptions and the breadth of the
exceptions will then be considered, with discussion of potential areas in
which the present exemption may be abused. Then, the transfer provisions
will be considered, with emphasis on who should be protected by the
exemption, and when and how they should be protected.
This article also will explore the appropriate method to implement such
reform. In some cases, a constitutional amendment will be needed. In other
cases, the solution may be implemented by statute or judicial decision, or
by revision of another area of the law, such as the fraudulent transfer law.
151. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
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Constitutional reform should be the exception rather than the rule.
Constitutional provisions should bear the test of time. If the Florida
homestead provisions are to be reformed, there should be a significant
showing of need for reform in addition to a showing of changed circum-
stances or unequal or unfair treatment that merits reform. In addition, it is
important to focus on the purpose of the exemption when considering
reform: to assure that an owner's home is a shelter, free from the reach of
his or her creditors, and that home can provide shelter for the homeowner's
family during the owner's lifetime or upon his or her death.
1. Qualification Requirements and Limitations.
The qualification requirements of the homestead exemption relate to
who can own a homestead and how it can be used, as well as what interest
in land qualifies for the exemption and how much land can qualify for it.
At present, there is no value limit on the exemption. First, the issue of
whether there should be a value limit will be addressed. Then, the
provisions relating to who can own a homestead and what residency or use
restrictions apply, as well as what limitations should apply to the exemption,
will be considered together. This is because the residency requirement and
the acreage limitations are intertwined. Then, the issue of what types of
ownership interest should qualify for the exemption will be discussed.
a. Limitation on Value
One of the calls for reform that sounds from time to time is the need
for the exemption to be limited by a maximum dollar value. 52 The
homestead exemption has not been subject to a value limit since its
enactment in 1868. The fact that the exemption has been extended to single
owners and other natural persons is not reason enough to impose a dollar
limitation. Occasionally, a case reaches the newspapers in which a person
with significant creditors purchases an expensive homestead for a price in
excess of $1,000,000 and qualifies for the exemption.'53 This exemption,
in and of itself, does not shield that person from the reach of creditors.
152. Crosby & Miller, supra note 14, at 47. This suggestion was not adopted by the
Constitution Revision Commission in 1977-78. The Background Papers state that "Florida
has evidenced a strong desire to protect the homestead exemption instead of the dollar value
exemption granted by most states." Background Papers, Constitution Revision Commission
1977-78, at 3 (copy on file at the Nova Law Review office).
153. See Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Find Shelter in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
1993, § 1, at 1, 26.
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If creditors' funds were wrongfully used to benefit the homestead, the
creditor can reach the homestead, and in some cases, the entire exemption
may be denied. If that homestead owner has other assets, those assets can
be reached by the creditors unless those assets qualify for another type of
exemption. If the owner sells his or her homestead, the proceeds can be
reached unless the owner intends to reinvest the proceeds, segregates them,
and does reinvest them in another homestead within a reasonable period of
time. Thus, the creditors have other remedies. If the owner of the
homestead keeps the homestead and files a petition in bankruptcy, the owner
can obtain a discharge from liability to some of these creditors. In that case,
it is the discharge, rather than the homestead exemption, that protects the
debtor/homeowner. 1
54
The 13ankruptcy/UCC Committee of The Florida Bar conducted a
limited study in 1992 to determine if there was a pattern of abuse in the use
of the forty-seven different exemptions available to debtors in Florida.'55
One of the eight exemptions claimed most often was the homestead
exemption. One-third of the 400 debtors surveyed in the Southern, Middle
and Northern Districts of Florida claimed a homestead exemption. The
average homestead exemption was $40,000 in the Northern and Middle
Districts combined and $72,000 in the Southern District. The highest
homestead exemption claimed was $115,000 in the Northern and Middle
Districts and $300,000 in the Southern District. This limited survey did not
reflect a pattern of abuse in claiming exemptions. If there is a pattern of
abuse, one alternative would be to limit the total exemptions a debtor can
claim. There would be no maximum value for the homestead exemption,
but the value of the homestead exemption claimed could limit the total value
of other exemptions that a debtor could claim. If this alternative is
appropriate, it would be advisable to amend the constitution to authorize the
Legislature to enact legislation limiting the maximum value availability of
other exemptions that can be claimed, taking into account the value of the
homestead exemption being claimed by that person. One exemption that
Florida cannot control is the federal exemption provided to benefits in a
qualified retirement covered by ERISA, such as a pension, profit-sharing,
or stock bonus plan.' 56 The amount of this exemption is not limited by
154. See II U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (Supp. 1993)
155. A Survey of Bankruptcy Exemptions in Florida, report of The Bankruptcy/UCC
Committee of THE FLORIDA BAR, presented and approved on January 9, 1992 (copy on file
at the Nova Law Review office).
156. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992); see also FLA. STAT. § 222.21
(1991).
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ERISA, although there are built-in limitations on deductible employer
contributions and benefits.
It also is noteworthy that some of these high profile debtors have been
unable to claim the exemption when they used stolen funds to purchase the
exemption, 157 when the homestead was owned by a corporation, 158 or
when the purchase of the homestead could be avoided.'59
A survey of other states may provide some insight into the issue of
whether a maximum value should be imposed on the homestead exemption.
There is no uniformity among the states; although, there are common
patterns. Ninety percent of all of the states (forty-five of fifty states)
provide a homestead exemption in a nonbankruptcy context. 6 ° In bank-
ruptcy, a debtor in every state but Delaware can claim a homestead exemp-
tion. Some debtors in bankruptcy have the option of choosing the federal
homestead bankruptcy exemption; while others are limited to the state
exemption.
Fifteen states (one-third of the forty-five) provide the homestead
exemption in their state constitutions.' 6' The median exemption offered
by the forty-five states in a nonbankruptcy context is $30,000. Eight of
these states provide an exemption that is limited by acreage but not
value. "'62 The other thirty-seven impose a maximum value on the exemp-
157. In re Gherman, 101 BR. 369, 371 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989). The court also held
that Henry Gherman had "abandoned his homestead when he secretly departed Miami on
August 8, 1988 with suitcases containing $4.4 million in embezzled funds in $100 bills,
fleeing those he had swindled, and headed for a country with no extradition treaty. Id.
158. In re Duque, 33 B.R. 201 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1983).
159. See Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assocs., 121 B.R. 145, 158 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that Kuhn's sale of his New York home and purchase of a new home in
Florida might be a fraudulent transfer); see also In re Warner, 90 BR. 532, 533 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1988) (noting that certain transfers, such as the debtor's purchase of a 400 acre
farm, the transfer of 320 of those acres to the debtor's wife or son, and the subsequent
transfer of the "homestead" property to a tenancy by the entirety could be avoided if deemed
fraudulent).
160. Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island are the five
states that fail to provide a homestead exemption in a nonbankruptcy context.
161. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
162. Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas.
All of these are constitutional exemptions, except for Iowa's and South Dakota's, which are
statutory. Arkansas' exemption contains a $2500 limit for 160 rural acres or one urban acre;
however, the exemption is unlimited for a reduced acreage of 80 rural acres or one-quarter
urban acre. Iowa's exemption is unlimited; however, it provides that if the homestead's value
is less than $500, it can be enlarged in excess of one-half city acre or 40 acres outside the
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tion, ranging from a high of $200,000 to a low of $3500. Most of these
states do not impose acreage limitations.'63 Nine of these thirty-seven
homestead exemptions are provided by state constitution.'64 One problem
with having a constitutional exemption with a maximum value is that it is
difficult to change the value if it becomes outdated. In some cases, the
constitutional limits have been raised by statute.165  In two states, the
constitution authorizes the exemption but does not set the limit; instead,
these constitutions provide that the legislature will establish the appropriate
value limitation.
66
Twenty-eight other states provide a homestead exemption with a
maximum value by statute. Massachusetts offers the highest exemption,
$200,000 for an owner age sixty-two or older or disabled. 67  Any other
owner in Massachusetts is entitled to a $100,000 exemption. 6  The
Massachusetts homestead exemption is a statutory exemption. In 1977, the
exemption was $30,000 for a householder with a family; 169 in 1979, the
exemption was $50,000 for an owner with a family; 7 ° in 1989, the
exemption was $150,000 for a person age sixty-five or disabled and
city to $500 in value. Oklahoma's exemption contains a $5000 limit for one urban acre if
the urban homestead is used for residential and business purposes; otherwise, the exemption
for an urban homestead is unlimited in value for one-quarter acre. Each of these states
impose an acreage limitation on the exemption, with the maximum acreage for a rural
homestead ranging from 80 to 200 acres and the maximum acreage for an urban homestead
ranging from one-quarter to one acre. The limit is one-quarter acre in Arkansas and Florida;
one-half acre in Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota; and one acre in South Dakota and Texas.
163. Most of the 38 states with maximum exemption values do not impose an acreage
limitations in addition to the value limitation. Five states do: Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska and Oregon. Most of those states use 160 acres as the rural limit
(Michigan uses 40 acres). Some also use the 160 acres as a limit for an urban homestead
also (Louisiana and Mississippi); others limit the urban homestead to one lot (Michigan), two
lots (Nebraska), or one block (Oregon).
164. Alabama. Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Three of these nine states use the constitutional limits (Michi-
gan, $3500; Tennessee, $5000; and West Virginia, $5000).
165. Three states have increased the constitutional limits by statute (Alabama from
$2000 to $5000, North Carolina from $1000 to $10,000, and South Carolina from $1000 to
$5000).
166. Washington, presently $30,000 by statute, and Wyoming, presently $10,000 by
statute.
167. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § IA (West 1991).
168. Id. § I.
169. MASs. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 791, § I (West 1977).
170. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 756, § I (West 1979).
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$100,000 for any other owner;171 and in 1991, the present limits and
categories were adopted.' 72
Arizona's exemption is $100,000 for all debtors.'73 This amount is
a statutory amount enacted in 1989. Nevada's exemption also is $95,000,
enacted by statute in 1989.' North Dakota's exemption is limited to
$80,000, pursuant to a statutory exemption enacted in 1979.175 In 1977,
it was $60,000.176 California has an exemption that ranges from $100,000
for persons age sixty-five, or persons age fifty-five with a low income, or
for disabled persons to $75,000 for a family home, and $50,000 for all
others. 177 This is a statutory exemption that was amended in 1983, 1984,
1986, 1988, and 1990. In 1983, there were two California exemption limits;
$45,000 and $30,000.178
Other state exemptions range across the board; there are state
exemptions limited to $75,000, 17 $60,000, 18 $54,000,81 $50,000,182
$40,000,183 $30,000,184 $20,000,185 $1 5,000,186 $12,500,187
$10,000,188 $8000,189 $7500,190 $5500,'9' $5000,192 $3500,'9' and
171. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § I (West 1989) (amended 1991).
172. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § I (West 1991).
173. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101 (1989).
174. NEV. REV. STAT. § 115.010 (1989).
175. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (Supp. 1991).
176. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (1977) (amended 1979).
177. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 704.730(a) (Deering Supp. 1993).
178. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §704.730(a)(1)-(2) (Deering 1983) (amended 1990).
179. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-21 (1972).
180. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992) (this limit applies
if the debtor is 60 years of age or older, or is physically or mentally disabled).
181. ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.010 (Supp. 1992).
182. IDAHO CODE § 55-1003 (Supp. 1992).
183. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-32-104(1) (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 815.20 (West Supp.
1992).
184. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-201 (Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-92(a)(1)
(1985) (this limitation applies to the head of a family or a person 65 years of age or older);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.030 (West 1993).
185. HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-92(a)(2) (1985) (for any person not a head of a family or
65 years of age or older); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-9 (Michie Supp. 1992).
186. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § I(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §
23.240(l) (1991).
187. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
188. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (1988); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. 5206 (McKinney 1980
& Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IC-1601(a)(l) (1991); WYO. STAT. § 1-20-101 (1977).
189. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.475(1) (Vernon Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-
3(I) (1992).
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$3000.'9' Most of these exemptions amounts were once lower. West Vir-
ginia's homestead exemption was originally $1000; but in 1973, the West
Virginia Constitution was amended to increase it to $5000.'9'
In states that allow the debtor to elect the federal bankruptcy homestead
exemption, the amount exempt is $7500; however, if the home is co-owned
each owner can exempt up to $7500.96 Thus, a married couple co-
owning a home can exempt up to $15,000 of value. Each also has a $400
wildcard so that the exemption can be increased to $7900 or $15,800.197
Clearly, there is no uniform amount that is considered adequate to
provide a debtor with an appropriate shelter. Further, an exemption limited
by a dollar amount is usually not exempt from attachment of liens. In
addition, the homestead is not exempt from forced sale if the net value of
the home exceeds the maximum amount. Thus, an exemption limited by a
dollar amount does not protect a homeowner from losing that home to
creditors. Instead, an exemption with a maximum value provides the
homeowner with the equivalent of a housing allowance. If the net value of
an owner's home exceeds the maximum amount, the sale of the home can
be forced, leaving the owner with net proceeds up to the exemption amount.
To limit the Florida homestead exemption by a dollar limit would
substantially change the nature of the exemption. Presently, the exemption
applies to the entire homestead estate, limited only by acreage. Florida's
exemption has been limited by acreage, but not value, since 1868.19 The
framers of the original constitution considered a debtor's right to have a
190. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-901 (Smith-Hurd 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
2-28-1 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1992).
191. MD. CODEANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 11-504(b)(5) (1989). This limitation applies
to debtors in bankruptcy. See id. §§ 11-504(b), 11-504(f) (1989).
192. ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-100 (Michie 1982 &
Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 480:1 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(1) (Anderson 1991); S.C.
CODE ANN. § it1-30 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301(a) (1980); VA.
CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Michie 1990); W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48.
193. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102(l)(o)(1) (1987) (this limitation applies to a house
trailer or trailer coach); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6023(I)(h) (1991).
194. MD, CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1 I-504(b)(5) (1989) (This limitation is used
for nonbankruptcy purposes).
195. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1988). The states that allow debtors to elect the federal
bankruptcy homestead exemption are Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
197. Id. § 522(d)(5).
198. See discussion supra part I.B.I.a.i.
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place to live and work so important as to protect it by constitution with no
dollar limitation; whereas, the right to exempt personalty was limited to
$1000.199
Florida is not alone in allowing an exemption with an acreage
limitation but no value limitation. Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas also provide exemptions with
limitations on acreage but not value.200
A maximum value should not be imposed on Florida's homestead
exemption. Any maximum would be arbitrary.20 ' In 1868, the head of
any family who could afford to own and maintain a home of any value he
or she chose, up to the permitted acreage and uses, had the right to live
there free from the reach of most creditors.2 2 The head of the family's
creditors had the burden of finding other property or sources of income from
which the debt could be satisfied. In 1984, this protection was extended to
any natural person.0 3 There does not appear to be any compelling reason
to change the nature of the exemption. Rather than imposing an arbitrary
value limitation on the exemption, it would be more fruitful to address
whether the scope of the exemption should be limited by expanding the
types of debts that can become liens against a homestead and whether there
are solutions available to prevent a debtor from abusing the exemption and
its unlimited value.20 4 Before addressing the scope of the exemption, it
would be useful to address the residency, use, and acreage requirements and
limitations as well as what types of interest should qualify for the exemp-
tion.
199. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § I.
200. See supra note 163.
201. If a maximum value is to be imposed on the exemption, one model is for the
constitution to authorize the Legislature to periodically establish the appropriate maximum.
The maximum could be updated, then periodically by legislation. Another alternative would
be for the constitution to impose the value, with a provision that the value would be adjusted
periodically by reference to a cost of living index or other index that measures changes in
the property values. A final alternative would be to establish a maximum value in the
constitution. Based on past experience, this alternative would be the least effective. Consider
the present constitutional exemption for personalty. This exemption is for $1000 of personal
property. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. This is the same amount that was in the constitution in
1868. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § I. Presently, this exemption is so insignificant that
it would cost more money than the exemption is worth to litigate an issue involving that
exemption. Yet in 1868, $1000 could shelter a significant amount of furniture and personal
property contained in an exempt homestead of any value.
202. See FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1.
203. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
204. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
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b. Residency, Use and Acreage Requirements and Limitations
The exemption, from its inception, has reflected that Florida's economy
is both agrarian and urban based. It recognizes the existence of the family
farm as well as the need for other families to reside and work in cities or
towns. Thus, the constitution always has exempted 160 acres outside of a
incorporated area or municipality and one-half an acre within.2 °5
The original purpose of the exemption was to protect and shelter the
family and allow the head of the family to use homestead for his or her
livelihood if he or she desired. Another purpose was to prevent families
from becoming homeless and a burden to the state. Thus, 160 acres were
sufficient to provide the family with a home and a farm. Conversely, if the
home were in a city or town, one-half an acre was sufficient to provide the
family with a home and place for a business.
Since January 7, 1969, the exemption for an urban homestead has been
limited to the residence of the owner or the owner's family.20 6 Prior to
the 1968 revision, the urban homestead could include a business home.
0 7
The rural homestead has no such express limits on use. This amendment
raises questions regarding what use is permissible for an urban homestead
and what use is required for a rural homestead.
i. Urban Homesteads
An urban homestead is limited to the residence of the owner or
family and up to one-half an acre of contiguous land.208 If the property
contains other buildings used for nonresidential purposes, that portion of the
property can not qualify.
There is some question as to whether a portion of a home held for rent
to others or a duplex unit for rent can qualify for the exemption. If property
constitutes the owner's residence or the residence of the owner's family,
then a temporary renting of a portion of that home will not result in loss of
the exemption.20 9 If the portion rented is de minimnis, then that rental also
205. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1. Prior to the
1968 constitutional revision, the urban limitations applied to incorporated or unincorporated
cities or towns rather than municipalities.
206. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (1984).
207. See FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § I.
208. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (1984).
209. Collins v. Collins, 7 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1942) (holding that owners' intent to return
to residence after temporary rental during tourist season maintained the homestead
exemption).
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should be disregarded.
If a portion of the home is held for rent and the owner or family has
no intent to reside there personally, then a portion of the homestead may be
considered non-homestead property. If the property can be partitioned, the
non-homestead portion can be sold via forced sale. If the property cannot
be partitioned, the property should be treated the same as property owned
by tenants in common, when neither tenant has the exclusive right to possess
the homestead. The entire property should be sold, and the proceeds
apportioned." ° This should be the result, but there is case law allowing a
person to exempt both the duplex unit in which he or she lives plus the unit
rented for income when the rental unit cannot be sold separately under
zoning laws."'
The courts should resolve the question of whether a unit that is held for
the production of income, in the form of rent, can qualify as a homestead
if the owner or family has no intent to occupy it as a residence. In addition,
whether rental of one of the units once occupied as a residence by the owner
or family constitutes an abandonment also should be resolved judicially.
Until then, the issues involving the rental of a duplex or other homestead
property should not be an appropriate issues for constitutional reform.
ii. Rural Homesteads
At present, there is no limitation on the use of the 160 acres contiguous
to the residence on an a rural homestead. Most assume that the use will be
agricultural or related to farming or ranching. The constitution has never
expressed such a limitation and it is not a requirement at present. Most
rural homesteads are used as farms or have limited acreage. Some are
condominium units located outside a municipality. The cases do not reflect
any attempted abuse of these provisions; although, the courts have exempted
contiguous acreage that has been platted suitable for future sale as individual
lots.21 Thus, it does not appear that there is a need to limit the rural
210. See Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1978) (holding that the homestead
exemption does not preclude the forced sale of property owned by tenants in common when
the forced sale is the only method by which the two owners could obtain enjoyment of their
one-half undivided interest in the property).
211. In re Kuver, 70 B.R. 190 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); see also supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
212. Buckels v. Tomer, 78 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1955) (including as homestead, in addition
to a residence on an unplatted tract of land, 27 subdivision lots that were platted and in some
cases separated by streets, but otherwise contiguous). However, it is possible that an
individual who develops and owns a condominium parcel outside of a municipality and who
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homestead to any particular use, so long as a portion of it is used as the
residence of the owner or the owner's family.
The constitution limits the urban homestead to the residence of the
owner or the owner's family.2" 3 There is no comparable limit on the rural
homestead. Prior to the 1968 revision, the head of the family was required
to reside on the homestead, whether it was urban or rural.2"4 After the
constitutional revision in 1968, this requirement was deleted."' The rural
property still must be a "homestead" to qualify; thus, it must be a permanent
place of residence. Presumably, the rural homestead and urban homestead
are similar in that the homestead can be the residence of the owner or the
owner's family, but it must be the residence of at least one of them. The
rural and urban homesteads then differ because the rural homestead is not
limited just to the residence. This result, that the rural homestead can be the
residence of the owner or his or her family, is generally understood to be
correct; but there is no definitive case law on point. If the constitution is
amended for other reasons, it would be appropriate to expressly provide this
expanded residency provision for a rural homestead. This amendment
should be a technical rather than a substantive amendment.
iii. Multiple Homesteads
The constitution provides that a "homestead" owned by a natural person
shall be exempt.2" 6 Prior to the 1968 revision, the owner was required to
reside on the homestead.2 7 The 1968 revision changed this so that the
owner need not reside there if his or her family does. 2 8 This change was
in the case of an urban homestead and is implied for rural homesteads. This
raises the question of whether one owner can claim two homesteads, one for
the owner'; residence and a second if a different residence is used by his or
her family. For example, this issue could arise if a husband owns his own
home and is required to own and maintain another home for his former wife
and their children.
lives in one of the units could claim the entire parcel, including the other units for sale, as
a homestead. In most cases, the developer uses a corporation to avoid personal liability
rather than rely upon the homestead exemption. See also Armour & Co. v. Hulvey, 74 So.
212 (Fla. 1917) (rural homestead included a preparatory school for students and cadets).
213. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1).
214. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § I; see also FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1.
215. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
216. Id. i 4(a)(1).
217. See FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; see also FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1.
218. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1).
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It is arguable that the constitution's reference to "a homestead"2"9
means that a person can claim only one homestead as exempt. Further, it
is arguable that an urban homestead is limited to the owner's residence or
the family's, but not both. If only one can be exempt, chapter 222 of the
Florida Statutes would allow the owner to designate which was exempt if
the owner is alive;22° however, the issue may arise after the owner's death.
This issue has not yet been litigated on an- appellate level, so that it may not
be ripe for review. If the constitution is to be amended, this issue should
be visited to determine if appropriate language should be added to limit the
exemption to one homestead, 2 that being the owner's residence. If
neither residence is used by the owner but both are used by different family
members, then the owner should have the option of selecting which family
residence is the exempt homestead.
c. Type of Qualifying Interest
There have been significant changes in home ownership since 1868.
There also have been changes since the last constitutional revision in 1968.
At one time, the choice was between owning a single family home or
renting an apartment. At present, a person can choose to own a single
family home in the country or in the city. A person can choose to own a
single family home in a development with common areas for all owners and
a homeowner's association. Some new developments are zero lot line
homes. A person can choose to own a duplex or triplex and rent some of
the units to other families. A person can choose to live in a condominium
and own his or her unit, plus an undivided interest in common areas. These
condominium units may be units in a high-rise structure or a low-rise
structure or they may be townhouses.
A person can live in a cooperative apartment, renting the unit from a
corporation or association in which the person is a shareholder or member.
A person can own land and a mobile or modular home and live in that
home on that land. A person can own a mobile or modular home situated
on land that the person leases from another. A person can own a houseboat
or any other type of boat or yacht and live on it at a dock that the person
owns as a condominium unit (a "dockominium"). A person also can own
219. Id.
220. FLA. STAT. § 222.01 (1991).
221. The owner's permanent residence would qualify for the exemption. In the unusual
case where neither was the owner's residence, then the owner could select which family
residence was the exempt homestead.
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and live on a boat kept in a rented boat slip.
Should the homestead exemption apply to all of these forms of
ownership? Under present law, the issue is whether the applicable interest
in any residence is an interest in an estate in land. If it is not, it only
qualifies for a $1000 constitutional exemption for personal property. To the
extent that the interest does not qualify for the unlimited homestead
exemption, the issue is whether it should. This section will consider the
various forms of ownership in the context of the homestead exemption.
i. Single Family Homes and Farms
The present homestead exemption clearly applies to single family
homes and farms. It also can apply to multiple family dwellings, with some
limitations. If the multiple family dwelling is located within a municipality,
the units that are not used as the residence of the owner or the owner's
family should not qualify for the exemption."22 Thus, the owner would
own an exempt homestead as well as non-exempt property. Liens can attach
to the non-exempt portion of the homestead, and it may be subject to forced
sale. In such a case, the owner of the homestead within the multiple family
dwelling is at risk that the property will be partitioned, if possible, or sold
in its entirety to satisfy liens on the non-exempt portion. If the property is
sold, the proceeds attributable to the exempt portion would qualify for the
exemption; although the proceeds should lose their exemption if not
reinvested within a reasonable period of time. 23
ii. Condominiums
Ownership of an individual condominium unit used as the residence of
the owner or the owner's family also qualifies. Ownership of a condomini-
um includes ownership of an individual unit, which can include land, and
ownership of an undivided interest in common areas. 24 Condominium
222. See discussion supra part ll.A. l.b.i (regarding the qualification of a duplex for the
exemption). But see In re Kuver, 70 B.R. 190 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (allowing homestead
exemption for duplex, of which half was being rented out, because divided portion of duplex
was not sellable under existing zoning laws).
223. This restriction is imposed on proceeds from a voluntary sale of a homestead. The
proceeds can retain their exemption so long as the seller intends 'to reinvest them within a
reasonable period of time after the sale, and does in fact reinvest them. See supra note 36.
224. A unit is defined as "a part of the condominium property which is subject to
exclusive ownership" and "may be in improvements, land or land and improvements
together." FLA. STAT. § 718.103(24) (Supp. 1992). A condominium parcel includes "a unit,
together with an undivided share in the common elements which is appurtenant to the unit."
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ownership is a unique form of ownership, that has been recognized as
qualifying for the homestead exemption, when the unit is the residence of
the owner or the owner's family.
If a condominium is located within a municipality, a potential issue is
how the one-half acre of contiguous land limitation applies to a specific unit
and its undivided interest in common areas. It is possible for the common
elements to be located on more than one-half acre, so that the condominium
owner has an undivided share in more than one-half an acre. The Florida
Condominium Act provides that the undivided share in common elements
is appurtenant to the unit and cannot be separated from it, nor can it be
conveyed or encumbered except with a conveyance or encumbrance of the
unit.225 Thus, a lien that cannot attach to the condominium unit because
of the homestead exemption should not be able to attach to the appurtenant
undivided share of common elements. This is true even if the common
elements exceed the acreage limitation, because of the provisions of the
Florida Condominium Act. The condominium act extends the constitutional
protection to the common elements that exceed the permitted homestead
acreage.
Common areas can include an area for parking, areas for recreation,
(such as a pool, playground, or tennis, racquetball or basketball courts),226
and areas for personnel of the condominium association (such as manager,
engineer, security, or valet). These areas are located on the entire tract of
land comprising the condominium.2 7 What if these common areas are
used for a commercial purpose that would prevent the unit from being
exempt if the unit were used for that commercial purpose? Such use should
not preclude the exemption from attaching to the condominium unit.
Id. § 718.103(11). The common elements are the "portions of the condominium property
which are not included in the units." Id. § 718.103(7).
225. FLA. STAT. § 718.107 (1991).
226. See White v. Posick, 150 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ("the pool
[in a one-story family dwelling house] and patio were conventional residential appur-
tenances-all well within the ambit of the constitution.").
227. If the condominium is located within a municipality, there may be a question as
to how the one-half acre of contiguous land limitation applies to a specific unit, its undivided
interest in common areas, and the condominium parcel of land. If the owner is treated as
owning only a portion of the entire condominium parcel, then the interest can qualify if that
portion is less than one-half acre. If that portion is computed based on the undivided
percentage share the owner has in common areas, it will fit within the acreage limitations in
most cases. Further, a question may be raised as to whether the use of common areas is
residential. Does it matter if a common area is rented to a concession, such as a store that
serves food or sells various sundry items?
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Further, if the condominium unit qualified for the homestead exemption, the
owner's undivided share in the common elements would be protected by the
Florida Condominium Act-a lien that could not attach to the condominium
unit could not attach to the owner's undivided share in the common
elements.
The condominium or homeowner's association generally has the right
to assess costs for maintaining common areas or recreational facilities. The
Florida Condominium Act permits a lien to attach for unpaid assess-
ments.22 Most declarations of restrictions and covenants also authorize
the imposition of a lien for non-payment of these amounts. Can a lien for
non-payment of obligations for recreational leases, regular maintenance
obligations, and special assessments attach to the homestead property?
There are several ways that such a lien can attach. A lien can attach for
"house, field or other labor performed on the realty" or for an obligation
"'contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof. '229  In
addition, a lien can attach to the unit prior to the time it attains its status as
homestead, in which case it is considered a preexisting lien.
In the case of a recreational lease for a subdivision, the Supreme Court
of Florida held that such a lien was part of an affirmative covenant created
when the owners accepted their deed to their lot in the subdivision and that
the lien related back to the time when the declaration of restrictions were
filed.23 ' These liens were considered to have attached to the land prior to
the time the owners acquired their homestead interest in the property and
thus, were valid liens against their homestead. This reasoning also should
apply to liens for unpaid condominium maintenance fees and special
assessments. Thus, a condominium homestead may be subject to a pre-
existing lien for unpaid maintenance and assessments. Further, a condomin-
ium homestead may be subject to liens for obligations relating to the
purchase, repair, or improvement of that unit or for house, field, and other
labor for that unit. It is unclear whether a condominium unit qualifies for
the homestead exemption would be subject to its share of any liens relating
to the house, field, and other labor performed for the condominium common
areas.
228. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(5)(a) (Supp. 1992). Liens for unrelated condominium
assessments relate back to April 1, 1992, or the creation of the condominium parcel, and
includes a lien for interest and attorney's fees. Id.
229. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
230. Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
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iii. Homes with Subdivision Recreational Facilities
In some subdivisions or developments, single family homes also can
include an ownership or leasehold interest in recreational facilities. These
facilities usually are not contiguous to each lot in the subdivision. It has not
yet been determined how the present contiguity requirement or the acreage
limitations would apply to the homeowner's interest in these facilities.
Under a strict construction of the constitution, common areas that are not
contiguous to the homestead parcel should not qualify for the exemption.
However, these areas could be protected in a manner similar to the way
common areas in a condominium are protected."' For example, the
declaration of restrictions could provide that an interest in these areas can
be transferred only with a transfer of the parcel that it serves. If each parcel
owner has an undivided share in the facilities, the transfer of a parcel could
operate as a transfer of that undivided share. Further, an encumbrance of
the parcel also would be secured by the parcel and that parcel's undivided
share in the common elements. However, the undivided share cannot be
transferred or encumbered by itself. In this way, if a parcel qualifies for the
homestead exemption, the same protection would extend to the parcel's
undivided share in the common facilities.
iv. Mobile Homes
An individual who owns land and resides in a mobile home permanent-
ly affixed to that land can qualify for the homestead exemption provided for
realty under the constitution. There is some question whether an individual
who owns and resides in a mobile home, but does not own the land upon
which the mobile home is situated, can claim the homestead realty
exemption for the mobile home and leasehold interest. The issue is whether
the leasehold satisfies the constitutional definition of a homestead on
realty.232
231. See discussion supra part II.A.I.c.ii.
232. A similar issue arises if a condominium parcel is leased rather than owned. The
Background Papers for the Constitutional Revision Commission in 1977-78 reflect the
following:
fW]hether the Revision Commission wishes to expand the umbrella of protection
to include kinds of living situations which are becoming increasingly common
in this day of high housing costs or whether the also increasing incidence of
bankruptcy and skipping out on bad debts should encourage a conservative
approach. Even where the mobile home is "affixed" to the property, there is no
denying the relative ease with which the mobile home can be made mobile again
when compared to standard housing. On the other hand, it is difficult to see a
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In 1977, section 222.05 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide
that:
Any person owning and occupying any dwelling house, including a
mobile home used as a residence, or modular home, on land not his
own which he may lawfully possess, by lease or otherwise, and claiming
such house, mobile home, or modular home as his homestead, shall be
entitled to the exemption of such house, mobile home, or modular home
from levy and sale as aforesaid.
The purpose of this amendment was to extend the homestead exemption to
a person who owned the mobile home and had the legal right to possess the
land.233
This statute raises many questions. What is the meaning of "afores-
aid"? Florida Statutes section 222.01 provides a procedure so that "any
person residing in this state [who] desires to avail himself of the benefit of
the provisions of the constitution and laws exempting property as a
homestead from forced sale under any process of law" may make a
statement designating and declaring real property or a mobile home as
exempt.234 Is this the "aforesaid" exemption? Is a mobile home exempt
from liens attaching to it or just from levy and forced sale? In addition, is
a mobile home exempt from obligations contracted to purchase, repair, or
improve the mobile home or for taxes or special assessments thereon? Is
the leasehold interest exempt or just the mobile home? The statute only
exempts the mobile home.
These: issues are not constitutional issues; instead, they only relate to
the statutory exemption granted to mobile homes on leased or lawfully
possessed land. Chapter 222 of the Florida Statutes should be amended to
great difference where the mobile home owner also owns the land as well, as far
as protection of the family's domicile is concerned. In fact F.S. 222.05 allows
a person to set apart as homestead a dwelling house which is owned but main-
tained on land which is not. This is probably an area where it would be helpful
to have empirical data on the number, length of residence, and financial history,
of those who reside in mobile homes which they own but maintain upon the land
of others.
Background Papers, Constitutional Revision Commission 1977-78, at 3 (copy on file at the
Nova Law Review office).
233. See Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp., 21 B.R. 345, 349 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1982) (noting that Florida Statutes, section 222.02 (1979), which it called the "real property
exemption implementation statute ... has only been amended once since its enactment in
1869, and that was to expand its coverage to include protection of mobile homes.").
234. FLA. STAT. § 222.01 (1991).
1994]
143
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
clarify that the statute exempts mobile homes from the attachment of liens
and from forced sale in the same manner as the constitution exempts
homestead realty. This statutory exemption should be subject to all the
exceptions applicable to the constitutional amendment. The mobile home
and leasehold interest also should be subject to any liens to which the lessor
is entitled.235 At the same time, the statute could allow the owner to
alienate or devise the mobile home and any leasehold interest, capable of
being alienated or devised.236 In this way, the mobile home could be
freely alienated during the owner's lifetime and devised at death without
restriction. 37
v. Cooperatives
At first blush, a cooperative appears similar to a condominium and
thus, it seems logical to extend the exemption and transfer provisions to
cooperative ownership. But cooperative ownership differs significantly from
condominium ownership.
In a cooperative, a corporation owns the land and building or may lease
the land under a long-term lease.23 The corporation has the power to sell,
mortgage, or transfer the land and building. The corporation's articles of
incorporation may restrict these rights or require some form of shareholder
approval for transfer of corporate assets. The corporation may have
members or shareholders who own shares of stock in the corporation.
Interest as a member or shareholder does not grant the holder any interest
in a specific unit in the corporate building, the right to partition the
property, or the right to receive the unit he or she leased upon dissolution
of the corporation. If the corporation is dissolved, each shareholder will
receive an undivided interest in the land and the building, including all its
units, subject to outstanding leases. If a resident shareholder wants to
receive sole ownership of a residential unit plus an undivided interest in
common areas, the land and building must be converted into a condomini-
um.
235. See FLA. STAT. § 712.77 (Supp. 1992) (lien for unpaid rent on "goods, chattels,
or personal property of such occupant"); see also id. § 723.084 (lien for storage).
236. If the right to alienate or devise is to be restricted by statute, the statute must meet
the test mentioned in Shriner Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla.
1990), as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 225-227.
237. The constitutional restrictions on devise do not apply to the $1000 personal
property exemption.
238. Chapter 719 of Florida Statutes provides for an unexpired term of at least 50 years.
FLA. STAT. § 719.401 (1988).
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Each shareholder usually will enter into a lease with the corporation for
the exclusive right to possess a specific unit or will have some other "muni-
ment of title" to an apartment unit. Restrictions usually are placed on a
shareholder's right to transfer the lease and shares. A shareholder can use
his or her shares as collateral for a loan without the corporation's consent,
if a lender is willing to accept them.
Ownership of shares and a lease of a cooperative apartment unit differ
from ownership of a mobile home and a lease of the land on which the
mobile home is situated. In the case of a cooperative, a person does not
own a unit he or she leases; instead, that person has lawful possession of the
unit and the land on which it is situated. A corporation owns the land and
building in which the unit is located. Although a cooperative parcel
includes an undivided share of the assets of the corporation as an appurte-
nance to the unit, ownership of shares in that corporation does not grant the
shareholder specific ownership in any corporate asset.239 The same result
applies when the corporation is not-for-profit and has members instead of
shareholders.
Thus, a shareholder/lessee has no proprietary ownership in any unit.
Instead, the shareholder leases an apartment unit. By contrast, a mobile
home owner owns the mobile home and leases only the land. 4° This is
a significant difference. In addition, the corporation may incur liabilities
that can reach the entire building, including the individual units. If the
exemption were extended to an owner's stock interest, the exemption would
be subject to liabilities that indirectly affect the value of the shares.
If the exemption is extended to cooperatives, one question is whether
the exemption would be limited to the owner's interest in the lease of the
residential unit or would extend also to the ownership of shares of stock in
the corporation. Even if the shares of stock or membership in the associa-
tion qualified for the exemption, the land and building, including the
residential unit, could be subject to liens for the debts and liabilities of the
corporation and forced sale. The corporation could sell, mortgage, or
239. FLA. STAT. § 719.05(i)(b) (1991). See also FLA. STAT. § 711.43(2)(b) (1975) (the
predecessor statute-replaced by chapter 719).
240. A mobile home park also may be owned as a cooperative. If the shareholder or
member of the association owns his or her mobile home, that mobile home should qualify
for the exemption. See FLA. STAT. § 222.05 (1991). The mobile home owner's lawful right
to possessthat land would be sufficient under that statute. Whether the mobile home owner's
interest in the cooperative that owns the land that the mobile home owner leases is exempt
is a different question that depends on the interpretation of section 222.05 of the Florida
Statutes. See id lowever, the constitutional exemption would not apply to the cooperative
shares or membership.
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otherwise alienate the land and building without the consent of the
shareholder/lessees or the spouses of any married shareholder/lessees, unless
the documents relating to the association provided otherwise, or Florida law
regarding cooperatives is changed. Therefore, allowing a cooperative unit
to qualify for the homestead exemption would not provide all the protection
accorded the owner and family of a single family home or a condominium
unit.
Granting homestead status to the shares of stock in a cooperative
creates a full exemption, with only half of the impact. It is an incomplete
exemption, not because of the limitations of the exemption but because of
the corporate ownership of the land and building. Chapter 222 should be
amended to extend the exemption accorded a mobile home to cooperatives,
so that a person's membership or shares in the corporation, plus the lease
or other muniment of title to the unit, could qualify for the exemption.
241
vi. Floating Homes
What then about floating homes-boats owned by individuals who own
a dock slip attached to land as a condominium, and who lease the dockage?
The boats are in the water. Is the fact that the owner's access to the boat
and access to utilities is via a dock attached to land significant? Is the fact
that the owner obtains ownership of the interest in the dock condominium
through a deed significant, or that the dock is taxed as real property? The
connection is tenuous. Even if a mobile home could qualify as a homestead
under the constitution, a boat could not. Furthermore, the statute intended
to exempt mobile homes, specifically defining a dwelling home to include
a mobile home.242 It is a stretch to interpret the term "dwelling home
on land" to include a boat in a dock slip attached to land.243
The constitutional homestead protection for realty does not extend to
floating homes.244 Instead, the owner is limited to a $1000 exemption for
personalty. There does not appear to be a compelling need to extend the
constitutional exemption to boat owners. A person who resides on Florida
waters does not need to be guaranteed the same protection from creditors as
241. The issue of whether the shares should be subject to alienation or devise, and
whether the lease could or should be subject to alienation or devise, also would need to be
considered.
242. FLA. STAT. § 222.05 (1991).
243. Oregon exempts mobile homes and includes boats within the definition of a mobile
home, however, this exemption is a statutory exemption limited by a dollar amount of
$15,000, OR. REV. STAT. § 23.164 (1983).
244. It is arguable that it could encompass the dock slippage, but not the boat.
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one who resides on Florida land. A person who desires protection should
purchase a home on land, whether it be a single family home, a multi-family
dwelling, or a condominium. If a person cannot afford a permanent
structure, an argument can be made for extending the exemption to a mobile
home on land lawfully possessed by the owner, even if the mobile home can
be removed from the land,245 but not to a boat on water even if it is kept
in a dock.
vii. Future Interests
At present, the exemption does not extend to a nonpossessory future
interest, such as a remainder interest. In Aetna Insurance Co. v. La-
Gasse,246 the supreme court held that the holder of a vested remainder
interest cannot qualify for the exemption while the life estate is in existence.
The primary reason is that the holder of the remainder interest does not have
a present interest in the property. The holder of the remainder interest
cannot satisfy the residency requirement, because the remainder beneficiary
cannot reside on that interest. Residing with the life tenant is insuffi-
cient.2
47
This rule can work to the detriment of a person who is dependent on
the life tenant for shelter or was dependent on the decedent for such. For
example, a child can lose his or her remainder interest to a creditor;
whereas, the surviving spouse's life estate is protected from the spouse's
creditors. This is unfair, particularly if the child were a minor when the
first spouse died, because the constitutional prohibition on devise was
designed to protect that minor. Unfortunately, the statutory remainder
interest does not provide the minor adequate protection.
To the extent a descendant or other person receives a remainder interest
245. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101 (1956);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-54-102 (West 1987); IDAHO CODE § 55-1003 (1989); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 513.430 (Vernon 1992); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.& R. 5206 (McKinney 1980); OR.
REV STAT. § 23.164 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-3 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 613.030 (West 1987).
246. 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969).
247. Id.
The uniform view of the courts in similar situations, however, has been that
consent by a life tenant to a remainderman's occupancy does not divest the life
tenant of a paramount present interest. The record here presents no reasonable
basis upon which any conveyance of a present interest to respondent [daughter]
and owner of remainder interest can be found.
Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
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in property and resides there with the permission of the life tenant, that
interest should qualify for the exemption. A constitutional amendment is
required to effectuate this change.
viii. Conclusion Regarding Extension of Exemption
The constitutional homestead exemption should continue to apply only
to an interest in an estate in land. Any extension of the exemption to mobile
homes on land lawfully possessed, but not owned, or to cooperatives should
be by legislative fiat.
The constitutional exemption should be extended to a remainder interest
when the owner of that remainder interest resides with the life tenant on the
property. Consideration should be given to: (1) creating an exemption for
leasehold interests, to the extent those interests have value248 (whether it
be limited or unlimited in value), and, (2) changing or increasing the $1000
personalty exemption in the constitution. The personal exemption could be
extended to apply to items of furniture and other household items reasonably
necessary for use in the exempt homestead (with or without a value limit).
2. Scope of Exemption and Exceptions
Florida is a "creditor beware" state when it comes to homestead. The
exemption is broad and the exceptions are narrow. A creditor cannot rely
upon a homestead to satisfy its debt, unless the debt has some direct
relationship to the homestead, (e.g., purchase, repair, improvement, or labor)
or the debtor agrees to secure that debt with a mortgage (and if married, the
spouse consents), or there are countervailing equitable considerations.249
In many cases, a potential creditor can protect itself by obtaining security.
In other cases, a potential creditor can insure against the risk or may find
protection under the homeowner's insurance coverage. Additionally,
doctors, hospitals, and nursing homes may choose not to provide services
248. The leasehold could have value due to improvements to the leased property or the
right to assign or sublease it. If the leasehold is exempt, then consideration needs to be given
to whether a married lessee can assign the lease without joinder of the spouse and whether
the landlord's right to evict would be affected by a spouse's rights. Also, an exception to
the exemption would be needed for a landlord's lien. The exemption could be constitutional
or statutorily granted.
249. Palm Beach Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993) (mortgagee
at risk when it failed to supervise mortgage execution and husband forged wife's signature,
except to extent equitable lien granted for proceeds used to satisfy preexisting mortgages and
taxes); Bigelow v. Dunphe, 197 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1940) (creditor at risk when it receives a
mortgage without spouse's joinder).
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unless there is health insurance coverage, prepayment, or a guarantee of
payment by another.
In determining whether the scope of the exemption should be limited
or the exceptions expanded, it is helpful to consider which types of creditors
cannot protect themselves against non-payment by a homeowner and
whether they should have a claim superior to the exemption.
a. Tort Creditors
A tort creditor generally is not protected under homestead law. It is
arguable that a person who was injured repairing or improving the home-
stead could receive a valid lien against the homestead because of a laborer's
ability to place a mechanic's lien on the property for unpaid labor.25 °
Other tort creditors might not have such lien rights.
A tort creditor usually cannot anticipate the tort or the resulting injury
and is at risk that the tortfeasor will not have sufficient, nonexempt assets
to satisfy that liability. In some cases, a person can insure against an injury
or loss that a tortfeasor might cause. Uninsured motorists coverage, health
insurance, life insurance, and disability income insurance can insure against
some of these risks. But the amount of the insurance coverage may be less
than the tortfeasor's liability.
Should a Florida homestead be liable for debts arising in tort such as
from the debtor's negligence or other torts? It seems inappropriate to
subject a homestead to liability for ordinary negligence and tortious conduct
unrelated to the homestead. It is possible that an exception should be made
for liability arising out of the owner's gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct. Maine is one of the few states that provides a specific homestead
exception for "judgments based on torts involving other than ordinary
negligence on the part of the debtor."25 ' But what if the homestead is the
residence of the owner's spouse or other family members? The exemption
protects them too. Should their shelter be jeopardized by one wrongful act
of the owner?
It is arguable that the homestead should be liable for any injuries,
resulting from gross negligence or willful misconduct, directly connected to
the homestead, but not for other tort liability. For example, if a person who
was invited to the owner's home was injured because the owner was grossly
negligent in maintaining the home and did so with willful disregard for the
safety of others, that owner should not be able to hide behind the homestead
250. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4(a)
251. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422 (West 1991).
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exemption to escape that liability. It does not seem necessary to create a
specific exception for this purpose. First, it is unlikely that a homeowner
will maintain a home in such condition because to do so would expose the
homeowner and the homeowner's family to great risk of harm from that
condition. Second, if the property is so dangerous, the property may not be
exempt. The homeowner might abandon the homestead because of the
danger. If the home were permanently abandoned, the exemption would be
lost and a lien could attach to the property for that liability. If it was
temporarily abandoned, the chance of the owner inviting persons to that
home would be slim. A better solution would be to require a homeowner
to maintain liability insurance for such purposes, rather than to limit the
constitutional exemption. Third, to allow the owner to claim the exemption
in egregious cases might result in a "fraud or unjust imposition on
creditors," so that the homestead would not be exempt from tort liabili-
ty.252 Consequently, there is no compelling need to amend the exemption
to provide a specific exception for tort liabilities.
b. Alimony Maintenance or Support Creditors
A spouse, former spouse, or child with a claim for alimony, mainte-
nance, or support payments generally is not protected under Florida
homestead law. These claims do not fall within the specific exceptions to
the present exemption. Under limited circumstances, these claims can reach
the homestead if the claims are secured by a mortgage, a pre-existing lien
on the homestead, or an equitable lien. In addition, a court might prohibit
the obligation claiming the exemption if to do so would operate as a fraud
against the former spouse or child; but it is questionable whether such
judicial action would withstand appeal.253 Otherwise, a judgment for
alimony or support cannot become a valid lien against the homestead or
force its sale.
252. The court could allow the exemption but impose an equitable lien for such liability;
thereby overriding the exemption. See discussion supra in text accompanying notes 49-51.
253. Compare Isaacson v. Isaacson, 504 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987) with
Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In Gepfrich, the former
husband who was $20,000 in arrears in alimony and had an income of $4700 a month
purchased a $300,000 homestead, maintained it at a cost of over $3000 a month, and lived
there with a girlfriend who did not contribute to its maintenance. The trial court ordered him
to sell his house to satisfy his alimony and the district court affirmed that order. The court
held that he was "attempting to use the homestead exemption law as a [sic] instrument to
defraud his former wife and to escape his honest debt to her." Id. at 744. The authority of
this case is questionable.
[Vol. 18
150
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Seiden
Under prior law, several cases held that a person who failed to satisfy
support obligations to family members could not be considered the head of
that family. Accordingly, homestead status was denied and the former
spouse or child was able to obtain a lien against the nonhomestead property
in which the owner resided. The support obligation was not considered an
exception to the exemption, but failure to pay support was considered a bar
to qualification for the exemption. Under the present exemption, any natural
person can qualify for a homestead exemption. Thus, failure to pay alimony
or support normally will not preclude a claim for a homestead exemption.
It is unclear whether this result was contemplated when the natural person
amendment was proposed and approved.
At present, a person with a claim for alimony, support, or maintenance
has a solution under bankruptcy law.254 If the debtor becomes insolvent,
and a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy is filed, the homestead
will not be exempt from this type of prebankruptcy debt.2" There is some
question whether these creditors can reach the homestead in a proceeding
under state court or must limit collection to the bankruptcy proceeding.
An argument can be made that a Florida homestead should not be
exempt from liens for alimony and support obligations. But this should
occur only as a last resort.256 The Bankruptcy Code provides that last re-
sort. Thus, the federal bankruptcy laws provide a remedy for such debtors.
This remedy should be tested judicially.257 If, and only if, the Bankruptcy
Code does not provide these persons with an adequate remedy, then
consideration should be given to amending the Florida Constitution in this
regard. If bankruptcy law does not provide that remedy, consideration also
should be given to the fact that the homestead exemption may provide
254. See I I U.S.C. §§ 522(c)(1), 523 (a)(1). For a discussion of when a claim is for
alimony, support, or maintenance, see Frank Nussbaum, A Second Bite at the Apple for
Dissolution Clients, 67 FLA. B.J. 85 (No. 9 Oct. 1993).
255. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(a)(1), 523(a)(5); see also Feldman v. Grimes, 46 B.R. 84 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1985).
256. See 3acardi v. White, 463 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985) (holding that as a last resort, a
beneficiary's right to a distribution from a spendthrift trust could be subject to liability for
payment of that beneficiary's alimony obligations).
257. The Bankruptcy Code has the effect of subordinating the exemption to certain
debts. The United States Constitution authorizes federal laws regulating bankruptcies. Is I I
U.S.C. § 522(c) constitutional? It should be to the extent it allows a Florida homestead to
be administered by a bankruptcy trustee and sold to satisfy these types of preferred debts.
Further, it is constitutional for certain debts not to be dischargeable in bankruptcy. An
additional question is whether the United States Constitution authorizes the Bankruptcy Code
to subject an asset to liability in a state proceeding for a debt from which that asset is liable
under state law.
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shelter for persons that the owner is legally obligated to support, such as a
new spouse or other children. Thus, at the present time, there is no
compelling argument that a specific exception to the exemption should be
created for alimony, maintenance, or support liabilities.
c. Other Creditors
Creditors who can reach nonexempt assets but cannot reach exempt
assets are at risk that a debtor will convert nonexempt assets to exempt
assets. A person who uses a nonexempt asset to purchase a homestead in
Florida is converting the nonexempt asset into an exempt asset. A person
who uses a nonexempt asset to satisfy a mortgage on a homestead can
increase the net value of the exempt asset. Similarly, a homestead owner
can purchase additional acreage contiguous to the homestead and additional
acreage will become part of the exempt homestead. Under present law,
absent unusual circumstances, a creditor cannot have the purchase or
satisfaction set aside, or obtain a lien superior to the exemption.
Florida had a fraudulent transfer statute from 1923 to 1988.258 When
this law was in effect, the federal circuit court of appeals court held that the
use of nonexempt funds to purchase an equitable interest in a homestead
was not fraudulent as to creditors. The court stated in Beall v. Pinck-
ney,2" 9 that "the intention to do what the Constitution not only permits but
provides, is not an intention to hinder and defraud creditors within the
meaning of the Florida Statutes [section 726.01 regarding fraudulent trans-
fers] .,260
This statute did not reach the transfer by a debtor of property that
qualified as the debtor's homestead to another, because the creditors had no
right to reach the homestead before the transfer was made. 26' This statute
258. FLA. STAT. § 726.01 (1987) (repealed 1988). This statute voided gifts, sales, and
transfers made with "the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors."
259. 150 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1945).
260. Id. at 4 7 1 (referring to section 726.01 of the statutes regarding fraudulent transfers).
261. Rigby v. Middlebrooks, 135 So. 563, 564 (Fla. 1931) ("as to exempt creditors there
are no creditors within the meaning of statutes prohibiting the conveyance of property in
fraud ofcreditors, and as homesteads are exempt from execution, a creditor acquires no rights
in regard thereto."); see also Murphy v. Farquhar, 22 So. 681, 683 (Fla. 1897) (creditor who
could not receive homestead if husband had not conveyed it to his wife, cannot contest
conveyance because "attempted transfer ... cannot give to any unexcepted judgment against
him any other, further or greater right in or to such homestead than it had before such
attempt had been made."); Saint-Gaudens v. Bull, 74 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1954) (conveyance by
mother of her homestead to daughter was not made to defraud mother's creditor); Grass v.
Great American Bank, 414 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("Alfred Grass's
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also did not reach conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets, because
the intention to claim an exemption was not an intention to delay, hinder,
or defraud creditors. This statute, however, was broad enough to reach a
gratuitous transfer of a nonexempt asset by a debtor, even if the transferee
could claim the property as an exempt homestead.
In 1988, Florida adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.262
Under this act, a transfer can be fraudulent as to a particular creditor if it is
made before or after a claim arose with the "actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any creditor of the debtor., 263  Effective October 1, 1993, a
new statute was enacted to grant relief to a creditor when a debtor
fraudulently converts nonexempt assets into products or proceeds that are
exempt by law.264  For this purpose, the conversion is fraudulent if it is
made "with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditor." This statute
can apply to a creditor whether the "claim to the asset arose before or after
the conversion. 2 65  This statute raises several questions. One question is
whether a homestead purchased from nonexempt funds can be "proceeds"
of these funds. This would be an unusual interpretation of the term
"proceeds." If it could be interpreted that way, another question is whether
the purchase of a homestead can be made with the intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud a creditor. Based on the predecessor statute, the mere conversion
subsequent conveyance of his interest in the homestead cannot be fraud upon Great American
Bank since the property was beyond the reach of Great American Bank due to its homestead
character, which was clearly established prior to entry of any judgment against Mr. Grass.");
Freehling v. McDonald, 16 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (gratuitous transfer of undivided
one-half interest in debtor's homestead was not fraudulent conveyance under Florida Statutes,
chapter 726, section 01 because at time of conveyance it was debtor's homestead; whereas,
later conveyance of other one-half interest was a fraudulent conveyance because it was made
when property was no longer debtor's homestead because debtor was no longer head of a
family and had moved from property and rented it). But see Roemelmeyer v. Vidana 19 B.R.
787, 788 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (gift to daughter of homestead owned by parents as tenancy
by the entirety avoidable, where daughter sold home two weeks later in prearranged sale and
gift was made to prevent levy on nonexempt homestead proceeds).
262. FLA. STAT. ch. 726(1988). In United States v. Romano, 757 F. Supp. 1331, 1335
(M.D. Fla. 1989), the court noted that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act adopted by
Florida "does not displace the principles of law and equity that were developed under
previous statutes and case law." See FLA. STAT. § 726.111 (1991).
263. FLA. STAT. § 732.105 (1991); Romano, 757 F. Supp. at 1331 (transfer of
homestead to son for inadequate consideration avoided to enforce federal tax liens; however,
government's tax lien is superior to homestead exemption under Florida law).
264. Ch. 93-256, § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws 2497, 2499 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
222.30).
265. Id.
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of non-exempt assets into exempt assets does not satisfy that intent element.
Effective October 1, 1993, the Florida Legislature extended the
fraudulent transfer doctrine so that an exemption provided under Florida
Statutes chapter 222 is not effective if it results from a "fraudulent transfer
or conveyance under chapter 726. "266 The homestead realty exemption is
created by the Florida Constitution, not chapter 222 of the Florida Stat-
utes. 267  Thus, the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and its
extension do not enable a creditor to reach the purchase of a homestead,
payment of a mortgage on a homestead, or conveyance of a homestead to
another if the homestead is exempt under the constitution. The Act could
apply to the extent a mobile home on leased land is statutorily exempt
absent additional, unusual factors,268 In addition, the conversion of
nonexempt assets into exempt assets generally is not prohibited under the
Bankruptcy Code,269 although certain transfers are avoidable.27°
The Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act also provides that a
transfer may be fraudulent if the debtor does not receive "reasonable and
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor
was insolvent at the time of the transfer or the debtor became insolvent as
a result of the transfer obligation. 271  A transfer of nonexempt assets to
exempt assets usually involves an exchange of equivalent value. Thus, a
transfer of assets into a homestead made when the debtor was insolvent, or
was rendered insolvent, should not be covered by the act. Based on the
judicial interpretation of the predecessor statute,272 it also is questionable
266. Id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2499 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 222.29 (effective
Oct. 1, 1993)).
267. Florida Statutes sections 222.01-222.08 provide the procedures for a person to
follow to claim the constitutional exemption.
268. See FLA. STAT. §§ 222.05, 222.29 (1991).
269. See Govaert v. Primack, 89 B.R. 954 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (move to Florida and
acquisition of $450,000 homestead 18 months before filing bankruptcy petition was not a
fraudulent transfer avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code); Tavormina v. Robinett, 47 B.R.
591, 592 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (transfer of wife's homestead to tenancy by the entirety not
avoidable even though transfer made when both husband and wife were insolvent, because
"transfer of exempt property cannot adversely affect any creditor, and therefore, cannot be
fraudulent transfer [under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)]."); Judson v. Levine, 40 B.R. 76 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1984) (use of $100,000 to satisfy line of credit secured by mortgage on homestead four
days prior to filing bankruptcy petition was not fraudulent on grounds for imposition of an
equitable lien).
270. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
271. FLA. STAT. § 732.106 (1991). A debtor with exempt assets may be insolvent. Id.
§§ 732.102, 732.103.
272. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
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whether this act can be used to avoid the constitutional exemption.
There is ajudicial exception to the homestead exemption that may help.
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that the homestead laws should be
liberally construed but not interpreted or applied "to make them instruments
of fraud or unjust imposition upon creditors., 273 This raises the question as
to what type of fraudulent conduct or set of facts would preclude application
of the homestead exemption.
Generally, acquiring an exempt homestead does not make the
exemption an instrument of fraud. This is true even if this results from a
conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets. Moreover, a person can
expand a homestead by acquiring additional acreage contiguous to an
existing homestead, even when the acreage is acquired when the person is
subject to an outstanding judgment. 274 The exception to this rule arises
when the nonexempt assets used to purchase the initial homestead property
or the additional acreage were fraudulently obtained. In some cases, the
fraud will result in denial of the exemption completely. 275 In other cases,
the fraud will result in the imposition of an equitable lien.276 In one
liberal decision, a Florida district court held the exemption would work a
fraud against a former wife due alimony if her former husband was allowed
to claim the exemption for a home. In Gepfrich, the husband had purchased
the home when he was in arrears on alimony payments and claimed he
could not afford to maintain the new home and pay his current and past due
alimony obligations.
277
In addition, using nonexempt assets to satisfy a mortgage on a
homestead will not make the exemption an instrument of fraud, especially
273. Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 13 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1943). See Milton v.
Milton, 58 So. 718, 719 (Fla. 1912) and Jettson Lumber Co. v. Hall, 64 So. 440, 442 (Fla.
1914) for similar language. Some district courts have extended this by stating that the
homestead exemption laws also should not be applied "as a means to escape honest debt."
See, e.g., Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (home-
stead exemption could not be used to defeat claim for alimony); Frase v. Branch, 362 So. 2d
317, 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), appeal dismissed, 368 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1979)
(contract to sell a portion of tract exceeding 160 acres, signed by one spouse only, could not
be avoided by claiming that portion was part of the homestead exemption, when the portion
retained exceeded 160 acres); Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704, 708 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
274. Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 2 10
So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1968).
275. In re Gherman, 101 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (exemption denied on
alternate grounds for use of embezzled funds to purchase homestead or abandonment).
276. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
277. 582 So. 2d at 743.
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if the property was mortgaged after the exemption attached. An exception
may apply when the funds used to satisfy the mortgage were wrongfully
obtained. In most cases, the remedy would be to grant the injured party an
equitable lien upon the homestead.2"
Presently, the burden is on a creditor to reach property before it
becomes exempt or is converted into an exempt asset.279 Should this
result change by allowing the fraudulent transfer doctrine to extend to
conversions of nonexempt assets into a constitutionally exempt homestead?
Consideration should be given to shifting the burden if two elements
are met. First, the conversion occurs when the debtor is insolvent or when
the conversion renders the debtor insolvent. Second, the person whose
claim arose before the conversion must have been prevented from reaching
the nonexempt asset because of circumstances beyond the person's control.
Lack of diligence on the part of the creditor would not be one of those
circumstances. For example, this exception would protect a creditor if an
insolvent debtor converts assets while a case is pending on the creditor's
cause of action, but before a judgment is rendered against the debtor.
Additionally, it would apply if an insolvent debtor converts assets, after a
judgment creator schedules a deposition to discover whether the debtor has
nonexempt assets but before the deposition takes place. It also should
protect a creditor who was recorded with a judgment in the county where
the homestead property is located or acquired.
Would such a result provide unequal treatment for debtors? Under this
approach, a person with an existing creditor who is insolvent or will become
insolvent after a conversion will not be able to exempt property he or she
purchased. By contrast, a person who is solvent can purchase a homestead
and exempt it from a future creditor, whose cause of action arose after the
purchase, even if the debtor thereafter becomes insolvent. This treatment
is analogous to situations where a solvent person makes a gift that cannot
be set aside present or future by creditors as a fraudulent conveyance; while
a present creditor could have the gift set aside if the debtor were insolvent
at the time of the gift.28° When the insolvency occurs, in relation to the
278. Friedman v. Luengo, 104 B.R. 489 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (equitable lien imposed
on homestead in favor of corporation for funds wrongfully taken from corporation's escrow
account). But see Raymos v. Collins, 19 B.R. 874 (Bankr. R.D. 1982) (debtor was denied
discharge when he used "business resources to satisfy a mortgage on his homestead" and also
because he failed to disclose the transfer)..
279. Heddon v. Jones, 154 So. 891 (Fla. 1934).
280. See FLA. STAT. § 726.105 (1991) (exceptions when transfers can be voidable by
future creditors).
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transfer or acquisition of an exempt asset, it creates unequal treatment and
that is appropriate. Solvent debtors are treated differently from insolvent
debtors with respect to their conveyances and transfers. Each would be
entitled to claim the exemption with respect to creditors' claims that arose
after the transfer or conversion occurred.
Whether a conversion while insolvent can be set aside should be tested
under the judicial fraud exception or the applicable statutes. If the courts
determine that a creditor cannot reach the converted assets under present
law, then a new statute or constitutional amendment should be considered.
d Judgment Creditors When Homestead is Sold
A judgment creditor cannot obtain a valid lien against a Florida
homestead unless it falls within an exception or the homestead is abandoned.
The supreme court has stated that "once property acquires the status of
homestead such characteristic continues to attach to it unless the homestead
be abandoned or alienated in the manner provided by law." '' The
meaning of the reference to alienation is unclear, unless it is considered a
reference to the issue of whether the proceeds from an alienation by sale are
exempt.
A sale by a married owner is an alienation for purposes of the joinder
requirement. This raises an issue as to whether a sale or the execution of
a contract to sell a homestead, or the sale itself, is an abandonment or
alienation of the homestead for creditor purposes. This would be relevant
if the seller does not intend to reinvest the proceeds in another home.2"2
If the sale is not considered an abandonment or alienation, the sale can be
made free of liens, other than excepted liens. The seller will be entitled to
receive the proceeds without having to satisfy those creditors at the time of
281. Wilson v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1953). See also In
re Estate of Skuro, 487 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 1986); Clark v. Cox, 85 So. 173, 174 (Fla.
1920).
282. If the seller resides on the property but dies before consummating the sale, the
supreme court has held that the contract is not treated as an alienation for devise purposes.
Thus, an owner with minor children who contracts to sell the homestead but dies before the
closing cannot devise the homestead. The court did not discuss whether the decedent
intended to reinvest the proceeds if he lived. In re Estate of Skuro, 487 So. 2d at 1066.
"While we recognize the doctrine of equitable conversion, because of the unique
treatment of the law of homestead property, we find that doctrine inapplicable
when the potential vendor is physically residing on the property as his home at
the time of his death. Had Skuro abandoned possession and no longer claimed
it as his family's place of abode, the doctrine would likely apply.
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the sale. A judgment creditor's remedy would be to reach the proceeds,
after the closing, once the proceeds are in the hands of the seller. On the
other hand, if the sale is treated as an abandonment or alienation, a
judgment that could not attach to the homestead while it was the residence
of the owner could attach to the property at the time of the contract or sale.
If a sale constitutes an abandonment, then a related question is whether a
gift of the homestead also could be treated as an abandonment.
Clearly, a sale is not an abandonment or alienation of the exemption if
the owner intends to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead within a
reasonable time. Further, the proceeds are exempt if they are not commin-
gled and the owner intends to reinvest them and does so within a reasonable
period of time. But is the converse true? Is a sale an abandonment if the
owner does not intend to reinvest the proceeds of the sale? The supreme
court has not ruled on this issue. In Beensen v. Burgess,283 the Fourth
District held that a seller who vacated his homestead before a closing in
order to surrender possession of the property at closing had not abandoned
the homestead. In Beensen, the seller temporarily resided with his daughter
until the closing; but, it was unclear whether the seller reinvested the
proceeds in another homestead. Beensen was followed by the federal
district court in Brown v. Lewis.28 4 In Brown, the owner of a homestead
signed a contract to sell and then permanently moved to Michigan two
months prior to the closing. The court held that she had not abandoned the
property when she moved. Thus, the property retained its exempt status and
the buyer's title was not subject to a lien for a judgment against the seller.
Neither court discussed the seller's intention to reinvest the proceeds;
however, in Brown v. Lewis, the owner established permanent residency in
Michigan and could not claim the intent to reinvest the proceeds in a Florida
residence.
The law should be clarified as to whether these cases are correct. If
these cases are correct, a buyer has no obligation to satisfy a judgment
against the seller if it is not a valid lien against the homestead, and the
buyer will receive title free from those judgments. The burden is on the
creditor to attach the proceeds once they are in the hands of the seller.
If these cases are correct, consideration should be given to whether this
rule should be changed to grant a creditor the right to be paid at closing if
the seller does not intend to reinvest the proceeds. If the seller intends to
reinvest the proceeds, consideration should be given to whether the proceeds
283. 218 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
284. 520 F. Supp. 1114 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
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should be held in escrow. This would place a significant burden on the
escrow agent. The proceeds would be held in escrow for a reasonable
period of time and during that time could be disbursed only for the purposes
of reinvesting them in a new homestead. Once the reasonable time period
for reinvesting expired, any remaining proceeds would be used to satisfy the
creditors' judgments.
Satisfying creditors out of sale proceeds would protect creditors. On
the other hand, it would place a burden on the homeowner to prove non-
abandonment (i.e., an intent to reinvest), a burden on the buyer to assure
that the judgments were satisfied or the proceeds properly escrowed, and a
burden on an escrow agent. This would unduly burden homestead owners,
buyers, and commerce, when the creditor presently has an adequate remedy.
The burden under present law is on the creditor to find and reach the
nonexempt proceeds. There does not seem to be any compelling reason to
shift the burden, when present law allows the creditor to reach the
nonexempt proceeds.2"5
e. Creditors with Dischargeable Debts Under Bankruptcy
When a homeowner files a petition in bankruptcy or is involuntarily
placed there, the rules change. The homeowner can claim the state
exemption in bankruptcy. The creditors may be satisfied, in whole (rarely)
or in part out of nonexempt, unsecured assets of the estate. To the extent
a creditor is not paid in full, the debt is discharged unless the debt is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.
If the debt is not dischargeable, the homeowner remains liable for the
debt. Then, if the homeowner sells the exempt homestead with no intent to
reinvest the proceeds, the creditor could reach the sales proceeds. In
addition, in some cases, the homestead may be liable for some of the
owner's debts; either because the debt is secured by a nonavoidable lien2 6
or the debt is a certain type of nondischargeable debt.287
Most debts are dischargeable.288 This means that after the discharge,
285. Ch. 93-256, § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws 2497, 2499 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
222.30(2)).
286. Present bankruptcy law allows a debtor who claims a homestead under Florida law
to avoid a pre-existing judicial lien if the lien attached after the debtor acquired his or her
interest in the property under I I U.S.C. § 522(0(1) (1992). Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305
(1991). This is a problem under bankruptcy law that Florida law cannot address.
287. I1 U.S.C. §§ 522(c)(1), (3) (1992).
288. Id. .§ 523.
1994]
159
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
the homeowner no longer has these debts."8 9 Thus, the homeowner can
sell the homestead and keep the proceeds free from the claims of the
discharged creditors. It even means that a homeowner can contract to sell
the home before the petition is filed and still claim the homestead exemp-
tion."'
If the debt is not dischargeable, a person who stacks a bankruptcy
discharge on top of the homestead exemption can reap great benefits from
it. This benefit would be obtained by contracting to sell the homestead,
either before or after the bankruptcy petition is filed, and closing the sale
after the petition is filed."' If the property is exempt, the trustee should
have no reason to avoid the contract to sell.
The problem that needs to be addressed is the fact that a discharge
precludes the creditor from reaching the sales proceeds. If the claim of a
"temporary" exemption coupled with a bankruptcy discharge results in this
type of abuse, the creditor should have a remedy, such as denial of the
exemption or revocation of the discharge. One question is whether this
abuse can be corrected by a change in Florida law. Permanent residency is
a requirement for the Florida homestead exemption. Permanent residency
does not mean that a person cannot sell the homestead. It means that the
person must intend to make that home (or a substitute home) his present,
permanent residence. A voluntary sale after the exemption is claimed may
raise a question as to whether the prerequisite intent existed at the time the
exemption was claimed. Similarly, the execution of a contract to sell before
the exemption is claimed raises a question as to whether the prerequisite
intent existed. In this context, the question of permanent residency,
abandonment, and alienation really are the same issue. In a non-bankruptcy
context, the creditor is protected by its right to reach the proceeds. In the
bankruptcy context, the discharge cuts off these rights. Could Florida
establish a different rule regarding permanent residence and abandonment
289. If the debt is secured by a valid lien, the discharge means that the debtor is relieved
of personal liability for the debt; however, the lien secures a nonrecourse liability.
290. In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). In Crump, the homestead was
exempt on the petition date (November 27, 1979), even though the debtor entered into the
contract to sell (November 1, 1979) and even though the debtor intended to leave the house
the day after the petition was filed "to reside at least temporarily in a rented house, which
they would like to purchase but have no present prospect of being able to purchase." Id. at
223.
291. See id; see also In re Washofsky, 78 B.R. 347 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (homestead
was exempt as of date petition was filed, even though debtor vacated the property after
petition was filed and moved into a rental apartment, and homestead was under contract for
sale).
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when the exemption is claimed in bankruptcy as opposed to when it is
claimed in a nonbankruptcy proceeding?292 Assuming that Florida could
do this, it does not seem desirable. If the bankruptcy exemption were more
desirable, it would provide an incentive for the debtor to file a voluntary
petition. If the bankruptcy exemption were less desirable, it would provide
an incentive for a qualifying creditor to file an involuntary petition. Present
bankruptcy law contains some of these incentives, but that is not sufficient
reason for Florida law to contain more incentives. In addition, changing the
rules could affect debtors that need their homesteads and have no intention
to sell them after bankruptcy.
Accordingly, the Florida courts need to resolve the issue of whether the
intent to sell without reinvesting the proceeds constitutes an abandonment
as of the sale.293 Then, the bankruptcy issue needs to be addressed with
regard to whether the debtor can claim the exemption and receive the
proceeds, free from any liability to those creditors.
B. Transfer Provisions
The devise provisions were revised in 1968 to limit the protected class
of children to minor children.2 94 They also were revised in 1972 to allow
a devise to the spouse (one protected class), in the absence of any minor
children (the other protected class). If devise is prohibited because their is
a minor child, however, the statutory descent provisions extend a benefit to
adult children. In addition, the 1984 extension of the exemption to all
natural persons increased the number of homesteads. It extended protection
to the spouse and heirs of natural persons who were not heads of a family.
Thus, it increased the number of spouses who can be protected and the
number of heirs who can benefit from the decedent's exemption. Several
supreme court decisions after these revisions and amendments reflect
inconsistencies between the purpose for the transfer restrictions and
inurement of the exemption and the results of these provisions. An
inconsistency arises when those who reap the benefit of these provisions do
so to the detriment of the decedent's creditors. These cases and inconsisten-
292. Maryland has a homestead exemption, limited in value, that differs for bankruptcy
and nonbankruptcy proceedings. The value is $5000 in a bankruptcy proceeding and $3000
in a nonbankruptcy proceeding. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 11-504 (1989).
293. Determining that the abandonment occurred immediately preceding the sale would
prevent creditors from forcing the sale of the homestead. If the sale is an abandonment, then
the question of when a creditor's lien attached would be relevant, if there were several
creditors and insufficient funds to satisfy them all.
294. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
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cies will be discussed in the context of how the transfer provisions should
be reformed.
When considering reform, it is important to consider the impact of the
supreme court's decision in Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children v.
Zrillic.295 In Shriners, the court held that an individual's right to "acquire,
possess and protect property" is protected by the constitution of Florida296
and that right includes the right to devise. It also includes the right to
dispose of property during lifetime. Obviously, the constitutional right to
alienate or devise property may be restricted by another provision of the
constitution. Further, "constitutionally protected property rights are not
absolute, and 'are held subject to the fair exercise of the power inherent in
the State to promote the general welfare of the people through regulations
that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order [and]
general welfare."'297  Nevertheless, in determining whether the present
transfer provisions are desirable, it is helpful to view them from the
standpoint that the right to alienate and devise property is a basic protected
property right, and it should be restricted only to the extent necessary to
secure the general welfare of the people. Thus, the right to alienate or
devise homestead should be restricted only to the extent necessary to protect
the persons the exemption is designed to protect.
In Shriners, the supreme court also stated that "Florida law is replete
with protections for surviving family members who may have been
dependent on the testator. For example, the Florida Constitution expressly
provides protection in the form of homestead exemptions for real and
personal property . *.".., It should be noted that the present homestead
exemption provides protection for surviving family members, whether or not
they are dependent on the homestead for shelter.
The transfer provisions affect a married person's right to alienate or
devise his or her homestead. They do not affect a parent's right to alienate
the homestead, even if that parent has a minor child, unless the parent is
295. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
296. Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution provides:
SECTION 2. Basic rights.-All natural persons are equal before the law
and have inalienable rights, among which are the right ... to acquire, possess
and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and
possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated
or prohibited.
297. Shriners, 563 So. 2d at 68. (quoting Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla.
1976)).
298. Id. at 69. See also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401-732.4015
(1985).
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married. They do, however, prevent the parent of a minor child from
devising the homestead at death. Should these provisions be retained or
amended? To determine this, it is necessary to analyze the purposes of
these provisions and the effect of these provisions.
1. Inter Vivos Provisions
The requirement for spousal consent for an inter vivos alienation has
applied since 1868.299 Originally, this requirement applied only to a
married owner who was head of a family. Thus, only a spouse married to
the head of a family was protected by this provision. The purpose of this
provision was to protect the spouse who was part of the family but did not
own the homestead. In most cases, the husband was the head of the family,
and the wife resided there with her husband and needed the shelter of the
homestead. The constitution protected this wife from her husband
transferring or mortgaging the homestead without her consent. If the wife
did not reside with her husband, then he usually was not the head of the
family and the property did not qualify as homestead. Thejoinder provision
also protected a husband if the wife owned the home and she was the head
of the family.
In some cases, the constitution protected a spouse of the head of the
family, when the spouse did not reside on the homestead or was not part of
the family. For example, a spouse who had temporarily or involuntarily
abandoned the homestead was protected from the other spouse alienating the
homestead without his or her consent. Thus, if the husband owned the
homestead and the wife abandoned the homestead because he physically
abused her, a court probably would have ruled that he was the head of the
family and could not convey it without her consent. On the other hand, if
the wife had voluntarily and permanently abandoned the husband and the
homestead, the result was less clear. If the husband was the head of the
family, which included his children, the court had the equitable power to
waive thejoinder requirement if the wife voluntarily abandoned him and the
children.3"' This doctrine of spousal abandonment was part of the law in
effect, when the owner was required to be the head of the family in order
299. One difference in the present constitution is that it specifically authorizes gratuitous
transfers. FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 4(c). Another difference is that the Florida Constitution of
1885 required a deed or mortgage to be duly executed, resulting in a requirement for two
subscribing witnesses to a contract to purchase, which has been eliminated. See FLA. CONST.
of 1885, art. X, § 4.
300. See In re Estate of Scholtz, 543 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1989) (regarding its
characterization of the pre-1985 caselaw).
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to qualify for the homestead exemption.3"'
In 1984, the homestead exemption was amended to apply to any natural
person owning a homestead. Since then, any spouse married to a natural
person owning a homestead is protected. This amendment substantially
changed the classes of spouses that can prevent a homeowner from
alienating it by extending protection to spouses of natural persons who are
not the head of a family. The spouse of any person who owns a homestead
is protected, whether that person is the head of the family and whether the
homestead is that spouse's residence.
Consider the following example: A husband owns the home in which
he and his wife reside. He and his wife are the sole members of the family,
and he is the head of the family. The wife abandons him and the home and
moves to another state, with no intention of returning to him or the home.
Thereafter, the husband is no longer the head of the family. If the
abandonment occurred in 1984, the home would not be a homestead and the
husband could sell or mortgage the home without her consent. If the
abandonment occurred after January 7, 1985, the home would be a
homestead and the husband could not sell or mortgage the home without his
wife's consent, unless the marriage has been dissolved." 2 Thus, under the
present law, a spouse is protected from alienation, even if he or she does not
reside on the homestead and has abandoned the owner-spouse and the
homestead.
In many cases, the nonowner-spouse is dependent on the owner-spouse
for shelter and support. This nonowner spouse needs the protection
accorded him or her under the constitution to prevent the owner from
alienating the homestead without his or her consent. If the home is owned
by both spouses as tenants by the entireties, both spouses are protected.
Neither can alienate the property without the other's consent. But if only
one spouse owns the home, the other may need protection. The joinder
requirement should be retained to protect that owner's spouse. The question
is whether the joinder requirement should apply to all spouses.
The joinder requirement for a married owner should not be abolished
entirely." 3 It should be retained, but only for a limited class of spouses.
301. See Barlow v. Barlow, 23 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1945) (regarding devise restriction).
302. See In re Estate of Scholtz, 543 So. 2d at 219 (concept of spousal abandonment
does not apply to devise restriction, so that husband who was survived by a spouse who lived
separately from him for 29 years, was not entitled to devise homestead that he purchased
during their separation).
303. If the choice is to have the restriction apply to all nonowner spouses or to none of
them, then its present scope should be retained so that it applies to all spouses.
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Thus, the joinder requirement should apply to spouses whose permanent
residence is or was the homestead, so long as that residence has not been
voluntarily and permanently abandoned by that spouse.
A spouse who has never resided in the homestead or who resided there
and then voluntarily abandoned it as a permanent residence does not need
protection. That spouse can choose to remain married or dissolve the
marriage and divide the assets, including the homestead. Consider the
example of an estranged husband and wife with no children. Neither has
attempted to have the marriage dissolved. Each owns and lives alone in a
separate homestead. Neither relies on the other for support or has any
contact with the other. Neither of them can give, mortgage, or sell their
respective homesteads without the other's consent (except to create a
tenancy by the entirety). Neither spouse should have the right to prevent the
other from alienating his or her homestead.
The purpose of the joinder requirement should be to provide a spouse
who chooses to reside in the homestead with the security that the homestead
will not be alienated without that spouse's consent. If the spouse lives in
the home and the nonowner chooses to abandon it, that home still would be
the owner's homestead and the joinder requirement should apply.
The joinder requirement should not apply to other spouses. According-
ly, the law should provide that the right to prevent the owner spouse from
alienating the homestead, without the other nonowner spouse's consent, can
be waived by the nonowner spouse. Permanent, voluntary abandonment of
the homestead by the nonowner spouse would operate as a waiver of the
joinder requirement. In addition, this requirement should be waivable by
agreement between the spouses. The requirements for the waiver agreement
could parallel the requirements for an agreement to waive the right to inherit
the homestead or they could parallel the requirements for other provisions
of an antenuptial agreement.3"4 Waiver of the right to inherit restores the
right to devise the homestead to a married owner who has no minor
children."' Similarly, waiver of the right to join in an alienation should
restore the right of a married person to freely alienate the homestead during
lifetime.
An unmarried parent can alienate his or her homestead, even if he or
304. Compare FLA. STAT. § 732.702 (1991) (no consideration required; disclosure
required only if the agreement is made after the marriage) with Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio,
143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962) (the requirements for an antenuptial agreement are that it must
contain fair and reasonable provisions for the waiving spouse or the waiving spouse must
receive full, fair and open disclosure of the other spouse's wealth).
305. City Nat'l Bank v. Tescher, 578 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1991).
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she has minor children. By contrast, that parent cannot devise the
homestead, if he or she is survived by any minor children. At first, this
appears to be inconsistent, but it is not. The laws regarding parental support
are designed to protect the minor child while the parent is alive. The parent
needs the ability to purchase or sell the homestead in order to determine the
appropriate means of providing a shelter for that minor child. The parent's
ability to alienate the homestead should not be restricted when that parent
has a minor child.3"6 The restriction on alienation should apply only when
the owner is married, regardless of whether the owner has any minor
children; however, the restriction should not apply if the spouse has waived
the homestead rights by abandonment or agreement.
2. Devise Provisions
The original purpose of the devise prohibition was to protect the widow
and children of the head of the family. Now, the devise prohibition is
designed to protect a widow, a widower, or only a minor child, but not an
adult child. The constitution prohibits devise, but it does not guarantee that
the homestead will descend to the protected class, nor does it necessarily
guarantee the protected class the exclusive right to reside in the homestead.
The legislature fills in this gap, by determining how the homestead will
descend. To determine if the prohibition on devise should be maintained,
it is essential to consider how the homestead descends when devise is
prohibited. If the descent provisions do not benefit the members of the
protected class, then they should be amended. If they cannot be amended
to do this effectively, then the prohibition on devise should be revised.
The devise prohibition only applies when the owner's interest is one
306. Any proposal requiring that a minor child consent to the alienation, through his or
her natural or legal guardian or guardian ad litem, would be inappropriate or unduly
burdensome. If the child lives with the parent who owns the homestead, that parent will
provide shelter for the child, be it this homestead or another home. If the child does not live
with the parent who owns the homestead, why should that child have the right to prevent the
parent-owner from selling that home? In addition, if the owner is the child's guardian, there
is no reason to require the owner to consent in his or her capacity as guardian. Further, there
is no reason to require a guardian ad litem to be appointed. Even if the guardian ad litem
could make an informed decision as to what is in the best interests of the minor child, the
owner's decision as to what is in the best interest of the owner and child should override the
guardian ad litem's decision. If the child does not reside with the owner, the owner's former
spouse or the child's other parent (if the child was born out of wedlock) could be the child's
guardian. Requiring that guardian's consent would be problematic. If the owner is married
and has a minor child, the spouse'sjoinder should be the only joinder requirement, even if
that spouse is not the child's other parent.
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capable of being devised. Thus, the devise prohibition does not apply if the
homestead is owned as a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship. It also does not apply if the owner has only a life
estate or a beneficial life interest in an irrevocable trust.
When the owner has a devisable interest but devise is prohibited under
the constitution, the homestead descends pursuant to the Florida Probate
Code. The surviving spouse receives a life estate and the descendants
(including any minor child) a vested remainder. If there is a surviving
spouse or descendant, but not both, the homestead descends to the surviving
spouse or descendants, as the case may be. The minor child is not granted
possession of the homestead so long as the surviving spouse is alive. If the
surviving spouse is the minor child's other parent or guardian, the child will
live with the spouse on his or her life estate. Further, if there is no
surviving spouse or the surviving spouse dies, the minor is not granted
exclusive possession if there are other descendants. Instead, ownership and
possession are shared with the other descendants, per stirpes. In addition,
the minor will reside in the home only if the child's guardian also resides
there. One result of these provisions is that adult children are treated
differently depending on whether the owner is or is not survived by a
surviving spouse or a minor child.
In recent years, there have been legislative proposals to remove all of
the devise prohibitions. However, the devise prohibition is an integral part
of the homestead protection and should be retained in some fashion to
protect the surviving spouse. Whether the prohibition against devise should
be retained if the owner is survived by a minor is questionable and is
discussed infra.
When the constitution was revised in 1968, adult children lost their
status as members of the protected class. An adult child has no right to
prevent the parent from devising the homiestead °7 An adult child has a
statutory right to inherit an interest in the parent's homestead, if the parent
cannot devise it or chooses not to devise it. This lack of standing is
reflected in two decisions of the supreme court.
In In re Estate of Finch,308 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the owner of a homestead who is survived by a spouse and adult children
and who wants to devise the homestead has only one choice: the owner can
307. Upon the death of the parent, an adult child could contest an inter vivos alienation,
if the parent was married and the spouse was required to join in the alienation but failed to
do so.
308. 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981).
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devise a fee simple interest in the homestead to the surviving spouse. 09
Otherwise, the homestead will descend by statute, with the surviving spouse
receiving a life estate and the descendants (adult children) receiving the
vested remainder. In Finch, the husband owned the homestead and he
wanted to devise a life estate to his wife and a vested remainder to only one
of his two adult daughters. The court held that "[w]here a testator dies
leaving a surviving spouse and adult children, the property may not be
devised by leaving less than a fee simple interest to the surviving
spouse."' 1
0
In City National Bank v. Tescher,31' the court held that a married
person with adult children, but no minor children, could devise the
homestead when the surviving spouse waived homestead rights in an
antenuptial agreement." 2 This decision was followed by Hartwell v.
Blasingame,313 which held that the surviving spouse's waiver was binding
on the adult children, so that they could not contest their parent's devise of
the homestead.3"4 Accordingly, if a surviving spouse has waived the right
to inherit an interest in the homestead, the owner has the right to devise the
homestead if there are no minor children. The waiver is equivalent to the
spouse's death, so the owner is treated as not being survived by a spouse.
The reason the owner cannot devise the homestead when survived by
a spouse or minor child is premised on the assumption that the spouse and
minor child need the shelter that the homestead can provide them. The
surviving spouse can be protected by providing a life estate to that surviving
spouse. A surviving minor child can be protected by providing the minor
with a term interest during his or her minority.
If there is a surviving spouse and minor child, it is not possible to
guarantee both of them possession of the homestead. If the surviving
309. Id. at 1309. If the owner is a tenant in common, so that the owner's homestead
interest is an undivided interest in the property, then the owner can devise that undivided co-
tenant interest to the surviving spouse. See also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text
(regarding a devise to the spouse of an interest as a tenant in common).
310. Finch, 401 So. 2d at 1309.
311. 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991).
312. Id. at 703. In Tescher. the wife owned the homestead and her husband waived his
rights by an antenuptial agreement. The wife was survived by two adult children and four
adult grandchildren, and the homestead was not specifically devised. The personal
representative wanted to sell the homestead and distribute it as part of the residuary devise.
The probate court's order authorizing the sale was affirmed by the district court and the
supreme court. Id.
313. 584 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1991).
314. Id. at 7. In Hartwell, there were no minor children. Id. at 6.
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spouse is the minor child's parent or guardian, the child will be protected
by that spouse or guardian rather than by the homestead law. If the
surviving spouse is not that child's parent or guardian, the surviving
spouse's right to possession should be superior to the minor child's.
Accordingly, if the surviving spouse receives a life estate, the minor's term
interest would not begin until the surviving spouse died, and then it would
begin only if the surviving spouse died while the child was still a minor.
If there were no surviving spouse, the minor child's term would begin when
the owner died and would cease when the child attained the age of majority
or died prior thereto. If there were several minors and they did not want to
share possession, the homestead could be offered for rent, with any rental
income shared by the minors and used by their guardians to provide
substitute housing. The life estate and term interest would be alienable by
the surviving spouse and minor child (via guardian), respectively. Thus, the
surviving spouse and minor child can be protected without granting all
descendants a remainder interest in the homestead.
If the surviving spouse is the minor child's other parent, the minor
child does not need to receive a term interest when the owner dies. Instead,
the owner of the homestead should be able to devise the homestead to the
surviving spouse. If this occurs and the surviving spouse resides there, it
will be the surviving spouse's homestead. Then, the minor child will be
protected by the homestead laws, when the surviving parent dies during the
minority of that child.
A life estate or term interest is sufficient to protect a surviving spouse
or minor child, respectively. There is no reason that the owner should not
have the right to devise a remainder interest in the homestead as he or she
pleases. This remainder would be subject to the life estate of the surviving
spouse, if any, and to the term interest for the minor child or children, if
any.
The constitution and statutes should be amended so that the surviving
spouse receives a life estate, minor children receive a term interest, and the
remainder interest can be devised as the owner chooses." 5 The remainder
would default to the owner's lineal descendants to the extent not devised
otherwise. This amendment will overcome the result of Finch.3 6  The
present law grants an adult child a right to inherit if there is a surviving
315. A minor's term interest should qualify asa homestead if the life estate qualifies and
the minor resides with the life tenant. The same should apply to the remainder interests if
the holder of that interest resides with the holder of the possessory interest, be it the life
estate or the term interest. See supra part II A. l.c.vii. (regarding remainder interests).
316. 578 So. 2d at 701.
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spouse-a right that the adult child would not have if there were no
surviving spouse. This amendment will avoid that result unless the owner
wants that result and chooses not to devise the homestead.
The owner could devise a contingent or vested remainder interest. For
example, the decedent could choose to vest the remainder interest in the
surviving spouse, in order to give that spouse the right to dispose of the
property or remainder once the child attains the majority. The remainder
interest could be vested in an adult child if the owner chose to do so. Or
the remainder interest could be vested in any other person or entity the
owner chooses. Or the remainder interest could be contingent upon the
occurrence of certain events or the remainder beneficiary surviving the life
estate or term interest.
The owner should not be able to create successive life estates, granting
a married adult child a residence for life and thereby avoiding the homestead
rights the surviving spouse of the married child might have in the residence.
The owner should not be able to impose a restriction that would prevent the
remainder beneficiary from alienating or devising it. To the extent the
remainder interest qualifies as a homestead, that owner's spouse and minor
child should receive the full protection accorded them under the homestead
laws.
Consideration also should be given to allowing devises in trust. This
would allow the owner to devise a life estate and term of years in trust. A
new trust form, a qualified homestead trust ("QHOT") could be established
for this purpose. The QHOT would provide the surviving spouse with the
exclusive right to use the homestead during his or her life. The spouse
would have the right to direct the trustee to rent the homestead to others
during the surviving spouses lifetime. If it were rented, the spouse would
be entitled to the net income. The trustee would have the obligation to
maintain the homestead, but only to the extent there were adequate funds
available for this purpose. Funds could be provided from rental income, by
the surviving spouse or trust funds provided by the decedent. The trustee
would have the right to sell the homestead, with the surviving spouse's
consent.317 The trustee would have the right to reinvest the proceeds in
317. Should the remainder beneficiaries be granted a right of first refusal? This would
give them the right to purchase the homestead at the price and upon the terms presented in
a bona fide offer for the homestead. If a remainder beneficiary were a minor, this would
require the appointment of a guardian ad litem, which is one of the problems associated with
the present statutory life estate and vested remainder. Further, the right of first refusal could
affect the trustee's ability to sell the homestead and close when the buyer would want,
particularly if there are comparable properties for sale without that right. Thus, the protection
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a new homestead, with the surviving spouse's consent. If there were a
mortgage on the homestead, the surviving spouse would be required to pay
the interest on the mortgage and the remainder beneficiaries the princi-
pal.3"' If any beneficiary advanced funds for another beneficiary's share
of the expenses, that beneficiary would be entitled to recover the funds
advanced, plus interest, from any sale of the homestead and possibly a lien
against that beneficiary's interest. A beneficiary could serve as the trustee.
After the surviving spouse died and all minor children had attained the age
of majority or had died, the homestead would be distributed, outright, to the
remainder beneficiaries. The QHOT should be designed so that it can
qualify for the marital deduction, as qualified terminal interest property.1 9
An additional question is whether all surviving spouses should be
granted protection against disinheritance. It is arguable that a spouse who
has never resided on the homestead or who voluntarily abandoned it is not
entitled to that protection.
In Barlow v. Barlow,320 the supreme court held that a surviving wife
was not entitled to any interest in her husband's homestead when she had
abandoned her husband and the home prior to his death. Ms. Barlow
removed her effects from the home, voluntarily and permanently left it, and
moved to another city where she retained counsel to procure a divorce. The
abandonment occurred within two weeks of the husband's death, while his
death was imminent. This case was decided when the head of the family
requirement existed. It was decided on one of two grounds: either that the
husband no longer was the head of the family, consisting of his wife and
himself, or that it would be inequitable to allow the wife to abandon the
husband and then return after his death to claim an interest in his home-
stead.3 1
In 1988, the issue of whether "the concept of abandonment as set out
in Barlow v. Barlow [is] still viable in view of the 1985 amendment of the
homestead provisions of the Florida Constitution" was certified to the
supreme court.3 22 In In re Estate of Scholtz,13 the husband and wife
had been separated for twenty-nine years and he had purchased the
that the right of first refusal could provide appears to be outweighed by the detriments.
318. Whether a burden should be imposed on the term interest of a minor would need
to be decided.
319. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).
320. 23 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1945).
321. Id. at 724.
322. In re Estate of Scholtz, 525 So. 2d 516, 516 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
323. 543 So. 2d at 219 (Fla. 1989).
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homestead while they were separated. They filed joint income tax returns,
but "there was no familial support between them," "no domestic relation-
ship," and "no evidence of any reconciliation.' 324 The court held that the
"concepts of abandonment and inequity that were part of the cases predating
the 1985 amendment all related to the definition of homestead which
contemplated a 'head of the family."' 325 Accordingly, the supreme court
held that spousal abandonment of the homestead does not prevent that
spouse from receiving an interest in the homestead. Therefore, the
restrictions against devise applies to a married owner who has been
abandoned by his or her spouse, unless the spouse has waived homestead
rights in a valid agreement.
The effect of the extension of the exemption to all natural persons is
that a married owner must provide his or her surviving spouse with a
residence (for the survivor's life or in fee), unless the surviving spouse
waives that right. Under present law, this right can be waived by agree-
ment, without consideration.326 It can be waived without any disclosure,
if the agreement is made prior to the marriage,327 but it cannot be waived
by abandonment. This result should be changed. A spouse who voluntarily
abandons the homestead or chooses never to reside there should not be
granted a life estate in that homestead when the owner-spouse dies.
The purpose for the Florida homestead law does not mandate that all
spouses should be protected against disinheritance. When the exemption
was extended to any natural person, the class of protected spouses was
expanded unnecessarily.32 If the homestead is the permanent residence
of the nonowner spouse, that spouse deserves the protection the constitution
accords him or her. If the homestead is owned as a tenancy by the entirety,
324. In re Estate of Scholtz, 525 So. 2d at 517.
325. In re Estate of Scholtz, 543 So. 2d at 221.
326. FLA. STAT. § 732.702 (1991).
327. Id.
328. The Background Papers for the Constitutional Revision Commission of 1977-78
indicate that deleting the head of the family requirement "would alter the policy behind the
art. X exemptions; namely to protect the owner's dependents." Background Papers,
Constitutional Revision Commission 1977-78, at 3 (copy on file at the Nova Law Review
office). This report, however, does not discuss the devise provisions in connection with this
change. In In re Estate of Scholtz, 543 So. 2d at 221, the supreme court noted:
While we may have some doubt about whether the proponents of the amendment
considered its effect as related to the prohibition against the devise of home-
steads, we are unable to state with any certainty that they did not intend the
surviving spouse and the children to receive the homestead regardless of whether
the family unit continued to exist at the time of the owner's death.
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that spouse will be protected. A spouse who is financially unable to
purchase a home in his or her own name or in a tenancy by the entirety or
who is unable to convince the other spouse to create a tenancy by the
entirety needs protection. But a spouse who has permanently and voluntari-
ly abandoned the homestead does not.
The homestead law should be amended, so that the right to inherit an
interest in the homestead can be waived by agreement or abandonment.
Waiver by agreement has been sanctioned by the supreme court and is
codified in the current probate code. Waiver by abandonment is not part of
the present law, according to the supreme court's decision in In re Estate of
Scholz.32 9 Accordingly, a constitutional amendment is required to make
it part of the homestead laws. Waiver by abandonment would arise if a
spouse failed to make the homestead his or her permanent residence during
the owner's lifetime or had voluntarily and permanently abandoned it prior
to the owner's death.
3. Inurement of Exemption
If creditors cannot reach a person's homestead while he or she is alive,
should they' have a last chance when he or she dies? This issue arises if the
decedent owned an interest in the homestead as the sole owner, as a co-
tenant, or as a beneficiary of a revocable trust. 330
In Public Health Trust v. Lopez,33' the supreme court held that the
decedent's exemption inures to the heirs of any natural person, even when
the heirs are not dependent on the decedent.332 The court noted that "[t]he
term 'heirs" is defined by section 731.201(18), Florida Statutes (1985), as
those persons entitled to the decedent's property under the statutes of
intestate succession." '333 The court applied this rule to heirs who were
adult children of the decedent but were not dependent on the decedent at the
329. 543 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1989).
330. This issue does not arise if the decedent's interest did not survive his or her death
or was the type of interest that passes by survivorship rather than by devise , intestacy or
homestead statutes. For example, a life estate terminates when the decedent dies, and the
decedent's creditors would have no right to reach the remainder interest. Another example
arises when the homestead is owned as a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy with right
of survivorship-the surviving spouse or joint tenant receives the property by survivorship
and the decedent's interest does not survive for purposes of a sole creditor of the decedent
being able to reach it.
331. 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1988).
332. Id. at 951.
333. Id. at 951 n.6 (citing FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1985)).
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time of death. Lopez consolidated two cases. In one case, the adult
children lived with their mother who owned the homestead. In the other,
the adult children lived elsewhere.334
Under the present law, the decedent's surviving spouse, minor children,
and other descendants who receive an interest in the homestead do so with
the benefit of the decedent's exemption. In addition, any other person who
inherits the decedent's property if the decedent dies intestate will receive the
benefit of the exemption (and will apply it to any interest in the decedent's
homestead that the person inherits). Further, the rules are applied when the
persons who would inherit the property receive it by devise.
35
In some cases, the provisions are fair. They are fair if the persons who
occupied the homestead while the decedent was alive receive an interest in
the homestead and the decedent's exemption inures to them. In other cases,
the provisions are not fair. A person who was a member of the decedent's
family in law336 and resided on the homestead, but did not have the right
to inherit from the decedent, would not be protected if the decedent died
intestate. If the decedent devised the homestead to that family in law, they
would receive the homestead but not the exemption. Thus, the homestead
will pass through administration, subject to the decedent's creditors. This
has always been an anomaly was part of the law when the head of the
family requirement existed as well.
Another inequity arises when the spouse or heirs who receive the
homestead and the exemption never used the property as their permanent
residence. This inequity existed under the old law, but it was less likely to
happen. Prior to January 8, 1985, only the head of the family was entitled
to the exemption, so only the heirs of the head of the family benefitted from
the protection. Now that the exemption has been extended to any natural
persons, the exemption inures to the heirs of any natural person with a
homestead. Thus, there are more homesteads for more heirs to receive free
from creditors. For example, after 1984, an unmarried man who owns a
home and lives there alone can qualify for the homestead exemption. If he
dies intestate or devises the property to the persons who would be his heirs,
they will receive the homestead free from his creditors. If he were survived
by his parents, the exemption would inure to them. They would get this
protection even though the decedent did not provide them a home during his
334. Id. at 947.
335. See supra note 93.
336. For this purpose, a family in law would arise from communal living, if the owner
provides that family in law with the shelter of the homestead, whether or not one person was
regarded as the head of that family. It would not include bona fide tenants.
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lifetime. Prior to the 1984 amendment, he would not have qualified for the
exemption, so that his creditors could reach the homestead during his
lifetime and upon his death. This creates a windfall to these heirs, at the
expense of the decedent's creditors.
The exemption should inure to a person who receives the homestead
if the homestead was that person's permanent residence when the decedent
died. By contrast, a person who receives an interest in a homestead that
was not his or her residence should not receive the benefit of the exemption.
For example, an adult son who owns his own home, exempt from his own
creditors, should not be able to receive his mother's homestead, free from
the reach of her creditors. In addition, the exemption should inure to the
persons who resided there and receive an interest in the homestead, even if
that person would not be an heir of the decedent under the laws of intestacy.
In this way, persons who would not be heirs at law would be protected if
they depended upon the owner for shelter, via the homestead.
Another question is whether the exemption should inure to a person
who receives the decedent's homestead but does not intend to permanently
reside there after the decedent's death or who intends to sell it without
reinvesting the proceeds in a new homestead. The inurement of the
exemption has never been tied to the spouse or heir establishing that
property as his or her homestead. This may have made sense under the
head of the family requirement. For example, a spouse or child who was
dependent on the decedent for shelter could receive the decedent's
homestead, free from the decedent's creditors, even if that person would not
qualify as the head of a family after the decedent's death.337 Under
present law, any natural person who owns a homestead can qualify for the
exemption if the property is her or her permanent residence. If the
constitution is amended so that the exemption inures only to those who used
the homestead as their permanent residence, it does not seem necessary to
impose the additional requirement that that person must continue to use the
homestead as a permanent residence after the owner's death.
III. CONCLUSION
Florida's homestead exemption is a powerful exemption with a
337. Florida Statutes, section 222.19 addressed this problem for the surviving spouse by
conferring head of the family status on the surviving spouse, even if the spouse lived alone
and could not have qualified as head of a family otherwise. FLA. STAT. § 222.19 (repealed
1983).
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significant history. The exemption is conferred by the Constitution of the
State of Florida and this exemption cannot be amended without the approval
of the Florida voters. This exemption does not solve the problem of those
who are homeless, because it only benefits those who can afford to purchase
and maintain a home. At the same time, it will help prevent homeowners
who suffer financial adversity from becoming homeless and assure them
shelter while they work to satisfy their creditors or avail themselves of a
discharge and fresh start in bankruptcy.
The purpose of the exemption is two-fold; to protect the homestead
from the owner's creditors (via lien attachment or forced sale), to protect
certain members of the owner's family from the owner (via alienation or
disinheritance), and to protect those members from the owner's creditors
(via inurement of the exemption). In most cases, the exemption accom-
plishes these purposes. There is a need for clarification of the law or reform
in a few areas.
The major areas of the law that need reform involve the class of
persons that is designed to be protected by the exemption. These areas
relate to the constitutional restrictions on alienation and devise and the
impact of the statutory descent provisions involving the homestead. Reform
is necessitated as a result of the changes made to the Florida Constitution
in 1968 and 1984. This article suggests a number of alternative reforms,
and the following are recommended as the best alternatives:
1. The joinder requirement for alienation by married persons protects
all spouses, even when they have never used the homestead as a permanent
residence or have voluntarily abandoned it. Extending the exemption in
1984 to all natural persons extended the protection against alienation to all
spouses. At the same time, this amendment eliminated the concept of
spousal abandonment. The concept of abandonment should be revived so
that a spouse who voluntarily and permanently abandons the homestead does
not have the right to prevent the owner-spouse from alienating the
homestead. In addition, the joinder requirement should be waivable in a
manner similar to the way that the devise restriction is waivable. This
would extend the supreme court's decision in City National Bank v. Tescher
to inter vivos alienation. In this way, homestead rights could be waived by
abandonment or agreement.
2. The devise restriction also should be limited to cases where the
owner is survived by a spouse who has not voluntarily abandoned or waived
the homestead. This amendment would change the rule adopted by the
supreme court in In re Estate of Scholtz. Then, the right to inherit an
interest in the homestead could be waived by abandonment or agreement,
and the right to devise would not be restricted by the existence of a
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surviving spouse if his or her rights had been waived. Further, the devise
restriction applicable when the owner is survived by a minor child should
be limited, so that the survival of a minor child does not prevent the owner
from devising the homestead to the surviving spouse if that survivor is also
the parent of the minor child. In this way, the restriction would apply when
it is desirable to limit the surviving spouse's interest to a life estate in order
to protect the minor child who is not the surviving spouse's child.
3. If there is a protected spouse, but no protected minor child, then the
surviving spouse should receive a life estate and the minor child a term
interest (possessory during minority, but only after the surviving spouse's
death).338 The owner should have the right to devise the remainder as he
or she chooses. This would overrule In re Estate of Finch. The use of a
qualifying homestead trust ("Q-HOT") should be considered, whereby the
homestead could be held in trust after the owner's death for the life of the
surviving spouse and the minority of any surviving children. This type of
trust could be designed so that it could qualify for the marital deduction for
estate tax purposes.To the extent a child or other person receives a future interest in the
homestead (for a term or as a remainder interest), that interest should qualify
for the exemption if the possessory interest (the life estate or term interest)
qualifies for the exemption and the holder of the future interest resides with
the owner of the possessory interest in the homestead. This would change
the rule adopted in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Lagasse.
These changes would require constitutional and statutory amendments.
These changes would be consistent with the supreme court's holding in
Shriners, that the right to acquire, possess, and dispose of one's property is
a constitutional right that should be limited only to the extent necessary to
promote the general welfare of the people in Florida. Clearly, any
constitutional restriction on the devise of homestead would be constitutional;
however, any constitutional restriction on devise should be allowed only to
the extent there is a compelling need for the restriction. Further, a
restriction on devise should be imposed only to the extent the statutes on
descent can effectuate the purpose for the restriction.
In addition, the devisees or heirs of the homestead should receive that
homestead, free from the claims of the owner's creditors, only when there
is a reason that the exemption should shield them from the owner's
improvidence or misfortune. Thus, the exemption should inure upon the
338. Ownership by tenants by the entirety would avoid creation of a term interest at the
death of the first spouse.
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death of the owner only to the class of persons who need the protection of
the exemption. This class should include only the persons whose permanent
residence was the homestead at the time of the owner's death. This class
could include a person who would not be an intestate heir. A person within
this class who voluntarily abandoned the homestead would not be entitled
to the protection.
In addition, there is a need for the homestead law to be judicially
clarified or amended so that (1) a rural homestead used by the owner's
family as a residence qualifies as the owner's homestead; and (2) only one
homestead owned by a person can qualify for the exemption.
The constitutional requirement that only an interest in an estate of land
can qualify for the exemption should remain. The exemption should be
extended legislatively when needed so that the following applies:
1. The homestead exemption for mobile homes attached to land, which
the owner has the right to lawfully possess, should be granted by a clear
statutory exemption, with specific exemptions similar to those applicable to
the constitutional exemption. The extent, if any, to which the restrictions
on alienation and devise apply should be determined.
2. The homestead exemption should be extended statutorily to
cooperatives, with due regard given to creating specific exceptions and
restrictions on alienation and devise.
3. Consideration should be given to creating a statutory exemption for
leasehold interests.
Consideration also should be given to creating a statutory or constitu-
tional exemption for personal property reasonably necessary for the use of
the homestead as a residence.
Consideration also should be given to curtailing any abusive use of the
homestead and the incentive for debtors to move to Florida for this
exemption. This may include expansion of the judicial fraud exception for
homesteads as well as a proposals to amend the federal bankruptcy laws.
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APPENDIX A339
Florida Constitution of 1868:
(effective May 8, 1868)
ARTICLE IX-HOMESTEAD
Section 1. A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres
of land, or the half of one acre within the limits of any incorporated city or
town, owned by the head of a family residing in this State, together with
one thousand dollars' worth of personal property, and the improvements on
the real estate, shall be exempted from forced sale under any process of law,
and the real estate shall not be alienable without the joint consent of
husband and wife, when that relation exists. But no property shall be
exempt from sale for taxes, or for the payment of obligations contracted for
the purchase of said premises, or for the erection of improvements thereon,
or for house, field, or other labor performed on the same. The exemption
herein provided for in a city or town shall not extend to more improvements
or buildings than the residence and business house of the owner.
Section 3. The exemptions provided for in sections 1 and 2 of this
article, shall accrue to the heirs of the party having enjoyed or taken the
benefit of such exemption, and the exemption provided for in section 1 of
this article shall apply to all debts, except as specified in said section, no
matter when or where the debt was contracted, or liability incurred.
Florida Constitution of 1885:
(effective January 1, 1887)
ARTICLE X-HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS
§ 1. Exemption of homestead; extent
Section 1. A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres
339. Note: The underlined portions of the text represent sections added to or changed
from preceding version.
1994]
179
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
of land, or the half of one acre within the limits of any incorporated city or
town, owned by the head of a family residing in this State, together with
one thousand dollars worth of personal property, and the improvements on
the real estate, shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court
and the real estate shall not be alienable without the joint consent of
husband and wife, when that relation exists. But no property shall be
exempt from sale for taxes or assessments, or for the payment of obligations
contracted for the purchase of said property, or for the erection or repair of
improvements on the real estate exempted, or for house, field or other labor
performed on the same. The exemption herein provided for in a city or
town shall not extend to more improvements or buildings than the residence
and business house of the owner; and no judgment or decree or execution
shall be a lien upon exempted property except as provided in this Article.
§ 2. Exemption to inure to widow and heirs
Section 2. The exemptions provided for in section one shall inure to
the widow and heirs of the party entitled to such exemption, and shall apply
to all debts, except as specified in said section.
§ 3. Exemptions in former constitution; applicability
Section 3. The exemptions provided for in the Constitution of this
State adopted in 1868 shall apply as to all debts contracted and Judgments
rendered since the adoption thereof and prior to the adoption of this
Constitution.
§ 4. Homestead may be alienated by husband and wife
Section 4. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent the
holder of a homestead from alienating his or her homestead so exempted by
deed or mortgage duly executed by himself or herself, and by husband and
wife, if such relation exists; nor if the holder be without children to prevent
him or her from disposing of his or her homestead by will in a manner
prescribed by law.
§ 5. Homestead area not reduced by subsequently including in municipality.
Section 5. No homestead provided for in section one shall be reduced
in area on account of its being subsequently included within the limits of an
incorporated city or town, without the consent of the owner.
* * * * * *
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Florida Constitution-1968 Revision
(effective January 7, 1969)
ARTICLE X-MISCELLANEOUS
Section 4. Homestead-exemptions
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and
no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the
payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house,
field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned
by the head of a family:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one
hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which
shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent
inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality to the extent
of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be
limited to the residence of the owner or his family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the
owner.
(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is
survived by spouse or minor child. The owner of homestead real estate,
joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage,
sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the
entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is incompetent, the method
of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.
Florida Constitution-Amended in 1972:
(effective January 2, 1973)
ARTICLE X-MISCELLANEOUS
The first sentence of article X, section 4(c) was amended to read as
follows:
§ 4. Homestead-exemptions
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(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived
by spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to the
owner's spouse if there be no minor child....
Florida Constitution-Amended in 1984:
(effective January 8, 1985)
Article X, Section 4(a) was amended in 1984, to change the reference from
"the head of a family" to "a natural person." Art X § 4, as amended reads
as follows:
ARTICLE X-MISCELLANEOUS
Section 4. Homestead-exemptions-
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court,
and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the
payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house,
field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned
by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one
hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which
shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent
inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent
of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be
limited to the residence of the owner or his family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of
the owner.
(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is
survived by spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to
the owner's spouse if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real
estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by
mortgage, sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an
estate by the entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is incompe-
tent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech .... And
the LORD said ... let us go down, and there confound their language,
that they may not understand one another's speech .... So the LORD
scattered them abroad . . . and they [never completed the tower] . . .
called Babel.'
From the time of the Tower of Babel, people the world over have
struggled to communicate despite language barriers. In America, where
English is the de facto,2 although not official,3 language of the country,
I. Genesis 11:1-9. According to the Bible, the descendants of Noah began to build a
great city, including a tower that would reach to heaven. Id. But God did not want the
tower completed, so he made the workers speak different languages and then scattered them
over the earth. Id. The story of the Tower of Babel has been used to explain the origin of
languages. 19 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 349 (1988 ed.)
2. English is not only the language spoken most frequently in the United States, but the
language of the Constitution and the country's laws as well.
3. The Founding Fathers rejected the establishment of a national language as well as
John Adams' proposal for an "American Language Academy" designed to standardize the
English language. Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom to Speak One Language: Free Speech and
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governmental policy has historically tolerated the presence of minority lan-
guages4 under the theory that natural societal and economic pressures would
force new immigrants to learn English and assimilate into American life.'
Since the early 1980's, however, there has been a growing movement
to legislate language by requiring people in the United States to learn and
use English. This push for language unity has resulted in several state
statutes and constitutional amendments designating English as the official
language of the particular state.6
the English Language Amendment, 11 CHICANO L. REV. 35 (1991).
4. However, immigrants must meet literacy requirements in order to become naturalized
citizens, with an exception for persons over 50 years old with at least 20 years of United
States residency and persons over 55 years old with at least 15 years of United States residen-
cy. 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1988).
5. See Dennis Baron, FederalEnglish, in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES 36-37 (James Crawford
ed., 1992). This is commonly referred to as the melting-pot theory. See AMERICAN
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 759 (1970).
6. The eighteen states that currently have statutes or amendments declaring English to
be the official language of the state are as follows:
Alabama, in 1990: requiring enforcement by the Legislature and providing for standing
to bring suit, ALA. CONST. amend. 509;
Arizona, in 1988: prohibiting the use of non-English languages and providing for
standing, ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII; held to violate the First Amendment, see Yniguez v.
Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 317 (D. Ariz. 1990), afd and rev'd in part, 939 F.2d 727 (9th
Cir. 1991);
Arkansas, in 1987: mandating that the amendment does not prohibit public schools from
providing equal educational opportunities to all children, 1987 ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117
(Michie 1987);
California, in 1986: requiring enforcement by the Legislature and providing for
standing, CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6; found by the attorney general not to prohibit the use of
languages in addition to English, see infra note 106;
Colorado, in 1988: allowing enforcement by the Legislature, COLO. CONST. art. II, §
30a
Florida, in 1988: allowing enforcement by the Legislature, FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9;
Georgia, in 1986: merely designating English as the official language, 1986 GA. LAWS
70;
Hawaii, in 1978: designating both English and Hawaiian as official languages, but only
requiring Hawaiian for public acts and transactions as provided by law, HAW. CONST. art.
XV, § 4;
Illinois, in 1923: merely designating English as the official language, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. v, para. 460/20 (Smith-Hurd 1991); held to be purely symbolic, Puerto Rican Org. for
Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973);
Indiana, in 1984: merely designating English as the official language, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 1-2-10-1 (West 1988);
Kentucky, in 1984: merely designating English as the official language, KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 2.013 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985);
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On November 8, 1988, Florida voters overwhelmingly approved a
controversial "Official English" amendment 7 to the state constitution.8 The
Official English amendment declared that "English is the official language
of the State of Florida .... The legislature shall have the power to enforce
this section by appropriate legislation." 9  Supporters of the amendment
applauded its passage as "sending a clear message to government to conduct
its business in English."'" Opponents, however, charged that the amend-
ment was driven by anti-Hispanic sentiments and that it advertised Florida
as a land of bigots."
Despite the amendment's landslide victory, the Florida legislature has
Mississippi, in 1987: merely designating English as the official language, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 3-3-31 (1991);
Nebraska, in 1920: requiring all official proceedings, records, and publications to be
in English, and English to be used in all public and private schools, NEB. CONST. art 1, § 27;
North Carolina, in 1987: mandating that the section is meant to preserve and protect
the English language, and not to supersede any state or federal constitutional rights, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 145-12 (1992);
North Dakota, in 1987: merely designating English as the official language, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 54-02-13 (1987);
South Carolina, in 1987: mandating that no law shall require the use of any non-
English language except as required for state employment or educational purposes, S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-1-696 to 1-1-698 (Law. Co-op. 1991);
Tennessee,in 1984: requiring governmental communications and public school courses
to be in English, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1992);
Virginia, in 1981: mandating that school boards have no obligation to provide classes
in languages other than English, VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.1 (Michie 1992).
7. For purposes of this note, a distinction will be made between Official English and
English-only legislation. English-only legislation specifically excludesthe use of languages
other than English, while Official English legislation declares English to be the official lan-
guage and may or may not provide for enforcement of that declaration. The distinction is
often blurred, however. Because enforcement provisions are often vague, it is not always
easy to classify a particular amendment or statute as English-only or Official English
legislation. See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice
Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293 (1989); Laura A. Cordero, Constitutional
Limitations On Official English Declarations, 20 N.M. L. REV. 17 (1990).
8. Maya Bell, State Gets an Official Language - English, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov.
9, 1988, at D4.
9. FLA CONST. art. II, § 9. It should be noted that the amendment only permits, rather
than directs, legislators to enforce the amendment. Since the concept of a standardized
national language was rejected by the Founding Fathers, see supra note 3, the question
remains as to how and by whom "official English" would actually be defined.
10. Bell, supra note 8.
II. Id.
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as yet declined to pass any legislation to enforce it.12 However, on May
18, 1993, the 13-year-old English-only ordinance of Dade County, Florida
was repealed. 13 The repeal of this 1980 forerunner to the Official English
amendment unleashed a new determination to put "teeth" into the amend-
ment. 4 The current influx of Haitians into South Florida may further fuel
this determination.' 5 Attempts to enforce the Official English amendment,
however, raise issues of constitutional and statutory legality, depending on
the type of legislation proposed.
This note chronicles the divisive history of the Florida Official English
amendment and analyzes why attempts to enforce this amendment by
English-only legislation would violate federal statutory and constitutional
law. Part two of this note sets forth the history of the amendment's passage,
beginning with the 1980 Dade County English-only ordinance. Part three
of this note discusses the constitutional and statutory issues that might be
raised by English-only legislation enacted to enforce the amendment.
II. HISTORY OF THE FLORIDA OFFICIAL ENGLISH AMENDMENT
A. Dade County English-Only Ordinance
In 1959, the year of the Cuban revolution, Dade County's population
of less than one million residents was 80% non-Hispanic white, 5.3%
12. Karen Branch, English-Only Scuffles Are Far From Over, MIAMI HERALD, May 23,
1993, at 6B.
13. John Fernandez, United Commission Votes to Dump Dade's English-only Measure,
PALM BEACH POST, May 19, 1993, at IA.
14. Branch, supra note 12. Citizens for Dade United, a local organization that bitterly
fought repeal of the English-only ordinance, announced a possible statewide petition drive
to put teeth into the Official English amendment by making it impossible for government to
conduct business in anything but English. Id.
15. Out of the 41.000 boat people picked up by the U.S. Coast Guard since a military
coup ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, 11,000 have passed
immigration officials' initial screening for political asylum. Lisa Ocker, Let Haitians Go,
Judge Orders, SUN-SENTINEL, June 9, 1993, at I A. On June 8. 1993, a federal judge ordered
the release into the United States of 158 Haitians. Id. These Haitians had previously not
been allowed to leave the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because they or their
relatives had tested positive for HIV, the virus commonly thought to cause AIDS. Id. This
has increased fears that many more thousands of refugees will be encouraged to flee Haiti
for the United States. Id.
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Hispanic, and 14.7% black. 6 As hundreds of thousands of Cubans fled
their homeland, they poured into nearby Dade County, especially the city of
Miami, which had long been popular with immigrants. 7 An influx of
Haitians and Central Americans added to the ethnic influence. 8 By the
time the Mariel boatlift of 1980 brought more than 100,000 new Cuban
exiles into Miami, including a small but noticeable criminal element, it had
become apparent that the Cubans were not temporary exiles who would soon
return to a liberated Cuba.' 9
By November 1980, the population of Dade County was more than
forty percent Hispanic.20 Perhaps because they had seen their flight from
Cuba as only temporary, perhaps due to close family ties, or perhaps simply
because their numbers were so great, the Cubans had not followed the
expected process of assimilation into pre-existing Miami life. Rather than
accommodating the melting-pot theory, Cubans had become a culturally,
economically, and politically distinct presence.2'
As the Cuban influence grew, non-Hispanic whites felt increasingly
alienated from their Hispanic neighbors and threatened with the loss of the
community they had known.2   Festivals, concerts, films, and theater, as
well as the media, all began to reflect Miami's multi-ethnic nature. 2' Non-
Hispanic whites began to complain of daily encounters with Cubans who
were either unwilling or unable to speak to them in English.24
16. Joanne Bretzer, Language, Power, and Identity in Multiethnic Miami, in LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES 209-11 (James Crawford ed., 1992).
17. Max J. Castro, On the Curious Question of Language in Miami, in LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES 178-79 (James Crawford ed., 1992).
18. Bretzer, supra note 16, at 213-14.
19. Id.
20. Castro, supra note 17, at 181.
21. Bretzer, supra note 16, at 213. This does not mean, however, that these immigrants
have refused to learn English. Hispanics are learning English just as rapidly as preceding
German. Italian, Jewish and other immigrant waves. Andres Viglucci, Studies: Hispanics
Are Learning English-And Fast, MIAMI HERALD, July 31, 1988, at 15A. While it typically
takes three generations for newcomers to become English-dominant, Hispanics approached
a two-generation model during the 1980's. James Crawford, Official English Amendment II.-
Should English Become Florida's Official Language? No, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 16, 1988,
at IC (citing a study by demographer Calvin Veltman).
22. See Castro, supra note 17, at 179.
23. Bretzer. supra note 16, at 213.
24. See, e.g., id., at 210. One Miami resident voiced the feelings of many non-Hispanic
whites by declaring, "if I had wanted to live in a Latin country, I would have moved to one.
... Strangers come up to me on the street to ask directions, in Spanish, presuming that
everyone here knows the language .... Many of the criminals have Spanish surnames, but
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Against this backdrop of simmering ethnic tension, and sparked by the
final straw of the Mariel boatlift, the 1980 Dade County English-only
ordinance was enacted.25 The ordinance prohibited county officials from
using any language but English, and from fostering any culture other than
that of the United States.26 "In effect, the county government had to
conduct meetings and print documents only in English."27 The ordinance
was so restrictive that "even zoo signs identifying an animal's name in Latin
violated the law."28
In 1984, the county commissioners voted to cure the most egregious
overreachings of the ordinance by allowing certain exceptions for promoting
tourism, providing medical and emergency services, and serving the elderly
and handicapped. 29  Even these common-sense exceptions were met by
bitterness and ethnic discord) People attending the hearings held signs
calling for the commissioners to be hanged.3
Even after the ordinance had been slightly relaxed, educational
information was still restricted to English.32 For example, Spanish
directional signs in the county hospital had to be removed, and fire-
prevention information, neo-natal care literature, and bus schedules could
not be printed in Spanish. 31 In 1993, however, Federal court-ordered
then so do the policemen. How many [other] major American newspapers have a Spanish-
language edition, or need to?" Pre-Cuban Miami Was a Good Place to Live, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 15, 1990, editorial, at 8A.
25. Citizens for Dade United, the political action group that organized the anti-bilingual
campaign, was born practically overnight when two women met through a WNWS radio talk
show. Castro, supra note 17, at 178. In just over four weeks, the group had gathered twice
the necessary signatures to put the ordinance on the ballot. Id.
By the time the 1988 Florida Official English Amendment was passed, thirty-one
Florida cities and two other counties had followed Dade County's lead by passing English-
only or Official English laws or resolutions. Tom Lassiter, English-only Fight Heats Up,
Intent Unclear, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 31, 1988, at ]A.
26. Language Law Out in Dade; The County Commission Repeals the Ordinance That
Made English the Only Medium for County Business, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 19, 1993,
at Al.
27. Fernandez, supra note 13.
28. Califa, supra note 7.
29. Celia W. Dugger, Metro OKs Bilingualism Law Changes, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 17,
1984, at ID.
30. Id.
31. Craig Gemoules, English Campaign Truce is Short-Lived, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 10,
1988, at IC.
32. Maya Bell, Where is English Battle Going?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 1988, at
GI.
33. Id.
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redistricting resulted in a new commission that promptly voted to repeal the
ordinance. 4
B. The Florida Official English Amendment
In early 1985, Florida English kicked off a campaign drive to collect
enough initiative petition signatures to place the Official English amendment
on Florida's ballot.35 Florida English, a state organization, was sponsored
by U.S. English, a national organization with the primary goal of a federal
Official English amendment.36 Placing the amendment on the 1988"7
34. Dade Redistricting Could Lead to Repeal of 'English-only'Law, PALM BEACH POST,
May 3, 1993, at 8A; Fernandez, supra note 13.
35. Robert A. Liff, In Fla., An Effort to Make English the Official Language, PHIL.
INQUIRER, Feb. 17, 1985, at C03. "Amendments to the Florida Constitution must be
approved by a majority of people voting on them in a general or special election." Bobette
Hlusick, Consiitutional Amendments 1990, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990 (Citrus
Times), at 2. Amendments can be placed on the ballot in one of five ways: (!) joint resolu-
tions approved by a three-fifths vote of each house of the Legislature; (2) action of a
constitution revision commission, which convenes every 20 years; (3) action of a constitution-
al convention, convened by citizen petition initiative; (4) action by the Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission, which convenes every 10 years; and (5) citizen petition initiatives,
requiring signatures equaling at least: (a) eight percent of the total votes cast in the last
preceding general election, and (b) eight percent of the votes cast in the last preceding
general election in at least half of the state's congressional districts. FLA. CONST. art. XI,
§§ 1-6.
Of the 79 constitutional amendments placed on the Florida ballot between 1968 and
1990, six were citizen initiatives, three of which (the Sunshine Amendment, the Florida
Lottery, and Official English) were approved. Husick, supra.
36. Liff, supra note 35. U.S. English, based in Washington, D.C., was founded in 1983
by Dr. John Tanton, an ophthalmologist and civic activist, and former U.S. Senator S.I.
Hayakawa (R-Calif.). who had unsuccessfully introduced federal Official English legislation
in 1981. Calit, supra note 7. By 1988, U.S. English had over 300,000 members and a
seven million dollar annual budget. id. U.S. English is located at 818 Connecticut Avenue,
N.W.. Suite 200, Washington D.C. 20006. 10 U.S. ENGLISH UPDATE I (Spring 1993) at 1.
In arguing that the real motivation behind U.S. English was discriminatory, critics
pointed out that Tanton had previously founded the Federation for American Immigration
Reform ("FAIR") in 1979 to lobby for stricter immigration policy. Califa, supra note 7.
Critics also noted that Ilayakawa, a native Canadian of Japanese ancestry, found it "'perfectly
understandable' that Japanese-Americans were sent to relocation camps during World War
I." Former Sen. S.I. Hayakawa Dies, Defied Student Protesters in '60s, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb, 28, 1992, at AI. Hayakawa died of a stroke at age 85 in 1992. Id.
37. Florida English had been previously unsuccessful in placing the Official English
amendment on the 1986 Florida ballot. See Liff, supra note 35.
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ballot would require 342,9393" validated signatures39 by August 9,
1988.40
From its inception, the proposed amendment generated suspicion and
distrust, dividing its supporters and its opponents into hostile camps.
41
Both sides agreed that immigrants coming to this country need proficiency
in English.42 However, they disagreed on whether the amendment was
necessary and whether it would ultimately help or harm non-English
speaking people.43 Amendment supporters and opponents also fiercely
debated whether the true aims of the supporters were altruistic, nationalistic,
or xenophobic.
44
Opponents of the amendment feared that its passage would hurt South
Florida's extensive business and tourism ties with Central and South
America by insulting foreign investors and tourists.45  They saw the
amendment as a threat to elderly, less-fluent immigrants who might not be
afforded a needed interpreter in the courtroom or in an emergency
situation.46 Opponents feared that the amendment would affect not only
38. Maya Bell, Even Success Doesn't Stop English-only Petition Drive, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1988, at DI.
39. Maya Bell, English-only Petitions to be Peddled at Polls, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar.
5, 1988, at DI. A validated signature is one that has been verified as belonging to a
registered voter. Id.
40. Tom Lassiter, English-only Amendment to Go to Vote, Last-Minute Blitz Nets
Necessary Signatures, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 1988, at 1B.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 44-58. Ironically, 82% of those polled believed
that sharing an official language would draw Floridians together, even as the amendment
debate polarized the state. See Paul Anderson, 81% Support Official English, Amendment
Backers'Poll Shows, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 24, 1988, at 20A.
42. Leaders to Fight Ordinance, English-only Plan Crippling, Group Says, SUN-
SENTINEL, June 21, 1988, at 4B.
43. Supporters of the amendment charged the U.S. Government of pursuing a policy
primarily directed at "native language maintenance" that could thwart the natural process of
assimilation and language acquisition. Linda Chavez, Official English Amendment 11: Should
English Become Florida's Official Language? Yes, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 16, 1988, at IC.
However, this statement is at odds with recent demographic studies. See supra note 21.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 45-58. Xenophobia is a fear or hatred of
foreigners. AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1411 (1970).
45. Tom Lassiter, 'Official Language' Vote OK'd 'English-only' Lobby Gains Court's
Ruling, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1988, at 13A.
46. Florida's Constitutional Amendments on Official English, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 22,
1988, at 26A. In calling for the elimination of "911" services for non-English speakers,
Florida English declared that "everybody calling the emergency line should have to learn
enough English so they can say 'fire' or 'emergency' and give the address." Laura A.
Cordero. Constitutional Limitations on Official English Declarations, 20 N.M. L. REV. 17,
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official governmental functions, but would contribute to the loss of freedom
to speak a non-English language in the workplace. 7 They charged that the
drive behind the amendment was fueled by bigotry and anti-Hispanic senti-
ments.48 Opponents of the amendment included the Greater Miami
Chamber of Commerce, 49 Florida's Roman Catholic bishops,"° and
Florida's governor.5'
The difficulty in determining what the amendment would actually mean
was due not only to the nonspecific nature of the amendment itself 2 but
to the mixed motivations and contradictory statements of its supporters, 53
51 (1990).
47. Zita Arocha, Dispute Fuels Campaign Against Official English; Foes Say Memo
Shows Racism's Behind Plan, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1988, at A20. Opponents of the
amendment also feared it would halt the purchase of foreign language books by public
libraries. Tom Lassiter, English-only Fight Heats Up, Intent Unclear, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct.
31. 1988, at IA.
48. Maya Bell, Leader Quits Language Group Over Controversy, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct.
18, 1988, at 3A.
49. English-only Foes Push Spanish Plan, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 1988, at 19A.
50. Official English is Racist, State Catholic Bishops Say, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1988,
at 14A. A representative of Florida's Roman Catholic bishops maintained that much of the
support for the amendment was based on racism. Id.
51. Allow the Vote, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 13, 1988, at 24A. Governor Bob Martinez
noted, "We don't select a religion for Americans ... and we have not selected a language
for Americans, If you pass it, the only thing you'll get is hard feelings." Id.
52. Supporters of the amendment admitted that they did not know what legislation would
be required to maintain English as the official language of government. Lassiter, supra note
47. "We are not legislators. The more specifics you put into this, the more it's going to be
attacked." Id.
53. The stated goals of U.S. English, in addition to the passage of a national English
amendment, were to reform bilingual education to use short-term immersion techniques rather
than long-term transitional methods, and to eliminate bilingual ballots. Chavez, supra note
43. The execulive director of U.S. English said her principal objection to bilingual balloting
is that it makes voting "too easy." John Jacobs, Supporters Spread Word on English-only
Ballot, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1983, at A8.
Florida English's campaign chairman, however, sawthe amendment as having little real
impact. Bell, supra note 39. He insisted that it was designed merely to turn the social reality
of English as the state's official language into law, although he later stated that the practice
of allowing applicants to take driver's license tests in Spanish should be reviewed. Lassiter,
supra note 47. The campaign's spokeswoman, on the other hand, said that the campaign
intended to ask legislators to encourage funding for English classes, promote foreign language
instruction, and emphasize learning the geography and history of Central and South America.
Bell, supra note 39.
Some supporters felt the amendment would mean that Florida's government would only
be under no obligation to use non-English languages in the provision of services, while others
saw it as a loud and clear mandate to government to conduct business in English only.
1994]
191
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
some of whom spoke Spanish fluently.14 Supporters viewed the amend-
ment as everything from a mere symbol" to a way of demanding govern-
ment to curtail bilingual programs56 or enact English-only legislation57 to
a way of forcing immigrants to speak English. 8
Florida's Official English amendment won its first legal battle on
February 4, 1988, after the state legislature directed the attorney general to
petition the Florida Supreme Court for an advisory opinion as to the
Backers to Arguefor English as Official Language, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 1987, at 2C;
Maya Bell, Where is English Battle Going?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 1988, at GI.
News articles at times described the amendment as actually prohibiting state and local
governments from using non-English languages in conducting public business. Leaders to
Fight Ordinance, English-only Plan Crippling, Group Says, SUN-SENTINEL, June 21, 1988,
at 4B.
Although supporters maintained that the intent of the proposed amendment was "not
at all anti-Hispanic," they conceded that at least some of its backers were driven by
discriminatory motives. Jon Marcus, English Drive Called Racially Motivated, Backers Say
Move 'Not Anti-Hispanic', SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1988, at 14A. Some supporters hoped the
impact of the amendment would be to force the use of English even in the private sector.
Lassiter, supra note 40, at I B. "English is the language that should be spoken in America,"
said the Broward Country coordinator for Florida English. Id.
Some Floridians supported the measure because of their frustration at feeling like a
foreigner in Dade County, and their annoyance at not being able to find a convenience store
clerk or taxi driver who speaks English. Bell, supra note 32. Non-Spanish speaking
employees felt uncomfortable and excluded when fellow employees, who could speak
English, chose to speak Spanish in front of them. Lydia Villalva, Hispanics Attack Ban on
Spanish, English-only Amendment is Concernfor Ethnic Group, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
22, 1988 (Osceola Sentinel), at I. An official language was seen by many as a way to
prevent the country from becoming a "Tower of Babel." Bell, supra note 32. As of a 1987
survey, Spanish was the dominant language in 36.7% of all Dade County households.
Marcus, supra.
54. For example, the spokeswoman for the Tampa-based Florida English Campaign
spoke fluent English, as did the president of U.S. English. Zita Arocha, Dispute Fuels
Campaign Against Official English, Foes Say Memo Shows Racism's Behind Plan, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 1988, at A20; Lassiter, supra note 40; Official English is Racist, State Catholic
Bishops Say, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1988, at 14A.
55. Bell, supra note 39. It seems unlikely, however, that U.S. English would contribute
more than $300,000 to Official English groups in Florida, Arizona, and Colorado (where
Official English amendments were also on the 1988 ballot) to promote passage of a mere
"symbol." See Susan Kelleher, Advocates of Official English on the Defensive; Proponents
of Ballot Measures in 3 States Deny Racism Charges in Wake of Controversy, WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 1988, at A16.
56. Chavez, supra note 43.
57. Bell, supra note 32.
58. Lassiter, supra note 40.
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petition's validity. 9  In holding that the initiative petition was legally
sufficient, the court found that the amendment was not so broad as to violate
the single-subject requirement of the Florida Constitution6" and that the
ballot summary fairly represented the substance of the amendment.6
The court rejected the attorney general's argument that because Florida
law requires that "the ballot be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to
enable him intelligently to cast his ballot," the ballot summary should
explain in detail what the amendment's proponents hoped to accomplish by
its passage.62 The court held that the seventy-five word ballot summary
required by statute did not have to provide this detail.6 3 The court
cautioned that its opinion dealt only with the legal validity of the amend-
ment and ballot and, therefore, should not be construed as either favoring
or opposing passage of the amendment.64
The court victory spurred amendment supporters into well-organized
and heavily-funded6" activity.66 Petitions were distributed at festivals,
59. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, 520 So. 2d II, 12 (Fla. 1988). An
advisory opinion is required when an initiative petition has validated signatures equal to 10%
of the state's voters in at least one-fourth of the congressional districts. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
15.21 (West Supp. 1993).
60. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, 520 So. 2d at 13. The purpose of
the single-subject requirement of article Xl, § 3 of the Florida Constitution is to avoid voters
having to accept part of a proposal which they oppose in order to obtain a change which they
support. Id. at 12. Opponents of the amendment argued that it was so broad that legislation
to implement it might abridge the freedom of speech or the press, violate due process, or
invade the right of privacy. Id. The court agreed that the amendment could have broad
ramifications, but held that dealing with only one subject "on its face" was legally sufficient.
Id. at 13.
61. Id. The attorney general had pointed out that the ballot summary stated that the
amendment enables the legislature to "implement this article" by appropriate legislation,
whereas the amendment itself gave the legislature the power "to enforce this section" by
appropriate legislation. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, 520 So. 2d at 13.
The court held that the differing use of terminology could not reasonably mislead the voters.
Id
62. Id.
63. Id. Based on the conflicting interpretations given the amendment by its supporters,
however, see supra note 53, it strains credulity to think that a voter could really have
"intelligently cast his ballot." See supra text accompanying note 62.
64. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, 520 So. 2d at 13.
65. U.S. English contributed more than $300,000 to Official English groups in Florida,
Arizona, and Colorado. Kelleher., supra note 55.
66. Amendment opponents did not organize until April, 1988, when prominent members
of Miami's Hispanic community banded with members of the black, Anglo and Jewish
communities to form English Plus, which was created with the blessings of the Greater Mi-
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club and organizational meetings, and shopping centers.6' The amend-
ment's greatest gain, however, came when its supporters capitalized on the
opportunity presented by the presidential primary ballot.
6
On Super Tuesday, March 8, 1988, 500 volunteers and an equal
number of paid staffers69 staked out polling places across the state, asking
voters7° to sign Official English petitions.7' Voters were more than willing
to comply; the demand for petitions was so great that people stood in line
to sign them, and complained when petitions were unavailable because the
supply had been depleted.72
By the next day, the number of signatures collected had jumped from
240,000 to about 450,000, exceeding the 342,939 signatures required to put
the amendment on the ballot.73 Only 126,000 of the signatures had been
validated, however, and campaign officials vowed to continue the petition
ami Chamber of Commerce. Andres Viglucci, Opposition to Official English Debuts, Foes'
Cry: Law Would Hurt Business, MIAMI HERALD, June 20, 1988, at IB; English-only Foes
Push Spanish Plan, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 1988, at 19A. English Plus is a concept
declaring that it is best when individuals can acquire strong English language proficiency
along with the mastery of two or more languages. Official Language, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Nov. 19, 1988, at D14.
English Plus aired radio spots and sponsored ads, conferences, and debates to deliver
the message that the Official English amendment would be discriminatory and could cripple
business and tourism in a state with such strong ties to Latin America. Leaders to Fight
Ordinance, English-only Plan Crippling, SUN-SENTINEL, June 21, 1988, at 4B. In August,
1988, Speak Up Now for Florida ("SUN") was created to spread this message to North and
Central Florida. Andres Viglucci, Group to Speak Up For Florida, Will Battle Official
English Drive, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 10, 1988, at 2B.
67. Tom Lassiter, Signatures Increase for State's 'Official Language' Campaign, SUN-
SENTINEL, Apr. 26, 1988, at 2B.
68. Bell, supra note 38.
69. In Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), the Supreme Court ruled that a Colorado
statute prohibiting the use of paid circulators to gather signatures on an initiative petition
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
70. The signature of a registered voter had the advantage of being, by definition, a valid
signature. See supra note 39. Aware that the sight of petition gatherers could arouse anger
in some voters, particularly in Dade County, the petition gatherers were instructed to be
"courteous and polite" and not to get into arguments. Bell, supra note 39.
71. Bell, supra note 38. Staffers, who were paid by the number of valid signatures
collected, were organized by a professional consultant hired by U.S. English at a cost of over
$50,000. Id. While volunteers collected about 60,000 signatures, the equal number of paid
staffers gathered over 150,000 signatures. The professional consultant noted, "[wie do a lot
of work with very dedicated volunteers, but nothing seems to motivate like profit." Id.
72. Lassiter, supra note 67. At this point, polls were showing about 74% support for
the amendment. Id.
73. Bell, supra note 38.
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drive until the required 342,939 signatures had been validated. 4 Eventual-
ly, 366,666 signatures were validated, exceeding the requirement to sign up
at least eight percent of the number of residents who voted in the 1984
general elections.75
Just six days before the August 8th deadline for amendment initiatives,
however, campaign officials realized that they had not met a second
requirement to gather the eight percent in at least ten of the state's nineteen
congressional districts.76 They were, instead, one district short. 7
Campaign officials targeted the twelfth congressional district, where
another 956 signatures were required to pick up the district and meet the
requirement." The signatures were obtained, and, just twenty-four hours
before the deadline, the state Division of Elections approved the referendum
for the November ballot.79 Many amendment opponents agreed with its
supporters that, having been placed on the ballot, the amendment would
probably be passed by the voters.8°
In late October, 1988, however, amendment supporters suddenly found
themselves on the defensive in the face of renewed charges of racism and
bigotry when a memo written by John Tanton, the chairman and founding
member of U.S. English, became public." In the internal memo, Tanton
suggested that the growing Hispanic population threatens the United States
because Hispanics are both fertile and corrupt.8 ' Tanton also suggested
that Hispanics are overwhelmingly Catholic and therefore may not respect
the well-established separation between church and state.83
In response to the memo, retired CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite
resigned as a member of the U.S. English advisory board, and former
74. Id.
75. Tom Lassiter, English-only Amendment to Go to Vote, Last-Minute Blitz Nets
Necessary Signatures, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 1988, at lB.
76. Id.
77. Id. A miscount by an election official in St. Lucie county had left the petition short
by almost 1000 signatures. Id.
78. Id.
79. Lassiter, supra note 75.
80. Id
81. Maya Bell, Leader Quits Language Group Over Controversy, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct.
18. 1988, at 3A.
82. Id. In discussing birthrates, Tanton wrote: "Perhaps this is the first instance in
which those with their pants up are going to get caught by those with their pants down."
David Hacker, Petosky Doctor Leads English Only Crusade, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 14,
1989, at 3A. Tanton also wondered whether Latin-American immigrants will "bring with
them the tradition of the mordida, or bribe." Id.
83. Bell, supra note 81.
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Reagan aide Linda Chavez resigned as the organization's president.8 4
Amendment opponents hoped that news of the memo would make Florida
voters realize that they were being manipulated by a bigoted national
organization with a dangerous hidden agenda.8" Florida English's founder,
Dr. Mark LaPorta, took immediate steps to distance his group from its
sponsor, calling the memo anti-immigrant, anti-Hispanic, anti-Catholic, and
"not what Florida English is all about. 816
The Official English amendment met its second legal challenge when
four registered voters, whose primary language was Spanish, sought to
enjoin Florida officials from conducting an election on the citizen initia-
tive."7 The plaintiffs argued that the amendment petition violated the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the petition, which was written only in
English, was circulated in designated bilingual political subdivisions.88 The
plaintiffs' position was supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, which
agreed that petitions should have been available in Spanish in six coun-
ties. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found, however, that the
Voting Rights Act does not apply to initiative petitions because initiative
petitions are related to political speech rather than to the process of casting
a vote.9" The court also found that involvement by state officials in the
initiative process does not constitute state action because the state's
responsibility is solely to ensure that the petition meets the requirements of
84. Id. Linda Chavez said that her decision to step down was hastened by revelations
that a major U.S. English backer had helped reprint "an awful, awful book" called Coup of
Saints, which was a "paranoid fantasy" about "'undesirables of the Third World" taking over
dcveloped nations. Id.
85. Kelleher, supra note 55.
86. Sandra Dibble, Amendment Backers Downplay U.S. English Ties, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 20, 1988, at 3D.
87. Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918
(1989). The voters were appealing a prior federal district court judgment dismissing their
complaint. Id.
88. Id. Colorado voters had previously presented the same Voting Rights Act challenge
to the Official English amendment petition in their state. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989). The Tenth Circuit reversed a district
court's order which had enjoined the Secretary of State of Colorado from conducting an
election on the proposed amendment. Id.
89. Dave Von Drehle, U.S. Fights Language Petitions, Official English Opponents
Buoyed, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3, 1988, at IA.
90. Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1495.
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law and will fairly present the proposed amendment.9 The court's
November 4, 1988, decision removed the amendment's last legal hurdle to
being placed on the November 8th ballot. 92
The Official English amendment moved quickly to victory on election
day, passing with an overwhelming eighty-four percent of the vote.93 As
a conciliatory measure, amendment supporters joined with its opponents to
warn that the amendment should not be used as an excuse for discrimina-
tion.94 Nevertheless, the truce was short-lived. 95
Florida English's Dr. LaPorta caused a near-riot when he urged repeal
of the Dade County English-only ordinance, arguing that the ordinance
should be pro-English like the amendment, rather than anti-bilingual.96
Feeling betrayed, his former supporters rushed the stage, grabbing and
breaking the microphone, and calling him a traitor. 97 This display con-
vinced amendment opponents more than ever that amendment supporters
were hard-core xenophobes with no constructive agenda. 98
Several incidents immediately following the amendment's passage
seemed to confirm the fears of its opponents as the amendment allegedly
was misused to justify and vocalize anti-Hispanic sentiments.99 A super-
market employee was suspended for speaking Spanish to another employ-
91. Id. at 1497. The state does not initiate, draft, or address the merits of petitions, and
does not participate in the circulation of petitions or collection of signatures. Id. The court
noted a distinction between Florida and states such as Massachusetts, where, pursuant to the
Voting Rights Act, petitions are printed in both English and the applicable minority language
because the state itself pays for and prints the initiative petitions. Id.
92. Id. at 1489. A later challenge to the Eleventh Circuit's ruling was rejected without
comment by the United States Supreme Court. See Delgado v. Smith, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).
93. Maya Bell, Workers, Customers Report Bias Over Non-English Use, SUN-SENTINEL,
Jan. 2, 1989 (Weekly Business), at 10. The actual tally was 3,457,039 for the amendment
and 664,861 against. Florida Trivia, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 3, 1991, at lB.
94. Maya Bell, State Gets An Official Language, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 1988, at
D4.
95. See id.
96. Maya Bell, English Won Vote, Now Comes Real Battle, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov.
14, 1988, at BI.
97. Id
98. Id.
99. Maya Bell, English-only Rule Raises Concern, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. II, 1988,
at DI. On the other hand, charges of anti-Hispanic bias were sometimes raised to defend
inconsiderate behavior, such as the use of Spanish to exclude others. Lydia V. Lijo,
Hispanics Attack Ban on Spanish, English-only Amendment is Concern for Ethnic Group,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 22, 1988 (Osceola Sentinel), at I.
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ee; °00 a city mayor was quoted as making derogatory remarks about his
Hispanic opponent;"' and children complained that they were forbidden
to speak Spanish in school hallways and on school buses.10 2 An 18-year-
old clause in a hospital handbook requiring employees to speak English
during the workday was used for the first time to prohibit employees from
speaking a foreign language to non-English-speaking patients and to each
other.0 3 A Spanish-speaking customer seeking to place an order was told
that she must speak English.'04 Listeners who called into an English-
language station talk show willingly admitted that they had voted for the
amendment because it seemed to be anti-Hispanic.0 5
Despite these incidents, however, most legal experts felt that unless the
legislature decided to "enforce this section by appropriate legislation," the
amendment would remain nothing more than a symbolic measure.'0 6 In
January, 1989, Florida's governor issued an executive order that recognized
English as the state's official language and directed that all official records
100. Hispanics Blame English Law for Rise in Harassment, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov.
16, 1988, at D3. Publix supermarket administrators, who apologized profusely and
transferred the Coral Gables manager involved, nevertheless insisted that the cashier was
actually disciplined for carrying on a personal conversation while serving a customer. Id.
The written reprimand, however, cited only his use of Spanish. Ethnic Ugliness, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 15, 1988, at 22A.
101. Mayor Apologizes For Latin Remark, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 1988, at D8.
The mayor, who later apologized, said that he was more qualified than his Hispanic opponent,
because Hispanics like to sleep late. Id.
102. Lijo, supra note 99; Hispanics Blame English Law for Rise in Harassment,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1988, at D3.
103. Bell, supra note 99. The rule was subsequently rewritten. Id.
104. Id. Sears, Roebuck and Co. officials apologized for their employee's behavior.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Bell, supra note 99. The California Attorney General, in discussing that state's
Official English amendment, noted that the amendment was not merely symbolic, because
a state act, in order to have a binding effect, must be published in English. Califa, supra
note 7, at 302. However, the attorney general found that the text of the amendment does not
prohibit the use of languages in addition to English. Id.
California's Official English amendment goes further than the Florida amendment. It
not only gives the Legislature power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation,
but commands the Legislature and state officials to "take all steps necessary to ensure that
the role of English is preserved and enhanced." CAL. CONST. art. 111, § 6. The amendment
also prohibits the Legislature from making a law "which diminishes or ignores the role of
English as the common language" of the state. Id.
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and proceedings of state and local governments be in English.' °7 The
order also stated that the use of languages other than English in the state's
economic, social, or political institutions, or by an employee in the
workplace., shall not be restricted. °8 This order did not satisfy amend-
ment supporters, however, and a U.S. English-backed bill which required
that all official governmental acts, documents, and publications be in
English was proposed in the Florida Senate in March, 1989.' Although
a U.S. English director insisted that the bill was not English-only legisla-
tion," o the bill allowed for non-English communication only when
necessary to comply with federal law."'
The bill's supporters predicted an easy victory, believing that legislators
would respond to the overwhelming voter approval of the Official English
amendment."' The bill, however, which was described as vague, unnec-
essary, and a threat to public health," 3 was defeated in a 3-3 vote after
three Cuban-American senators gave impassioned arguments against it.' '4
In the four years since this bill was defeated, there have been no
serious attempts to pass legislation which would enforce the Official English
amendment. This period of relative quiet may be ending, however, now that
107. Tom Lassiter, Print Government Documents in English, Group Proposes, SUN-
SENTINEL, Mar. 14, 1989, at 20A.
108. Id. The governor's press secretary noted that the governor was more interested in
ensuring that the amendment did not interfere with the health, safety, and welfare of all
Floridians than in regulating foreign languages. Maya Bell, English Won Vote, Now Comes
Real Battle, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 14, 1988, at BI.
109. Lassiter, supra note 107. The proposed legislation stated "[a]ll official documents
that are governmental acts must be in English except that translation services and
accommodating communications are permissible to comply with Federal laws and regulations.
All official publications must be printed and made available in English." Id.
110. Id. If, as the U.S. English director insisted, the bill was not English-only
legislation, there would seem little point in promoting it, since it would then be quite similar
to the governor's executive order.
I 11. Id. The same U.S. English director conceded that official documents were already
being maintained in English, but argued that a law was necessary to sustain the status quo.
Id.
112. John Kennedy, Panel Kills English-only Plan, Amendment Backers Vow to
'Regroup. Retrench and Reorganize, 'SUN-SENTINEL, May 18, 1989, at 24A.
113. Wesley Loy, Senate Panel's Tie Vote Kills English-only Bill, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
May 18, 1989, at B3. In calling the bill unnecessary, Senator Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-
Miami), argued that there was not a single government document printed in a foreign lan-
guage and not English. Id. The senator also said that the bill was so vague in defining an
"official document" that it could threaten public health by stopping state publications such
as AIDS pamphlets printed in Spanish and Creole. Id.
114. Kennedy, supra note 112.
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the Dade County English-only ordinance has been repealed." 5  The
constitutional and statutory issues raised by English-only legislation that
could be enacted to enforce the amendment is the subject of Part three of
this note.
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF POSSIBLE LEGISLATION
TO ENFORCE THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH AMENDMENT
A. Constitutionality of the Amendment Itself
In order to analyze the legality of any legislation created to enforce the
Florida Official English amendment, it is first necessary to determine
whether the amendment itself might be unconstitutional. The Florida
Supreme Court found the amendment's initiative petition legally valid." 6
However, some authors have suggested that all Official English amend-
ments, even those such as Florida's which have not been "enforced by
appropriate legislation," are unconstitutional because they violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 7
Laws potentially implicate the Equal Protection Clause when they treat
one class of people differently than another class."' Such laws are
analyzed with varying levels of scrutiny: strict, intermediate, and rational
basis. '"9 Strict scrutiny, which is the highest level of scrutiny, is only
applied when the law infringes on a fundamental right, such as the right to
vote, or when the law operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class, such
as a class based on race or national origin.' E When strict scrutiny is
applied, the law must be necessary for a compelling governmental interest
or the law will be struck.' 2 '
115. See supra note 14. Fears about the influx of Haitian refugees may also lead to
renewed attempts to enforce the Official English amendment. See supra text accompanying
note 15.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
117. See, e.g., supra note 7, at 330; Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay
on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269
(1992). The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 120-25.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120-25.
120. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
121. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992).
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Intermediate scrutiny is applied when the class has not been found to
be "suspect," but still merits heightened judicial review, such as a class
based on gender. 2 ' When intermediate scrutiny is applied, the law must
be substantially related to an important governmental interest, or the law
will be struck."2 3
All other classes are analyzed under rational basis.'24 A law is rarely
defeated under this level of scrutiny; rational basis merely requires that a
law be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in order to be
upheld. '25
The Supreme Court has not resolved the question of whether language-
based discrimination constitutes a "suspect class."' 26  However, several
authors have made a convincing argument that language is a proxy for
national origin, and therefore language-based discrimination should be
afforded the same strict scrutiny as discrimination based on national
origin.27
The Official English amendment would not necessarily be struck,
however, even assuming that language-based discrimination deserves strict
scrutiny analysis and assuming that language unity is not a compelling state
interest. The amendment would not be violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment unless it can first be shown that the amendment is intentionally
discriminatory.' 28  Purposeful discrimination is commonly referred to as
de jure discrimination. 129
122. See. e.g.. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
123. See, e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
124. See, e.g., United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 167-175
(1980).
125. See id.
126. See Cordero, supra note 7, at 26.
127. See, e.g., Califa, supra note 7, at 347-48; Cordero, supra note 7, at 26; Perea,
supra note 117, at 370-71.
One author argues that people who are reluctant to acknowledge racist tendencies are
more comfortable using language as a basis for exclusion because language, unlike race, is
seen as a mutable quality; language choice is something one can be held accountable for.
Joanne Bretzer, Language, Power, and Identity in Multiethnic Miami, in LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES 209, 215 (James Crawford ed., 1992).
128. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976). A law is not invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of-one race
than another. Id. at 242.
129. De jure means "by law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (6th ed. 1990).
Discrimination that is found not to result from a discriminatory purpose is known as "de
facto" discrimination. See id. at 416.
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De jure discrimination can be found either: (1) on the face of the
law; 3' (2) through discriminatory application of the law;' or (3) by
evidence of the discriminatory intent of the law.132
Florida's Official English amendment is not discriminatory either
facially, or by application, because it does not legislate the exclusion of
another language.'33 Some authors contend, however, that the xenophobic
nature of all Official English amendments is sufficient evidence of
discriminatory intent to satisfy the de jure requirement.'34
The history of Florida's Official English amendment, discussed in Part
two of this note, however, clearly reveals that its supporters interpreted the
amendment in various ways, and backed it for various reasons. This
inconsistency in motivating factors, combined with the Supreme Court's
reluctance to infer discrimination based on intent,' renders it unlikely
that the requisite de jure discrimination would be found, despite the clearly
discriminatory purpose of many of the amendment's backers.'36
Assuming, then, that the Florida Official English amendment itself
would not be found unconstitutional, the question is whether legislation
enacted to enforce it by putting "teeth" into the amendment, as many of its
supporters advocate, 3' would be legally valid. 3 ' Such legislation would
130. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303-04 (1880).
131. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886).
132. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 106.
134. See, e.g., Califa, supra note 7, at 324-25; Perea, supra note 117, at 356-57.
135. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 (1977); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975).
136. See supra text accompanying note 105.
137. See supra text accompanying note 14.
138. It should be noted that Dade County's English-only ordinance, which was
extremely restrictive, was repealed before being facially challenged on constitutional grounds.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-34. The ordinance did lose in another legal challenge,
however.
After substantial research and consultation between Dade County's Election
Department, Communications Department, and the office of the County Attorney, Dade
County reached the conclusion that the ordinance prohibited the county from publishing and
disseminating election pamphlets in Spanish. United States v. Metropolitan Dade County,
815 F. Supp. 1475, 1476 (S.D. Fla. 1993). The United States challenged the county's
English-only publication of election pamphlets, and the federal district court agreed, holding
that a voter information pamphlet was "assistance or... information relating to the electoral
process" that should have been provided in the language of the applicable minority group.
Id. at 1477-78. Ironically, the election related to these election pamphlets was based on
court-ordered redistricting and subsequently resulted in a new commission that repealed the
ordinance. See supra note 34, at IA.
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transform the amendment into English-only legislation that might implicate
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and violate the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
B. First Amendment Considerations
Legislation to enforce the amendment could require all official
governmental acts to be in English. This requirement could take two forms:
(1) requiring any official governmental act to be in English, in addition to
any other language used; or (2) restricting official governmental acts to
English-only. The first alternative would make little sense, since it would
go no further than the governor's 1989 executive order, which did nothing
to change the status quo because official documents were already being
maintained in English.' 39 It seems more likely that legislation supporters
would attempt to have the amendment replicate the repealed English-only
Dade ordinance by restricting official state and local governmental acts to
English-only. 40
Attempts to restrict governmental acts to English, however, to the
exclusion of other languages, would likely violate the First Amendment,
which prohibits laws "abridging . . . the freedom of speech."'' Regula-
tion of content-based speech must be "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest" and "narrowly drawn, to achieve that end" to be constitutionally
valid. 4 2  With respect to English-only legislation, a compelling state
interest can be found in the need for the state's government to communicate
with its constituents. Requiring public agencies such as state courts, county
hospitals, and city police departments to operate exclusively in English,
however, would be counter-productive, rather than "necessary," where those
constituents cannot speak English. English-only legislation also fails the
"narrowly-drawn" requirement because there are less restrictive means of
improving communication, such as increasing the quality and availability
of English.-instructional courses.
English-only legislation, which could be far-reaching when taken to its
logical extremes, is also likely to be unconstitutionally vague. Under such
139. See supra text accompanying note 107.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
142. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S.Ct. 269, 274 (1981). The guarantee of free speech,
however, "does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time." American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950). Certain speech, such as
obscenity, defamation, and "fighting words," is considered undeserving of constitutional
protection. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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legislation, governmental officials might feel compelled to communicate
only in English during a disaster such as 1992's Hurricane Andrew. A
bilingual county hospital employee might believe she could not legally
utilize her ability to comfort a dying patient in his own language. A police
officer might feel restricted to English while pursuing and apprehending a
Spanish-speaking suspect. If individuals affected by the English-only
legislation are uncertain as to its application, they will "'steer far wider of
the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked."' 43 A law which reasonably deters people from engaging
in otherwise protected speech is unconstitutionally vague.'44
This reasoning is in accord with the holding in Yniguez, an Arizona
case. "'45 Arizona's Official English amendment, which was adopted by
initiative petition at the same time as Florida's amendment, specifically
provides that the state and its subdivisions act in English and in no other
language.'46 A federal court found the amendment facially invalid as
overbroad because it gave rise to substantial potential for inhibiting constitu-
tionally protected free speech.' 47
143. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 317 (D. Ariz. 1990), affid and rev'd in
part, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
144. Id. at 315 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.6
(1982)).
145. See id. at 309.
146. See ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3. The amendment binds all government officials
and employees during the performance of all government business, and gives standing to any
person who resides in or does business in the state to bring suit to enforce the amendment.
Id. §§ 1, 4.
147. Yniguez, 730 F. Supp. at 314. Ms. Yniguez was a government employee who often
spoke Spanish to Spanish-speaking persons asserting medical malpractice claims against the
state. Id. at 310. After passage of the Official English amendment, Yniguez, who had signed
a state loyalty oath promising to obey the Arizona Constitution, immediately ceased speaking
Spanish while performing her official duties because she feared sanctions for speaking
Spanish. Id.
In finding that the Official English amendment violated the First Amendment, the court
did not accept the Arizona Attorney General's restrictive construction of the state amendment.
Id. at 315. The Attorney General interpreted the amendment to mean that the English-only
requirement applies solely to official acts of the state governmental entities and does not
prohibit the use of languages other than English that are reasonably necessary to facilitate the
day-to-day operation of government. Id. at 315. The court criticized the Attorney General's
opinion as a "remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the [amendment]." Yniguez,
730 F. Supp. at 316.
The federal court noted that no Arizona state court had as yet construed or interpreted
the state's amendment. Id. at 315. A class action suit is currently pending, whereby it is
alleged that plaintiffs' rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments have been
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C. Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Florida English spokespersons have repeatedly claimed that driver's
license tests should not be offered in Spanish because such tests give
immigrants the mistaken notion that it is not necessary to learn English.14
Eliminating Spanish driver's license tests, they claim, would be a step
toward language unity.'49 The question of eliminating such tests would
likely become a heated topic in any renewed push to enforce Florida's
Official English amendment, especially since driver's license tests may soon
be offered in Creole as well. 5°
Any statute to prohibit non-English driver's license tests, however,
potentially implicates the Equal Protection Clause. 5' Assuming, as
discussed above, that language discrimination deserves strict scrutiny
analysis, the required de jure discrimination would be found on the face of
violated by the Arizona Official English amendment. Ruiz v. Arizona, No. CV 92-19603
(Ariz. Mar. 4, 1993).
Ironically, on July 2, 1993, Arizona became the first state in the nation to conduct a
naturalization ceremony partly in Spanish. Hispanics Take Oath as Citizens Ceremony
Conducted Mostly in Spanish, SUN-SENTINEL, July 3, 1993, at 4A. The ceremony was held
for immigrants who had been allowed, based on their age and residency, to take the citizen-
ship test in their native language. Spanish in Citizenship Ceremony Upsets English-only
Supporters, MIAMI HERALD, July 3, 1993, at 12A.
U.S. English, which has backed several unsuccessful proposals for a national Official
English amendment over the last decade, reacted to the unfavorable Arizona court ruling by
backing yet another proposed national amendment, the "Language of Government Act,"
introduced by Representative Bill Emerson (R-MO) on January 5, 1993. See 10 U.S. ENG-
LISH UPDATE I (Spring 1993), at 1. The Language of Government Act, like the Arizona
amendment, requires government to conduct its official business in English and grants alleg-
edly injured persons the standing to file suit. See H.R. 123, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
The Act attempts to circumvent the Arizona amendment's First Amendment problems by
stating that the Act is "not intended to discourage or prevent the use of languages other than
English in any nonofficial capacity." See id.
148. Lassiter, supra note 47.
149. Id.
150. Telephone Interview with representative of the Bureau of Records, Division of
Driver's Licenses, Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (June 11,
1993). Driver's license examinations are currently available statewide in both English and
Spanish. Id. An application has been filed for the federal funding of examinations in Creole
as well, in order to accommodate the growing Haitian community. Id.
151. A statute to prohibit non-English driver's license tests may also be violative of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans discrimination based "on the ground of race, color, or
national origin," in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). Driver's license tests are funded by federal grant. See
supra note 150.
205
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
the statute. The statute would exclude non-English languages on its face by
prohibiting non-English speaking persons from taking the driver's license
test.
Given strict scrutiny, a statute prohibiting non-English driver's license
tests would fail. Even if promoting language unity is a compelling state
interest, prohibiting non-English driver's license tests to promote it would
be neither necessary nor productive. While studies have shown that Florida
immigrants are in fact learning English rapidly,' and past events indicate
that English-only laws lead to ethnic bitterness,'53 nothing has supported
the theory that English-only driver's license tests lead to language unity.
Even if the argument that language is a proxy for national origin
discrimination were rejected and the English-only statute was analyzed under
rational basis scrutiny, it is likely that the statute would be struck. Even
assuming that promoting language unity is a legitimate state interest, a law
leading to ethnic divisiveness cannot be rationally related to promoting
language unity.
D. Violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Official English supporters and critics agree that it is a socioeconomic
imperative for United States immigrants to learn English.' 54 Official
English supporters, however, want to shift away from bilingual educa-
tion' 55 to the "sink-or-swim" approach of English-immersion classes.'56
The question, then, is whether legislation to enforce the Official
English amendment by prohibiting bilingual education in the public schools
would survive a legal challenge. The answer depends on whether the
bilingual program would simply be withdrawn, leaving a child "immersed"
152. See supra note 21.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
154. Leaders to Fight Ordinance, English-only Plan Crippling, Group Says, SUN-
SENTINEL, June 21, 1988, at 4B.
155. In bilingual education, a non-English-speaking child keeps up with other classes
in her native language while studying English until she is proficient enough to attend all
classes in English. Puig-Lugo, supra note 3.
156. Andres Viglucci, Supporters of English Target Polls Push Official Language,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 6, 1988, at IA. Today, U.S. English has shied away from using the
term "English-immersion." Its current flyer insists that Official English legislation does not
even affect bilingual education. What is Official English?, U.S. ENGLISH FACTS (undated).
Another flyer states, however, that the newly proposed "Language of Government Act," see
supra note 147, will strengthen "the purpose of bilingual education, that of teaching non-
English proficient . . . children English." Common Questions about Official English, U.S.
ENGLISH ISSUES (undated).
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in English-only classes, or whether the child's native language would
continue to be used, on a limited basis, in order to teach the child English.
In Lau v. Nichols,' the Supreme Court held that by denying Chinese
children the opportunity to learn English, the school district had violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans discrimination based "on the ground
of race, color, or national origin" in "any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'58 The Court found that "there is no equality
of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities,
textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand
English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education."'
' 59
Therefore, any attempts to restrict bilingual education in Florida would have
to ensure that English language instruction would still be available and
meaningful. 161
E. Violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965
The call to "eliminate bilingual ballots" was a rallying cry behind
Florida's Official English campaign. 6' However, it appears that Official
English supporters are now willing to concede that eliminating bilingual
ballots would not be possible, at least at the state level.
162
The federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires that state and local
governments publish bilingual election ballots in designated bilingual
157. 414 U.S. at 563.
158. Id. at 566. By relying solely on § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to reverse
the court of appeals, the Court did not reach the Equal Protection argument advanced by the
plaintiffs. Id,
159. Id. A concurring opinion emphasized the substantial number of non-English
speaking students involved and would not consider the decision as conclusive in situations
where only a very few students were involved. Id. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
160. A 1990 agreement worked out between Florida's Department of Education and anti-
discrimination groups that had threatened to sue the state was seen as a step around the
Official English amendment. Luisa Yanez, State's Schools to Relax Rules for English-only
Amendment, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 16, 1990, at IA. Under the agreement, new statewide
guidelines would: (1) end the disciplining of non-English-speaking students for using their
native language at school; (2) classify minority students by nationality, rather than solely by
race; (3) require that information sent from schools to students' homes be written in the
parents' native language; (4) guarantee that students who lack proficiency in English are not
shut out of programs for the gifted, talented, or handicapped; and (5) mandate close monitor-
ing of dropout rates among students not fluent in English. Id The cost of the program was
estimated to be in the millions of dollars for Broward, Dade, and Palm Beach counties. Id.
161. See supra note 53.
162. Common Questions about Official English, U.S. ENGLISH ISSUES (undated).
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political subdivisions.'63 Several counties in Florida have been designated
as bilingual political subdivisions.,' Since the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI provides that state law must yield to federal law in case of
conflict,165 a state statute prohibiting bilingual ballots, thereby conflicting
with federal law, would not be valid.
IV. CONCLUSION
Florida's Official English amendment, despite the alleged high ideals
of many of its supporters, served only to widen the rift between the English-
speaking and Hispanic communities of Florida. Fortunately, the amendment
has not been enforced and remains a mere symbolic measure. Despite the
ill-will it engendered, the amendment is not unconstitutional, even under
strict scrutiny analysis, because it lacks the requirement of dejure discrimi-
iation. Discriminatory intent is not likely to be inferred based on the mixed
motivations of its supporters.
English-only legislation, however, would serve to exclude other
languages and people who do not speak English. Therefore, although the
unenforced Official English amendment is not unconstitutional, English-only
legislation to enforce the amendment would likely violate federal statutory
and constitutional law.
Finally, even if the Official English amendment could be legally
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1981 & Supp. 1993). The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended in 1975, extended in 1982 as the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 and in
1992 as the Voting Rights Language Assistance Act of 1992, requires state and political
subdivisions to publish bilingual voting materials when:
(i)(I) more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age of such State or political
subdivision are members of a single language minority and are limited-English
proficient;
(II) more than 10,000 of the citizens of voting age of such political subdivision
are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient;
or
(111) in the case of a political subdivision that contains all or any part of an
Indian reservation, more than 5 percent of the American Indian or Alaska Native
citizens of voting age within the Indian reservation are members of a single lan-
guage minority and are limited-English proficient; and
(ii) the illiteracy rate of the citizens in the language minority as a group is
higher than the national illiteracy rate.
Id.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
165. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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enforced through English-only legislation, it seems unlikely that such
legislation could result in the public good. Enforcing the amendment would
not only renew intercultural hostilities and cause unnecessary hardships, but
it would legitimize the idea of language exclusion. In a state such as
Florida, where the Spanish-speaking voting population has increased so
dramatically, the legitimized idea of legalized language exclusion could
someday be turned against the advocates of the Official English amendment
themselves.
Donna M Greenspan
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PART II
THE LEGISLATURE
Although most people consider the Florida Legislature as being
responsible only for passing laws as needed, the Constitution actually
places many other responsibilities on the Legislature as well.
Accordingly, the second part of our Symposium focuses on the
constitutional duties of the Legislature.
Dr. P. C. Doherty begins with an analysis of the recently-enacted
"Eight is Enough" amendment. His insightful article reveals that the
Legislature will face serious problems when it attempts to put the
amendment's provisions into operation. Next, Patricia A. Gleason
and Joslyn Wilson, both of whom serve in the Office of the Florida
Attorney General, describe the also recently-added "Open Govern-
ment" amendment and the impact that it will have on the Legislature.
Assistant Florida Attorney General George L. Waas then looks at
reapportionment, a subject that causes the Legislature grief at least
once each decade.
Professor Robert M Jarvis continues the examination by
considering the most symbolic of all of the Legislature's duties: the
duty to prescribe the state flag and seal. Finally, Nova Law Review
staff member Eugene Neimy Bardakjy discusses an issue that has been
hotly debated by Floridians for years and may ultimately have to be
resolved by the Legislature: whether Florida should legalize
gambling.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"'Sorry to interrupt the festivities,' said Hal, 'but we have a problem."'
These words, which appear on page 120 of the novelization of the film
2001: A Space Odyssey' and serve as the first notification of the lesson to
* Dr. Doherty earned his B.S. from North Georgia College, and his MSPA and Ph.D.
from Florida State University where he authored a six-volume, 3401 page dissertation on the
subject of Florida legislative events ca. 1954-1990. Currently, he hopes to one day actually
make a living preserving, studying, writing, and teaching about the legal and social history
of Florida's Legislature and Government.
The author wishes to thank Florida State University President Talbot "Sandy"
D'Alemberte for his early and continuing encouragement; the late Professor Augustus B.
Turnbull, I11, of Florida State University, for believing serious academic study of Florida
state-level government & politics is both useful and needed; Doris W. Bates of Fort Walton
Beach, Florida, for reading and commenting on early drafts; Dr. Allen Morris, Clerk Emeritus
and Historian of the Florida House of Representatives, for his learned counsel over the years
on the understudied and fascinating world of the Florida Capitol; Mr. Eric D. Rosenberg of
Nova University Law Review for a superb job editing; and Mr. Robert Jarvis, Professor of
Florida Constitutional Law at Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center, for his gracious
review of the completed draft.
1. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY 120 (Signet Books 1968); 2001: A
SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968). "Hal," was the familiar term used to address
the spaceship "Discovery's" on board HAL-9000 computer, which had as its primary
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come: no matter how careful and thorough we may think we have been in
the application of our technical skills, our best-laid plans, in the somewhat
more classic words of Robert Bums, still can "gang aft agley."2
In the present instance, what the agley has ganged after is Florida's
recently passed term-limitation amendment; but the problems are not to be
found in how, or even if, its provisions apply to the members of Florida's
congressional delegation. True, there is a significant question in the
enactment as it regards these offices, but as was the case in the movie, the
concern over this apparent and obvious issue seems to have obscured others
much closer to home. The first of these is a minor knot which could affect
the timing of the applicability of the amendment to certain offices.
Somewhat more Gordian is the second as it, if left unaddressed, shall,
among other odd things, free the Gerrymander to fly in the fourth dimen-
sion.
II. TERM LIMITS COME TO FLORIDA
The term limit provision of the Florida Constitution was drafted by a
team composed of what was described as, "the best political and legal minds
responsibility the day-to-day running of the ship during its voyage into deep space. The
machine was essentially a sentient being and was considered to be so well and perfectly
designed as to be incapable of error. Unfortunately, it (he) knew this, and when his
preoccupation with concealing from his human crew mates a bit of secret information
programmed into him by the experts on earth-while at the same time obliquely referring to
it-led him to make a small mistake, that was caught by the humans, he could not admit
fault. Instead, he slipped into a kind of paranoia and elected to believe that since he knew
himself to be incapable of error, the revelation of any alleged error would cause the mission
to suffer. So he tried to prevent this by killing the humans who, he reasoned, had not been
given the secret he possessed and so must be out to destroy both him and the mission. Thus,
was exposed the most grievous design flaw imaginable. Id.
2. ROBERT BuRNs, To a Mouse on Turning Up Her Nest with a Plow, November 1785,
in THE LITERATuRE OF ENGLAND 118-19 (George K. Anderson & William E. Buckler eds.,
5th ed., vol. 2, Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966) (1786). This mot is among the most famous
of all those found in Bums' poetry, and the image it conveys is so universal its use has
become ubiquitous if not actually hackneyed. The entire stanza which contains the line reads:
But Mousie, thy art no thy lane,
In proving foresight may be vain:
The best-laid schemes o'mice an' men
Gang aft agley,
An' lea'e us naught but grief an' pain,
For promised joy!
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in the State," 3 headed by David Cardwell of the law firm of Holland and
Knight during a six to eight week period during the months of February,
March and April of 1991. 4  The team had been brought together in
February 1991 by Orlando-based financier-politico Phil Handy. Mr. Handy,
who had first achieved statewide notice for his role in the 1986 election of
Governor Bob Martinez, decided to undertake the campaign for term limits,
in part, due to the virtual nationwide groundswell of support such endeavors
had enjoyed since they began in 1989 or 1990.' Wherever it was possible
to do so, or so it seemed, initiatives to limit the terms of state and federal
officeholders were cropping up and meeting with enthusiastic approval.
And though the "political class," as the pundits of the scribbling class tagged
them, spoke and worked against such proposals, their point of view lost so
regularly and so decisively that by the end of 1992 fifteen states had
adopted limits of one kind or another.6
During this period, a term limit initiative suffered a notable defeat at
the polls in only one jurisdiction. In the State of Washington a particularly
harsh measure was put forward which would have both limited terms and
applied the time constraints retroactively. The effect would have been to
unseat a number of incumbents including the United States Speaker of the
House, Toni Foley. In response to this threat, Representative Foley and his
colleagues actively joined the debate and managed, albeit very narrowly, to
beat back the drive. Subsequently, however, they were not so successful.
3. Telephone Interview with John Sowinski, Former Campaign Manager, Citizens For
Ltd Political Terms (a.k.a. "Eight Is Enough") (June 21, 1993).
4. Id.
5. As with every popular and successful political movement, a number of claimants have
come forward to the designation of "originator" of the modem term-limits crusade. As there
is no practical way of sorting out these claims, simply dating the probable start of them will
have to suffice.
6. Telephone Interview with Cleta Deatherage Mitchell, Executive Director, TermLimits
Legal Institute (July 21, 1993). The 15 states which currently have some form of term limit
provision are: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming.
In addition, a term limit proposal has recently been approved as of July 1993 to appear on
the ballot in Maine during 1994. The specific details of the various term limit provisions
differ from state to state and a complete listing would exceed the scope of this article.
Suffice to say that as written, and notwithstanding any legal challenges pending against them,
the limitations break down into three main categories: (I) those which limit both federal and
state officials; (2) those which limit state officials only; and (3) those which limit state
officials immediately and which may limit federal officials is specific events or situations
come to pass. Most typically this trigger is tied to "x" percent (or number) of other states
adopting term limits for their federal officeholders.
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A new measure was submitted to Washington voters which did not include
retroactivity, and it was adopted.7
Retroactivity aside, the single biggest question to arise with regard to
term limits is whether it is constitutional for states to unilaterally restrict the
length of service of the members of their congressional delegations.'
Usually those who claim term limits are impermissible declare that the states
have no power to enact qualifications for the holding of federal offices
which are in excess of those laid out in the United States Constitution
because such are applicable to the states under the Supremacy Clause.9
Others challenge the states' ability to do so based upon objections they have
on how the restrictions would inhibit First Amendment-protected free
(political) speech which is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment.' °  Still others declare such limits cannot stand scrutiny
because they deny voters of the affected states rights guaranteed under the
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments." To
limit the terms of congressional officials in one state without limiting the
terms in all states would, they claim, deprive the term-limited states'
citizenry of meaningful representation particularly given Congress'
seniority-based leadership system.12
The Handy-Cardwell team addressed each of the well known areas of
7. Id.
8. Id. Though the question of whether states may limit the terms of their own state
officials has been raised, most notably in California, their prerogative to do so has been
consistently upheld.
9. Id. Article I, Section 2, of the United States Constitution provides: "No Person shall
be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been
seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant
of that State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Article I, Section
3, of the United States Constitution states: "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. Article VI (the Supremacy Clause) of the United States
Constitution states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. See Mitchell supra note 6.
II. Id.
12. Id. According to Ms. Mitchell, this argument is among the principal ones currently
being raised by the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Thomas Foley,
and his Washington State colleagues in their challenge to that jurisdiction's recently enacted
term-limit measure. Id.
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the possible troubles discussed above. 3  With regard to retroactivity,
Floridians decided to make their initiative prospective only. It would not
apply either to time already served in previous terms by an occupant of a
covered office nor would it apply to anyone in the midst of a term which
had begun prior to the initiative becoming part of Florida's basic law. 4
Adopting this posture was smart both politically and judicially. The Florida
Supreme Court had already disallowed "retroactive application of a constitu-
tional amendment[s] to pre-adoption conduct."15
The other problem, that of finding a way to apply the restrictions to
Florida's congressional officials, presented a more difficult task which the
framers elected to counter by skirting the heart of it entirely. Beginning
with the provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution,
which gives states the power to "prescribe" the "Times, Places, and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators, and Representatives,"16 and then adding
to this the reserved powers language of the Tenth Amendment,1 7 the
drafters decided not to make the issue of term limitations one of the
qualifications a person must have to hold a particular office. Rather, they
decided to make it one of ineligibility to stand for re-election by adding a
new time-sensitive disqualification to the existing disqualifications found in
article VI, section 4, of the Florida Constitution which prohibits certain
individuals from voting or appearing on the ballot for election to office.' 8
13. See Sowinski supra note 3.
14. See supra note 4.
15. See Baillie v. Town of Medley, 262 So. 2d 693, 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972),
appeal dismissed, 279 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1973); Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 933 (Fla.
1978).
16. See the United States Constitution which provides:
Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators, and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations, except as
to Places of chusing Senators.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Though elegant as a statement of intent, the Tenth
Amendment has not had much practical effect. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
18. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). At the time "Eight Is Enough" was being
developed, article VI, section 4, of the Florida Constitution provided: "Section 4.
Disqualifications.-No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state
to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil
rights or removal of disability." FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
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In other words, under this scheme, while it would be legal for a person to
hold a covered office in excess of the maximum consecutive time pre-
scribed, once that person had reached the limit he or she would have to
contrive to remain there by some means other than being re-elected,
something which under most realistic circumstances one can imagine, would
be an almost impossible stunt to pull off. The only real weakness in this
approach would be if Congress, acting under the authority granted it in
Article I, Section 4, attempted to fashion legislation overruling the provi-
sion.' 9
In addition to the advantage of not directly addressing the issue of the
"qualifications for holding federal office,"2 there was a second benefit to
adopting the "disqualification for ballot purposes"'" approach. Simply put,
using the vehicle of article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution
eliminated the necessity of drafting language which would attach itself to
more than one place in the Florida document.22 Of the six types of offices
the framers wished to cover, election of Florida State Senators and State
Representatives were dealt with in article III, section 15;23 the Lt. Governor
and members of the Cabinet were housed in article IV, section 5;24 and the
19. See supra note 16.
20. See supra note 9.
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. For example, of those plans authored in the Legislature in 1992, most proposed
amending and/or creating three sections in three separate articles. The next most popular
numbers were two sections in two articles. Only one legislative vehicle proposed a single
change to a single article and this measure would have applied term restrictions to state
legislators only. See FLA. LEGIS, FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1992 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, at 30-3 1, SJR 54. At the other extreme, Senate Joint
Resolution 1204, Id. at 114, SJR 1204, proposed five separate changes to five. separate
articles.
23. Article III, section 15, of the Florida Constitution reads in pertinent part:
SECTION 15. Terms and qualifications of legislators.-
(a) SENATORS. Senators shall be elected for terms of four years, those from
odd-numbered districts in the years the numbers of which are multiples of four
and those from even-numbered districts in even-numbered years the numbers of
which are not multiples of four...
(b) REPRESENTATIVES. Members of the house of representatives shall be
elected for terms of two years in each even-numbered year.
(c) QUALIFICATIONS. Each legislator shall be at least twenty-one years of
age, an elector and resident of the district from which elected and shall have
resided in the state for a period of two years prior to election.
FLA. CONST. art. III, §15.
24. Article IV, section 5, of the Florida Constitution reads in pertinent part:
SECTION 5. Election of governor, lieutenant governor and cabinet
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United States Senators and United States Representatives were not
mentioned anywhere. Therefore, if the direct route were taken, a potential
amendment would have to add new language to two existing sections while
creating a third entirely new one.25 Though the framers knew such an
amendment would probably stand court review for sufficiency under the
"single subject requirement" found in article XI, section 3,26 owing to its
"logical and' natural oneness of purpose,"27 it could conceivably have
proved more vulnerable to attack than would one adding a single block of
new text to a single section. Also, from a purely political standpoint, an
attempt to amend multiple sections simultaneously could have ended up
confusing the electorate, and hence more vulnerable in the fall than a single,
unified item.2"
members, qualifications; terms.-
(a) At a state-wide general election in each calendar year the number of
which is even but not a multiple of four, the electors shall choose a governor
and a lieutenant governor and members of the cabinet each for a term of four
years ... [I]n the general election and party primaries, if held, all candidates
for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor shall form joint candidacies
in a manner prescribed by law so that each voter shall cast a single vote for a
candidate for governor and a candidate for lieutenant governor running together.
(b) When elected, the governor, lieutenant governor and each cabinet
member must be an elector not less than thirty years of age who has resided in
the state fbr the preceding seven years. The attorney general must have been a
member of the bar of Florida for the preceding five years ....
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
25. The single place, single block of text coverage of all offices was not a feature of any
of the proposals submitted to the Legislature. In addition, none of the legislative proposals
addressed themselves in any way to article VI, section 4. Instead, the legislative proposals
all addressed themselves to some combination of the following: article III, section 15 (terms
and qualifications of legislators); article III, section 19 (new section providing legislative term
limits); article IV, section 5 (election of governor, lieutenant governor and cabinet members;
qualifications; terms); article X, section 16 (new section in "miscellaneous" article prescribing
term limits for congressional officials); and article XII, section 20 (new section in "schedule"
article providing for establishment of terms limits and for the timing of their imposition).
26. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3, reads in pertinent part:
SECTION 3. Initiative.-The power to propose the revision or amendment of
any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people,
provided that, any such revision or amendment shall embrace but one subject
and matter directly connected therewith ....
Id,
27. See Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 990 (Fla. 1984); Advisory Opinion to the
Attorney Gen.-Limited Political Terms In Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 226-27
(Fla. 1991) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General].
28. See supra note 4.
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The above matters of approach and placement aside, the final decisions
facing the framers had to do with the allowable time limits and the specific
wording. Here the team adopted what they felt was the "sensible"
course.2 9 Rather than deviate from the length of time allowed in the sole
limit on service provision then present in the Florida Constitution, which
capped the tenure of a Governor at maximum of eight consecutive years,
they chose to adopt the same figure as the maximum stay in all specified
offices.3" All covered officials3 could appear on the ballot fo reelection
only so long as by the end of their current term they had not completed
eight consecutive years of service. 2 To enact this restriction, the drafters
then chose to copy, almost exactly, the language already present in article
IV, section 5(b), which applies to the Governor.33
With the intellectual and technical underpinnings thus in place, the
initiative's backers produced their petition and on April 15, 1991, Federal
29. See supra note 4.
30. All Florida Constitutions have contained a provision limiting the length of time a
governor may serve. Prior to 1968, this limit was always set at a single four-year term
though governors could run and serve again later. The 1968 language limits a governor to
two consecutive four-year terms if he is elected in his own right, or to one full four-year term
should he succeed to the office and serve therein for more than two years in a term to which
someone else had been elected. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
31. U.S. Senators, given the initiative's wording, would be allowed to serve two full
six-year terms for a total of twelve consecutive years.
32. See Sowinski supra note 3. In making this decision, the framers of "Eight Is
Enough" chose to ignore an obvious loophole which from time to time will allow persons
who succeed to office during a term to serve more than eight consecutive years. For
example, Secretary of State Jim Smith, was appointed in 1987 to fill the office vacated by
Secretary of State George Firestone, who had last been reelected in 1986. Mr. Smith, under
"Eight Is Enough", would have been eligible to serve a total of eleven years and a few
months. This was possible because he could have run for one two-year term (the remaining
portion of the Firestone term), and then for two consecutive four-year terms on his own
before he would have served eight consecutive years in that office by the end of the "current"
term.
By the reverse of the same token, any United States Senator appointed to an unfinished
term where two or more of the six years remained would be limited to election in his/her
own right, to a single full 6-year term of his/her own before the "eight consecutive years"
in office provision would prohibit him/her from further appearances on the ballot for
reelection to that office.
33. The specific language setting forth this limit in article IV, section 5(b), of the
Florida Constitution reads:
No person who has, or but for resignation would have, served as governor or
acting governor for more than six years in two consecutive terms shall be elected
governor for the succeeding term.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b).
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Income Tax Day, to launch their campaign for public support. Thereafter,
the concept of term limits proved just as popular in Florida as it had
elsewhere.34
34. In full, and with its "Ballot Summary," the text of the "Eight Is Enough" Initiative
Petition read:
TITLE: LIMITED POLITICAL TERMS IN CERTAIN ELECTIVE OFFICES
Summary: Limits terms by prohibiting incumbents who have held the
same elective office for the preceding eight years from appearing on the ballot
for re-election to that office. Offices covered are: Florida representative and
senator, lieutenant governor, Florida cabinet, and U.S. senatorand representative.
Terms of office beginning before amendment approval are not counted.
Full Text Of Proposed Amendment: Be It Enacted by the People of
Florida that:
The people of Florida believe that politicians who remain in elective office
too long may become preoccupied with re-election and beholden to special
interests and bureaucrats, and that present limitations on the President and
Governor of Florida show that term limitations can increase voter participation,
citizen involvement in government, and the number of persons who will run for
elective office.
Therefore, to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States,
the people of Florida, exercising their reserved powers, hereby declare that:
1) Article VI, s. 4 of the Constitution of the State of Florida is hereby
amended by:
a) Inserting "(a)" before the first word thereof and,
b) Adding a new sub-section "(b)" at the end thereof to read:
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to any of the
following offices:
(1) Florida representative,
(2) Florida senator,
(3) Florida lieutenant governor,
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet,
(5) U.S. representative from Florida, or
(6) U.S. senator from Florida
If, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or, but
for resignation would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years.
2) This amendment shall take effect on the date it is approved by the
electorate, but no service in a term of office which commenced prior to the
effective date of this amendment will be counted against the limit in the prior
sentence.
3) If any portion of this measure is held invalid for any reason, the
remaining portion of this measure, to the fullest extent possible, shall be severed
from the void portion and given the fullest possible force and application. The
people of Florida declare their intention that persons elected to offices of public
trust will continue voluntarily to observe the wishes of the people as stated in
this initiative in the event any provision of this initiative is held invalid.
Citizens for Ltd. Political Terms, Initiative Petition (1992) (original petition on file with State
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By late 1991, the "Eight Is Enough" drive was going so well that the
State Attorney General petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a ruling on
the initiative's sufficiency for inclusion on the ballot should it obtain the
requisite number of signatures. On December 19, 1991, the justices gave
their approval by a vote of five to two." With Justices Overton and
Kogan dissenting in part. Their objections related to the inclusion of the
federal offices, and Justice Kogan also found fault with the wording and
effect of the initiative's severability clause. 6 Both Justices agreed with the
majority that "Eight Is Enough" was fit as it regarded the state-level
offices.37
With the ruling of the high court, the path was open for the amendment
to be placed on the ballot, but before it did the entire issue of term limits
had to transit the 1992 regular session of the Florida Legislature. By that
time Florida's political class was wide awake and paying great attention.
No fewer than thirteen joint resolutions were introduced during the sixty day
meeting which suggested term-limiting constitutional changes of one sort or
another.38 Some of these affected all of the offices the initiative sought to
cover.39 Some did not. Some proposed limiting the terms of state legisla-
tors only,4" one the Cabinet only,4 and some included Congress, while
Division of Elections).
35. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen., 592 So. 2d at 225 (Fla. 1991).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 232.
38. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1992 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS [hereinafter HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS]. The joint resolutions
introduced in the Florida House of Representatives during the Twelfth Legislature, Second
Session were: House Joint Resolution 121, Id. at 205, HJR 121; House Joint Resolution 379,
Id. at 222, HJR 379; House Joint Resolution 459, Id. at 228, HJR 459; House Joint
Resolution 485, Id. at 231, HJR 485; House Joint Resolution 549, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS,
at 234-35, HJR 549; House Joint Resolution 745, Id. at 247, HJR 745; House Joint
Resolution 1097, Id. at 270, HJR 1097. The joint resolutions introduced in the Florida
Senate were: Senate Joint Resolution 54, FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMA-
TION, 1992 REGULAR SESSION HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, 30-31, SJR 54 [hereinafter
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS]; Senate Joint Resolution 98, Id. at 34, SJR 98; Senate Joint
Resolution 238, Id. at 44, SJR 238; Senate Joint Resolution 844, Id. at 88, SJR 844; Senate
Joint Resolution 1184, Id. at 113, SJR 1184; and Senate Joint Resolution 1204, Id. at 114,
SJR 1204.
39. Joint resolutions of this type were: House Joint Resolution 459, House Joint
Resoultion 745, and Senate Joint Resolution 844. See HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS, supra note
38; HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, supra note 38.
40. Joint resolutions of this type were: House Joint Resolution 485, House joint
Resolution 549, House Joint Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 54. See HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS, supra note 38; HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, supra note 38.
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others did not.42 The time limits they contained varied as well from a high
of sixteen consecutive years43 to a low of eight.44 The most popular cut
off was twelve years and this was the limit found in the scheme which went
the furthest in the process. 5 This joint resolution, submitted by a score of
prime sponsors and nearly half again as many co-sponsors, originated in the
house. On its top two lines were to be found the names of House Rules and
Calendar Committee Chairman Bo Johnson, a Democrat who was scheduled
to become Speaker in November of 1992; and Representative James
Lombard, a Republican who served as House Minority Leader.46
41. See HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, supra note 38. House Joint Resolution 121 was this
type. See id. at 205, HJR 121.
42. Joint resolutions which included members of Congress were: House Joint Resolution
379, House Joint Resolution 459, and Senate Joint Resolution 1184. See HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS, supra note 38; HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, supra note 38. Joint resolutions which did
not include members of Congress were: House Joint Resolution 121, House Joint Resolution
485, House Joint Resolution 549, House Joint Resolution 1097, Senate joint Resolution 54,
Senate Joint Resolution 98, Senate Joint Resolution 238. Senate Joint Resolution 844, and
Senate Joint Resolution 1204. See HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS, supra note 38; HISTORY OF
SENATE BILLS, supra note 38.
43. See HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS, supra note 38 at 270, HJR. 1097 (proposed FLA.
CONST. art. Ill, § 19; art. XII, § 20).
44. Joint resolutions in this category were: House Joint Resolution 121, House Joint
Resolution 485, and Senate Joint Resolution 1204. See HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS, supra note
38; HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, supra note 38.
45. Id. The twelve year limit, for at least some of the offices covered, was a feature of
all the following joint resolutions: House Joint Resolution 379, (12 years for state legislators
and members of congress only); House Joint Resolution 459 (12 years for state legislators and
members of congress, and maximum of 8 years for lieutenant governor and cabinet); House
Joint Resolution 549 (state legislators only); House Joint Resolution 745, (state legislators,
cabinet, lieutenant governor); Senate Joint Resolution 98, (state legislators and cabinet
members); Senate Joint Resolution 844, (state legislators, cabinet, lieutenant governor); and
Senate Joint Resolution 1184, (12 years for state legislators and members of congress, and
maximum of 8 years for lieutenant governor and cabinet). See supra note 38.
46. Id.; OFFICE OF THE CLERK, THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CLERK'S
MANUAL 1990.-1992 (199 1). The prime sponsors and co-slonsors of H.R.J. Res. 745, their
highest official position(s) during the 1992 regular session, and their tenure in office as of
the end of their 1990-1992 term of office were (in order of signatures):
Prime Sponsors: Rep. Bo Johnson (D-Milton), Chairman, House Committee -on Rules
and Calendar, Speaker-Designate for 1992-1994 biennium, serving 7th term (14 years
consecutive); Rep. James Lombard (R-Osprey), Republican Leader of the House of
Representatives, serving 4th term (8 years consecutive); Rep. Everett A. Kelly (D-Tavares),
Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of Representatives, serving 7th term (14 years
consecutive); Rep. Harry C. Goode (D-Melbourne), Chairman, House Committee on Ethics
and Elections, serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive); Rep. Kelley R. Smith, Jr. (D-Palatka),
Vice Chairman House Committee on Ethics and Elections, serving Ist full term following
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In practice, any measure possessing this kind of pedigree will swamp
any competing proposals; the Johnson-Lombard resolution47 ("House
initial partial term of 7 months (2 years, 7 months consecutive); Rep. Fred Lippman
(D-Hollywood), serving 7th term (14 years consecutive). Note: Mr. Lippman had been, until
forced to step down in 1991 due to adverse publicity, House Majority Leader. He remained,
however, an influential member of the house in 1992 due to his close connection to Rep. Bo
Johnson.; Rep. Joe Viscusi (D-Lakeland), Vice Chairman, House Committee on Tourism,
Hospitality, and Economic Development, serving 1st term (2 years consecutive), Rep. Luis
E. Rojas (R-Hialeah), serving 2nd term (4 years consecutive); Rep. Debby P. Sanderson
(R-Ft. Lauderdale), serving 5th term (10 years consecutive); Rep. Willie Logan, Jr. (D-Opa
Locka), Chairman, House Committee on Corrections, serving 5th term (10 years consecutive);
Rep. Susan Guber (D-Miami), Chairman, House Committee on Vocational/Technical
Education, serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive); Rep. Patricia "Trish" Muscarella
(R-Clearwater), serving Ist term (2 years consecutive); Rep. Brian P. Rush (D-Tampa),
Chairman, House Committee on Claims, Vice Chairman, House Committee on Natural
Resources, serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive); Rep. Hurley W. Rudd (D-Tallahassee),
Chairman, House Committee on Natural Resources, serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive);
Rep. David Flagg (D-Gainesville), Vice Chairman, HouseCommittee on Health Care, serving
2nd term (4 years consecutive); Rep. Thomas J. "Tom" Tobiasson (D-Gonzalez), Vice
Chairman, House Committee on Finance and Taxation, serving 5th term (10 years
consecutive) in current seat which immediately followed 2 terms (8 years consecutive) as a
member of the senate which immediately followed 3 terms (6 years consecutive) as a member
of the house (total legislative service as of 1992 was 24 years consecutive); Rep. William
Thomas "Tom" Mims (D-Lakeland), Vice Chairman, House Committee on Postsecondary
Education, serving 2nd term (4 years consecutive); Rep. Walter "Walt" Young (D-Pembroke
Pines), Chairman, House Committee on House Administration, serving 10th term (20 years
consecutive); Rep. Norman "Norm" Ostrau (D-Plantation), Chairman, House Committee on
Regulated Industries, serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive); and Rep. Buzz Ritchie
(D-Pensacola), Vice Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, serving 2nd term (4
years consecutive).
Co-Sponsors: Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Pruitt (R-Port St. Lucie), serving 1st term (2 years
consecutive); Rep. James E. King, Jr. (R-Jacksonville), serving 3rd term (6 years consecu-
tive); Rep. Art Grindle (R-Altamonte Springs), serving 5th term (10 years consecutive); Rep.
Betty S. Holzendorf (D-Jacksonville), Vice Chairman, House Committee on Community
Affairs, serving 2nd full term following initial 6-month partial term (4 years, 6 months
consecutive); Rep. Tom Banjanin (R-Pensacola), Assistant House Republican Floor Leader,
serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive); Rep. Robert T. Harden (R-Fort Walton Beach),
serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive); Rep. Miguel A. "Mike" De Grandy (R-Miami),
serving I st full term following initial 14-month partial term (3 years, 2 months consecutive);
Rep. Michael Edward "Mike" Langton (D-Jacksonville), Vice Chairman, House Committee
on Health and Rehabilitative Services, serving 3rd full term following initial 13-month partial
term (7 years, I month consecutive); and Rep. Jack Ascherl (D-New Smyrna Beach),
Chairman, House Committee on Insurance, and Vice Chairman, House Committee on
Commerce, serving 3rd term (6 years consecutive).
47. H.R.J. Res. 745, 12th Leg., 2d Sess. (1992).
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Resolution 745") proved no exception. 8 The resolution cleared subcom-
mittee on day one of the session,4 cleared full committee on day three,5"
was placed on the General Calendar on day eight,5 and on day ten it was
placed on the Special Order Calendar, taken up, passed, and sent immediate-
ly to the senate. 2
Subsequently, the resolution lost momentum. Fourteen days passed
before the senate, on day twenty-four, got around to formally receiving it
and assigning it to a committee. 3 Once in committee, it languished until
it died quietly, as did its sister proposals, when the regular session adjourned
sine die on March 13, 1992. 54
This spare history of the Legislature's effort to either climb on board
the term-limit train, or mitigate its impact, does not tell the most politically
interesting side of the story. To deal with this, we must return to when
House Resolution 745 was still on the house fast track and touch on
something that informally came to be known as the "supremacy clause."55
In concept, the supremacy clause contained in the original rendering of
House Resolution 745 was, for those who take delight in the fine points of
the process, a gem. It provided that if both House Resolution 745 and Phil
Handy's Eight Is Enough (and/or any other term-limit proposals) appeared
on the same ballot, and both (or all) passed, then the term-limit resolution
authored by the Legislature would take precedence and would be the one to
go into the constitution. 6 Needless to say, this proviso drove the Eight Is
48. See id.
49. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 00119 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 00148-00150 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
53. FLA. S. JOUR. 00196 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
54. While not mandated in the Florida Constitution, both houses of the Legislature
operate under a scheme whereby all bills and resolutions introduced during a given session
die at the end of that session if not passed. Accordingly, all 1992 regular session bills and
resolutions in and of both houses died where they stood on March 13, 1992 when the
Legislature adjourned sine die.
55. See Sowinski supra note 3. Mr. Sowinski, who played an active role in lobbying
against the approval of any legislative attempts to place a term limit amendment on the ballot
which would necessarily compete with "Eight Is Enough," stakes a claim to having first used
the term "supremacy clause" as it applies here. As the author can find no better claimant it
seems fair to give Mr. Sowinski the credit.
56. The so-called "supremacy clause" which appeared in House Resolution 745 took the
form of an amendment to Article XII of the Florida Constitution. It proposed creation of a
new sub-section (§ 20(b)), and read as follows:
If at the general election at which the amendments proposed by this
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Enough crowd wild. 7  In appearances before the House Ethics and
Elections Committee, as well as in one-on-one meetings with house
members, the Eight is Enough supporters tried to get the supremacy clause
removed or modified. For example, one of these alternatives provided that
in case of passage of more than one term-limit proposal, the one which
received the most votes would prevail.58
Initially things went badly. All attempts to quash or modify were
spurned under the watchful eye of Representative Johnson. All knew that
when Mr. Johnson became Speaker in a few months he would be in a
position to pass out political plums to "cooperative" members while
withholding them from those who had not been viewed as "reasonable."59
Yet despite this, Eight Is Enough would not give up. They continued
working against the Supremacy Clause, and the joint resolution itself, as it
wound its way toward floor action.6"
On January twenty-third (day ten) the winding stopped. Mr. Johnson,
as Rules and Calendar Committee Chairman, pulled the bill up onto the
floor and the debate was joined.6 Lobbying continued right up until the
last minute, and even though the media had been quite critical of the
supremacy clause, there was no indication the Chairman was prepared to
yield.62  In fact, just the opposite was assumed: he would, using the
considerable clout at his disposal as he rose toward the speakership, ram the
proposal through.63 Yet instead of doing this, Mr. Johnson suddenly
reversed field. He offered an amendment of his own to delete the
"supremacy clause." It passed,64 and for a moment the Eight Is Enough
crowd was stunned. Then a possible reason for Representative Johnson's
resolution are adopted, there is also adopted an amendment which provides
different limitations on the terms of office of members of the legislature, the
lieutenant governor, on members of the cabinet, this amendment shall prevail,
and such other amendment shall be inoperative and of no effect.
Id.
57. See supra note 4.
58. Id.
59. Id. Whether or not Mr. Johnson would have actually sought to punish any
less-than-cooperative members of the committee is, of course, open to debate. However, this
type of assumption is common enough in the Florida Capitol for any bill regarded as the
"pet" of any Speaker (or Senate President) Designate. Further, it is a perception which
Speakers (or Presidents) Designate generally do nothing to disabuse.
60. Id.
61. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 00148 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
62. See Sowinski supra note 3.
63. Id.
64. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 00148 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
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about face became clear as a number of his colleagues withdrew amend-
ments they had prepared eliminating or modifying the offending provi-
sion.65  Such was the battle. Once it ended, House Resolution 745 was
debated, passed, and sent to the Senate where, as reported earlier, it was
taken into custody and never seen alive again.66
Such was not the case with Eight Is Enough. Throughout the early
months of 1992, the petition drive continued apace and until in mid-June
the petition's fathers submitted it to the Secretary of State for inclusion on
the November 3, 1992 General Election ballot.6" The Secretary's office
took approximately one month to conduct its review and on Thursday July
23, 1992 announced the initiative had qualified.68 It would appear on the
ballot as "Amendment # 9"69 -to the dismay of some who had hoped, for
alliterative reasons, that it would receive the number "8."
So now it was on to the fall, and Mr. Handy's troops held the upper
hand from the outset. Though an organized opposition, mostly composed
of ex-lawmakers and lobbyists (many were both), did attempt to make itself
heard, it never really attracted much in the way of public notice or
credibility, not to mention support.7 °
At lenght election day arrived and the results were, in a word, clear.
5,436,340, or 83.1%, of Florida's 6,541,925 registered voters went to the
65. See Sowinski supra note 3.
66. Id. According to Mr. Sowinski, Florida House Joint Resolution 745 was essentially
"'dead on arrival" in the senate, which had informally decided to avoid dealing with the issue
of term limits entirely. Though the measure was eventually assigned to the Senate
Committee on Executive Business, Ethics and Elections, as well as to the Senate Committee
on Rules and Calendar., FLA. S. JOUR. 00196 (Reg. Sess. 1992), should it clear the former,
the Chairman of the Committee of first reference, Senator Arnett Girardeau (D-Jacksonville),
never placed it on the agenda.
67. See Sowinski supra note 3.
68. Telephone Interview with Division of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State
(June 21, 1993) [hereinafter Division of Elections].
69. See Sowinski supra note 3.
70. Id. One of these groups, "Let The People Decide-Americans For Ballot Freedom,"
had surfaced as far back as the previous year and had filed a brief with the Florida Supreme
Court when the Attorney General submitted the "Eight Is Enough" petition for review. Of
those individuals willing to sign on as respondents in the case, most were former members
of the Legislature including five former Speakers of the House (two of whom were also
former members of the Cabinet). Two signatories were former members of the Florida
Supreme Court (a third former justice acted as lead counsel for the group). One signatory
was a former President of the State Senate, and one was an incumbent member of the United
States House of Representatives who had also served as a member of the Florida house
before his election to Congress. See Advisory Opinion to Attorney Gen., 592 So. 2d at 225
(Fla. 1991).
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polls. Of these approximately 4,722,627, or 86.8%, registered an opinion
on the question of adopting Amendment #9. Only 713,713 electors, or
13.1%, chose to ignore the question. Of those who did cast ballots 76.8%
(3,625,500) did so in favor, while 1,097,627, or 23.2%, said "No." The raw
difference in terms of votes cast for and against was 2,528,373. It was,
especially given how far down the ballot Amendment #9 appeared, a
blowout by anyone's measure.7 In addition, emphasis was added to the
results when all the votes were tabulated from all the states which had
similar measures on their general election ballots. When these numbers
became available it was apparent that the percentage of Florida voters voting
in the affirmative was virtually unsurpassed anywhere.72 Phil Handy had
caught the wave at just the right time and ridden it standing up.
So now it is 1994. Florida has a term-limit provision in its constitution
ready to do its work.73 Of course the question of the federal officials
remains unsettled. How long that issue will take to wind its way through
the judicial machinery is anyone's guess, but as said earlier, the issues
relating to its resolution will not be addressed here. For our purposes, in
fact, where mention of federal officeholders is necessary at all, the limits
will be assumed to be fully applicable. Our focus from here forward will
be on two aspects of Eight is Enough as it applies to the Florida Legislature
which, at 160 seats, is the largest single institution covered by the amend-
ment.
71. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, NOVEMBER 3, 1992
GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (November 16, 1992).
72. See Sowinski supra note 3.
73. Article VI Section 4 of the Florida Constitution, as amended by "Eight Is Enough,"
currently reads:
Section 4. Disqualifications.-
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to
be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until
restoration of civil rights or removal of disability.
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to any of the following
offices:
(I) Florida representative,
(2) Florida senator,
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor,
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet,
(5) U.S. Representative from Florida, or
(6) U.S. Senator from Florida
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or, but
for resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years.
FLA. CONST. art VI, § 4.
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III. IT'S ABOUT TIME
The first question raised by the wording of Amendment #9 is one of
its applicability to the legislative class of 1992. There is no question that
(under the normal electoral timetable) from 1994 forward, all members of
both houses will be covered. The same cannot be said for those who were
voted into office in November of 1992,' 4 and since 1992 was an apportion-
ment year, the entire membership of both houses were elected simultaneous-
ly at that time.
To be sure, it was the intent of the framers that those elected in 1992
be covered and this desire is reflected in the language they selected to
employ in the initiative's effective date clause. That language, which
specified the amendment was to "take effect on the date it is approved by
the electorate,"" was designed to mesh seamlessly with the language
regarding legislators' terms found in article III, section 15(d), which
specifies "members of the legislature shall take office upon election." 6
In practice, the combined effect of these two provisions was intended
to be that both Amendment #9 and the terms of those legislators elected in
1992 were to take effect and begin co-instantaneously.7 7 Since such would
74. Under the provisions of article III, section 15(b) of the Florida Constitution, all
members of ihe Florida House of Representatives are to be elected in each even-numbered
year for a term of two years. As for the state senate, article III, section 15(a) specifies
staggered terms of four years with half the members going before the voters each biennium.
However, the Florida Supreme Court in In re Apportionment Law Appearing As Senate Joint
Resolution I E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982), ruled that
the final clause of the sub-section required all members of the senate to stand for election
simultaneously if "geographic changes" had been made to their districts during an
apportionment. As a practical matter, since almost by definition all senate districts will be
altered geographically during any apportionment, the court's ruling requires the entire senate
to stand for election every second year of every decade when the apportionment takes place.
75. See supra note 34 for complete text. The effective date clause is to be found in the
second sub-section of the initiative and it reads as follows:
2) This amendment shall take effect on the date it is approved by the electorate,
but no service in a term of office which commenced prior to the effective date
of this amendment will be counted against the limit in the prior sentence.
See supra note 34.
76. Article II1, section 15(d) of the Florida Constitution reads in full:
(d) ASSUMING OFFICE; VACANCIES. Members of the legislature shall take
office upon election. Vacancies in legislative office shall be filled only by
election as provided by law.
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 15(d).
77. See FLA. CONST. art. 11l, § 15(d). Curiously there is no exact definition of when
this moment in time is though by custom the Legislature uses election day itself. However,
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be the case, the reasoning ran, all legislators elected in 1992 would be
bound by the limits since the simultaneous effectiveness would deprive them
of the partial and temporary exemption granted to those officials (i.e., the
Lieutenant Governor, members of the Cabinet, and Florida's Junior United
States Senator) whose most recent terms had "commenced prior" to the
amendment being approved and going into effect.7" There was to be no
grace period. If you were elected to the Legislature in 1992, you must, if
re-elected to consecutive terms, leave the seat you won in '92 no later than
the end of your term in the year 2000 when you will have served "eight
consecutive years."'79
On its face this all seems pretty clear, but just below the surface there
exists a potential snag. The snag is built around an idea of advance notice
as articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in "Footnote 32" in the similar,
once celebrated, but now somewhat obscure case of Myers v. Hawkins,"°
which appears to speak directly to the exact situation the framers of
Amendment #9 sought to produce: simultaneous effectiveness. Footnote 32
reads: "We express no view on the applicability of a constitutional or
statutory change to persons who assume office simultaneously with the
effective date of the change."'"
The footnote, as many footnotes are, was intended to clarify something
Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte in his commentary on section 15(d) says: "Subsection (d)
clears up an area of uncertainty under previous constitutions by providing that a legislator is
in office upon election. 'Upon election' would probably be the time of final canvassing of
the election." 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 669 (West 1991) (commentary to FLA. CONST. art. III,
§ 15(d)).
This uncertainty brings up the interesting question of whether the effective date clause
in the "Eight Is Enough" initiative and the "take office" clause of article Ill, section 15(d),
refer to the same date. For example, it could be argued that legislators elected in 1992 took
office at midnight November 3-4, 1992, but that the term limit amendment did not go into
effect until the complete statewide general election results were certified on November 13,
1992. If such were indeed the case, the terms of the legislative class of 1992 would have,
in the words of the initiative, "commenced prior to the effective date of the amendment" and
so would not be covered. See Division of Elections supra note 68. Citizens for Ltd. Political
Terms, Initiative Petition (1992) (original petition on file with State Division of Elections).
78. See supra notes 34 & 63. This partial and temporary exemption was specifically
provided for in the second sub-section of the "Eight Is Enough" initiative. In 1992 the
lieutenant governor and all members of the Florida cabinet were in the second year of a
four-year term to which they had been elected in 1990. Additionally, Florida's junior U.S.
senator was then serving the fourth year of the 6-year term to which he had been elected in
1988.
79. See supra note 34.
80. 362 So. 2d 926, 934-35 (Fla. 1978).
81. Id.
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the court had just ruled. In Myers, the case revolved around during and
after term-of-service restrictions on the remunerative activities of officehold-
ers that were placed into the constitution as a result of the 1976 adoption of
Governor Reubin Askew's so-called "Sunshine Amendment.1 2 The court
had just declared the new proscriptions "should [n]ot be considered
applicable to persons in office on its effective date." 3 In State Senator
Ken Myers' instance, though he had been on the ballot at the same time as
the amendment, it was relatively simple for the court to declare him (as well
as others similarly situated) exempt for the time being. The out was in the
dates. Mr. Myers was reelected to his senate seat and took office in
November, 1976.84 The amendment, approved in November, did not go
into effect, pursuant to article XI, § 5(c), of the Florida Constitution until
January of 1977.85 Ergo, Myers and his colleagues were all in office when
it became law, and therefore, he (and they) would not be covered until and
unless they successfully sought reelection to their seats or election to another
covered office. In the meantime the prohibitions were to apply only to
those persons who, for whatever reason, entered a covered office after the
amendment had become effective and before the next regularly scheduled
round of elections.
86
To the court, the reason the exemption was needed at all seemed to boil
down to a matter of notification; of the necessity of a potential officeholder
being fully apprised in advance of the rules of the game and of their effect
upon him. The principal passage of Myers explained the rationale beginning
with references to the two most closely-related cases then at hand:
A Holley approach focuses attention directly on the question assumed
under a Reynolds approach-whether the constitutional change has
abolished the office, changed the qualifications for office, or imposed
82. See id at 928. This constitutional provision is titled "Ethics in government." FLA.
CONST. art. II, § 8.
83. Myers, 362 So. 2d at 934.
84. Id at 932 n.22.
85. Id. at 928 n.2. Section 5(c) of the Florida Constitution reads:
(c) If the proposed amendment or revision is approved by a vote of the electors,
it shall be effective as an amendment to or revision of the constitution of the
state on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January following the
election, or on such other date as may be specified in the amendment or
revision. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(c). The 1976 "Sunshine Amendment"
contained no specific effective date, and so the default date specified in the
above controlled.
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(c).
86. Myers, 362 So. 2d at 935-36.
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new and onerous requirements on some or all of the incumbents who
desire to continue in office. The resign-to-run law considered in Holley
led the Court to conclude that neither an ouster nor an impermissible
burden on officeholding was imposed. The same cannot be said of [the
Sunshine Amendment]. To apply newly-created professional limitations
on a part-time Florida legislator in the midst of his term of office
obviously defeats expectations honestly arrived at when the office was
initially sought. The office itself is not abrogated or its duties altered
... but the privileges of officeholding are no less impaired by curtailing
non-legislative employment opportunities than they would be if the
office was made full-time and outside employment prohibited altogether.
The abridgement in either case [of Mr. Myers' employment preroga-
tives] is tantamount to changing the qualifications of office. There was
absolutely no employment limitation when the term of office was
sought.87
Following this comes yet a further clarification. It appears as
"Footnote 38," and reads:
38. Not every statutory or constitutional impairment in the expectations
or in the status of officeholders, will operate only as to future office-
holders. This case does not present an occasion to announce other
circumstances in which an impairment would be considered tantamount
to an ouster to use the Reynolds phraseology. Wherever a line may
ultimately be drawn to separate permissible impairment from that which
is impermissible, it is clear that [the Sunshine Amendment] so substan-
87. Id. at 934-36 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Holley v. Adams, 238 So. 2d
401 (Fla. 1970), had to do with whether the state's so-called "resign to run" law was
applicable to an incumbent officeholder who took office prior to its enactment. The court
ruled that it was applicable because the requirements of "resign to run" were triggered by an
independent decision of the officeholder himself, i.e., his decision to seek election to a post
other than the one he currently occupied. Id. at 406. Without this decision there would have
been no requirement that he resign from his current post. Id. at 407.
Florida ex rel. Reynolds v. Roan, 213 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1968), had a different thrust in
that it dealt with whether or not a school board could abrogate an existing fixed-term contract
with its appointed school superintendent. Id. at 426-27. The contract had been entered into
prior to the adoption of a state constitutional amendment which provided that appointive
superintendents were to serve at the pleasure of their respective school boards. Id. In this
case, the court held the new amendment could not be used as ajustification for annulling the
preexisting contract prior to its expiration date. Id. at 428. Despite the factual differences
in the three cases, the central idea of advance notification of a newly imposed "change in
qualifications of office" is present in all. This seems particularly so when the change
imposed upon the office is self-executing and applicable without either a grace period or an
independent trigger-pulling action of the affected officeholder. Myers, 362 So. 2d at 934-36.
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tially abrogates Myers' status as a part-time legislator and as a member
of the Florida Bar that it would fall well outside the established bound-
ary.
88
Considering the above in light of Eight Is Enough and taking into
account that the Myers court held the Sunshine Amendment restrictions were
"tantamount to changing the qualifications of office,"8 9 and that the justices
spoke of the limitations as not being in place when the office was both
"initially sought"9 and "sought,"9 1 one must wonder about the situation
presented with regard to term limits. First, these would seem to represent
the flip-side of the Myers coin." Second, when one views term-limits in
the morning sans their makeup, they are not, it would seem, merely "tanta-
mount" to a qualifications change. They are the genuine article albeit cast
in looking-glass terms as a kind of "disqualification."93 Third, the limits
were plainly not in place in the constitution when the legislators elected in
88. Myers, 362 So. 2d at 935 n.38.
89. Id. at 935.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 928 n.l, 932 n.22. The court's use of the qualified term "initially sought" in
one place and the unqualified term "sought" in another place is interesting but, more than
likely meaningless. This is so because in two footnotes the court specifically referred to Mr.
Myers' tenure in the Senate. In the first instance the court stated, "Myers, who was first
elected to his senatorial seat on November 5, 1968." Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 928
n.I (Fla. 1978). In the second instance, it referred to this again by stating, "as noted earlier,
Myers has served in the Florida senate continuously since 1968. His present four-year term
began on November 2, 1976." Id. at 932 n.22. These references, when combined with
differing presentations of the term "sought" raise the question of whether the justices had two
different things in mind, i.e., one's first election to an office as opposed to one's subsequent
reelection to that office. Were such the case then it may be that an officeholder's
"expectations" could be developed over time to such a degree that a long-term incumbent's
"expectations" about his/her office, his/her tenure in that office, and his/her prerogatives
while in the office could weigh heavier than would those of a newly elected first-time
officeholder when a significant change in rules of the game are made.
92. They both, after all, deal with the affected individuals' employment options and with
restrictions thereon. Myers deals with the impact on an individual's primary occupation of
restrictions imposed as a result of his part-time job. The term-limits amendment creates new
restrictions on an individual's ability to continue to hold the part-time job itself, the holding
of which will result in restrictions being placed on his/her present and, for a limited time,
his/her future employment options.
93. Despite its placement, the language added to the Florida Constitution by "Eight Is
Enough" has the practical effect of placing the language "and shall not by the end of the
current term have served (or, but for resignation, would have served) in the office for eight
consecutive years" in every list of qualifications for every covered office. See FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b) (amended 1992).
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1992 "sought" office94 nor was the Eight Is Enough initiative even
officially certified to the ballot when they signed up and paid their generally
non-refundable fees.95
Given the above, a question presents itself for consideration: Is the
effect of this immediate imposition of a "change in qualifications of office"
via term limits with no grace period a "burden" which is "onerous"96
enough to trigger a Myers-style analysis? One can, after all, with only slight
effort, posit arguments and questions tending toward the affirmative. For
example, the new restrictions can easily be cast as an "ouster. 9 7  A
slow-motion "ouster" to be sure, but an "ouster" nonetheless. This is
94. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (amended 1992), which specifies that general elections
in the state are to be held on "[t]he first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each
even-numbered year .... Id.
The Florida Statutes specify that the first primary election shall be held on the Tuesday
which falls nine weeks prior to the date of the general election. FLA. STAT. § 100.061
(1991).
The Florida Statutes specify that the qualifying period for state-level officials shall be
from noon of the 50th day until noon of the 46th day prior to the date of the first primary
election. FLA. STAT. § 99.061(1) (1991). Another section specifies that in apportionment
years (the second year of each decade) the qualifying period for Florida federal officials shall
be from noon of the 57th day until noon of the 53rd day prior to the first primary election.
FLA. STAT. § 99.061(8) (1991). In all other years, the qualifying period for Florida federal
officials is governed by section 99.061(1) which specifies the qualifying period for those
offices to be from noon of the 120th day until noon of the 116th day prior to the first
primary. FLA. STAT. § 99.061(1) (1991).
Taking all of the above into account, one can calculate exactly when the official periods
of "seeking" office occurred in 1992. As it was an apportionment year, the period for
Florida federal officials ran from noon on Monday July 6, 1992 until 7:00 p.m. EST/CST
(depending upon the time zone(s) the election district was located in) on Tuesday November
3, 1992. For state-level officials the official period of "seeking" ran from noon on Monday
July 13, 1992 until 7:00 p.m. EST/CST (depending upon the time zone(s) the election district
was located in) on Tuesday November 3, 1992. "Eight Is Enough," therefore, could not,
even under the most liberal view, have become a part of the Florida Constitution and taken
effect until after 7:00 p.m. CST (8:00 p.m. EST) when the polls officially closed in the far
western panhandle and the electoral "seeking" was officially over in the State.
95. Id.; see supra note 63. The "Eight Is Enough" initiative was officially granted a
place on the November 3, 1992 general election ballot as "Amendment # 9" on Thursday July
23, 1992. This was six days after the period for qualification had closed for state-level
offices and 13 days after the end of the sign-up period for Florida federal offices. Section
99.092(1), states that candidates, may only withdraw and receive a refund of their fees if they
withdraw prior to the last day of the qualifying period for the office they are seeking or if
they die prior to an election being held. FLA. STAT. § 99.092(1) (1991).
96. See Myers, 362 So. 2d at 934-35; Holley, 238 So. 2d at 401.
97. See Myers, 362 So. 2d at 934-35; State ex rel Reynolds, 213 So. 2d at 425.
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especially true in the case of long-term incumbents whose lives have come
to be arranged around their service, given the observable fact that the nature
of state legislative service in Florida has changed drastically since 1976, it
now being essentially a full-time job.9
Putting this another way, did the public really know they were voting
to throw out Senator Faugbounde even as they were voting to throw him
back in for the umpteenth time? How did the voters, after all, interpret the
partial exemption in the initiative? Would Ms. Wellmeaning have made the
decision to bear the considerable sacrifices inherent in a run for the
Legislature in 1992, if she had known her stay would be so relatively brief
that any real shot at obtaining a position of leadership was effectively
foreclosed in advance due to the presence of individuals with long tenure
who were already lined up for important leadership posts? And how about
Mr. Activist6, would he have decided to run for a time-gobbling, relatively
low-paying, term-limited, state legislative seat? Might he have chosen
instead to seek a seat on his county commission? Might he have chosen not
to run at all and to spend his time tending to his "civilian" business or job?
Following this line of argument, it may not have been sufficient for the
"newly created"99 change in qualifications to merely be on the ballot or
apparently headed for the ballot, when the affected office was being
"sought."""0  It must, it suggests, be there in advance if the notice
requirement of Myers is to be satisfied.
98. ALLEN MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK: 1991-1992 101 (23rd ed. 1991). One
way to illustrate this change in character is to look at the number of special legislative
sessions. According to Legislative Historian, Dr. Allen Morris, prior to the arrival in
Tallahassee of Governor Claude Kirk in January 1967, special sessions were relatively rare.
In fact, in the 98 years between 1869 and 1967 there had been but 28 such sessions. With
Kirk however, the pace picked up and, after the onset of annual regular sessions and the
putting into place of a permanent staff structure, the number of special sessions essentially
exploded. Between 1967 and the end of 1990, there were 48 special sessions.
Today the special session is more or less a given. There will be at least one and
usually more every year. Too, even absent formally called special sessions, there has been
a dramatic increase in committee work as each committee essentially functions year-round
with meetings being held at least once a month even when the legislature is not formally
meeting. The upshot of these changes is that present-day legislators must be ready to drop
everything and run to Tallahassee at almost any time besides planning to be there full time
for both the 60-day regular session each year and the week's worth of committee meetings
held almost every month. It is a far cry from the once-every-two-years, single, 60-day
regular session of but 25 years ago, and every year the work load, as well as the time
required to handle the load, increases.
99. Myers, 362 So. 2d at 935.
100. Id.
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Using the cases of the Sunshine Amendment and Eight Is Enough as
exact examples, if mere presence on the ballot or reports of a successfully
proceeding petition drive were sufficient to provide the quality of notice the
Myers court seemed to demand, then the argument available to the backers
of the Sunshine Amendment would have been the strongest possible one to
advance. After all, it was the brainchild of an extremely popular, sitting,
second-term Governor. The Governor partially drafted the amendment,
launched and headed its petition drive, and once placed on the ballot, he
flogged the amendment's passage before the public.' This was not the
case with Eight Is Enough. It was imagined, drafted, petitioned for, and
flogged by a group of individuals none of whom possessed either the proven
current popularity, nor the level of simple public recognition as had
Governor Askew. So, if the Askew initiative did not apply in part to those
officeholders who "sought" office at the same time the initiative "sought"
passage, because it was not in place as a functioning portion of the
constitution when all the "seeking" was a-progress; how, one must wonder,
is it that term limitations could be held to apply to those who were
"seeking" office at the same time the term limitation amendment was
"seeking" passage? This seems both a good question and a hard one to
answer as the court in Myers itself indicated." 2
Aside from simply being a good question, it is also one which provides
a possible opportunity for the court to hone its decision in Myers.
Answering this question will not only clarify the status of the legislative
class of 1992, but it will edify the backers of future constitutional or
statutory changes who may wish to modify the rules applicable to one of the
most basic institutions in the game of representative democracy as practiced
in Florida. Such a sharpening would be entirely consistent with the Myers
court's message in Footnote 38.1"3
101. See Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 418-19 (Fla. 1978) (discussing the
Governor's role); see also Myers, 362 So. 2d at 928.
102. Myers, 362 So. 2d at 932. It should be pointed out this area of inquiry was entered
into at the request of the court itself. In a footnote, the court stated that, "although this issue
[i.e., the issue of the timing of the Sunshine Amendment's applicability] was not originally
argued by the parties, the Court on its own motion directed that the parties file supplementary
briefs addressing the question." Id. at 932 n.22.
103. Id. at 935 n.38.
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IV. FUN WITH NUMBERS IN THE FLORIDA
STATE SENATE
Let Lis now turn to the second kink in Eight Is Enough, and as we do,
let us assume for the sake of argument and ease of illustration that it applies
to all those members elected to the Legislature in 1992. Let us also
stipulate that from here on we shall be talking only of the State Senate.
Given these stipulations, let us now assert that the second problem may be
considered the real problem with the amendment, because if nothing is done,
its consequences shall, without question, be felt. This is because, to put the
matter simply and in the extreme vernacular, term limits don't work right
in the senate 'cause they was borned broke.
The reason why this kink developed and not raised appears to be the
result of an oversight. Specifically, the proponents forgot at every level of
the initiative's development and review that an aspect of Florida constitu-
tional law functions vis A vis the Senate as the equivalent of, say, the Infield
Fly Rule. 0 4 The rule in question is suitably muddy. Put into baseball
104. The "Infield Fly Rule" was brought into being by the combined action of four
separate items over a 12-year period. First, by the provisions of article III, section 15(a) of
the Florida Constitution, which reads:
(a) SENATORS. Senators shall be elected for terms of four years, those
from odd-numbered districts in the years the numbers of which are multiples of
four and those from even-numbered districts in even-numbered years the
numbers of which are not multiples of four; except, at the election next
following a reapportionment, some senators shall be elected for terms of two
years when necessary to maintain staggered terms.
FLA. CONST. art. I1l, § 15(a).
Second, by the provisions of article XII, section 12 which provides:
Section 12. Senators.- The requirement of staggered terms of senators in
Section 15(a), of Article Ill of this revision shall apply only to senators elected
in November, 1972, and thereafter.
FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 12.
Third, by the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court in In re Apportionment Law
Appearing As Senate Joint Resolution I E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d
1040, 1045-50 (Fla. 1982) [hereinafter In re Apportionment Law], which declared that if
during any apportionment "geographic changes" were made to any senate district, its
incumbent must then run for reelection whether or not his/her four year term was set to
expire that year. Further, if all senatorial districts were geographically altered, then all
members of the senate must run in that year. Id.
Fourth, by the ruling of the court also found in In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d
at 1050-51, wherein the justices defined what was meant by the constitutional phrase
"consecutively numbered . . . districts." In pertinent part the text of this portion of the
decision read:
The second issue . . . concerns the construction of a portion of the lan-
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terms, it runs as follows: Despite what the rule book seems to say, players
do not always seek four-inning contracts. Sometimes it's two. Moreover,
who seeks what and when depends upon the number on their jersey, the
time of their initial at-bat, and whether the at-bat occurred during an "In"
or "Out" inning. Provided, however, that the specific application of the
preceding is subject to modification each tenth inning, when such numbered
jerseys, as are authorized under the rules, may be freely exchanged among
players."15
It is fairly plain that this particular quirk in how the system operates
was simply overlooked. It was not raised during the campaign for the
amendment's approval, nor in any of the filings related to the court's
guage of article Ill, section 16(a), and whether, as written, the language requires
each senate and house district to be both contiguous within itself and that each
district must also be contiguous with the next consecutively-numbered district.
The house of representatives [argues] . . . that the numbered districts must be
adjacent to each other in numerical order ....
[I]t is the position of the house that a distorted numbering pattern had
developed under the constitution of 1885, and in its view it was probable, in an
effort to avoid such distortions, that the phraseology, "consecutively numbered
senatorial districts of either contiguous, overlapping or identical territory" was
placed in the present constitution. The house argues that the requirement for
contiguous territory refers not only to the territory within each district, but to the
relationship of the districts to each other, and must be read in pari materia with
the requirement for consecutive numbering. It follows from this construction
that each district for the house and for the senate must, therefore, be contiguous
with the next consecutively numbered district. In the house's view, the purpose
of the provision is to prohibit a distorted numbering which would serve the
interest of individual senators or representatives.
It is the senate's position, supported by the attorney general, that the
provision of article I1, section 16(a), requires only that district numbers be
consecutive and that the territory within each district be contiguous. They argue
that a strict grammatical reading of the sentence in article Ill, section 16(a),
supports the conclusion that the words "consecutively numbered" appear to
modify the noun "districts," and the word "contiguous" modifies the noun
territory.
We agree with the senate and the attorney general that the plain language
of article Ill, section 16(a), does not modify or limit the word "contiguous" or
"territory." Even if the drafters had intended that each district be contiguous
with the next consecutively numbered district, as contended by the house, that
is not what they grammatically wrote. We conclude that we must interpret the
constitutional provision as it has been grammatically written . ...
In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1050-51 (citations omitted).
105. Id.
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consideration of the term limit initiative's fitness for inclusion on the ballot.
In addition, neither the majority opinion in its Advisory Opinion To The
Attorney General-Limited Political Terms In Certain Elective Offices'0 6
nor either of the two partial dissents mention it. In fact, the ruling of the
majority asserts:
The proposed amendment does not change or affect the age or residency
requirements of article III, section 15 (state legislators) .... Further,
should the proposed amendment be approved by the voters, state
senators will still be elected for four-year terms and state representa-
tives for two-year terms as provided in article III, section 15."7
Moreover, to the preceding may be appended an illustration used by Justice
Kogan in his separate opinion:
For example, voters might decide that the advantages outweigh the
disadvantages on the question of term limitations for state legislators.
This is because the delegations from all portions of the state will be
treated equally in the statehouse. No geographical region would suffer
any disadvantage with respect to any other region. The rules of the
political game in Tallahassee would be the same for everyone.'09
To put it simply, this is wrong. In the first place, due to the Infield Fly
Rule, many senators contract with the electorate for some combination of
two and fbur year terms, and two plus four equals six, a number not
divisible evenly into eight. Secondly, because under Eight Is Enough
selected players will be entitled to play extra innings, delegations will be
treated differently. Some delegations will, therefore, be more equal than
others. Consequently, "the rules of the game"' 9 shall most assuredly not
be the same for all. An explanation follows. Gather 'round the plate.
The master interval of time around which the Florida State Senate is
organized is the decennium. By the provisions of article II, section
15(a)," ' and article XII, section 12,"' as interpreted by the Florida Su-
preme Court in In re Apportionment Law,'"2 the Senate decennium begins
106. 592 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991).
107. Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. See supra note 104.
11I. See supra note 104.
112. 414 So. 2d at 1040 (Fla. 1982).
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and ends in each year numbered "2" when, pursuant to article III, section
16(a), apportionment is undertaken." 3 If during that process "geographic
changes" '  are made in a given senate district, then the constitutionally
mandated term of four years must, if not expiring of its own in that year,
be "truncated" ' 15 so that the senator may be "elected from" the "new" dis-
trict. 16  Further, when "all senate districts have been changed [the]
113. Article III, section 16(a). of the Florida Constitution reads in pertinent part:
(a) SENATORIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS. The legisla-
ture at its regular session in the second year following each decennial census, by
joint resolution, shall apportion the state in accordance with the constitution of
the state and of the United States into not less than thirty nor more than forty
consecutively numbered senatorial districts of either contiguous, overlapping or
identical territory, and into not less than eighty nor more than one hundred
twenty consecutively numbered representative districts of either contiguous,
overlapping or identical territory.
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a).
114. In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1047-48. The key passage reads:
We hold, consistent with the views of the house of representatives and Common
Cause, that the Florida Constitution, by its provisions, requires, upon reappor-
tionment, that senate terms be truncated when a geographic change in district
lines results in a change in the district's constituency. Because the new plan
alters all district lines and the constituency therein, elections must be held in all
senate districts in 1982.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1049-50. The key passage treating with the notion of "elected from" reads:
The principle that holdover senators represent the newly drawn geographic
districts requires us to answer the question of how a senator elected from a
former district apportioned in 1972 would meet the requirement of section 1,
article III. That section mandates that the senate be "composed' of one senator
"elected' from each senatorial district. Given this provision, it necessarily
follows that, since none of the senate districts from which senators were elected
in 1980 are preserved intact (because all senate districts have been changed by
the new apportionment plan), no senators elected in 1980 were in fact elected
from the senatorial district which they now propose they should represent. In
our view, the senators could be deemed elected from those districts only if they
had been elected from the specific districts set forth in the 1982 apportionment
plan. By this, we mean that their specific districts, from which they were
elected in 1980, had not been changed geographically by the 1982 plan. We do
agree that when a senate district is carried forward with no geographic change
in boundary lines, article III, section 1, is satisfied, and there is no need to
implement the exception provision of section 15(a). On the other hand, where,
as in the instant case, all senate districts have been changed, we conclude that
our constitution requires all senators to stand for election in order to be "elected
from" the new districts.
[Vol. 18
238
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Doherty
Constitution requires that all senators stand for reelection.""' 7 Under the
formula for such elections given in article III, section 15(a),"' when this
takes place, some senators seek election to four-year terms while others run
for two-year terms. This is done in order to satisfy section 15(a)'s final
requirement that senate terms be "staggered" so that half the membership
goes before the voters every two years." 9
The Senate objected in 1982 to the truncation of terms. It contended
that mandatory wholesale truncation was intended by the 1968 framers to
apply only in 1972 as provided in article XII, section 12, as a method of
restaggering the senate. (It had been left unstaggered as a result of the
apportionment battles of the 1960's which concluded with the simultaneous
election of all senators in 1968). It further argued that after 1972, truncation
was only to be utilized as necessary for a seat here and there following
subsequent apportionments to maintain the staggered feature. Despite the
Senate's objections, the court ruled otherwise. 12
The court disagreed as well with the Senate's contention that, notwith-
standing the addition or subtraction of territory and peoples to or from a
given district during an apportionment, a senator in the middle of his or her
constitutionally prescribed four-year term in the apportionment year should
be allowed to "holdover" and complete the term prior to having to stand for
election in the newly aligned district.'2 ' The justices on a five to two vote
ruled such "holdovers" would violate the provision that each member of the
body be "elected from" his or her district. If a district encompassed new
territory, said the court, one had to run in it in order to be "elected from"
it. One could not simply be assigned to it during apportionment and have
that count as an "election.'
'1 22
In the context of 1982 this decision made some sense; it was at least
popular.' 23  The only people at all miffed were some of the twenty
Id.
117. In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1049-50.
118. See supra note 104.
119. See supra note 104.
120. In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1045-50.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. It may be said with significant confidence that a good portion of the decision's
popularity stemmed from the identity of the leader of the pro-holdover faction. This man,
Senate Dean Dempsey J. Barron (D-Panama City) was both revered and feared in the Capitol
for his power. To "beat" him on any issue was notable, but to "beat" him on something he
personally cared about-and there were relatively few issues of this sort Barron being
notorious for not having issues with his name visibly written on them-was worthy of great
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would-be "holdovers" and their close supporters.124 On the other hand,
a host of individuals and groups were delighted and no doubt would have
been howlingly indignant if the matter had gone the other way.12 It
really was, given the humid political atmosphere, no contest. Unfortunately,
no one could then have known that just a decade later this popular, right-
thing-to-do position would turn out to be one which would yield not a
fairer, more representative Florida Senate, but rather a Florida Senate soon
to be characterized by lurching inequity.
To explain: Article III, section 15(a) in combination with article XII,
section 12, specifies that from 1972 forward, senators from odd-numbered
districts are to run for four-year terms in each even year which is a multiple
of four, and senators from even-numbered districts are to run for 4-year
terms in each even year which is not a multiple of four. The former
subsection also gives the Legislature the power to shorten the term for
which a given senator, or group of senators, will run to accommodate the
goal of staggered elections.
126
In 1972, a year which was a multiple of four, the Legislature obeyed
article III, section 15(a), and article XII, section 12, and declared that all
senators from even-numbered districts would run for initial terms of two
celebration in the eyes of many.
124. See generally P.C. Doherty, Development and Impact of Legislative Involvement
on Selected Aspects of State University System Operations: 1954-1990 (vols. 1-6) (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University (Tallahassee)). Not all of the
potential holdover senators were upset. The 1980-1982 biennium was the most politically
volatile period in recent memory in the state senate and had as its centerpiece a running,
often bitter, feud between Senate Dean Dempsey J. Barron (D-Panama City) and his erstwhile
protdg6, Senate President W.D. Childers (D-Pensacola). The battle essentially consumed the
Senate and caused it to divide along pro-Barron and anti-Barron lines rather than the more
traditional ones of party or ideology. More than one of the anti-Barron senators occupied
odd-numbered seats and were, therefore, potential holdovers. Yet these people were just as
happy as any to see him and his pro-holdover position bested. In fact, Senator W.D.
Childers, the occupant of the district one seat, and, hence, a potential holdover himself,
openly declared early on that he would stand for election in 1992 regardless of whether he
was required to do so or not.
125. Id.; see also In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1040. Aside from the House
of Representatives, the two most vocal opponents of holdover senators were Common Cause
and The League of Women Voters. Each joined the suit to strike the provision. In addition
Governor Bob Graham, a long time political oppugner of Mr. Barron, weighed in forcefully
on the anti-holdover side as did the bulk of the state's media outlets who, it may be fairly
said, wasted few opportunities to vigorously oppose both the Dean personally as well as
virtually anything he even seemed to be supporting.
126. See supra note 104.
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years in order to put the staggered terms feature into effect.'27 Thereafter,
all senators were to run for terms of four years unless some sort of
adjustment was required to maintain the integrity of the staggered terms
provision. If this occurred, the Legislature could once again declare that
certain senators' terms would be "truncated." "Truncation," however, was
seen as being applicable only to the odd case. The assumption was that,
from 1974 forward, all members of the Senate would run for four year
terms. 28
The above assumption held true only until 1982 when the court in In
re Apportionment Law ruled that "truncation" was to be a regular and
continuing feature of Senate terms and that every apportionment year was
to be the start and finish of a discreet Senate decennium.2 9 This decision
did more than simply declare that under normal circumstances all senators
must run after apportionment whether their terms have expired or not. It
also, though it was not so noted, created two types of apportionment decades
and mirror-image term patterns for odd and even numbered seats.
For the sake of convenience, let us call the two decade types (and the
years they contain) "In Decades" (years) and "Out Decades" (years). "In
Decades" are those which are identical in electoral pattern to the first
decade, 1972-1982 (inclusive), under the 1968 revision and are characterized
by having an initial year which is a multiple of "4." "Out Decades" are
those which are identical in electoral pattern to the second decade,
1982-1992 (inclusive), under the 1968 revision and are characterized by
having an initial year which is not a multiple of "4." As these two decade
types alternate, it can be projected that for the Fifty-year period between
1992 and 2042, the distribution will be as follows:
"In Decades": 1992-2002; 2012-2022; 2032-2042 (all inclusive).
"Out Decades": 2002-2012; 2022-2032 (both inclusive).
Whether a decade is "In" or "Out" is of importance because it
determines what term pattern a given Senate seat must observe. During "In
Decades," odd-numbered seats follow (beginning in the year "2" and ending
ten years later in the next year "2"), the pattern 4 + 4 + 2, while even-num-
bered seats follow the pattern 2 + 4 + 4. The patterns are reversed during
127. In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1045-50.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court nowhere used the term "discreet decenniums." However, the concept
was clearly embodied in its decision, and, in practical terms, were exactly what was created.
Id.
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"Out Decades" with odd-numbered seats running for terms of 2 + 4 + 4 and
even-numbered seats for terms of 4 + 4 + 2. If one takes these numbers and
extends them out over the entire fifty years (1992-2042) the sequences
which emerge are:
Odd-Numbered Seats: 4+4+2 1 2+4+4 14+4+2 12+4+4 4+4+2
Even-Numbered Seats: 2+4+4 14+4+2 12+4+4 14+4+2 12+4+4
Intrinsically, there is no particular problem with this arrangement.
Once every twenty years, each odd-numbered seat and each even-numbered
seat sees one of its four-year terms broken into two two-year terms. The
two-year terms always run back-to-back, and are always followed by a
stretch of four consecutive four-year terms before the 2 + 2 pattern must
again be observed. It seems a ducky design ... but it is not.
It is not ducky because the scheme proceeds from an erroneous implied
assumption thereby concealing within the folds of its truncations seeds of
doom. The assumption is that odd-numbered seats will always be
odd-numbered seats and even-numbered seats will always be even-numbered
seats. This is not true because numbers change. 3 '
In 1982, the Florida Legislature's legendary "Dean," Senator Dempsey
J. Barron (D-Panama City), declared that senators like himself from
odd-numbered districts, who had been elected in 1980, should continue in
office, notwithstanding apportionment, until 1984. One man, Representative
H. Lee Moffitt (D-Tampa), the incoming Speaker of the House, disagreed
with the powerful and much-feared Barron and made the disagreement his
130. Id. at 1050-51 ; see supra note 104. The numerical designations of legislative seats
may be moved about at will during an apportionment so long as each Senate seat bears a
number between one and forty (inclusive) and each House seat bears a number between one
and one hundred and twenty (inclusive). Indeed, in the next apportionment year, 1992, seat
numbers went gamboling far and wide especially in the Senate. For example, in 1990 Senate
district "7" was located in the far northeast region of Florida, including Nassau and part of
Duval counties (suburban Jacksonville), while Senate district "2" was in the panhandle,
running from the Escambia/Santa Rosa County line to Tallahassee. After the 1992
apportionment, however, Senate district -7" had hopped better than 200 miles west to the
coastal areas of Escambia, Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, Walton, and Bay counties in the far reaches
of the western panhandle and Senate district "2" had migrated 200 miles east to northeast
Florida.
The situation was not so pronounced in the House although even there, in contrast to
earlier practice, the numerical designations of many seats were changed. In 1982, it had been
virtually an article of faith in the House that a member should, if at all possible, be allowed
to keep his/her seat number even if his/her territory had changed.
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reason for living. 3 ' So began The Great Battle of Wills which ended
when the State Supreme Court declared that the terms of the odd-seat
senators were to be truncated in 1982. Thus were discreet decenniums, "In"
and "Out" decades, and 2 + 4 + 4 and 4 + 4 + 2 term patterns born. T'was
a Famous Victory.1
2
Barron and Moffitt were gone by 1992,' but an echo of their
combat carried forward. The apportionment year of 1992 was the start of
the "In Decade" of 1992-2002. As such it was to be the occupants of the
even-numbered seats who faced 2 + 2. But Senators can add, so, when the
apportionment process was undertaken, seat numbers changed. As a result,
when the distribution ended, more than one lucky senator who had filled an
even-numbered 2 + 2 seat in the spring found himself scheduled to seek an
odd-numbered 2 + 4 seat in the fall. The pattern had been shattered. A
simple change in a seat's numerical designation was all that was required to
change 4+4+2 12+4+4 into 4+4+2 14+4+2. The Time-Shifting Gerrymander
had awakened: Even numbers became odd; two became four.'
131. Telephone Interview with Ralph H. Haben, Jr., former Speaker of the House,
Florida House of Representatives (Jan. 1990); Doherty, supra note 124.
132. Id.
133. Mr. Moffitt retired from the Legislature in November, 1984 following his term
(1982-1984) as Speaker of the House of Representatives. Mr. Barron was defeated for
reelection in 1988 and retired from politics at that time. In Mr. Barron's case, the retirement
came after a legislative career spanning some 32 consecutive years, 28 of which (1960-1988)
were spent as a member of the Senate. Mr. Moffitt retired after having served 10 consecutive
years in the House.
134. OFFICE OF THE CLERK, THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CLERK'S
MANUAL 1980.-1982 (1981); OFFICE OF THE CLERK, THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, THE CLERK'S MANUAL 1982-1984 (1983); OFFICE OF THE CLERK, THE FLORIDA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CLERK'S MANUAL 1990-1992 (1991); OFFICE OF THE
CLERK, THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CLERK'S MANUAL 1992-1994
(1993). To illustrate this point by way of contrast, in 1982, when the senate was operating
under the assumption that holdover senators were permitted, only one seat held by an
incumbent who returned for the next biennium was given a new numerical designation. This
individual, Senator Pat Thomas (D-Quincy), saw his seat number change from "4" to "2."
The change was made necessary because a population shift east and south caused the
panhandle region to lose a Senate seat. However, it is to be noted that despite the numerical
change, Senator Thomas still occupied an even-numbered seat after reapportionment which
meant that in the election of 1982 he ran for a full four-year term.
In 1992, the next apportionment after the court ruled holdover senators impermissible
except in very limited and very unlikely circumstances, a radically different situation
occurred. Of those 21 senators present for apportionment in 1992 who returned to office in
the fall, nine who had odd numbers going into apportionment kept them and so ran for full
four-year terms, five who had gone into apportionment with even numbers kept them, and
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Still, despite this change, the overall system could have worked. There
is no real inequity in it; it is only politics. However, to have worked, it was
necessary for the rules to remain static, which they did not. Phil Handy
appeared with Eight Is Enough, and, for the second time in as many
decades, changed the rules of the game. No good was thereby done.
The basic problem with Eight Is Enough when it is imposed upon the
rules of 1968,135 as modified in 1982,136 is that it can only work if two
highly unlikely scenarios occur in combination. First, the Senate must
forget how to make odd numbers even and even numbers odd. Second, all
Senators must serve the maximum time allowed. If these two things do
occur, then, after the initial "tail" of two years extra eligibility which will
apply to those even-seat senators elected in 1992 has been dispensed with,
the eight-year limit will work for all. Figures # 1 (odd seats) and # 2 (even
seats) illustrate this.
Figures # 3 (odd seats) and # 4 (even seats) by contrast illustrate what
will happen if only one of the above two conditions prevail, i.e., if all
senators serve the maximum time allowed. Should this come to pass, and
the Senate continues to change numerical seat designations each apportion-
ment year, the result will be a "Grand Manipulation." All Senate seats will
become ten-year seats except for those odd-numbered seats elected in 1992,
and those even-numbered seats whose occupants are first elected to the
Senate in 1994. The holders of these seats would be restricted to eight
years. It is ironic that one of these two groups is the same one which, via
numerical manipulation, had been the winner under the 1982-1992 rules.
As illustrative as the above are, neither the perfect alignment necessary
for Eight Is Enough to work nor the situation necessary to make the Grand
Manipulation function are likely. They are both too rigid. Deviation causes
them to splinter. Therefore we must analyze the problem arithmetically.
People come and go in the Senate each and every election year, so we must
approach the effect of the term-limit amendment from that vantage point.
We must also, for the sake of comprehensibility, leave out any consideration
so, ran for truncated two-year terms, and six who had gone into apportionment with even
numbers came out of it with odd numbers, and so, ran for full four-year terms instead of
truncated two-year terms. Only one senator (Bill Bankhead, R-Jacksonville) went into
apportionment with an odd number and came out with an even number, and so, saw the term
he was permitted to seek in the fall shortened from four years to two.
135. See supra note 104 for full texts of the rules of 1968 as embodied in article III,
section 15(a), and article XII, § 12 of the Florida Constitution.
136. See supra notes 104, 114, and 116 for pertinent text of rulings.
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of the effect service in a partial term might have.' 37 Let us begin this by
looking at four straight-line situations. By straight-line we mean that no
change from even to odd or vice versa is made in a seat's designation
during an apportionment.
During "In Decades," there are three elections held to fill odd-num-
bered Senate seats. As shown in figure # 5, all result in eight-year seats if
there is no change in the numerical designation.
The same cannot be said, though, with regard to those odd-numbered
seats to which senators are elected during "Out Decades." As shown in
figure # 6, during these decades there are also three opportunities for
odd-numbered seats to be filled, but only two classes yield eight-year seats.
Membership in the third class brings ten years of eligibility. Also, the
ten-year class of seats are what may be termed "Natural 10's." They cannot
be eliminated. They will crop up, without any help from politics, each and
every "Out Decade."
As expected, the mirror-image situation obtains with regard to the
even-numbered seats. Whether beginning in an "In Decade" or an "Out
Decade," the members of all classes except one will be eligible to serve
eight years. This exceptional class will always be entitled to sit for ten
years. '38
Taking the above down, as it were, to the floor of the Florida Senate,
it is important to look hypothetically at what effect Eight Is Enough would
have produced in 1992 had it been in effect prior to that year. In 1992, the
initial year of the "In Decade" of 1992-2002, the Senate saw a heavy
turnover as it will from time to time. When the dust had settled, almost half
(nineteen) of the seats were occupied by new, first time, members. Of these
nineteen new members, thirteen had been elected to even-numbered seats.
Therefore, all thirteen would be "Natural 10's," and, hence would be
eligible to serve for ten years while their six new odd-numbered seat
colleagues who were elected at the same time would be restricted to eight
years of eligibility. Their more senior colleagues, of course, would have
available to them varying lengths of time based upon the number of years
they had served prior to 1992.
If theory is important reality is more so. Therefore, if we presume
Eight Is Enough went into effect simultaneously to the 1992 election, that
it covers all forty senators now sitting, and that it exempts all pre-No-
137. See Sowinski supra notes 3; see also supra note 32. Partial term service was
deemed sufficiently rare by the framers of Eight Is Enough to permit their ignoring its
possible impact on their plan.
138. See Figures # 7 and # 8.
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vember, 1992 Senate service, then fully one-half (twenty) of the present
members are eligible to stay for ten consecutive years. The other half of the
Senate is not so fortunate. They must leave office upon the completion of
eight years.
Given the above, whither Eight is Enough? Gone, or nearly gone, as
the saying goes, to where the Woodbine twineth. Moreover, the kind of
arrangement left behind by its departure for the Woodbine simply reeks of
inequity. Perhaps such asymmetry is not per se unconstitutional, but it
surely smells funny when applied to theoretically "equal" members of the
same chamber who are supposed to represent theoretically "equal" districts.
The fact is that he who can serve ten years will be more equal than he who
can serve but eight, no matter how the issue is presented. To assert
otherwise is to beggar common sense.
Worse still is the fact that the parade of horribles does not end with
simple asymmetry. One must also consider the effect on a seat-and its
occupant of any switch in his or her designation from odd to even or even
to odd during an apportionment. This is where the real fun starts; where the
New and Improved Gerrymander can be loosed to fly through time.
Employment of the Time-Shifting Gerrymander as a political weapon
can be readily seen in figures # 9, # 10, # 11, and # 12. These diagrams
show it to be a weapon of enormous potency because these "Petit Manipula-
tions" can shorten or lengthen most members' maximum tenure. Also, in
the case of seats soon to be open as a result of retirement from the body
(mandatory or otherwise), or in the case of seats made vulnerable to the
present incumbent via the normal partisan give and take of apportionment
the Time-Shifting Gerrymander may be used to pave the way for either an
eight or ten-year replacement. This is powerful stuff--constitutionally
enshrined institutional asymmetry joined at the hip with political jiggery-po-
kery. It is difficult, if not impossible, to believe this result is what the term
limit proponents had in mind. Yet, it is equally plain this is exactly what
they wrought.
So to quote an age-old refrain of the Russian intelligentsia, "What is
to be done?"'3 9 There is no judicial guidance available on the point as it
would seem this particular situation is a new one and, hence, unadjudicat-
ed.'4 ° Therefore, something new will have to be tried, or, to quote a
139. Gary Saul Morson, What is the Intelligentsia? Once More, An Old Russian
Question, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS, Summer, 1993, 20-38.
140. In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1047. The complicating factor here is the
matter of truncation. As the court noted, no other jurisdiction has a provision such as the one
found in Article Ill, section I 5(a) of the Florida Constitution which contains the "exception"
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famous English export, we will have to "let it be"-an alternative that seems
as unlikely as it is unattractive. While a number of possible solutions come
to mind, most would require adding to the confusion by repeating the
amendatory process to make the constitution's provisions regarding Senate
numerical seat designations and/or terms square with those requiring
consecutive years of service be limited. And even were this tried, great
care; perhaps, given what has happened here, excessively great care; would
have to be taken lest the balloon pop out elsewhere unexpectedly.
Yet a simple solution is available. One which will not require the
constitution to be amended again, nor require any agonizing over any
manner of complex formulae. This simple solution is for the court to back
off its 1982 decision in In re Apportionment Law,' if for no other reason
than clinging to it now would make of it, in a word coined by Henry VIII,
a man who knew just a bit about the creative limitation of terms-a mump-
simus. 142
Were the court to "dumpsimus" those parts of In re Apportionment
Law'43 relating to holdover senators, truncated terms, and mandatory
post-apportionment elections, the Gordian Knot would be hacked through,
the situation resolved, and the Gerrymander restricted to more familiar
haunts. Granted, certain senators would "hold over"'44 for two years in
language, and as it was this language the justices emphasized in ordering truncation of Senate
terms following apportionment, it is this language which renders the Florida term limit
situation unique. No court in any other state in which term limits have been imposed and
challenged has had to deal with this situation. Nor is any likely to be called upon to do so.
It is a Florida question only.
141. 414 So. 2d at 1040.
142. This is a marvelously colorful and descriptive word which is unfortunately much
under used. Its etymology is as follows:
For example, the word "mumpsimus," meaning "an erroneous doctrinal view
obstinately adhered to," was first put into currency by Henry VIII, in a speech
from the throne in 1545. He remarked, "Some be too stiff in their old mumps-
imus, others be too busy and curious in their sumpsimus." He was referring to
the . . . story of a priest who, on being reproved for reading in the mass "Quod
in ore mumpsimus" instead of"Quod in ore sumpsimus" ("which we have taken
in our mouths"), his missal (catholic mass book) being miscopied, replied ...
he had read it [that way] for forty years, "and I will not change my old
mumpsimus for your new sumpsimus." The word has held its own since, though
the doctrinal sense has lost its importance compared with the scholastic sense:
It now means "an established manuscript-reading which, though obviously
incorrect, is retained blindly by old-fashioned scholars."
ROBERT GRAVES & ALAN HODGE, THE READER OVER YOUR SHOULDER 17-18 (1961).
143. 414 So. 2d at 1040.
144. Id. at 1045-50.
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districts that, after apportionment, they may not have been, in the purest
sense, "elected from."'45  However, one is here vexed by the task of
balancing which kind of "holdover"'46 is worse--one prohibited by judges
on the basis of wordplay, or one declared out of order by millions of voters?
Small "r" republicanism says to take the voters. A review of the applicable
case law on the "holdover" question also says to take the voters. This body
of jurisprudence is, in the words of former Chief Justice Sundberg,
"essentially unanimous" in saying there is nothing particularly evil in
them. "'47 Besides, the court could easily justify such a decision not as a
reversal, but as a response to changed conditions. Further, were this route
taken, the mechanics of implementation could be perfected were the court
to rule that the term limit language takes effect with the seating of the
successors to those persons elected in 1992. This would allow the
elimination of the two-year "tail" which now appends itself to the asymmet-
ric arithmetic regarding the even seat senators elected in 1992-a "tail"
which makes them the first class of "Natural 10's."
There is, of course, another judicial alternative, but it is not pretty as
it would mock the constitutionally mandated length of Senate terms. This
solution is "double truncation," wherein those terms which would extend
beyond the eight-year limit would be "truncated" at eight. If this were to
be considered, it would probably be better to wholly abandon the concept
of staggered four-year terms for senators and go, via amendment, to a
straight two-year term scheme identical to the Florida House.
V. CONCLUSION
As there is nothing much useful or new left to say, convention declares
that at this point some sort of conclusion should be offered. The substantive
material has been laid out in what the author hopes is an adequate way and
it is now his job to concoct some manner of summing up. In the best of all
possible cases, this exercise will result in something profound and compel-
lingly prescriptive. In the more realistic case, it usually takes the form of
a more dignified way to end than simply quitting. In that light then, let it
be said the foregoing presents two problems with Florida's term-limit
amendment as adopted. One of these, the question of timing, is a nice, but
little, question of line-drawing which will resolve itself even if nothing
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1056 (Sundberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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happens. There may be a bump or two along the road to resolving the
initial confusion, but within a decade, it will be forgotten like the great
concern over the timing of the imposition of the Sunshine Amendment
restrictions fifteen years ago.
The same, ultimately happy, fate cannot be said to be on its way with
regard to the second problem. It will not, and cannot, be cured through any
sort of neglect. It must be addressed; and it is to be hoped it will be
addressed, ideally before it becomes a critical problem, rather than one of
intellectual projection.
Why it was that the second problem crept in unnoticed will probably
never be known. Indeed, there probably is no real reason at all. Yet it is
there and its presence suggests a type of failure. The drafting of constitu-
tional provisions may have one foot firmly planted on the solid ground of
technical skill, but the other rests upon the somewhat more plastic surface
of art. Done well, the resulting product is the highest and most sublime of
all legal endeavors. Done less than well, the result is at best harmlessly
cumbersome and at worst unworkable.
If the product be the former, a unity of art and technical skill, wisdom
teaches the folly of attempting further improvement. "If it ain't broke don't
fix it," the saying goes.
Not so in the case contrariwise.
Not so here.
It's broke.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Florida's reputation as the "Sunshine State" was established long ago
by laws which provided the public with a right of access to the records and
proceedings of governmental agencies. This tradition of an open govern-
ment began with Florida's enactment of the Public Records Law in 1909,'
and the Government in the Sunshine Law in 1967.2 However, as these
rights of access were primarily secured by statutory enactments, they were
subject to the discretion of the Legislature and faced the continual threat of
being weakened or dismantled by future legislatures. Nevertheless, the
tradition has been reinforced by the Florida judiciary which, for the most
part, has liberally construed the provisions of the open government laws, to
give effect to the strong public interest in access to governmental meetings
and records.'
This commitment to open government has been recently reaffirmed with
the adoption of two amendments to the Florida Constitution: article 1II,
section 4(e), in 1990, and article I, section 24, in 1992. These amendments
grant constitutional status to the public's right of access to all levels of
government. With the adoption of these amendments, the people of Florida
have secured for the future their right to an open government.
II. HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENTS
The Sunshine Law establishes a right of access to meetings of "any
board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or
authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision."4
The Public Records Law provides that records made or received by an
"agency" in the course of its official business are available for inspection.5
1. Ch. 09-5942, § 1, 1909 Fla. Laws 132 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1991))
[hereinafter the Public Records Law].
2. Ch. 67-356, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 1147-48 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1991))
[hereinafter the Sunshine Law].
3. See Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Seminole
County v. Wood, 512 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 520
So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1988), see also Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985), review denied, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985) (suggesting that public policy favoring
open records should be given its broadest possible expression); Blackford v. School Bd., 375
So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that the Sunshine Law should be construed
to frustrate all evasive devices).
4. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1991).
5. Id § 119.01.
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Florida courts have affirmed that the broad reach of these open government
laws extends to the executive branch of the state government,6 counties,7
municipalities,8 and special districts.9
The independence of the judiciary with regard to court records and
proceedings, however, has been recognized in several Florida Supreme
Court decisions.'" In addition, the applicability of the open government
statutes to the legislative branch has been disputed. While the Florida
Attorney General's Office has considered the open government laws to be
applicable to the state Legislature," that view was not universally held.'
6. See, e.g., Wood v. Marston, 442 So. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 1983) (stating that the advisory
committee of a state university must comply with the Sunshine Law); Florida Dep't of Law
Enforcement v. Ortega, 508 So. 2d 493, 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
department of law enforcement records are subject to release under the Public Records Law).
Turner v. Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 148, 151-54 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), affd and
remanded 389 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1980) (stating that the Sunshine Law is applicable to
meetings of the Parole and Probation Commission).
7. See, e.g., Seminole County, 512 So. 2d at 1003; Bland v. Jackson County, 514 So.
2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the Sunshine Law is meant to
protect the public from closed door politics); Orange County v. Florida Land Co., 450 So.
2d 341, 343-44 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the work product privilege does
not take precedence over the disclosure requirement of the Public Records Act), review
denied, 458 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1984).
8. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1971) (holding that
municipal officials violate the Sunshine Law when they meet at a time or place designed to
avoid the public); City of Delray Beach v. Barfield, 579 So. 2d 315, 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that the primary intent of the Public Records Law, with respect to
complaints against police officers, is openness and availability of public records); Krause v.
Reno, 366 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that when a city manager
appoints an advisory board to make recommendations, it is subject to the dictates of the
Sunshine Law).
9. See, e.g., Doran, 224 So. 2d at 700 (holding-that the Sunshine Law requires that
meetings of public boards must be made public); Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v.
Azzarelli Constr. Co., 436 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a
county aviation authority's work product cannot be withheld from production under the
Public Records Law); Cape Coral Medical Ctr. v. News-Press Publishing Co., 390 So. 2d
1216, 1218 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a public hospital must make its
records available under the Public Records Law).
10. See In re Advisory Opinion Concerning the Applicability of Chapter 119, Florida
Statutes, 398 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1981); Johnson v. State, 336 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1976). The
authority of the judiciary over access to court records flows from the separation of powers
doctrine and from the Supreme Court's ability to adopt rules for practice and procedure in
all courts pursuant to article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 95.
11. See 1977 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 10 (stating that the Government in the
Sunshine Law applies to the Legislature and Public Records Act extends to all "state
officers," including members of the Legislature); 1972 FLA. AT'VY GEN. ANN. REP. 16
1994]
264
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
Two circuit courts have held that the law was inapplicable to the Legisla-
ture. 3 Thus, the full scope of the public's right of access to all branches
of government was unclear.
In the late 1980's, increased public awareness, coupled with a growing
dissatisfaction that key legislative decisions were being made by the
legislative leadership behind closed doors, gave rise to renewed efforts to
amend Florida's Constitution to subject the Legislature to an open meetings
requirement. 4 Of the thirteen constitutional amendments proposed on this
issue in the twenty-two regular sessions between the enactment of the
(Legislature and its committees are subject to the Sunshine Law, and two or more members
of the Legislature may not hold a secret meeting with the intention of excluding the public
and the press, for the purpose of discussing their official actions respecting proposed or
pending legislation without violating the Sunshine Law).
12. See Memorandum from Steven Kahn, Att'y for Fla. S. Rules and Calen. Comm.,
(May 19, 1976). Mr. Kahn stated that the Senate did not fall within the plain meaning of,
and thus was not subject to, the Sunshine Law. Id. Memorandum from Staff, Fla. H. Gov.
Op. Comm. (April 14, 1975). The staff noted two possible constitutional impediments to
applying the Sunshine Law to the Legislature: Article III, section 4(a) of the Florida
Constitution, authorizing the Legislature to determine its own rules, and article Ill, section
4(b) of the Florida Constitution, requiring that the sessions of each house be open. Id.
13. See City of Safety Harbor v. City of Clearwater, No. 40,269 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. May
14, 1974) (inasmuch as the Sunshine Law imposes criminal sanctions for violations of its
terms, it should be strictly construed; therefore, as the statute does not clearly include the
Legislature, the Legislature is not subject to its terms); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Moffitt, 6 Fla. Supp. 2d 13 (2d Cir. Ct. 1983). Although the Moffitt case went to the Florida
Supreme Court, that court did not directly address the applicability of the open government
laws to the Legislature. See Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1984), in which court
concluded that the only issue before it was the propriety and constitutionality of certain
internal activities of members of the Legislature. The court stated, "[iut is a legislative
prerogative to make, interpret and enforce its own procedural rules and the judiciary cannot
compel the legislature to exercise a purely legislative prerogative." Id. at 1022. The rules
of procedure of both houses required then, as they do now, that committee meetings be open
to the public. Compare Fla. S. Rule 2.13 (1988-1990) with Fla. S. Rule 2.13 (1992-1994);
and Fla. H.R. Rule 6.25 (1989) with Fla. H.R. Rule 6.25 (1992-1994). See also FLA. CONST.
art III, § 4(b) (requiring the sessions of the House of Representatives and of the Senate to
be open to the public except for Senate sessions relating to the appointment to or removal
from public office).
14. For a detailed analysis of the history surrounding the adoption of the open legislative
meetings amendment, see Thomas R. McSwain, The Sun Rises on the Florida Legislature:
The Constitutional Amendment on Open Legislative Meetings, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 307
(1991). McSwain attributes much of the impetus for a more open Legislature to the
aftermath of the now-defunct services tax in which key legislators and gubernatorial aides
met secretly at a pizza and beer party in a lobbyist's townhouse to work out the details of
the tax. Id. at 307.
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Sunshine Law in 1967 and the passage of article III, section 4(e) of the
Florida Constitution in 1990, twelve were filed during the 1988-1990
legislative sessions."
In 1990, Senate Joint Resolution 1990 & 1992 passed in both houses
of the Florida Legislature.' 6 It was placed on the ballot for the November
1990 general election where it was overwhelmingly approved by the
voters.'7 The amendment, however, dealt only with legislative meetings.
Still in dispute was the applicability of the Public Records Law to legislative
records and the public's right of access to the judicial branch of government.
On November 7, 1991, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Locke
v. Hawkes'8 forced a reexamination of this issue. The question before the
court concerned the application of the public records law to the expenditure
records of a state representative's district office.' 9 However, the opinion
focused on far more than the simple question of whether the Public Records
Law applied to the financial records sought in the case at bar.2"
After reviewing prior decisions which focused on the application of the
Public Records Law and its possible interference with the separation of
powers provision in the state constitution,2' the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that the Public Records Law was inapplicable to the Governor,
members of the cabinet, judicial officers and members of the Legislature.22
The court, however, did not expressly limit its holding to these officers;
rather, it stated, somewhat ambiguously, that the Public Records Law did
not apply to the "constitutional officers of the three branches of government
15. Id. at 328 n.155. In addition, efforts were undertaken by the Florida Sunshine
Committee and Common Cause of Florida to amend the Florida Constitution by initiative
petition pursuant to article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, Id. at 336-37.
16. FLA. S. JOUR. 1397-1398 (Reg. Sess. 1990) (indicating passage of the joint
resolution in the Senate was 36 yeas to 0 nays); Fla. H.R. JOUR. 1817 (Reg. Sess. 1990)
(indicating passage of the joint resolution in the House of Representative was 109 yeas to 3
nays).
17. The amendment was approved 2,795,784 to 392,323. McSwain, supra note 14, at
365 n.448 (citing November 6, 1990 General Election Results, Florida Department of State,
Division of Elections, at 5).
18. 1991 WL 231589 (Fla. Nov. 7, 1991), vacated and superseded by 595 So. 2d 32
(Fla. 1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3. This section states that '[t]he power of the state
government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided herein." Id.
22. Locke, 1991 WL 231589 at *1.
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or to their functions. 23
The apparent grounding of the Locke decision on separation of powers
principles, when coupled with the Florida Supreme Court's distinction
between constitutional and statutory functions, insofar as the open govern-
ment laws are concerned, generated a number of questions regarding the
application of these laws to a variety of agencies. The Attorney General's
Office reported receiving telephone inquiries from property appraisers, tax
collectors and other officers. 24 Additionally, claims were made that school
districts and the state attorney's offices were now exempt from statutory
disclosure requirements. 25  Eventually, most of these contentions were
retracted and the agencies agreed to abide by the open government laws.
However, the uncertainty stemming from the Locke decision prompted the
Attorney General and other parties to the decision to ask the court to clarify
its ruling.
Although the court subsequently agreed to rehear the case,26 in light
of the court's reliance on separation of powers principles in its analysis of
the application of the open government statutes, it was clear that the only
effective means to assure access to all three branches of government was to
secure this right in the Florida Constitution. Accordingly, on November 13,
1991, Attorney General Butterworth proposed the adoption of a new "Open
Government Constitutional Amendment" to be added to the Declaration of
Rights of the Florida Constitution. 7
Following weeks of debate and consideration of various proposals,
28
23. Id.
24. Louis Lavelle, Attorney Wants Records Law Clarified, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 9, 1991,
at A1.
25. Public Should React Strongly to Closing of Public Records, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION,
Nov. 29, 1991, at A10 (school board attorney advises that due to Locke, The Public Records
Law no longer applies to school boards and personnel records should be closed to avoid
liability); Stephanie Tripp, A Cloud OverSunshine Law, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 10, 1991, at A8.
The author stated, "[o]n Friday, the State Attorney's Office in Hillsborough County, citing
[Locke], initially refused to show a reporter the file of a closed investigation. Prosecutors
handed over the file only after talking with an attorney for The Tampa Tribune." Id.
26. Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 1992).
27. The Attorney General stated that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Locke
"casts a tremendous shadow on the Sunshine in Florida Government .... This constitutional
amendment will get rid of the shadow." Mark Silva, Attorney General Urges 'Sunshine'
Amendment, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 13, 1991, at Al.
28. Speaker of the House, T.K. Wetherell, and Senate President Gwen Margolis initially
claimed that they would support the amendment but wanted to see "the fine print."
Associated Press, Florida Seeking Amendment for Open Records, FLORIDA TIMES UNION,
Nov. 13, 1991, at BI. However, several different proposals were ultimately proposed and
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the Legislature eventually enacted ajoint resolution proposing a constitution-
al amendment entitled "Access to public records and meetings."29 Shortly
after this legislative action, the Florida Supreme Court, on February 27,
1992, withdrew its earlier decision in Locke, and in a substituted opinion,
made it clear that the open government laws applied to the executive branch
and to local governmental entities.3° However, the final Locke ruling reaf-
firmed the court's previous conclusion that the Public Records Law did not
apply to the courts or to the Legislature." Thus, the question of access to
all three branches of government remained at issue and could be resolved
only through passage of a constitutional amendment.
The proposed open government constitutional amendment was placed
on the November 3, 1992, general election ballot and was overwhelmingly
approved by the voters. 2 The amendment took effect July 1, 1993. Prior
to the effective date, both the judicial and legislative branches took steps to
enact exemptions to the open government laws that would be "grandfathered
in" prior to the amendment.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
A. Legislative Open Meetings Amendment
Article III, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution authorizes each
house of the Legislature to adopt its own rules of procedure.33 The
legislative open meetings amendment, which creates article III, section 4(e),
requires these rules of procedure to provide for public access to certain
legislative meetings.34
debated during the 1992 legislative session. See infra note 29.
29. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1727, 863, 2035 (Reg. Sess. 1992). The bill was passed by the
Legislature on February 25, 1992, signed by the appropriate constitutional officers and filed
with the Secretary of State on March 2, 1992. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 545, 547 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the steps leading to the passage of the
resolution see generally, Kara. M. Tollett, The Sunshine Amendment of 1992: An Analysis
of the Constitutional Guarantee of Access to Public Records, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 525
(1992) [hereinafter Toilet].
30. Locke, 595 So. 2d at 36-37.
31. Id. at 32.
32. Tollett, supra note 29, at 525 (citing November 3, 1992 General Election Results,
Florida Department of State, Division of Elections (unofficial)) (The amendment won 83.1%).
33. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 4(a).
34. FLA. S. JOUR. S1990 (1990) (proposed FLA. CONST. art 111, §§ (4)(c), (4)(e)). As
amended, article II1, section 4 of the Florida Constitution provides in part:
1994]
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Article III, section 4(e) requires that the rules provide for all legislative
committee and subcommittee meetings of each house and joint conference
committee meetings to be open and noticed.35 While such a requirement
is now a constitutional mandate, it did not significantly impact on existing
House and Senate rules which already required legislative committee and
conference committee meetings to be open and noticed.36
Of perhaps greater significance is the requirement in article III, section
4(e) that all prearranged meetings between three or more legislators, or
between the Governor, the Senate, President or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, for the purpose of agreeing upon formal legislative action,
which is or will be taken on pending legislation, or amendments, must be
reasonably open to the public.37 However, section 4(e) also recognizes that
where it is reasonably necessary for security purposes, or to protect a
Section 4. Quorum and Procedure.-
(c) Each house shall keep and publish ajoural of its proceedings; and upon the
request of five members present, the vote of each member voting on any
question shall be entered on the journal. In any legislative committee or
subcommittee, the vote of each member voting on the final passage of any
legislation pending before the committee, and upon the request of any two
members of the committee or subcommittee, the vote of each member on any
other question, shall be recorded.
(e) The rules of procedure of each house shall provide that all legislative
committee and subcommittee meetings of each house, and joint conference
committee meetings, shall be open and noticed to the public. The rules of
procedure of each house shall further provide that all prearranged gatherings,
between more than two members of the legislature, or between the governor, the
president of the senate, or the speaker of the house of representatives, the
purpose of which is to agree upon formal legislative action that will be taken at
a subsequent time, or at which formal legislative action is taken, regarding
pending legislation or amendments, shall be reasonably open to the public. All
open meetings shall be subject to order and decorum. This section shall be
implemented and defined by the rules of each house, and such rules shall control
admission to the floor of each legislative chamber and may, where reasonably
necessary for security purposes or to protect a witness appearing before a
committee, provide for the closure of committee meetings. Each house shall be
the sole judge for the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of this
section.
FLA. CONST. art III, § 4.
35. Id. § 4(e).
36. See FLA. S. RULE 2.13 (1988-1990); FLA. H.R. RULE 6.25 (1989); FLA. S. RULE
2.19 (1989); FLA. H.R. RULE 6.57 (1989); seealso FLA. S. RULES 2.6, 2.8-2.10 (1988-1990);
FLA. .-IR. RULES 6.14, 6.17-6.20 (1989) (relating to notice).
37. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 4(c).
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witness appearing before a committee, the rules may provide for closure of
committee meetings. All open meetings are subject to order and deco-
rum.
38
Senate Joint Resolution 1990 also amended the existing provisions of
article 111, section 4(c). Article III, section 4(c) required, among other
things, that the vote of each member voting on a question be entered into
the House or Senate's journal, upon the request of five members present.39
The open legislative meetings amendment expands this requirement. Article
III, section 4(c) now also requires that in any legislative committee or
subcommittee, the votes of the members during the final passage of
legislation pending before a committee, or on any other question when
requested by two members of a committee or subcommittee, be recorded.4"
The amendment, while requiring a new openness in proceedings of the
Legislature., is not as broad as the Sunshine Law. While the Sunshine Law
has been interpreted to apply to two or more members of a public collegial
body,4' article III, section 4(e) refers to meetings of "more than two," or
in other words, at least three members.42 In addition, the Sunshine Law
has been held to encompass all dtliberations and discussions of public board
members on a matter which foreseeably will come before that board.43
Conversely, the constitutional amendment limits its application to committee
or subcommittee meetings and to prearranged meetings between three or
more legislators for the purpose of agreeing upon formal legislative action
which is or will be taken on pending legislation or amendments. 4
The constitutional amendment also specifically protects the authority of
the Legislature to interpret and implement its own rules.45 Seeking to
foreclose judicial interpretations which might expand its interpretation,
article III, section 4(e) states:
This section shall be implemented and defined by the rules of each
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
42. FLA. CONST. art 111, § 4(e).
43. Id. See also Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); City
of Miami Beach v. Bems, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); Wolfson v. State, 344 So. 2d 611 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1969) ("it is the entire decision-making process hat the legislature intended to affect
by the enactment of [section 286.011 of the Florida Statutes]").
44. FLA. CONs'r. art. Ill, § 4(c).
45. Id.
1994]
270
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
house . . . . Each house shall be the sole judge for the interpretation,
implementation, and enforcement of this section.46
B. Open Government Constitutional Amendment
Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution provides that "every
person" has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received
in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or
employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except as otherwise
authorized by section 24, or as provided elsewhere in the constitution.47
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. art. 1, § 24. The full text of article 1, section 24 of the Florida Constitution
provides:
Section 24. Access to public records and meetings.-
(a) Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or
received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or
employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to
records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by
this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created
thereunder; counties, municipalities, anddistricts: andeach constitutional officer,
board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.
(b) All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state
government or of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school
district, or special district, at which official acts are to be taken or at which
public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, shall be open and
noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall be open and noticed
as provided in article Ill, section 4(e), except with respect to meetings exempted
pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution.
(c) This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may provide
by general law for the exemption of records from the requirements of subsection
(a) and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of subsection (b),
provided that such law shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying
the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated
purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws governing the enforcement
of this section, including the maintenance, control, destruction, disposal, and
disposition of records made public by this section, except that each house of the
legislature may adopt rules governing the enforcement of this section in relation
to records of the legislative branch. Laws enacted pursuant to this subsection
shall contain only exemptions from the requirements of subsections (a) or (b)
and provisions governing the enforcement of this section, and shall relate to one
subject.
(d) All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records
or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the
legislative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. Rules of court that are
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This language incorporates key terms contained in the statutory definition
of "public record" found in section 119.011(1) of the Florida Statutes.48
The scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to public records extends
to all three branches of government; Executive, Legislative, and Judicial, as
well as to state and local agencies and agencies created under the Florida
Constitution.49
The right of access to meetings of public agencies extends to collegial
bodies in the executive branch of state government as well as to those of
local governmental entities and special districts. Legislative proceedings are
controlled by the terms of article III, section (4)(e) of the Florida Constitu-
tion, containing express provisions governing legislative meetings. Meetings
within the judicial branch are not encompassed by the amendment."°
The Legislature is authorized to enact general laws providing for
exemptions from the access requirements. However, any law creating an
exemption must expressly state the public necessity justifying the exemption
and must be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of
the law.5
Additionally, the Legislature is required to adopt laws governing
enforcement, maintenance, control of destruction, disposal and disposition
of records made public by this section. However, each house of the
Legislature has the authority to adopt rules governing enforcement regarding
records of the legislative branch. Any law creating an exemption of
governing enforcement must relate to one subject and shall contain only
exemptions and provisions relating to enforcement.52
All laws in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records or
meetings "shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the
legislative and judicial branches, until they are repealed."53 Thus, existing
exemptions are "grandfathered in" and need not be reenacted. Additionally,
the Legislature was provided with an entire legislative session between the
in effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit access to records shall
remain in effect until they are repealed.
Id.
48. The term "public records" is defined to mean "all documents, papers, letters, maps,
books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other material, regardless of physical
form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with
the transaction of official business by any agency." FLA. STAT. § 119.011(l) (1991).
49. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
50. Id. § 24(b).
51. Id. § 24(c).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 24(d).
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passage of the amendment in November 1992 and the July 1, 1993 effective
date to enact new exemptions without complying with the new constitutional
requirements. Court rules in effect on the date of adoption of the amend-
ment that limit access to records remain in effect until repealed. 4
IV. AFTER THE AMENDMENTS
A. Open Legislative Meetings Amendment-Reactions by the
Legislature
1. The House of Representatives Response
The House quickly moved to meet the constitutional amendment's
mandate by adopting several rules during its 1990 organizational meeting.
Under the new rules, each member of the House is required to provide the
public with reasonable access to any prearranged meeting between the
representative and two or more other legislators for the purposes of agreeing
upon formal legislative action on pending legislation or amendments.
However, admission to the meeting is conditioned upon request by members
of the public. 5 The rules, therefore, do not automatically open such
meetings but require the meetings to be open if a member of the public
seeks admission.
Such meetings may not be conducted in the members' lounge, any
location which is closed to the public, or which the representative knows to
prohibit admission on the basis of race, religion, gender, national origin,
physical handicap, or similar classification." The rule specifies, however,
that meetings conducted in either chamber while that body is in session are
considered to be held at a location which is reasonably accessible and open
to the public. Where the number of persons that may attend is limited
because of space considerations or in order to maintain order or decorum,
at least one representative of the print media, radio, and television must be
54. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(d).
55. FLA. H.R. RULE 5.25 (1993). The rule provides, as the constitutional amendment
does, that such meetings are subject to order and decorum. Id.
56. Id. Compare FLA. STAT. § 286.011(6) (1991) (stating that all persons subject to the
open meetings requirement set forth in subsection (1) are prohibited from holding meetings
at any facility or location which discriminates on the basis of sex, age, race, creed, color,
origin, or economic status or which operates in such a manner as to unreasonably restrict
access to such a facility).
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included if they request admission."
Similar requirements are imposed for prearranged meetings between the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and either the Governor or the
Senate President, for the purpose of agreeing upon formal legislative action
to be taken on pending legislation or amendments at the meeting or at a
subsequent time.58 The Speaker is required to provide reasonable access
to members of the public at such meetings, subject to order and decorum.
At least one representative, who requests admission, of the print media and
the radio and television news media must be included."
"Pending legislation" is defined by rule to mean legislation filed with
the clerk of the House of Representatives. On the other hand, an amend-
ment is considered pending if it has been delivered to the secretary of a
committee in which the legislation is pending or to the clerk of the House
if the amendment is to a bill that has been reported favorably by each
committee of reference. 60 "Formal legislative action" includes any vote of
the House or Senate or of a committee or subcommittee, on final passage
or on a motion, other than a motion to adjourn or recess.6'
The rules continue to provide, as they did prior to the adoption of the
constitutional amendment, that committee meetings and conference
committee meetings are open.62 Committee meetings remain subject to the
presiding officer's authority to maintain order and decorum. However,
where necessary for the witness' protection, the meeting may be closed by
the committee chairman with the concurrence of the Speaker.63
2. The Senate Response
The Senate also sought to implement the new constitutional mandate
by the adoption of a new rule. Like its counterpart in the House,64 Senate
Rule 1.441 requires that all legislative committee, subcommittee, and joint
57. FLA. HR. RULE 5.25 (1993).
58. Id. RULE 2.7. This rule also provides that "[s]uch meetings shall be reasonably open
to the public and shall be governed by, and conducted in accordance with, the requirements
of Rule 5.25, as if such meeting were a meeting between three or more legislators." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. FLA. F.R. RULE 5.25 (1993).
62. Id. Rule 6.25. 6.57.
63. Id. RULE 6.25.
64. 1d. RULE 5.25.
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conference committee meetings be open and noticed to the public.65 In
addition, the rule reiterates the constitutional amendment's requirement of
open meetings between "more than two" legislators or between the
Governor, the Senate President or Speaker of the House, when such
meetings are prearranged for the purpose of agreeing upon formal legislative
action on pending legislation or amendments.66
In the event of a conflict with another rule, Senate Rule 1.441 states that
the rule allowing greater access will prevail. This provision is significant
when considering other Senate rules which, although adopted before the
constitutional amendment, continue to be effective. For example, the
language of Senate Rule 1.43, adopted in 1989,67 is more aligned to the
language the courts used in interpreting section 286.011 of the Florida
Statutes, than it is to the constitutional amendment. The rule requires that
all meetings at which "legislative business" is discussed between two or
more senators be open to the public. 68 The term "legislative business" is
defined by the rule as "issues pending before, or upon which foreseeable
action is reasonably expected to be taken by the Senate, a Senate Committee
,,69or Senate Subcommittee.
The rule recognizes a limited exception for meetings between two
senators to exchange information, provided the purpose of the meeting is not
to agree upon final action that will be taken at a later meeting.7" Discus-
sions on the floor while the Senate is in session and discussions between
senators in a committee room during committee meetings are in compliance
with the rule.7
65. FLA. S. RULE 1.441 (1993). Earlier Senate Rules had required legislative committee
and subcommittee meetings and conference committee meetings to be open and noticed. See
FLA. S. RULES 2.6, 2.13, and 2.19 supra note 36.
66. FLA. S. RULE 1.441 (1993).
67. FLA. S. JOUR. 92, 93 (Reg. Sess. 1989).
68. FLA. S. RULE 1.43(a) (1993). See supra note 43 and accompanying text, discussing
the applicability of the Sunshine Law to gatherings of two or more members of the same
board or commission.
69. FLA. S. RULE 1.43(c) (1993). Compare FLA. S. RULE 1.43(c) (1993) with cases
cited supra note 43, discussing the applicability of the Sunshine Law to gatherings of two or
more board members to discuss some matter which will foreseeably come before that board.
70. FLA. S. RULE 1.43(a) (1993).
71. Id. Other existing rules were amended. See McSwain, supra note 14, at 367 (noting
that minor refinements were made to the time periods for notice specified for certain
meetings of the Senate President and that an exemption from the notice and access
requirements for political caucuses in Florida Senate Rule 1.44(c) was adopted when such
caucuses are held to designate Senate leaders).
[Vol. 18
275
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Gleason / Wilson
B. Open Government Amendment-Reactions by the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial Branches
1. The Executive Response
In its initial decision in Locke," the Florida Supreme Court stated that
the open records law did not apply to "constitutional officers or to their
functions."73  Immediately, there was concern that the Governor and
members of the Florida Cabinet, whose offices are established under the
Florida Constitution,74 could exempt themselves from the Public Records
Law, or even the Government in the Sunshine Law."s
However, the Governor and the six cabinet officers stated that they
would continue to abide by the open government laws despite the Locke
decision.76 This determination eventually proved to be the position taken
by the Florida Supreme Court when it revisited Locke in February 1992 and
held that the Public Records Law applied to the executive branch."
Accordingly, it was apparent that the adoption of a constitutional right
of access would probably impact the executive branch far less than the
legislative and judicial branches." With regard to the executive branch,
the Florida Supreme Court essentially preserved the pre-amendment status
quo by holding that the records and proceedings of this part of government,
as opposed to the legislative and judicial branches, were subject to statutory
72. Locke v. Hawkes, 1991 WL 231589 (Fla. Nov. 7, 1991), vacated and superseded
by 595 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1992).
73. Id.
74. The Florida Constitution vests supreme executive power in the Governor. FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Cabinet, consisting of the Attorney General, Secretary of State,
Comptroller, Treasurer, Commissioner of Agriculture, and Commissioner of Education, is
created by article IV, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art IV" § 4.
75. See Lavelle supra note 24, at A6. Bill Jones, executive director of Common Cause
is quoted as expressing concern that the Locke ruling could permit meetings between Cabinet
members, Cabinet aides, task force members and search committee members to occur behind
closed doors: "They could close that door tomorrow if the supreme court reads the open
meetings law the same way they read the public records law. The way they're interpreting
separation of powers, there's a real possibility the [sunshine law] could go as well." Id.
76. Bill Cotterell, Butterworth Wants More Sunshine, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov.
13, 1991, at 5B.
77. Locke, 595 So. 2d at 37.
78. Id. The court stated that it granted the rehearing petitions filed after the initial Locke
decision "to clarify our opinion and avoid improper interpretation by government entities not
involved in this cause." Id. The court thus limited its ruling to the legislative and judicial
branches.
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regulation under the Public Records Law.7 9
In light of the fact that the right of access to public records and
meetings in the executive branch is specifically recognized in article I,
section 24, the major impact of the amendment on that branch is to secure
as a constitutional right that which had previously been merely a statutory
guarantee, subject to the absolute discretion of the Legislature."
However, early in the 1993 legislative session, the Governor's office
recognized that once effective in July, the constitutional amendment would
serve to open clemency records and proceedings. The Legislature was asked
to create an exemption to these proceedings that would be "grandfathered
in" prior to the July 1, 1993 effective date.81
The clemency power is derived directly from the Florida Constitution.
Pursuant to article IV, section 8(a), the Governor, with the concurrence of
three members of the Cabinet, may "grant full or conditional pardons,
restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for
offenses."82 Because the exercise of the clemency power is a constitutional
function outside the control of the legislative branch, the courts had
traditionally determined that the Sunshine Law was inapplicable to the
Governor and Cabinet in dispensing clemency. 3 However, this result
would change once the constitutional amendment took effect because the
open government provision would apply to constitutional entities.
The initial proposal of the Governor's staff was to create a new statute
with both a public records and a sunshine exemption. Under the proposed
statute, records developed or received by any state agency relating to an
Executive Clemency Board investigation would be exempt from disclosure.
Additionally, meetings between members of the Board of Executive
79. Id.
80. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a), (b).
81. See id. § 24(a) providing that the right of access provided therein applies to "each
constitutional officer, board, and commission or entity created pursuant to law or this
Constitution." Similarly, section 24(b) provides that "[aill meetings of any collegial public
body of the executive branch of state government... " are open to the public. Id. § 24(b)
(emphasis added).
82. Id. art. IV, § 8(a).
83. SeeTurner v. Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), affd
and remanded, 389 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1980); see also In re Advisory Opinion of the
Governor, 334 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1976) (clemency power does not exist by virtue of legislative
enactment; rather, constitution sufficiently prescribes rules for manner of exercise of the
power). Cf 1977 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 65 (concluding that the Florida Administra-
tive Procedures Act is inapplicable to the Constitution Revision Commission established by
article XI, section 2 of the Florida Constitution).
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Clemency (the Governor and Cabinet) would be exempt from the Sunshine
Law when no official action was taken.84
The proposed clemency exemptions were included in a larger bill,
House Bill 2007, which contained numerous exemptions for legislative
records as well as other exemptions from the Public Records Law that were
intended to apply to all agencies. 5 Although several amendments were
made to House Bill 2007 during the legislative process, the clemency
exemptions survived with only minimal modifications in the final version
of the bill.86
House Bill 2007 passed the Legislature as amended on April 2, 1993,
and was presented to the Governor. 7 However, citing concerns about the
breadth of exemptions which the Legislature had granted for some of its
own records, the Governor vetoed the bill.88
During the subsequent special session, the Legislature passed a
narrower version of House Bill 2007. As originally introduced, Senate Bill
20-B contained the same exemption for clemency meetings and records as
had existed in House Bill 2007.9 However, the bill was amended to
eliminate the open meetings exemption.9" Thus, the final version of the
bill contained only the exemption from the public records law.9' Senate
84. See Fla. HB 2007 (1993). According to the staff analysis prepared by the House
Governmental Operations Committee, "Gubernatorial staff" advised that the purpose of the
amendment was to protect the safety of individuals providing information in a clemency
investigation. For example, public disclosure of the identities of persons requesting that
certain felons not be released could jeopardize the health, safety, and welfare of the reporting
individuals. The same analysis reports that "gubernatorial staff' felt that it was necessary to
protect brief and casual communications between the Governor and clemency board members;
see also Fla. H. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 2007 (1993) Final Bill Analysis and Economic
Impact Statement, 8 (May 17., 1993) (vetoed by the Governor May 14, 1993).
85. Fla. HB 2007 (1993). The proposed legislative exemptions are discussed infra in
Part Ill.B3.
86. The "'Sunshine" exemption was amended by Representative Peeples (D-72), on the
House Floor to read: "Except for clemency hearings before the Board of Executive
Clemency, the provisions ofs. 286.011 shall not apply to meetings of board members or their
staff." FLA. HR. JOUR. 401 (Reg. Sess. 1993).
87. FLA. S. JOUR. 1430 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (vote on passage in the Senate was 30 yeas
and 5 nays).
88. FLA. FI.R. JOUR. 6 (Spec. Sess. B 1993).
89. FLA. S. JOUR. 3 (Spec. Sess. B 1993).
90. FLA. S. JOUR. 83 (Spec. Sess. B 1993) (vote on passage in the Senate was 31 yeas
and 6 nays).
91. The final version states: "All records developed or received by any state entity
relating to a Board of Executive Clemency investigation shall be exempt from [public
disclosure requirements]." Ch. 93-405, § 6, 1993 Fla. Laws 2906, 2910 (to be codified at
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Bill 20-B became a law without the Governor's signature and took effect on
June 30, 1993.92
Although the legislative enactments relating to clemency appeared to
be the most directly related to the constitutional amendment, several other
significant exemptions relating to the executive branch were also enacted in
the 1993 session. These included: a law providing circumstances whereby
a governmental board could meet privately with its attorney to discuss
pending litigation involving the agency; 93 an exemption to the Public
Records Law providing increased confidentiality for medical records of past,
present and current employees and officers; 94 an exemption allowing for
temporary closure of records relating to certain internal investigations; 95
and a new provision establishing confidentiality for certain complaints
alleging discrimination in employment.96
2. The Judicial Response
Although early versions of the proposed open government amendment
would have permitted public access to records and meetings within the
judicial branch, with the exception of grand jury and jury deliberations,97
the final version provided a right of access only to records in the judicial
FLA. STAT. § 14.28).
92. Id. § 8. 1993 Fla. Laws at 2910.
93. Ch. 93-232, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2374 (amending FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1991),
appearing at FLA. STAT. § 286.011(8)).
94. Ch. 93-405, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2906, 2909 (amending FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)
(Supp. 1992), appearing at FLA. STAT. § I 19.07(3)(cc)).
95. Id (amending FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3) (Supp. 1992), appearing at FLA. STAT. §
I 19.07(3)(dd)).
96. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3) (Supp. 1992), appearing at FLA. STAT. §
I 19.07(3)(bb)).
97. This was the approach taken in the initial proposal offered by Attorney General
Butterworth on November 12, 1991. The proposed amendment stated:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, no person shall be
denied access to any meeting at which official acts are to be taken by any
collegial public body in the state or by persons acting together on behalf of such
a public body, with the exception of jury and grand jury deliberations.
See Statement by Attorney General Bob Butterworth, November 12, 1991; see also House
Joint Resolution 863 by Representative Paul Hawkes,Republican, Crystal River, and House
Joint Resolution 2035 by Representative Mary Brennan, Democrat, Pinellas Park containing
similar language. For an analysis of the various proposals considered in the legislature, and
their impact on the judicial branch; see generally, Open Records Amendment Would Impact
the Judiciary, THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS, March 1, 1992, at 17.
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branch of government.98
The amendment establishes a grandfather clause providing that "rules
of court that are in effect on the date of adoption of this amendment
[November 3, 1992] shall remain in effect until they are repealed."99 Thus,
the supreme court was required to adopt court rules prior to November 3,
1992, in order to authorize its own exemptions. Laws in effect prior to July
1, 1993 could limit access to records of the judicial and legislative branches
until repealed.' 0
On September 15, 1992, the Public Records Rules Drafting Committee,
led by Judge Gerald Wetherington of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit,
published proposed amendments to the Rules of Judicial Administration in
the Florida Bar News.' The proposed rule set forth a list of court
records "which shall be confidential."'02 These included trial and appel-
late memoranda, opinion drafts, complaints alleging misconduct against
judges until probable cause is established, periodical evaluations intended to
improve job performance ofjudges, applications by persons seeking to serve
as volunteers, all records currently made confidential by state or federal law,
and copies of arrest and search warrants.0 3
The proposed rule also established confidentiality for any court records
regarding a judicial determination in which confidentiality is required:
(1) To prevent a serious and imminent threat to the fair, impartial and
orderly administration of justice; or
(2) To protect trade secrets; or
(3) To protect a compelling governmental interest; or
(4) To obtain evidence to determine legal issues in a case; or
(5) To avoid substantial injury to innocent third parties; or
(6) To avoid substantial injury to a party by disclosure of matters
protected by a common law or privacy right not generally inherent in
98. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 24(a).
99. Id. § 24(d).
100. Id.
101. Florida Rules of udicialAdministration, THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Sept. 15, 1992,
at 3 1 (listing the proposed amendments to the public access to judicial records rule)
[hereinafter Judicial Administration]. The Drafting Committee also published in the same
issue of the THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS notice of proposed amendments relating to access to
the records of the Florida Bar. See Proposed Amendments Deal with Confidentiality, THE
FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Sept. 15, 1992, at 25 [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. However,
these amendments are beyond the scope of this article.
102. See Judicial Administration, supra note 101, at 3 1.
103. Id.
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the specific type of proceedings sought to be closed." 4
Additionally, the rule provided procedures in the event of a denial of access
(through an action for mandamus) and policies for retention of records. The
proposed rule admonished that "[d]emands for access to public records
under this rule shall be made in a reasonable manner which does not
interfere with the normal functions or duties of the person to whom such
demand is made."' 10 5
In response to the proposed rule, the Florida Press Association and
Florida Society of Newspaper Editors ("Press") expressed concern that the
proposed rules did not sufficiently distinguish between the role of the court
as an employer of personnel and expender of public funds, and the role of
the court as supervisor and custodian of judicial records.1 °6 The Press
urged the court to make it clear that records generated as part of the
judiciary's administrative function should be governed by the same rules
applicable to agencies in other branches of government." 7 Moreover, the
Press warned that, as currently phrased, the rules were vague and ambiguous
in critical areas and could allow the creation of additional confidential
records in circumvention of the constitutional amendment.'0°
Finally, the Press objected to the portion of the rule providing that
public records shall be furnished if the demand for public access is
"reasonable" and "does not interfere with the normal functions or duties of
the persons to which such demand is made."'0 9 The Press stated that this
paragraph authorized too much discretion and contravened the supreme
court's prior rulings. In response, at the October 5, 1992 oral argument,
Judge Wetherington stated that it was his understanding that the rules simply
codified existing practice and were no more restrictive than current laws and
104. Id. This provision incorporates the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Barron v.
Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988).
105. See Judicial Administration, supra note 101, at 31.
106. Response Brief for the Florida Press Association and Florida Society of Newspaper
Editors at 1, 2, 10-11, In re Amendment to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Public
Access to Judicial Records and In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 608
So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1992) (Nos. 80419 & 80432) [hereinafter Response].
107. Id.
108. Id. at 12-13.
109. Id. at 17. The Press argued that the "reasonableness" and "non-interference"
requirement placed too much discretion in the hands of the records custodian and contravened
the supreme court's holding in Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1984).
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rules.'
On October 29, 1992, the court issued an opinion adopting Rule 2.05 1,
entitled Public Access to Judicial Records."' In its ruling, the court stated
that "[t]he amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration are
intended to reflect the judiciary's responsibility to perform both an
administrative function and an adjudicatory function."' 12  The court
observed that in its administrative role (as public employer and expender of
public funds), the judiciary is acting in an administrative capacity and hence,
"should be subject to the same standards that govern similar records of other
branches of government." ' 13
The court emphasized, however, that the judiciary's adjudicatory
responsibilities, require a "modified policy toward public inspection. '
In order for the judiciary to perform these responsibilities and protect "the
rights of all citizens" some exceptions to public access were necessary."'
The court thus adopted the rules as proposed by the drafting committee.
However, some provisions were narrowed in an apparent attempt to avoid
their use to shield "administrative" records which would be open in other
agencies." 6 In addition, the provision dealing with responses to public
records requests was modified to provide: "Requests and responses to
requests for access to public records under this rule shall be made in a
reasonable manner." ' 7
110. Gary Blankenship, Justices Ponder Public Access to Courts, Bar, THE FLORIDA
BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at I, 14.
111. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration-Public Access
to Judicial Records, 608 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1992) [hereinafter Public Access]
112. Id. at 472.
113. Id. at 472-73. This point was perhaps most strongly made by Justice Overton in
his concurring opinion in which he stated:
I concur and write only to emphasize that, as I read these rules: (1) there is no
change regarding the presumption of openness of court records, as set forth in
Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., and (2) the judicial branch's
administrative documents, including personnel and finance records, are being
treated the same as similar records in the executive and legislative branches.
Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. Public Access, 608 So. 2d at 473.
116. See, e.g., JudicialAdministration, supra note 101, at 31 (proposed rule, which was
not adopted, provided for confidentiality of "preliminary drafts, notes, or other written
materials which reflect the tentative thought processes of court committees and judicial
conferences, and the members thereof, assigned to perform functions affecting the
administration of justice in Florida.").
117. Public Access, 608 So. 2d at 475.
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3. The Legislative Response
Of the three branches of government, the legislative branch faced
perhaps the greatest impact. Because of the open government amendment,
the Legislature was now subject to public access requirements established
by constitutional mandate; historically, the Legislature had argued that it
alone had the power to determine which of its records were open and which
were not."1
8
However, the amendment also affected the Legislature by placing
limitations on the manner in which public records' exemptions could be
enacted both for itself and for all other agencies." 9 Prior to the amend-
ment, the only restrictions, other than the general "single subject rule" and
similar constitutional 20 provisions applicable to legislative enactments in
general, were a self-imposed statutory directive to consider certain factors
when determining whether to enact or continue exemptions from the open
government laws.' There was little to prevent the Legislature from
118. See supra notes 12 and 13, for earlier decisions regarding the Legislature's
authority to establish its own rules governing access. This position was expressly adopted
by the Florida Supreme Court in both Locke decisions. Until the passage of Senate Bill 20
in the 1993 Session, legislative records available to the public were set forth in Florida House
Rule 1.11 and Rule 1.442. See Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Pub. Rec., SB 20 (1993) Staff
Analysis (May 25, 1993) (on file with Comm.).
119. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 24(c), (d).
120. See FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 6, which provides: The Florida Constitution states:
Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title. No law shall
be revised or amended by reference to its title only. Laws to revise or amend
shall set out in full the revised or amended act, section, subsection or paragraph
of a subsection. The enacting clause of every law shall read: "Be It Enacted
by the Legislature of the State of Florida:."
Other procedural requirements relating to publication are set forth in article 111, section 7 of
the Florida Constitution.
121. See FLA. STAT. § 119.14(2) (1991). Exemptions are possible only if:
(a) The exempted record or meeting is of a sensitive, personal nature concern-
ing individuals;
(b) The exemption is necessary for the effective and efficient administration of
a governmental program; or
(c) The exemption affects confidential information concerning an entity.
However, the impact of this statutory directive is somewhat weakened by 4(g) of this
section, providing:
(g) Notwithstanding the provision of s. 768.28 or any other law, neither the
state or its political subdivisions nor any other public body shall be made party
to any suit in any court or incur any liability for the repeal or revival and
reenactment of any exemption pursuant to this act. The failure of the Legisla-
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placing an exemption deep within a bill filled with numerous other
issues. 22 Occasionally, the absence of a "single subject rule" for exemp-
tions resulted in bills passing the Legislature which were later deemed to be
a "mistake" and subsequently vetoed by the Governor.'23
Under article I, section 24, the Legislature is authorized to enact
general laws providing for exemptions from the access requirements;
however, any law creating an exemption must expressly state the public
necessity justifying the exemption and must be no broader than necessary
to accomplish the stated purpose of the law. 24 Further, any law creating
an exemption or governing enforcement must relate to one subject and shall
contain only exemptions and provisions relating to enforcement.'25 These
provisions will be in place for the 1994 legislative session.
The session following the adoption of the amendment but prior to its
taking effect-the 1993 session-was of critical importance because it was
the final opportunity for the Legislature to determine which of its records
were going to be open and which were not. Any exemptions enacted during
this time would be "grandfathered in" once the constitutional amendment
took effect in July; all other records would be subject to constitutional
access requirements. 1
26
On February 23, 1993, the Legislature responded to the challenge with
the introduction of House Bill 2007, by Representative Boyd and the
ture to comply strictly with this section shall not invalidate an otherwise valid
reenactment.
Id.
122. For example, in 1989, a public records exemption was enacted for certain claims
records involved with an agency's risk management program. The provision was added on
the floor of the House of Representatives as Section 92 of an act "relating to insurance and
the State Fire Marshall." See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1349-79 (Reg. Sess. 1989).
123. For example, in the closing days of the 1993 Session an amendment to an
exemption found in section II 9.07(3)(z) of the Public Records Act was inserted on the Senate
floor as an addition to a bill expanding the definition of "criminal justice agency." See FLA.
S. JOUR. 545 (Reg. Sess. 1993). A newspaper reporter subsequently reported that the bill
"accidentally exempted most of the state's [police] and court records from the public records
law .... ." Lucy Morgan, Legislature Accidentally Closes Police, Court Records, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at 5B. The sponsor of the bill stated that he was
unaware of this result when he offered the proposal. The Governor concurred that the
exemption was too broad and noted that this "was not the intention of the sponsor of the
legislation" and vetoed the bill on May 4, 1993. Id.
124. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(c).
125. Id. § 24(d).
126. Id.
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Committee on Governmental Operations.'27 As proposed, the bill provid-
ed for the following key exemptions from disclosure.
A formal complaint about a member or officer of the Legislature or
about a lobbyist would be exempt until dismissal of the complaint,
determination as to probable cause, or the respondent had requested that the
complaint be made public, whichever occurred first. Other exemptions
applied to drafts of legislative material which were not provided to any
person other than a member, officer, or employee of the Legislature and to
records prepared for or used in executive sessions of the Senate until fifty
years after the session was held. The bill also provided confidentiality for
these records held by the Legislature which would be exempt from disclo-
sure.
House Bill 2007 passed with one amendment and was certified to the
Senate on March 11, 1993.128 The full Senate took up the bill on March
31, 1993.129 The Committee on Rules and Calendar and Senator Jennings
moved an amendment to strike everything after the enacting clause and
substitute a new version of the bill. 3° The revised bill substantially
expanded the exemptions provided in the House-passed bill. Specifically,
the following changes were made:
(1) While records of future executive sessions would become public
in ten years, "[r]ecords of former legislative investigating committees whose
records are sealed or confidential as of June 30, 1993" would not be subject
to disclosure until December 31, 2028.131
(2) Requests for advisory opinions concerning application of legislative
ethics rules would not be public unless the requestor authorized release. 32
(3) "Requests for, and drafts of, bills, amendments, reapportionment
plans, and redistricting plans, including supporting documentation; and
[w]orking papers of employees, officers or members, relating to their official
or legislative oversight responsibilities" were exempted from disclosure and
copying.1
33
An additional amendment was offered by Senators Weinstein, Sullivan,
Boczar, Holzendorf, Beard, Forman, Johnson and Grant to exempt
"[c]orrespondence received or sent from a member of the Legislature" and
127. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 222 (Reg. Sess. 1993).
128. Id. at 427-28.
129. FLA. S. JOUR. 615 (Reg. Sess. 1993).
130. Id. (amendment 1).
13 I. Id. (amendment 1(2)(d)).
132. Id. (amendment 1(2)(f)).
133. Id. (amendment 2(g), (b)).
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"[w]orking papers relating to constituent casework."' 34 This amendment
was adopted and House Bill 2007, as amended, was approved by a vote of
thirty-eight to zero. 35  Senator Jennings then offered an additional
amendment relating to the records of former legislative investigating
committees to provide that such records are subject to disclosure, except that
the names of persons testifying before such committees were to be
deleted.
3 6
On its return to the House, the Senate inspired version of House Bill
2007 was amended again to narrow the exemptions added on the Senate
side. On motion by Representative Boyd, the House adopted an amendment
to the Senate amendment to strike everything after the enacting clause and
inserted new language. 17 Specifically, the House amendment limited the
exemption for legislative correspondence to those portions of correspondence
which, if disclosed, would reveal,
information otherwise exempt from disclosure by law; an individual's
medical treatment, history, or condition; the identity or location of an
individual if there is a substantial likelihood that releasing such
information would jeopardize the health or safety of that individual; or
information regarding physical abuse, child abuse, spouse abuse, or
abuse of the elderly ....
The exemption relating to "working papers" was modified to apply to
"[w]orking papers of employees, officers, or members relating to their
legislative responsibilities."' 39 The House amendment also spelled out the
"supporting documentation" relating to bills which could be withheld as
"supporting, documentation to or for bills, resolutions, memorials, amend-
ments, bill analyses, fiscal notes, reapportionment plans and redistricting
plans."' 4° As amended, the bill passed the House with 114 yeas and 0
nays.'
41
The bill returned to the Senate. This time the Senate concurred with
the House amendments and the bill was approved by a 30 to 5 vote as the
134. FLA. S. JOUR. at 616 (amendment I(d)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. FLA, H. R. JOUR. 1515, 1516 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (House Amendment I to Senate
Amendment 1).
138. Id. (section (a), (h)).
139. Id. (section (2)(c)).
140. Id. (section (2)(d)).
141. Id. at 1517.
19941
286
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
regular session drew to a close.'42
Florida newspapers, not surprisingly, were critical of House Bill 2007.
It was described by the Florida Press Association and the Florida Society of
Newspaper Editors as opening a "major loophole" in the open government
law and establishing a "terrible precedent."' 43
Although early reports indicated that Governor Chiles was prepared to
allow the bill to become law without his signature,'44 he subsequently
vetoed the measure. In withholding his approval, the Governor wrote that
he was concerned about the breadth of the exemptions for working papers
and legislative drafts. The Governor stated that these provisions had not
been granted to other governmental entities and served to frustrate the will
of the people as expressed in the passage of the open government constitu-
tional amendment. According to the Governor, the exemptions impeded
"public understanding of influences on, and the purpose of, legislation, and
diminishes the ability of Floridians to hold their lawmakers account-
able."
, 145
In the ensuing special session, the Legislature refined the legislative
exemptions bill in an attempt to address the Governor's concerns. The staff
analysis for Senate Bill 20 B noted that in his veto message on House Bill
2007, the Governor stated that most of the exemptions in that bill were
"appropriate and necessary to a smooth running government."' 146 Howev-
er, staff commented that neither the constitutional amendment nor the
Governor had defined what constitutes an "appropriate" exemption.
According to staff, this determination must therefore be a "policy" ques-
tion. 147
The "policy" reflected in Senate Bill 20 essentially focused on meeting
the objections noted by Governor Chiles to the doomed House Bill 2007.
This meant that the provisions relating to legislative working drafts and
working papers required revision. Instead of the broad exemption for
142. FLA. S. JOUR. 1428, 1430 (Reg. Sess. 1993).
143. Louis Lavelle, State Newspapers ask Governor for Public Access to State Records,
TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 11, 1993, at B3.
144. Lucy Morgan, Records Secret Bill is to Become Law, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May
12, 1993, at B3.
145. Id.
146. See Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Pub. Rec., SB 20 (1993) Staff Analysis 5 (May 25,
1993) (on file with Comm.).
147. Id. However, it might be noted that the constitutional amendment appears to set
forth policy considerations to be considered in the enactment of exemptions by stating that
such "law shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and shall
be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the Law." Id.
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preliminary documents contained in the earlier bill, Senate Bill 20 narrowed
the exemption to those documents which had not yet been circulated outside
the legislative arena.
Thus, legislative produced bill drafts, and requests for drafts, are
exempt from disclosure if they have not been provided to any person other
than the member or members who requested the draft, an employee of the
Legislature, a contract employee or consultant retained by the Legislature,
or an officer of the Legislature. Bill analysis drafts or fiscal note drafts are
exempt from disclosure until the bill analysis or fiscal note is provided to
a person other than a legislative employee, a contract employee or
consultant retained by the Legislature, or an officer of the Legislature. In
addition, drafts or requests for drafts of a reappointment plan or redistricting
plan and amendments are exempt. "Supporting documents" used in
connection with reapportionment or redistricting plans are exempt "until a
bill implementing the plan, or the amendment, is filed."'48
This bill appeared to represent a consensus view and was quickly
passed in the Legislature.'49 The only revision of significance was to
remove the Sunshine Law exemption for informal clemency meetings which
had been requested by the Governor's office and had been contained in the
vetoed House Bill 2007."0 Although there was some grumbling in the
media that the exemptions in Senate Bill 20 were still too broad, 5' the
Governor allowed the bill to become law without his signature. Senate Bill
20, now Chapter 93-405 of the Laws of Florida, took effect June 30,
1993.12
IV. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the open legislative meetings constitutional
amendment in 1990 and two years later, the open government constitutional
amendment,, Floridians have overwhelmingly voiced their approval for
government in the sunshine at all levels of government. It is still too early,
however, to assess the full extent to which government will give effect to
the expressed will of the people.
148. Ch. 93-405, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2906, 2907 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
11.0431 (2)(e)).
149. FLA. S. JOUR. 83 (Spec. Sess. B 1993).
150. FLA. S. JOUR. 3 (Spec. Sess. B 1993).
151. See, e.g., Lucy Morgan, Bill to Limit Records Access Advances, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 26, 1993, at B3.
152. Ch. 93-405, § 8. 1993 Fla. 2906, 2910 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 14.28).
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Allegations of legislative meetings behind closed doors still arise.' 53
The legislative open meetings amendment provides that it is the Legislature,
not the courts, which has the right to interpret and enforce its terms. While
both houses have adopted rules to implement the legislative open meetings
amendment, it is not yet clear how well the Legislature will fulfill its role
in enforcing those provisions. The first test for the open government
amendment will come in the 1994 legislative session as the Florida
Legislature implements for the first time the procedural safeguards contained
in article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution that are intended to assure
that the public interest in open government is given equal consideration
when proposal for closure are considered.
The challenge issued by the people by their overwhelming support of
these two constitutional amendments, however, cannot be ignored. For the
people of this state have recognized that open government provides the best
assurances that the people will get good government that is responsive and
responsible to its needs.
153. See, e.g., Lucy Morgan, Discord Hits Lunch of Hours of Power, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, March 9, 1993 at BI (lobbyist invited five members of the Senate Commerce
Committee to lunch to discuss a bill to benefit his clients and sought to eject newspaper
reporter who showed up at the gathering, thus "creating a situation that appears to be in direct
violation of Senate rules and the state's open government laws"); Judy Doyle, Lobbyist Holds
Secret Meeting with Senators, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, March 9, 1993, at Al.
l000 [Vol. 18
289
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
The Process and Politics of Legislative Reapportionment
and Redistricting Under the Florida Constitution
George L. Waas"
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................... 1002
1I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF REDISTRICTING
IN FLORIDA ............................. 1004
A. The Former Provisions .................. 1004
B. The Current Provision .................. 1007
1. Overview of Substantive Considerations ... 1007
2. Procedural Requirements .............. 1013
III. THE CONSTITUTION IN OPERATION .............. 1014
A . 1972 .............................. 1014
B . 1982 .............................. 1018
C . 1992 .............................. 1021
IV. A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE? .................. 1034
V. CONCLUSION ............................ 1035
* George L. Waas was admitted to The Florida Bar in 1970. He received a B.S. in
journalism from the University of Florida in 1965 and a J.D. in 1970 from Florida State
University.
Since 1987, Mr. Waas has been employed by the Florida Attorney General's Office as
an Assistant Attorney General. From 1986 to 1987, he was counsel to the Division of
Elections, Department of State. From 1980 to 1986, he was in private practice. He also
served as counsel to the Departments of Transportation, Health and Rehabilitative Services,
and Commerce.
Mr. Waas currently handles civil trials and appeals, with emphasis on governmental law
representation. In addition to handling numerous cases covering the breadth of public agency
and official representation, Mr. Waas handles First Amendment litigation, and elections and
voting rights cases. He served as counsel in major judicial elections, voting rights cases and
reapportionment litigation heard by the United States Supreme Court. Additionally, Mr.
Waas has argued a case for the Attorney General's Office before the United States Supreme
Court.
Mr. Waas is a frequent lecturer for continuing legal education programs, and has written
numerous articles for The Florida Bar Journal, as well as the Florida State University and
Nova University Law Reviews. Mr. Waas is admitted to practice before all U.S. District
Courts of Florida, including the Southern District Trial Bar, the Eleventh, Fifth, and District
of Columbia United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.
290
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
I. INTRODUCTION
Reapportionment' and redistricting 2 of the State Legislature are
initially and predominantly functions of the State Legislature.3 These tasks
are accomplished by article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution which
requires the participation of each of the three branches of government.4 On
1. "Reapportionment" is the redistribution of the number of legislative seats. See FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 16(a). For example, the decision as to how many legislative seats to have
within the 30-40 senatorial districts and the 80-120 representative districts allowed under
article III, section 16(a) of the Florida Constitution is a reapportionment decision. See id.
2. "Redistricting" is the redrawing of district lines or boundaries once the number of
district seats is determined. In this article, reapportioning and redistricting will be used inter-
changeably, with emphasis on the redistricting process.
3. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that "reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its
legislature or other body." Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975).
4. The primary responsibility resides with the State Legislature to enact a redistricting
plan. See FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 16(c). The Attorney General must submit the plan to the
Supreme Court of Florida for a declaratory judgment determining its validity. Id. The
Governor's role is to call for extraordinary legislative sessions when the court finds the
redistricting plan to be invalid. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 16(d).
The constitutional provision reads as follows:
Section 16. Legislative apportionment.-
(a) SENATORIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS. The legislature
at its regular session in the second year following each decennial census, by joint
resolution, shall apportion the state in accordance with the constitution of the
state and of the United States into not less than thirty nor more than forty
consecutively numbered senatorial districts of either contiguous, overlapping or
identical territory, and into not less than eighty nor more than one hundred
twenty consecutively numbered representative districts of either contiguous,
overlapping or identical territory. Should that session adjourn without adopting
such joint resolution, the governor by proclamation shall reconvene the
legislature within thirty days in special apportionment session which shall not
exceed thirty consecutive days, during which no other business shall be
transacted, and it shall be the mandatory duty of the legislature to adopt a joint
resolution of apportionment.
(b) FAILURE OF LEGISLATURE TO APPORTION; JUDICIAL REAPPOR-
TIONMENT. In the event a special apportionment session of the legislature
finally adjourns without adopting a joint resolution of apportionment, the
attorney general shall, within five days, petition the supreme court of the state
to make such apportionment. No later than the sixtieth day after the filing of
such petition, the supreme court shall file with the secretary of state an order
making such apportionment.
(c) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF APPORTIONMENT. Within fifteen days after
the passage of the joint resolution of apportionment, the attorney general shall
petition the supreme court of the state for a declaratory judgment determining
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three separate occasions during 1972, 1982, and 1992, this section served
as the procedural framework for redistricting the Florida Senate and House
of Representatives. However, as the contentious 1992 redistricting effort
graphically demonstrates, this constitutional provision does not eliminate the
partisan politics that permeate the process.
As a result of the politically divisive 1992 legislative struggle over the
redistricting of the State Legislature, efforts were undertaken during the
1993 legislative session to alter or eliminate this constitutional procedure
which maximizes government involvement by requiring participation by all
three branches of state government. Proposals were made to either replace
the present system with an appointed commission, or involve such a
commission with legislative efforts. Although these proposals did not pass,
the seeds of change appear to have been planted by the discord of 1992.
To understand how the state has gotten to this point after only three
redistricting experiences, it is necessary to examine the genesis of this
constitutional provision, study its procedural and substantive requirements
with particular emphasis on federal law considerations, trace its operation
the validity of the apportionment. The supreme court, in accordance with its
rules, shall permit adversary interests to present their views and, within thirty
days firom the filing of the petition, shall enter its judgment.
(d) EFFECT OF JUDGMENT IN APPORTIONMENT; EXTRAORDINARY
APPORTIONMENT SESSION. A judgment of the supreme court of the state
determining the apportionment to be valid shall be binding upon all the citizens
of the state. Should the supreme court determine that the apportionment made
by the legislature is invalid, the governor by proclamation shall reconvene the
legislature within five days thereafter in extraordinary apportionment session
which shall not exceed fifteen days, during which the legislature shall adopt a
joint resolution of apportionment conforming to the judgment of the supreme
court.
(e) EXTRAORDINARY APPORTIONMENT SESSION; REVIEW OF
APPORTIONMENT. Within fifteen days after the adjournment of an
extraordinary apportionment session, the attorney general shall file a petition in
the supreme court of the state setting forth the apportionment resolution adopted
by the legislature, or if none has been adopted reporting that fact to the court.
Consideration of the validity of ajoint resolution of apportionment shall be had
as provided for in cases of such joint resolution adopted at a regular or special
apportionment session.
(f) JUDICIAL REAPPORTIONMENT. Should an extraordinary apportion-
ment session fail to adopt a resolution of apportionment or should the supreme
court determine that the apportionment made is invalid, the court shall, not later
than sixty days after receiving the petition of the attorney general, file with the
secretary of state an order making such apportionment.
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during 1972 and 1982, explore the contentious 1992 redistricting battle, and
then look at proposed changes to see if they might improve upon the
existing provision.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF REDISTRICTING IN FLORIDA
A. The Former Provisions
Florida Constitution, article III, section 16 is a product of the 1965
Florida Constitution Revision Commission's efforts which ultimately led to
the present Florida Constitution, adopted by the voters in 1968. The
Commission's work on the legislative redistricting provision, however, had
its roots in the United States Supreme Court decision of Baker v. Carr.5
In Baker, the Court tossed the lower courts into a "political thicket"6 by
holding that legislative redistricting presented a justiciable issue.' Ensuing
litigation challenged Florida's legislative districts as being malapportioned.8
The history of redistricting litigation in Florida is a study of the rapid
migration into, and urbanization of, a state that had been traditionally
controlled politically by rural interests. The explosive urban growth that
began in the 1950's came at a time when minorities, particularly Blacks,
were seeking, and to some degree realizing, a greater voice in the political
processes. This stronger minority voice can be seen in the United States Su-
preme Court desegregation decisions of the mid-1950's 9 and the passage of
both the Civil Rights Act ° and Voting Rights Act" in the mid-1960's.
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
7. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
8. These cases are commonly referred to as the Swann litigation. See Sobel v. Adams,
208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Sobel v. Adams, 214 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Fla. 1963), rev'd
sub nom. Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); Swann v. Adam, 383 U.S. 210 (1966);
Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev d, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Swann v.
Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1967). See also In re Apportionment Law Appearing
As Senate Joint Resolution I E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1048
(Fla. 1982).
"Malapportionment" is the inequitable distribution of legislative seats created either by
the failure to reapportion at regular intervals based on population formula, or by the use of
a population formula that discriminates against a group or geographical area of the state.
Both practices are illegal under Baker and its progeny.
9. See, for example, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and its progeny.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
11. Id. § 1973.
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Each Florida redistricting case represents a microcosm of the population
shift from rural to urban domination and the attendant emergence of
minorities toward becoming a potent political focus, all reflected in the
battle for legislative power.
Prior to the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, the provision controlling
legislative redistricting was article VII, section 3 of the 1885 Constitution
which required legislative districts
to be as nearly equal in population as practicable, but no county shall
be divided in making such apportionment, and each District shall have
one Senator; and, at the same time, the Legislature shall also apportion
the Representation in the House of Representatives, and shall allow
three (3) Representatives to each of the five most populous counties,
and two (2) Representatives to each of the next eighteen more populous
counties, and one Representative to each of the remaining counties of
the State at the time of such apportionment. 2
Thus, as demonstrated in Sobel v. Adams, a relatively small number of
voters could elect a majority of the Legislature:
Each of the three representatives in the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives from Dade County, the most populous county in the State,
represents the equivalent of 311,000 people according to the 1960
Federal census. The member from Gilchrist, the least populous county,
would represent 2,868 residents. The five most populous counties
12. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VII, § 3. The 1885 constitutional provision called for 38
Senate districts. Id. Prior to 1885, redistricting was governed by article IX of the Florida
Constitutions of 1838, 1861, 1865 and article XIII of the Florida Constitution of 1868.
The 1838, 1861, and 1865 Constitutions provided for one representative for each
county, with increases in the number of representatives based on a uniform population ratio,
which would remain in place until a new census was taken. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX,
§ I; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 1. The Senate was
not to be less than one-fourth nor more than one-half the number of representatives. FLA.
CONsT. of 1838, art. IX, § 2; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. IX, § 2; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art.
IX, § 2.
The 1868 Constitution gave each county one representative, plus an additional
representative for each 1000 registered voters, up to a maximum of four for any county.
FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI1I, § I. The Senate remained essentially unchanged. See 25A
FLA. STAT. ANN. 672 (West 1991) (annot. to FLA. CONST. art XII, § 10). The 1885
Constitution, as amended in 1950, provided that the official federal census would be the
official Florida census upon which the Legislature would rely. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art.
VII, § 5 (1950). Prior to this amendment, the 1885 Constitution required the Legislature to
enumerate by county all of the state's inhabitants. Id.
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average one representative for each 106,000 people. The five least
populous counties average one representative for each 3,266 people.
The membership of the Florida Senate, considered on a basis of
representation of numbers, would show a similar disparity between the
more populous and the less populous areas.13
The three-judge court 4 in Sobel, considering a constitutional challenge
based on urban-rural population inequality as opposed to pure race-based
variance, found the 1962 redistricting plan before it invidiously discrimina-
tory and contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but gave the Legislature the opportunity to remedy the violation. 5
The federal court, upon reviewing the Legislature's new plan, proceeded to
validate it.'6 On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirements of the use of population as a basis for redistricting and
permitting deviations only if supported by legitimate considerations
implicating rational state policies as set out in Reynolds v. Sims. 7
On remand, the federal district court deferred action until after the
1965 legislative session, during which the Legislature adopted another
redistricting plan. 8 The district court held that the new plan did not meet
constitutional requirements; however, the plan would be implemented on an
interim basis expiring sixty days after adjournment of the 1967 legislative
session.' 9 The United States Supreme Court, finding no basis for allowing
interim implementation of an unconstitutional malapportioned plan, reversed
the district court and remanded the cause for the purpose of effectuating a
valid plan for the 1966 elections.2"
In March, 1966, the Legislature adopted yet another plan which
provided for multi-member districts with population deviations in the Senate
in excess of twenty-six percent and in the House in excess of thirty-four
percent." The United States Supreme Court once again invalidated the
13. Sobel, 208 F. Supp. at 317.
14. Litigation challenging any statewide legislative redistricting is heard by athree-judge
federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988).
15. Sobel, 208 F. Supp. at 318-19.
16. Sobel, 214 F. Supp. at 812.
17. See Swann, 378 U.S. at 553; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
18. Sobel, 258 F. Supp. at 820.
19. Id. at 822.
20. Swann, 383 U.S. at 211-12.
21. See Sobel, 258 F. Supp. at 826. As demonstrated herein, Florida Constitution article
11I, section 16 requires redistricting in conformity with the Federal Constitution. Population
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plan because the state had not justified these deviations on rational state
policy grounds.22 On remand, the district court, finding Florida's plan
constitutionally infirm, took it upon itself to redistrict the State into forty-
eight Senate districts and 119 House districts.23 The 1968 Constitution
Revision Commission wanted to avoid further litigation by providing a
mechanism for ultimate judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court.24
During its deliberations, the Commission's main focus was on the impor-
tance of the one person, one vote principle, as well as the contiguity and
relative size of districts.2"
B. The Current Provision
1. Overview of Substantive Considerations
Florida Constitution, article III, section 16 was born of this five-year
litigation chronology and requires the Legislature, by joint resolution not
subject to gubernatorial veto, to reapportion the state into not less than thirty
nor more than forty senatorial districts, and into not less than eighty nor
more than 120 representative districts, in accordance with both the state and
Federal Constitutions.2' This must be accomplished during the regular
session of the Legislature convened "in the second year following each
decennial census."27  The provision further requires that both Houses
consist of "consecutively numbered . . . districts of either contiguous,
overlapping or identical territory. 28  "Contiguous" means sharing a
deviation is a factor in the one person, one vote mandate. Population deviation is the
difference between a district's actual population, and the "ideal" population determined by
dividing the total state population by the number of districts. For example, if a state has a
population of 10,000,000 and a 100-seat legislative body, the ideal population district is
10,000,000 divided by 100 or 100,000.
22. Swann, 385 U.S. at 573.
23. Swann, 263 F. Supp. at 226. The court further held that the term of office for those
elected under this plan would expire with the 1968 general elections. Id. at 228.
24. See Constitution Revision Commission Convention Proceedings, 11-28-66 to 1-7-67,
Vol. 22 Series 722.
25. Id.
26. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 16(a).
27. Id. The decennial census is conducted in every year ending in zero. See 13 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1988). The Florida Constitution provides that "[e]ach decennial census of the state
taken by the United States shall be an official census of the state" and "become(s) effective
on the thirtieth day after the final adjournment of the regular session of the legislature
convened next after certification of the census." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 8.
28. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a).
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common boundary for a reasonably significant distance; "overlapping"
means sharing some of the territory of two districts; "identical" means two
districts following the same lines.29
The state constitutional requirement that redistricting be accomplished
in accordance with the Federal Constitution necessitates inquiry of the one
person, one vote principle. Specifically, population deviation, the profound
implications of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, political
gerrymandering and other federally recognized factors have to be considered
in the process.
The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 2 governs appor-
tionment of the United States House of Representatives and requires that
redistricting of that body be approached with the objective of achieving zero
deviation from population equality.3" The ideal district population is
determined by dividing the state's total population by the number of seats
assigned to the state. 31 A state's total deviation is determined by adding
the percentage above the ideal population of the largest district and the
percentage below the ideal population of the smallest district. The United
States Supreme Court, in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,32 held that there is no
point at which population deviations become de minimis or insignificant for
congressional reapportionment; states are required to make a good faith
effort to achieve mathematical equality.33  Any deviation from precise
mathematical equality with regard to congressional redistricting is examined
with a jaundiced eye. Only where population variances are unavoidable
despite a good faith effort to achieve zero deviation, or where there is a
compelling justification for the deviation, will the court accept such
variances. 4
While the Federal Constitution, Article I, Section 2 controls congres-
sional reapportionment and redistricting, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to state legislative realignment. In Reynolds
29. See In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, 1982
Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 1982). These considerations
are addressed further in part III of this article.
30. See U.S. CONST. art i, § 2; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
31. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 528. Congressional districts are all single-member. 2
U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988). By the 1990 census, Florida was accorded 23 congressional districts.
32. 394 U.S. at 526.
33. Id. at 530-31.
34. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973). Population variance is determined by
taking the difference between a district's actual population and ideal population, and dividing
that number by the ideal population. This results in the percentage proportion by which a
district's population exceeds or is below the ideal population.
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v. Sims,35 the Court recognized that the Equal Protection Clause provides
for more flexibility with respect to state legislative apportionment.36
However, states are still required to make an honest and good faith effort to
draw districts as near to equal population as is practical.37 The Reynolds
Court recognized that mathematical exactness or precision is not necessarily
a workable constitutional requirement in the state legislative process, and
that some deviations are constitutionally permissible so long as the variances
from a strict population standard are based on legitimate state policy consid-
eration.38 The Court cautioned, however, that even where there may be
rational state policy considerations for population deviations among the
several legislative districts, population is still the controlling consideration,
and population equality the ultimate goal.39
The Reynolds Court declined to spell out any precise constitutional test
for population variance propriety, deciding instead to consider each case on
its particular factual basis. However, the Court, in Mahan v. Howell,
40
suggested the outer limits of allowable population variation among
legislative districts when it held that a 16.4% variation did not exceed the
limits under which equal protection would be satisfied. However, the Court
cautioned that its view was limited to the particular and complex facts of
that case.4' In Connor v. Finch42 and Chapman v. Meier,43 the Court
held that variations of sixteen to twenty percent were constitutionally
unacceptable.44
In White v. Register45 and Gaffney v. Cummings,46 the Court held
that population deviations of less than ten percent were ipsofacto acceptable
as de minimis in the face of a challenge of invidious discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47
Through the 1982 redistricting process, minorities claiming that their
respective voting power was negated or diluted as a result of skewed
35. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36. Id. at 578.
37. Id. at 577.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 567.
40. 410 U.S. 315, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
41. Id.
42. 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
43. 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
44. Connor, 431 U.S. at 417; Chapman, 420 U.S. at 24.
45. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
46. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
47. Id.; White, 412 U.S. at 764.
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boundary lines had to rely on the Voting Rights Act of 196548 and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, all
of which required a showing of purposeful discriminatory intent.49 This
intent requirement spurred Congress to amend the Voting Rights Act by
eliminating a showing of intent and imposing a results standard which
allows affected minorities to prove a violation of federal law by establishing
that they did not have an equal opportunity to "participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice" as a result of a voting
practice or procedure, including a legislative redistricting plan." The 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act were first considered by the United
States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles5" which involved a chal-
lenge to legislative redistricting plans in North Carolina calling for one
multi-member senate district, one single-member senate district, and five
multi-member house districts. The Court held that challengers to a
redistricting plan must prove the following three threshold conditions: (1)
that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district;" (2) that it is "politically
cohesive;" and (3) that, in the absence of special circumstances, such as
incumbency, bloc voting by the white majority usually defeats the minority's
preferred candidate. 2
Once these three conditions are established, certain objective factors
must be considered by the court in determining whether, from the "totality
of the circumstances,"" a violation has occurred. 4  These totality factors
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
49. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). This is commonly referred to as Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended. Section 2 provides:
A violation of [Section 2] is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by [Section 2] in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
51. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
52. Id. at 50-51.
53. See id. at 43.
54. Id. at 46.
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include the following: (1) the extent of the history of official discrimination
touching on the class participation in the democratic process; (2) racially
polarized voting; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single-shot provisions,55 or other voting practices that enhance the opportu-
nity for discrimination; (4) denial of access to the candidate slating process
for members of the class; (5) the extent to which the members of the
minority group bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education,
employment, and health which hinder effective participation; (6) whether
political campaigns have been characterized by racial appeal; (7) the extent
to which members of the protected class have been elected; (8) whether
there is a significant lack of responsiveness by elected officials to the
particularized needs of the minority group; and (9) whether the policy
underlying the use of the voting qualification, standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous. 6
This list is not exhaustive; other factors may be relevant, and it is not
necessary that all, or any number of factors, be proved. 7 Litigation under
Section 2 is highly fact-intensive, and must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. 8 Therefore, for challengers to prevail on a vote dilution claim
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, they must ultimately show that
under the totality of the circumstances, the legislative redistricting scheme
"has the effect of diminishing or abridging the voting strength of the
protected [minority] class."'59
In addition to the availability of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as amended, to allow minorities such as Blacks and Hispanics to
challenge redistricting plans that dilute the relative strength of minority
55. Under single-shot voting, a voter may cast as many votes as there are candidates in
a pool, or the voters may choose to vote for a lesser number of candidates. This tends to
allow factions to target, or single-shot, particular candidates.
56. Id. at 44-45.
57. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45.
58. See id. at 46.
59. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993). As the cases noted below
demonstrate, implicit concerns in the vote dilution analysis include packing and fracturing
of a cohesive minority group. "Packing" is the concentration of a minority group into one
or more districts so that the group constitutes an overwhelming majority in those districts,
thereby negating the relative voting strength of a percentage of the total minority vote.
Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1093 (N.D. III. 1982). "Fracturing"
is the breaking off of small percentages of a bloc of minority voters for inclusion in a large
majority district, thereby submerging the minority vote in the majority district. Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 349 (E.D.N.C. 1984), ajf'd sub nom. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at
30.
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voters, there is another provision of the Voting Rights Act which has
vitalized the federal government's role in monitoring state governments'
regulation of the election process, including the redistricting process:
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.6"
Section 2 applies to all jurisdictions by prohibiting states or political
subdivisions from imposing any voting practice or procedure that dilutes the
voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities, regardless of intent to
discriminate. Section 5, however, applies only to specified jurisdictions,
requiring them to be precleared by either the Department of Justice (DOJ)
or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, by showing
that any election practice or procedure affecting them does not have the
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote of a racial or
ethnic minority group.6
In addition to voting strength equality and minority vote dilution
considerations, the Federal Constitution also makes political gerrymandering
a justiciable issue.62 Thus, if a redistricting plan, by arbitrarily arranging
district boundaries so as to give undue advantage to one political group over
another, thereby preventing the adversely affected group from improving its
standing in elections, consigns that group to minority status during the life
of the redistricting plan, or provides that group with little or no chance of
improving its position at the next redistricting, that plan is subject to legal
challenge.63 Other factors recognized by the United States Supreme Court
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
61. Since redistricting is a voting procedure which must be precleared as to covered
'jurisdictions, Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the redistricting plans for
state legislative seats are required to pass the preclearance procedure before they can become
effective in those covered jurisdictions. Five Florida counties-Collier, Hardee, Hendry,
Hillsborough and Monroe-were included in 1975 amendments to the Act as covered
jurisdictions because of their use of English-only election materials that discriminated against
voters with a dominant language other than English. A redistricting plan must be precleared
as to these five counties only. Other changes include, but are not limited to: (1) any change
in qualifications or eligibility for voting; (2) changes concerning registration; (3) changes
involving the use of a language other than English in any aspect of the electoral process; (4)
changes in the boundaries of voting precincts or in the location of polling places; (5) changes
in the boundaries of a voting unit (through redistricting, annexation, incorporation,
reapportionment, changing to at-large elections from district elections or vice-versa); (6)
changes in the method of determining the outcome of an election; (7) changes affecting the
eligibility of persons to become or remain a candidate; and (8) changes in the eligibility and
qualification for independent candidates. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.13 (1992).
62. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986).
63. A plan that purports to save as many incumbents of a political party as possible at
the expense of opposing party candidates is susceptible to a charge of political gerry-
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as legitimate considerations in the redistricting process include respecting
local boundaries, making districts compact, preserving the cores of existing
districts by not unnecessarily dividing them, and avoiding contests between
incumbents.64 Compactness generally refers to districts that are regular in
shape, having no unnecessary bulges or protrusions. The emphasis on
compactness is on eliminating distance variations for constituents and candi-
dates. These principles are not found in the state or Federal Constitution;65
however, they are important, along with the other redistricting principles,
because they may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been racially
gerrymandered.66 Implicit in the application of these time-tested principles
of redistricting is the view that those who are contained within a district
share a commonality of ideas and beliefs, and that any plan that may disrupt
this putative cohesiveness, such as splitting boundaries or pitting incumbents
against one another, is to be treated with skepticism.
2. Procedural Requirements
The Florida Constitution contemplates that redistricting will be
accomplished by joint resolution by the end of the regular legislative
session.67  This happened only once, however, in 1972. Under the
constitutional scheme, if a plan is adopted by the end of the regular session,
the Attorney General of Florida then has fifteen days to petition the supreme
court for a declaratory judgment ruling on the validity of the plan.6' The
supreme court then has up to thirty days to both permit adversary interests
to submit their views and to enter its judgment.69 If the court disapproves
the plan adopted during the regular session, the Governor has up to five
days to convene by proclamation an extraordinary session of the Legislature,
mandering. The evidentiary burden, however, is the high intent standard of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
64. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983). The desire to protect
incumbents, however, must not take precedence over the voting potential of a protected
minority group. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
65. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973).
66. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 725.
67. FLA. CONST. art. IlI, § 16(a).
68. Id. § 16(c).
69. Id. If approved, the plan becomes law, "binding upon all the citizens of the state,"
id. § 16(d), subject to review by the United States Attorney General under § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1975), which requires preclearance as described
above, and subject to the court's retained jurisdiction.
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which has up to fifteen days to adopt a valid plan. 0 If a plan is adopted,
the Attorney General has fifteen days to submit it to the court, which has
thirty days to permit adversary interests to present their views and to enter
its judgment.71 If the plan is disapproved following an extraordinary
session, the court has sixty days from the submission by the Attorney
General to draw up a plan.72 If no plan is adopted by the Legislature
during the extraordinary apportionment session, the Attorney General has
fifteen days to so inform the court,73 which then has sixty days to draw up
its own plan.74
If the Legislature is unable to adopt a redistricting plan during its
regular session, the Governor has thirty days to convene a special apportion-
ment session by proclamation, giving the Legislature an additional thirty
days to adopt a plan.75 If no plan is adopted, the Attorney General has
five days from adjournment of that session to inform the court, which then
has sixty days to adopt its own plan.76
Thus, while the Legislature is given the first opportunity to establish
a redistricting plan, there are three instances in which the supreme court
may exercise this power: (1) when the Legislature fails to adopt a plan by
the end of a special apportionment session; (2) when the Legislature fails to
adopt a plan by the end of the extraordinary apportionment session; and (3)
when the court invalidates the legislative joint resolution adopted during an
extraordinary apportionment session.77
III. THE CONSTITUTION IN OPERATION
A. 1972
The first opportunity for article III, section 16's operation took place
70. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(d).
71. Id. § 16(e).
72. Id. § 16(f).
73. Id. § 16(e).
74. Id. § 16(f).
75. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a). This 30-day period cannot be limited by the Gover-
nor, who may use his discretion only in deciding when this special session will begin, which
must be within 30 days after adjournment of the regular session. Florida Senate v. Graham,
412 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1982). Only apportionment may be considered during this special
apportionment session. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 16(a).
76. Id. § 16(b).
77. 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 672 (West 1991) (annot. to FLA. CONST. art III, § 16).
1014 [Vol. 18
303
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Waas
in 1972 when the Attorney General petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for
a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a joint legislative
resolution adopted during the regular session. In In re Apportionment Law
Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972 Regular Session,7
the court held that its review of an apportionment plan is limited to facial
validity only,7 9 and declared both that legislative reapportionment is
primarily a matter for the Legislature,"° and that "[j]udicial relief becomes
appropriate only when a legislature fails to act according to federal and state
constitutional requisites."'" The court was called upon to address the
integrity of traditional boundary lines, population deviations and multi-mem-
ber districts-matters not found in the constitutional provision itself. The
court held that there is no requirement for legislative district lines to follow
county or precinct lines; the only requirement is that districts be either
"contiguous, overlapping or identical territory."82
As to population deviations, the court said:
The Constitutions of Florida and the United States require that one
man's vote in a district be worth as much as another. Mathematical
exactness is not an absolute requirement in state apportionment plans;
however, deviations, when unavoidable, must be de minimis. Whether
a deviation is de minimis must be determined on the facts of each
case.
83
The court noted that the total deviation for the House of Represen-
tatives was 0.30% while that of the Senate was 1.15%.84 The issue of
minority representation was addressed in connection with the legislative
decision to combine single- and multi-member districts in the redistricting
plan.
78. 263 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1972).
79. Id. at 808.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 800.
82. Id. at 801. Contiguity was not discussed during the 1972 process. It was not until
1982 that the court first addressed contiguity.
83. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972
Regular Session, 263 So. 2d at 802.
84. Id. As previously noted, to determine population deviation for legislative redistrict-
ing, it is first necessary to establish each district's ideal population. This is done by dividing
the total state population according to the official census by 40 (Senate) and 120 (House),
respectively. The deviation is the difference between the ideal population and a district's
actual population; the range of deviation is the difference between the least and most
populous districts.
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On multi-member districts, the court, after considering both article III,
section 16(a) and article III, section 1, which provides for the election of
one senator from each senatorial district and one representative from each
house district, held:
Construing these two sections together, the Constitution requires that
there be one senator elected from each Senatorial district and one
member of the House of Representatives elected from each representa-
tive district. This, standing alone, would require single-member
districts. However, the Constitution further provides that districts may
be "identical territory." This means that multi-members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives may be elected from identical territory
if such territory were designated as constituting several districts.85
Thus, the court concluded that multi-member districts are permissible
and may co-exist in the same plan with single-member districts. The court
found that the plan which divided Florida into 120 house districts of which
twenty-one were single-member, ten were two-member, nine were three-
member, twenty were four-member, thirty were five-member and thirty were
six-member; and into forty senate districts, of which five were single-memb-
er, fourteen were two-member, and twenty-one were three-member, was
reasonable and did not violate federal constitutional equal protection
requirements.86 The supreme court's 1972 decision did not end the matter,
for in its opinion, it set its precedent for retaining jurisdiction to permit
challengers to question the validity of the plan by presenting specific factual
objections to it.
The Constitution Revision Commission's desire to avoid proliferating
redistricting litigation was short-lived, as four supplemental proceedings
were filed with the supreme court, and a separate lawsuit was filed in
federal court in Jacksonville. Soon after the supreme court acted, suit was
filed in federal court both by plaintiffs who appeared before the supreme
85. Id. at 806-07. The court, in addressing claims of unreasonableness of classifications
of single-member and multi-member districts, said it "is not at liberty to declare the ... plan
void because it allegedly creates inconvenience, is unfair, or is inequitable, in the absence of
a violation of some provision of the constitution." Id. at 807. Multi-member districts are
those from which more than one legislator is elected to represent the area. Single-member
districts are those from which only one legislator is elected. The latter is the more common;
Florida's Legislature is made up of single-member districts.
86. The state court did not address the United States Supreme Court's jaundiced view
of multi-member districting plans, namely that they generally pose greater threats to
minority-voter participation than do single-member districts. See Bums v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
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court and others who did not, claiming that portions of the redistricting plan
created impermissible racial and political gerrymandering.17  The federal
court, after dismissing plaintiffs who appeared in the supreme court for
impermissibly seeking to appeal a decision from the state's highest court,
found that the remaining plaintiffs, claiming a one person, one vote
violation, failed to meet the high evidentiary burden of intentional discrimi-
nation, proof of discriminatory effect on and actual prejudice to-identifiable
racial or political segments of voters, or racial gerrymandering."8 A year
later, the supreme court held that the legislative plan was not shown to be
unconstitutional in its implementation on a claim that it deprived citizens of
Lee County of meaningful senatorial representation by the fact that no
candidate from that county entered any of the primary elections for seats in
the senate in any of the four districts which cut across Lee County lines.89
In another proceeding, the supreme court rejected a claim that the redistrict-
ing plan left voters in Neptune Beach and Jacksonville Beach without an
effective voice because the plan did not join these two communities. The
court concluded that the plan did not leave Neptune Beach officials without
any effective voice in the Legislature,, even though the plan assigned the
area to senate districts which did not include the consolidated city of
Jacksonville.9" These two cases involved local interests desirous of
obtaining a broader political power base through enhanced representation.
Several years after the 1972 redistricting process, the growing influence
of minorities manifested itself in redistricting challenges before the Florida
Supreme Court. In 1977, the court rejected claims by Dade County
Hispanics that their voting strength had been negated because of the large
influx of Hispanics into that area of the state, coupled with the fact that the
petitioners resided in multi-member districts. A bare majority of the court
held that it did not intend to retain jurisdiction over the 1972 plan in order
to continuously monitor changing racial, ethnic or population patterns. 9'
Finally, in a case that began in 1977 and concluded in 1980, the court
rejected a constitutional challenge to the multi-member house districts in
Pinellas County, Florida. 92 However, the court appointed a commissioner
to take evidence on the claim that the multi-member district constitutionally
impaired the voting strength of the racial or political composition of Pinellas
87. Wolfson v. Nearing, 346 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
88. Id. at 804.
89. In re Tohari, 279 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1973).
90. Futch v. Stone, 281 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1973).
91. Cardenas v. Smathers, 351 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1977).
92. Milton v. Smathers, 351 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1977).
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County. The commissioner's findings were reported to the court in 1980,
and the court denied relief.93
B. 1982
The 1982 Legislature, reflecting on a history of litigation characterizing
the redistricting process, approached its mandate from the standpoint of an
openness not previously seen in Florida.94 A House Select Committee on
Reapportionment was formed in 1980 to analyze case law on the subject and
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 requires federal preclearance,
or approval, of any plan that of necessity involves five of Florida's sixty-
seven counties, as a result of amendments adopted after the 1972 redistrict-
ing.95  This Select Committee conducted twenty-one public hearings
throughout the state from August to October, 1981.96 It considered
detailed population data, the dynamics of population growth particularly
with respect to minorities, and all criteria applicable to the process.
97
Additionally, the Select Committee actually sought and received interest
group input.98 The Legislature adopted the plan on April 7, 1982; 99 five
days later, the Attorney General submitted his petition.' 0 One month
later, the supreme court approved the plan.' The plan was then Submit-
ted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was received by the
state on August 5, 1982."02
The 1982 redistricting effort is noted for five precedent-setting actions.
93. Milton v. Smathers, 389 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1980). After conducting fact-finding
proceedings, the commissioner found that the multi-member districts did not unconstitutional-
ly impair the voting strength of the district's Black population. The supreme court's decision
was based on the absence of evidence of intent to discriminate-the critical element in
proving a fourteenth amendment violation. Indeed, all of the cases based on the 1972
redistricting process were reviewed under this "intent to discriminate" standard. As shown
below, a change in this standard of proof coupled with United States Supreme Court and
Department of Justice involvement, paved the way for further and more intensive litigation
culminating in the 1992 experience.
94. Mark Herron, An Overview of Florida's 1982 Reapportionment, FLORIDA
ENVIRONMENTAL AND URBAN ISSUES, Oct. 1982, at 5.
95. Id at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Herron, supra note 94, at 5.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id.
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First, the Legislature had to convene a special session to accomplish its
constitutional mandate. Second, the Legislature opted for single-member
districts for all forty Senate seats and all 120 House seats, adopting a
recommendation made by the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission." 3
The purpose of this shift was to lessen the prospects that minority groups'
voting strength would be negated as a result of the winner-take-all nature of
multi-member district elections.0 4 Third, the Select Committee defined
"contiguity."' 0 5 Fourth, detailed consideration was given to representation
for the Hispanic and Black population with de minimis population devia-
tion.106 Finally, a redistricting plan had to be submitted to the DOJ for
preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,
directed to the five counties brought under the law in 1975. °7
The Florida Supreme Court considered a contiguity challenge to one
house district in which challengers contended one portion was only touching
another portion and the constitution requires more.0 8 The court rejected
this challenge, holding that while lands mutually touching only at a common
comer or right angle are not contiguous, a district in which no part is
isolated from another by an intervening district is contiguous.0 9
The House plan provided seven districts with Hispanic population of
fifty-eight percent or higher and seven districts with Black population of
fifty-two percent or higher."0 The Senate plan had one district with a
Black population of sixty-five percent and two districts with Hispanic
population of fifty-five percent or higher."' The total deviation in
population among senate and house districts was 1.05% and 0.46%,
103. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a) provides for the creation of a constitution revision
commission 10 years after the adopting of the 1968 Constitution, and every 20 years
thereafter.
104. See In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 1982).
105. Id. at 1051.
106. See Herron, supra note 94, at 7.
107. Id.
108. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1051.
109. Id. "Contiguous" means sharing a common boundary for a reasonable distance;
"overlapping" means that some parts of the districts are shared; "identical" applies when
districts follow the same lines, as in the case of multi-member districts where a house and
senate district may have the same lines or boundaries. Id.
I10. ld. at 1045.
111. Id.
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respectively.'1 2 The plan for senate districts maintained the boundary line
integrity of forty-five counties by not splitting them; the plan for house
districts maintained the integrity of twenty-six counties.113 In most
instances, county lines were split because population was greater than the
ideal number of people per district.'' 4
The Florida Supreme Court found no proof of purposeful discrimina-
tion.115 The court rejected claims that a district in Dade County had been
gerrymandered to the detriment of the Hispanic population, and that in Dade
County, districts should be redrawn to provide for a larger concentration of
Black voters." 6 The court recognized that challenges are cognizable under
the Fourteenth Amendment even though districts may be relatively equal in
population."' However, in citing to United States Supreme Court cases
decided after the 1972 Florida Supreme Court decision validating the 1972
redistricting plan, the court said:
We consider any minority challenge to the plan as raising an issue of
whether it invidiously discriminates against any minority group. To
show invidious discrimination, the objector to the plan for apportion-
ment must produce evidence which supports the finding that the
political process in this apportionment plan was a "purposefully
discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to
vote 'on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."'
The objectors have the burden to show this Court that the plan was
motivated by an intent to discriminate." 8
The court concluded that the plan before it did "not invidiously
discriminate against any racial or language minority for the purpose of
minimizing or canceling the voting strength of either the Black or Hispanic
population in violation of either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments,
112. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1044.
113. Id. at 1045.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1052.
116. Id.
117. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1052.
118. Id. (citations omitted). The court also decided that senators' four-year terms should
be truncated, there could be no "holdover" terms, and senators were required to run if, as a
result of redistricting, there is a change in district lines and constituency. Id. at 1047-48.
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,"119
In contrast to 1972, the openness of the 1982 process and the decision
to use single-member districts only (coupled with the high evidentiary
burden necessary to prove a constitutional violation), contributed to the least
contentious redistricting process in Florida's modern history.2 2 The
relative ease by which 1982 redistricting was accomplished and the lack of
any federal and supplemental state judicial activity is in stark contrast to
what transpired in 1992.121
C. 1992
The 1992 redistricting process was the end product of an unprecedented
population growth and a fundamental change in federal voting rights laws.
These two factors clashed with the state's traditional one-party domination
of Florida government to produce the most intense legislative district
realignment in the state's history, dominated by racial and ethnic minority
group efforts to secure a greater piece of the state's political power pie.
According to the 1990 census, the state's population increased during
the last decade by more than thirty percent, to just under thirteen million,
from a previous 9.7 million. 122 A substantial portion of this phenomenal
growth resulted from the immigration of Hispanics from Central and South
America. Nowhere was this growth more evident than in heavily populated
Dade County. As the number of Hispanics mushroomed, they became
increasingly active both civically and politically in their new community.
They registered, voted, campaigned for, sought and won election to office
as Republicans in what was historically a firmly entrenched Democratic
Party stronghold.
The second significant change involved the amendments to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.123 The amendments altered the method by which a
minority group could show a voting practice or procedure, including a
redistricting plan, thereby violating its right to fair and equal participation
119. Id. at 1052 (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
120. Critics accused the 1972 Legislature leadership of adopting a "secret plan." Herron,
supra note 94, at 6-7.
121. As in 1972, the supreme court retained exclusive state jurisdiction to consider
challenges to the 1982 plan. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution
I E, Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1052.
122. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d 276, 289 (Fla. 1992).
123. Id. at 280.
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in the electoral process. 24  As noted above, this change in the legal
standard took place at a time of rapid increase in the Hispanic population,
particularly in the multicultural population-intense counties of Dade and
Hillsborough. These factors, coupled with the rise of the Republican Party
in what was traditionally a one-party state, and the enhanced overall
consciousness of minority rights generally, set the stage for 1992's
redistricting efforts dominated by politics, race and ethnicity.
The battle lines for the 1992 redistricting effort were drawn along
political, racial and ethnic lines toward a common goal: the exercise of
political power and influence. In addition to the clamor for access to and
exercise of political power during this most contentious redistricting cycle,
underlying tensions surfaced between Blacks and Hispanics, particularly in
Dade County. 2 '
Legislative leaders anticipated heightened activity, particularly by
minorities during the 1992 legislative session. Reflecting on the 1982
experience, the leaders began preparing for the session four years earlier.
The House and Senate each hired separate expert technical staffs and
provided them with state-of-the-art computer systems. Reapportionment
committees were appointed in 1991 for the House and Senate, and both
chambers hosted thirty-two public hearings throughout the state between
September and December, 1991. The purpose of the hearings was to
provide for unfettered citizen involvement in the development of a
constitutional redistricting plan, and to educate the public on the subject and
its process. '26
On January 14, the first day of the 1992 Florida legislative session,
Miguel DeGrandy filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the constitu-
tionality of Florida's then-existing congressional and state legislative
districts."2 7 DeGrandy, a Republican member of the Florida House of
Representatives from Dade County, joined with party leaders, other Republi-
can legislators and voters, in naming as defendants the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, T. K. Wetherell, the President of the Florida Senate,
124. Id.
125. In Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1481 (11th Cir. 1993),
involving a Voting Rights Act claim that the at-large county commission election districts
dilute the voting strength of Blacks and Hispanics, the appeals court found that a district
court's finding of a "keen hostility" between Blacks and Hispanics in Dade County is not
clearly erroneous.
126. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 278.
127. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1554 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
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Gwen Margolis, the Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State. 128
The Complaint alleged that the then-existing congressional and state districts
violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amend-
ed. 12
9
After preliminary procedural skirmishes, DeGrandy filed a Second
Amended Complaint on March 9th 3' further alleging that the then-existing
congressional and legislative districts violated Article I, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution and the "one-person, one-vote" principle, and that
since the former districts diluted the voting strength of minority voters, they
violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.' 3 ' DeGrandy also
alleged that the Florida Legislature was at an impasse and therefore unable
to act; that the time frame for redistricting set forth in the Florida Constitu-
tion, article III, section 16, in light of the preclearance requirements of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, would not provide for sufficient time
to adopt a valid redistricting plan for the State Legislature and that therefore
this provision was unconstitutional; 3 2 and that the democratic leadership,
the Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, and Governor, "intention-
ally misused the time lines and procedures found in Article III ... to delay
the redistricting process to the advantage of white (democratic) incumbents
and to the detriment of voters and would-be challengers to those incum-
bents."' 33
On March 13, the Florida Legislature adjourned its regular session
without adopting a state redistricting plan.' 34 Two weeks later, the federal
court established an expedited schedule for adoption of both congressional
and state legislative plans by May 29.'3 However, the court's order did
not prohibit state officials from attempting to enact a redistricting plan.'
136
On April 2, the Governor called a special redistricting and apportionment
session of the Florida Legislature pursuant to article III, section 16(a) of the
Florida Constitution. Eight days later, the Legislature adopted Senate Joint
Resolution 2(3 redistricting both houses of the Legislature.'37
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Specific dates are included here to demonstrate the intensity of the litigation.
131. Id.
132. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1554. The federal court never ruled on this claim.
133. Id. at 1555.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1555.
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Four days before the Legislature adopted a redistricting plan, the
federal court appointed a special master.3 ' On April 7, the court consoli-
dated the DeGrandy case with a similar lawsuit filed by the Florida State
Conference of the NAACP Branches and other individual African-American
voters. 39  The court also granted other persons and entities leave to
intervene or act as amicus curiae."'
On April 17, the Florida Attorney General submitted Senate Joint
Resolution 2G to the DOJ for preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.'4 ' That same day, the three-judge federal court
ordered bifurcated hearings on congressional redistricting and state
redistricting plans. 42 Meanwhile, three days after the April 10 legislative
adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, the Florida Attorney General
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment determining
the validity of the joint resolution.' 43 Before the supreme court, the
proponents of the senate joint resolution contended that because the court's
analysis is directed solely to facial constitutional validity of the legislation,
the court could not address the complex evidentiary standard imposed on
those who challenge a redistricting plan under the Voting Rights Act.'
Opponents of the senate joint resolution, also the intervenors to the
federal court litigation, contended that the supreme court could not fulfill its
duty without conducting a time-consuming analysis under the Voting Rights
Act-an impossible burden in light of time constraints on campaigning and
elections.'45 The opponents further requested that the court declare the
joint resolution facially invalid. 4 ' They also argued that the court should
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1555. The adoption of a congressional redistricting
plan is accomplished in the same manner as the adoption of any piece of Legislation-appro-
val by both houses of the Legislature and subject to gubernatorial veto. In 1992, the
Legislature was unable to adopt a congressional redistricting plan; therefore, the federal court
undertook the task and appointed a special master, who presided over a trial and prepared a
report. After receiving the special master's report on congressional redistricting, and con-
ducting hearings on his findings and conclusions, the federal court, on May 29, issued its
judgment adopting a congressional redistricting plan. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp.
1076, 1081 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
143. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 278.
144. Id. at 281-82.
145. Id. at 282.
146. Id.
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disregard the thirty-day requirement of the Florida Constitution redistricting
provision and refer the case to a judge or master to conduct the necessary
fact-finding analysis contemplated by the Voting Rights Act or withhold
ruling and defer to the federal court action.' 47
The supreme court rejected the view that it could not conduct a Voting
Rights Act analysis in evaluating the validity of the plan. 4 ' The court,
while recognizing the impossibility of conducting "the complete factual
analysis contemplated by the Voting Rights Act . . . ," nevertheless
analyzed all of the statistical data filed by the parties. This data included
the breakdown of White, Black, and Hispanic voting-age populations and
voting registrations."' The court then analyzed numerous legislative
districts contained in Senate Joint Resolution 2G, particularly Hispanic and
Black majority districts, and concluded that the plan was valid. 5 ' Howev-
er, as in the past, the court retained exclusive jurisdiction to provide "any
interested person ...the opportunity to attempt to prove that the Joint
Resolution is invalid through a presentation of evidence in accordance with
the Gingles analysis of the Voting Rights Act."'5 2  Should such an
opportunity be sought, the court provided "for an expedited disposition
through the appointment of a commissioner to make findings of fact.""'
The supreme court's validation of the plan took place over a vigorous
dissent by Chief Justice Shaw, who found the redistricting plan invalid
under the Voting Rights Act.
154
When considering total population, the legislatively adopted plan
included thirteen Black majority population house districts and three Black
influence districts in which minority population exceeded twenty-five
percent but was less than fifty percent. 55 The plan also provided for two
Black majority population senate districts (both in Dade County) and three
147. Id.
148. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 282.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 285.
152. Id.
153. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 286. This is what the supreme court did in Milton v. Smathers,
351 So. 2d 24- (Fla. 1977).
154. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 287-93 (much of Chief Justice Shaw's analysis is found in the
federal court's decision).
155. Id. at 282.
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Black influence districts with minority population ranging from twenty-eight
percent to forty-nine percent. 156 With regard to Hispanic representation,
the court noted that the plan provided for nine majority house districts and
seven intfluence districts, the latter ranging in population from twenty-six
percent to forty-six percent.'57 The plan created three Hispanic majority
senate districts.'58 When voting-age population is considered, the joint
resolution provided for eleven Black majority and two influence districts in
the House, and two majority and one influence district in the Senate.'59
The court noted that the 1982 plan contained seven Black house
districts, seven majority Hispanic districts, "only 1" Black majority senate
district and "only 2" Hispanic majority senate districts. 6  The court ob-
served that the 1992 plan was accomplished with maximum population
deviations of 1.99 percent in the house districts and 0.87 percent in the
senate districts, and thus concluded "[t]he 1992 plan is a material improve-
ment over conditions under the 1982 plan ...and provides a substantial
opportunity for minorities to influence elections and elect representatives of
their choice.'
6 1
These findings did not satisfy the objectors, however, who, although
given the opportunity to press their specific voting rights claims before the
supreme court, 62 never did. Instead, the objectors engaged in unsuccess-
ful efforts to remove the supreme court proceedings to federal court and
thereby ousted the supreme court of its jurisdiction.'63  The parties
returned to the supreme court only to address the Section 5 objection by the
Justice Department. The objectors to the joint resolution wanted to wage
their fight in federal court to create more minority districts. 64
The Florida Supreme Court also had occasion to address contiguity for
156. Id. at 283. An influence district is one in which a minority, while it may not be
able to elect a candidate outright, nevertheless has a sizeable enough population to influence
the outcome of the election, when the minority vote is added to the non-minority crossover
vote. Id. at 282-83 n.8.
157. Id. at 283.
158. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 283.
159. Id. at 282-83.
160. Id. at 284.
161. Id. at 285.
162. Id. at 285-86.
163. DeGrandy Plaintiffs' Petition for Removal, DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1550.
164. As demonstrated by the voluminous filings in DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1550.
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the second time.'65 Four senate districts were challenged because, as a
result of the lack of roads or the presence of bodies of water without
connecting bridges, travel throughout these four districts could not be
accomplished without crossing into another district.' 66 The court held that
these districts are contiguous because "[c]ontiguity does not impose a
requirement of a paved, dry road connecting all parts of a district."'
16 7
The supreme court's decision was issued on May 13. On May 27, the
federal court held a hearing on all pending motions, including those
designed to set trial on legislative redistricting, as well as those designed to
secure the federal court's deference to the state legislative and judicial
review process.'68 At that hearing, the federal court learned from the DOJ
that it probably would issue its preclearance decision by June 17, 1992.169
On June 16, the DOJ issued its preclearance decision, emphasizing that
its Section 5 review addressed the plans only insofar as the five preclearance
counties (Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough and Monroe) were
affected. 7 ' The Attorney General of the United States did not interpose
any objections to the redistricting plan for the House of Representatives.' 7'
The DOJ, however, refused to preclear the Senate Plan stating:
With regard to the Hillsborough County area, the state has chosen to
draw its senatorial districts such that there are no districts in which
minority persons constitute a majority of the voting age population. To
accomplish this result, the state chose to divide the politically cohesive
minority populations in the Tampa and St. Petersburg areas. Alternative
plans were presented to the legislature uniting the Tampa and St.
Petersburg minority populations in order to provide minority voters an
effective opportunity to elect their preferred candidate to the State
Senate .... [T]he information before us, including the economic and
other ties between Tampa and St. Petersburg, as well as the political
cohesiveness of minority voters in those two cities, demonstrates that
the two areas do share a commonality of interest. Finally, we have
examined evidence, including evidence in the legislative record, which
suggests that the state's approach to senatorial redistricting in the
165. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 279.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1555.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1556.
171. Id.
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Hillsborough area was undertaken with an intent to protect incumbents.
Such a rationale, of course, cannot justify the treatment of minority
voters in this area by the State Senate plan. 7
2
At the request of the Attorney General of Florida, the supreme court
set an expedited schedule to address the Justice Department's objections to
the Senate plan.' 73 In its order of June 17, 1992, the supreme court
encouraged the Legislature to adopt a proper plan, taking into consideration
the Justice Department objections. 174  The supreme court cautioned that
if the Legislature declared its inability to adopt a plan, or failed to adopt a
plan by June 24, 1992, the court would conclude that the Legislature is at
an impasse, upon which the court would accomplish the task. 7 ' The su-
preme court also set out an abbreviated schedule within which redistricting
action had to be taken.'76 On the following day, House Speaker Wetherell
and Senate President Margolis informed the supreme court of their decision
not to convene their respective chambers in an extraordinary apportionment
session.'77 The court was also informed that the Governor did not intend
to convene the Legislature.77 As a result, the supreme court declared a
legislative impasse and adopted an amended schedule. 179
Meanwhile, plaintiffs in the federal court action, upon notice of the
DOJ's refusal to preclear the Senate plan, immediately asked that forum to
establish a scheduling order and set the matter for trial on legislative
redistricting, and filed yet another Amended Complaint contending that the
joint resolution itself violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.'"0
Thus, rather than litigating Section 2 claims in the supreme court pursuant
to its retained jurisdiction, objectors to the plan opted for federal court
involvement.
Challengers to the plan raised jurisdictional questions both in the
supreme court and federal court.' 8' The Florida Supreme Court, address-
172. Id. (quoting letter from John Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, United States Department of Justice, to Robert A. Butterworth, Florida Attorney
General (June 16, 1992)).
173. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1556.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1556.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1558.
181. Id. at 1557.
1028 [Vol. 18
317
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Waas
ing the questions, said:
The reapportionment of state legislative bodies is not a power delegated
by the Constitution of the United States to the federal government.
Under the provisions of the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, this is a power reserved to states. Of course, this Court
is obligated to apply any applicable federal constitutional provisions and
any federal statutes implementing these provisions.
The Florida Constitution places upon this Court the responsibility to
review state legislative reapportionment. Art. 1I, § 16, Fla. Const.
Pursuant to that authority, we approved the original legislative reappor-
tionment and retained jurisdiction to entertain subsequent objections
thereto. Consistent with the provisions of art. II, section 16 of the
Florida Constitution, we believe that it is our obligation to redraw the
plan to satisfy the objection of the Justice Department now that the
Legislature has declared that it is not going to do so.' 82
On June 25,, the supreme court adopted, as a cure for the portion of the plan
rejected by the DOJ, a proposal submitted by certain African-American
parties.'83
Two days before the supreme court issued its curative decision, the DOJ
filed its own lawsuit in federal court against the State of Florida and several
elected officials,' 84 contending that the redistricting plans diluted the
voting strength of African-American and Hispanic citizens in several areas
of the state in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,'85 and that
the state's proposed Senate plan for the Hillsborough County area divides
the politically cohesive minority population in the Tampa and St. Petersburg
areas, such as there are no senatorial districts in which minority persons
constitute a majority of the voting age population.' 86
182. Id. (citing In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special
Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 1992)).
183. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1557 (citing In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint
Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So. 2d at 546). The remedial plan
selected was the one submitted to the supreme court by the Humphrey-Reaves plaintiffs.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1557-58.
186. Id. at 1558. The DOJ expressed its view that the supreme court's modification for
the Hillsborough County area satisfied its Section 5 objection. However, the Department did
not officially preclear the modification decision. Accordingly, the three-judge court adopted
the supreme court's modification as its own for Section 5 purposes, thereby precluding the
need for Justice Department preclearance. Id. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978),
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The DOJ's lawsuit was consolidated with DeGrandy's action."8 7
DeGrandy was then permitted to amend his Complaint to allege Section 2
violations as to Senate Joint Resolution 2G as now modified.' On June
26, the federal court, one day after the supreme court adopted its remedy for
the Justice Department's objection, commenced trial which lasted five days,
through July 1. During the trial, the parties entered into a consent decree
with respect to the Escambia County portion of the lawsuit by redrawing the
Escambia County house districts to provide for greater African-American
participation.'89 The agreement on Escambia County was reached after the
court ruled from the bench that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case
on a constitutional violation of intentional discrimination in Escambia
County.'90
On July 1, after testimony and argument had been concluded, the court
ruled from the bench that, with respect to the Senate plan, although the
plaintiffs demonstrated that a fourth Hispanic district can be drawn in the
Dade County (South Florida) area, they failed to prove that a fourth
Hispanic district can be drawn without creating a regressive effect upon
African-American voters in the same area.' 9 ' Therefore, the federal court
was required to give deference to the state policy as expressed in the Florida
plan, Senate Joint Resolution 2G as modified, and ultimately approved by
the supreme court.
19 2
With respect to the House plan, the federal court took note that the
Senate Joint Resolution created thirteen minority-majority districts of which
nine had Hispanic voting-age population supermajority districts and four had
African-American voting age population majority districts. 93 The De-
Grandy plan, as modified during the trial, provided for eleven Hispanic
south Florida districts of supermajority proportion, each containing no less
than sixty-three percent Hispanic voting age population.'94 The modified
DeGrandy plan also provided for four African-American districts containing
holds that a court-adopted plan does not require preclearance by the DOJ under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 540.
187. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1558.
188. Id at 1559.
189. Id. at 1560.
190. Id. Only plaintiff-intervenor Daryl Reaves, a member of the State House, was not
a party to the Escambia County consent decree. Id.
191. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1560.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1580.
194. Id. at 1581.
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Black voting-age population percentages of no less than fifty-five per-
cent. '95
The federal court concluded that only the modified DeGrandy plan was
acceptable under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.'96 By its action, the
federal court thus concluded--contrary to the supreme court's view that the
joint resolution represented a significant improvement for minorities over
1982-that because four Hispanic senate seats (instead of the Legislature's
three) and eleven Hispanic house seats (instead of the Legislature's nine)
could have been created for the Dade County area, the state plan ipsofacto
violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the modified DeGrandy
plan would be used for the 1993 elections.
Immediately thereafter, the government defendants applied for a stay
from the United States Supreme Court as to the federal court's decision on
the House plan. Upon application to that Court, the federal district court's
House plan with respect to Dade County was stayed.'97 Accordingly,
when the 1992 elections were held for the Florida Legislature, the plan
adopted by the Florida Legislature, as modified and approved by the
supreme court, was the plan used for those elections. The three-judge court
decision is before the United States Supreme Court in the form of three
separate appeals which have been consolidated for briefing, argument and
disposition.
In its appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the House of
Representatives contends that the federal court's plan constitutes maximiza-
tion'98 of electoral opportunities in violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act because the legislative plan already provides that minorities have
the opportunity to elect candidates in numbers essentially equal to the
minorities' percentages of the population. The House further contends that
the district court erred by not abstaining and deferring to the state constitu-
tional process, contending that the state supreme court is the proper forum
to address redistricting concerns. Finally, the House maintains that the
remedy imposed by the court is flawed in that the court relied on erroneous
population data by considering Hispanic non-citizens in the voting-age
195. Id. Unlike the joint resolution, the modified DeGrandy plan reached beyond Dade
County and into neighboring counties. See DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1581.
196. Id. at 1582.
197. Wetherell v. DeGrandy, 113 S. Ct. 1 (1992) (order of the United States Supreme
Court granting stay).
198. Maximization means drawing the greatest, or maximum, number of majority
minority districts and that the failure to do so constitutes a Voting Rights Act violation.
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population equation.' 99
The DeGrandy plaintiffs contend that the federal court erred by not
providing a complete remedy once it found a violation of Section 2 with
respect to the Senate redistricting plan.2°° The DOJ appeal is essentially
similar to that presented by the DeGrandy plaintiffs.2"'
A reading of the chronology of events pertaining to legislative
redistricting, as contained in the two Florida Supreme Court decisions and
the federal district court decision, provides the flavor of political, racial and
ethnic battles that overshadowed redistricting during 1992. During the
litigation before the two judicial forums, there was much talk about the
unusual alliance forged between Blacks and Hispanics, particularly since it
was understood among insiders that Hispanics, who generally vote
republican in Dade County, were in actuality seeking to sever Black voters
from traditional democratic jurisdictions and place them into their own
majority districts, thereby giving Hispanic Republicans a greater opportunity
to elect Republicans in those now-diluted democrat districts.
Because the primacy of racial and ethnic representation mandated by
federal law transcended all of the other factors that inhere to redistricting,
district compactness took on an "Alice in Wonderland" reality. Odd-shaped,
elongated, snake-like, Rorschach ink-blot district lines drawn to accommo-
date racial and ethnic population patterns were nevertheless deemed compact
because these districts-regardless of shape-represented an identifiable
community and constituency.
The vitality of these odd-shaped districts drawn to accommodate
minority representation is suspect as a result of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno.2"2 Shaw involved the drawing of a
redistricting plan for North Carolina by the Legislature in response to a
Section 5 objection by the United States Attorney General.0 3  White
residents challenged a portion of this plan creating a congressional district
that, for the most part, was no wider than the Interstate 85 corridor, and
drawn to create a black-majority district.20 4
The Court held that the residents stated a justiciable claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, holding that "a plaintiff challenging a reapportion-
ment statute under [this clause] may state a claim by alleging that the
199. See House of Representatives Brief, DeGrandy,815 F. Supp. at 1550 (No. 92-519).
200. DeGrandy v. Johnson, 113 S. Ct. 2438 (1993).
201. United States v. Florida, 113 S. Ct. 2438 (1993).
202. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
203. Id. at 2819.
204. Id. at 2820.
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legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood
as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on
the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.""2 5
The emphasis of this decision is that traditional notions of compactness will
not be sacrificed solely for racial purposes in the absence of "sufficient
justification. 2 °6
It is risky indeed to attempt to predict the outcome of a case pending
before the United States Supreme Court. However, it is evident from the
redistricting decisions issued during the 1992-93 term that the Court is
protective of the traditional deference accorded the state in the exercise of
its redistricting responsibilities,2 °7 while frowning upon the creation of
districts solely for racial purposes.20 8
The most significant issue now before the Court concerns maximization
of minority districts. 2 9  In light of Shaw v. Reno, and since the Voting
Rights Act specifically provides that there is no right to proportional
representation for minority groups, 210 it appears the Court will reject the
notion that the Act requires the creation of the maximum number of
minority districts, however configured. Race and ethnicity will remain
factors to be considered in the redistricting process, along with other
traditional considerations (compactness, respecting existing boundaries, etc.);
however, race and ethnicity will not be exclusive factors, at least in the
absence of a clear showing of a constitutional violation.
The bottom line, however, is that the Voting Rights Act and population
dynamics together fired a political power struggle that led to the most
divisive redistricting process in Florida's history. As a result of this divisive
205. Id. at 2828.
206. Id. at 2826. While the Voting Rights Act will not permit a redistricting plan "so
highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to segregat[e] ... voters on the basis of race." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826 (quoting
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)). The use of bizarre districting is not
precluded by this decision, or Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27 (1971). The Court, in dealing with a long history
of state-imposed unconstitutional school discrimination, approved "a frank-and sometimes
drastic-gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones," resulting in "zones [that]
are neither compact nor contiguous; indeed they may be on opposite ends of the city." Id.
Thus, it appears the Constitution permits what the Voting Rights Act does not; traditional
notions of compactness may be sacrificed to remedy a constitutional violation, but not to
remedy a statutory infirmity.
207. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993).
208. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
209. See DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1550.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(e) (1988).
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process, proposals were submitted to the Legislature in 1993 by Democrats
and Republicans, Blacks and Hispanics alike, to either remove the Legisla-
ture entirely from the districting process or otherwise involve another entity
in it.
IV. A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE?
In a concurring opinion in In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint
Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992,21 Justice Ben
Overton suggested that a 1978 Constitution Revision Commission proposal
calling for the creation of a Reapportionment Commission, and providing
for specific redistricting standards be reexamined for placement on the
ballot.212 One legislative proposal submitted in 1993 called for the
creation of a commission consisting of seven members, none of whom may
be elected public officials, party officers, registered lobbyists or legislative
employees. Six would be selected by the chief justice of the supreme court,
five of whom must be selected from recommendations made by the chief
judge of the five district courts of appeal. Each chief judge would
recommend three individuals who met the qualifications set out above. The
chief justice would appoint at least one member of each racial or language
minority group that comprised ten percent of the population of the state as
shown by the most recent federal decennial census.
The chiefjustice would be authorized to disregard the recommendations
if they did not permit such appointments. Within thirty days after the
appointments were made, the six commissioners would have to select by
majority vote of at least four, a seventh commissioner who would serve as
chair. The Commission would be authorized to hold hearings and to take
action in accordance with specific reapportionment standards. Once the
Commission completed its plan, it would file it with the Secretary of State,
and within fifteen days of that filing, the Attorney General would petition
the supreme court for its approval. Another proposal called for the creation
of a commission to undertake the task in the event the Legislature fails to
fulfill its redistricting obligation.
In Florida, as in most states, it is the Legislature that is called upon
initially to undertake the redistricting process. The stark reality of this fact
is that legislators, with an eye to their political careers, are expected to rise
above partisan politics and pragmatic self-survival by fairly and lawfully
211. 597 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1992).
212. Id. at 286.
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redistricting-even at their own expense.
It appears to have taken three redistricting cycles for some of Florida's
political leaders (and the people they represent) to address whether it may
be asking too much for our legislators to redistrict, as constitutionally
required, without concern for political survival. No doubt the suggested
shift to a commission is reflective of this political reality. By operation of
article XI, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, a constitution revision
commission will be established in 1998. Perhaps Florida voters will have
a chance to consider at that time whether the current method of redistricting,
with its political storm and stress, should give way to an alternative
approach.
Whether a commission approach is more appealing in light of the
political exigencies involved in the appointment process remains to be seen.
The fact of the matter is that the Legislature apparently wants to avoid
putting itself and the citizens of the state through another contentious,
hostile redistricting process, a process that historically is steeped in
litigation.
Perhaps, after more than thirty years of redistricting litigation,
representation percentages are such as to provide all citizens with a fair,
level playing field where each group has equal opportunity to participate in,
and realize the fruits of, the political process. If this is so, 213 then perhaps
contentious, protracted litigation will be relegated to history.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of redistricting litigation in Florida exemplifies the shifting
political sands from rural to urban concentration, coupled with rapid
Hispanic migration and the rise of minority influence in tandem with a
change in federal law protective of minority rights. In hindsight, it was
inevitable that, by casting the judiciary into the political thicket of
apportionment and redistricting, this most fundamental process in a
democratic form of government would become steeped in political power
entanglements in which the federal courts would be regarded as the ultimate
referee.
The state constitutional process under article III, section 16 of the
Florida Constitution was born of, and nurtured by, litigation over the
213. The Florida Supreme Court specifically found that the redistricting plan afforded
minorities fair and substantial political opportunity. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint
Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 285.
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ultimate exercise of political power, predominantly by Blacks and Hispanics
seeking a greater voice in the democratic process by resorting to remedies
provided by changing federal law. The intensity of the conflict in 1992 led
to a bipartisan move to change the present system. Whether change comes
about, and whether any change will be for the better, is speculative at best.
If there is a single message to be learned from Florida's redistricting
history under its constitution, it is that as the voices of minority groups grow
louder, so will their insistence on a correspondingly greater voice in the
exercise of political power. The overriding goal is fairness-a level playing
field where all participants have a voice, the strength of which is unrestrict-
ed by racial or ethnic status alone. Perhaps the most recent litigation
experience achieves this laudable end; only the ameliorative effect of time
will tell. If, however, this goal remains unattainable in the minds of some,
then intensely litigating future redistricting efforts, even to the point of using
increased minority group leverage to further a political party's personal
agenda, looms on the horizon.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Constitution requires the state to have an official flag, and
places responsibility for its design on the State Legislature.' Prior to 1900,
a number of different flags served as the state's banner. Since 1900,
however, the flag has consisted of a white field,2 a red saltire,3 and the
* Professor of Law, Nova University. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University
of Pennsylvania; LL.M., New York University.
1. "The design of the great seal and flag of the state shall be prescribed by law." FLA.
CONST. art. If, § 4. Although the constitution mentions only a seal and a flag, the Florida
Legislature has designated many other state symbols, including: a state flower (the orange
blossom - adopted in 1909); bird (mockingbird - 1927); song ("Old Folks Home" - 1935);
tree (sabal palm - 1.953); beverage (orange juice - 1967); shell (horse conch - 1969); gem
(moonstone - 1970); marine mammal (manatee - 1975); saltwater mammal (dolphin - 1975);
freshwater fish (largemouth bass - 1975); saltwater fish (Atlantic sailfish - 1975); stone
(agatized coral - 1979); reptile (alligator - 1987); animal (panther - 1982); soil (Mayakka Fine
Sand - 1989); and wildflower (coreopsis - 1991). DEL MARTH & MARTHA J. MARTH,
FLORIDA ALMANAC 1992-1993 311-13 (9th ed. 1992).
2. The background of a flag is called its field or ground. In describing the field, it is
common to divide it into vertical halves known respectively as the hoist and the fly. The
hoist is the area closest to the pole or staff from which the flag is being flown, while the fly
is the free end of the flag. The field is sometimes further divided into quarters, known as
cantons. The upper hoist canton always is the canton that is being referred to unless
otherwise noted. WILLIAM CRAMPTON, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO FLAGS 18 (1989).
3. A saltire is an X-shaped cross. Flags that use crosses employ one of three basic
types: a plain cross, in which the arms are of equal length; a Scandinavian cross, in which
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state seal.4
Although Floridians encounter the flag every day,5 few know anything
about its rich history.6 Accordingly, this essay provides an overview of the
many flags that have flown over Florida.7
II. EUROPEAN DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST
Flags as we think of them today are of relatively recent origin.
Although differences of opinion exist, most scholars believe that flags made
out of fabric first appeared in China and were in regular use in that country
by the fifth century B.C. India, Burma, and Siam also employed fabric
flags at an early date.' Flags did not become popular in Europe until the
Middle Ages, however, and no truly national flag existed before the
sixteenth century. 9
As far as is known, none of the Indian tribes of North America had
the fly-end arm is longer than the one on the hoist; or a saltire, in which the arms are
diagonal. A cross is said to be "couped" if it does not extend across the entire length of the
flag; otherwise, it is described as being "throughout." Id. at 17.
4. For a description of the state seal, see infra notes 97, 98, and 109.
5. By law, the state flag must "be displayed at a suitable place and in the appropriate
manner on the grounds of each elementary and secondary public school." FLA. STAT. § 256-
.032 (1991). By custom, the state flag is flown on and around government office buildings,
courthouses, historical sites, and sporting venues.
6. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that so many Floridians are transplants. It is
estimated that two out of every three Floridians were born somewhere else, and nearly 1,000
new residents arrive in Florida every day. MARTH & MARTH, supra note I, at 256-57.
7. A concise summary of the laws regulating the use of the current state flag can be
found in 48 FLA. JUR. 2D State of Florida § 4 (1984 & 1993 Cum. Supp.).
8. For a detailed discussion of the development of flags, see CRAMPTON, supra note 2,
at 7-20. As Crampton explains, "Flags began as vexilloids, solid objects carried at the top
of staffs. They were made of wood, bronze or precious metal, and depicted a god or totem
object, or the attribute of a god or guardian spirit." Id. at 7. The word vexilloid comes from
the Latin word "vexillum," meaning flag, and it is from this root that the words vexillology
(the study of flags), vexillologist (a flag historian), vexillophilist (a flag collector), and
vexillary (a flag bearer) are derived. See WHITNEY SMITH, FLAGS THROUGH THE AGES AND
ACROSS THE WORLD 30 (1975) [hereinafter SMITH, ACROSS THE WORLD].
9. Because of the prominent role played by the Crusades, most early European flags had
a religious connotation. Subsequently, flags began to be used for other purposes, such as to
mark one's station in life or affiliation with a particular group or trade guild. Thus, for
example, the candlemakers of Bayeux in France used a black flag with three white candles.
Flag, in 4 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA: MICROPAEDIA 811, 812 (15th ed. 1988).
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their own flags prior to the twentieth century.'0 Thus, credit for being the
first to bring a flag into the Western Hemisphere usually is given to the
Vikings for their "Raven" flag." It is thought that this flag, which most
probably had a white field and sported a black raven, appeared somewhere
in present-day New England in about 1000 A.D."
10. WHITNEY SMITH, THE FLAG BOOK OF THE UNITED STATES 10 (1970) [hereinafter
SMITH, FLAG BOOK]. Rather than using flags, the tribes employed standards to identify
themselves:
The forerunners of flags in America were symbols (standards) used by Indian
tribes. Although some tribes were identified by their physical appearance, many
had developed standards much like those used in Europe and Asia thousands of
years before.
These standards were often a symbol of the tribes' "animal god," which
was believed to be watching over them and lending "his" spirit to the members
of "his" tribe. These symbols were made of leather, wood, stone and so on, and
often decorated with feathers and/or stained in different colors to create a
distinctive standard that was placed on a spear or lance. The "flag" was carried
by the chief or his emissary during battle and was placed in a conspicuous
position during times of peace.
Some Native American tribes also used another type of standard known
as the totem pole. Usually a tall wooden carving, sometimes decorated with
feathers and stained various colors, a totem was too large to be carried and was,
therefore, a stationary standard.
CANDICE M. DEBARR & JACK A. BONKOWSKE, SAGA OF THE AMERICAN FLAG: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 9 (1990). Today, both the Miccosukees and the Seminoles have their
own flags. The Miccosukee flag, adopted in 1962, consists of four horizontal stripes. The
top stripe is white, followed by stripes of black, red, and yellow. Because the Miccosukees
believe that life spins in a circle, beginning in the east and ending in the south, each stripe
represents a different compass point: yellow for east, red for north, black for west, and white
for south. ALLEN MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1993-1994 283 (24th ed. 1993).
The Seminole flag was selected in August 1966 during a flag-designing contest held
at the tribe's annual powwow. Intended to resemble the current Florida state flag, it has a
blue field with the seal of the Seminole tribe in the center. The seal consists of a palm tree,
a dugout canoe (representing the business interests of the tribe), and a chickee house and
council fire (suggesting the social affairs of the people), and is surrounded by the words
"Seminole Tribe of Florida" and "In God We Trust." A red saltire bearing blue-and-white
chevrons appears behind the seal. Id.
II. Ravens were a traditional Norse symbol for good luck. Arthur E. DuBois &
William C. Dwiggins, Flags, in 10 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 35, 36 (1990).
12. As has been explained elsewhere:
It is generally accepted that the first real flag flown in what would become the
United States was a white flag with a black raven on it. Legend tells us this
flag was carried by Erik the Red and his son, Leif Eriksson, Viking explorers
believed to have landed in the Americas during A.D. 1000.
There are no actual illustrations or consistently accurate written descrip-
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After the Vikings, flags were not seen again in the New World until
Christopher Columbus traveled to the Americas in 1492 with two different
flags. The first was a special expeditionary flag that had been given to him
by his Spanish patrons, King Ferdinand V and Queen Isabella. This flag
was white and had a green cross flanked by the letters F (for Ferdinand) and
Y (for Isabella). Like the cross, both of the letters were green and each was
topped with a gold crown."
Columbus' other flag was the royal banner of the Spanish kingdoms of
Castile and Leon. Created in 1230 and known as the "Castle and Lion"
flag, it had two gold castles, each on a red field, in the upper hoist and
lower fly, and two red lions, each on a white field, in the upper fly and
lower hoist. 4 Since this flag was used by many early Spanish explor-
ers, 15 most historians believe that Juan Ponce de Leon had it with him
when he discovered Florida in 1513.16
tions to prove the existence of the Viking flag. However, coins of the early
ninth century show a fringed, triangular flag, sometimes with a cross in the field
and sometimes with a raven ....
If the Viking flag (white with a black raven) did exist-and the majority
of our historians accept that it did-it is doubtful the flag represented the
Vikings as a nation. The Bayeux tapestry, an embroidery made between A.D.
1070 and 1080, shows us that flags were commonly used, but not as national
symbols. The Viking flag, therefore, would most likely have been a personal
flag of Erik and his son, Leif.
DEBARR & BONKOWSKE, supra note 10, at 9, 1I.
13. SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at 13.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. ("The most important flag displayed by Columbus and other early Spanish
explorers was the royal banner of Castile and Leon which bore the arms of these kingdoms,
namely a castle and a lion.").
16. See, e.g., HARRISON S. HERRICK, "THE FLAGS OF THE UNITED STATES:" YOUR
FLAG AND MINE 58 (1925) ("Ponce de Leon, a Spanish explorer in search of the Magical
Fountain of Perpetual Youth, planted the Royal Banners of Spain in Florida in 1512.").
Although Herrick and other historians are confident that Ponce de Leon had the Castle and
Lion flag with him, at least one scholar has questioned their assumption:
No mention is made [in contemporary accounts] of any ceremony attendant upon
the act of taking possession. The omission of details seems to have been
accepted by later writers as an invitation to supply them and this has been done
in many elaborate interpretations. The scene of taking possession is usually
pictured with Ponce surrounded by priests and soldiers kneeling in prayer amidst
the banners of the Church and state, with an audience of interested Indians in the
background. ... These descriptions may be picturesque, but I can find nothing
in the record to support them.
T. Frederick Davis, Juan Ponce de Leon's Voyages to Florida, 14 FLA. HIST. Q. 7, 35-36
(1935).
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The first flag to be displayed on a regular basis in Florida was the
French "Chape de Martin."' 7  A blue flag 8 with three 9 gold lilies2°
arranged in an alternating up-and-down pattern, the Chape de Martin arrived
in Florida in 1564 when a group of French Huguenots, led by Rene de
Goulaine de Laudionniere,2' established Fort Caroline as the first perma-
nent settlement in Florida. Located near present-day Jacksonville, the
outpost fared badly from its inception due to internal conflicts, mutinies, and
brutal reprisals,22 and in 1565 the Spanish conquistador Pedro Menendez
de Aviles23 burned the fort to the ground and enslaved its inhabitants.
17. The flag was called the Chape de Martin because it was inspired by the story of
Saint Martin. According to a popular legend, Martin shared his blue cloak, or chape, with
a beggar at Amiens. This act of charity was said to have so touched Christ that he made the
deed known to all the angels in heaven. See "Our Flag Number," 32 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
281, 373 (1917). Among its many contributions, the Chape de Martin is the basis of the
word chaplain: "So important did the cloak of St. Martin become, the oratory in which it
was carried came to be known as a chapel, from the Latin word for cloak (cappa or capella),
and the priest in charge of it was known as a chaplain." SMITH, ACROSS THE WORLD, supra
note 8, at 131.
18. Although the field of the Chape de Martin could be either blue or white in the
sixteenth century, it is felt by most experts that the flag that flew in Florida was blue. See
MORRIS, supra note 10, at 279 ("The flags of France of the 1500s had lilies both on white
and blue backgrounds but the flag flown in Florida almost surely was the gold lily on blue.").
This belief is based on the fact that the royal standard had a white field. CRAMPTON, supra
note 2, at 41. As such, persons not part of the royal family generally used the blue version
of the flag. Nevertheless, some commentators are convinced that the Huguenots flew the
white version. See HERRICK, supra note 16, at 62 ("The French White Bourbon Flag, with
Yellow fleur-de-lis, also flourished in North America during the life of the Huguenot colony
in South Carolina and Florida, 1562-1565.") Id.
19. The number three is thought to have been chosen to honor the Holy Trinity. SMITH,
ACROSS THE WORLD, supra note 8, at 131.
20. The lily, or fleur-de-lis, is the traditional emblem of France and dates to the twelfth
century. CRAMPTON, supra note 2, at 40.
21. For a portrait of Laudionniere, see Charles E. Bennett, A Footnote on Rene
Laudionniere, .45 FLA. HIST. Q. 289 (1967).
22. For a description of what life was like at Fort Caroline, see Charles E. Bennett, Fort
Caroline, Cradle of American Freedom, 35 FLA. HiST. Q. 3 (1956), and Lucy L. Wenhold,
Manrique de Rojas' Report on French Settlement in Florida, 1564, 38 FLA. HIST. Q. 45
(1959).
23. For profiles of Menendez, see Eugene Lyon, Pedro Menendez's Strategic Plan for
the Florida Peninsular, 67 FLA. HIST. Q. 1 (1988); Albert Manucy, The Man Who Was
Pedro Menendez, 44 FLA. HIST. Q. 67 (1965); and John F. Schwaller, Nobility, Family, and
Service: Menendez and His Men, 66 FLA. HIST. Q. 298 (1988).
24. See Eugene Lyon, The Captives of Florida, 50 FLA. HIST. Q. 1 (1971).
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Thereafter, France never again played a role in the settling of Florida,25
although the Chape de Martin did reappear briefly over Pensacola in the
Quadruple Alliance War. 6
In the same year that they destroyed Fort Caroline, the Spanish founded
Saint Augustine, the oldest city in the United States,27 and raised the
"Burgundian Saltire." Also called the Cross of Burgundy, it had a white
field and a red saltire with serrated teeth.2 ' The white represented the
French state of Burgundy and the French crown; the knobby saltire signified
the rough branches of the tree on which Saint Andrew, the patron saint of
Burgundy, was crucified; and the red most probably symbolized Andrew's
blood.29
The Burgundian Saltire was introduced into Spain by Philip I, the Duke
of Burgundy, after his marriage in 1496 to Joan, the daughter of Ferdinand
and Isabella.3° Upon Ferdinand's death in 1516, the Castle and Lion flag
increasingly gave way to Philip's flag. Thus, by the time Saint Augustine
was organized, the Burgundian Saltire was in general use throughout the
Spanish empire.3'
For nearly two hundred years following the founding of Saint
Augustine, the Burgundian Saltire served as Florida's flag. But in 1763,
Spain lost control of Florida to England as a result of the Seven Years'
War.32 The transfer in governments resulted in numerous dislocations,
33
25. Instead, France decided to focus its energies on present-day Canada. This effort
proved very successful, and by 1697 the area around Quebec was known as New France. See
further W. J. ECCLES, FRANCE IN AMERICA (rev. ed. 1990).
26. During the war, which began in 1719, control of Pensacola changed hands at least
four times. Finally, in 1722, the city was ceded to Spain by treaty. The Triangular Contest
for Florida, 21 FLA. HIST. Q. 281, 283 (1943).
27. See Luis R. Arana, The Exploration of Florida and Sources on the Founding of St.
Augustine, 44 FLA. HIST. Q. I (1965).
28. As was true of other Spanish flags during this time, the appearance of the
Burgundian Saltire was not uniform. Thus, for example, on religious holidays the field was
blue and images of the Virgin Mary appeared in the quarters formed by the cross, while on
other occasions the Spanish coat of arms was added to the ends of the arms. MORRIS, supra
note 10, at 276.
29. Id.
30. Although Philip popularized the Burgundian Saltire, the first leader to use it was
King Pelayo of Asturias in 718 A.D. See SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at 15.
31. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 276.
32. This capped a long drive by the British to oust the Spanish and take control of
Florida. See Charles W. Arnade, The English Invasion of Spanish Florida, 1700-1706, 41
FLA. HIST. Q. 29 (1962), and J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Sixteenth Century English-Spanish Rivalry
in La Florida, 38 FLA. HIST. Q. 265 (1960).
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including the replacing of the red and white Burgundian Saltire by the red,
white, and blue "Union Jack."34
The Union Jack, one of the most recognizable flags in the world,35
was created in 1606 after King James VI of Scotland ascended the English
throne and became King James I of England and Scotland. To commemo-
rate the historic merger, the red cross of Saint George, the patron saint of
England, was combined with the white saltire of Saint Andrew, the patron
saint of Scotland.36 Upon the overthrow of King Charles I by Oliver
Cromwell in 1649, the Union Jack was changed to include an Irish harp.
This symbol was removed, however, when the monarchy was restored in
1660."
England's reign in Florida was both brief and difficult,38 and in 1783
it returned Florida to Spain pursuant to the Treaty of Paris. 39 Thus, after
an absence of just twenty years, the Burgundian Saltire once again graced
33. See Robert L. Gold, Politics and Property During the Transfer of Florida from
Spanish to English Rule, 1763-1764, 42 FLA. HIST. Q. 16 (1963), and Wilbur H. Siebert,
How the Spaniards Evacuated Pensacola in 1763, 11 FLA. HIST. Q. 48 (1932).
34. Although the British flag is universally known as the Union Jack, its official name
is the Union Flag:
As well as being the national flag the Union Jack is also the jack used by ships
of the Royal Navy, and some people think it should only be called the 'Union
Jack' when used in this context. However, the practice of calling it the Union
Jack in almost all circumstances is so widespread as to make it the flag's
unofficial name. Officially, the government and the military still call it the
'Union Flag.'
CRAMPTON, supra note 2, at 23.
35. The universal recognition of the Union Jack is attributable to "its striking graphic
design, its influence on other flags, and the importance of the British Empire (later
Commonwealth) in world history." WHITNEY SMITH, FLAGS AND ARMS ACROSS THE WORLD
224 (1980).
36. Prior to the introduction of the Union Jack, England had used a white flag that bore
a red cross while Scotland's flag consisted of a blue field and a white saltire. These designs
dated back to the Crusades, when all Christians were assigned crosses of various styles and
colors. CRAMPTON, supra note 2, at 23-24.
37. Id. at 23. The Union Jack now in use dates to 1801, when Ireland, England, and
Scotland formed a parliamentary union. To mark Ireland's participation in the alliance, the
red saltire of Saint Patrick was added to the Union Jack. Although Ireland became
independent in 1921, the Union Jack was not changed. Id.
38. See Charles L. Mowat, St. Augustine Under the British Flag, 1763-1775, 20 FLA.
HIST. Q. 131 (1941), and Robert R. Rea, "Graveyard for Britons, " West Florida, 1763-
1781, 47 FLA. HIST. Q. 345 (1969).
39. The bloodless return was especially sweet for Spain in light of the fact that its
attempt to reclaim Florida through force had been a dismal failure. See Albert W. Haarmann,
The Spanish Conquest of British West Florida, 1779-1781, 39 FLA. HIST. Q. 107 (1960).
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Florida's skies. Its reinstatement, however, was short-lived, for on May 28,
1785, Spain's King Charles III replaced the Burgundian Saltire with a flag
of his own design.40
The primary feature of the new flag was three horizontal stripes. The
top and bottom stripes were red, while the larger middle stripe was yellow.
These colors had been chosen because they were the heraldic colors of the
Spanish regions of Castile (yellow) and Aragon (red). 41 Within the middle
stripe, slightly to the left of the center, were placed a castle (to represent
Castile) and a lion (for Leon).42
Although Charles' flag flew over Florida for thirty-six years, Spain's
rule during this span was beset by numerous problems. In addition to
having to contend with an assortment of pirates, Indians, and slaves, Spain
faced numerous independence movements43 that over time gave birth to
several different unofficial flags.44 Thus, in February 1821, Spain agreed
40. With only slight modification, Charles' flag continues to serve as Spain's national
flag. CRAMPTON, supra note 2, at 63.
41. Id.
42. As another commentator has pointed out, the castle and lion continue to influence
modem American design, and can be seen "in the seals or arms of such cities as Coral
Gables, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Sante Fe." SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at
15-16.
43. For an examination of the increasing unrest in Florida during this period, see Helen
H. Tanner, Zespedes and the Southern Conspiracies, 38 FLA. HIST. Q. 15 (1959).
44. The first of these flags was devised by the English adventurer William A. Bowles.
A longtime nemesis of the Spanish, Bowles in 1799 persuaded a congress of Seminoles and
Creeks to make him "Director General" of a new state that Bowles hoped to organize around
Tallahassee and call Muskogee. Upon his election, Bowles created a flag for his new state
that had a blue cross edged in white surrounded by three red squares and one blue square.
Unlike the red squares, which were empty, the blue square contained a yellow sun. In 1803,
before Bowles had a chance to move ahead with his plans, he was captured by American
agents and delivered to the Spanish authorities. He subsequently died in a prison in Havana.
For a further discussion of the life and times of Bowles, see Jack D. L. Holmes & J. Leitch
Wright, Jr., Luis Bertucat and William Augustus Bowles: West Florida Adversaries in 1791,
49 FLA. HIST. Q. 49 (1970); Lyle N. McAlister, William Augustus Bowles and the State of
Muskogee, 40 FLA. HIST. Q. 317 (1962); and David H. White, The Spaniards and William
Augustus Bowles in Florida, 1799-1803, 54 FLA. HIST. Q. 145 (1975).
After Bowles, the next flag to appear was the "Bonnie Blue Flag." A blue flag with
a single white star, the Bonnie Blue Flag gained prominence during the Civil War when it
was used throughout the South as an unofficial banner. It first appeared, however, over the
"Free and Independent State of West Florida," an area located between the Pearl and
Mississippi Rivers, from September 23, 1810 to December 6, 1810. Ironically, the State of
West Florida's easternmost boundary was 140 miles west of what is now Florida; as a result,
this flag never flew over any portion of present-day Florida. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 283.
For the particulars of how Florida "lost" its western land, see Hugh C. Bailey, Alabama and
1044 [Vol. 18
333
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Jarvis
to give Florida to the United States in exchange for the United States
assuming up to $5 million in damages allegedly owed by Spain to American
settlers living in Florida. Several months later, on July 17, 1821, transfer
ceremonies were held in Pensacola and Saint Augustine. As Charles' flag
was lowered for the last time, General Andrew Jackson, Florida's first
American governor,45 raised the "Stars and Stripes" of the United States.
III. AMERICAN ACQUISITION AND STATEHOOD
From 1821 to 1845, Florida was a United States territory. Because
Florida did not have its own flag during this period, the United States flag
was used. At the time of Florida's acquisition, the flag had twenty-three
stars. By 1845, when Florida was admitted to the Union, three more states
had joined the Union. In keeping with the practice of adding one star to the
flag for each new state, a twenty-seventh star was added for Florida on July
4, 1845.46
West Florida Annexation, 35 FLA. HIST. Q. 219 (1956), and Hugh C. Bailey, Alabama's
Political Leaders and the Acquisition of Florida, 35 FLA. HIST. Q. 17 (1956). Florida's
current boundaries are set out in article !1, section I of the Florida Constitution.
The final independence flags of this period are a legacy of the British blockade of East
Florida. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the siege, which lasted from 1806 to 1812, helped
to reveal the strategic importance of Amelia Island, see Christopher Ward, The Commerce
of East Florida During the Embargo, 1806-1812: The Role of Amelia Island, 68 FLA. HIST.
Q. 160 (1989), and made control of the island a top military objective. As a result, between
1812 and 1817 three different attempts were made to seize Amelia Island. The first, in
March 1812, involved a group of seventy Georgians and nine Floridians who, after capturing
the island, proclaimed the free "Territory of East Florida." They then raised the "Patriots
Flag," a white field that depicted, in blue, a soldier above the Latin phrase "Salus Populi Lex
Suprema" ("Safety, the Supreme Law of the People"). Five years later, in June 1817, Gregor
MacGregor, a veteran of several Latin American revolutions, landed on Amelia Island and
hoisted a white flag bearing a green cross. Finally, it is believed that General Luis Aury, the
father of Mexico's independence movement, may have lifted a red, white, and green flag over
Amelia Island in October 1817. If Aury had a flag, its design has not survived the
vicissitudes of time. For further descriptions of the struggle for Amelia Island, see T,
Frederick Davis, MacGregor's Invasion of Florida, 1817, 7 FLA. HiST. Q. 3 (1928), and
Richard G. Lowe, American Seizure of Amelia Island, 45 FLA. HIST. Q. 18 (1966).
45. For accounts of Jackson's role in Florida, see Herbert J. Doherty, Jr., The
Governorship qf Andrew Jackson, 33 FLA. HIST. Q. 3 (1954), and Herbert J. Doherty, Jr.,
Andrew Jackson vs. The Spanish Governor, 34 FLA. HIST. Q. 142 (1955).
46. The Stars and Stripes, consisting of thirteen red and white stripes and an equal
number of white stars on a blue canton, was adopted as the official flag of the United States
by the Continental Congress on June 14, 1777. See II JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN
CONGRESS 165 (1823). Following the Revolutionary War, the flag remained unchanged for
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As part of the statehood application process, territories were required
to draft and submit to Congress a proposed constitution. Florida took this
step in 1838."7 In keeping with the custom of the day, the constitution
made no provision for a state flag.48 As a result, Florida did not have an
official flag when it became a state on March 3, 1845. 49
At 12:00 noon on June 25, 1845, William D. Moseley was inaugurated
ten years. The admission of Kentucky and Vermont in 1792, however, raised the question
of whether the flag should be altered as new states joined the Union. Many members of
Congress opposed changing the flag, pointing out that it would be expensive for shipowners
to acquire new flags, and the issue became a fiercely debated one. Finally, a law was passed
providing that after May 1, 1795, the flag would have fifteen stripes and fifteen stars. See
Act of Jan. 13, 1794, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 341. The admission of still more states, however,
threatened to make the design of the flag unwieldy. As a result, in 1818, Congress, acting
on a proposal introduced by Representative Peter Wendover of New York, decreed that
henceforth the flag would have thirteen stripes and one star for each state, with new states
receiving their stars on the first July 4th after their admission. Since 1947, the design of the
flag has been codified, see 4 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988), although details on the number of stars,
dimensions, color, and miscellany are controlled by executive order. The flag assumed its
present configuration in 1959, when Hawaii became the fiftieth state. See Exec. Order No.
10834, 3 C.F.R. 367 (Aug. 21, 1959). For histories of the flag, see DAVID EGGENBERGER,
FLAGS OF THE U.S.A. (1964); WILLIAM R. FURLONG & BYRON MCCANDLESS, SO PROUDLY
WE HAIL: THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FLAG (1981); SCOT M. GUENTER, THE
AMERICAN FLAG, 1777-1924: CULTURAL SHIFTS FROM CREATION TO CODIFICATION (1990);
PELEG D. HARRISON, THE STARS AND STRIPES AND OTHER AMERICAN FLAGS (5th ed. 1914);
BOLESLAW MASTAI & MARIE-LOUISE D'OTRANGE MASTAI, THE STARS AND STRIPES (1973);
and MILO M. QUAIFE, MELVIN J. WEIG & ROY E. APPLEMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES FLAG (1961).
47. See F. W. Hoskins, The St. Joseph Convention: The Making of Florida's First
Constitution, 16 FLA. HIST. Q. 33 (1937).
48. Although each colony had a state seal prior to the start of the Revolutionary War,
none had a flag, and it was not until the Civil War that states began using flags. Today,
however, every state has an official flag. See RITA D. HABAN, How PROUDLY THEY WAVE:
FLAGS OF THE FIFTY STATES (1989), and BENJAMIN F. SHEARER & BARBARA S. SHEARER,
STATE NAMES, SEALS, FLAGS, AND SYMBOLS: A HISTORICAL GUIDE (1987).
49. To maintain the delicate balance between free and slave states established by the
Missouri Compromise of 1820, Congress authorized the territories of Florida and Iowa to
enter the Union as soon as they met the requirements for admission. Although Florida
qualified immediately, Iowa's admission was delayed pending settlement of a boundary
dispute and the submission of an acceptable state constitution. See Franklin A. Doty, Florida
and Iowa: A Contemporary View, 36 FLA. HIST. Q. 24 (1957), and Franklin A. Doty,
Florida, Iowa, and the National "Balance of Power," 1845, 35 FLA. HIST. Q. 30 (1956).
For a description of what Florida was like when it became a state, see Dorothy Dodd, Florida
in 1845, 24 FLA. HIST. Q. 3 (1945).
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as Florida's first state governor.5" Earlier in the day, James E. Broome,
chairman of the citizens' committee on inaugural arrangements, had
presented a colorful new flag to the governor-elect and the joint legislative
committee on the inauguration." While no copies remain in existence,
eyewitness reports describe the flag as having five horizontal stripes, each
in a different color. 2 The flag also depicted the United States flag in the
canton,53 as well as a white scroll on the second stripe that bore the motto
"Let Us Alone.,
54
Although no official explanation of the significance of the design or the
colors was provided,55 upon receiving the flag the joint legislative commit-
tee introduced a resolution in both chambers of the General Assembly
providing "That the Colors now presented be the Colors of the State of
Florida, till changed by law, and that the same be placed over the Speaker's
chair of the House of Representatives."56 The House at once adopted the
50. Born in North Carolina in 1795, Moseley had been educated at the University of
North Carolina. Following graduation, he became a successful lawyer in Wilmington and
later served in the North Carolina State Senate. Unsuccessful in his bid to become the
Democratic nominee in the North Carolina gubernatorial race in 1834, Moseley moved to
Florida in 1835. He immediately became involved in territorial politics and was elected
governor of Florida in 1845, defeating his Whig opponent Richard K. Call by a vote of 3,292
to 2,679. Because the 1838 Constitution prohibited him from running for reelection, Moseley
retired to his plantation on Lake Miccosukee at the conclusion of his term in October 1849,
and died in Palatka on January 4, 1863. I BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE GOVERNORS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1978, at 251 (Robert Sobel & John Raimo eds. 1988).
5 1. Dorothy Dodd, The Flags of the State of Florida, 23 FLA. HIST. Q. 160, 161 (1945).
The flag had been prepared by a group of Tallahassee citizens with the approval of Governor
Moseley. Id. at 160.
52. Id. Although modem-day drawings of the flag always show the stripes as being,
from top to bottom, blue, orange, red, white, and green, whether this was the actual
arrangement is open to debate because "[c]ontemporaneous accounts vary as to the sequence
of the colors of the flag." T. Frederick Davis, Pioneer Florida, 22 FLA. HIST. Q. 134, 137
n.* (1944).
53. Dodd, supra note 51, at 160. It was not at all uncommon during this period to
depict a separate flag in the canton. The "Continental Colors," the flag used by George
Washington prior to the adoption of the Stars and Stripes, for example, included the Union
Jack in its canton. See CRAMPTON, supra note 2, at 30. Likewise, Hawaii's state flag, which
was adopted in 1845, displays the Union Jack in its canton. Id. at 33.
54. Dodd, supra note 51, at 160.
55. Davis, supra note 52, at 137. The editor of the Tallahassee Star suggested that the
colors of the flag "were intended to represent youth, energy, purity etc." Id. at 137 n.*.
56. See FLA. S. JOUR. 8 (1845); FLA. H. R. JOUR. 10 (1845). Although modem flag
etiquette would prohibit the draping of the flag over a chair, nineteenth century conventions
were considerably more relaxed:
In the United States, what one law professor has termed "vexillatry" or the
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exaltation of the flag "into a kind of mystical reification of the nation," is a
relatively recent development clearly associated with the growth of American
nationalism in the post-Civil War era. Apparently, great patriots of the past
committed acts that qualify as flag desecration under modem standards: for
example, one photograph which survives from the Civil War shows President
Lincoln and General McClellan eating at a table covered with a flag. Further-
more, the law has only recently recognized national respect for the flag. Con-
gress declared the "Star Spangled Banner" to be the national anthem only in
193 1, and it declared "The Stars and Stripes Forever" to be the national march
in 1987. Congress did not establish Flag Day until 1949, and expanded the
observance into Flag Week only in 1966. Although a magazine first published
the Pledge of Allegiance in 1892, the government did not endorse the Pledge
until 1942, when Congress codified flag etiquette for the first time. Most
significantly, while the first state laws prohibiting flag desecration date only
from 1897, no federal flag desecration law was passed until 1968.
Robert J. Goldstein, The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap: An Historical, Political, and Legal
Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 36-37 (1990). For a further discussion of the evolution
of flag etiquette in the United States, see Emmet V. Mittlebeeler, Flag Profanation and the
Law, 60 KY. L.J. 885 (1972).
In recent times, of course, the subject of flag desecration has been a much debated one.
On June 21, 1989, the United States. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Texas
statute that outlawed flag burning. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). The decision
ignited a firestorm of public indignation, led President Bush to call for a constitutional
amendment, and resulted in the passage of the Flag Protection Act of 1989. See Pub. L. No.
101-131, § 2(d)(2), 103 Stat. 777 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 700). Flag burners in Seattle and
Washington, D.C., quickly tested the new law, and, on June 11, 1990, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the Act was invalid. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990). Although Congressional Republicans vowed to renew their efforts to pass a
constitutional amendment, by September 1990 the issue had disappeared in the face of the
recession and the increasingly tense situation in Kuwait. For a further look at the crisis, see
Douglas W. Kmiec, In the Aftermath of Johnson and Eichman: The Constitution Need Not
Be Mutilated to Preserve the Government's Speech and Property Interests in the Flag, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 577; Daniel H. Pollitt, The Flag Burning Controversy: A Chronology, 70
N.C. L. REV. 553 (1992); and George S. Swan, The Political Economy of Congressional
Social Policymaking: United States v. Eichman and Texas v. Johnson, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J.
146 (1991). See also Peter E. Quint, The Comparative Law of Flag Desecration: The
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
613 (1992).
Several years after Johnson and Eichman, the subject of flag desecration was revived
in an international setting when the Canadian flag was displayed upside-down by a United
States Marine Corps color guard before the start of the second game of the 1992 World
Series between the Atlanta Braves and the Toronto Blue Jays. See World Series Notebook:
Flag, If Not Jays, Was Upended, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1992, at C8. Although the incident
threatened to ruin the fall classic, the crisis was defused after President Bush apologized for
the mistake and a different Marine color guard carried the flag correctly before the start of
the third game. See Claire Smith, World Series: Marines Rally 'Round the Maple Leaf
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resolution, as well as a proclamation giving thanks "to the patriotic citizens
of Tallahassee for the present stand of colors for the State of Florida."57
Matters did not go as smoothly in the Senate however, and as noon
approached the resolution still had not been passed. With a large crowd
beginning to gather at the recently-completed capitol for the swearing-in
ceremony,58 the Senate finally had no choice but to adjourn, thereby
leaving the issue unsettled.
While Moseley's inaugural address "was rather modest and unassum-
ing," when he finished the large crowd "responded to [it with] deafening
shouts."59 A twenty-eight gun salute then was fired, the Stars and Stripes
and the proposed flag were raised, and the band struck up "Yankee Doodle
Dandy.
60
In the days following the inauguration, the debate over the flag
resumed. As before, the sole issue was the flag's motto. While the
Easing a Flap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1992, at B 11. For an interesting discussion of the
obligations that the United States owes to the flags of other nations, see Mark C. Phillips,
Comment, Protecting National Flags: Must the United States Protect CorrespondingForeign
Dignity Interests?, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 329 (1989-1990).
57. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 11 (1845).
58. As in modern times, Moseley's inauguration attracted a great deal of public interest.
According to one commentator: "Burying the animosities and differences of the late political
campaign, residents of Florida flocked to Tallahassee by the hundreds to observe Florida's
official entrance! into the Union; it is said that several thousand visitors assembled there to
witness the ceremonies [which lasted for three days]." Davis, supra note 52, at 135-36. For
a brief look at the inaugurations of other Florida governors, see MORRIS, supra note 10, at
267-73.
59. Davis, supra note 52, at 138-39. Although no copies of the actual text remain, it
is estimated that Moseley's speech ran 2,250 words. Id. at 139. In contrast, the average
presidential inaugural address contains 2,399 words. JOSEPH N. KANE, FACTS ABOUT THE
PRESIDENTS: A COMPILATION OF BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INFORMATION 377 (5th
ed. 1989). While George Washington needed only 135 words when he was inaugurated in
1793, and Abraham Lincoln limited his remarks to 698 words at the 1865 inauguration,
Moseley's speech was brief compared to other inaugural addresses of the 1840s. Just two
months before Moseley was inaugurated, for example, his college classmate, James K. Polk,
became the nation's eleventh president and delivered a 4,776 word speech. Id. Four years
earlier, on March 4, 1841, William Henry Harrison gave what remains the longest inaugural
address in presidential history: 8,445 words. Id. As is well known, Harrison contracted
pneumonia while presenting his speech and died on April 4, 1841.
60. Dodd, supra note 51, at 160. Some commentators, however, believe that the flag
was raised before Moseley began his speech. See Davis, supra note 52, at 138 ("Promptly
at noon, Mr. Moseley appeared on the east portico of the capitol to deliver his inaugural
address before the General Assembly and 'several thousand' Floridians gathered in front of
the building. Simultaneously, the new State flag was hoisted on the flagstaff of the
capitol.").
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Democrats contended that it was a fitting credo,61 the Whigs countered that
it was nothing more than a party slogan,62 and for the next six months the
debate dragged on as the issue was raised, debated, tabled, and then raised
again." Finally, however, on December 27, 1845, the Democrats prevailed
61. While it is not known what the public thought of the motto, at least one source has
concluded that the phrase "probably represented the sentiments of most Floridians[.]"
CHARLTON W. TEBEAU, A HISTORY OF FLORIDA 173 (rev. ed. 1980). Another has gone even
further, contending that the phrase was placed on the flag as a warning to the federal
government not to meddle in the state's affairs:
At the inauguration of Governor Moseley, the ceremonies of which were
performed in the completed capitol, a state flag was displayed consisting of
horizontal stripes of blue, orange, red, white and green bearing the motto, "Let
Us Alone." The motto was significant, in view of the long period of discussion
over the aggressions of the Federal Government and the North, and the warnings
of Florida nullifiers who were following Calhoun rather than Jackson. The
strong States Rights element had also introduced into the [territorial] council's
call for a constitutional convention the phrase "the admission of Florida into the
National Confederacy." The state flag placed an added emphasis on the "Let-
Us-Alone" attitude of Florida. The new state asked to be allowed to work out
her own salvation.
I HISTORY OF FLORIDA: PAST AND PRESENT 121 (Harry G. Cutler ed. 1923).
62. It has been written elsewhere that:
No one seems to have objected to the rather bizarre color combination, but the
motto raised a furor. The Whigs charged that "Let us alone" was a party motto,
"now about being foisted upon this State" by the Democrats. The Floridian, a
Democratic organ, seeking to refute this, claimed that it was "the substance of
the answer of the French manufacturers of Lyons, to the French minister of
Finance (Colbert), when he asked what they wished the Government to do for
them." To which the Whig Sentinel rejoined, if its origin was sought it would
be found to be "the frantic exclamation of an 'unclean spirit' to our Saviour."
(Mark 1:24)
Dodd, supra note 51, at 160-61.
63. The odyssey endured by the Senate has been described as follows:
But the Whigs in the Senate, though in the minority, succeeded in having
consideration of the resolution deferred from day to day. On June 27, R. B.
Haughton, "after briefly stating his objections to the motto, appealed to the
liberality of the majority for further time, in order to propose a substitute."
George S. Hawkins replied "that there was no disposition to press the matter too
urgently; but if it was procrastinated, the gentleman should obligate himself to
show a better. Mr. Haughton thought this could easily be done and he would
undertake it."
The resolution was again debated on July 2, when a number of devices
were suggested. When Haughton proposed "a magnolia with a rattlesnake
entwined around its trunk, with an English motto which we (the editor of the
Sentinel) have forgotten," Hawkins approved the device but suggested "Let us
alone" as an appropriate motto. Among other suggestions were, "A single Live
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and a resolution adopting the flag and its motto "as the Flag of the State of
Florida" was approved by a vote of 8 to 5.64
Rather than bringing the furor over the flag to an end, the Senate's
action sparked a new controversy as to whether the resolution had been in
the proper form.6" By now, however, the Senate had grown weary of the
entire issue and therefore decided to move on to other business. As for the
flag itself, following its unveiling at the inauguration it was never flown
again, and eventually either was discarded or lost.66
IV. THE CIVIL WAR
The election of Abraham Lincoln on November 2, 1860 resulted in
calls for secession throughout the South, and before the year was out South
Carolina had left the Union. In Florida, reaction was almost as swift, and
on November 30, 1860 Governor Madison S. Perry signed a bill authorizing
the holding of a convention to consider whether Florida should disassociate
itself from the United States.67 On the same day, Senator George W. Call,
the sponsor of the secession act, introduced a bill proposing that Florida
adopt a state uniform and flag.6 Although the bill was approved by the
Senate on December 1, 1860, time did not permit the House of Repre-
sentatives to consider it before adjourning for the year. As a result, the
matter was not taken up by the House until the following February.69
oak, with the motto, 'Robore, sicutfronde perennis,'-in strength as in verdure
perpetual," and "a Live Oak upon a craggy beach, against which the surfs of a
raging sea are beating, and in the distance a view of the tempestuous ocean, with
the motto, 'The same in sunshine as in storm."' No agreement being reached,
the resolution was referred to a select committee, which failed to make a report
on it.
Id. at 161-62.
64. Id. at 162.
65. While the Senate had passed a resolution, the House's approval had been expressed
in a joint resolution. This led opponents of the flag to argue that the Senate's action had no
effect: "'Therefore,' the Florida Sentinel pointed out, 'although both houses have passed
upon this motto, and approved it, yet for want of attention to the matter of form, it has not
been legally adopted, and it is not the motto of the State."' Id.
66. Id. ("Whether legally adopted or not, presumably the flag thereafter gathered dust
over the speaker's chair, for we hear no more of it.").
67. For a look at Florida during the year leading up to the Civil War, see George C.
Bittle, Florida Prepares for War 1860-1861, 51 FLA. HIST. Q. 143 (1972).
68. Dodd, supra note 51, at 163.
69. Id.
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In the interim between Lincoln's election and the start of the Conven-
tion, numerous unofficial secession flags began to appear throughout
Florida.7" Of these, the one to gain the greatest prominence was a flag
prepared by the "Ladies of Broward Neck," a community in Duval County,
and presented to the governor by Miss Helen Broward on December 28,
1860.
The flag had a white field and the motto "The Rights of the South At
All Hazards" painted in black across the top.7 On the hoist below the
legend was a pale blue circle that had two large dark blue stars and twelve
small light blue stars.72 The fly, meanwhile, had an alternating pattern of
red, white, and blue stripes.7" In acknowledging "the receipt of the
beautiful States Rights flag," Governor Perry promised that the flag would
"be unfurled on all fitting occasions which may present themselves in the
progress of the important and interesting events which are now daily
transpiring."74
The Secession Convention began on January 3, 1861, and one week
later the delegates voted sixty-two to seven to secede from the Union.75
On the next day, January 11, 1861, the Ordinance of Secession was signed
on the east portico of the capitol. After the last delegate had affixed his
signature, a fifteen gun salute was fired to usher in the new nation. Gover-
nor-elect John Milton, who was presiding due to the illness of Governor
Perry, then presented Miss Broward's flag to the Convention.76 The news
that the Secession Ordinance had been signed triggered merrymaking
throughout the state, and in Saint Augustine a locally-produced flag bearing
70. Id.
71. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 279.
72. The two large stars were intended to portray South Carolina and Florida as the first
two states to secede from the Union, while the twelve small stars were meant to represent the
states that were expected to join them: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Just
days before Florida seceded, however, Mississippi left the Union, and a third large star was
hastily added to the flag. Mississippi is therefore represented by both a large and a small
star. Dodd, supra note 51, at 165 n.21.
73. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 279.
74. Dodd, supra note 51, at 163-64.
75. Despite the lopsided margin by which the secession ordinance passed, at least one
scholar has suggested that most Floridians did not want to leave the Union. See John F.
Reiger, Secession of Florida from the Union-A Minority Decision?, 46 FLA. HIST. Q. 358
(1968).
76. Although Miss Broward's flag was not officially adopted, it was displayed on the
rostrum of the Florida House of Representatives throughout the Civil War. MORRIS, supra
note 10, at 279-80.
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a palm tree and an eagle was raised over the city."
Recognizing that the United States was now a foreign nation and that
war was likely, Governor Perry dispatched Captain V. M. Randolph and
Richard L. Campbell to seize the Pensacola Navy Yard. Encountering little
resistance, Randolph and Campbell quickly secured the vital base and on the
next day, January 13, 1861, replaced the Stars and Stripes with an
improvised flag. Even by impromptu standards, however, the new flag was
a rather pathetic sight,78 and upon seeing it Colonel William H. Chase, the
commander of the Florida troops stationed in Pensacola, ordered all
Floridians to fly the United States flag modified so as to have just one white
star in the canton until a permanent flag could be adopted.79
77. The description of the Saint Augustine flag comes from a story carried in the
January 19, 1861 issue of the St. Augustine Examiner:
"[T]he report [that the Secession Ordinance had been signed] was communicated
almost instantly to the entire population, and there was exhibited a scene of
intense excitement never before witnessed by us. In approbation of the result,
all the bells of the City reechoed in loud, long and continuous peals the feelings
of a rejoicing public." Later in the day public ceremonies were held in the
Plaza.... After an address by Judge Benjamin A. Putnam, "the national flag
of Florida, wrought by the fair hands of some of our patriotic ladies .. .rose
beautifully amidst deafening cheers and saluting discharges of artillery and small
arms, and as it reached the top of the staff unfolded gracefully and expanded to
a favoring breeze, bearing on its ground the cherished Palmetto with an Eagle
resting on a globe and holding in its mouth the State's motto, 'Let us alone."'
Dodd, supra note 51, at 166.
78. According to one account, the flag was "a dingy white flag" that "looked like an old
signal flag with a star put on it." Id.
79. Born in Massachusetts, Chase had moved to Pensacola at a young age. A graduate
of West Point, he was a man of considerable influence and eventually rose to the rank of
major general in the Florida militia. Cutler, supra note 61, at 140. Being a highly-trained
military officer, Chase's order was both detailed and explicit, and left little to the
imagination:
Colonel William H. Chase, commanding the Florida troops, immediately took
steps to replace this obvious makeshift with a more suitable flag. By General
Order No. 3, issued January 13, he required a flag, whose design he prescribed,
to be displayed at the Navy Yard, forts, barracks, and hospital in possession of
state troops. "Until otherwise ordained by the people of Florida assembled in
convention," the order read, "the emblems of the flag will be thirteen stripes,
alternate red and white, commencing with the red, a blue field, with a large
white star in the center." On January 14, the commander of the U. S. S.
Wyandotte, lying in Pensacola harbor, noted in his log, "Florida forces hoisted
the American flag with lone star." Chase's order required that the flag, when
hoisted for the first time, be saluted with thirteen guns.
Dodd, supra note 51, at 167.
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From a historical standpoint, Chase's flag was a poor choice for a
people attempting to distance themselves from the United States. Designed
in 1836 for use by the Texas navy, the flag had been intended to demon-
strate solidarity with the United States during the days of the Texas
Republic.8" Nevertheless, Chase's order was accorded widespread respect
and was complied with throughout Florida.8
On February 1, 1861, the House of Representatives, having reassembled
following the Secession Convention, took up Senator Call's flag bill. Not
surprisingly, the bill passed without dissent and was signed into law on
February 8, 1861.82 As approved, the bill directed the governor "by and
with the consent of his staff' to adopt "an appropriate device for a State
flag, which shall be distinctive in character.,1 3
One month later, on March 4, 1861, the Provisional Congress of the
Confederate States of America selected the "Stars and Bars" to be the
national flag of the Confederacy.84 Modelled after the Stars and Stripes,
80. Like Florida, Texas originally had belonged to Spain, but became a Mexican
possession in 1821 when that country broke away from Spain. Following increasing
hostilities, Texas declared her independence from Mexico on March 2, 1836, and thereafter
was a self-governing republic. On December 29, 1845, Texas became the twenty-eighth state
to join the United States, just ten months after Florida had been admitted to the Union.
During the nine years that Texas was a republic, a number of different flags were used,
including a flag known as the "Texas Naval Ensign:"
During the era of the Republic, Texas also had distinctive flags for use at sea.
During the pre-independence period of the revolution, Texas privateers flew the
"1824" flag. In 1836, this was replaced by the ensign of the Texas Navy. The
Texas naval ensign proclaimed the attachment of Texas to the United States,
both symbolically and diplomatically, and was in fact the flag of the United
States with a lone star in the union. This ensign graced the naval vessels of the
Republic until Texas became one of the United States in 1845.
DEVEREAUX D. CANNON, JR., THE FLAGS OF THE CONFEDERACY: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
43 (1988). For a detailed look at the flags of Texas, see Charles A. Spain, The Flags and
Seals of Texas, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 215 (1992).
81. MORRIs, supra note 10, at 279.
82. Dodd, supra note 51, at 167.
83. Id.
84. Adoption of the Stars and Bars had proven rather contentious, and in many ways
was the first tangible crisis faced by the seceding states:
For the first twenty-four days of the existence of their government, the
Confederate States of America had no officially approved flag. When Jefferson
Davis was inaugurated President of the provisional government on February 18,
1861 the capitol building in Montgomery flew the flag of the State of Alabama,
and the inaugural parade was lead [sic] by a company of infantry carrying the
flag of Georgia.
The Provisional Congress had established a Committee on Flag and Seal,
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the Stars and Bars consisted of three horizontal stripes, or bars, in an
alternating combination of red-white-red, and a blue canton bearing seven
white stars arranged in a circle. 5 Within weeks, use of the Stars and Bars
had spread throughout the South, 6 and in Florida Governor Perry decided
to model the new state flag after the Stars and Bars." Consequently, on
September 13, 1861, an executive order was issued establishing as the new
state flag a vertically split field with a blue hoist bearing a white shield and
a fly with the same stripes as the ones found on the Stars and Bars.88
the chairman of which was William Porcher Miles of South Carolina. The
Committee received hundreds of designs for flags which were submitted to it by
citizens from all parts of the country. Even citizens of States still among the
United States sent in proposals. An unwritten deadline for the adoption of a flag
was March 4, 1861 because on that date Abraham Lincoln was to be inaugurated
president of the now foreign United States; and on that date the Southern States
were determined to fly a flag which expressed their own sovereignty.
As the deadline neared, the Committee continued to examine and debate
designs without being able to reach a consensus.... The Committee finally had
to admit its inability to agree on a flag and chose four patterns to present to the
full Congress for a final decision.
[Thus, o]n the morning of March 4, large cambric models of the proposed
flags were hung up on the walls of the Congressional chamber.
CANNON, supra note 80, at 7.
85. Although it now seems odd that the Provisional Congress would have selected a flag
that so closely resembled the Stars and Stripes, the "sentimental attachment to 'the old flag'
felt by the public at large . . . made it impossible [for either the Flag Committee or the
Congress] to ignore the elements of its design." Id.
86. "The use of this new flag not only spread rapidly across the Confederate States but
also among Confederate sympathizers in States still in the old Union." Id. at 10.
87. Id. at 37 ("The flag adopted by the Confederate Congress on March 4, 1861 was
altered to serve Florida's needs by extending the canton to form a vertical bar the entire
width of the flag.").
88. More precisely, the executive order described the flag as follows:
The one half of the Flag next to the Staff is blue: the other half has alternately
one red, one white, one red stripe. Each stripe (three in all) [is] of equal width
and perpendicular to the staff. (The stripes are the same as the Confederate
stripes, only they form one half the Flag). On the blue ground, and occupying
somewhat more than one half of it is an elliptical band (the axis of the ellipse
in the proportion of fifteen to thirteen, the longitudinal axis parallel with the
Flag Staff) bearing superiorily 'In God is Our Trust'-nferiorily-'Flor-
ida'-making as it were a frame for the Shield. In the centre of the ellipse is
a single strong Live Oak Tree. Beyond it is seen the Gulf of Mexico, with
vessels in the distance. In front of and near the foot of the Oak is a piece of
Field Artillery. Beyond the gun, and resting against the boll of the Oak, is seen
a stand of six colors-the Confederate and State Flags, to the front. To the left
of the Fieldpiece are Four Muskets stacked. To the right and near, balls piled,
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Perry's flag apparently failed to generate much enthusiasm, for it
appears that it was never "raised over the capitol or in the field."89
Instead, like most Southerners, Floridians preferred using the Confederate
battle flag. Known as the "Southern Cross," this highly distinctive flag had
a red field and contained a blue saltire with thirteen white stars arranged
inside the arms. Designed by William Porcher Miles of South Carolina, it
had been submitted for consideration as the national flag. When the Stars
and Bars were selected instead, General Joseph E. Johnston adopted the
Southern Cross as the battle flag of the Army of the Potomac.9" In time,
the Southern Cross became the unofficial flag of the South and appeared in
a multitude of civilian and military styles.9
V. RECONSTRUCTION AND THE END OF
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
On April 9, 1865, General Robert E. Lee surrendered his troops to
General Ulysses S. Grant at the Appomattox courthouse.92 The defeat of
the Confederacy ushered in a period of hard feelings between the victorious
North and the vanquished South, and, in time, resulted in the formulation
of a stem national reconstruction plan.
In order to end the military occupation that had been established and
be readmitted to the Union, Southern states were required to pass new
constitutions that renounced slavery, guaranteed equal protection to all
and a drum.
Dodd, supra note 51, at 167-68.
89. Id. at 168.
90. CANNON, supra note 80, at 51-54.
91. For a detailed history of the Southern Cross as well as other Confederate battle flags,
see ECHOES OF GLORY: ARMs & EQUIPMENT OF THE CONFEDERACY 230-81 (Henry
Woodhead ed. 1991).
92. Because of communication difficulties, troops stationed in Florida did not begin to
surrender until May 10, 1865, and it was not until May 20, 1865 that General Edward M.
McCook took formal possession of Tallahassee and raised the United States flag over the
capitol. Morris, supra note 10, at 415. For the most part, Florida was untouched by the
Civil War, and the only battle of consequence to be fought in the state was the Battle of
Olustee, which occurred on February 20, 1864. As a result, Tallahassee was the only
confederate capital east of the Mississippi not to be invaded by Union troops. For a further
discussion of the role of Florida in the Civil War, see Allen W. Jones, Military Events in
Florida During the Civil War, 1861-1865, 39 FLA. HIST. Q. 42 (1960), and John F. Reiger,
Florida After Secession: Abandonment by the Confederacy and Its Consequences, 50 FLA.
HIST. Q. 128 (1971).
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citizens, repudiated the Confederate war debt, and punished anyone who had
taken up anns against the Union. Although Florida adopted a new
constitution on November 7, 1865, it fell far short of what the Radical
Republicans in Congress expected and was rejected in 1867.93 As a result,
Florida was returned to military control and remained in that status until a
constitution acceptable to the North was passed on May 8, 1868. 94
Because: the Civil War had made flags very popular,95 the 1868
constitution's "Miscellaneous" article directed the Legislature to "adopt a
State Emblem having the design of the Great Seal of the State impressed
upon a white ground of six feet six inches fly and six feet deep." 96 Since
Florida did not have an official state seal at the time the 1868 constitution
was ratified,97 the design of the flag was not finalized until August 6,
1868, when the Legislature met and passed ajoint resolution adopting a seal.98
93. See TEBEAU, supra note 61, at 239-47.
94. The military occupation of Florida is discussed further in Merlin G. Cox, Military
Reconstruction in Florida, 46 FLA. HIST. Q. 219 (1968), while the drafting of the 1868
Constitution is set out in Richard L. Hume, Membership of the Florida Constitutional
Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican Factionalism in the Reconstruction South,
51 FLA. HIST. Q. 1 (1972), and Jerrell H. Shofner, The Constitution of 1868, 41 FLA. HIST.
Q. 356 (1963). In large part, the 1868 constitution was written by Northerners who had
migrated to Florida to take advantage of the post-war chaos. Because such persons were
called "carpetbaggers," in recognition of the suitcases that they used, the 1868 Constitution
is often referred to as the "Carpetbag Constitution." For an assessment of the carpetbaggers,
see Maurice M. Vance, Northerners in Late Nineteenth Century Florida: Carpetbaggers or
Settlers?, 38 FLA. HIST. Q. 1 (1959).
95. Although little attention had been paid to flags prior to the war, the conflict served
to elevate the place of flags in the minds of most Americans. Thus, for example, when the
Ku Klux Klan was founded in 1867, one of the first things it did was adopt a flag. Seeking
to set itself apart from the numerous other groups that were forming in the post-war South,
the Klan's flag consisted of a yellow triangle with a red scalloped border and bore a black
dragon and the Klan's motto. SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at 274.
96. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 31 (1868).
97. Although seals had been used throughout Florida's history, no official seal had ever
been adopted. Prior to 1821, the Spanish or English seal was used in Florida depending on
which country was in power. From 1821 until 1846, a seal bearing an American eagle with
outstretched wings resting on a bed of clouds and ringed with the words "The Territory of
Florida" was employed. After 1846, a seal depicting an outline map of Florida and the
sitting figure of a woman holding her hand out in the direction of the Gulf of Mexico was
utilized. For a further description of the Spanish and British seals, see Robert R. Rea, The
Deputed Great Seal of British West Florida, 40 ALA. HIST. Q. 162 (1978), and Peter Walne,
The Great Seals Deputed of British East Florida, 61 FLA. HIST. Q. 49 (1982). For a further
description of the American seals, see MORRIS, supra note 10, at 284-87.
98. Dodd, supra note 51, at 169. According to the description contained in the
resolution, the seal was to be "the size of the American silver dollar," and was to have "in
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Reconstruction ended in 1877 with the election of Rutherford B. Hayes
as president, and like other Southern states, Florida set out to eradicate all
vestiges of Northern control and influence. 99 This attempt reached its
zenith in 1885, when an entirely new constitution was adopted to replace the
1868 constitution.00°  Like the 1868 constitution, however, the 1885
constitution provided that the state flag was to be a field of white with the
state seal in the middle.''
The next change in the flag's design occurred just as the century was
coming to an end. Whenever the flag would hang limp, such as on windless
days, it appeared to be completely white.0 2 Since white flags always
have stood for surrender,0 3 late in the century Governor Francis P. Flem-
the centre thereof a view of the sun's rays over a highland in the distance, a cocoa tree, a
steamboat on water, and an Indian female scattering flowers in the foreground, encircled by
the words: 'Great Seal of the State of Florida: In God we Trust."' Id.
99. For a sense of what Florida was like during Reconstruction, see Jerrell H. Shofner,
Political Reconstruction in Florida, 45 FLA. HIST. Q. 145 (1966). In large measure,
Reconstruction came to an end because the Florida State Board of Elections decided to award
Florida's electoral votes to Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican nominee, in the disputed
presidential election of 1876. Modem-day historians are in agreement that the election
actually was won by Samuel J. Tilden. See further Jerrell H. Shofner, Florida Courts and
the Disputed Election of 1876, 48 FLA. HIST. Q. 26 (1969), and Jerrell H. Shofner, Florida
in the Balance: The Electoral Count of 1876, 47 FLA. HIST. Q. 122 (1968).
100. See Edward C. Williamson, The Constitutional Convention of 1885, 41 FLA. HIST.
Q. 116 (1962).
101. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 12 (1885).
102. This visual effect should have been anticipated, since a similar problem had been
encountered during the Civil War. As noted above, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying
text, the original Confederate flag was the Stars and Bars. On May 1, 1863, however, the
Confederacy replaced the Stars and Bars with a new flag known as the "Stainless Banner."
This flag had a white field and contained the Southern Cross in its canton. Because the
Stainless Banner often was mistaken for a flag of surrender when no breeze was blowing, a
red vertical stripe was added to its fly on March 4, 1865. See further CANNON, supra note
80, at 14-24.
103. SMITH, ACROSS THE WORLD, supra note 8, at 97. Although no harm is supposed
to come to a person proceeding under a white flag, one's protection is by no means
guaranteed. History has recorded numerous incidents in which a flag of truce either was
ignored or used to stage an ambush, and Floridians need look no further than their own state
for such an episode.
In 1832, President Andrew Jackson ordered the forcible relocation of the Seminoles
from Florida to Oklahoma. Jackson harbored a strong antipathy for the tribe as a result of
his participation in the First Seminole War (1817-18), and therefore was quite willing to
oblige the white settlers in Florida who were clamoring for the Seminoles' land. Jackson's
decision to remove the Seminoles touched off the Second Seminole War (1835-42), a bloody
confrontation that eventually cost $20 million and claimed at least 1,500 lives. During the
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ing"° recommended that a red saltire be placed behind the seal. °5  In
1899, the Legislature responded to Fleming's suggestion by passing a joint
resolution proposing that the constitutional description of the flag be
changed to include a red saltire. °6 On November 6, 1900, the amendment
was approved by the voters."'
VI. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Although no major changes have been made in the flag during the
twentieth century, three small modifications have taken place. First, on
November 8., 1966, a constitutional amendment was passed reducing the
early years of the fighting, the Seminoles were led by a Creek warrior named Osceola. His
brilliant tactics and ability to elude capture completely frustrated the United States Army, and
finally led Major General Thomas S. Jesup to invite Osceola to a peace conference near Saint
Augustine in October 1837. Although Osceola arrived carrying a white flag, Jesup had him
imprisoned, first at the Castillo de San Marcos in Saint Augustine, and later at Fort Moultrie
in Charleston, South Carolina, where he died on January 30, 1838. Despite a public outcry
and a Congressional investigation, Jesup was not punished, although his reputation suffered
permanent damage and he spent much of the rest of his life defending his actions. For a
further description of the affair, see The White Flag, 33 FLA. HIST. Q. 218 (1955). See also
PATRICIA R. WICKMAN, OSCEOLA'S LEGACY (1991).
104. Fleming served as governor of Florida from January 8, 1889 to January 3, 1893.
Born in Panama Park, Florida, on September 28, 1841, Fleming served in the famous 2d
Florida Regiment during the Civil War. While home on sick leave, he commanded a
company of volunteers at the Battle of Natural Bridge. After the war he studied law, gained
statewide prominence, and entered politics. As governor, Fleming is best remembered for
having set up the State Board of Health and charging it with suppressing Yellow Fever. He
died on December 20, 1908 in Jacksonville. Sobel & Raimo, supra note 50, at 261.
105. SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at 126. Although it is not known why Fleming
proposed adding, a red saltire, the generally-accepted theory is that he got the idea from the
recently-adopted Alabama state flag. During the Civil War Alabamians had used a modified
version of the Bonnie Blue flag as their state flag. See supra note 44. In 1895, this flag was
replaced by an entirely new design:
The present State flag [of Alabama] was adopted by the Legislature on 16
February 1895 in accord with a motion introduced by Representative John W.
A. Sanford, Jr. It is described as having a "crimson cross of St. Andrew,"
although St. Andrew's saltire has in fact always been white .... The propor-
tions are not specified, but since the intention of the creator was to suggest the
Battle Flag of the Confederacy, the flag should be made square in shape.
Id. at 102. Given the fact that less than four years separate the adoption of the Alabama flag
and Fleming's proposal, the theory seems well-founded.
106. See 1899 FLA. LAWS, J. Res. No. 4, at 359.
107. SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at 126.
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dimensions of the flag to conform to standard commercial sizes. 08
Second, on May 21, 1985, the state seal was changed to correct a number
of historical inaccuracies.0 9 Finally, as part of the 1968 revision of the
constitution, the description of the flag was deleted."' Consequently, the
constitution now simply provides that the design of the flag "shall be
prescribed by law.""'-
Today, in addition to the state flag, many other flags regularly appear
in Florida. Among the most common are the red-and-white diver's
flag," l2 the red-and-black hurricane flag," 3 and the blue-and-gold flag
108. This change was necessitated because "the proportions of three to four which were
selected for the flag in 1900 did not correspond to those generally in use for other state flags.
Thus on 8 November 1966 a further amendment was ratified, specifying a greater flexibility
in the proportions of the flag, the width of the seal, and the saltire." Id. Although the
change made little difference to the public, it was greeted with great enthusiasm by
flagmakers: "The former size of the Florida flag had presented a problem to flagmakers, who
were being called upon to furnish Florida flags in ever increasing number because of
legislative requirements for its display at school and other public buildings." MORRIS, supra
note 10, at 280.
109. Id. at 284. Among the errors found in the old seal were the following: "a bag of
coffee, never a prime crop in Florida; a cocoa palm instead of the state's Sabal (Palmetto)
palm; an Indian maiden dressed as a Plains Indian, mountains in a state where the highest
elevation is 345 feet, and questionable seaworthiness of the sidewheel steamer." Id.
Although no one knows how these anomalies crept into the seal, "[t]here is an unconfirmed
story that a Northern designer modified for Florida a seal previously prepared for use by a
government in the West." Id. at 286. For a further discussion of the errors contained in the
1868 seal, see Florida's Great Seal: Its Historical Inaccuracies, 3 FLA. HIST. Q. 16 (1924).
110. Some legislators wanted to go further, and argued that the constitution should not
mention the flag at all. See, e.g., Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Commentary, 25A FLA.
STAT. ANN. 504 (1970).
111. See supra note 1. At the same time, chapter 15 of the Florida Statutes was
amended to include the following description of the flag: "The seal of the state, in diameter
one-half the hoist, shall occupy the center of a white ground. Red bars, in width one-fifth
the hoist, shall extend from each corner toward the center, to the outer rim of the seal." FLA.
STAT. § 15.012 (1991).
112. The diver's flag, consisting of a white diagonal stripe on a red field, "warns of
diving in the area where it is displayed[.]" SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at 275. In
Florida, all divers are required to "prominently display a divers-down flag in the area in
which the diving occurs, other than when diving in an area customarily used for swimming
only." FLA. STAT. § 861.065(4) (1991).
The desire of commercial dive shops to fly the diver's flag in front of their stores has
spawned an interesting situation in Fort Lauderdale and other Broward County cities. Under
the zoning ordinances of both the County and the various municipalities, the use of
commercial banners, including flags, is illegal. See, e.g., FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., 11 CODE
§ 47-50.3(c) (1990). Governmental flags, however, are exempt from the prohibition. Id. §
47-50.3(c)(5). Some years ago, dive shop owners discovered that the flag of the Brazilian
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of the Conch Republic." 4  Other often encountered flags are foreign
flags," 5 municipal and corporate flags," 6 and the deeply moving black-
and-white P.O.W.-M.I.A. flag." 7 By far, however, the most popular flag
state of Para looks exactly like the diver's flag, except that it adds a blue star to the middle
of the white horizontal stripe. MAURO TALOccI, GUIDE TO THE FLAGS OF THE WORLD 225
(rev. ed. 1982). As a result, the Para flag now can be seen throughout Broward County.
113. The hurricane flag is actually two identical flags flown one above the other. Each
flag is red and has a black square in the middle. When only one such flag is flown, a whole
gale rather than a hurricane is indicated. See Whitney Smith, Flag, in II Encyclopedia
Americana 348, illus. opp. 363 (1986). For a look at how hurricanes have shaped the
development of Florida, see MORTON D. WINSBERG, FLORIDA WEATHER 111-33 (1990). The
legal issues that can be spawned by hurricanes are canvassed in Symposium, Andrew: Force
Majeure-The Legal Aftermath, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1003 (1993).
114. The Conch Republic was "founded" on April 23, 1980, by residents of Key West
to protest a United States Border Patrol road block that turned U.S. Route I into a nineteen
mile long parking lot. In recent years, the Conch Republic flag, which in actuality is the Key
West city flag, has become something of a collector's item. See further Whitney Smith, The
Conch Republic Flag, 32 FLAG BULL. 49 (1993).
115. Nowhere is this more true than in Coral Gables, where the local chamber of
commerce recently convinced the City to permanently display the flags of more than 200
countries in a colorful salute to the city's large international business community. See Coral
Gables Salutes ihe World, NEW MIAMI, Oct. 1993, at 8. Although the Cuban, Haitian, and
Israeli flags are very prominent in South Florida, on a statewide basis the Canadian Maple
Leaf is the most frequently seen foreign flag. It also enjoys the distinction of being the only
foreign flag ever to fly over the Capitol:
After the spiriting of six Americans from Tehran by the Canadian Ambassador
to Iran in February, 1980, Governor Bob Graham ordered the flying of the flag
of Canada from four poles at the Capitol until the hostages then held at the
American Embassy in Tehran were freed. The six rescued were those who had
escaped when militants took over the Embassy. The Canadian flags were
lowered for the last time at noon on January 26, 1981, as bands played and in
the presence of dignitaries headed by Governor Graham and of the public.
MORRIS, supra note 10, at 281.
116. Since the end of World War 11, an increasing number of American counties and
cities have adopted their own flags. Most often, such flags depict the government's seal and
are displayed in "the chambers of the mayor or the governing council." SMITH, FLAG BOOK,
supra note 10, at 248-53. Similarly, many corporations today find it advantageous for
advertising purposes to have their own flag. Like municipal flags, corporate flags normally
bear the company's seal. Id. at 271-78. This is not always the case, however, for when Carl
Barger, the president of the Florida Marlins baseball team, died shortly before the start of the
team's inaugural season, owner H. Wayne Huizenga had a flag bearing Barger's name and
his favorite number (5, for legendary Yankee outfielder Joe DiMaggio) raised over Joe
Robbie Stadium before the Marlins' first home game. See S. L. Price, Marlins Don't Make
a Move Before Making Sure Barger is Remembered, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 1993, at 12D.
117. The P.O.W.-M.I.A. flag, which depicts a prisoner of war in the foreground and a
sentry box and barbed wire in the background, was created after the Viet Nam War to honor
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in Florida is the Southern Cross. 1 8 But because many Americans recently
have come to the conclusion that this flag promotes racism, the future use
of the Southern Cross is in considerable doubt.119
missing soldiers. Since September 19, 1990, the Florida Legislature has required "each state-
owned building at wfiich the flag of the United States is displayed [to] also display a P.O.W.-
M.I.A. flag[.]" FLA. STAT. § 256.12 (1991).
118. The popularity of the Southern Cross is not limited to just Florida:
Another flag which has been transformed over time is the naval jack of the
Confederate States of America. Originally flown only on the prow of ships,
since the late nineteenth century it has been displayed extensively on land as an
unofficial Southern banner - a kind of national flag of Dixieland, symbolizing
adherence to the "Lost Cause" and the principles of racial segregation and
"States' Rights." In the North it has also been widely used since World War II
by some high school and college students on speedboats, hot rods, motorcycle
helmets, in dormitories and similar situations. It is often mistakenly called the
Battle Flag or the Stars and Bars. This is the only regional flag now used in the
United States, although in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries New England
had its own flag.
SMITH, FLAG BOOK, supra note 10, at 273-74.
119. In a recent interview, the owner of a popular flag store in Sunrise, Florida noted
that of all the flags he stocks, none is more controversial than the Southern Cross. See Beth
Feinstein-Bartl, A World of Flags: Merchant Finds Patriotism Brings Business Success, SUN-
SENTINEL, May 16, 1993, North East, at 6. In Georgia, the debate over the Southern Cross
has grown so fierce that many citizens have demanded the governor's resignation. On May
28, 1992, Governor Zell Miller, saying that the flag represented the "dark side of the
Confederacy-that desire to deprive some Americans of the equal rights that are the birthright
of all Americans[,]" called on the Georgia Legislature to remove the Southern Cross from
the state flag, which had been added in 1956 to protest the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Believing that Miller has
turned his back on the state's heritage, many Georgians have taken to sporting bumper
stickers and buttons that read "Keep the Flag, Lose the Governor." For a further discussion
of the controversy, see Don Melvin, Scars & Bars, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 7, 1993, at 1G.
Despite Miller's troubles, on April 29, 1993, the new governor of Alabama, Jim
Folsom, reversed a longstanding tradition when he prohibited the Southern Cross from being
flown from the dome of the capitol. Folsom defended his action by saying: "This has been
a divisive issue in our state, and I believe it is time we put it behind us and move our state
forward." See Confederate Flag Banned from Capitol, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 30, 1993, at
3A. Encouraged by this action, black leaders in Mississippi have sued to have the Southern
Cross removed from their state flag, while black legislators in South Carolina have stepped
up their longstanding effort to end the practice of flying the Southern Cross alongside the
state flag. See Ray Recchi, 'Tradition' Unravels to Reveal Racism, SUN-SENTINEL, May 3,
1993, at ID.
The dispute over the Southern Cross reached the national stage in July 1993, when
Senator Carol Mosley-Braun, the only black member of the United States Senate, gave a
heartfelt speech and thereby singlehandedly persuaded her colleagues not to renew a patent
held by the United Daughters of the Confederacy ("UDC"). The patent, which dated back
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VII. CONCLUSION
It has been written that "Flags are fond symbols, popular with people
of all ages."' 20 As this essay has shown, anyone who likes flags will find
Florida an exciting and rewarding place to indulge their passion.
to 1890, protected a UDC insignia that included the Confederate flag. See Michael Riley,
Nixing Dixie: An Impassioned Senate Vote Focuses Attention on the South's War of Symbols,
TIME, Aug. 2, 1993, at 30.
Braun's speech has inspired partisans on both sides of the controversy, particularly in
Florida. While Braun's words encouraged Richard Klos, a white freelance writer, to appear
before the Hillsborough County Commission to urge that it remove the Southern Cross from
the county seal, see Hillsborough to Take Rebel Flag OffSeal, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 1993,
at 8A, they also caused the Populist Party of Florida to hold a rally in downtown Davie to
show support fbr the flag. See Bob French, Protesters Support Confederate Flag, SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 1993, at 3B. Thus, it appears that the struggle over the Southern Cross
in Florida, as well as in other parts of the South, will be a long one.
120. CANNON, supra note 80, at I.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A jackpot close to eighty thousand dollars awaits one of the many who
flock to the Seminole reservation with hopes of picking the lucky eight
numbers.' Although the Florida Constitution prohibits gambling except for
I. The Seminole reservation conducts a do-it-yourself bingo whereby a person can win
the jackpot if he correctly chooses eight numbers ranging from one to seventy-five, and those
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pari-mutuel games 2 and state-run lotteries,3 approximately twelve hundred
persons each night gamble at the Seminole reservation, which offers casino-
style entertainment.4 The Seminoles are a federally recognized tribe and
are therefore subject to the plenary power of the federal government. Thus,
the State of Florida plays a limited role in regulating the tribe.'
In 1988, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") was enacted by
Congress to provide clear standards for the conduct of gaming on Indian
lands.6 The purpose of IGRA is to promote tribal economic development,
self-sufficiency, and a strong tribal government.7 IGRA has prompted
many tribes nationwide, including the Seminole Tribe of Florida, to conduct
casino-style gambling operations.8 However, many casino-style games the
tribes wish to operate must first be negotiated under a Tribal-State
compact. 9 Presently, the Seminole Tribe of Florida is engaged in litigation
against the State of Florida, claiming that the state has violated IGRA by
failing to negotiate in good faith.' ° In Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
numbers are called before the twenty-first number has been selected.
2. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
3. Id. art. X, § 15.
4. The Seminoles offer 162 electronic video machines. The electronic machines include
modem-style slot machines and Superpick Lotto. Superpick Lotto is played by choosing six
numbers ranging from zero to nine; if at least two of the player's numbers correspond to the
numbers displayed by the machine, the player receives credits which can be exchanged for
money. The video machines carry a jackpot close to $21,000. Furthermore, the Seminoles
offer high-stakes bingo. A regular session of bingo consists of twenty games which offer a
prize to a single winner as high as $1199. (The above statistics are based on personal
observations of the author.)
5. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
6. See id. § 2702.
7. Id. § 2702(1).
8. Tom Davidson & Bob French, Support for Casino Gambling, Bingo Evident at Tribal
Powwow, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 10, 1992, at BI. Since IGRA, there have been at least 23
casino-style operations opened. Id. In 1992, there were at least 140 Indian gambling
operations in business in the United States, which were estimated to bring in $1.3 billion
dollars in revenue. Id.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(!)(C) (1988). Furthermore, the United States Code provides:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III
gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State
in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations ... of gaming
activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the
Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.
Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
10. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. State, No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at * 1 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 22, 1993).
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State," the parties disagree as to which games are permitted by the state
and are thereby negotiable under the Tribal-State compact.' 2 The state
maintains that "slot machines" are not negotiable under the compact because
Florida law does not permit such machines to be operated within the
state.' 3 The tribe asserts that the machines are in fact permitted within the
state, and are therefore negotiable under the compact. 4 Meanwhile, the
Seminoles continue to offer the electronic gambling machines at the
reservation despite the absence of a Tribal-State compact.
Indian gaming plays an interesting role in the development of gambling
in Florida. This article examines the history of gambling in Florida,
including the undertaking of illegal gambling, the corruption of law
enforcement agencies, and the subsequent changes to the Florida Con-
stitution due to changing public opinion. This article also explores the
emergence of Indian gaming in Florida, the federal enactments pertaining
to tribes, and a particular decision of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida which held in favor of the state. Finally, this
article discusses the future of gaming in Florida and the probable outcome
of full-scale casino gambling within the state.
II. FLORIDA'S GAMBLING HISTORY
In the early 1800's, lotteries were common in many states as a means
of raising revenue." In 1828, the territorial legislature of Florida created
Union Academy in Jacksonville, and authorized its trustees to raise revenue
by conducting a lottery. 6 However, lotteries were short-lived in Florida
when the Legislature, in 1832, enacted the first statute pertaining to
gambling. This statute prohibited and punished the playing and betting of
II. Id.
12. Id. Under the IGRA, class III gaming activities include banking card games,
electronic facsimiles of any game of chance, or slot machines. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988).
In order for class III games to be lawful, the activities must be authorized by an ordinance
adopted by the governing body of the tribe, meet approval by the Chairman of the National
Indian Gaming Commission, and be an activity which is located within a state that permits
it by any person, organization, or entity. Id. § 2710(d)(I).
13. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *1.
14. Id.
15. Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State, 234 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1970). In
1823, Maryland authorized a state lottery for the purpose of raising revenue for Washington
College, a statue of George Washington, and turnpike roads. Id.
16. Id.
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any game of cards, dice, checks, billiards, or any other instrument used for
the purpose of betting.'7 Furthermore, even though lotteries had proven to
be a worthwhile source of revenue for the creation of many educational
institutions, 8 a large number of states, including Florida, instituted
constitutional bans against state lotteries.' 9 In 1885, Florida's Constitution
provided that "the authorization of lotteries by the legislature is inhibited,
and the sale of lottery tickets shall not be allowed., 20  This lottery
prohibition, according to the Florida Supreme Court, was in response to the
widespread infestation that the lottery preyed upon the hard earnings of the
poor.2 ' The prohibition against lotteries accomplished its intended goal
of morality for a while, but a much stronger force brought the Legislature
to a realization; the Great Depression and failing tourism were debilitating
state revenue.
In 1931, Florida legalized pari-mutuel betting on horses, which
guaranteed state and local governments millions of dollars of revenue to
help relieve the paralyzation of the Depression.22 The Legislature had
become by that time a full-fledged partner in the gambling business by
authorizing track-run betting pools and taking cuts off the top.23 The
17. Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486, 490 (1935).
18. Marc Fisher, Gambling Goes Way Back Moses, Jefferson Indulged, MIAMI HERALD,
May 18, 1986, at 24A. The proceeds from lotteries helped pay for the renovation of Faneuil
Hall in Boston and for the establishment of Harvard, Yale, and Dartmouth colleges in the
early seventeenth century. Id.
19. By 1885, 29 state constitutions had prohibited lotteries. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art.
V, § 41 (1868); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 23 (1885); IOWA CONST. art. I11, § 28 (1857); MIcH.
CONST. art. IV, § 27 (1850); N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1844); R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 12
(1842); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (1834); WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1848).
20. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 23 (1885).
21. Lee, 163 So. at 489.
22. See ch. 14832, 1931 Fla. Laws 679. According to the First Research Corporation,
"the state's desire for a new source of revenue so desperately needed overshadowed any
moralistic concept that this taxation would serve as a control for some sort of unwanted
gaming thought distasteful to the citizenry." FLORIDA RESEARCH CORP., STUDY OF THE
PARIMUTUEL INDUSTRY: STATE OF FLA. 4 (1968). The legislation stipulated that each of the
67 counties would share equally in the revenue derived from pari-mutuel racing. Id. Today
the games contribute over $105 million to the state. 1992 FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. REG., Div.
OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING ANN. REP. 33.
23. John D. McKinnon, Legislature Seems Ready to Take a Chance, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at BI.
In the fiscal year 1931-1932, state revenue from pari-mutuel racing amounted to
$737,301, or 4.25% of the total pari-mutuel handle. 1992 FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. REG., Div.
OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING ANN. REP. 33. Total paid attendance at the pari-mutuel games
was 1,157,161 through 462 racing days. Id. This figure steadily increased, as did the
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legalization of pari-mutuel racing was not only an answer for the much
needed revenue, but was also an indication of what the public desired.
However, the legalization of horse racing neither fulfilled the public's
hunger for gambling entertainment nor solved Florida's revenue problems.
As a result, the Legislature in 1935 legalized slot machines.
24
Although slot machines existed throughout the state prior to legaliza-
tion, the state was now in a position to regulate their use and derive revenue
from their operation. Nonetheless, two years later the law was repealed.25
Slot machines had proven to be an attraction to tourists and a worthwhile
source of revenue to Floridians. Consequently, illegal gambling enterprises
flourished in South Florida.
26
Illegal gambling was considered a solution to the plight brought to
South Florida by the bust of the land boom in 1925, the hurricane destruc-
tion in 1926 and 1928, the stock market crash of 1929, and the Great
Depression." Local politicians and law enforcement agencies protected the
illegal operations in order to bolster tourism and satisfy their constituents.2 8
number of racing days. Id. In 1946, the total state revenue from the pari-mutuel wagering
soared to $15,554,034, or 7.35% of the handle. Id. Furthermore, the racing days amounted
to 1442 with 4,448,084 in paid attendance. Id. Since legalizing pari-mutuel wagering, over
one-half billion people have attended the games, which translates into $2,920,064,124 dollars
of revenue collected by the state. 1992 FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. REG., Div. OF PARI-MUTUEL
WAGERING ANN. REP. 33.
24. Seech. 17257, 1935 Fla. Laws 1085 (repealed 1937). The law permitted the opera-
tion of automatic coin-operated vending "slot machines" and required the person intending
to set up operation of the device to obtain a license. Id. The reason for the legalization of
the "slot machines," according to Carl W. Burnett, a representative of Madison County, was
the realization that "slot machines [were] here and nobody [had] been able to stop them and
we can get revenue from them under this bill." FLA. HOUSE OF REP. J. 981 (May 21, 1935)
(statement by Carl W. Burnett, Rep. Madison).
25. See ch. 18143, 1937 Fla. Laws 909.
26. Dan Ray, Sheriff Was a Sure Bet, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 18, 1985, at CI. In Dade
County, the S&G syndicate operated a series of bookmaking houses, while in Palm Beach
County, the Beach Club was known to attract the wealthy to its gaming tables. Id. Broward
County housed many casino operations: the Colonial Inn, the Lopez Restaurant, the Casa
Grande in Hallandale, the Club Greenacres, the It Club near Port Everglades, and the Valhalla
Club in Hollywood. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. Walter R. Clark, Broward County Sheriff from 1933 to 1950, was part-
owner of a slot machine company and permitted the illegal casino operations to flourish
throughout South Florida. Ray, supra note 26, at C 1. Clark maintained that he looked the
other way because he was "elected on the liberal ticket, and the people want it [casinos] and
they enjoy it." Id. J.B. Wiles Jr., a county commissioner from 1941 to 1949, commented
on the authorities who authorized the illegal gambling, and stated that "they were running the
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However, casino gambling in South Florida soon came to an end in 1950
when the United States Senate Hearings, conducted by Estes Kefauver of
Tennessee, informed the nation of South Florida's illegal gambling
operations and exposed its governmental corruption.2 9  The Kefauver
committee hearings led to the shutdown of South Florida casinos in 19 50 .3o
Although illegal casinos had been effectively closed by Kefauver and
South Florida's economy had made a steady recovery, the public's pursuit
of legalized gambling still had not subsided. Consequently, with the passage
of the 1968 Constitution, Florida's tight grip on prohibiting lotteries had
weakened. Pari-mutuel pools, which included horse racing, dog racing, and
jai-alai, were now permitted within the state.3 Shortly thereafter, Florida
again weakened its stand against gambling when the pari-mutuel games,
permitted under article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution, were now
extended to include bingo. This extension was the result of an interpretation
of the constitution by the Florida Supreme Court in Greater Loretta
Improvement Ass 'n v. State. 2 The supreme court concluded that the same
legislature that passed the bingo statute 33 and that permitted certain
charitable, nonprofit organizations to conduct bingo games was instrumental
in the writing and passage of the 1968 constitution.34 Therefore, the court
concluded, bingo must have been included with horse racing, dog racing,
and jai-alai as exceptions to the lottery prohibition.35 The court's determi-
nation to declare the bingo statute constitutional came in response to
changing public opinion in favor of legalized gambling in Florida. 6
Over the next decade, the public's desire for legalized gambling was
evident by its repeated attempts to amend the Florida Constitution by
county in line with the thinking of the people of Broward County at the time." Id.
29. Id. Kefauver's committee took aim at ending corruption in government; the United
States Senate Hearings exposed Sheriff Clark who was subsequently removed from office and
indicted on gambling and tax evasion charges. Id. He was ultimately acquitted. Ray, supra
note 26, at Cl.
30. Id.
31. See article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution which provides: "Lotteries, other
than the types of pari-mutuel pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this constitu-
tion, are hereby prohibited in this state." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
32. 234 So. 2d 665, 671 (Fla. 1970).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992).
34. Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 670-71.
35. Id. at 671.
36. Id. at 672. The court determined that the moral issue concerning bingo is a matter
of legislative concern; therefore, the court relied upon the fact that the Legislature, which was
"directly responsible to the people," had legalized pari-mutuel pools, which included bingo.
Id,
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initiative.3 7 Although Florida may not have been prepared to permit casino
gambling within the state by 1986, the public was more than ready to permit
a state-run lottery for education. On November 4, 1986, a proposal to
authorize a state-run lottery was placed on the ballot for general election38
37. Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides the public with the means
of revising or amending the state constitution by initiative. A petition containing a copy of
the proposed amendment must be signed by a number of electors in each of one-half of the
congressional districts of the state. Of the state as a whole, the number of signatures must
be equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of the respective districts in the last
preceding election in which presidential electors were chosen. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
In 1978, a proposed amendment to permit casinos on Miami Beach was placed on the
statewide ballot. Article X, section 15 of the Florida Constitution would have provided:
Casino Gambling: The operation of state regulated privately owned
gambling casinos is hereby authorized only within the following limited area:
That area of Dade and Broward Counties, Florida, bounded on the East by
the Atlantic Ocean; on the West by the centerline of ... Collins Avenue from
its intersection with 5th- Street southerly to Biscayne Street and the southerly
prolongation of the centerline of Collins Avenue to an intersection with the
centerline of Government Cut; bounded on the South by the centerline of
Government Cut; and bounded by the North by the North line of Lot 1, Block
14, Beverly Beach, according to the Plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 22, Page
13, Broward County Records.
Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1978).
The plan was defeated in large part by then-governor Reubin Askew; the vote was 71%
to 29% against casinos. Paul Anderson, New Pro-Gambling Drive Kicks Off Soon, MIAMI
HERALD, June 23, 1983, at B6. In 1980 and 1984, Charles Rosen, president of Florida
Casinos Inc., initiated drives to legalize casinos in Florida, but was unsuccessful in placing
the proposal on the ballot. Id.
In 1986, a proposal to allow individual counties to determine whether to permit casino
gambling was placed on the ballot, but was defeated by 68.4% of the voters. William L.
Leary, The Florida Lottery Act, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 732 n.12 (1987).
38. Leary, supranote 37, at 732. Ralph Turlington, former Commissioner of Education,
was responsible for and succeeded in obtaining the required number of signatures necessary
for the proposal to appear on the ballot in the general election. Id. The proposed amendment
to article X read as follows:
Section 15. State Operated Lotteries.-
a) Lotteries may be operated by the State.
b) If any subsections of the Amendment to the Florida Constitution are held
unconstitutional for containing more than one subject, this Amendment shall be
limited to subsection (a) above.
c) This amendment shall be implemented as follows:
I) Schedule - On the effective date of this Amendment, the lotteries shall be
known as the Florida Education Lotteries. Net proceeds derived from the
lotteries shall be deposited to a state trust fund, to be designated The State
Education Lotteries Trust Fund, to be appropriated by the Legislature. The
schedule may be amended by general law.
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and was overwhelmingly adopted by the citizens of Florida. 9
Indicative of the public's desire to gamble, the Florida lottery set
national sales records within the first twenty-four hours of operation,4° and
since its inception, the lottery has brought in much needed revenue with
Dade and Broward Counties leading the state in sales.4 Recently,
however, the lottery has declined in sales.42 Legislative revenue forecasters
maintain that the public's interest in the lottery has peaked.
3
In 1986, the state lottery may have temporarily fulfilled the public need
for gambling entertainment, but recent public interest in the lottery has
dulled." When the enthusiasm for horse racing dwindled in the 1930's,
the public turned to illegal gambling for excitement. Today, Floridians have
lost interest in the state lottery and have turned their attention towards a new
gambling enterprise: casino gambling on Indian reservations.45
III. FLORIDA INDIAN GAMING AND REGULATIONS BEFORE IGRA
The Florida Seminoles own more than 200,000 acres in South Florida;
Id. at 732 n.9.
39. Id. The general election revealed that 2,039,437, or 63.5% of the total 3,208,295
votes were cast in favor of the proposed amendment authorizing a state-run lottery. Id. at
732 n. 11.
40. Scott G. Campbell, Year Later, State Not Nearly Spent on Lottery, PALM BEACH
POST, Jan. 8, 1989, at AI. The Florida Lottery began operation on January 12, 1988. Id.
National records were set when Floridians purchased about $20 million in tickets within the
first 24 hours and about $95 million by the end of the first week. Id. In its first year of
operation, the lottery was played by almost 72% of the state's households, amounting to
approximately $1.6 billion spent. Id.
41. Fast Facts: Lotto's Sales, SUN-SENTINEL, May 13, 1993, at B1. Since January 12,
1988, the Florida Lottery has sold $10.7 billion worth of tickets, with $160,121,038.00 and
$99,343,993.50 coming from Dade and Broward Counties respectively, constituting most of
the sales in the state. Id. Over the five year period, sales from the lottery have generated
$3 billion for education, with 70% going to public schools kindergarten through twelfth
grade., 12% going to community colleges, and 15% going to public universities. Linda
Kleindienst, On-Line Lottery Pays $5 Billion in 5 Years, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1993, at
A12.
42. Lottery's Earning Power Slips After 5 Years, SUN-SENTINEL, July 18, 1993, at A 13.
Florida Lottery sales have dropped from $2.22 billion in the 1991-92 fiscal year to $2.17
billion in 1992-93 fiscal year. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See generally Don Van Natta, U.S., Tribe at Odds Over Game, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 29, 1991, at BI.
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however, because most of the land is not productive, the tribe's ability to
generate income is limited.46  In 1934, Congress passed the Wheeler-
Howard B ill, 47 better known as the Indian Reorganization Act, which
sought to protect the land base of the tribes and enable them to create their
own governments. 48 In 1935, the Wheeler-Howard Bill went into effect,
49
and although not important to the Seminoles at the time, the Act exempted
the tribe from paying state and local taxes.50 This exemption has led the
tribe to conduct various money-making operations on their land,5 includ-
ing the first high-stakes bingo operation in the country.52 Although the
state authorizes certain charities to conduct bingo games, high-stakes
operations are prohibited. 3  In Greater Loretta Improvement Ass' v.
State,54 the Florida Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of Flor-
ida's charitable bingo statute" and provided the reasoning which ultimately
enabled the Seminoles to engage in high-stakes bingo operations.56
A. Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State
In 1967, the Florida Legislature enacted section 849.093 of the Florida
Statutes, which permits certain charitable, nonprofit organizations to conduct
bingo games. 7  In Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State,58 the
46. James C. Clark, An Unpopular Act Became a Boon to the Seminoles, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 17, 1992, Florida at 8. During the 1800's, the Seminoles survived by
hunting and fishing in the Everglades; however, the Seminoles were deprived of a valuable
part of their holdings when a project to drain the Everglades began in 1906. Id.
47. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
48. See Florida Dep't of Business Reg. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 768 F.2d
1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
49. Clark, supra note 46, at 8. Unless tribes voted not to be included, the act was to go
into effect in 1935. Id. Out of the 500 eligible voters in Florida, only 21 went to the polls.
Id. The voters unanimously voted for the measure despite the discouragement from tribal
leaders. Id.
50. Id.
51. Clark, supra note 46. In the 1970's, the Seminoles initiated the tax-free sale of
cigarettes. Id.
52. See 133 CONG. REC. s2241 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992). Presently, Florida authorizes
charitable bingo. See FLA. STAT. § 849.0931 (Supp. 1992).
54. 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970).
55. See id.
56. Id.; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
57. FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992).
58. 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970).
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Florida Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the bingo statute
was constitutional under the prohibition against lotteries contained in the
1885 and 1968 constitutions.59 The court reasoned that when the Legisla-
ture imposed a license tax on certain gaming in 1879, including the bingo-
like game of "keno, '' 60 the Legislature had legalized the game by making
it a source of revenue for the state.61 This reasoning was upheld when the
exact language of the anti-lottery provision of the 1868 constitution was
written into the new constitution in 1885.62 Therefore, the court deter-
mined "[s]ince the Florida Legislature was empowered in 1879 to legalize
and license the bingo-like game of keno, it was empowered in 1967 to
legalize bingo. Precedent commands this conclusion."63  The supreme
court concluded the bingo statute64 was not in violation of the constitution-
al provision prohibiting lotteries.6 ' Bingo became another type of pari-
mutuel pool permitted by the state under Florida's Constitution article X,
section seven.66  This decision proved instrumental in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Butterworth,67 which provided the Seminoles with the authority
to conduct high-stakes bingo operations.
59. Id. The 1885 constitution provided for the prohibition of lotteries within the state,
while the 1968 constitution provides for the prohibition of lotteries with the exception of
parimutuel pools authorized by law. FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 23 (1885); FLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 7.
60. Keno is a game which is played and won by a player when he or she has five
numbers in a row on a card purchased by him or her corresponding with numbers on balls,
drawn from a globe, or other receptacle. Greater Loretta Improvement Ass 'n, 234 So. 2d at
668 [hereinafter "Loretta"].
61. Id. at 669. The Supreme Court relied upon an earlier decision which held that the
Legislature did have the power to impose a license tax on this game resembling bingo, and
as a result, the game was now legalized. See Overby v. State, 18 Fla. 178 (1881). Overby
was later verified by the Legislature when it expressly repealed all laws in conflict with its
licensing statute. See Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 669.
62. Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 669.
63. Id.
64. FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1979) (repealed 1992).
65. Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 671.
66. Id. Article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution reads: "Lotteries, other than the
types of pari-mutuel pools authorized by law ... are hereby prohibited in this state." FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 7.
67. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
68. See id.
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B. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth
In 1979, the Seminoles were offering bingo prizes of $10,000 as well
as new cars69 despite the existence of a state law limiting bingo prizes to
$100.70 Subsequently, Sheriff Butterworth's attempt to prevent Seminole
gaming by enforcing the bingo statute was circumvented in Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Butterworth.7' The Seminoles sought to permanently enjoin
the Sheriff of Broward County from enforcing Florida's bingo statute72 on
Indian Land. 73 The tribe had just constructed a $900,000 bingo hall, which
was in operation six days per week and delivering jackpots unquestionably
in violation of the bingo statute.74 Florida sought to prevent the Seminoles
from violating the statute by exercising criminal jurisdiction over the tribe
pursuant to Public Law 280. 7' The Fifth Circuit, relying on the Supreme
Court case of Bryan v. Itasca County,76 determined that states do not have
69. Clark, supra note 46.
70. Id. Section 849.093 of the Florida Statutes, which was repealed in 1992, stipulated
that:
(4) The number of days during which such organizations as are authorized
hereunder may conduct bingo or guest games per week shall not exceed two.
(5) No jackpot shall exceed the value of $100 in actual money or its equiva-
lent, and there shall be no more than one jackpot in any one night.
(6) There shall be only one prize or jackpot on any one day of play of $100.
All other game prizes shall not exceed $25.
(7) Each person involved in the conduct of any bingo or guest game must be
a resident of the community where the organization is located and a bona fide
member of the organization sponsoring such game and shall not be compensated
in any way for operation of said bingo or guest game.
FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1979) (repealed 1992).
71. 658 F,2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992).
73. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 311.
74. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 491 F. Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
75. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 313. Public Law 280 conferred criminal and civil
jurisdiction on six named states which included: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988).
Furthermore, since Public Law 280 authorized all other states to assume such jurisdiction
over Indian country if they chose, Florida obtained civil and criminal jurisdiction in 1961.
See FLA. STAT. § 285.16 (1991).
76. 426 U.S, 373 (1976). The United States Supreme Court determined that Public Law
280 granted civil jurisdiction to the states only to the extent necessary to resolve private
disputes among Indians and between Indians and private citizens. Id. at 383. Utilizing
legislative history, the Court determined Public Law 280 does not give states general
regulatory powers over the Indian tribes because if Congress had intended to provide the
states with the power, it would have expressly said so. Id. at 390.
365
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
general regulatory powers over Indian tribes under Public Law 280.
According to the Butterworth court, in order to apply Florida's bingo statute
to the Seminoles, the bingo statute would have to be criminal/prohibitory in
nature, and not merely civil/regulatory. 7 Since the Florida Supreme Court,
in Loretta, had previously determined that the bingo statute did not violate
the Florida Constitution,7" and the Legislature has "seen fit to permit bingo
as a form of recreation . . .but has chosen to regulate by imposing certain
limitations to avoid abuses,"79 the court held the playing of bingo was not
against public policy, and therefore, was regulatory in nature. 0
This authorization of high-stakes bingo on the Seminole reservation
triggered the rapid increase in Indian gaming enterprises across the
country;8' Native Americans had found a way to raise revenue and to
replace the lost federal aid desperately needed to build schools and health-
care clinics.82 Although Indian tribes around the country had found a
method to finally become self-reliant, many states sought to prevent the
tribes from conducting the games. 3 Subsequently, in 1987 the United
States Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
[hereinafter "Cabazon"], 4 provided the support desperately sought by
many tribes around the country.8
77. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 313.
78. See Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 665.
79. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 314 (quoting in part Carroll v. State, 361 So. 2d 144 (Fla.
1978)).
80. Id.
81. See 133 CONG. REC. S2241 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987). Within six years after
Butterworth, 100 bingo operations had opened on Indian lands and were estimated to generate
$100 million in annual revenues. Id.
According to the National Indian Gaming Commission, at least 140 Indian gambling
operations are in business in the United States. Tom Davidson & Bob French, Support for
Casino Gambling, Bingo Evident at Tribal Powwow, SuN-SENTtNEL, Jan. 10, 1992, at I B.
82. Davidson & French, supra note 81, at BI.
83. In Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981),
Wisconsin sought to prevent the Oneida Tribe from conducting high stakes bingo. The state
was unsuccessful in enforcing the state bingo law. Id. Subsequently, Wisconsin sought to
prevent the Lac du Flambeaus from operating their bingo hall. The court, in Lac du
Flambeau Band v. Williquette, 629 F. Supp. 689 (W.D Wis. 1986), held the bingo laws were
civil/regulatory in nature and unenforceable under Public Law 280. Id. In Barona Group of
Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983), the court determined the state was without jurisdiction over the
small tribe, and could not enforce the state law. Id.
84. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
85. Id.
1076 [Vol. 18
366
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Bardakjy
C. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
The reinforcement of inherent tribal sovereignty was delivered by the
United States Supreme Court when California, under Public Law 280,
sought to prevent the Cabazon and Morongo bands of Mission Indians from
conducting high-stakes bingo on their reservations. 6 California asserted
that the tribes had violated the restrictions of the state's bingo statute8 7 by
failing to set limits on jackpots and providing payment to staff members for
their services.88 Although the tribes admitted their games violated the stat-
ute, they claimed the state had no authority to apply its gambling laws
within the reservations. 89  After recognizing that "a grant to States of
general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations would result in the
destruction of tribal institutions and values,"9 the Court concluded that
Public Law 280 "was not intended to effect total assimilation of Indian
tribes into mainstream American society."'" Because California did not
prohibit all forms of gambling, but actually permitted a substantial amount
of gambling, including pari-mutuel betting,92 bingo, 93 and a state-operated
lottery, 94 the state merely "regulates rather than prohibits gambling in
general and bingo in particular." 95
The Supreme Court, by utilizing the same regulatory analysis for Public
Law 280 as was applied in Butterworth,96 prudently favored tribal self-
sufficiency and self-government over the states' need to regulate.9 7
However, because Cabazon virtually depleted the power of the states to
regulate under Public Law 280, and existing federal law failed to provide
clear standards for tribal gaming operations, in 1988 Congress enacted the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 98 to provide a remedy.
86. Id.
87. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987). The statute permits charitable
organizations to conduct bingo games provided that the jackpots not exceed $250 per game
and staff members conducting the games are not paid for their services. Id.
88. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 206.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id.
92. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19400-667 (West 1964 & Supp. 1987).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987).
94. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19(d).
95. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211.
96. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
97. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202.
98. 25 U.S.C. § 2701-21 (1988).
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IV. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") was introduced to resolve
the competing interests between tribes and states,99 which had become the
subject of considerable litigation. With the enactment of IGRA, Congress
sought to facilitate tribal self-sufficiency through Indian gaming operations
and to provide an adequate shield from corruption. 00 IGRA categorizes
gambling into three classes: 1) unregulated class I gaming includes social
games or ceremonial celebrations for prizes of minimal value;' 2) class
II gaming includes bingo and some card games,10 2 provided they are
explicitly authorized and played in conformity with the laws and regulations
of the state;0 3 and 3) class III gaming encompasses all other forms of
gambling including slot machines and banking card games.0 4
In order for class III gaming to be legally conducted on tribal lands, the
activity must: 1) be authorized by a tribal resolution and approved by the
Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission; 2) be located in a
state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization,
or entity; and 3) be conducted in conformity with a Tribal-State compact
99. 133 CONG. REC. E387 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987). State officials expressed a need to
regulate Indian gaming because the activity attracted organized crime. Id. Meanwhile, the
tribes wish to raise revenue, and have resisted these assertions of state jurisdiction. Id.
100. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988). The purpose of IGRA is:
1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a
means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments; 2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming
by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other cor-
rupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of
the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly
by both the operator and players; and 3) to declare that the establishment of
independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on Indian lands, the estab-
lishment of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment
of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional
concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating
tribal revenue.
Id.
101. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988).
102. Id. § 2703(7)(A). "Class II gaming" includes those nonbanking card games where
players play against each other rather than the house, e.g. poker; "Class II gaming" does not
include banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack. 25 U.S.C. §
2703 (7)(B)(i) (1988).
103. Id. § 2703(7)(A).
104. Id. § 2703(8).
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entered into by the Indian tribe and the state. 10 5 Any Indian tribe having
jurisdiction over Indian lands that wishes to conduct class III gaming must
request that the state in which the lands are located enter into negotiations
for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact.0 6 Upon receiving
notice, the state is obliged to negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to
enter into the compact. 107
Furthermore, IGRA provides for federal jurisdiction of any cause of
action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a state to enter
into negotiations, or failure to negotiate in good faith with the tribe.0 8 In
the event the court determines that the state failed to negotiate in good faith
with the tribe, the court may order the parties to conclude a compact within
a sixty-day period.0 9 Furthermore, if the parties fail to reach an agree-
ment, a court appointed mediator may select the proposed compact that best
comports with IGRA."' Although IGRA was envisioned to be a solution
to the myriad of litigation between tribes and states, the provision allowing
class Ill gaming under a Tribal-State compact has prompted the Seminoles,
as well as other tribes, to file suits against their respective states.
V. SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA
In Florida, the Seminoles have once again found themselves in
opposition with the state concerning reservation gambling.' The Semi-
105. Id. § 2710(d)(1).
106. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
107. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
108. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
109. Id. § 271 0(d)(7)(B)(iv).
110. Id.
IL. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993). On January 29, 1991, Chairman James E. Billie wrote to Governor Lawton Chiles
requesting negotiation, pursuant to IGRA, for a Tribal-State compact permitting the
Seminoles to conduct certain "class Ill gaming" on their reservations. Seminole Tribe of
Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum at 8, Seminole Tribe
of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993). The Seminoles wished
to conduct poker, video games that duplicated poker, bingo, pull tabs, lotto, punch boards,
tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo. Id. On May 24, 1991, the State
asserted that poker would be the only activity negotiated for the Tribal-State compact. Id.
Subsequently, Tribal Chairman James Billie submitted additional requests to negotiate casino
gambling, but was again refused by the State. Id. On August 22, 1991, the State asserted
that it would only negotiate those activities expressly authorized by state statute, namely
poker, raffles, and pari-mutuel wagering on dogs, horse racing, and jai alai. Id.
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noles have recently brought suit against the State of Florida claiming that
it failed to negotiate in good faith a Tribal-State compact." 2  As a
defense, Florida claimed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,"3 but
the United States District Court, despite case authority to the contrary," 4
held state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment was abrogated by Con-
gress under the Indian Commerce Clause." 5 Basically, Congress had the
power to permit tribes to sue states under IGRA notwithstanding the
Eleventh Amendment, which prevents states from being sued in federal
court.116
A. The Seminole's Arguments
1. A Regulatory Policy Towards Class III
Gaming Compels Negotiation
The Seminoles, who conduct gaming on tribal lands in Tampa and
Hollywood, maintain that negotiations for gambling machines (slot
machines) and casino-gambling are mandatory to conclude a Tribal-State
112. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
113. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 801. F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "The Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commence or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
114. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484
(W.D. Mich. 1992) [hereinafter "Sault Ste. Marie"]; Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington,
790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991). These courts reasoned that "mutuality of concession"
grants Congress the power to abrogate state immunity. Sault Ste. Marie, 800 F. Supp. at
1488; Spokane Tribe of Indians, 790 F. Supp. at 1061. Since states have mutually surren-
dered immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to abrogate.
Id. Since Indians Tribes have retained their immunity from suits by the states, no mutuality
of concession exists. Id. Therefore, Congress did not have the authority to abrogate state
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. Id
115. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 801 F. Supp. at 657. The court determined the existence
of three exceptions to state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment: I) a state may consent
to suit in federal court, or waive its immunity; 2) Congress may abrogate state immunity
when possessing the power; and 3) state officials, in their official capacities, may be sued to
obtain prospective relief. Id.
116. Id. The Seminole court reasoned that both the Indian and Interstate Commerce
Clauses are found in the same delegation of legislative authority. Id. Therefore, under the
Indian Commerce Clause, Congress had the power to abrogate state immunity. Seminole
Tribe of Fla., 801 F. Supp. at 657.
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compact, if any Class III gaming is permitted in Florida."7 Because Flori-
da expressly permits pari-mutuel wagering" 8  and a state-operated
lottery, 119 both class III gaming activities, the Seminoles assert that all
class III gaming is negotiable for a Tribal-State compact. 2 ° Relying upon
the Cabazon analysis, and the holdings in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v.
Connecticut'' and Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Wisconsin,'22 the Seminole tribe argues that, basically, all class
III games can be negotiated in the compact process unless Florida, as a
matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibits class III gaming
activities. 123
a. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut124 was the first case to
apply the Cabazon analysis of Public Law 280 to class ILL gaming activities
under IGRA. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe sought to operate casino-type
games of chance on its reservation, and requested that the State of Connecti-
cut enter into negotiations to form a Tribal-State compact in accordance
with IGRA.'25 The tribe asserted that since the state permitted "Las Vegas
Nights" under its constitution, 126 class III gaming could properly be the
subject for negotiation of a Tribal-State compact.'27 According to the
117. Id. The tribe maintains "permits such gaming" means if any class III gaming is
located within the state then all "class III gaming is up for negotiation." Seminole Tribe's
Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Seminole Tribe
of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
118. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
119. See id. art. X, § 15.
120. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 3, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
121. 913 F2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1620 (1991).
122. 770 F, Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
123. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 18, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
124. 913 F.2d at 1024.
125. Id. at 1025.
126. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-186a-p (1989). The statute permits "Las VegasNights"
to be conducted by any nonprofit organization, association, or corporation. Such entities may
promote and operate games of chance to raise funds for the purposes of such organization,
association, or corporation, subject to specified conditions and limitations. Id.; see also
MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029.
127. MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1027.
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state, the limited authorization of "Las Vegas Nights" conducted by
nonprofit organizations did not satisfy the condition under IGRA that the
activity had been "permitted" by the state;128 therefore, because casino
gambling was actually against the public policy of Connecticut, there was
no obligation to negotiate a Tribal-State compact.
129
In determining whether casino-type gaming should be the subject of
negotiation, the court examined both congressional findings and legislative
history. 3' According to the congressional finding in 25 U.S.C. section
2701(5) of IGRA, "[i]ndian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically
prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not,
as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming
activity."'31  Not only did the court determine the congressional finding
was consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale in Cabazon, but
according to legislative history, 32 the requirement that class II gaming be
"located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization or entity"'33 was likewise specifically adoptive of the
Cabazon rationale. 34  The Mashantucket court applied the legislative
intent behind class II gaming requirements, and assimilated its basis to class
III gaming due to the fact that both provisions contain identical lan-
guage.'35 Under this statutory construction, the court concluded that class
128. Id. According to IGRA, class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands
only if such activities are "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity" 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (1988).
129. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3071, 3076.
133. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A) (1988).
134. MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029. The court referred to United States
v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 365 (8th Cir. 1990), for an interpretation
of the legislative history as to section 2710(b)(l)(A) and class 11 gaming. Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029. The court in Sisseton revealed that Congress intended to
permit a particular gaming activity, even if conducted in a manner inconsistent with state law,
if the state law merely regulated, as opposed to completely barred, that particular gaming
activity. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d at 365.
135. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1030. Both sections require that "such
Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization or entity" 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A), (d)(l)(B) (1988).
Under a settled principle of statutory construction, "when the same word or phrase is
used in the same section of an act more than once, and the meaning is clear as used in one
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III gaming should be negotiated in the compact process unless the state, "as
a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit[s] [class 1II] gaming
activity.' 36 The Mashantucket court held the state's approach to class III
gaming was regulatory rather than prohibitory because Connecticut not only
permitted "Las Vegas nights," but also a state-operated lottery, bingo, jai-
alai, and other forms of pari-mutuel betting. 137 Therefore, "such gaming
is not totally repugnant to the state's public policy," and should be the
subject of negotiations for a Tribal-State compact. 38 As a result of this
ruling, the state was forced to negotiate casino gambling, and the Mashan-
tucket Pequots now run one of the largest tribal casinos in the country with
an estimated revenue intake of $100 million a year."'
b. Lac du Flambeau Tribe
A case frequently cited by the Seminole Tribe of Florida is Lac du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin. 4' The
Flambeau Tribe filed suit against the state of Wisconsin under IGRA
alleging that it failed to negotiate in good faith for a Tribal-State com-
pact.'4 ' The tribe sought to conduct casino games, including video
gaming machines, roulette, slot machines, poker, and craps on their reserva-
tion. '42 Pursuant to the requirements of IGRA, the tribe submitted a
written request for Tribal-State compact negotiations. 43  With the
exception of lotteries and on-track pari-mutuel wagering, the state refused
to negotiate class II gaming with the tribe because those activities were
prohibited in Wisconsin. 144  Once again, the issue centered around the
meaning of section 2710(d)(1)(B) which requires that class III gaming
activities are "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose
place, it will be construed to have the same meaning in the next place." MashantucketPequot
Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1030 (quoting United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978)).
136. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1030 (alteration in original).
137. Id. at 1031-32.
138. Id.
139. Eric J. Swanson, The Reservation Gaming Craze: Casino Gambling Under the
Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of 1988, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 471, 480 (1992).
140. 770 F. Supp 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
141. Id. at 4-83.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 770 F. Supp. at 484
[hereinafter "Flambeau"].
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by any person, organization or entity . . . . ""' According to the state,
because casino gambling, video games, and slot machines were not
permitted for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity within
Wisconsin, it was not required to negotiate their use.'46 The state main-
tained it need only negotiate those particular activities that were operating
legally within the state."'
The court, in accord with Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,14' resolved the
issue using the Cabazon analysis. 49 The court concluded "[t]he initial
question in determining whether Wisconsin 'permits' the gaming activities
at issue is not whether the state has given express approval to the playing
of a particular game, but whether Wisconsin's public policy toward class III
gaming is prohibitory or regulatory."' 50  If the policy is to prohibit all
forms of class III gaming by anyone, then the policy is characterized as
criminal/prohibitory, and the activities are not subject to negotiation.'
If the state allows some forms of class III gaming, even subject to extensive
regulation, then its policy is considered civil/regulatory and such activities
necessitate negotiation.'
In determining Wisconsin's public policy, the court found that for more
than a century, Wisconsin's Constitution had banned lotteries.' 53 The
prohibition was defined as the operation or playing of any game, scheme or
plan involving the element of prize, chance and consideration.'54 In 1987,
voters amended the Wisconsin Constitution to allow for a state-operated
lottery and pari-mutuel on-track betting.'5 According to the court, the
authorization of a state-operated lottery "removed any remaining constitu-
tional prohibition against state-operated games, schemes or plans involving
prize, chance and consideration ... ."156 As a result, Wisconsin's public
145. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
146. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 484.
147. Id. at 485.
148. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1024. The Flambeau court and the
Mashantucketcourt utilized identical analysis of legislative history and congressional findings
in order to determine that the Cabazon analysis should interpret 25 U.S.C § 2710(d)(1)(B)
of the IGRA. See id; Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485.
149. See Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485.
150. Id. at 486.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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policy toward class III gaming was deemed regulatory in nature, and the
state was required to negotiate the requested activities.'57
2. Florida Permits Class III Games Sought for Negotiation
To further support the right to negotiate casino gambling, the
Seminoles alternatively argue that the activities they wish to conduct are
permitted by the State for three reasons. First, the Florida Lottery as well
as many Florida pari-mutuel facilities are permitted to utilize machinery
which is considered "illegal" under Florida statutes.' According to the
Seminoles, the prohibition of certain gambling devices defined under Florida
Statutes section 849.16 are actually permitted by the state 59 and are the
proper subject for negotiations on a Tribal-State compact. 60  Second, the
157. Id.
158. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 7, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993). The Florida Lottery operates electronic machines for certain "on-line" lottery
games such as Cash 3, Play 4, Fantasy 5, and Lotto. Id. The terminals print out lottery
tickets showing numbers chosen by the consumer or randomly chosen by the computer. Id.
If the ticket reveals the winning numbers selected in Tallahassee, the holder is entitled to
receive money in exchange for the ticket. Id.
Furthermore, fifteen pari-mutuel facilities utilize automated machines (SAMS) which
enable a bettor to select his or her desired number or combination by inserting money,
vouchers, or credit cards into the machine. Id.
The machines utilized by the Florida Lottery and the various pari-mutuel facilities
fashion those prohibited under Florida Statutes section 849.16 (1991). Seminole Tribe of
Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum at 7, Seminole Tribe
of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
159. ld. Section 849.16 of Florida Statutes defines the machines and devices which
come within the provision of the law as:
1) Any machine or device is a slot machine or device within the provisions of
this chapter if it is one that is adapted for use in such a way that, as a result of
the insertion of any piece of money, coin, or other object, such machine or
device is caused to operate or may be operated and if the user, by reason of any
element of chance or of any other outcome of such operation unpredictable by
him, may:
a) Receive or become entitled to receive any piece of money, credit,
allowance, or thing of value, or any check, slug, token, or memoran-
durn, whether of value or otherwise, which may be exchanged for
any money, credit, allowance, or thing of value or which may be
given in trade ....
FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1991).
160. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 8, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
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state expressly permits casino gambling when one-day gambling cruise ships
are authorized to use Florida ports for the expressed purpose of offering
casino-style entertainment on the high seas. 161 Finally, various charities
in Florida have conducted "Casino Nights," which include raising money
through the use of blackjack tables, roulette wheels, crap tables, and other
casino equipment. However, the state has repeatedly failed to enforce the
prohibition against casino gambling. 162  The Seminoles urge that the
authorization of these activities indicate that Florida "permits such gaming"
under IGRA and, therefore, gaming machines and casino gambling should
be negotiable for a Tribal-State compact.
163
B. The State's Counter-Arguments
1. The State is Not Obligated to Negotiate Any
Class III Game Not Expressly Permitted
In sharp contrast, the state urges that the Supreme Court analysis in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,164 which was relied upon
by the legislature with respect to class II gambling, cannot be applied to
class III gaming due to the substantial difference between the two classes of
activities. 65 Primarily, the state's reasoning hinges on the fact that class II
22, 1993).
161. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 8, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993). Section 849.231(3) of the Florida Statutes provides for an exception to the
prohibition against the possessionof gambling devices. See FLA. STAT. § 849.231(3) (1991).
"This section ... [does] not apply to a vessel of foreign registry or a vessel operated under
the authority of a country except the United States, while docked in this state or transiting
in the territorial waters of this state." Id.
Presently, three of the more than 47 cruise ships, which sail from Florida ports offering
casino gambling, are day cruises. Bob LaMendola, All Aboard for Big Bucks Cruise Ships
Reel in Money With Casino Games, SUN-SENTINEL, May 17, 1992, at Al. The day cruises
haul approximately 920,000 passengers each year, accounting for about one-third of South
Florida's cruise trade. Id. The day cruises travel out three miles beyond Florida waters, and
sail around for a few hours in order to provide casino gambling. Id. The cruise ships do not
contribute any gambling revenue to the state. Id.
162. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 6, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
163. Id. at 4.
164. 480 U.S. 202 (1986).
165. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 1, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D.
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gaming involves mainly "social" gambling, while class III gambling is "hard
core."' 66 The state simply asserts that the Mashantucket and Pequot courts
have erred in their legislative analysis of class III gaming, and alternatively
argues that legislative history indicates that states, during the compact
process, are to provide their expertise in gaming in order to instruct the
tribes as to appropriate regulation.'67 Therefore, it is argued that states are
not required to negotiate class III games which they do not permit because
states could not possibly render instruction on gaming they have not experi-
enced. '68
2. The Activities Permitted in Florida
Do Not Necessitate Negotiation
Although the state has proceeded to negotiate certain class III gaming
like horse racing, dog racing, and jai-alai, it has refused to negotiate on
gaming machines or casino gambling. 69 The state maintains that negotia-
tions hinge on activities which are "legal" within the state, and since slot
machines and casino gambling are illegal in Florida,' 70 the state need not
negotiate for their use.' 7' First, the state maintains that the machines
utilized by the Florida Lottery and various pari-mutuel facilities do not fit
within the context of the Florida Statute, 72 and are not gambling machines
as the tribe asserts. 73 According to the state, "[t]he statute requires that
the machine make the player entitled to receive some prize by reason of any
element of chance or of any other outcome of such operation unpredictable
Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
166. Id.
167. Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Pursuant to section 849.16 of the Florida Statutes, illegal gambling devices include
those which operate by insertion of money or an object, and by reason of chance, the player
may become entitled to receive money, or a ticket which may be exchanged for money. FLA.
STAT. § 849.16 (1991).
171. Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
172. FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1991).
173. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
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by him."' 74  Therefore, because the machines utilized by the Florida
Lottery and pari-mutuel facilities do not operate to determine the prize, e.g.
the horse race, or the lottery numbers chosen in Tallahassee, the state does
not "permit" gambling machines as attested to by the Seminoles. 7 ' Fur-
thermore, the state asserts that casino gambling conducted by foreign flag
vessels who use Florida ports is only permitted in international waters, and
is a limited exception to the statute,'76 which criminally prohibits the
general possession of gambling paraphernalia.'77 Finally, the state refutes
the Tribe's argument concerning charity "Casino Nights" by indicating that
Florida "does not 'permit' casino gambling merely because a charitable
activity in violation of the state's statutory prohibition 78 is not high on
local law enforcement priorities." '
VI. SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA: THE DISTRICT
COURT DECISION
Recently, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida has ruled against the Seminoles, concluding that the state did not
negotiate in bad faith under IGRA when the state refused to negotiate casino
gambling in the compact process. 8° The court agreed with the tribe "that
the legislative history relating to the phrase as found in the provision
governing Class II gaming is instructive regarding the meaning of the
language found in the provision governing Class III gaming."'' As a
result, the court concluded that "Congress intended the
174. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
175. Id.
176. FLA. STAT. § 849.231 (1991).
177. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
178. See FLA. STAT. § 849.231 (1991) (prohibiting possession of gambling parapherna-
lia); id. § 849.08 (prohibiting gambling in general); id. § 849.01 (prohibiting the keeping of
a gambling house).
179. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 11, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
180. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *17.
181. Id. at *12.
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prohibitory/regulatory analysis found in Cabazon to be consistent with and
to be applied to the IGRA provisions covering both Class 1I and Class III
gaming."
'182
The district court, however, refused to accept the tribe's argument that
the permittance of any class III gaming activity within the state opens
negotiations for all class III activities; in doing so, the court narrowly inter-
preted the cases upon which the tribe relied in support of its position.1
3
The court restrictively interpreted Mashantucket to stand for the
proposition that in order to compel negotiation of a class III gaming activity,
that particular activity must be permitted by statute and, therefore, merely
regulatory in nature."8 4 This analysis is not only restrictive of the essential
wording in Mashantucket, s5 but is likewise restrictive of the Cabazon
analysis.'86 When determining a state's public policy in the context of a
particular class III activity requested, the court is to look at whether class
III gaming in general is "totally repugnant to the State's public policy. '87
If the state permits other forms of gambling similiar in scope, i.e. a state-
operated lottery and pari-mutuel racing, the existence of those games reflect
upon that state's tolerance for that class of gaming.' Therefore, if a
state's public policy towards a class of activities is regulatory in nature, then
all class III activities are subject to negotiation provided they are requested
for by the tribe. 8 9
182. Id.
183. See id. at *13.
184. See id. at *14-15.
185. The Mashantucketcourt, in accordance with the wording in Cabazon, revealed that
Connecticut permitted "other forms of gambling, such as a state-operated lottery, bingo, jai
alai and other forms of pari-mutuel betting" which factored into the realization that
Connecticut's public policy towards class III gaming in general was regulatory. Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031. Furthermore, the fact that charities were allowed to
conduct Las Vegas Nights was an additional factor in the court's conclusion "that the
Connecticut law applicable to class III gaming is regulatory rather than prohibitive." Id. at
1032.
186. In Cabazon, the Supreme Court expressly relied upon the existence of other forms
of gambling to determine California's public policy towards the disputed activity. Cabazon,
480 U.S. at 210-11. "In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gam-
bling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we
must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo
in particular." Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
187. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031.
188. See id.
189. See id at 1030. The court stated, "The compact process is therefore to be invoked
unless, applying the Cabazon test, it is determined that the state, 'as a matter of criminal law
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The district court, interpreting Mashantucket, quoted the case, which
stated "This ruling means only that the State must negotiate with the Tribe
concerning the conduct of casino-type games of chance at the Reserva-
tion."' 90 This statement, in its proper context, does not indicate how the
court arrived at its holding, but indicates the state need only negotiate the
particular class III activity requested.' 9 ' An analysis of the Mashantucket
holding reveals that, in general, if the state's treatment of "class III gaming
is regulatory rather than prohibitive," this fact determines whether the state
must negotiate the class III activity requested. 192
In deciding whether Flambeau was applicable, the district court
dismissed that court's analysis because it had based its decision on an
erroneous interpretation of Cabazon.'93 Once again, the district court's
restrictive interpretation of Cabazon, as well Mashantucket, led to the
conclusion that the Flambeau holding was erroneous. 94 Flambeau stood
for the proposition that to determine whether a state must negotiate a
particular class III gaming activity, the "issue is not whether the state has
given express approval to the playing of a particular game," but whether the
state's "public policy toward class III gaming is prohibitory or regulato-
ry.' 95 This proposition is directly in line with the essential analysis in
both Cabazon and Mashantucket. '"
Furthermore, even if the Flambeau decision was not erroneously based,
the district court determined that review of Wisconsin's public policy
towards the disputed gaming activity is necessary under the Cabazon
analysis, and that reliance solely on a state's constitution is not indicative
of its public policy towards gambling. 97 Although this fact may be true,
the Seminole Tribe did not rely solely on the similiarities between the states'
constitutions in attempting to show an analogous public policy but in fact,
and public policy, prohibit[s] [class III] gaming activity."' Id. See also Flambeau, 770 F.
Supp. at 487. The Flambeau court stated, "the initial question in determing whether
Wisconsin 'permits' the gaming activities at issue is not whether the state has given express
approval to the playing of a particular game, but whether Wisconsin's public policy toward
class II1 gaming is prohibitory or regulatory." Id. at 486.
190. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *8 (quoting Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031-32).
191. See MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1032.
192. See id.
193. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *8.
194. Id.
195. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp at 486.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
197. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *18 n.1.
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the Seminoles asserted the similarities of both states' statutes, which still
prohibit various forms of casino gambling.'98 Therefore, the district court,
in its determination to find that Flambeau does not control this case,
attacked the court's interpretation of Cabazon and ignored the similiarities
between both states' statutory schemes with regard to the particular disputed
activity, casino gambling.'99
The Flambeau court, in determining Wisconsin's public policy,
examined the gradual diminution of that state's constitutional ban against
lotteries, and determined Wisconsin no longer prohibits gaming but rather
regulates it.2"' Likewise, Florida has diminished its constitutional strong-
hold on banning lotteries, which may indicate an analogous public policy
towards class III gaming."' Historically, both Florida and Wisconsin had
constitutional provisions banning all lotteries, °2 but eventually provided
for constitutional amendments and statutory provisions designed to permit
charitable bingo,"' pari-mutuel wagering,"' and state-operated lotter-
ies. 2°5  Although each state continues to criminally prohibit gambling
198. See Seminole Tribe's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993). In the state of Florida, statutes provide criminal punishment for the operation of a
gambling machine or device. See FLA. STAT. § 849.15(1) (1991). In addition, the placing
of a bet or wagering of any money or thing of value is punishable. See id § 849.14 (1991).
The state of Wisconsin likewise provides criminal punishment for the making of a bet or
operating a gambling machine. See Wis. STAT. § 945.02 (1982).
199. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *18 n.l.
200. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486.
201. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 19, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
202. Both states included constitutional provisions which prohibited lotteries. See Wis.
CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1848); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 23 (1885).
203. In 1968, Florida adopted section 849.093, which permitted certain charitable,
nonprofit organizations to conduct bingo games. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1969) (repealed
1992). Furthermore, bingo was interpreted to be included as a parimutuel game under article
X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution. See Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 671.
In 1973, the Wisconsin Constitution was likewise amended to permit charitable
organizations to conduct bingo. See Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24(3).
204. In 1968, the Florida Constitution was amended to permit pari-mutuel pools to
legally function within the state. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7. The constitutional amendment
permitted dog racing, horse racing, and jai alai. Id.
In 1987, the Wisconsin Constitution provided for the legalization of pari-mutuel, and
on-track wagering. See Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24(5).
205. In 1987, both Wisconsin and Florida established state-operated lotteries by
constitutional amendment. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24(6).
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activities," 6 this fact alone does not render a state's public policy as
prohibitory.2"7 According to the Supreme Court in Cabazon, the fact that
a state provides criminal punishment for certain gambling activities does not
necessarily make a prohibitory policy. 2 8 Therefore, this gradual acquies-
cence by both states to legalize gambling indicates a similar regulatory
scheme, and the holding in Flambeau should have controlled the outcome
in Seminole.2 °9
On the issue of whether the state in fact permits precisely those class
III activities the Tribe seeks to negotiate, the district court refused to accept
any argument. First, Judge Marcus admitted that "certain Florida charities
have conducted casino or Las Vegas nights," but did not believe that the
existence of thirty-three events evinces a public policy permitting casino
gambling.10 Once again, the court was unwilling to look towards the
211state's policy in general as to class III activities. Undoubtedly, utilizing
the Mashantucket and Flambeau analysis, the recorded existence of casino
gambling permitted by charities, as well as the existence of other class III
gaming, evinces a regulatory public policy permitting class III gaming in
general.21 2 Although the Tribe argued the similarity between the permit-
ting of Las Vegas nights in Florida with those permitted in Mashantucket,
the district court, consistent with its policy of restrictive interpretation, was
quick to point out that Connecticut "officially sanctioned the operation of
casino nights by way of statute.2 13
Next, the Seminole court was unimpressed with the tribe's assertion that
one-day gambling ships, which embark passengers from Florida ports with
no destination other than the high seas, evinces a regulatory public policy
toward casino gambling. 2 4 The district court relied upon the fact that no
gambling occurs within the territorial bounds of the State, but failed to
refute the argument that when given the ability to prohibit these specific
gambling cruises to nowhere, the state continues to permit the activity to
206. See supra text accompanying note 198.
207. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211.
208. Id.
209. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 19, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
210. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *13.
211. See id.
212. See MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031-32; Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at
486.
213. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *12.
214. Id. at *36.
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occur.
2 15
Finally, Judge Marcus, relying upon Deeb v. Stoutamire,21 6 deter-
mined that the machines utilized by the Florida Lottery and various pari-
mutuel facilities ("SAMS") 217 are not violative of Florida Statutes section
849.16.18 The court reasoned:
[T]he unpredictable event or element of chance which determines the
winner must be linked to the machine's operation. Thus, the winner at
a parimutuel facility is determined by the dog or horse race, not by the
operation of the SAMS machines. Similarly, the winner of the State
Lottery is determined by the weekly drawing in Tallahassee, not by the
operation of the individual lottery ticket terminals. 219
In review of the various issues raised by the tribe, as well as the pattern
by which the district court restrictively interpreted the word "permits" under
the IGRA, it is apparent that the court has not only miscontrued case law
supporting the tribe, but has ignored the basic legislative intent for enacting
IGRA. Congress intended to preserve tribal sovereignty while promoting
economic development and self-sufficiency.22 °
According to legislative history, the compact process was envisioned
to provide a rnechanism for "two sovereigns-the tribes and the States-[to]
sit down together in negotiations on equal terms and come up with a recom-
mended methodology for regulating class III gaming on Indian lands."22'
Legislative history provides no indication that compact negotiations would
depend upon what the State thought were appropriate activities for the tribe
to engage in, but rather Congress was explicit in reinforcing tribal sover-
eignty.22 2 The district court was obligated to adhere to Congress' intent
for enacting IGRA, and should, therefore, have liberally construed the word
"permits" in favor of the tribe and not the state. In this case, because the
sovereign state reaps the benefits from permitting a variety of class III
215. Id. at *38.
216. 53 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1951).
217. See supra text accompanying note 158.
218. See supra note 170.
219. Seminole Tribe of rla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *16.
220. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
221. See 134 CONG. REC. S12651 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988).
222. Id. According to legislative history, the IGRA was not intended to be a "blanket
transfer to any State of any jurisdiction over Indian lands. Indian tribes are sovereign
governments and exercise rights of self-government over their lands and members. This bill
does not seek to invade or diminish that sovereignty." Id. at S12650.
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gaming activities, which include five forms of pari-mutuel wagering,"'
and four on-line computer games of the state-operated lottery,224 it is only
equitable that the other sovereign entity, the Seminole Tribe, who supposed-
ly is negotiating on "equal terms," have the facts liberally contrued in its
favor.
VII. THE FUTURE OF FLORIDA GAMBLING
The Seminoles will undoubtedly seek to negotiate for new machines
that conform to those utilized by the Florida Lottery and various pari-mutuel
facilities. The thrust of the argument will surely entail the length of the
period of time whereby the unpredictable event, which is determined by an
independent machine, must take place. The existence of these machines
may prove to be just as successful in luring the public as those machines
rejected by the Seminole court.
Additionally, the State of Florida has decided to negotiate an agreement
with the Seminoles that would allow the tribe to offer poker, pinochle,
bridge, and other card games without a pot limit.225 Players will legally
be able to wager thousands of dollars at these games,2 6 and the state will
not receive any revenue from it.227 This legalization of tribal card games
may be the beginning of what lies ahead for Florida's gambling future.
Even if the Seminoles lose on appeal, the tribe will continue to offer
machines conforming to the district court ruling and provide those card
games presently under negotiation. Consequently, many Florida gamblers,
as well as curious spectators, will flock to the reservations, and will spend
millions of dollars that will elude taxation by the state. As a result,
Florida's inability to tax the tribe creates a loss of potential revenue
desperately needed for crime prevention, public schools, and its rebuilding
program after Hurricane Andrew. As a solution, Florida should legalize
223. As of 1992, the state of Florida regulated 5 thoroughbred tracks, I quarter horse
track, 19 greyhound tracks, 1Ojai alai frontons, and I harness racing track. 1992 FLA. DEP'T
OF Bus. REG., Div. OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING ANN. REP. 23-32. The state received
6.06% of the total pari-mutuel handle from 5321 racing days which generated $105,074,018
in state revenue. Id. at 21.
224. In 1992, the Florida Lottery generated $2.17 billion in state revenue. Lottery's
Earning Power Slips After 5 Years, SUN-SENTINEL, July 18, 1993, at A13.
225. Bob French, SeminolesSeek High-Stakes Gambling, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 1993,
at BI.
226. Id.
227. See Clark, supra note 46.
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casino gambling within the state and expand its economic base by taxing the
revenue acquired by regulated casino gaming facilities.
Although Floridians have the power to change Florida's constitional
prohibition against casino gambling,22 they have been reluctant to do so
for fear that legalization of casinos will bring organized crime and
corruption to the state. These fears are based erroneously on comparisons
with Las Vegas and Atlantic City, neither of which were as big or as
developed as; South Florida when their casinos were legalized.229
According to one authority, "Nevada has had the biggest problems
controlling organized crime in casinos for one simple reason: organized
crime built the industry. Inspired by the success of gangster Meyer
Lansky's casinos in Havana, Bugsy Siegel moved to Las Vegas and founded
a gambling empire."23 Nevada was a desert with no future, and officials
gladly received casino revenues no matter who was paying.' Presently,
Nevada has partially succeeded in eliminating organized crime and
corruption; however, the state still employs fewer than two regulatory
workers per licensed casino, thus enabling corruption to linger.232
By contrast, New Jersey employs nearly 100 regulators per casino, with
an annual budget of $50 million a year paid up-front by the casinos.233
In 1976, Atlantic City legalized casino gambling as a solution to its bleak
economy: tourism was failing, seaside hotels were deteriorating, the local
businesses were boarding up, and the unemployment rate was high and
climbing.23 4 Casino gambling proved to be the solution. Shortly thereafter,
Atlantic City became the most popular destination in America, drawing one-
third more people than Disney World, despite having nothing more to offer
than gambling.235 Casinos have not only provided Atlantic City with the
means for economic development,236 but have also provided the revenue
228. See supra text accompanying note 37.
229. Dave Von Drehle, Facts, Guesses About Casinos Consider Source Each Side Has
Its Own Vision of Future with Legal Gaming, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 27, 1986, at AI.
230. Dave Von Drehle, Casinos and Crime: Can the House Rules Keep Out the Thugs?,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 1, 1986, at Al. The authority was a law professor at the University
of California Berkeley, Jerome Skolnick. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Dave Von Drehle, Florida Casino Debate Goes to Boardwalk, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 15, 1986, at A7.
235. Id.
236. Id. In Atlantic City, casino hotels pay about two-thirds of all property taxes, in
addition to an eight percent tax on gross winnings to the state, plus sales taxes, licensing
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revenue to enforce strict regulations in order to keep organized crime out of
the business. 37 Unfortunately, organized crime became involved in casino
operations when New Jersey made a tragic mistake with the first licensed
casino."' When gambling was approved in 1976, politicians promised
casinos in two years. Subsequently, political pressure induced the licensing
of Resorts International, despite investigative reports which provided
evidence showing the applicant's close ties to organized crime. 39 Present-
ly, the State of New Jersey requires every casino employee to be li-
censed, 4 ' and according to New Jersey officials, this has been successful
in keeping organized crime and corruption out of the day-to-day operations
of casinos."'
Florida retains a remarkable feature uncommon to Nevada and New
Jersey: diversity. Other than gambling, Nevada and New Jersey possess no
qualities that attract tourism. This may explain why visitors to those states
remain in hotel casinos while local shops and restaurants suffer.242
Conversely, if the state of Florida legalized casinos in order to allure
tourists, Orlando and South Florida attractions would provide the essential
assortment of entertainment to entice visitors to remain longer within the
state to fully explore its attributes.
In light of the fact that casinos could provide a solution to Florida's
bleak economy by creating 50,000 jobs, spurring $2.2 billion in new
investment, and doubling the tourist trade to $6.6 billion per year, 243 the
state's only option in response to its inability to tax the revenue from Indian
gaming is to legalize and regulate casinos within the state. As proven in
Atlantic City, the absence of political pressure, along with the. strict
enforcement of tough regulations, should adequately deter the negatives
associated with casino gambling. Therefore, Floridians, who hold the key
costs and regulation fees, plus a tax to supply about $800 million in loans over the next 20
years to build low-cost housing. Id. Furthermore, each casino hotel employs an average of
3600 people. Id.
237. Von Drehle, supra note 230, at Al.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. From the hotel waiter to the CEO, the state investigates criminal histories,
character, integrity, honesty, and finances. Id. Furthermore, administrators are required to
completely disclose all holdings, shareholders, bonds, and five years of IRS records. Von
Drehle, supra note 230, at Al.
241. Id.
242. Von Drehle, supra note 234, at A7. The average visitor to Atlantic City, who lives
less than 150 miles away, stays seven hours and spends $66 dollars. Id.
243. Von Drehle, supra note 229, at Al.
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to a prosperous future, should undoubtedly amend article X, section 7 of the
Florida Constitution244 in order to provide for the authorization of casino
gambling.24
VIII. CONCLUSION
The State of Florida has consistently reduced its constitutional
stronghold against gambling when faced with economic crises. As a result,
Florida permits pari-mutuel wagering and a state-operated lottery. In light
of the fact that the state, with its inability to tax Indian gaming, has
foregone a substantial amount of revenue desperately needed for a
diminished economy, Florida should once again diminish its stronghold
against gambling by legalizing the exact games it is currently trying to
prohibit.
Eugene Neimy Bardakjy
244. See article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution, which provides: "Lotteries,
other than the types of pari-mutuel pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this
constitution, are hereby prohibited in this state." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
245. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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PART III
THE EXECUTIVE
Although all state governors must be willing to make some
compromises if they hope to win passage of their programs, the
Florida Constitution makes our governors particularly dependent.
Our state's "weak-governor" approach has been the subject of both
praise and scorn, and is the focus of the third part of our Symposium.
Political scientist Jon Mills begins the discussion by examining
the Governor's budgetmaking powers and the large role played by the
Legislature in the setting offiscal priorities. Next, attorney Stephen
T. Maher examines the Florida Cabinet, the bane at one time or
another of every Florida governor, and calls for further study before
a decision is made to either keep or abolish this most unique of
government institutions. Finally, Nova Law Review staff member
Anthony J. Scaletta looks at the one area where the Constitution
leaves no doubt that the Governor is supreme: the Florida militia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflicts between the Legislative and the Executive branches on fiscal
issues are a tradition as old as the separation of powers.' Conflicts have
occurred at the federal and state levels over the power of the purse. In the
early 1970's, substantial litigation occurred over the issue of "impound-
ment" 2 by the Executive. The litigation addressed whether the Executive,
in particular President Nixon, had abused its constitutional authority and
violated the separation of powers doctrine.'
The battle between the Legislative and Executive branches in Florida
regarding impoundment has focused on the exercise of the line item veto4
and the Governor's budget reduction power.5 The new section 19 of article
III was enacted with the hope of resolving the controversy and uncertainty
surrounding the Legislative and Executive conflicts over the budget.6 Even
the commission proposing the budget reforms of 1992, the Tax and Budget
1. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits any branch of the state government from
encroaching upon powers of another and prohibits any branch from delegating to another
branch its constitutionally assigned powers. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
2. The term "impoundment" is applied to situations in which the Executive declines to
enter into obligations or commitments for the full amount appropriated by the Legislature.
Decisions to impound are made by the Executive branch alone through the use of closed
meetings and confidential information. See generally L. Harold Levinson & Jon L. Mills,
Budget Reform and Impoundment Control, 27 VAND. L. REV. 615 (1974).
3. See generally id. (for discussion of presidential discretion during execution of
appropriations with a focus on President Nixon).
4. "The governor [of] Florida has the [line] item veto only over appropriations bills.
This permits him to veto a part of an appropriations bill rather than the entire bill."
MANNING J. DAUER, FLORIDA'S POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 147 (2d ed. 1984).
5. See infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
6. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 19.
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Reform Commission ("TBRC"), originated out of conflict.7 The TBRC is
at least partially a result of the services tax conflict and the desire to create
a less political forum for major tax and budget reforms.
The goal of demystifying the rituals of the appropriations and budget
process is laudable. Undoubtedly, the leaders in the appropriations process
found power in complexity, detail, and obscurity.8 The Executive's power
to control the implementing process9 and the scope of the line item veto has
been attacked. Section 19 embodies the constitutional efforts to achieve a
reasonable balance and to open the process to public scrutiny.
Much of section 19 deals with procedural improvements and budget
policy issues including clarifying annualized costs, clarifying the format of
appropriation bills, establishing a planning and appropriation process for
agencies, providing a 72-hour viewing period for the appropriations bill,
providing a final budget report, reducing the use of trust funds, establishing
a schedule to increase the budget stabilization fund (the working capital
fund), and expanding the importance of planning in the budget process.'"
While many of these provisions will have an impact on the clarity of the
budget process and on important policy issues, such as an inadequate
working capital fund" and excessive reliance on trust funds, the major task
will be redefining the Legislative/Executive relationship embodied in
subsections (b) and (h) of section 19 and the closely related article IV,
subsection (13), also proposed by the TBRC. These provisions redefine the
nature of the line item veto and the process for budget reductions in the
event of shortfalls. Each of these related issues has been the subject of
litigation between the Executive and Legislative branches in the last decade.
The constitutional revisions have not ended the battle. In fact, the
Governor recently vetoed a bill proposed by the Legislature to implement
section 19.2 This bill would have allowed a legislative committee to
revise Executive agency budget requests. The Governor vetoed the bill,
stating that it was unconstitutional to allow a legislative committee to alter
7. The author was Speaker of the House during the services tax controversy and when
the Legislature passed the Resolution creating the TBRC.
8. The author observed this conflict when he chaired the two different Appropriations
Subcommittees in the Florida House of Representatives.
9. See Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991) (statute authorizing Executive
Branch Commission to take steps to reduce state agency budgets to prevent deficit violated
separation of powers doctrine).
10. FLA. CONST. art. ItI, § 19.
II. Eckl, Planning Ahead with Budget Stabilization Funds, THE FISCAL LETTER,
March/April 1990, Vol. XII, No. 2. at 6 [hereinafter Eckl].
12. FLA. S. JOUR. 1608 (Reg. Sess. 1993).
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the product of an officer of the Executive branch. In his veto message, the
Governor stated, "[c]ommittee substitute for Senate Bill 1692 represents a
substantial and serious intrusion into the executive powers long recognized
in this state and recently recovered for the executive by the citizens of this
state."' 3 The recently recovered Executive power referred to in the veto
message is section 19. Regardless of the constitutional revisions, the battle
continues.
This article describes the policy changes and the history of section 19
and focuses on the continuing conflict between the branches surrounding the
veto and budget reduction process. The battle between Florida's Legislative
and Executive branches is sure to continue during the implementation of
section 19. Even when section 19 is implemented, the effectiveness of the
reforms can only be assessed after several years of experience. However,
preliminary analysis indicates serious difficulties with some of the reforms.
II. SUMMARY OF THE GOALS OF SECTION 19
A. The Tax and Budget Reform Commission (TBRC)-Context for
Reform
Section 19 is the focal point of some of the bolder initiatives of the
TBRC. Some understanding of the history of the Commission is useful to
evaluate its proposals. The Commission was created to separate fiscal issues
into the equivalent of a mini-constitutional convention. 4 The hope was to
allow reform of budget and fiscal matters and to modernize Florida's
Constitution with less political pressure than the Legislature would encounter
and with more deliberation than is generated by initiative petition. 15
According to constitutional mandates, 6 the TBRC was politically
balanced by a split of appointments and voting procedures were formulated
13. Letter from Governor Lawton Chiles to the Honorable Jim Smith (May 3, 1993)
(delivering veto message).
14. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6; H.R.J. Res. 1616 (1988).
15. The initiative petition is a method of amending the constitution. The amendment
is written out in the same form as it would appear if added to the constitution. It is then
placed on a petition and circulated for signatures of registered voters. If sufficient signatures
are secured at least 90 days before the general election, the amendment is placed on the
ballot. To be added to the constitution, the amendment must win a majority of the votes cast
on the amendment. See DAUER, supra note 4, at 100; see also FLA. CONST. art XI, § 3.
16. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
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to prevent radical reforms. 7 Additionally, the election of a republican
Governor and the continuance of democratic control in the Legislature
further diversified the TBRC, probably to a greater extent than the drafters
of the TBRC amendment envisioned. This diversity is reflected in article
III, section 19, which adopted fiscal conservatism along with several
progressive budget and planning policies.
One progressive aspect of section 19, apparently unique to Florida, is
the constitutional linkage of planning to budgeting. 8 This section requires
plans to be used as budgetary tools. The current administration is using the
agency strategic plans as a basis for the agency budgets.' 9
B. Provisions and Goals of Section 19
To aid with the future interpretation of section 19, the TBRC passed a
resolution articulating its intent behind each provision.20 The basic goals
of the section are outlined below:
1. To Formulate an Open and Understandable Budgeting
Process for the Benefit of the Public
The Commission repeatedly stated that it intended for section 19 to
provide an "open and easily understood budgeting process"'" in order to
"increase the ability of the citizens of Florida to understand where money
17. Eleven members are selected by the Governor, seven members are selected by the
Speaker of the House, and seven members are selected by the President of the Senate. None
of these members may be a member of the Legislature at the time of appointment. Four non-
voting ex-officio members must be members of the Legislature at the time of their
appointment. Two members are selected by the Speaker and two members are selected by
the President of the Senate. One appointment by each shall be a member of the minority
party.
To place a measure on the ballot, the Commission must achieve a greater-than-majority
vote. Specifically, two-thirds of the members of the full Commission must concur as well
as a majority of the appointees of the Governor, a majority of the members appointed by the
Speaker and a majority of the members appointed by the President of the Senate. FLA.
CONST. art. XI, §§ 6 (a), (c).
18. Telephone Interview with Ron Snell, Budget Analyst, National Conference of State
Legislatures (August 19, 1993).
19. Telephone Interview with Robert Bradley, Deputy Director, Office of Planning &
Budgeting, Office of the Governor (August 19, 1993).
20. Tom L. Rankin, Chairman of the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission,
Resolution of the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission (August 9, 1993) [hereinafter
Resolution].
21. Id. at 2.
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for state expenditures comes from, how that money is appropriated, what
goals are being met by that appropriation, how that money is eventually
spent, and the results achieved."22 Section 19 attempts to achieve this goal
though several basic changes in the budgeting process including:
a. Annual Budgeting: The Commission stated in its Resolution on
section 19 that it intends to "ensure that Florida maintains an integrated
planning and budgeting system." To this end, the TBRC suggested that the
state use an annual budgeting and planning process.23
b. Appropriation Bills Format: The Commission suggested that the
state use a single General Appropriations Bill, rather than multiple
appropriation bills, in order to avoid having multiple bills which exceed
available revenue.24 However, the single appropriations bill is to contain
separate sections for a variety of major programs including education, the
criminal justice system, and environmental protection. 25  The most
significant aspect of this change in bill format is the Commission's explicit
recognition of the Governor's power to apply a line item veto to substantive
bills containing appropriations.26
c. Appropriation Review Process:27 The Commission stated that the
Legislature should adopt a formal review process which requires the
appropriate subcommittee of the Appropriation Committee of each house to
review each department's or agency's budget request. These requests should
be compared to the major issues in each department's or agency's planning
document and to the major issues in the Governor's recommended budget
for the department or agency.28
d Seventy-Two Hour Public Review Period.29  The Commission
implemented a seventy-two hour public review or "cooling off' period, in
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 2. Additionally, "state agency Legislative Budget Requests, the Governor's
Recommended Budget, and Appropriation Bills should be accompanied by detailed data
reflecting the annualized costs of the budget." Each agency should use the state plan and all
relevant agency planning documents to develop its budget request. Id.
24. Resolution, supra note 20, at 2.
25. Id. at 2, 3.
26. See supra text accompanying note 15 for further discussion of this issue.
27. Resolution, supra note 20, at 2.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id.
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which the Conference Report on the General Appropriation Bill is to be
made available to the Legislature and to the general public. The TBRC
implemented this review period to allow the public and the Legislature the
necessary time to read and understand the merits of the policies contained
in the Conference Report. However, substantive bills containing appropria-
tions are specifically excluded from this mandatory review period.3"
e. Final Budget Report:31 The Commission required the preparation
of a final budget report within ninety days of the beginning of each fiscal
year. This report should include the following: all appropriations approved
by the Governor, whether in substantive bills or in the General Appropria-
tion Bill; the net appropriations for each budget item; the actual expenditures
for preceding fiscal years; the estimated expenditures for the current fiscal
year; the estimated revenues and cash balances for the current fiscal year;
and the final budget, expenditures, and revenues by department or agency
and major program areas.32
2. Establish'Planning as a Fundamental
Part of Budgeting
Florida has been a national trendsetter in the use of planning as a
budgeting tool.33 Perhaps because of Florida's rapid growth, the need was
more apparent and the political will more available than in other states. The
State Comprehensive Plan34 is designed as the blueprint to the state's
future. Other legislation, such as the Growth Management Act,35 also adds
to the overall commitment to planning in Florida. However, the TBRC
noted that Florida has not reached all of its planning goals.36
Florida's new effort to incorporate planning in the budgeting process
includes appointing the State Plan Growth Management Advisory Committee
to propose legislation to improve the state plan. The intent of the Commit-
tee is to clarify state land development goals and objectives.37 These
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
32. Resolution, supra note 20, at 5, 6.
33. THE SPEAKER'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE, THE SUNRISE REPORT
(1987).
34. FLA. STAT. ch. 187 (1991).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-163.3243 (1991).
36. Florida Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, A Program for Reform of Florida
Government, (February, 1991) at 25.
37. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-217 (1993); FLA STAT. § 186.009 (1993).
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legislative proposals will be part of an overall effort to implement the
section 19 provisions related to planning.
3. To Increase Working Capital Reserves to
Promote Stability and Responsibility
The purpose of this subsection is to expand Florida's "rainy day fund"
to make budget shortfalls easier to manage. Some other states are
implementing such increases as well. However, fiscal problems and political
disagreement on the proper extent and proper use of these funds is likely to
prohibit significant increases in other states' budget reserve funds in the near
future.38
Wall Street analysts recommend that states "maintain budget reserves
equal to five percent of the state's general fund to cushion state finances
against unforeseen fiscal problems., 39  Although section 19 does not
mandate that Florida fall within this suggested amount immediately, the
TBRC set basic guidelines for reaching the goal of five percent by fiscal
year 1998-1999." 0 Similarly, most other states do not have sufficient rainy
day funds. At the end of fiscal year 1989, eight states had funds with a zero
balance, twenty-five states had funds with less than three percent of their
general fund budgets, and only four states had balances of five percent or
more.41 Although state reserves are difficult to maintain, especially at the
suggested five percent level, most state officials recognize their importance.
In Florida, for example, the TBRC mandated that the fund increase to five
percent by 1998 because the state has experienced budget shortfalls42 and
inaccurate budget estimates in the past. The TBRC acknowledged the
importance of this fund for effective future budget management.
4. To Reduce the Use of Trust Funds
Trust funds constitute a significant segment of the Florida budget.
Trust funds raise policy concerns because they are less visible and less
scrutinized than general revenue funds. Earmarking revenue by placing it
in a trust fund is thought to inhibit revenue sources for general government
priorities.
38. Eckl, Rainy Day Funds, I NCSL Legisbrief No. 9 (March, 1993).
39. Id.
40. Resolution, supra note 20, at 8.
41. Eckl, supra note II, at 6.
42. See Resolution, supra note 20, at 8.
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5. To Facilitate Budget Reductions by the Executive
The TBRC specifically stated its intent to overrule Chiles v. Chil-
dren,43 viewing that decision as a constraint on Executive power to control
budget reductions. The Commission's intent was to increase the Governor's
power to implement budget reductions. Section 19 specifies that reductions
adhere to agency planning documents which will prioritize programs for
possible cuts.44
Additionally, the new section 13 of article IV specifically refers to
revenue shortfalls. This section empowers the Governor and Cabinet to
"establish all necessary reductions in the state budget"45 to comply with the
balanced budget requirements of article VII. 46  Section 13 allows the
Legislature to define "revenue shortfalls.
47
6. To Facilitate Executive Line Item Vetoes
Section 19 specifically expands the Executive authority to line item
veto appropriations. Beginning July 1, 1994, section 19 requires the
Legislature 1.o itemize every "specific appropriation" over one million
dollars.48  This section increases the number of line items available for
veto. Additionally, section 19 subjects substantive bills (other than the
general appropriations bill) to the Executive's veto power for the first
time.49
While a primary purpose of section 19 was to increase the Governor's
line item veto power,5" the section's effect may be to micro-manage the
budget. Literally read, implementation of these changes in the line item
veto process is impossible. For example, large segments of the budget, such
as the funding formula for public schools, are not amenable to division into
line items.5"
43. 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
44. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 19(h).
45. Id. art. IV, § 13.
46. Id. art. VII, § I(d).
47. Id. art. IV, § 13.
48. Id. art. III, § 19(b).
49. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 19(b).
50. Telephone Interview with Robert Bradley, Deputy Director, Office of Planning &
Budgeting, Office of the Governor (August 19, 1993).
51. The Florida Education Finance Program is distributed to school districts through a
complex formula which is applied to a lump sum appropriation.
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III. OTHER BUDGET-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION: A PERSPECTIVE OF FLORIDA'S BUDGET PROCESS
Part of the drive for budget reform was generated by the overall
constraints and parameters of Florida's Constitution. Florida relegates a
fairly small role for the Executive in the budgeting process in comparison
to other states. California, for example, authorizes its Governor to reduce
appropriations in the veto process." The Florida Supreme Court has held
that such a reduction specifically violates the separation of powers provision
of Florida's Constitution."
Additionally, prior to the adoption of section 19, article III, section 8
prohibited the Governor from vetoing specific appropriations unless those
appropriations were contained in a "general appropriations bill." 4 This
provision prohibited the Governor from modifying and amending substantive
legislation containing appropriations. If the Governor wished to veto the
appropriation provision, section 8 required that he/she veto the entire bill.
Section 19 drastically changes this policy and allows line item vetoes in
substantive bills.
55
Although section 19 significantly alters Florida's budgeting process,
other forces continue to limit tax sources and to constrain spending. First,
Florida is one of only ten states which virtually prohibits a personal income
tax.56 During the debate which preceded the adoption of TBRC's resolu-
tion on section 19, some legislators expressed a desire that the TBRC submit
a modification of the income tax restriction to the public. The TBRC,
however, did not focus on this issue. Instead, the Commission concentrated
on addressing spending controls and budget policies.
A second fiscal policy which remains unchanged by section 19 is the
article VII, section l(d) requirement for a balanced budget. Unlike some
other states, Florida cannot deficit finance. No groundswell of support
exists for modifying this policy.
Third, Florida continues to prohibit using appropriation bills to modify
substantive policy." The purpose of this prohibition is to confine substan-
tive policy making to individual bills. Individual bills must comply with the
52. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(e) ("The Governor may reduce or eliminate one or more
items of appropriation while approving other portions of a bill.").
53. FLA. CONST. art. i, § 3; Chiles v Children, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
54. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
55. Id. § 19(b).
56. Cutting Expenses Will Make Nest Egg Last, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 18, 1993,
at F2.
57. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
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single subject rule, and, therefore, must be separately scrutinized in the
legislative process.5" To allow substantive statutory amendments in an
appropriation bill would allow logrolling and inclusion of multiple subjects
in one bill."
Conflict over managing the budget has ensued over the last decade.
The issues of veto power and budget control were fought out in the courts.
Those battles set the playing field for the TBRC reforms of 1992.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS, VETOES AND BUDGETING
IN FLORIDA COURTS
Two major sources of budget controversy have generated litigation on
budget issues in Florida. First, the recurrent controversy over the extent of
the Governor's authority to line item veto appropriations, and second, the
less frequent circumstance of administrative budget reductions in the case
of revenue shortfalls.6" The TBRC sought to address both these controver-
sies in its section 19 amendment to article III of the Florida Constitution.6'
While section 19 does speak directly to these issues, much controversy still
exists regarding the Governor's power to line item veto and to correct for
budgetary shortfalls.
A. The Line Item Veto Power Prior to the Enactment of Section 19
Prior to the enactment of section 19, the Governor's line item veto
authority was based solely on the language of article III, section 8, which
states, "[i]n all cases except general appropriations bills, the veto shall
extend to the entire bill. The Governor may veto any specific appropriation
in a general appropriation bill, but may not veto any qualification or
restriction without also vetoing the appropriation to which it relates."62
The terms "general appropriation bill" and "specific appropriation" are not
defined in section 8. Consequently, the definitions of each of these terms
became the subject of litigation and were finally addressed by the Florida
Supreme Court.
58. Id. § 6.
59. Of course, some may correctly argue that large appropriation bills have a major
substantive effect.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27.
61. See infra notes 110-128 and accompanying text. The TBRC sought specifically to
overrule Chiles v. Children and to strengthen Executive authority.
62. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 8(a).
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1. Defining "Specific Appropriation"
In Brown v. Firestone," the court discussed generally the limits of the
Governor's line item veto power and defined the term "specific appropria-
tion."" In Brown, the Governor vetoed appropriation provisions which
included legislation on other subjects in contravention of article III, section
12 of the Florida Constitution (the single subject requirement).65 The court
characterized the Governor's veto power as "a negative power, the power
to nullify, or at least suspend, legislative intent. It is not designed to alter
or amend legislative intent."66 Thus, the court determined that any exercise
of veto power over an appropriation destroys that appropriation and that the
Governor could not redirect the appropriation to another recipient.67
According to the court, the framers of the 1968 Florida Constitution sought
to avoid creative use of the gubernatorial veto by controlling "the expendi-
ture of funds unless the governor was willing to forsake the funds appropri-
ated along with the legislative direction. 68
The court in Brown also considered the intended meaning of "specific
appropriation. 69 It found that the terms "line item" and "specific appro-
priation" are identical, stating "[a] specific appropriation is an identifiable,
integrated fund which the legislature has allocated for a specified pur-
pose."7 According to the court, each "fund" meeting this description was
subject to the line item veto power.7
The court later refined its definition of "specific appropriation" in
Martinez v. Florida Legislature.72 The court found that language in the
Legislature's statement of intent was not part of the appropriation bill, and
therefore, not a specific appropriation.73 In addition, the court found that
these statements were not binding upon the Executive and were only
63. 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980).
64. Id.
65. Id. The supreme court held that mandamus was the proper mechanism to challenge
the constitutionality of appropriations acts rather than to veto them. Id. at 662 (citing
Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1971) and Division of Bond Finance v. Smathers,
337 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1976)).
66. Id. at 664. It is important to note that other states allow budget reductions.
67. Brown, 382 So. 2d at 664-65.
68. Id at 667.
69. Id. at 668.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 542 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1989).
73. See id. at 361-62.
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directive in nature.74 Consequently, Martinez held that the Executive had
no authority to veto the intent language."
In Florida House of Representatives v. Martinez," the court evaluated
several line item vetoes in the 1989 appropriations bill. In continuing to
interpret the term "specific appropriation," the court stated that in order to
veto "proviso" language in an appropriation bill, "that language on its face
must create an identifiable integrated fund-an exact sum of money-that
is allocated for a specific purpose."77
Among the challenged vetoes were a provision that authorized
exceeding the standard pay grade for certain salaried officials without
providing a funding amount, a provision setting forth conditions under
which certain workers could redeem unused annual leave credits on
termination of employment without identifying a sum of money, and a
provision providing for the treatment benefits for alcohol dependency for
members and employees of the State Legislature without specifying a sum
of money funded.78 The court found the veto of these provisions unconsti-
tutional because none of these provisions met the court's definition of
"specific appropriation" requiring an identifiable sum of money.79
The court in Florida House also addressed a $4 million appropriation
which the Legislature divided into two parts. The first part of the
appropriation was specifically designated, but the second part was identified
only as the "remainder."8 ° The Governor sought to veto the second part
of the appropriation.8" The court found that this was an acceptable veto
because the source and amount of the funding were readily discernible."
According to the court, the appropriation met the Brown definition of
"specific appropriation" because it constituted an "integrated identifiable
fund allocated for a specified purpose."83
In another challenged veto in the same case, the court found that the
Governor could not use the line item veto to eliminate specific funding
sources from a single appropriation item, leaving the line item partially
74. Id. at 362.
75. Id.
76. 555 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1990).
77. Id. at 844.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Florida House, 555 So. 2d at 844.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 844-45.
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funded.84 Stating that the Governor "must veto all or none" of such
appropriations, 5 the court found that this veto violated the legislative intent
to spend a certain amount of money for a certain purpose.86  The court
reiterated the position that a line item veto could not partially reduce an
appropriation. In this instance, the veto would have partially reduced the
sources of funding, thereby reducing the appropriation. The court believed
that vetoing part of a funding source for a line item would be equivalent to
vetoing part of a "specific appropriation" or editing a specific appropriation,
a clear violation of the then-existing constitutional provisions.8 7
2. Defining "General Appropriation"
In addition to defining "specific appropriation," the court also defined
the term "general appropriation" within the context of article III, section 8.
In Thompson v. Graham,88 the legislation question amended statutes and
authorized and provided funding for specific public education capital outlay
(PECO) projects. Governor Robert Graham vetoed several of the specific
appropriations. As a result, the House of Representatives filed a petition for
writ of mandamus, arguing that the PECO bill was not a "general appropri-
ations bill." Examining the legislation, the court noted that the PECO bill
was an act "authorizing and providing funding for specified public
educational capital outlay projects," and found that it was indeed a general
appropriation bill for the purposes of the veto power.89 The court further
noted that although only one section of the bill provided funding authoriza-
tion, this section contained eighty-six specific items authorizing the
expenditure of over a half billion dollars.9" The court rejected the House
of Representatives' argument that the appropriations were merely "inciden-
tal" to the legislation and approved the Governor's line item veto.
91
84. Id. at 845-46 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 845. "If the legislature's purpose is to expend a specific amount of money for
a single stated purpose, then the governor has no authority to reduce that amount by vetoing
one of several funding sources. The governor must veto all or none." Florida House, 555
So. 2d at 845.
86. See id.
87. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8.
88. 481 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1985).
89. Id. at 1214.
90. Id. at 1215.
91. Id. (distinguishing this case from Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 413
(1937), which held that general legislation might include provisions "carrying an appropria-
tion as an incident"). Concurring in Thompson, Justice Boyd noted that, even though the
funds for these PECO projects were provided by bonds, the bill would still be considered a
1114 [Vol. 18
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Justice Ehrlich, dissenting in Thompson, criticized the majority's broad
definition of' "general appropriation bill."g  He argued that a general
appropriation bill provided for payment of "salaries of public officers and
other current expenses of the state."93 According to Justice Ehrlich, the
PECO bill did not provide for such payments, but only appropriated money
for Florida's educational system. He determined that the PECO bill was an
appropriation bill but that it did not meet the definition of a "general
appropriation bill," and, therefore, was not subject to line item veto.94
The issue of whether line item vetoes should extend beyond general
appropriation acts is raised by new language in section 19(b), where
substantive bills containing appropriations are subject to the line item veto.
B. Budget Reductions and the Separation of Powers
A revenue shortfall in the fiscal 1991-92 state budget of some $621.7
million led to an order to revise budgets and reduce expenditures. This
order was made pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 216.221(2), which
provides:
If, in the opinion of the Governor, after consultation with the Revenue
Estimating Conference, a deficit will occur in the General Revenue
Fund, he shall so certify to the commission. The commission may, by
affirmative action, reduce all approved state agency budgets and releases
by a sufficient amount to prevent a deficit in any fund.95
Controversy ensued over the Governor's proposed budget reductions. This
controversy resulted in litigation challenging the constitutionality of the
actions of the Governor and Cabinet and the constitutionality of section 216.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Chiles v. Children,96 found that section
216.221(2) violated the separation of powers doctrine, and thus was
"general appropriation." Citing article XII, section 9(a)(2), which says that bonds may be
issued and their proceeds expended only by authorization of the legislature, Justice Boyd
concluded that the authorizations were "appropriations of state taxpayers' money to the state
budget for the purpose of meeting the current expenses of the state" whether the money was
to come from current revenues or bond proceeds to be repaid by future revenues. Id. at
1216-17 (Boyd, J., concurring).
92. Thompson, 481 So. 2d at 1219-20 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1220 (quoting Amos v. Mosley, 77 So. 619, 623 (Fla. 1917)).
94. Id.
95. FLA. STAT. § 216.221(2) (1991).
96. 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
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unconstitutional.97 The court also found that the statute conflicted with
article III, sections 1 and 7, which grant to the Legislature the responsibility
of passing bills into law, and article VII, sections 1(c) and (d), which require
a balanced budget. 98 The court noted that it "has long held that the power
to appropriate state funds is legislative and is to be exercised only through
duly enacted statutes." 99 Furthermore, the court stated that the power "to
reduce appropriations, like any other lawmaking, is a legislative func-
tion."'00  The court recognized that the Governor was constitutionally
prohibited from using his veto power to alter or amend appropriations.
Accordingly, the court held that the Legislature was prohibited from
abandoning its legislative responsibility through delegation."0
The court distinguished its holding regarding budget deficits from cases
addressing the legislative delegation of authority to the Executive branch in
order to dispose of surplus funds.'0 2 The court stated that in the case of
surpluses, the legislative mandates in appropriations had to be met before
the Executive branch could act.'0 3 In the case of deficits, however, "the
facts indicate that entities of state government will not even be able to fulfill
their legal responsibilities. Moreover, there is no express legislative policy
that is being carried out. It is, in fact, the Commission which is setting poli-
cy."'0 4 In the event that a shortfall would be imminent under the then-
unconstitutional section 216, the court asked the attorneys in Chiles to
suggest some available options. The attorneys offered a variety of
97. Id. at 268. Several constitutional provisions are implicated by Chiles v. Children.
Florida Constitution article II, section 3 provides: "The powers of the state government
shall be divided into legislative, executive andjudicial branches. No person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided [by the constitution]." Id. at 263-64 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. It, § 3)
(emphasis added).
Florida Constitution article VII, section l(c) provides: "[No money shall be drawn
from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriation made by law." Id. at 264 (quoting
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(c)).
Florida Constitution article VII, section 1(d) provides: "[P]rovision shall be made by
law for raising sufficient revenue to defray the expenses of the state for each fiscal period."
Id. at 264-65 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(d)).
98. See Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264-65.
99. Id. at 265 (citing State ex rel. Davis v. Green, 116 So. 66, 69 (Fla. 1928)).
100. Id. (citing Florida House of Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839, 845 (Fla.
1990)).
101. Id. at 265.
102. Id. at 267.
103. Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 267.
104. Id.
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suggestions ranging from the position that the Governor could do nothing
to the position that the Governor could act reasonably under emergency
powers to balance the budget.' °5
The court went on to suggest that it might be permissible for the
Legislature to allow the Executive branch to respond to budget crises, but
specified that any such delegation of functions must be accompanied by
"sufficient guidelines to assure that the legislative intent is clearly estab-
lished and can be directly followed ....""' Under this interpretation, the
delegation must be accompanied by specific guidelines. 0 7 These guide-
lines must indicate the amount of possible reductions, prioritize the
reductions, and provide for some legislative control or oversight.0 8 Such
guidelines were included in amendments to section 216 which were enacted
after Chiles, but before the enactment of section 19.109
Dissenting in Chiles, Justice McDonald stated that Florida Statutes
section 216.221 is a statutory response to the constitutional mandate for a
balanced budget in article VII, section 1(d)." He also stated that the
Governor already has the responsibility under article IV, section 1(a) to
execute the laws, including the balanced budget, and to ensure that no more
money is spent than is taken in."'
V. THE FUTURE OF THE BUDGET BATTLE AFTER
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 19
A. Line Item Veto Authority After Section 19
The language of section 19 evidences a clear intent by the TBRC to
increase the Governor's line item veto power. The section 19 requirement
that the Legislature line item any appropriation over $1 million is intended
to increase Executive authority to veto line items-most particularly those
which are termed "legislative turkeys." "Legislative turkeys" refer to those
special projects which some view as wasteful pork barrel appropriations.
The Legislature, therefore, is left with the practical problem, and now the
105. The author was amicus curiae in Chiles v. Children and presented oral argument
in the case.
106. Id. at 268.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Seesupra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (for the implications of the conflict).
110. Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 270 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 270-71.
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constitutional duty, to define "specific appropriation." While the supreme
court has previously offered such a definition, that definition may not suffice
under the new constitutional language.
Pragmatically, using the line item on every one million program in a
thirty billion budget is impossible. Additionally, such a requirement will
surely result in both inefficient and ineffective management. In all states,
"[s]ignificant portions of state operating budgets are uncontrollable.
Entitlement and mandates mean that services must continue in some capacity
regardless of performance.""' 2 Line item budgeting is not pragmatic for
these entitlement programs and will not accomplish the goal of cutting
government costs. The challenge will be to design legislation which will
meet the purposes of the TBRC, pass the Legislature, and be acceptable to
the Governor.
Another important controversy will arise under the new ability of the
Governor to partially veto appropriations in legislation other than a general
appropriation bill." 3  This provision radically departs from the former
restriction prohibiting line item vetoes in substantive bills which include
appropriations. This concept also directly contravenes the logic of the cases
which vehemently denied the authority of the governor to partially veto a
policy and let the rest of the policy stand." 4
B. Budget Reductions After Section 19
The TBRC directly addressed the conflict between the Legislative and
Executive branches represented by the various line item veto cases and by
the budget reduction controversy. The Commission specifically referred to
Chiles and declared its intent to reverse the case in order to vest authority
for budget reductions in the Governor and the Cabinet, consistent with the
provisions of section 19.
The statement of intent to reverse Chiles has limited practical effect
because section 10 controls the budget reduction process, which effectively
invalidates the authority of Chiles on the issue. Chiles is no longer the
authority for evaluating budget reductions; section 19 specifically controls
that process. Chiles simply found that the existing statutes for budget
reductions were unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers."'
112. Hayes, The Performance Budget Revisited: A Report on State Budget Reform
Initiatives at 7 (July 1993).
113. See FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 19.
114. See, e.g., Florida House of Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1990).
115. See Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 268.
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The language of section 216.221 created an unconstitutional, overbroad
delegation of authority to the Executive branch. The language of section
216.221 delegated authority to the Administration Commission. 6 to
reduce all approved state agency budgets and releases by a sufficient amount
to prevent a deficit in any fund." 7 State agencies, for purposes of fiscal
affairs, include all budget entities other than the Legislature."' Reducing
the budget requires a majority vote of the Cabinet, which includes the
Governor. 9
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently maintained a strict
separation of powers doctrine.2 °  Accordingly, the court found the
language of section 216.221 to be an overbroad unconstitutional delega-
tion. ' 2' Section 216.221 required no legislative authorization of cutbacks,
did not restrict the amount or percentages of the cuts, and required only that
the cutbacks be sufficient to prevent a deficit. 22
While section 216 relinquished broad discretion and authority to the
Administration Commission, the court has consistently held that the
Legislature must limit its delegation of authority with specificity. Following
the standards of Askew v. Cross Key Waterways 23 and related cases, it is
argued that the court should hold the Legislature to the rigorous standard
required by the Florida Constitution in delegating the fundamental power of
budget decisions.
Pursuant to the decision in Chiles, the Legislature passed revisions to
chapter 216 which specify how reductions are to be carried out.2 4 These
provisions must now be read in conjunction with the new section 19.
Together, the provisions substantially increase executive authority both by
116. The Administration Commission is composed of the Governor and the Cabinet.
117. See FLA. STAT. § 216.221(2) (1991).
118. See id. § 216.011(l)(kk).
119. Id. § 14.202 (1991).
120. See, e.g., Orr v. Trask, 464 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1985); Askew v. Cross Key
Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978); Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53 (Fla.
1976).
121. See Orr, 464 So. 2d at 134-35.
122. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FISCAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM,
Legislative Budget Procedures in the 50 States: A Guide to Appropriations and Budget
Processes (1988). Examples include a binding requirement of approval by House and Senate
Appropriations Committees in Michigan and Illinois, where cuts over two percent of total
appropriations require approval of the full legislature. Some states grant authority to reduce
the budget up to a set percentage. Id.
123. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
124. See FLA. STAT. § 216.221 (1991).
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accomplishing a constitutional delegation of authority and by placing
expanded Executive authority in the Florida Constitution.
Section 19 does not suspend the operation of the separation of powers
clause. Section 19 does, however, define the exercise of Executive authority
in reductions and is likely to have a dramatic effect on the application of the
separation of powers clause in budget reduction actions. The TBRC
resolution discusses the need for expeditious action in shortfalls and,
therefore, focuses on Executive action.125
Section 19 also specifies that reductions adhere to agency planning
documents which will prioritize programs for possible cuts.126 Further-
more, the new article IV, section 13 of the Florida Constitution specifically
refers to revenue shortfalls and empowers the Governor and the Cabinet to
"establish all necessary reductions in the state budget" in order to comply
with the balanced budget requirements of article Vll.' Section 13 does
allow the Legislature to define "revenue shortfalls." ' 8  This provision
provides an opportunity for the Legislature to limit Executive power by
controlling when a shortfall occurs.
C. Other Provisions
1. Integration of Planning and Budgeting
The success of the efforts in section 19 to integrate planning and
budgeting will depend in large measure on the cooperation of the Legisla-
ture and the Executive branch because section 19 does not compel
appropriations to comply with plans.'29
One critical problem with section 19 is the potentially destructive
consequences of increased line item budgeting in appropriation bills. This
effort, which was intended to increase the Governor's power to cut wasteful
spending, runs contrary to trends in budgeting which accord increased
discretion to program administrators. For example, in Massachusetts, so
long as an agency does not overspend its budget and "service delivery
groups" do not change by more than ten percent, an administrator can set
125. See Resolution, supra note 20, at 11.
126. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 19(h).
127. See id. art. IV, § 13; id. art. VII, § I(d).
128. See id. art. IV, § 13.
129. See Hayes, supra note 112, at 4 ("[A]greement on priorities and full cooperation
in execution [of performance budgeting] will depend, however, upon local circumstances and
personalities involved.").
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on state budgeting noted that, "performance reform asks lawmakers to
abandon traditional line item spending controls and allow managers to
reallocate appropriations as conditions merit."'' The constitutional
mandate of section 19 to increase line items appears to be contrary to this
kind of management reform.
2. An Open and Accountable Process: Working Capital
Requirements, Trust Fund Limitations and
Simplification of the Process
The gradual increase of the working capital fund to five percent makes
solid financial sense. Of course, pressure will increase in times of shortfall.
However, by placing this provision in the constitution, meeting the reserve
level is a mandate.
The series of issues dealing with establishing waiting periods for public
review and clearer appropriation formats will help public understanding of
the process. However, the Legislature must be committed as an institution
to facilitating these reforms for them to make a major impact.
Limitation of trust funds has long been a goal of budget reformers.
The number of trust funds in Florida will decline due to the continuing
review process, and making enactment of future trust funds more difficult
through the three-fifths vote requirement of each chamber of the Legislature.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reforms of section 19 are the beginning of resolving the complex
issues of budget policy rather than the end. Many provisions are not even
effective as of 1993. Legislation implementing the reforms of section 19
will be the prime indicators of whether the provision will meet its goals of
improved openness, understandability, and efficiency.
The most difficult goal to implement is integrating planning and
budgeting. Solid implementing legislation and commitments from the
leadership of the Legislature and the Governor are indispensable.
The most unpredictable outcome is the continuing controversy over line
item vetoes and budget reductions. Again, implementing legislation is a key
factor in achieving a balance of power, efficiency, and accountability. The
most predictable outcome is that the Legislature and the Executive branch
will continue to struggle over political control of the budget process.
131. Id. at 10.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most people assume that, in the United States, the Executive branch of
state government is controlled by the state's Governor. That assumption is
not true in Florida. In Florida, the Governor shares executive power with
other elected executive branch officials, a group designated in the state
constitution as the Cabinet.' This "plural executive" form of organization
has been described as an institution "unique" to Florida.2 Is this system an
advance worth examination by other jurisdictions or is it a detour on the
road to good government that other jurisdictions have correctly ignored?
* Lawyer and legal educator. Chair of The Conference on the Florida Constitution, a
joint program of the Administrative Law Section and the Council of Sections of The Florida
Bar.
I. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a).
2. TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
65 (1991). Allen Morris, a longtime observer and commentator on Florida government,
seems to concur with this assessment. "Since the Governor shares so much of the traditional
executive responsibility with members of an independent Cabinet, it is not surprising that
political scientists regard Florida's system of state government as different from virtually all
other states." ALLEN MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1993-94 14 (24th Biennial ed.
1993). Some argue that Florida's Cabinet system is not that different from other states,
noting that attorneys general, treasurers and secretaries of state at the state level are
commonly elected. Fred 0. Dickinson, Jr., The Florida Cabinet, 43 FLA. B.J. 337, 339
(1969). However, the role that cabinet officers play in Florida government is significantly
different than the role played by similar officers in other states. Joseph W. Landers, Jr., The
Myth of the Cabinet System: The Need to Restructure Florida's Executive Branch, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1103 (1992) ("No other state has an executive branch that even
resembles ours in Florida.").
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II. THE CABINET
The Florida Cabinet is part of the Executive branch, but it is not the
Governor's Cabinet. Its members are not appointed by the Governor and
they do not serve at the Governor's pleasure. Instead, members of the
Cabinet are elected independently of the Governor on the same statewide
ballot used to elect the Governor.' The Florida Constitution provides for
a Cabinet that consists of six members: a secretary of state, an attorney
general, a comptroller, a treasurer, a commissioner of agriculture and a
commissioner of education.4 The Florida Constitution and the Florida
Statutes prescribe the powers and responsibilities of these offices.5
Cabinet members discharge some of their powers and responsibilities
while acting individually; they discharge others while acting jointly with the
Governor and Cabinet; and they exercise still others while acting with other
cabinet officers. Where the constitution and statutes provide for a cabinet
member to oversee a particular agency of government, that responsibility is
discharged individually.6 Where the law provides for the Governor and
Cabinet to act together to manage an agency or to make certain decisions,
cabinet members have a different role. As joint decisionmakers, each acts
as a member of a collegial body chaired by the Governor. The Governor
is technically not a member of the Cabinet, even when acting with it.7
The legal formula for sharing power in this collegial body changes
depending on the type of question that the Governor and Cabinet must
decide.
Under this system, the governor has no control over the cabinet other
than that which comes from being the presiding officer, and, in most
cabinet decisions, it is possible for the governor to be outvoted on a
given issue. The governor is required to be in the majority for action
on certain issues under the provisions of the constitution (such as
clemency) or pursuant to statute (such as certain growth management
issues), thus giving the governor veto power on those issues even
3. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5.
4. Id. § 4.
5. See id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 16 - 19 (1993).
6. The constitution provides certain specified responsibilities for cabinet members, FLA.
CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5., and provides that the Legislature may place the administration of
departments within the Executive branch under the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the
Governor and Cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer or board appointed by the Governor,
except where otherwise provided in the constitution. Id. § 6.
7. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 13.
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though three cabinet members must join the governor for a decision.'
In some situations, cabinet members can act jointly without the
Governor. For example, confirmation by three members of the Cabinet can
be a substitute for senate approval of appointment to or removal from a
designated statutory office, if the statutes so provide. 9 Also, four cabinet
members may send the supreme court a written suggestion that the Governor
is incapable of serving as Governor.1"
The Governor is not required to share all executive power with the
Cabinet. One area where the Governor does not share executive power is
in the area of appointments. It has been estimated that the Governor makes
about 4,000 appointments over the course of a four year term." The
Governor also does not share the power to make the budget for Executive
branch agencies and to veto legislation.' In addition, the Governor is in
direct charge of state agencies that are not under the supervision of cabinet
officers or under the control of the Governor and Cabinet collegially. 3
III. THE DEBATE
Should the Florida Cabinet be abolished? People who care about the
organization of our state government tend to have strong feelings on this
subject. This is also a question that will likely confront the next Constitu-
tional Revision Commission when it convenes in a few years time. That
prediction is based on past history. The Cabinet was on the constitutional
revision agenda in 1968 and 1978. In the 1968 Constitution, the Cabinet
system was strengthened and given a clearer constitutional mandate. In
1978, the Constitutional Revision Commission recommended that the
8. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 2, at 65.
9. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
10. Id. § 3(b).
11. MoRRis, supra note 2, at 12.
12. Id.
13. For a good discussion of which agencies are under whose control, see Landers, supra
note 2, at 1092-93. However, there has been some reorganization of the Executive branch
since that article was published, most notably the merger of the Department of Business
Regulation to form the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Ch. 93-220, §
2, 1993 Fla. Laws 1793, and the merger of the Department of Natural Resources and the
Department of Environmental Regulation to form the Department of Environmental
Protection. Ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129, 2135-36 (amending FLA. STAT. § 370.017).
1994] 1125
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Cabinet be abolished, but that recommendation was rejected at the polls. 4
Would the abolition of the Cabinet be a welcome reform, or is the Florida
Cabinet a valuable resource that should be better appreciated?
A. The Origins of the Cabinet
The origins of the Cabinet have been traced back to the middle of the
last century.15
The first mention of Cabinet officers was in the 1868 Constitution, but
rather than being elected, they were appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the senate. The 1885 Constitution eliminated the word
"Cabinet," but established six "administrative officers" who were to be
elected and who came to be known as the "Cabinet." In subsequent
years, the Legislature began vesting these Cabinet officers with addition-
al duties beyond those established in the Constitution, and began
establishing collective responsibilities. By 1968 the Governor and
Cabinet, in various combinations, served on thirty-five different boards
and commissions.'
6
The Cabinet system was strengthened in the 1968 Florida Constitution.
The new [1968] constitution not only retains the same six elective
Cabinet officials as the old constitution, but actually strengthens their
powers by providing a specific constitutional source for statutes creating
ex officio boards with the right to appoint officers, hire employees, fix
salaries, etc. By contrast to the 1885 Constitution, the Florida Constitu-
tion of 1968 nowhere refers to the Cabinet members merely as
"administrative officers," expands the legislative empowering clause
from ". . . perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law," to
"... exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be pre-
scribed by law," and specifically authorizes laws placing executive
departments under the supervision of the Governor and the Cabinet, or
[even] under a single Cabinet member.'7
14. MANNING J. DAUER, FLORIDA'S POLITICS & GOVERNMENT 97 (2d ed. 1986) (70%
of the voters rejected the proposal).
15. For a more complete discussion of the origins of the Florida Cabinet, see Ira W.
McCollum, Jr., The Florida Cabinet System-A CriticalAnalysis, 43 FLA. B. J. 156, 158-61
(1969) and Landers, supra note 2, at 1098-1100.
16. Landers, supra note 2, at 1099.
17. McCollum, supra note 15, at 166-67.
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It is unclear whether the Cabinet will be in or out of favor when the next
round of constitutional revision begins.
B. The Arguments
The arguments for and against the cabinet system are not completely
unexpected. Those who support the cabinet system are likely to argue the
virtue of entrusting the work of the Executive branch to a number of
elected, and hence independently accountable, government officials, rather
than to the Governor and his or her appointed assistants. As expressed by
one former cabinet member:
The bad effects of the governor appointing system, rather than the
elected cabinet system, to oversee the executive branch must be
considered. Appointive bureaucracy is one of the great problems
continuing to mount on the American governmental scene. The power
of the ballot of Floridians in electing or rejecting those who seek
cabinet positions is the best possible guarantee for sound administration
because of the accountability of each cabinet officer to the people whom
he is privileged to serve."
At least in theory, elected officials have their credentials and performance
tested regularly at the ballot box, and, it is argued, a group of cabinet
members chosen in statewide elections could bring to the job a collective
wisdom, responsiveness and accountability uncharacteristic of appointed
officials. 9 The fact that there has historically been no limit on cabinet
members' terms has been advanced as a plus because they are able to
accumulate experience and provide continuity beyond that provided by the
Governor, who is limited to a maximum of two terms by the constitution.
20
Proponents also note that the cabinet system allows the government to
"spread the heat" of controversial decisions. 2'
18. Dickinson, supra note 2, at 339.
19. "One of the chief distinguishing features of the Cabinet is its ability to benefit from
the wisdom and experience of seven men instead of one on important, executive decisions.
This is the business-like board of directors' approach to sound executive decision making."
Id. at 338.
20. Id. The adoption of a constitutional amendment that places term limitations on
Florida officeholders promises to change this dynamic, but there has been very little
discussion of the effect of this change to date. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (eight year
limit).
21. Governor Fuller Warren said that "spreading the heat" may not be the most elegant
way to express it, but that this was one of the purposes of the cabinet system. MORRIS, supra
19941 1127
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Also, the system allows both Democrats and Republicans to participate
in the Executive branch at the same time. While this kind of power sharing
between political parties is common in the Legislative branch, it is quite
uncommon in the Executive branch. This feature is more significant now
that the two party system in Florida has become more vital. Although it
was once the exclusive domain of Democrats, the Cabinet today includes
four Democrats and two Republicans. Whether a multi-party Executive
branch is a benefit or a liability has not been the focus of much serious
study. It is also unclear how this new dynamic will effect the chances that
the Cabinet will be abolished during the constitutional revision. Since
neither party's control of the Governor's Office is certain, will both want to
leave open the possibility of participating in the Executive branch through
the cabinet system? Also, many cabinet members have come to the Cabinet
after serving as elected officials in the Legislative branch. Will the
Legislature oppose changes to the cabinet system to preserve their members'
opportunities to step up to statewide office after service in the Legislature?
In addition, proponents may contend that the cabinet system allows
potential candidates for governor or senator to develop and test their
statewide electoral support on the way to other statewide offices. Through
their decisions on issues before the Cabinet, cabinet members can develop
a track record on issues of statewide importance. Although cabinet
members have often aspired to other statewide offices in recent years,
surprisingly few have successfully used the Cabinet as a springboard to
other offices.2
Proponents are also likely to point to the openness of cabinet proceed-
ings as a significant virtue of the cabinet system.23 The proceedings are
open to public view and can provide ordinary people with a forum to
address the powerful on issues of statewide importance.
Cabinet day-usually a Tuesday-has come to serve as Florida's
note 2, at 14. One commentator critical of the cabinet system has suggested that it is better
characterized as "a way to escape the heat." Landers, supra note 2, at 1095.
22. For instance, one commentator has observed:
Since 1960, every Secretary of State except one has run for either Governor,
Lieutenant Governor or the United States Senate. Since the mid-sixties every
Attorney General has run for either Governor or the United States Senate. In
the last decade, the Treasurer has twice run for the United States Senate.
Interestingly, these attempts by Cabinet officers for political promotion have
almost never succeeded.
Landers, supra note 2, at 1100.
23. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 2, at 339.
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"town meeting" with the public's business transacted with a greater
degree of openness than may be found in any other state government.
A meeting on Cabinet day affords the public an opportunity to
watch State government in operation. Because the Governor and the six
Cabinet officers are peers, each responsible basically to the electorate,
differences of opinion usually go unconcealed.24
The integration of this "town meeting" role of the cabinet system into the
more traditional administrative and judicial process is sometimes awk-
ward, 5 but the goal of providing a forum where politics, policy, and law
converge during the decisionmaking process seems worthwhile.
Opponents of the cabinet system are likely to see the fact that the
Cabinet is elected as a liability. They are likely to see the dynamics of the
cabinet system as encouraging political horsetrading and discouraging
principled decisionmaking, since an elected Commissioner of Education or
Insurance Commissioner, for example, might be tempted to trade votes on
issues that come before the Cabinet that are in areas far removed from their
area of primary concern in order to win support in the areas important to
them. This dynamic may reduce the validity of the proponents' accountabil-
ity argument as well, since the Insurance Commissioner and the Commis-
sioner of Education are unlikely to run on, or be called to task for, their
environmental record for example, even though as cabinet members they
cast many important votes on the environment. Also, opponents may argue
that specialists would be more capable administrators of the agencies than
cabinet officers or the Governor and Cabinet as a collegiate body, both
because specialists are likely to have more expertise than politicians and
because specialists would give their full attention to their one job and not
divide their time and attention, as the current system requires elected cabinet
officials to do. Proponents are likely to respond both that this analysis
undervalues the experience and wisdom of cabinet officials and overvalues
appointed officials, who are more likely to be chosen for their political
connections than for their expertise as administrators.
In addition, the cabinet system is criticized for dividing the executive
power of the state. Critics suggest that if the entire executive power of the
state was vested in the Governor, the Executive branch would become more
24. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 17.
25. See, e.g., Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, 442 So. 2d 221, 226
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (compromise plan adopted by Cabinet sitting as the Florida
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission after hearing arguments "from parties as well as
comment by interested groups and individuals" remanded because not supported by evidence
in the record).
19941 1129
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accountable.
Who is held responsible for what? The Governor is generally perceived
as the head of the executive branch of government although he has less
than total authority over that branch. The Governor is always at risk of
being blamed for failures caused by elements beyond his control.
On the other hand, the Governor, as well as Cabinet members, may
escape accountability for departments they collectively head. Candi-
dates for Cabinet offices run almost exclusively on issues concerning the
departments they will head, and that is generally the basis for their
election. z6
Opponents also argue that the cabinet system is inefficient. Not only
have the Governor and Cabinet been known to spend great amounts of time
on small matters,27 the Cabinet has developed a staff structure that places
yet another layer of bureaucracy over the operation of the departments that
must answer to the Governor and Cabinet. Cabinet aides' sessions "have
become virtual 'mini' Cabinet meetings that sometimes last longer than
actual cabinet meetings" according to one critic. 21
A collection of lawyers, lobbyists, opponents, and proponents plead
their causes at these meetings, which have become a virtual prerequisite
to appearing before the Governor and Cabinet the following week.
After the aides meet and before the Governor and Cabinet convene, the
aides brief their principals and recommend how they should vote.29
One summary of the opponents' complaints is that the cabinet system
in Florida "results in a weak executive branch, a lack of accountability, poor
management, wasted money, and is illogical . . . ."" It has been suggest-
ed that the various roles of the Governor, Cabinet, and of various cabinet
officers could be reorganized to place most of the Executive branch under
the control of the Governor, and that some of those changes would require
only statutory changes.3 '
26. Landers, supra note 2, at 1094-95.
27. Id. at 1096. One oft cited example of this is the hours that were once spent debating
the size that green turtles must reach before they could be taken. Id.; MORRIS, supra note
2, at 15.
28. Landers, supra note 2, at 1097.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1098.
3 1. See id. at 1100-02.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The debate over the cabinet system in Florida is not a new debate. To
the extent that the debate is about the merits of election versus appointment,
the benefits of choosing government officials based upon their political
strengths versus their substantive expertise, it is an old debate that is now
being held in a new context. This debate has a familiar ring to it because
it is an argument that has echoed down so many corridors of American
government over so many years. This debate is repeated as our government
institutions are constantly organized and reorganized to respond to the
weaknesses in old systems and to help better prepare government to solve
new problems that seem increasingly more complex and intractable. As
Professor Bernard Shapiro explains:
From the founding of the republic, Americans have embraced two
opposing modes of public administration, the democratic and the
technocratic. The former, which we might term the Jacksonian
tradition, calls for government by the common people themselves, or at
least by administrators directly representative of and responsible to the
people . . . . The opposing, Federalist tradition, first advocated by
Hamilton, stresses the need for efficient government and thus the need
for an administration staffed not by an ever-changing stream of Know-
Nothings, but by experts.32
The recurring nature of this debate suggests that, while individuals may
adopt a position with great conviction, there are no "right" answers to
questions like: Which is better, election or appointment? If we are to arrive
at some consensus about which system is right for Florida, we must broaden
the debate.
More than the narrow arguments about which system makes decision-
makers more accountable, or more efficient, are necessary here. We must
recognize that even the word "accountability" may mean different things to
different people. Both sides in the debate argue their approach as to which
makes decisionmaking more accountable: the election of cabinet members
or the appointment of department heads by the Governor. One reason
behind the debate seems to be that they disagree about what accountability
means. What makes someone accountable; their formal accountability
through election, or their actual accountability as the system really operates?
Cabinet members are directly subject to reelection, but it is rare indeed that
32. Bernard Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487,
1495-96 (1983).
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they are turned out of office, no matter what they have done. Department
heads are not elected, but they may either be fired by the Governor, whose
reelection is not assured and who is not permitted to stay in office more
than eight years, or they may be "fired" by the people themselves when the
Governor is rejected at the polls. If accountability means directly subject
to reelection, none of these other facts matter.
In discussing efficiency, we must not only argue about which
approach is more efficient, we must also consider the importance of
efficiency. This should be done both as a philosophical matter, that is, how
important is efficiency when balanced against competing interests, and it
should be done in context, that is within the totality of circumstances of
Florida government. Just because a system is inefficient does not mean it
should be abolished. For example, Florida has chosen to adopt an
Administrative Procedure Act that is relatively inefficient, when compared
with other state administrative procedure acts. This was a choice motivated
both by the Legislature's view of the context at the time our state Adminis-
trative Procedure Act was adopted, a view that state agencies could not be
trusted in their dealings with the public, and their political philosophy, a
belief that in the balance between efficiency, accuracy and acceptability, the
three normative requirements usually identified in administrative procedure,
efficiency was a minor concern. The result was a conscious decision to
make the Act less efficient but more protective of individual rights.3
To date, much emphasis has been placed on apparent weaknesses of the
cabinet system (e.g., that it divides executive power) and on the perceived
irrationality of some power sharing choices (e.g., why is one department
under a cabinet officer, another under the Cabinet and a third under the
Governor?), but that alone will probably not be enough to compel people to
change the system. People will want to know how well the cabinet system
is serving Floridians. The literature as it exists does not answer this
question. A complete answer necessarily requires a more explicit discussion
of both political philosophy and the larger context of the debate. Until that
discussion occurs, we may have difficulty deciding with confidence what
changes, if any, should be made to the cabinet system.
33. For a more complete discussion of these points see Stephen T. Maher, The Seventh
Administrative Law Conference Chairman's Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 18 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 607 (1991); Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and Judicial
Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767 (1991).
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The militia' shall be composed of all ablebodied inhabitants of the
state who are or have declared their intention to become citizens of the
United States .... This requirement, found in article X, section 2 of the
Florida Constitution, imposes a universal military obligation3 on the
inhabitants of the state. The universal military requirement was the basis of
the colonial militia system.4 Members of the militia are citizen-soldiers5
who fulfill this obligation. They are ordinary citizens who are willing to
disrupt their lives for the greater good. The spirit of the militia is alive
today in the form of the National Guard.6
I. Militia is defined as "[t]he body of citizens in a state, enrolled for discipline as a
military force, but not engaged in actual service except in emergencies, as distinguished from
regular troops or a standing army." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 993 (6th ed. 1990).
2. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 2(a).
3. Universal military obligation is based on the theory that every ablebodied man has
a civic duty to defend his society. See JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND THE
NATIONAL GUARD 6 (Louis Morton ed., 1983).
4. See Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 919, 923 (1988); see also MAHON, supra note 3, at 14-18 (describing early
militia system).
5. See James B. Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA.
L. REV. 947, 949-51 (1992).
6. See Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 46 (1965) (declaring the
National Guard as the modem militia).
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"The [National] Guard is an essential reserve component of the Armed
Forces of the United States"7 that is used to augment the federal military
in times of need.' By presidential order,9 or congressional determina-
tion,' ° the National Guard can be called into federal service." This
creates a "dual enlistment 2 . . . whereby an incoming guardsman join[s]
both the National Guard of his home state and the National Guard of the
United States, a reserve component of the U.S. [military]."' 3  Thus,
Guardsmen lead their lives subject to calls for service by both their home
state and their federal government.' 4
Florida has the oldest militia of any state in the country.' 5 Duty,
honor, and sacrifice are traditions which permeate every aspect of the
Florida Guard.' 6 This article examines Florida's military force in regard
7. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 7 (1973); see also 10 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) (naming
the National Guard as a reserve component of the federal armed forces).
8. 10 U.S.C. § 262 (1988); see also id. § 263 (authorizing Congress to augment federal
forces).
9. Id. § 332.
10. Id. § 263.
11. For Florida's contribution to the Seminole Wars, see generally George C. Bittle, In
the Defense of Florida: The Organized Florida Militia from 1821 to 1920 (1965)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University). For Florida's contribution to the
Mexican War, Civil War, Spanish-American War, World War 1, World War II, Korean War,
and Vietnam War, see generally ROBERT HAWK, FLORIDA'S ARMY (1986) (detailing that the
Florida militia has been called to federal duty in every major war since gaining statehood in
1845). For Florida's contribution to the Persian Gulf War, see generally FLA. ADJUTANT
GEN. ANN. REP. 28 (1992) [hereinafter ADJUTANT REPORT].
12. The dual enlistment concept is embodied in the enlistment oath taken by a
Guardsman. See 32 U.S.C. § 304 (1988). In Florida, the Guardsman swears to "support and
defend the Constitution of the United States and of the State of [Florida] against all enemies
... and . . .obey the orders of the President of the United States and the Governor of
[Florida] ..... Id.
13. Johnson v. Powell, 414 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1969).
14. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 348 (1990). Justice Stevens,
describing the role of Guardsmen, wrote, "[in a sense, all of them now must keep three hats
in their closets - a civilian hat, a state militia hat, and an army hat - only one of which is
worn at any particular time." Id.
15. HAWK, supra note 11, at 16. Florida's militia tradition began on September 16,
1565, when Spanish Admiral Pedro Menendez de Aviles left the settlement of St. Augustine
with his troops and designated the civilian left behind to defend the settlement as "milicia".
Id.
16. Throughout this article, the terms Florida Guard, Florida National Guard, Florida Air
Guard, and organized militia will be used interchangeably. These terms refer to those
citizens who volunteer to serve in the state's military force, as opposed to the entire Florida
population comprising the militia. In addition, for the sake of consistency, fluidity, and
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to its state militia status.
1I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
A. Composition of State Military Force
The state constitutional authority for the composition of the militia is
found in article X, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. 7 Although the
constitution imposes a universal military obligation, 8 the militia is
statutorily divided into an organized and an unorganized component. 9 The
organized militia consists of the National Guard.2" The unorganized
militia consists of the entire ablebodied population who are, or intend to
become, Florida citizens.
2
'
Superficially, a universal military obligation seems antiquated.
However, it is by precisely this authority that the Governor can institute a
draft of ablebodied citizens into the state organized militia, thereby
compelling military service to the state. "The Governor shall have the
power ... to order into active service of the state all or any part of the
militia that he may deem proper., 22  Although the Governor's power to
draft Florida citizens into the organized militia appears diminished by related
simplicity within the article, all references to the Governor will be in the masculine.
17. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 2. Article X, section 2 reads in full:
(a) The militia shall be composed of all ablebodied inhabitants of the state
who are or have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States;
and no person because of religious creed or opinion shall be exempted from
military duty except upon conditions provided by law.
(b) The organizing, equipping, housing, maintaining, and disciplining of the
militia, and the safekeeping of public arms may be provided for by law.
(c) The governor shall appoint all commissioned officers of the militia,
including an adjutant general who shall be chief of staff. The appointment of
all general officers shall be subject to confirmation by the senate.
(d) The qualifications of personnel and officers of the federally recognized
national guard, including the adjutant general, and the grounds and proceedings
for their discipline and removal shall conform to the appropriate United States
army or air force regulations and usages.
Id.
18. See supra note 3.
19. FLA. STAT. § 250.02 (1991).
20. Id. § 250.02(2).
21. Id. § 250.02(3).
22. Id. § 250.06(3).
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legislation,23 it remains the state statutory law.
In 1917, Governor Catts sought an advisory opinion to determine his
authority to draft county guards into state military service.24 The Florida
Supreme Court interpreted sections 125 and 426 of article 14 of the 1885
Florida Constitution. The supreme court informed the Governor that all
inhabitants of the state who fit the constitutional definition were a part of
the state militia, and subject to the Governor's orders for purposes of
preserving the public peace, executing the laws of the state, and suppressing
insurrection.27 By informing the Governor of his authority, the Florida
Supreme Court validated a constitutional limitation on the Governor's
authority to draft civilians into state service.28 By constitutional mandate,
his authority to compel civilians into military service is strictly limited to the
express purposes of preserving public peace, executing laws, suppressing
insurrection, or repelling invasion.29
B. Authority for Command and Control
Although the Governor is commander-in-chief of all the state militia,3"
his power is greatest as commander-in-chief of the organized militia. To
23. See FLA. STAT. § 251.01(l) (Supp. 1992). In authorizing the Governor to organize
and maintain military forces to assist civil authorities in the event the Florida National Guard
is activated into federal service, the Governor is directed to take volunteers and supplement
the Florida Guard through the drafting of militiamen alreadyenrolledin the Florida National
Guard. Id. This represents a change from the previous provision which authorized the
Governor to supplement the Florida National Guard, in the event the Guard is activated into
federal service, through members of the entire state militia. See also FLA. STAT. § 252.36(4)
(1991) (during a state of emergency, the Governor is commander-in-chief of the organized
militia and the volunteer militia).
24. In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 77 So. 87 (Fla. 1917).
25. Article XIV, section 1 of the 1885 Florida Constitution defines militia as all
ablebodied male inhabitants between the ages of 18 and 45. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XIV,
§ 1.
26. Article XIV, section 4 of the 1885 Florida Constitution provides the Governor with
the power to call out the militia to preserve public peace, execute the laws of the state,
suppress insurrection, or repel invasion. Id. §4. It is the substantive equivalent of the current
constitutional provision.
27. Advisory Opinion, 77 So. at 88.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § l(a) (providing that "[t]he supreme executive power shall be
vested in a governor," and "[hie shall be commander-in-chief of all military forces of the
state not in active service of the United States"); see also FLA. STAT. § 250.06(l) (1991)
(declaring the Governor the commander-in-chief of all state militia).
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achieve the constitutional mandate of ensuring that the laws are faithfully
executed,3' the Governor is authorized to use the state military force.32
In cases of civil unrest, the Governor may use the state military force to
preserve public peace.33 When the Governor declares a state of emergen-
cy, he may use the military to enforce any rules or regulations promulgated
in reaction to that emergency.34 The Governor is further authorized to use
the military force to intervene in any situation where there exists violence,
threats of violence, or any disturbance which threatens the peace and good
order of society. 35 Furthermore, the Governor is authorized to deploy the
military forces to assist and aid those civil authorities which are unable to
suppress any of the following situations: invasion, insurrection, riot, mob,
unlawful assembly, breach of the peace, or resistance to the execution of
laws.36
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that maintaining
law and order is the most important state interest,37 and the range of
discretion within which a Governor acts pursuant to this interest must be
broad.38 When a Governor determines that an emergency requires the aid
of the military, his decision to deploy troops is conclusive.39 Although the
power to deploy the state military is broad, Florida governors have
historically used great discretion in calling out this body. No reported court
decision has ever challenged the use of this gubernatorial power by a Florida
governor.
In addition to his authority to deploy the military force, the Governor
has other duties as commander-in-chief. The Governor has the power to
authorize the Florida Guard's participation in any parades, reviews, or public
exercises." He is responsible for ensuring that the Florida Guard conforms
31. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a).
32. Id. § I(d).
33. FLA. STAT. § 14.02 (1991).
34. Id. § 14.021(3).
35. Id. § 14.022(1).
36. Id § 250.28.
37. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 (1932).
38. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
39. See Sterling, 287 U.S. at 399. "That means that he shall make the ordinary use of
the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist and . .. use the milder measure
of seizing the bodies of those [who] . . .stand in the way of restoring peace." Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909). But every action the Governor takes is not conclusive,
because "the allowable limits of military discretion ... are judicial questions." Sterling, 287
U.S. at 401.
40. FLA. STAT. § 250.06(4) (1991).
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to the terms of federal legislation.4" He also appoints all General officers,
including the Adjutant General.42 However, these appointments must be
confirmed by the Senate.43 The Governor is also responsible for convening
all General court martials,44 approving dishonorable discharges,45 approv-
ing pay vouchers,46 and borrowing funds to pay Guardsmen activated in
service of the state.47
Although the Governor is commander-in-chief, the Adjutant General is
vested with direct operational control of the militia.48 The state headquar-
ters is under the administration of the Adjutant General,49 who is Chief of
the Department of Military Affairs.5" The Adjutant General is charged
with supervising all aspects of the troops, arms, and equipment, maintaining
official records, and preparing all reports and returns required by the
Secretary of Defense.5'
The Adjutant General is vested with the exclusive authority of
appointing an Assistant Adjutant General and a State Quartermaster.52
Through the State Quartermaster, the Adjutant General is accountable for all
funds disbursed and received through the Department of Military Affairs.53
Similarly, the Adjutant General has the exclusive authority of allocating
appropriations to the armories54 located throughout the state.55 Further-
more, the Adjutant General is authorized to activate the Florida Guard if the
Governor cannot be reached and an emergency exists of which time is of the
41. Id. § 250.08.
42. See id. § 250.13.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 250.35.
45. FLA. STAT. § 250.35 (1991).
46. Id. § 250.24.
47. Id. § 250.25.
48. See id. §§ 250.10-250.28.
49. Id. § 250.07.
50. FLA. STAT. § 250.10 (1991); see also id. § 250.05 (the Department of Military
Affairs is an agency of the state government which includes every member of the Florida
National Guard and all employees required to wear a military uniform in performance of their
official duties); State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 47 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1950)
(holding that the Florida National Guard is an arm of state government).
51. FLA. STAT. § 250.10 (1991).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. An armory is a building used primarily for housing and training of troops and the
storing of arms and other military property. Id. § 250.41. For further discussion of armories,
see infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
55. FLA. STAT. § 250.20 (1991); see generally id. § 250.41.
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essence.56
The statutory scheme delegating duties to the Governor and Adjutant
General leads to the conclusion that their respective powers are expressed.
The Governor is commander-in-chief, but is only permitted to call out the
Guard in certain situations. 7 Other duties are dictated to the Governor by
statute as well.ft Similarly, the Adjutant General has been vested with
exclusive powers with which to run the Florida National Guard. 9
Since these powers are statutorily granted, the Governor cannot take
direct operational control of the Florida Guard pursuant to any implied
powers as commander-in-chief.6 ° When troops are called out in an
emergency, the civil authorities outline the objectives to be accomplished by
the military force.6 However, only active militia officers may give tactical
directions to the military forces on how to achieve those objectives.6" In
addition, courts have held that when a Governor calls out the state militia
pursuant to the constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, he is
acting in his civil capacity and not as a military commander-in-chief.63
56. Id. § 250.28.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.
60. See Farmer v. Mabus, 757 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Miss. 1991). When the Governor
of Mississippi attempted to assume performance of the Adjutant General's duties on the
theory of implied powers of the commander-in-chief to direct and control operations of
Mississippi National Guard, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Legislature had
clearly established that certain powers are to be exercised by the commander-in-chief and
certain powers are to be exercised by the Adjutant General. Id. Any theory of implied
powers would be contrary to the statutory scheme. Id.; see also State v. Hansen, 401 P.2d
954 (Wyo. 1965) (where Wyoming Supreme Court held that the Governor exceeded his
power in removing the Adjutant General pursuant to implied powers as commander-in-chief,
and not pursuant to statutory scheme).
61. See FLA. STAT. § 250.30 (1991).
62. See id. The statute reads in part:
When an armed force is called out in aid of the civil authorities, the orders of
the civil officer or officers may extend to a direction of the general or specific
objects to be accomplished and the duration of service by the active militia, but
the tactical direction of the troops, the kind and extent of force to be used, and
the particular means to be employed to accomplish the objects specified by the
civil officers, are left solely to the officer of the active militia.
Id.
63. Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227 (E.D. Tex. 1932), affd sub nom. Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); see also In re Moyer, 85 P. 190 (Colo. 1904), affd sub
nom. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Franks v. Smith, 134 S.W. 484 (Ky. Ct. App.
191 1); State v. McPhail, 180 So. 387 (Miss. 1938). The Florida Constitution embraces this
11391994]
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Thus, unless the Governor is also an active militia officer with command
authority, he is prevented by law from exercising tactical operational
command.
Members of the Florida Guard are not criminally or civilly liable for
any lawful act done by them in good faith and within the scope of their
duties.64 If injured while on active state duty, they are provided medical
treatment at the state's expense.65 More importantly to the troops, no
private or public employer can terminate, reprimand, or penalize a
Guardsman because of an absence due to state active duty.66 Since these
Guardsmen are primarily citizens, the security of their employment is
extremely important in maintaining an effective militia.
III. MILITARY MANAGEMENT
A. Strength and Firepower
Since the National Guard is an integral part of the first line defense of
the United States,67 the composition of its units" and its training" con-
forms to that of the federal military. In addition, the National Guard uses
the same type of arms and equipment as the federal military.7" There are
nearly 14,000 federally trained and equipped Guardsmen employed by the
Department of Military Affairs.7 Since the Department of Military Affairs
is a part of the National Guard of the United States, the Governor is
view by mandating that "[tihe military power shall be subordinate to the civil." FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 7. Consequently, the troops called out to enforce the laws "act as civil officers, with
no greater power than civil officers would have." Constantin, 57 F.2d at 241. The military
is sent to perform the duties which the local executives would and could perform were they
able. McPhail, 180 So. at 391. In essence, when the Governor calls out the troops to
execute the laws, the troops are police officers whose purpose is to preserve the peace and
tranquility of the state. See Franks, 134 S.W. at 493.
64. FLA. STAT. § 250.31 (1991).
65. Id. § 250.34.
66. Id. § 250.482.
67. 32 U.S.C. § 102 (1959).
68. Id. § 104.
69. Id. § 501.
70. Id. § 701.
71. ECON. IMPACT REP. OF THE FLA. NAT'L GUARD (Fla. Dep't of Military Aff.,
Tallahassee, Fla.) 6 (1993) [hereinafter IMPACT REPORT]. The exact figure at the end of
Fiscal Year 1992 was 13,852. Id. This figure fluctuates due to retirement, discharge and
new enlistments.
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commander-in-chief of a military force that could rival that of a third world
country.
The Governor's troops are divided into the Florida Army National
Guard and the Florida Air National Guard.72 The Adjutant General is
Commanding General for both divisions.73 The Florida Army National
Guard has seven major commands consisting of 12,168 troops.74 These
seven commands include: the 227TH Field Artillery Brigade, the 53RD
Infantry Brigade, the 419TH Aviation Group, the Troop Command, the
53RD Signal Brigade, the 164TH Air Defense Artillery Brigade, and the
Camp Blanding Training Site.75 As this article will demonstrate, these
seven commands provide the Governor with an army capable of accomplish-
ing any domestic mission, and most combat missions.
The 227TH Field Artillery Brigade provides command and control of
two field artillery battalions, and one direct support maintenance compa-
ny.76 The 53RD Infantry Brigade is comprised of three infantry battalions
that are specifically trained to provide public safety during civil emergen-
cies.77 The 419TH Aviation Group consists of a unit which operates both
the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and the UH-60 Blackhawk utility
helicopters.73 In addition, the 419TH operates an air ambulance.79 When
activated by the Governor, the 419TH provides command and control to
aviation units within Florida."° The Troop Command is the most diverse
command in the Florida Guard."1 It operates a medical group, a mobile
surgical hospital, a special forces battalion, and a military intelligence
battalion.8 2 The Troop Command is trained to assume command and
control of land defense units, and to provide military support to civil
authorities at the direction of the Governor. 3 The 53RD Signal Brigade
is made up of two signal battalions which operate two signal companies, two
transportation companies, and one maintenance company. 4 In addition to
72. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note 1i, at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 38-50.
76. Id. at 45.
77. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note 1I, at 40.
78. Id. at 47.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 46.
81. Id. at 38.
82. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note I1, at 38.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 44.
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providing support to civil authorities, they have the capability of installing
and operating a communications network for command and control during
an emergency. 5 The 164TH Air Defense Artillery Brigade is capable of
providing air defense through the use of the Chaparral Missile System,
which is a heat seeking air defense artillery weapon.86
The Florida Army's capabilities are enhanced by the Florida Air Guard.
The Florida Air Guard consists of one major fighter group,87 and three
major squadrons88 comprising 1615 Guardsmen.89 The 125TH Fighter
Group consists of a fighter interceptor group and support squadrons.9" It
also operates a medical clinic.9' The 202D Red Horse Civil Engineering
Squadron is capable of providing heavy damage repair to aircraft launch
facilities due to enemy attack or natural disaster.92 The remaining two
major squadrons have capabilities in satellite communications,93 and high
frequency communications support. 94
Due to the size and capabilities of the state's military force, it is highly
unlikely that the Governor would ever consider drafting civilians into state
service. The Florida Guard has both the firepower and the training
necessary to enable the Governor to achieve his constitutional mandates.
Whatever situation develops requiring military force, the Governor may be
certain that a competent, well equipped militia is ready to answer the call.
B. Financing the Force
In addition to providing the state with the security of an armed force
of citizen-soldiers, the Florida Guard generates federal funds and state
revenue. Since the National Guard is a reserve component of the federal
military, the federal government provides funding for the Florida Guard.95
When the Governor calls the Florida Guard to active state service, the State
85. Id.
86. Id. at 43.
87. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note 1I, at 73.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 54-64.
91. Id. at 58.
92. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note 11, at 64.
93. Id. at 67.
94. Id. at 65.
95. See 32 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (providing annual appropriations for the National
Guard).
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of Florida funds the Florida Guard.96 Guardsmen on active state duty
receive the same pay and allowance as received by the federal military.97
At the end of Fiscal Year 1992, the federal government expended
$127,550,329 on the Florida Guard. 98 Additionally, the state appropriated
$13,196,577 for a combined investment of $140,746,906. 99 Furthermore,
the value of army equipment on hand in the state totals nearly $700,000,-
000.100
The Guard also receives support from local governments.'' Since
the Florida Guard is based throughout the state, counties and municipalities
are authorized to donate financial and material support to the Guard. 1 2
The value of assistance received from local governments at the end of Fiscal
Year 1992 was $83,435. °3
C. Community Involvement
Although the headquarters is located in St. Augustine, the Guard is
based throughout the state. 0 4 The Department of Military Affairs main-
tains 858 buildings on 121,307. acres of land." 5 There are seventy-one
armories located in forty-three counties.'0 6
Most Guardsmen assemble one weekend a month at these armories.
The armories are primarily used for training0 7 and equipment storage, but
96. See FLA. STAT. § 250.24 (1991) (providing for pay and expenses of Guardsmen
activated to state duty from state appropriations for preserving public peace); see also id. §
250.25 (authorizing the Governor to borrow funds to pay active state Guardsmen if funds are
not available).
97. Id. § :250.23. In addition, enlisted soldiers receive a $20 per day bonus for every
day served on state active duty. Id.
98. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 4; see also ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note 11,
at 6.
99. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 4. Assuming a money multiplier effect of three
percent, the combined economic impact of this investment totals $423,000,000. Id.
100. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note 1I, at 6.
101. This support is in the form of cash, utility services and real property donations. See
id. at 83.
102. See FLA. STAT. § 250.40 (1991). Since national defense is a joint responsibility
of all political subdivisions of the country, it is considered equitable that the burden be
shared. Id.
103. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note I1, at 83.
104. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 7.1, at 3.
105. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note II, at 36.
106. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 2.
107. See generally 32 U.S.C. § 502 (1988). Members of the National Guard must
assemble for drill and instruction 48 times per year. Id. In addition, they must participate
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they are also available to the community for social activities and emergency
shelters.' The armories are part of the community. When the armory
loses a unit due to military downsizing, the communities grieve.109 The
communities suffer the loss of both economics' and patronage. The
Guard is the epitome of community benevolence.
The Florida Guard has implemented a statewide Drug Demand
Reduction program where Guardsmen enter school classrooms across the
state to educate the students on the danger of drugs."' The Florida Guard
is active in school career days, March of Dimes Walk-A-Thons, and parades
throughout the state."2  Individual Guardsmen volunteer their time to
work with youth groups such as scouting and little league, the American
Cancer Society, church organizations, and various other community
activities."3
The Florida Guard also has an extensive family support network in
place to assist families during times of mobilization." 4 This network
conducts family support workshops for volunteers around the state, and
administers an emergency relief fund." 5  Family support groups help
alleviate the strain caused when Guardsmen are activated for extended
periods of time. When the activation of the Guard is unexpected and the
family has no time to prepare, there is an intense strain on the family. As
this article will further indicate, this family support network was tested to
the limits during the second half of 1992.'6
D. The Guard in Action
On August 23, 1992, the Governor ordered the Adjutant General to call
out the Florida Guard in response to Hurricane Andrew." 7 The Florida
in training encampments at least 15 days each year. Id. This training requirement translates
into a requirement of one weekend a month, and two weeks a year.
108. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 6.
109. See Michael Day, Build Down Can be Traumatic Experience, FLA. GUARDSMAN,
3 (1993).
110. Since the armories are community based, Guardsmen boost the local economy
through spending and consumption during training weekends.
IlI. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 6.
112. ADJUTANT REPORT, supra note 11, at 14.
113. Id. at 42-45.
114. Id. at 20-21.
115. Id.
116. See John Daigle, Jr., Guard Families Weather Tough Year, FLA. GUARDSMAN, 5
(1993).
117. EXEC. ORDER No. 92-220-E.
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Guard was positioned in Dade County even before the storm hit on August
24, 1992.118 This turned out to be the longest and largest state activation
in the history of the Florida Guard." 9
After the storm hit, the Guard carried out its mission of assisting civil
authorities in a variety of ways. Infantry units patrolled streets, engineering
units cleared debris, and signal units worked to restore communications. 21
Aviation units flew in supplies, medics treated the wounded, and Guardsmen
served food and water to victims."' They helped find lost pets, and even
drove buses of children to and from school. 22 Although the Guard could
not replace the belongings or rebuild the lives of the victims devastated by
Hurricane Andrew, the Guard's relief effort, by neighbor helping neighbor
and Floridian helping Floridian, may have brought a temporary reprieve into
the desperation of the victims.
On November 6, 1992, while the South Florida relief effort was
ongoing, the Governor ordered the Adjutant General to call out the Guard
for a mission in North Florida.'23 One hundred eighty Guardsmen were
activated for thirty days to patrol a ten mile stretch of highway' 24 where
repeated incidents of rock and brick throwing, as well as sniper fire, resulted
in several injuries and one fatality.'25 The Guardsmen set up a communi-
cations system, and provided a show of force by the patrols."2  The
Guardsmen security mission resulted in success, as the attacks subsisted, and
118. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 5.
119. Id. At the peak of the activation, 58 units comprising over 6300 Guardsmen were
on duty. Id. The last Guardsman to leave active duty returned home on December 18, 1992.
Id. The Guard provided service for over 3 1/2 months. Id. In contrast, less than 1600
Guardsmen were called to federal duty for the Persian Gulf War. IMPACT REPORT, supra
note 71, at 5. In addition, President Bush sent 20,000 federal troops to Dade County to assist
in the relief effort. Id.
120. See C.J. Drake, Stormy Scenes Litter Andrew's Path, FLA. GUARDSMAN, 22, 23
(1993).
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 5. In addition, the Guard hauled
13,834 cubic yards of debris and cleared 1818 miles of road. Id. They distributed 61,990
pounds of food, 290,000 pounds of ice, and 248,000 gallons of water. Id. A total of 10,974
civilians were treated by medics and 3106 immunizations were given. Id. The Guard
provided 54 civilians with dental care and even delivered 13 babies. Id.
123. EXEC. ORDER No. 92-317.
124. John Daigle Jr., Guarding 1-295: Operation Overpass, FLA. GUARDSMAN, 12
(1993).
125. EXEC. ORDER NO. 92-317.
126. Kaye Jewell, 146TH Signal Battalion Patrolled Hometown Highway, FLA.
GUARDSMAN, 12, 13 (1993).
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several suspects were arrested.'27
Providing relief from natural disasters and assisting law enforcement
are common uses of the Guard.128 However, history reveals some uncom-
mon uses. Prior to the Civil War, the Florida militia was primarily devoted
to fighting Seminole Indians, 29 and conducting slave patrols. 3 °  After
the Civil War, the militia was activated over twenty times in a fifty year
period to protect African-American prisoners from lynch mobs.'
On May 4, 1901, the Florida militia was deployed to Jacksonville
pursuant to a declaration of martial law32 in response to a fire that leveled
their city.' The presence of the Guardsmen, as well as other federal
127. Daigle, supra note 124.
128. See IMPACT REPORT, supra note 71, at 8. In the last 15 years, there have been four
times where the state has called to active duty 1000 or more troops, excluding Hurricane
Andrew. These events were Hurricane Elena in 1985 (2561 troops), Miami/Liberty City riots
in 1980 (3979 troops), South Florida Cuban refugee support in 1980 (1414 troops) and the
South Florida fuel crisis in 1979 (1100 troops). Id.
129. Bittle, supra note 11, at 57-89.
130. HAWK, supra note 11, at 74.
131. Bittle, supra note 11, at 342, 378, 400, 430. The Guard was unsuccessful only
once. Id. at 401. In June of 1916, an African-American prisoner was murdered in Inverness
because the train from Brookesville transporting the troops did not depart in time. Id.
Consequently, the Guard did not arrive until after the murder. Id.
132. Martial law is defined as the "law of military necessity, where the military exercises
great control over civilians and civilian affairs, usually because of the existence of war."
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (3d ed. 1991). But the definition of martial law has never
been clear. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315 (1946). "[T]he term 'martial
law' carries no precise meaning. The Constitution does not refer to 'martial law' at all and
no Act of Congress has defined the term. It has been employed in various ways by different
people and at different times." Id.; see also Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77
YALE L.J. 1560, 1566 n.28 (1968). The confusion regarding the definition of martial law
results from the term being used to describe a broad spectrum of measures, ranging from total
military control over all civilian functions to the imposition of minor restrictions on personal
liberty. Id. The confusion is heightened because the Governor is both the chief executive
and the military commander-in-chief, thereby blurring the traditional separation of civil and
martial law. Id.
The concept of martial law is beyond the scope of this article. However, it must be
noted that the potential for a Governor to use a military force against the state citizenry has
historically been greatest under a declaration of martial law. For cases construing the concept
of martial law, see Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849); Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227 (E.D. Tex. 1932); Wilson & Co. v.
Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ind.
1935); Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 55 A. 952 (Pa. 1903).
133. 2 GENE M. BURNETr, FLORIDA'S PAST 213-16 (1988). The fire began around noon
on Friday, and by 8:00 p.m., the city of Jacksonville "lay in rubble and ashes, all but
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troops, provided stability to more than 10,000 homeless persons, and
prevented looters from plundering the remains of the city. 34 The show
of force ensured the framework in which the displaced but dedicated
Jacksonville residents could begin the task of rebuilding.'35 In April of
1929, the Guard was activated to help quarantine the Mediterranean Fruit
Fly discovered in Central Florida orange groves.'36 In 1960, the Guard
helped dispose of thousands of dead chickens which posed a health threat
to the town of Massayariktown."'
In 1980, the Guard was activated to assist the quelling of the Liberty
City Riots in Miami.' 38 Governor Graham sent the Guard to Miami under
orders that they be deployed only around the perimeter of the riot area to
avoid unnecessary loss of life due to armed confrontation. 139 The Gover-
nor required the Guardsmen to be accompanied by police officers, and the
Guardsmen were not authorized to arrest civilians. 4  The Governor's
prudent use of the Guard avoided a possible bloodbath, and "ensured the
eventual end of the riot by smothering it with sheer numbers."'' In
addition to providing relief efforts to areas destroyed by hurricanes, floods
and tornadoes, the Guard has hunted convicts, searched for missing persons,
controlled traffic, cleaned up toxic chemical spills and assisted in labor
disputes. 42 No matter what the mission, the Florida Guard has always
answered the call.
obliterated from the earth's face by a great conflagration that swept over its streets with
freakish fury in one of the greatest calamities ever to befall a Southern city." Id. at 213.
The fire produced so much smoke that "[i]n Savannah, Georgia, 160 miles north, people
flooded the weather office with calls when they mistook the huge pillars of black clouds far
southward for a great storm brewing." Id. at 215; see generally Bittle, supra note I 1
(referring to the Guard's deployment to Jacksonville pursuant to a declaration of martial law).
134. BURNETT, supra note 133, at 215.
135. Indeed, the effort to rebuild began quickly, as "[t]he first building permit was
issued that first Monday morning, and . . . [t~he sawmills in the surrounding county
could not turn out lumber fast enough." Id. at 216.
136. HAWK, supra note 11, at 157. Every car, bus and train entering or leaving the area
was stopped and searched. Id. Nearly 20,000,000 inspections revealed 20,000 contaminated
pieces of fruit. ld.
137. Id. at 201.
138. See BRUCE PORTER & MARVIN DUNN, THE MIAMI RIOT OF 1980 93-97 (1984).
139. Id. at 95-96.
140. Id. at 96.
141. Id.
142. HAWK, supra note 11, at 198, 201-02.
1994] 1147
434
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
IV. CONCLUSION
The militia provided for by article X, section 2 of the Florida
Constitution defines every state citizen as a soldier. The true brand of
citizen-soldier today is a member of the Florida National Guard. The
Florida Guard is a well trained, well equipped, professional military force
which is an essential agency of the state government. When the state needs
the Guardsmen, they interrupt their civilian employment, leave their spouses,
children and parents, and come to the aid and assistance of their fellow state
citizens.
Florida has never witnessed its militia used in an abusive manner which
restricts liberty, or is repugnant to the very foundation of government.
Florida governors have historically used the military in a conservative
manner as a means to achieve humanitarian objectives. In addition, the
Florida Legislature has framed the laws in such a way as to ensure that
actions taken under military orders are pursuant to the civil law, and in the
interests of the Florida citizenry. This being the case, the Florida Guard
stands ready to act in their fellow citizens' time of peril, and the state
citizenry is deeply indebted to this institution's humanitarian contributions
to the well-being of the state.
Anthony J. Scaletta
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PART IV
THE JUDICIARY
If the Constitution may be thought of as the bedrock of our
government, than the Florida judiciary can be thought of as the
guardians of our democracy. In the fourth part of our Symposium, we
examine the work of the Florida courts.
In our lead piece, Florida Supreme Court Justice Gerald Kogan
and Florida Supreme Court Law Clerk Robert Craig Waters provide
a comprehensive roadmap to the operation and jurisdiction of the
Florida Supreme Court. Next, District Judge Harry Lee Anstead
looks at the role that the Florida Constitution plays in appellate
decisionmaking. Finally, Circuit Judge John E. Fennelly examines
the constitutional certiorari jurisdiction of Florida's circuit courts.
Having looked at the different levels of the court system, our
remaining two pieces examine the work of the courts from a different
angle. In a piece most of our readers are likely to find personally-
meaningful, Thomas A. Pobjecky explains how the Florida Board of
Bar Examiners helps the Florida Supreme Court fulfill its constitu-
tional mandate to permit only qualified individuals to become lawyers.
Professors Brian E. Mattis and B. Taylor Mattis then explore the
judicial doctrine of stare decisis and explain why the time has come
to elevate the doctrine to constitutional dignity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary is Florida's most poorly understood branch of gov-
ernment. A lack of general public knowledge about the Courts' routine
operation is nearly demanded by the institution itself. Judges and their
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employees, unlike legislative or executive officials, cannot talk publicly
about matters pending before them. Official silence is imposed not merely
by constitutional constraints, but also by codes of ethics and the requirement
that judges receive information on a case only through the closely regulated
process of briefing, motions, and adversarial argument.1 The information
going out of the courthouse is so severely restricted that most Floridians
have only a dim understanding of how the judiciary works.
The same conclusion applies with greater force to the Florida Supreme
Court. The seven justices and their staffs perform virtually all of their
official duties away from public view, behind the security barriers on the
second floor of the Supreme Court Building in Tallahassee.2 What is
publicly known of the Court consists largely of its more ceremonial aspects:
black-robed justices seated at the Court bench, listening to arguments by
lawyers often talking in legal jargon unchanged since medieval times.
Officially, the Court speaks only through its formal opinions and orders, all
funneled through the Clerk's Office, which appear with little warning.
Part of the purpose of this article is to dispel some of the mystery and
lift some of the misconceptions about the Florida Supreme Court's daily
operations, including the exercise of its jurisdiction. Only a few prior
sources illuminate the topic addressed here, and none of these have
attempted a more-or-less comprehensive study. This paper is intended to fill
this gap by compiling information useful both to lawyers and to laypersons
interested in how the Court operates within its constitutional constraints.
On another level, this article will review the top level of a judicial
system that has come into existence in Florida because of the various
constitutional reforms that began with the adoption of the 1968 Florida
Constitution and continued with the jurisdictional reforms of 1980. The
authors believe that the present operations and jurisdiction of the Florida
Supreme Court are one of the success stories of the state's efforts to
modernize its governmental structure in recent decades. This article
examines how that constitutional mandate is translated into the Court's daily
functions.
1. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (West 1993).
2. The current high-technology security barriers are a recent addition, dating only to the
fall of 1989. They were added as a result of violent attacks inside courtrooms that have
occurred elsewhere in Florida and the nation, and because of threats received by some mem-
bers of the court. Prior to 1989, security was far more lax, and it was not unusual for
persons to walk off the street and into a justice's office.
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11. THE ROUTINE OPERATIONS OF THE COURT
Although the internal procedures of the Court are not widely known,
they follow a fairly well defined code. A few rules have been distilled into
the Supreme Court Manual of Internal Operating Procedure3 and portions
of the Rules of Judicial Administration,4 though these by no means contain
all or even most of the principles by which the Court operates. Some of the
flavor of day.-to-day Court operations can also be obtained from other works
detailing the Court's history.5 The purpose of this section is not to belabor
material that can be obtained elsewhere, but to review the more significant
operations regulated by the Court's customary, unwritten code,6 some
aspects of which date to the Court's first sessions in 1846.
Much of the mystery behind the Court's daily operations arises from
the fact that almost none of the internal machinery is visible to public view.
Unlike the Legislature with its committee system or the Executive branch
with its cabinet meetings and press liaisons, the Court's meetings and re-
search-apart from oral arguments-are entirely secret until the release of
an opinion or order. The most important meetings of the seven justices
occur during conferences that are closed even to the Court's own staff, and
the Court has never found any necessity for maintaining a permanent press
liaison.7
This lack of daily contact with the public is an unfortunate feature, but
one born out of a necessity. The Court must retain absolute impartiality
until the day a case is decided. The constitutional requirement of due
process, 8 among other reasons, gives litigants a right to have their cases
reviewed in an impartial forum. Out of deference to due process, the
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct requires judicial impartiality and prohibits
judges and their employees from talking about pending or impending 9
3. See SuP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES.
4. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.030.
5. E.g., Joseph A. Boyd, Jr., et al., A History of the Florida Supreme Court, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1019 (1981).
6. Of course, it will be necessary to reiterate a few matters addressed in the Supreme
Court Manual of Internal Operating Procedures in order to lay the groundwork for a
discussion of the Court's unwritten procedures. The authors also note that there are some
aspects of Court operations that are confidential for a variety of reasons. These will not be
discussed here.
7. Most routine releases of court-related information are handled by the Clerk of the
Court or the staff of the Chief Justice.
8. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
9. The terms pending and impending convey an important distinction. A case is pending
if it has been properly filed and is awaiting review. A case is impending if Court personnel
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proceedings except through briefing, internal discussions among Court
personnel, and the adversarial process.' ° As a general rule, no such
discussion outside the secrecy of the Court is permitted while a case is
pending or impending unless all parties to the case are given a chance to
participate and respond."
Yet, the procedures leading up to the release of a written opinion or
order are by far the most important work of the Court. Binding precedent
may be created in this way, affecting the lives of all Floridians. Even
citizens elsewhere in the United States can be affected. Florida is a major
state, and its courts' opinions are often used for guidance in other states'
courts throughout the nation. 2 It appears paradoxical that a state like
Florida, which is so deeply committed to "government in the Sunshine," is
required by its constitution to conduct the bulk of its judicial proceedings
in secret. However, there clearly is no other way to preserve litigants' rights
under the rule of due process. Unlike legislators or governors, judges and
their employees cannot be required or allowed to take public stands on
pending or impending matters that are yet to be resolved.
A. A Case Study: In re T.A.C.P.
In an effort to dispel some of the lack of knowledge that this mandato-
ry secrecy has created, this article will begin by reviewing the internal
process by which a recent case, In re TA.C.P., 3 was decided. Under-
standing how this case was handled may give a broader perspective on the
Court's operations and exercise of its constitutional powers.
The case was chosen for several reasons. First, it presented an issue
that has never been decided by any other court in the United States:
Whether a terminally ill child, born without a complete brain but whose
heart is still beating, can be considered "dead" for purposes of organ
donation. 4 Thus, the case has potentially set a national precedent that will
be considered by the courts of other states in confronting the same issue.
Second, the decision In re T.A.C.P. has become final and thus, there is no
have reason to suspect that it will eventually be filed for review.
10. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (West 1993).
11. Id.
12. E.g., Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991) (adopting analysis
developed in Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989)).
13. 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992).
14. Id. at 589.
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ethical impediment in discussing it to a limited extent.15 Lastly, the case
received wide publicity and is, therefore, better known than most cases
decided by the Court.
In March 1992, justices and employees of the Court became aware
through media reports that a child, known in court records as T.A.C.P. and
popularly known as "Baby Theresa," had been born in South Florida with
the medical condition known as "anencephaly." Anencephalic children lack
the upper portions of their brains and have only a partial skull, which leaves
the remaining brain tissue open to the air. The condition is invariably fatal
because the incomplete brain is unable to maintain a heartbeat for very long,
partly because the exposed brain tissue is disrupted by infection or the
process of childbirth.'6
News accounts of cases like T.A.C.P. often are the Court's first
warning that a major case may be impending for review. The Florida
Supreme Court library stocks current major Florida newspapers each
working day, and the justices and their staffs commonly examine the papers
for such information. The news accounts, however, are used primarily for
the knowledge that a new case may be impending'T-not for the substance
of the news accounts. The Court knows that news accounts sometimes
contain misleading or incomplete information, though they may be
informative for other purposes.
In T.A.C.P., the sole question before the Court was whether organs
could be removed from a child born with so serious a birth defect that she
must inevitably die in a few days' time. The parents' request in this regard
was both poignant and touching. They had known of their daughter's
congenital defect prior to her birth but had decided to carry her to term so
her organs could be donated to help other children. The parents' hope was
that their own tragedy might be redeemed by saving the lives of others who
needed transplantable organs, especially other infants. As the Court itself
recognized in its later opinion, there is a continuous and pressing national
need for organs that can be transplanted into infants. 8
15. The authors will not discuss the legal significance of the opinion, only the process
by which it was shepherded through the court. Nor will matters be discussed that fall within
the secrecy of the court.
16. In re TA.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 590-91.
17. Justices and their staffs actually have a need to know this information, because the
ethics codes applicable to them prohibit public comment on impending cases. The news
accounts help put the court on notice that silence now is required.
18. In re TA.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 591.
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However, health care providers refused to comply with the parents'
wishes because the child had a heartbeat independent of life support. The
providers feared they might run afoul of the law if they removed the child's
organs for transplant. 9
A rather speedy round of lawsuits ensued. The parents sued for a
judicial determination that T.A.C.P. was dead and that her organs could be
donated, notwithstanding the heartbeat. A Broward County trial judge
declined their request. 20 The parents then filed an emergency motion in
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in effect suing the trial judge. They
asked that the district court overturn the trial judge's determination and
direct that T.A.C.P. be declared dead. The intermediate appellate court
declined to do so.
21
At this point, the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction was invoked by
the parents. Initially, they filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, one of
several legal matters over which the Court has "original" jurisdiction.2
When issued by a court, a writ of mandamus directs a public official to
perform duties that he or she is obligated to undertake. Baby Theresa's
parents, in essence, were asking the Florida Supreme Court to order the trial
judge in South Florida to rule that their daughter was dead. On March 30,
1992, the Florida Supreme Court denied the motion without comment.23
At virtually the same time, however, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal took the extraordinary step of certifying the case as a question of
great public importance requiring immediate resolution by the Florida
Supreme Court.24 This created an entirely new basis for jurisdiction apart
from mandamus. Under the Florida Constitution, a district court can
authorize parties to "skip" the intermediate appellate court and directly
petition the Florida Supreme Court to hear a case, although the latter has
discretion to accept or to deny the petition as it deems fit. 25 In practice,
19. Id. at 589.
20. In re Pearson, No. 92-8255 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 1992).
21. In re T.A.C.P., No. 92-0942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1992).
22. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). Original jurisdiction means simply that the case
can be originated in the Florida Supreme Court without need of proceeding through a trial
court first. Mandamus is discussed infra notes 532-63 and accompanying text.
23. In re T.A.C.P., No. 79,581 (Fla. Mar. 30, 1992) (mem.).
24. In re Pearson, No. 92-0942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1992) (order); see In
re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 589.
25. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5). This type ofjurisdiction popularly is called "pass-
through jurisdiction." See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145,
1146 (Fla. 1985).
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such cases are almost always accepted for review.26
Within hours, the press reported that Baby Theresa had died.27 The
Florida Supreme Court, nevertheless, chose to exercise its inherent authority
to review the case on the grounds that it presented an issue of great public
importance "capable of repetition yet evading review." This is a long-stand-
ing traditional basis for hearing cases that have a tendency to be rendered
moot by physical events before a court of final jurisdiction can decide
them.2" Anencephalic children are likely to die before litigation can be
completed; a decision to dismiss the case as moot thus might forever bar an
appellate court from deciding the issue. The result would be the perpetual
lack of a controlling court decision on a legal issue obviously capable of
recurring. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for oral argument on
September 2, 1992, during the first oral argument week29 after the regular
summer recess had ended."
During the summer recess, the Florida Supreme Court library staff,
26. See infra notes 498-516 and accompanying text. The Florida Constitution creates
a distinction between the terms "appeal" and "review." Appeals constitute those appellate
cases in which the Florida Supreme Court must hear the case. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §
3(b)(1), (2). Reviews are those appellate cases in which the Florida Supreme Court merely
has discretionary jurisdiction. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(6). The court traditionally
has observed another standard for judicial nomenclature relevant to the distinction between
appeals and reviews. For appeals, the court either affirms or reverses the decision below; for
reviews, the court either approves or quashes the decision below. By contrast, when the court
expressly agrees or disagrees with a decision other than the one below, the court "approves"
or "disapprove;" the decision. On occasion, there may be lapses in the use of this
nomenclature, but the convention now is well established as a matter of court custom.
27. Baby Without Viable Brain Dies, But Legal Struggle Will Continue, N.Y. TIMES,
March 31, 1992, at A14.
28. In re TA.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 589 n.2 (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla.
1984)).
29. By tradition, the Florida Supreme Court usually observes its regularly scheduled oral
arguments during the first full business week of each month, with the exception of July and
August when no oral argument usually occurs. However, the chief justice has discretion to
schedule the regular oral argument calendar as may be necessary. For example, oral
argument sometimes is scheduled for weeks in which the Monday or Tuesday is the last day
of a month. Special oral arguments can be scheduled at other times by the chief justice, a
practice that especially occurs when the court deems oral argument necessary on a pending
death warrant, in some requests for advisory opinions, in cases involving pressing
constitutional questions, and in other emergency matters.
30. The Florida Supreme Court traditionally observes a summer recess that usually
occurs from the middle of July through the middle of August, but occasionally has been
observed earlier or later. The suspension of a regular oral argument calendar in these two
summer months is a traditional consequence of the summer recess.
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assisted by summer law student interns, began compiling legal, medical, and
ethical books and articles that had studied anencephaly. Compilation of
such materials largely was complete by the end of the summer, so that the
Court would have the benefit of the widest range of scholarly views on the
subject. Of course, such materials in no way are used to reflect on the
actual facts of the case at hand, but rather to enlighten the Court as to
opinions of experts on the purely legal and medical questions at stake. In
T.A.C.P., for example, the Court heavily relied on a medical definition of
"anencephaly" published by the New England Journal of Medicine, which
represented a consensus view among medical experts in fields such as
pediatrics, neurology, and obstetrics.3
The oral argument in T.A.C.P., in early September 1992, was high-pro-
file and well attended. Virtually the entire Tallahassee capital press corps
was present, as were a large number of persons associated with children's
rights groups, some of which had filed amicus briefs in the case. Immedi-
ately following oral argument, several persons from the various groups in
attendance held impromptu press conferences in the rotunda of the Supreme
Court Building. The scene was one of the liveliest in recent Court history.
In T.A.C.P., as with most other cases orally argued, the Court immedi-
ately held a closed-door conference the afternoon of the argument. Neither
the public nor the Court's own staff are allowed to attend such conferences.
At this point, the justices tentatively voted on how the case should be
decided. The official Court file was then transmitted to the office of the
justice assigned to the case, for a proposed majority opinion to be drafted
and circulated to the Court.32
TA.C.P. was decided quickly by the usual standards of the Court. The
normal elapse of time between oral argument and the release of an opinion
can be as short as a few months, although the Court attempts to render
decisions within six months of oral argument or submission of the case
without oral argument.3  Occasionally, the duration can be longer in
especially difficult cases.34 The T.A.C.P. opinion was released quickly,
31. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 590 (citing David A. Stumpf, et al., The Infant with
Anencephaly, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669, 699 (1990)).
32. The process of opinion writing and voting on cases is discussed more fully infra
notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
33. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.085(d)(2).
34. See id. In rare cases, the Court fractures so badly that no single justice is able to
obtain the concurrence of three other justices in a decision, which the Florida Constitution
requires for any decision to be binding. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). Release of any
opinion thus may be delayed for unusually long periods of time while members of the Court
seek a compromise. It is very rare, however, that the Court is completely unable to reach
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just over two months after oral argument, on November 12, 1992." The
decision was unanimous.36 Although some of the parties and amici
criticized the decision in published press accounts, none filed a motion for
clarification or rehearing. The opinion thus became final without further
challenge. This is an unusual event because motions for clarification or
rehearing are filed almost routinely. At this point, the Court's work was
done.
B. Internal Case Assignments & Opinion Writing
As the discussion of T.A.C.P. indicates, the Court's work in writing
official opinions is not conducted by all seven justices simultaneously.
Rather, work is delegated to individual offices. The system by which this
delegation occurs is perhaps one of the least understood aspects of the
Court's routine operations. As a result, on some occasions, parties have
erroneously assumed that particular justices have some unusual or unfair
ability to control case assignments. The reality is very nearly the opposite.
The actual method by which cases are assigned in the Florida Supreme
Court differs substantially from that used in the United States Supreme
Court, in which seniority equates to power. In the latter Court, the
assignment typically is made by the Senior Justice who is in the majority,
with the Chief Justice always considered more senior than any other Justice.
Thus, Senior Justices in the nation's highest court do, in fact, have an
unusual ability to control case assignments.
In the Florida Supreme Court, however, the bulk of cases in which
opinions must be written37 are assigned at random by the Office of the
some decision in which at least four justices agree. When that happens, the Court's precedent
holds that the lower-court opinion under review is automatically affirmed or approved for
want of a majority or, if the Court's original jurisdiction is being invoked, the relief requested
is deemed to be denied. Opinions issued in the absence of a four-member majority set no
precedent and do not constitute a decision for legal purposes. See State v. Hamilton, 574 So.
2d 124, 126 n.5 (Fla. 1991) (citing Powell v. State, 102 So. 652 (Fla. 1924)); State ex rel.
Albritton v. Lee, 183 So. 782 (Fla. 1938); Honaker v. Miles, 171 So. 212 (Fla. 1936). Thus,
the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to such cases.
35. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 588.
36. Id. at 589, 595.
37. This article will not discuss the large volume of motions and petitions that are
disposed without an opinion for lack of merit. For example, the Court receives numerous
petitions for habeas corpus, mandamus, and similar extraordinary writs from Florida inmates.
Relief is denied most of the time, but where the petition appears to have merit, the assigned
justice (sometimes with the advice or consent of other justices) will order a response from
the State, If the case still appears to have merit in light of the response, the Court then will
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Clerk, and assignments typically are made as soon as briefing is completed.
There are, however, some exceptions, discussed below. 8 In other words,
case assignments in the Florida Supreme Court are generally accomplished
by a kind of lottery system. This can lead to some very interesting
situations when the justice assigned to write a majority opinion in a case
disagrees with the majority viewpoint.
After assignment, the case file is sent to the office of the designated
justice, who then usually will assign one of that office's law clerks to begin
preparing the case. The process that follows varies somewhat depending
upon the type of case at issue. There are four broad categories of cases in
which an opinion will be written: (1) cases scheduled for oral argument; (2)
cases accepted without oral argument ("no request" cases); (3) petitions by
death-row inmates ("death cases"); and (4) special cases, often requiring
expedited consideration by the Court.
1. Oral Argument Cases
In all cases scheduled for oral argument, the law clerk assigned to the
case is required to write an "oral argument summary" that contains a
condensed, objective version of the parties' briefs. No recommendation
regarding the case's disposition is included.39 In some offices, the law
clerk is required to prepare a separate bench memorandum for the personal
use of the justice, but this practice is not uniform throughout the Court.
Bench memoranda sometimes are shared with other justices; this practice,
however, is more the exception than the rule. In other offices, no memoran-
dum is prepared, and the law clerk and justice simply sit down together and
discuss the case prior to the date of oral argument.4"
accept jurisdiction, and the office to which the petition was originally assigned will usually
be assigned to write the opinion. The process of opinion writing in such cases is essentially
the same as in any other.
38. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
39. Some district courts of appeal, on the other hand, require clerks to include a
recommendation as to disposition.
40. Oral argument summaries, bench memoranda, and other documents associated with
the preparation of a case are internal court documents and thus cannot be released to the
public or any person not on the court's staff. Violation of this rule is considered an ethical
breach and can be punished by contempt of court. In 1974, for example, the Court ordered
one of its law clerks to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for releasing
copies of oral argument summaries to unauthorized persons. Based on the mitigating
evidence, the Court withheld a contempt citation but publicly reprimanded the law clerk and
placed him on probation for a period of two years under close supervision. In re Schwartz,
298 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1974).
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As noted earlier in the discussion of TA.C.P., a closed-door conference
of the seven justices is usually held the afternoon after oral argument,
although conference may be delayed up to a few days due to conflicts in the
schedules of the justices. In some district courts of appeal, law clerks are
permitted to attend court conferences or are even asked to participate in the
judges' discussion of cases. However, in the Florida Supreme Court, the
strict secrecy surrounding court conferences forbids the admission of any
law clerk into a conference. Indeed, no one but the justices themselves are
allowed into any official court conference. There is a single exception to
this rule. By custom, the Clerk of the Court may be admitted, but usually
is not required to be present unless requested by the justices.
If any other Court staff members need access to a justice or the Clerk
of the Court during a conference, they are permitted only a single liberty
that is seldom exercised: knocking on the conference room door. By
custom, the Clerk, if present, answers the door. In the Clerk's absence, the
most junior justice in the room answers the door. Staff members may not
enter the room while a conference is in session, but they can ask the person
answering the door to deliver a message inside or to convey materials to a
justice. Non-staffers are not permitted to interrupt a conference for any
reason.
The secrecy surrounding conferences means that most justices, and
especially the justice assigned to write the particular case, must take notes
regarding the positions espoused by the other members of the Court. During
the conference, all the justices are given a chance to indicate their initial and
tentative prefierences regarding a case's disposition.4 These preferences are
noted by the justice already assigned to write the opinion.
Responsibility for opinion writing varies from office to office in the
Court. Some justices prefer to write their own opinions, with law clerks
often being asked to check the finished product for accuracy and style.
Other justices assign law clerks the responsibility of drafting most opinions,
with the justice then reviewing the draft and making any changes deemed
necessary. In still other offices, opinion writing is a shared responsibility
of both the justice and the assigned law clerk, and may, in fact, involve
every staff member in that office at some point in the process.
41. These preferences are by no means final. Justices frequently change their minds
after giving a case more thought, after closer review of the record or the law, or after another
justice proposes a method of analysis that seems more correct. On occasion, the Court has
decided a case completely contrary to the initial conference vote, although such instances are
the exception rather than the rule.
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The exact way an opinion will be written may be discussed in
conference, but it usually is left to the discretion of the assigned justice
subject to some significant exceptions. For example, the Court has
promulgated a system of legal style contained in a Rule of Appellate
Procedure. 42 For matters not covered in the Rule, style is governed by the
latest edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation published by
The Harvard Law Review Association. If nothing in The Bluebook is on
point, style is governed by the Florida Style Manual published by the
Florida State University Law Review in Tallahassee.43 If none of these
sources are on point, the Court generally considers that style should be
governed by the closest analogous rule or example contained in the three
sources listed here, in the same order of preference. As a practical matter,
most authorities not covered by the rule and style manuals are Florida
documents, and these typically are dealt with by reference to the closest
analogous rule or example from the Florida Style Manual.
Another significant exception deals with gender-specific language. In
the wake of a report by a Court commission investigating gender bias,4 the
Court now has instructed its staff and the Florida Bar agencies charged with
developing Rules of Court to avoid all gender-specific language wherever
possible. The purpose is to avoid masculinizing language, which suggests
an inferior status of women. The most common methods of complying with
the rule are to use plural pronouns instead of singular, 5 and to rewrite
sentences so that gender-specific language is not needed. Strained language
and newly coined words are also avoided.
The parties to a cause have their greatest opportunity to influence the
Court in their briefs. Briefs are summarized and read prior to oral argument
and thereby introduce the Court to the case. Therefore, a bad brief is a bad
first impression, whereas a strong brief can sway the Court. Some cases
may be won in oral argument, but these are a minority and usually involve
close issues. Oral argument primarily allows the justices to test the
strengths and weaknesses of first impressions created by reading the briefs.
As a result, attorneys should scrupulously prepare their briefs to the Court.
42. See FLA. R. APP, P. 9.800.
43. FLA. R. App. P. 9.800(n) (referencing Florida Style Manual, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
525 (1991)); see also Florida Style Manual, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137 (1987).
44. See Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA.
L. REV. 803 (1990).
45. In the English language, plural pronouns are inherently gender-neutral.
1164 [Vol. 18
450
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
Style and content of briefs are governed by court rule; 46 beyond that,
counsel should avoid anything that creates confusion as to facts and issues.
One practice sometimes used by respondents or appellees, for example, is
to ignore the sequence of issues framed by the petitioners or appellants.
This creates needless confusion and should be avoided. If the issues in the
briefs do not match one another, the Court then must perform a kind of
mental "cut and paste."
The better practice is to address the issues in the same sequence, even
if only to note that an issue is redundant or irrelevant, and then to list
separately and to discuss any issues the opponent may have failed to raise.
Another practice to avoid is incorporating by reference an argument from
a brief in a different proceeding or different court, except when the Court
grants leave to do so. Often the other brief may not be readily available,
which renders the later brief unintelligible. It is always better to make sure
a complete statement of the argument can be found within the four comers
of the brief.
One peculiarity of the Court's method of case assignment is that the
assigned justice sometimes is not in the majority. Under long-standing
Court custom, this fact alone does not necessarily disqualify that justice
from writing the proposed majority opinion. There are several possibilities
of what could happen next. Most often, the assigned justice will agree to
write an unsigned "per curiam" opinion47 reflecting the views of the
majority, with the justice also writing a separate opinion expressing any
contrary views.
However, on occasions when the conference vote is close or fails to
establish a tentative majority, the assigned justice may circulate a proposed
majority reflecting that justice's views, with the hope that other offices will
find the analysis compelling. Less commonly, a justice may circulate two
or more proposed majority opinions in the same case, thereby giving the
Court options from which to choose. If an assigned justice truly feels
unable to develop the majority's proposed opinion, the case can be
reassigned to another justice at conference. All reassignments lie within the
discretion of the chief justice, though in practice the case is usually
transferred to the justice in the majority who has most fully researched and
analyzed the case.
Once a proposed majority opinion is circulated, each justice must vote
on the proposal. A "vote sheet" is attached to the top of each proposed
46. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210, 9.800.
47. Per curiam opinions are discussed infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
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opinion and includes a listing of each kind of vote that is possible for the
type of case in question. 8 All voting is done manually on the vote sheets,
with the justices voting by placing their initials next to the vote they
prefer.49 By custom, the justices usually can cast only three types of votes
that do not require them to write a separate opinion. These are "concur,"
"concur in result only," and "dissent."5 In addition, each justice can write
a separate opinion if desired. The various kinds of separate opinions are
somewhat more complicated and are discussed more fully below."
All separate opinions are accompanied by their own separate vote
sheets, and every justice must manually vote on each one in much the same
manner they vote on a proposed majority opinion. Once all vote sheets are
returned to the clerk's office, one of two things will occur. If the case has
generated no further controversy among the justices, it will be routed to a
staff member in the chief justice's office to be checked for substantive and
stylistic problems, then scheduled for release to the public.
However, if some controversy remains, the case will be scheduled for
a second Court conference. Any justice can send a case to conference
simply by placing a question mark on any vote sheet from the case. When
the clerk's office sees the question mark, the case is routed to a staff
member in the chief justice's office to be included on the next available
conference agenda.5 2 At conference, the justices will discuss the case and
48. The possible votes vary slightly according to the kind of case.
49. If a justice is out of town and there is a pressing need for a vote on the case, the
justice by telephone may authorize a staff member to indicate the proper vote on the vote
sheet.
50. These votes mean precisely what they say. Concur indicates a full acceptance of the
majority opinion and decision. Concur in result only indicates an acceptance only of the
decision, and a refusal to join in the analysis expressed in the opinion. Dissent indicates a
refusal to join in either the decision or opinion. Members of the court usually do not vote
"specially concur" or "concur in part and dissent in part" unless they also write a separate
opinion, although there are exceptions even here. E.g., Maison Grande Condominium Ass'n,
Inc. v. Dorten, Inc., 600 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1992) (McDonald, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Moreover, in death penalty cases, each justice votes separately as to
conviction and sentence. Therefore, a justice can concur as to the conviction but dissent as
to the sentence without writing a separate opinion. E.g., Maharaj v. State, 597 So. 2d 786,
792 (Fla. 1992) (McDonald, J., concurring as to conviction, dissenting as to sentence).
Though less common, justices also may vote separately as to punishment in cases of attorney
discipline. E.g., The Florida Bar v. Morse, 587 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald,
J., concurring as to guilt, dissenting as to punishment).
51. See discussion infra part II.C.
52. Conference agendas are produced by the office of the chief justice.
1166 [Vol. 18
452
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
decide on any further action that may be necessary. Frequently, only minor
revisions are made in opinions to satisfy the concerns of particular justices.
Occasionally it becomes apparent during a conference, or after voting,
that a majority of the Court does not agree with the proposed opinion that
was circulated. When this happens, the Court's custom is that the chief
justice has discretion to reassign the case to a justice in the majority.
Reassignments usually occur during a Court conference upon the advice of
the other justices, but sometimes are decided more informally.53 However,
the original author of the "failed" majority opinion sometimes may be given
an opportunity to write a new per curiam opinion that conforms to the
majority's views, perhaps accompanied by a separate opinion expressing any
divergent views of the author. The latter action is more likely in complex
cases already involving considerable time spent on research and writing.
Once all questions regarding a case are settled and the opinion or
opinions have been proofread, the clerk's office will set a tentative date for
the opinion to be released. However, no opinion can be issued except upon
the signature of the chief justice. Typically, opinions are scheduled for
release no eariier than a week in advance,5 4 and copies of the final version
of the opinion or opinions are then circulated to all justices and each
member of their staffs prior to release. The purpose of this last exercise is
to allow for further proofreading of opinions. Justices and their staffs
sometimes find errors or inconsistencies not caught during the normal
proofreading process.
By Court custom, the regular day for issuing opinions is each Thursday
when the Court is in session.55 Copies of opinions are then made available
to the press and the public, often no later than by 10:00 a.m. The opinions,
however, are not considered final until any motion for rehearing or
53. For example, a justice may have written a separate dissenting opinion that clearly
reflects the views of at least four members of the court. In such cases, the court's majority
and the chief justice may agree informally among themselves that the author of the dissent
will simply recast the dissent as a majority and circulate it to the full court without need for
a conference discussion. In that case, the now-failed "majority" opinion may be recast as a
dissent.
54. This is not true, however, of some emergency cases such as collateral challenges by
death-row inmates scheduled for execution. When some urgency is involved, the chiefjustice
has discretion to order opinions released at any time after voting is finalized and the justices
have resolved any differences as fully as is possible.
55. Opinions are not issued during the court's summer recess, except for opinions
already finalized that could not be released before recess began. Opinions also are not
released if none are available, an event common immediately after recess ends.
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clarification is disposed of, although there are some cases in which the Court
notes that rehearing or clarification will not be entertained. 6
2. "No Request" Cases
A substantial percentage of the Court's docket consists of cases in
which oral argument is not granted. These can include cases in which oral
argument was sought but denied, the majority of contested Bar discipline
cases, and a few other categories. Once the case is submitted to the Court
without argument, a more summary process is followed than otherwise
would occur.
After all briefing is complete, the "no request"57 case is usually
randomly assigned to an office58 where the justice then gives the case to
a law clerk. Both the justice and law clerk review the file and make a
determination whether the case poses a question that has an obvious answer.
For example, any case that can be readily approved or quashed in light of
other recent or pending cases falls into this category. Where the answer is
obvious, the law clerk, or occasionally the justice, will prepare a summary
opinion approving or quashing in light of the controlling precedent.
Another procedure is followed where the question posed by the "no
request" case appears to be more controversial, such as where reasonable
persons could differ as to the outcome. This might exist, for example,
where two separate district courts of appeal have reached inconsistent but
equally reasonable conclusions regarding the same issue of law. In these
circumstances, the law clerk assigned to the case will prepare a memoran-
dum that essentially is a hybrid of an oral argument summary and a bench
memorandum for circulation to the entire Court. The first part of this
memorandum summarizes in objective fashion all the relevant facts and
56. The Court routinely notes that it will not entertain motions for rehearing or
clarification in cases requiring immediate finality, such as cases in which a death warrant is
pending, or after an opinion has been revised upon the granting or denial of a motion for
rehearing or clarification.
57. The term "no request" refers to the fact that the Court has made no request for oral
argument by the parties. In appropriate cases, it may also refer to the fact that the parties
themselves have not requested oral argument. There is no absolute right to oral argument
in any case, although the court's manual of internal operating procedures requires that oral
argument always be scheduled in every appeal from a judgment imposing a death sentence.
SUP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § II(B)(3).
58. There are exceptions to the random assignment process, most commonly, where a
number of cases all pose the same issue. In such circumstances, all the cases may be
assigned to the same office.
1168 [Vol. 18
454
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
information about the case, as well as the parties' arguments. In the second
part, the memorandum discusses the options available to the Court and states
the disposition preferred by the justice to whom the case is assigned. 9
The case is then scheduled for discussion at the next available court
conference. At this time, the justices state their own preferences regarding
the case and a vote is taken. The assigned justice then either drafts a
proposed majority opinion or assigns the law clerk to do so. The proposed
majority opinion is circulated to the entire Court using the same procedure
that would occur had oral argument been granted. Any differences among
the justices are resolved in the same manner as would apply in oral argum-
ent cases, including additional conference discussions as needed. Once all
the justices are satisfied that no further controversy remains about the case,
the majority opinion and any separate opinions are prepared for public
release.6°
3. Death Cases
While appeals from judgments imposing the death penalty are treated
like any other oral argument case, the Court traditionally follows a
somewhat different procedure in collateral challenges by death-row inmates.
Many of these cases involve claims raised via a traditional habeas corpus
petition or through the related procedure set forth in Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.6" Occasionally, other means of collateral. review
are sought, including the Court's "all writs" jurisdiction, 62 mandamus, 61
or other means. The most pressing of these cases involve claims by inmates
who have been scheduled for execution.
Except where there is an active death warrant, collateral challenges are
handled much the same as other cases. Oral argument is sometimes granted
but can be denied-unlike in appeals from judgments imposing the death
penalty where oral argument is always granted.64 Some justices require
their staffs to prepare a fact-sheet detailing the entire procedural history of
59. The use of this memorandum process in more controversial "no request" cases is a
recent innovation introduced by Justice Stephen Grimes and modeled after a similar
procedure used when he was a member of the Second District Court of Appeal.
60. "No request" cases are prepared for release in the same manner as other cases.
61. Although habeas corpus and Rule 3.850 have some differences, the Court has held
that the latter is a procedural vehicle for providing relief otherwise available through habeas
corpus. State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1988); see discussion infra part VIID.
62. See discussion infra part VII.E.
63. See discussion infra part VII.A.
64. SuP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § Ii(B)(3).
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the case, from trial to the latest collateral challenge, but this practice is not
uniform throughout the Court. Opinions are usually issued for each
collateral challenge filed, though the Court sometimes denies a claim in a
summary order if the claim clearly is barred or meritless.
When a case involves an active death warrant, different procedures are
used. Litigation often comes at unpredictable times and typically must be
decided on a severe deadline. 65  Thus, the office to which the case is
assigned frequently must review the record6 6 immediately after the warrant
is signed and before any pleadings have been filed in the Florida Supreme
Court. Typically, the justice and law clerk assigned to the case confer as
soon as possible to discuss any claims that seem likely based on the record.
As soon as pleadings are received from the inmate and the State, the
justice and law clerk assigned to the case usually meet immediately. The
justice then may confer informally with the other justices or request that a
court conference be held, if one seems necessary. If the case seems to
involve a meritorious claim, the Court may be inclined to grant an emergen-
cy oral argument, or may stay the execution until the matter can be studied
further and an opinion issued.
In the absence of a viable claim, the justice or law clerk assigned to the
case usually prepares an opinion (or in some cases a summary order)
denying all relief. If a proposed majority opinion is prepared, a copy faced
with a vote sheet will be circulated to the Court on an expedited basis and,
once all votes are tabulated, will be issued to the public immediately.
Summary orders may be handled in a formal or informal court conference,
with the order itself later issued by the Clerk of the Court.
As the time for the inmate's execution approaches, the justice and law
clerk assigned to the case remain on call for any last minute petitions that
may be filed. By custom, the chief justice or a justice designated by the
chief justice will be present in the Supreme Court Building at the time of
execution and is usually assisted by the Clerk of the Court and sometimes
also by the law clerk assigned to the case. 67 The Governor or a member
65. Because of the Florida Supreme Court's mandatory role in reviewing death cases,
the Governor, by long-standing tradition, does not sign death warrants to be effective during
the time when the Court will be in its summer recess. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(l), (9)
(requiring the supreme court's review of death penalty cases).
66. All records of death-row inmates remain stored in the Florida Supreme Court's
vaults or in the Florida Archives located across the street from the Supreme Court Building,
and are thus readily accessible to the staff.
67. The law clerk's presence may be especially important if there is any concern that
a legal issue might be raised at the last minute.
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of the Governor's staff opens a three-way telephone line connected with the
death cell of the state prison and the designated justice and all three parties
remain on the phone until the execution is completed and the inmate is
declared dead. Under the Florida Constitution, any single justice could
order the execution stayed for good reason shown,68 but this power has not
been exercised in memory. Any problems associated with the execution
generally are reported back to the full Court.69
4. Other Special Cases
The Court sometimes receives other more unusual kinds of cases, often
involving emergency issues that will be resolved in a written opinion.
Examples include: pressing constitutional questions between the branches
of state government;70 requests for an advisory opinion by the Governor;7'
or a petition to invoke the Court's own emergency rule-making powers.7"
Oral argument often is granted in cases of this type, though not always, with
argument usually scheduled as soon as possible. Whether accepted for
argument or not, emergency matters are normally handled like any other
case, except that preparation of the opinions typically is expedited and the
case is assigned to an office by the chief justice. 3 The opinions themselves
may be released outside the normal cycle if necessary to better resolve the
particular emergency.
68. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(9). Of course, the full Court could probably dissolve
any stay improvidently granted. See id
69. For example, Florida's electric chair malfunctioned during the execution of Jesse
Tafero in 1990, resulting in unusual generation of heat and the need to pass electric current
through Tafero's body three separate times. This malfunction was reported back to the full
Court by the justice assigned to be present in the Supreme Court Building during the
execution.
70. E.g., Florida House of Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1990); The
Florida Senate v. Graham, 412 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1982).
71. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
72. In re Emergency Petition to Extend Time Periods Under All Fla. Rules of Procedure,
No. 80,387 (Fla. Sept. 2, 1992) (emergency rule-making related to Hurricane Andrew).
73. Emergency cases are thus an exception to the Court's random assignment system.
The chief justice has broad discretion over these assignments, subject as always to the will
of the full Court, but often may assign the case to an office with special expertise in the field
or one that is most current in its workload.
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C. Types of Separate Opinions
As noted above, the Florida Supreme Court follows the traditional
practice of American appellate courts in assigning a single justice to write
the majority opinion in a case. However, justices are not obligated to agree
with the proposed majority opinion's viewpoint or even with the unsigned
majorities they themselves have written. Any view apart from the
majority's is expressed through the vehicle of a separate opinion attached to
and published with the majority opinion.
Although about seventy percent of the Court's decisions are unani-
mous,74 the press has a strong tendency to focus on disagreements embod-
ied in separate opinions. Strongly worded dissents catch the most attention.
This public focus can create a seriously exaggerated sense of division on the
Court and may suggest that dissents carry a legal significance that they
actually lack.
Dissenting views almost always are the least influential in the long
term, due to the fact of their apparent rejection by the Court's majority.75
A well reasoned concurring opinion, while technically not establishing any
precedent," may still be cited for persuasive authority in future cases and
occasionally may become more influential than the majority opinion to
which it was attached.77 Dissenting views sometimes prevail in the
long-run," but this is a far rarer occurrence. To embrace a prior dissent, the
Court usually must overrule its own precedent notwithstanding the doctrine
74. Records of the Clerk of the Court show that of the 3186 opinions filed between
January 1, 1986, and September 30, 1992 seventy percent were unanimous.
75. See Ephrem v. Phillips, 99 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1957). It is worth
noting, however, that dissents often contain statements that are "dissent dicta" because they
exceed the scope of what the majority is deciding. A majority opinion should not be read
as rejecting extraneous dissent dicta, but only as rejecting anything in the dissent contrary to
what the majority has actually said. There are occasions when dissent dicta may later be
embraced by a majority without overruling any prior opinion. Some attorneys erroneously
assume that the majority necessarily has rejected everything stated in a dissent.
76. Greene v. Massey, 384 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1980).
77. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, 576 So. 2d 261,
262-63 (Fla. 1990) (applying Wheeler v. Corbin, 546 So. 2d 723, 724-26 (Fla. 1989)
(Ehrlich, C.J., concurring)).
78. E.g., Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985), receding from
Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980). In Pullum, the court
expressly embraced Justice McDonald's dissent in Battilla, 392 So. 2d at 874-75 (McDonald,
J., dissenting).
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of stare decisis; 79 but a well reasoned concurrence can be accepted without
overruling anything, on grounds that it illuminated or explained the majority
opinion it accompanied.
Concurrences and dissents, however, constitute only two of six different
kinds of separate opinions that are in customary usage by the Court. This
variety has sometimes confused lawyers and the public alike, because the
Court has never fully clarified what each of the categories implies.
Confusion has been increased by the fact that the six categories are not
necessarily discrete but often blur into one another. Much depends on
exactly what the individual author has stated in the separate opinion,
although the choice of category is often a strong indicator of the strength of
the justice's feelings about the majority view.
Below, the six categories are ranked and their customary usage
described. This ranking begins with the category having the strongest sense
of concurrence and ends with the category having the strongest sense of
dissent.
1. Concurring Opinions
A separate concurring opinion usually indicates that the justice fully
agrees with the majority opinion but desires to make additional comments
or observations. Concurring opinions often are used when a justice wishes
to explain individual reasons for concurring with the majority. As a general
79. Many people erroneously view stare decisis as rigidly inflexible. The Court,
however, has held that stare decisis is not an ironclad, unwavering rule that the present must
bend to the dead voice of the past, however outmoded or meaningless; rather, it is a rule that
precedent will be followed except when departure is necessary to vindicate other principles
of law or to remedy continued injustice. Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992). In a
similar vein, the Court has said that the common law will not be altered or expanded unless
demanded by public necessity or to vindicate fundamental rights. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.
2d 588 (Fla. 1992). Although attorneys sometimes argue that only the Legislature can change
the common law, the Court in actuality has not hesitated to change the law when proper
reasons exist to do so, at least where the Legislature has taken no action on the precise
subject. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957); see, e.g., Waite
v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993) (abrogating common law doctrine of interspousal
immunity); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (abrogating common law doctrine
of contributory negligence). "Common law," of course, refers to law that has arisen from
the customary practices of the courts of Florida and their predecessors, which exists in its
most authoritative form when embodied in the written opinions of the Florida Supreme Court.
Once common law is codified within a legislative enactment, the Court is far more hesitant
to overrule it, because of the doctrine of separation of powers. See FLA. CONST. art. II, §
3.
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rule, concurring opinions should be presumed to indicate complete
agreement with the majority opinion unless the concurring opinion says
otherwise. Thus, a concurring opinion can constitute the fourth vote needed
to establish both a decision and a Court opinion,"° subject only to any
reservations expressly stated in the concurring opinion itself.81
2. Specially Concurring Opinions
A "specially concurring '' 2 opinion indicates general agreement with
both the analysis and result of the majority opinion but implies some degree
of elaboration of the majority's rationale, unless the separate opinion itself
says otherwise. The most common use of a special concurrence is when the
author believes the majority's analysis is essentially correct though perhaps
in need of elaboration or clarification. For example, a specially concurring
opinion may be used to explain why a separate dissenting opinion has
mischaracterized the majority's views and why the majority is correct.83
A specially concurring opinion can clearly constitute the fourth vote
needed to create a binding decision under the state constitution84 and can
be sufficient to establish an opinion as binding precedent. However, in this
last instance, the true nature of the precedent would not necessarily consist
of the plurality opinion, the special concurrence, or even both taken
80. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). There is a distinction between the terms decision
and opinion. The decision is the court's judgment-i.e., the specific result reached.
Whereas, the opinion is the written document explaining the reasons for the decision.
Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1958). Thus, so long as at
least four members of the Florida Supreme Court agree on the decision, it is irrelevant that
no similar agreement was reached regarding a written opinion. Similarly, at least four
justices must concur in an opinion for it to have any precedential value beyond the case at
hand. Greene v. Massey, 384 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1980). However, the word "decision" may
have a different meaning in the context of the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction over
particular categories of "decisions." See infra note 341.
81. Such reservations, depending on their strength, may give the concurrence the
appearance of actually being a special concurrence or a concurrence in result only. However,
the fact that the author has chosen to concur necessarily implies a greater sense of agreement
with the majority view. However, attorneys and lower courts may still legitimately take note
of any reservations expressed in a concurrence, especially where they may indicate that at
least four justices have not agreed on a relevant point.
82. Members of the Court sometimes label this type of separate opinion "concurring
specially." This label is synonymous with "specially concurring." The transposition is a
matter of each individual justice's preference.
83. E.g., Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98-102 (Fla.
1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
84. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
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together. Rather, the Court's opinion for purposes of precedent would
consist of those principles on which at least four members of the Court have
agreed.85 In other words, it is possible for a special concurrence to deprive
a plurality opinion of precedential value with respect to matters about which
the concurring justice has expressed reservations.8 6
3. Opinions Concurring in Result Only
A "concurring in result only" opinion indicates agreement only with the
decision (that is, the result reached) and a refusal to join in the majority's
opinion. A separate opinion that "concurs in result only" can constitute the
fourth vote necessary to establish a "decision" under the Florida Constitu-
tion,87 but the effect in such a case is that there is no "opinion" of the
Court and thus no precedent beyond the specific facts of the controversy at
hand.88 There may be cases in which a justice writes a "concurring in
result only" opinion that also appears to agree with more than just the result.
However, it seems doubtful that such an action could constitute the fourth
vote needed to give the opinion validity as precedent.
4. Opinions Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
An opinion that "concurs in part and dissents in part" is commonly
used to indicate disagreement with only one or some of the results reached
by the majority opinion, but may also be used to show disagreement with
part of the analysis, depending on what the separate opinion itself says.
Where an opinion of this type establishes part of the Court's majority, a
85. An example of such a case is In re T W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), in which
Chief Justice Ehrlich specially concurred but expressed reservations about certain points in
the plurality's analysis.
86. See id. A word of caution is in order here. It is easy and common, though not
actually correct, for courts and lawyers to overlook the fact that a specially concurring
opinion has expressed reservations about some legal point. For example, Chief Justice
Ehrlich's special concurrence in In re T W. expressed reservations about the plurality opinion,
yet few courts later analyzing T. W. seemed much concerned with that fact. Indeed, few have
even noted that T. W. was merely a plurality opinion; and at least one court has ignored Chief
Justice Ehrlich's special concurrence, even where his comments actually supported the result
being reached. See Jones v. State, 619 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
87. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). For an example of a case in which the fourth vote
concurred in result only, see Dougan v. State, 595 So. 2d I (Fla. 1992). The result is that
there is a decision in Dougan-in other words, a result in which at least four justices
concurred-but no court opinion.
88. See Greene, 384 So. 2d at 24.
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careful reading of the different opinions may be needed to ascertain the
actual precedent of the case.89
5. Dubitante Opinions
The rarest category of separate opinions are those issued "dubitante,"9°
a notation expressing serious doubt about the case. Only one such opinion
has been issued in the Court's history, although it is recent. 91 With this
sparse usage, it still is not entirely clear in Florida whether a dubitante
opinion should be regarded as a type of concurrence or dissent or something
else, 92 or indeed, whether a dubitante opinion can constitute the fourth vote
necessary to fulfill the constitutional requirement that four justices must
concur in a decision.93
In the federal system, an opinion designated "dubitante" at least
sometimes appears to constitute a very limited form of concurrence, 94 and
some federal judges have gone to the trouble of designating their opinions
89. The Florida Supreme Court has not consistently followed the United States Supreme
Court's practice of dividing opinions into numbered sections, in which members separately
can indicate agreement or disagreement. There are exceptions, e.g., Traylor v. State, 596 So.
2d 957 (Fla. 1992), but most opinions of the Florida Supreme Court are not divided in this
manner. This means that a careful reading may be necessary to determine the actual majority
position; and in some cases, the true majority view simply may be unclear. However, the
Florida Supreme Court's practice has the grace of avoiding the fractured opinions sometimes
found in the United States Supreme Court, in which two or more justices may separately
write and sign parts of opinions that collectively constitute the "majority" view.
90. The term "dubitante" means doubting. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (6th ed.
1990).
91. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla.
1992) (Barkett, J., dubitante). It should be noted that other separate opinions have been
written that in effect constituted a species of dubitante opinion, but without using the
designation "dubitante." E.g., Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So. 2d 575, 577-81 (Fla. 1993)
(Kogan, J., specially concurring).
92. The single instance in which a dubitante opinion was issued in Florida suggests that
it indicated neither a concurrence nor dissent, but rather a statement of complete doubt as to
the disposition of the case. See In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601
So. 2d at 549.
93. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
94. Indeed, some federal judges have marked their separate opinions with the heading
"concurring" but have indicated in the text that the opinion is "dubitante." New York v.
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring); see also Case-Swayne Co. v.
Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 403 (1967) (Douglas, J., dubitante); Radio Corp. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 412, 421 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dubitante).
1176 [Vol. 1 8
462
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
as "concurring dubitante." 95 At least one has issued a dubitante opinion
that expressly concurred in part and dissented in part, although the author
seemed to indicate doubts only as to the partial concurrence.96
In Georgia, the courts have sometimes issued "dubitante" dissents,
apparently meaning dissenting views in which the author has serious
doubt.97 Thus, a "dubitante dissent" would seem to constitute a species of
dissenting opinion less vigorous than a full dissent. However, there also
seem to be times when an opinion marked merely "dubitante" is neither a
dissent nor a concurrence, but an expression of doubts so grave that the
judge or justice can neither agree nor disagree with the majority.9" This
probably is the best construction, for example, in those rare cases in other
jurisdictions in which a judge votes "dubitante" without writing a separate
opinion. 99
Because of the still uncertain nature of dubitante opinions in Florida,
the better practice would be for the authors to indicate whether they intend
to concur, to dissent, or neither to concur nor to dissent. Perhaps a
statement to that effect could be included in the text of the opinion.
In any event, a statement that the justice "concurs dubitante" certainly
would seem necessary where the dubitante opinion is relied upon as the
fourth vote needed to create a binding decision; but even then, it remains to
be seen whether that concurrence would give the written opinion itself the
value of precedent. Some diminished form of precedential value might be
in order in such a situation, but only where it is clear from a careful reading
of the different opinions that at least four members of the Court, in fact,
have agreed on some rationale, not merely the result. Otherwise, there
would be no court opinion, and the plurality's view would not create
precedent beyond the case at issue.
95. E.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 524 F.2d 384, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly,
J., concurring dubitante).
96. United States v. Walker, 9 M.J. 892, 894 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980) (Mahoney, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part, & dubitante).
97. E.g., Kelleher v. State, 371 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. App. 1988) (Deen, P., dissenting
dubitante); City of Fairburn v. Cook, 372 S.E.2d 245, 255 (Ga. App. 1988) (Deen, P.J.,
dissenting dubitante).
98. See In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d at 549.
99. Adams v. Williams, 838 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Mo. App. 1992) (Crandall, J., dubitante).
In the absence of a written opinion, it is impossible to tell what the author's views were,
other than an expression of doubt.
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6. Dissents
A "dissenting" opinion should be presumed to indicate a complete
refusal to join with the majority's decision and opinion. A close reading of
some dissenting opinions may disclose that the author actually only
disagrees with part of the majority opinion.' ° Such a dissent could be
read as though it were an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part;
but the fact that the justice has labeled the separate opinion as a full
"dissent" almost certainly means the opinion could not constitute the fourth
vote needed to create a binding court opinion or decision. As a result, it is
doubtful that the dissenting justice should be viewed as joining the
majority's views for any other purpose.
D. Per Curiam Opinions
At one time, the Florida Supreme Court followed the practice, still
common in the district courts of appeal, of issuing very cursory opinions
designated per curiam, with the identity of the author not disclosed.
Historically, per curiam opinions came to imply short opinions devoid of a
rationale. This was the general sense conveyed by the Court in 1956 when
it defined the term per curiam as indicating "the opinion of the Court in
which the judges are all of one mind and the question involved is so clear
that it is not considered necessary to elaborate it by any extended discus-
sion. '  Some attorneys have ruefully noted the potential for abuse
inherent in the power to issue such opinions,0 2 because even a "clear"
rationale helps no one if left unstated.
After the creation of the district courts of appeal and the later adoption
of jurisdictional reforms, the traditional short per curiam opinion has fallen
into disuse in the Florida Supreme Court.0 3 The Court now seldom issues
unsigned opinions devoid of an obvious rationale. The few that might
qualify typically involve questions of law now fully resolved in a recently
issued opinion, to which the lower courts and parties are referred. Instead,
100. E.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1204-05 (Fla. 1989) (McDonald, J., dissenting)
(dissenting opinion agreeing with part of plurality's rationale).
101. Newmons v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 87 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. 1956).
102. Toby Buel, Conflict Review in the Supreme Court of a District Court ofAppeal Per
Curiam Decision, 56 FLA. B.J. 849 (1982).
103. The bulk of the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction now is discretionary, in which
case the Court has authority simply to deny jurisdiction. This is vastly different than the
situation that existed when the supreme court was Florida's only appellate tribunal, with
much broader mandatory jurisdiction.
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Florida Supreme Court per curiam opinions now have metamorphosed into
something else all together. Increasingly, they are fully analyzed majority
opinions whose authors simply are not identified. The news media typically
call such cases "unsigned majority opinions."
There are a variety of reasons for not identifying the true author or
authors.1"4 One is because the author of the majority opinion actually
disagrees with its analysis, an eventuality that can occur because of the
Court's method of assigning cases.'0 5 Another reason is that portions of
the opinion were written by more than one justice. As a matter of courtesy,
justices usually avoid claiming credit for material partially written by
another office. Such a per curiam opinion might be issued, for example,
when a majority of the Court has not agreed with the full analysis of a
proposed majority opinion and has decided to engraft onto that opinion part
of a separate analysis prepared by another justice.
In other circumstances, the decision to make an opinion per curiam is
left to the discretion of the justice whose offices originated the opinion.
Subject to some exceptions, most Bar discipline cases and disciplinary
actions against judges are now issued per curiam. The same is true of a
good number of death cases, though by no means all.
There is no way for the public to know the reasons an opinion was
issued per curiam and the justices and court staff are never permitted to
publicly identify the true author. In any event, the fact that an opinion is
issued per curiam by the Florida Supreme Court has no significant effect
other than to identify the Court itself, and not any particular justices, as the
author. Per curiam opinions bear the same status as any other opinion in
which the justices have voted the same way.0 6
E. Role of the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice
The chief justice is Florida's highest ranking judicial officer, serving
both as head of the Court and chief executive officer of the entire Florida
judicial branch.'0 7 The chief justice presides at all official Court functions
and governs the state court system through the machinery of the Office of
State Courts Administrator. One of the chief justice's most significant
104. Members of the Court, including the true author, still must indicate their votes
regarding a per curiam opinion, and those votes are recorded with the published opinion.
There is no anonymity in this sense. Moreover, only a majority opinion can be issued per
curiam. The Court has never issued, for example, per curiam dissents or concurrences.
105. See supra text accompanying note 47.
106. See Newmons, 87 So. 2d at 49.
107. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(b).
1994] 1179
465
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
powers in a legal sense is the ability to dispose of motions and procedural
matters connected with pending cases.' °8 This is a marked change from
earlier court practice, which required a meeting of the Court to consider mo-
tions. Today, some motions may be placed on the full Court's agenda for
further guidance, particularly on controversial matters; but by far, most are
handled by the chief justice alone.
Whenever the chief justice is absent or unable to act, the role of acting
chief justice automatically falls upon the next most senior justice who is
available. Most commonly, the Dean of the Court. 9 is the acting chief
justice, but on occasion so many members of the Court are absent that the
duty descends to the more junior justices. The Rules of JudicialAdministra-
tion also specify that the Dean of the Court automatically becomes acting
chief justice if the sitting chief leaves office for any reason; but in that
event, the Court is also required to promptly elect a successor to serve the
balance of the unexpired term."'
Each chief justice's term runs for a period of two years beginning and
ending on July 1 of each successive even-numbered year."' Prior to the
end of each two-year term, the Court must elect the chief justice who will
serve during the next term. For some time now, the Court has followed a
custom that has largely eliminated political considerations in the election.
By a custom unbroken for more than a decade, the Court elects as chief
justice the next most senior justice who has not yet held the office."' In
the unlikely event that a time comes when all seven have served, the Court
presumably would begin the rotation again, starting with the Dean of the
Court.
One beneficial result of this rotation system is that it lessens the
possibility that any particular justice or group of justices could gain
indefinite control of the Court's executive functions. This is vastly different
from the United States Supreme Court, where the Chief Justice is nominated
by the President subject to Senate confirmation and is life-tenured. The
Florida Supreme Court's customary rotation system creates a significant
check and balance omitted from the constitution itself, which specifies only
108. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.030(a)(2)(B)(ii).
109. The present Dean is Justice Ben F. Overton.
110. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.030(2).
I1l. Id.
112. The custom actually predates the 1980s but was interrupted during the 1970s when
some members of the Court were under investigation for alleged improprieties. The custom
resumed in 1984 with the election of Justice Joseph A. Boyd, Jr.
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that the Court must choose a chief justice by majority vote." 3 By honor-
ing the rotation system, the Court ensures that no particular ideological bent
will continuously dominate the highest level of the state's judicial branch.
F. Role of the Other Justices
The power of the chief justice, however, is not limitless. Very
significant powers reside in the Court as a body, particularly through the
fact that all judicial opinions and many major administrative concerns
require assent by at least four justices. Moreover, the chief justice alone
cannot possibly supervise all of the various committees and Bar offices
under the Court's control. The effect is that the Court in practice operates
on a highly collegial basis, with all of the justices involved in some aspect
of administration. Accordingly, the most effective chief justices tend to be
those that build a consensus before taking actions affecting the Court and its
governance.
Collegiality is expressed most noticeably in the fact that each justice is
assigned a variety of supervisory duties. These include: oversight of the
internal committees and offices that govern the Court; liaison responsibility
with Bar organizations; and assignment to a variety of special commissions
created, from time to time, to address questions of public policy involving
the courts. For example, members of the Court have chaired or supervised
public commissions charged with reforming guardianship laws, investigating
gender bias in Florida's judiciary, and examining ways to eliminate racial
and ethnic bias from the judicial system. Each of these commissions
ultimately produced extensive proposals for reform, most of which now have
been implemented by the Governor, the Legislature, and the courts.114 To
this extent, members of the Court use their offices to help effect changes in
public policy beneficial to the state and consistent with the sound adminis-
tration of justice.
G. Role of the Judicial Assistants, Law Clerks, & Interns
Because the justices' duties are so extensive, they could not possibly
discharge their obligations without the help of a staff. Each justice
accordingly is permitted to hire three staff members: a judicial assistant and
two law clerks. The chief justice, with far greater responsibilities, is
113. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(b).
114. E.g., Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Comission, 42 FLA.
L. REV. 803 (1990).
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permitted to have three law clerks, one of whom is called an executive
assistant. The latter's responsibilities can include both legal research and
some administrative functions. In addition, the chief justice's office has a
permanent staff of judicial assistants, a staff attorney, and an internal
auditor, all of whom remain attached to the office through different
administrations. Finally, the staffs of the justices are usually supplemented
three times a year by an internship program that brings law students into the
Court to act as research aides.
1. Judicial Assistants
In Florida's judiciary, secretaries ofjudges are called judicial assistants.
Their duties vary from office to office, but almost always include supervis-
ing the flow of paperwork, keeping files, overseeing the justices' schedules,
and dealing with correspondence and telephone calls. Members of the
public who call individual justices almost always deal with the judicial
assistant first. Judicial assistants are hired by and serve at the pleasure of
their respective justices.
2. Law Clerks
As noted above, the duties of law clerks also vary among the offices,
but they are usually responsible for conducting legal research for their
justices. Many also have the primary responsibility of drafting opinions for
their justices after receiving guidance from a court conference vote. In this
situation, law clerks typically are told the result and analysis that should be
used in the proposed majority opinion, but are given primary responsibility
for conducting research and writing an opinion for the assigned justice to
review, revise, or edit.
Opinion writing is a responsibility that can be both time-consuming and
labor-intensive. "' Few justices would be able to manage their schedules
unless at least some opinion writing was conducted by their staffs. Partly
as a result, members of the Court have often chosen law clerks not merely
based on academic performance in law school but also on proven writing
115. As a result, law clerks, at a minimum, must have a law degree before the date they
begin work. The Court previously required admission to The Florida Bar soon after law
clerks began work, but this requirement was dropped as part of the job description in the
mid-1980s. Justices, however, remain free to require Bar membership if they desire, and pay
scales overwhelmingly favor those who have Bar membership. As a result, only rarely are
law clerks not members of The Florida Bar.
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ability, often demonstrated in prior professional careers." 6  The writing
of legal opinions can be very exacting, if only because every majority
opinion establishes legal precedent. Law clerks responsible for opinion
writing, thus, must be able to master a style of English that is not merely
formal, but very precise as well.
Because of this heavy responsibility, it is somewhat paradoxical that the
common public image of law clerks is of young people freshly graduated
from law school, with little real experience, who will leave to enter private
practice after a year or two of clerking. At times the image has been borne
out by reality. But the Florida Supreme Court throughout its history, and
increasingly so today, has had a strong tendency to employ "permanent law
clerks."' These most often are attorneys whose skills and temperaments
especially suit the justices who employ them and who remain on staff
indefinitely, at the pleasure of the justice. The vast majority of present
justices have at one time or another employed such clerks."'
A number of factors have contributed to this tendency to keep
"permanent law clerks." Perhaps the most significant is that the administra-
tive and public responsibilities of the justices have so greatly increased in
recent years that a poor choice of law clerks can be a serious liability. This
has reinforced a tendency not to change staff once law clerks with
demonstrable skills have been found. Another factor is that the legal job
market that boomed in the 1980s has turned quite sour in the 1990s."'
As a result, the competition for clerkships has increased drastically, 2 ° and
those few hired as law clerks have a greater incentive to stay in their present
jobs. Yet another factor is an increasing tendency among some young
lawyers to steer away from the stress that can exist in private law firns.
116. Florida Supreme Court law clerks, for example, have included former journalists,
former law professors, and former assistant prosecutors.
117. Law clerks are not permanent in the sense of having a job with civil service-style
protections. Rather, these law clerks, at the request of their justices, agree to stay for some
indefinite period beyond the two year minimum commitment typically required by each
justice at the time the law clerk is hired.
118. Of the fifteen law clerks employed by justices in the summer of 1993, eight had
been employed indefinitely. One of these eight had worked for the same justice for more
than a decade, while four others had worked as law clerks in excess of five years each. Very
long clerkships have not been uncommon. One former law clerk remained employed in that
capacity for fourteen years before leaving to enter private practice.
119. In the mid-1980s, for example, it was common for nearly every Florida law student
to have been hired for a job by the time of graduation. Now, it is common for half or more
of a graduating law school class to still be looking for work after graduation.
120. Members of the court now receive applications from law students throughout the
United States on a nearly continuous basis. Many are students with top credentials.
118319941
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3. Interns
The Court also supplements its staff with student interns who work on
an unpaid basis during each of the three semester periods common in law
schools. Internships vary in length but usually commence each August,
January, and May. By long-standing arrangement, the Court accepts its
August and January interns only from students selected by the faculty of the
Florida State University College of Law in Tallahassee and these students
in turn are given academic credit for their work at the Court.
Internships starting in May are potentially available to students from
any law school and may be more or less informal in nature. 21  These
interns serve on a purely volunteer basis and are responsible for their own
expenses. Academic credit is available only if the students can make the
necessary arrangements with their law schools.
Summer internships have become commonplace at the Court almost by
a process of unguided evolution. They began sporadically and informally
with a handful of students whose colleges would give them academic credit
for summer work with government agencies. Now, summer internships
have become a routine dominated by students who, despite good academic
qualifications, have been squeezed out of paying summer jobs by the tight
market of the 1990s. 122 Many law school placement officers are encourag-
ing students to take volunteer summer jobs to gain experience rather than
do nothing. This has resulted in greater demand for volunteer summer
internships by well--qualified students. In response, the Court has gradually
expanded the number of interns it takes each summer.
Job responsibilities of interns vary among the offices, but usually
involve assisting the law clerks. Many offices have a structured program in
which student interns are given increasingly more responsibility as they
demonstrate aptitude. Very promising students may even be assigned to
write a simple majority opinion under the close supervision of the assigned
law clerk and the justice. Much of an intern's work, however, consists of
121. Application is usually accomplished by the student sending in a cover letter,
resume, and writing sample to a justice at the court, in late winter or early spring, prior to
the summer in question. Standards for these internships vary from office to office, as do the
number of interns that will be accepted. Some offices take only one intern, while others take
two or three.
122. In the mid-1980s, for example, it was very common for students to be employed
as summer associates in law firms. Top students could often earn thousands of dollars in a
single summer and even mediocre students could earn respectable salaries. As the market for
legal services has soured, many law firms have been forced to sharply curtail or even to
eliminate their summer associate programs.
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more routine matters such as writing memoranda to the justice on petitions
for jurisdiction, photocopying research material identified by law clerks, and
writing memoranda to the law clerks on legal issues.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the Court's internship program is
an insight into the Court's operation and an opportunity to work with a
justice of the state's highest tribunal. An internship can be a strong
credential. Moreover, a very significant number of former interns have gone
on to find jobs as law clerks at the Florida Supreme Court or in other
courts. Therefore, an internship can be an important stepping stone for a
student interested in working as a law clerk after graduation. It is also a
way in which the Court assists in educating succeeding generations of
lawyers.
H. Ethical Constraints on the Justices & Their Staffs
The public, and even some members of the legal profession, do not
fully appreciate the ethical constraints imposed upon judges and their staffs,
including interns. Justices at the Court frequently receive letters from
people asking that particular cases be decided certain ways or that judges
should correct some perceived oversight in a case. On occasion, news
reporters have even contacted judicial assistants or law clerks in an effort to
learn the inside story about particular cases. Members of the public are
sometimes offended when queries of this type go unanswered. However, the
Court and its staff live under a very rigorous code of ethics that forbids
them to comment in many instances.
1. Constraints on Justices
Perhaps the most common misunderstanding, especially among the lay
public, is a widespread belief that judges or justices can be approached
about their official duties in much the same way a governor, a legislator, or
their respective employees can. However, the Constitution" 3 and ethics
codes "'24 absolutely require that judges be and appear to be impartial. For
that reason, judges and justices are not permitted to publicly discuss any
aspect of pending or impending cases 25 and there are even restrictions
regarding cases that have become final.'26
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
124. FLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canons 2, 3 (West 1993).
125. Id. at 3A.(6).
126. These include, for example, the fact that matters were discussed at Court
conference, the content of unpublished draft opinions, and the Court's initial vote or changes
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In an effort to maintain the public image of impartiality, judges and
justices are also required to maintain a broad detachment from politics. In
a recent case,,for example, the Florida Supreme Court determined that a
judge or justice may be reprimanded for writing public endorsement letters
of a candidate in a nonpartisan judicial election.'27 This conclusion was
based on an ethics rule generally prohibiting ajudge or justice from lending
the prestige of the office to any political cause. 1 8 As a result, judges and
justices are required to refrain from participation in most types of political
activities beyond those necessary for their own judicial elections.
Even the personal finances of judges and justices are closely regulated.
For example, they are not permitted to be involved in any business
transactions that might reflect poorly on their impartiality or job perfor-
mance.' 29  They are required to divest themselves of investments that
result in their frequent recusal in cases before the Court, such as where a
judge or justice owns stock in a corporation that is a frequent litigant.'3 °
Gifts, loans, and favors are closely regulated'3 ' and some restrictions even
apply to the finances of a judge or justice's family and household mem-
bers.1 2  Judges and justices must also file disclosures of their income,
assets, and business interests. 133
A battery of other ethical constraints imposed upon judges and justices
are set out in considerable detail in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Moreover, the level of detail may be expanded by a revision of the Code
still pending review at the time this article was being written. The revision
focuses on restrictions on the political activities in which judges may
participate.
Enforcing ethical constraints on justices of the Florida Supreme Court
poses a unique problem because, in theory, the Court is the final arbiter of
what is ethical and what is not.'34 As a result, the Florida Constitution has
created special mechanisms to deal with alleged impropriety by a jus-
in votes prior to release of an opinion.
127. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, Hugh S. Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.
1993); see also In re Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons 1, 2, and 7A(1)(b)), 603 So. 2d 494
(Fla. 1992).
128. FLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7 (West 1993).
129. Id. at 5C.(l).
130. Id. at 5C.(3).
131. Id. at 5C.(4).
132. Id. at 5C.(5).
133. FLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 6B.(1) (West 1993).
134. The court itself promulgates the ethics rules. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
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tice. 35 First., members of the Court are subject to inquiry by the Judicial
Qualifications Commission ("JQC"), as are all Florida judges.'36 The JQC
recommends proposed discipline for breaches of judicial ethics, subject to
review by the Florida Supreme Court. However, when a justice of that
court is being investigated, all sitting members of the Florida Supreme Court
are automatically recused. Thereafter, the seven most senior chief judges
of Florida's twenty judicial circuits automatically sit as temporary associate
justices 3 7 to review the case and to impose discipline if appropriate.
Discipline can include reprimand, suspension, or removal from office.'
Justices of the Court are also subject to impeachment and to removal
by the Legislature. Grounds for impeachment are any misdemeanor in
office as determined by a two-thirds vote of the State House of Representa-
tives.'39 Once impeached, a justice is automatically suspended and the
Governor can appoint a temporary replacement until completion of the
trial. 40 Trial after impeachment occurs before the Florida Senate, and the
justice being tried can be removed from office upon a two-thirds Senate
vote. The Senate can also take the additional step of disqualifying the
justice from holding any future Florida office,' 4 ' though this requires an
affirmative act and is not an automatic consequence of removal.'
The Florida Constitution specifies that the chief justice of the Florida
Supreme Court must preside or choose another justice to preside over the
Senate at all trials after impeachment.' 43 Where the chief justice is under
investigation, the Governor presides.'44 This mandatory language could
lead to the problematic situation of a chief justice presiding over the trial of
another justice. While the constitution is not entirely clear, it may be
possible for the chief justice to appoint an impartial judge of a lower court
as an associate justice solely for purposes of presiding over the Senate trial.
Such an appointment would better ensure the impartiality of the presiding
officer. In any event, a future revision of the Florida Constitution may be
in order to address this problem.
135. See FLA. CONST. art. V.
136. Id. § 12.
137. The significance of the term associate justice is discussed infra note 165 and
accompanying text.
138. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(h).
139. Id. art. III, § 17(a); see also Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d I (Fla. 1974).
140. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(b).
141. Id. § 17(c).
142. Smith v. Brantley, 400 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1981).
143. FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 17(c)
144. Id.
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2. Constraints on Justices' Staffs
Judicial assistants, law clerks, and court intems are subject to much the
same ethical constraints imposed on justices, at least with respect to official
matters on which they work.'45 For their tenure on the staff, these persons
are effectively a kind of alter ego of the justice when dealing with the
Court's official business. As a result, they are subject to the canons of
judicial ethics in a derivative sense, though the JQC obviously lacks
jurisdiction over persons who are not judges. However, it deserves
emphasis that this conclusion applies only to official matters, not to all
activities of staff members outside the Court.
Prior to 1992, many persons assumed that judicial staff members were
subject to all of the constraints imposed upon the justices, even for matters
conducted on personal time.'46 In May 1992, the Florida Committee on
Standards of Conduct Governing Judges reinforced this interpretation in an
advisory opinion concluding that judicial assistants were prohibited from
engaging in partisan political activities, just as judges and justices are.47
The Committee's conclusions obviously implied that all judicial staff
members were subject to the canons of judicial ethics as though they
themselves were judges.
This view, however, was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in a
court conference in the fall of 1992. At that time, the Court took the
unusual step of overruling'48 the advisory opinion and issuing its own
statement on the question. This occurred after some of the judiciary's
employees voiced objections to the Committee's reasoning.
145. FLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B.(2) (West 1993).
146. See Scott D. Makar, Judicial Staff and Ethical Conduct, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1992, at
10.
147. See Harvey L. Goldstein, Chairman, Committee on Standards of Conduct
Governing Judges, Advisory Opinion 92-33 (Aug. 14, 1992).
148. The Court has traditionally used a somewhat unusual method of overruling advisory
opinions of the Committee on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges. This is something
that, in any event, is rarely done. If any member of the Court disagrees with the advisory
opinion, the matter is discussed in a Court conference and a vote may be taken. If a majority
of the Court agrees, a statement is prepared overruling the advisory opinion and that
statement is then placed in the official minutes of the Court. At this time, the Clerk of the
Court notifies the Committee chair of the Court's action and transmits a copy of the relevant
portion of the minutes to The Florida Bar News for publication. The act of overruling the
advisory opinion in this manner obviously does not constitute a decision of the Court and,
for that reason, is not absolutely binding. But the Court's statement is highly persuasive and
one from which the Court is unlikely to depart if discipline were attempted for some alleged
ethical breach.
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In its statement, the Court found that judicial staff members have a
First Amendment right to engage in political activities provided this is done
outside of Court, on personal time, and without reference to the judge or the
judge's office.' 49 In support of this conclusion, the Court said that mem-
bers of a judge's staff are analogous to the spouses of judges, who have a
right to engage in political activities using their personal time and resourc-
es.' This reasoning implies that staff members may be treated the same
as a judge's spouse in other contexts involving the use of free time, though
the analogy obviously is not a perfect one' and could be less forceful
outside the context of exercising free-speech rights.
A special variety of ethical problems commonly arises with respect to
law clerks. Some law clerks decide to enter private practice after complet-
ing two or more years of work at the Court, and some firms have voiced
confusion over the ethical standards that govern the process of hiring a law
clerk. Obviously, a problem could develop if the hiring firm has any case
pending before the Court. Thus, law clerks should generally disclose any
possible conflict of interest to their justices.
To assist in proper disclosure to the justice, at first contact or soon
thereafter, the firm should probably disclose to the law clerk all of its cases
pending for review in the Court or that are likely to be pending, before
employment negotiations are concluded.' At that time, the law clerk
should discuss the matter with the justice, who should then segregate the law
clerk from the disclosed cases if there is any possibility or appearance of a
conflict of interest. At a minimum, the law clerk may not personally or
substantially work on any of the disclosed cases during the pendency of
negotiations for employment with the firm. Furthermore, the law clerk may
be segregated even after negotiations end or fail if the justice deems it
necessary.
53
Upon leaving the Court, former law clerks must be segregated from
working on any case involving matters in which the law clerk participated
personally and substantially, except upon consent by all parties after
149. Florida Supreme Court Conference, Minutes of Meeting (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file
with Court).
150. Id.
151. It is unlikely, for example, that the financial activities of a judge or justice's
judicial assistant would create a substantial conflict of interest. The financial activities of the
judge or justice's spouse could.
152. This should include any case in which the firm has an interest in its own right or
as counsel to a party.
153. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 4-1.12(b).
1994] 1189
475
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
disclosure.'54 A problem of this type might occur, for example, where the
firm, after hiring the law clerk, acquires a client who had a case pending in
the Court. Moreover, law clerks seldom can ethically reveal information
learned at the Court, including the nature of their work assignments.
Therefore, it would be wise for all involved parties to assume that the
disqualification rule should apply to each of the firm's cases that were
pending in the Court on the date of the law clerk's last employment there.
In any event, if the former law clerk states that the disqualification rule
applies in a particular case, the parties probably should not inquire as to the
reasons why and former law clerks should not answer if asked.
Similar restrictions apply as to judicial assistants and interns, though
problems are less frequent in this regard. Judicial assistants are fewer in
number and do not change employment with the frequency more common
for law clerks. Interns, meanwhile, are present at the Court for a few
months at most and seldom are exposed to any but the most routine matters.
However, both judicial assistants and interns should adhere to the rules
applicable to law clerks if there is any possibility of a conflict of interest.
Interns, in particular, are routinely warned about conflicts that may be
created by employment or negotiations for employment. For example,
during their time at the Court, interns are not permitted to engage in
part-time or volunteer work assisting anyone engaged in the practice of law.
This is because all Court staff are prohibited from engaging in or providing
support services for the practice of law, except in representing their own
personal interests. Likewise, interns should disclose the fact that they are
interviewing for jobs during their time at the Court and should not work on
any matter in which their job prospects have an interest. Usually, the
supervising law clerks regulate the interns' compliance with these. ethical
duties.
Enforcement of ethical constraints imposed on judicial staff differs
from that used in the case of justices and judges. Ethical violations of a less
serious nature typically are handled by the justice and can include reprimand
or termination of employment. Serious violations also can result in
contempt proceedings being brought, though only one such incident has
occurred in the last few decades.'55 Any staff member who is an attorney
is also subject to professional discipline by The Florida Bar, with penalties
ranging from a private reprimand to disbarment. Student interns who plan
to become licensed attorneys can be investigated for ethical breaches by The
154. Id. at 4-1.12(a).
155. See supra note 40.
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Florida Board of Bar Examiners, possibly resulting in a denial of licen-
sure.
156
I. Court Protocol
In its day-to-day operations, the Florida Supreme Court has followed
a simple protocol that sometimes borders on the informal. The unifying
factor of the: protocol, and perhaps its most formal aspect, is a seniority
system in which more senior justices outrank their colleagues, with the
sitting chief justice always deemed most senior.'57 If more than one
justice is appointed to the Court simultaneously, seniority is determined by
reference to the appointee's prior career using a standard adopted in
1968. 18 Virtually every other aspect of business in the Supreme Court
156. The Florida Board of Bar Examiners routinely sends detailed questionnaires
regarding former interns to the justices and their staffs. The questions probe such matters
as the intern's thoroughness, promptness, work ethic, background, and personal problems.
If the answer to any question raises a concern about fitness to practice law, the Bar
Examiners will investigate further.
157. Except for the chief justice, seniority is determined according to the order of
appointment to the court. Upon ceasing to be chief justice, members of the court revert to
the seniority they otherwise would have had.
158. See The Fla. Supreme Court, minutes of meeting (Jan. 12, 1987) (on file with the
Court). On October 14, 1968, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the following resolution:
BE IT RESOLVED:
Seniority on this Court shall be determined by length of continuous service
on this Court:
In the event more than one Justice assumes office on this Court at the
same time, seniority of such Justices shall be determined in the following
manner:
1. Former Justices of this Court;
2. Judges or former Judges of the District Courts of Appeal. Seniority
of such District Court Judges shall be based upon the length of continuous
service;
3. Judges or former Judges of the Circuit Court. Seniority of such Circuit
Court Judges shall be based upon the length of continuous service;
4. Judges or former Judges of other courts of record of this State.
Seniority of such Judges shall be based upon the length of continuous service;
5. Lawyer[s] without former judicial experience. Seniority of such
lawyers shall be determined by length of time they have been admitted to The
Florida Bar.
This Resolution shall become effective immediately.
This policy was reaffirmed on January 12, 1987, when two justices assumed office
simultaneously. Because one of these justices had served on a district court, he was accorded
a higher seniority than the other, who had served on a circuit court.
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Building is governed by this seniority ranking.
Justices are listed according to seniority in court stationery, choose their
office suites in the same order, and appear formally in public ranked from
most senior to most junior. When the Court is in session the justices are
seated with the chief justice presiding in the center, the next most senior
justice placed to the immediate right, the next most senior justice placed to
the immediate left, and so on until all are seated. Even the separate
opinions attached to a majority opinion are ranked by reference to seniori-
ty. 1
59
The seniority system also expresses itself in other ways. For example,
a listing of justices in a publication should adhere to the system. However,
formal public introductions reverse the seniority ranking on the premise that
the most senior justices should be introduced last, giving them the "last
word."'
160
Formal modes of addressing justices in writing have varied over time.
However, in 1992, at the request of Allen Morris,' 6 ' and through Justice
Parker Lee McDonald, the Court established a few guidelines. The Court
concluded that it would be appropriate in addressing correspondence to refer
to the chief justice as "The Honorable (name), Chief Justice, Florida
Supreme Court."'62 By analogy, letters addressed to other justices would
be the same but with the word "Chief' omitted. The most common
introductory salutation in a letter is "Dear Chief Justice (name)" or "Dear
Justice (name)."
A member of the Court should not formally be called "Judge (name)."
In the Florida judiciary, the title "Justice" is given exclusively to members
of the Florida Supreme Court'63 because the constitution clearly distin-
guishes "justices" from "judges" sitting on the state's lower tribunals.'64
Contrary to the practice in the United States Supreme Court, the term
"Associate Justice" is not a proper title for any sitting member of the Florida
Supreme Court. The term is not used in the constitution. "Associate
Justice" is the temporary title given to judges of a lower court assigned for
159. As a general rule, separate opinions are divided into the six separate categories and,
within each category, are then ranked according to the author's seniority.
160. ALLEN MORRIS, PRACTICAL PROTOCOL FOR FLORIDIANS (Revised) 77 (1988).
161. Clerk-Emeritus/Historian, Florida House of Representatives.
162. Letter from Justice Parker Lee McDonald, Florida Supreme Court to Allen Morris,
Clerk-Emeritus/Historian, Florida House of Representatives (Nov. 2, 1992) (on file with
author).
163. Id.
164. See FLA. CONST. art. V.
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temporary service on the Florida Supreme Court.'65 Thus, the title should
not be used in any context except when a judge is temporarily assigned to
the Florida Supreme Court.
In less formal situations, or when addressing a justice verbally, the
members of the Court usually are called simply "Justice (name)." For
example, thi,; has become the standard method of addressing a member of
the Court during oral argument. In the late 1980s, the Court completely
abandoned the use of the gender-specific titles "Madam Justice (name)" or
"Mister Justice (name)" though a few attorneys still use these without
incident. 66 The staff of the Florida Supreme Court commonly address a
justice verbally with the single word "Judge," though this is an informal and
familiar usage.
Justices who have retired from the Court commonly are addressed by
the courtesy title "Justice," though this is not required and is subject to some
ethical constraints. The courtesy title should not be used during the practice
of law in which a former justice may be engaged except for purely
biographical purposes. Nor should the title be used in any other context in
which the title may create a false impression. The title "Chief Justice" can
be used only with respect to a sitting chief justice of the Florida Supreme
Court and is never used as a courtesy title. 6 7 Likewise, "Associate Justice"
is never used as a courtesy title by lower court judges who previously have
been temporarily assigned to sit on the Florida Supreme Court.
A few other matters of court protocol have been distilled into written
form by Allen Morris, including details of the investiture ceremony for new
justices"' and protocol for funeral ceremonies of justices.'69 The Court
generally has adhered to these two protocols. By tradition, the Court also
165. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.030(g). Temporary assignments are made, for example,
when a quorum of the court is not available. Id.
166. This change dates from the appointment of the first woman justice, Rosemary
Barkett. Shortly after her appointment in 1985, Justice Barkett indicated she would not use
the title "Madam Justice Barkett" but simply "Justice Barkett." Later, the other members of
the Court dropped the "Mister" from their titles, and this change was formalized by altering
all name plates on the justices' suites in the Supreme Court Building. The use of the
unadorned title "'justice" is consistent with the court's recently adopted policy of avoiding
gender-specific language wherever possible. See Ricki Lewis Tannen, Report of the Florida
Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L. REv. 803 (1990).
167. Letter from Justice Parker Lee McDonald, Florida Supreme Court to Allen Morris,
Clerk-Emeritus/Hlistorian, Florida House of Representatives (Nov. 2, 1992) (on file with
author).
168. MORRIS, supra note 160, at 122-24.
169. Id. at 113-14.
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generally has adhered to these two protocols. By tradition, the Court also
lowers its flags to half-staff upon the death of any present or former
justice.
J. The Clerk's Office
The vast majority of the Florida Supreme Court's contact with lawyers
and the public occurs through the Office of the Clerk of the Court.
7 0
Briefs are filed through the Clerk, and virtually all routine communications
with lawyers are handled by this office. Yet, the Clerk's staff does far more
than just deal with the public. The Clerk, who serves at the pleasure of the
Court,' 7' is charged with the responsibility of maintaining all papers,
records, files, and the official seal of the Court.
Moreover, the Clerk's staff maintains the Court's docket, 72 oversees
the rigorous procedural requirements imposed on death penalty cases,
173
arranges the exact timing of oral argument,'74 and prepares finalized
opinions for release to the public. 75 Orchestrating routine functions such
as these requires considerable coordination among the lawyers, the parties,
and the Court. All such matters are handled by the Clerk's Office, 176 and
the workload is substantial. In 1992, the Clerk's Office filed dispositions
in 1890 cases and opened files in 1844 new cases, in addition to handling
314 motions for rehearing.
K. The Florida Supreme Court Library
For its entire history, the Court has maintained its own law library,
which consequently is the oldest state supported library in continuous
operation in Florida. An 1845 catalog in the library's possession still lists
the 260 volumes that comprised the Court's first collection in the year
Florida was granted statehood. Today, the library maintains around 100,000
170. The present Clerk is Sid White, and the Chief Deputy Clerk is Debbie Casseaux.
171. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(c).
172. Most docketing matters currently are controlled by Kathy Belton and Barbara
Maxwell.
173. Most aspects of death penalty cases presently are supervised by Tanya Carroll.
174. The scheduling of oral argument is supervised by the Calendar Clerk, who presently
is Sara Gainey.
175. The release of opinions is controlled by the Opinion Clerk, who presently is Janie
Bentley.
176. Other members of the Clerk's staff who assist in these functions are Betsy Hill,
who circulates court files, and Sonny McAllister, who moves materials between the Clerk's
office and the justices.
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volumes along with some 10,000 monograph titles, 1400 serial titles, and
700 linear feet of archival and manuscript material.'77
But the library has not lost touch with its considerable history. A
number of rare Florida legal books are in the Court's collection, including
Spanish texts that were of great importance in the years after the Spanish
Crown ceded Florida to the United States. 7 ' The library also still retains
and uses a large number of antique glass-fronted "barrister" book cases that
have belonged to the Court since they were first purchased in 1913. These
Globe-Wernicke sectional bookcases filled five railroad cars when originally
delivered, prompting a proud headline in the October 3, 1913, edition of a
Tallahassee newspaper, the Weekly True Democrat.7 9
The office of the Supreme Court librarian 8 ° has existed only since
1957, and the occupant serves at the pleasure of the Court. Beginning in
1862, the Clerk also wore the hat of "head" librarian, though from 1899
until 1957 a full-time assistant librarian was employed. The library is open
to the public, but it does not circulate books. Its hours of operation are 8:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, although the stacks are available
to Florida Supreme Court justices and staff at any time.
L. The Office of State Courts Administrator
One of the newest internal components of the Court is the Office of
State Courts Administrator, which was created on July 1, 1972. Its initial
purpose was to assist the Court in the technical and fiscal problems
associated with preparing the operating budget of the judicial branch, as well
as compiling statistics on the need for new judges and specialized court
divisions throughout Florida. Today, the State Courts Administrator 8'
also serves as the Court's liaison to a number of other agencies, including
the Legislature, the Governor, auxiliary court agencies, and national judicial
agencies. The Office oversees a variety of legal programs and continuing
177. Some of the information used here was compiled by former Supreme Court
Librarian Brian Polley.
178. The treaty ceding Florida bound both the United States and the future state
government to honor matters already finalized under Spanish law. Thus, a large number of
early court cases actually rested on an interpretation of Spanish law. Apalachicola Land &
Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 524-25 (Fla. 1923).
179. See Five Carloads of Book Cases for Tallahassee, WEEKLY TRUE DEMOCRAT,
October 3, 1913.
180. The present librarian is Joan Cannon. Her staff are Jo Dowling, Joyce Elder, Jo
Smyly, and Linda Cole.
181. The present State Courts Administrator is Ken Palmer.
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education for judges,182 information systems used by the courts, 183 and
the judicial branch's accounting and fiscal activities.
M. The Marshal
The Court also appoints a Marshal"8 4 to be the custodian of the
Supreme Court Building and grounds and to be the conservator of the peace
in the building or any place where the Court is sitting. The Marshal is also
authorized to execute the process of the Court throughout Florida. To this
end, the Marshal is vested with constitutional authority to deputize the
sheriff or a deputy sheriff in any Florida county." 5 The Marshal also is
responsible for performing some court budgeting, purchasing and contract-
ing, security, and property accountability and maintenance.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF JURISDICTION
Another major aspect of the Court's day-to-day operations is the
exercise of its jurisdiction.'86 It is through the exercise of jurisdiction that
the Court chooses the cases that it will hear and thus, the kinds of issues
that will be decided. Florida's society is shaped by these decisions because
the opinions that result from the exercise of jurisdiction create the precedent
that will control future cases. Moreover, the bulk of the Florida Supreme
Court's jurisdiction is discretionary, meaning that the Court may decline to
hear cases falling into particular categories even if it has jurisdiction over
them. ' 7 Accordingly, the Court has significant power to choose the issues
it deems most important.
The membership of the Court has been diverse enough that no
particular ideology is discernible in the way jurisdiction has been exercised.
Jurisdiction in discretionary cases, for example, usually is put to a vote by
182. The present Deputy Administrator for Legal Affairs and Education is Dee Beranek.
183. The present Deputy Administrator for Information Systems and Program Support
is Peggy Horvath.
184. The present Marshal is Wilson Barnes.
185. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(c).
186. The historical development of the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction is amply
discussed elsewhere. E.g., Arthur J. England, Jr. et al., Florida Appellate Reform One Year
Later, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221 (1981); Arthur J. England, Jr. et al., Florida Appellate
Reform, 55 FLA. B.J. 704 (1981); Arthur J. England, Jr. et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 FLA. L. REV. 147 (1980).
187. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(6).
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a panel of five justices, with four votes being necessary to grant review.' 8
No single justice can dominate the choice of cases because of this proce-
dure. Moreover, in some discretionary categories such as certified questions
of great public importance,18 9 the Court routinely grants jurisdiction in
nearly every case brought for review by the parties. 9 This practice
further mutes any ideological bias that might seek to influence the choice
of cases.
A. The Nature of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction always involves a deceptively simple question: Does the
Court have the power to hear and to determine the case? 9' In discretion-
ary cases, a second question must also be addressed: Why should the case
be heard? 92 Most of the time the answers are obvious. But there are a
significant number of cases that fall somewhere near the outer limits of the
Court's jurisdiction. These can be exceedingly complicated, and opinions
addressing them often take on the quality of theological abstraction. Yet
such cases are highly important in the law because they draw the line
between what the Court will and will not hear. Much of the discussion
below necessarily involves such cases; for that reason, the remainder of this
article is of primary interest to lawyers and persons who may ask the Florida
Supreme Court to hear their cases.
To further complicate the issue, the Court's jurisdiction is not really a
single unified concept. Rather, jurisdiction falls into five distinct categories,
each of which involves somewhat different problems. These categories are:
advisory opinions, mandatory appellate jurisdiction, discretionary review
jurisdiction, discretionary original jurisdiction, and exclusive jurisdic-
188. SUP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § 2(A)(l)(a). If review
is granted, but four members do not agree on the need for oral argument, the chief justice
decides the issue or places the matter on the court conference agenda for resolution. Id. If
the jurisdictional vote is close and the case is significant, the chief justice also may send the
petition to the remaining two justices for a jurisdictional vote by the entire court in lieu of
placing the matter on the conference agenda.
189. See infra notes 462-85.
190. Occasionally parties choose not to bring such a case even though the district court
has certified a question. The fact that a question is certified does not bind the parties to seek
review in the Florida Supreme Court.
191. See State ex rel. Campbell v. Chapman, I So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1941).
192. See generally The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988) (holding that
Florida Supreme Court has subject matter jurisdiction over appeal of decision of intermediate
appellate court expressly citing a statute).
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tion.' 93 Each of these categories are addressed in detail below in separate
sections of this article.
The exact nature of the Court's jurisdiction is not entirely uniform, but
rather, can vary among the categories. The variations are too numerous to
include in anything less than a treatise. However, the most important are:
(1) the presumptions circumscribing the Court's jurisdiction; (2) the
precedential value of decisions and opinions within each category; and (3)
the limits placed on the Court's discretion.
1. Presumptions
The presumptions circumscribing jurisdiction depend on a key question:
Is the Court's jurisdiction limited or plenary? In a broad but imperfect
sense, the Florida Supreme Court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction.'94
This means that the Court is forbidden to exercise any form of jurisdiction
not expressly granted to it.'95 Unlike the circuit courts, the Florida
Supreme Court does not have a general grant of plenary jurisdiction, 96
which would give the Court authority over any matter not expressly
excluded from its jurisdiction.
This is an important distinction. It also is the reason why every well
written opinion issued by the Florida Supreme Court begins with a statement
establishing the basis of jurisdiction. The Florida Supreme Court cannot act
until it finds, in the Florida Constitution, an express provision granting
jurisdiction. The circuit court, to the contrary, is presumed to have
jurisdiction unless the constitution or statutes say otherwise.1 97  Put
another way, the jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, being limited,
tends to be strictly construed. Unlike the supreme court, the jurisdiction of
the circuit courts, being plenary, tends to be liberally construed.
Thus, in close cases, the presumptions would disfavor jurisdiction in
a court of limited jurisdiction while favoring jurisdiction in a court of
plenary jurisdiction. This has an important consequence. When parties
invoke the jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, they usually are
fighting against a presumption that the Court cannot hear the case. For
example, every petition seeking to establish jurisdiction based on an
193. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
194. See Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1976); Lake v. Lake,
103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
195. See generally Mystan Marine, Inc., 339 So. 2d at 201.
196. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) with FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
197. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
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"express and direct conflict of decisions"'98 labors under this presumption,
and it is one reason the bulk of these petitions are summarily denied.
However, these limitations are not entirely uniform. The Court's
authority may verge on being plenary, at least within the context of certain
types of cases. For example, the Court has mandatory exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over every final judgment of a trial court imposing a sentence
of death. 9 9 As a result, once the Court finds that a case involves the
death penalty, the Court, as a practical matter, probably has a form of
plenary jurisdiction in that case and the presumption would favor taking the
case, even if there is doubt remaining about some jurisdictional nicety.2"'
This is particularly true in light of the Court's "all writs" jurisdiction,
discussed more fully below.20 '
2. Precedential Value
Another factor that varies among the five categories is the precedential
value of cases. Some types of opinions issued by the Court lack the dignity
accorded others. This is especially true of advisory opinions, which, though
they may be persuasive, do not establish precedent.02 Opinions issued
pursuant to the Court's exclusive jurisdiction also may lack the binding
effect of precedent, but only to the extent that they deal with the Court's
administrative and rule making functions. The Florida Supreme Court's
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the bench and the bar is somewhat
different. Court opinions disciplining judges and lawyers for improprieties
may establish a kind of precedent. In practice, however, such cases are so
fact-bound that the precedent may be limited.
3. Discretion
Two categories of discretionary jurisdiction, discretionary review
jurisdiction and discretionary original jurisdiction, involve a separate
problem: the concept of "discretion., 2 3 Should the Court hear the case?
198. See discussion infra part VI.D.
199. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
200. See Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991).
201. See discussion infra part VII.E.
202. E.g., Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1992).
203. Discretion can be involved to a lesser extent in other categories ofjurisdiction, but
the restriction usually is so obvious as to merit little discussion. For example, the court has
no discretion to refuse to hear a proper appeal pursuant to its mandatory jurisdiction. See
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(I), (2).
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Discretion loosely implies the authority to make a decision as one sees fit,
but the term has a somewhat different meaning in the present context. In
The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,2 °4 the Court noted that even when a form of
discretionary jurisdiction is established, the discretion of the Court to act is
not always boundless. Discretion itself can be limited by the applicable law,
forbidding the Court to act even though jurisdiction might exist over the
case.
205
Restrictions on discretion are most obvious when the Court's discretion-
ary original jurisdiction is invoked to issue one of the so-called "extraordi-
nary writs." The fact that a petitioner merely asks for mandamus, for
example, vests the Court with jurisdiction. However, that is not the end of
the matter. Well established law severely restricts the Court's discretion to
issue writs of mandamus, 26 as is true of most of the extraordinary writs.
Similar restrictions on discretion apply when a petitioner asks the Court to
review a case decided by a district court of appeal that allegedly conflicts
with an opinion of another Florida appellate court.207  However, the
Court's discretion is generally much broader over the other subcategories of
discretionary review jurisdiction.
As a practical matter, lack of jurisdiction and lack of discretion equate
to the same thing: The case will not be heard by the Court. This explains
the tendency of lawyers and judges to blur the two concepts together,
because the distinction usually does not matter. However, there is one very
important consequence that justifies the distinction. In some cases, the
deadline by which appeals must be taken to the United States Supreme
Court hinges on whether the Florida Supreme Court actually had jurisdiction
of a case in which it has denied review.
If the Court had jurisdiction but did not exercise discretion, for
whatever reason, then the time to take the further appeal is judged from the
date the petition was dismissed by the Florida Supreme Court.2 0 8 But if
the Court lacked jurisdiction entirely, then the time to take the further appeal
is judged from the date the lower court's opinion became final.20 9 This
204. 530 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988).
205. Id.
206. See discussion infra part VII.A.
207. See discussion infra part VI.D.
208. The Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 286.
209. Id. This problem sometimes has been addressed by saying that a court has
"jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." However, the Florida Supreme Court has avoided
this type of analysis, which does not really solve the problem. If a court has jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction, then the decision not to hear a case could be construed as retroactively
depriving the court of actual jurisdiction over the controversy.
1200 [Vol. 18
486
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
is a crucial point for litigants seeking a further appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. Thus, lawyers and litigants who hope to preserve all
avenues of appeal must be mindful of the distinction between jurisdiction
and discretion.
Finally, even when discretion is not limited by the law, the Court still
210can refuse to hear any case falling within a discretionary category.
Typically this occurs because the Court does not believe the case presents
an important enough issue or the result was essentially just. For this reason,
jurisdictional briefs should almost always argue why the case is significant
enough to be heard. It is not enough merely to establish that jurisdiction
exists and that discretion is unrestricted for present purposes, except perhaps
where the importance of the case is obvious.
B. Invoking the Court's Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court usually must be invoked
by an affirmative act of one of the parties to the cause. This can occur in
several ways. Jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion is invoked by the
Governor or Attorney General by the mere filing of a letter with the Court
outlining the issues."' In the mandatory appellate jurisdiction category,
the Court's jurisdiction is automatic in death appeals,212 and is invoked by
notice of appeal and petition in the other subcategories. Discretionary
review jurisdiction is invoked by filing a petition seeking review.
However, in some types of cases, briefing on jurisdiction is not allowed." 3
Finally, the Court's exclusive original jurisdiction can be invoked by peti-
tion;2" 4 and in the case of the decennial review of legislative apportion-
ment, the Attorney General must file the petition.215
By far, the largest single category of petitions for review allege that
jurisdiction exists because the opinion under review conflicts with an
opinion of another Florida appellate court. This category is discussed in
greater detail below. 216
210. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(6).
211. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(10), art. IV, §10.
212. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
213. See in&ra text accompanying notes 493-94.
214. The court also may exercise its exclusive original jurisdiction over rule-making and
regulation of The Florida Bar on its own motion, but this is rarely done.
215. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
216. See discussion infra part VI.D.
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IV. ADVISORY OPINIONS
Any discussion of advisory opinions must begin with the well
established rule that they are disfavored. 217 This rule hinges on the nature
of advisory opinions. As a broad rule, an advisory opinion is any conclu-
sion of law stated by a court in the absence of a real controversy as to that
particular issue. 2  The reasons for this rule are obvious: Courts exist to
resolve disputes, not to address questions in the abstract. Thus, the rule
against advisory opinions prohibits parties from bringing a spurious lawsuit
in order to create precedent. The rule equally forbids judges to invent new
law irrelevant to the matters at hand.219 In this sense, the rule is probably
derived, in part, from the doctrine of separation of powers,22' because the
most extreme advisory opinions come close to being acts of judicial
legislation.
However, the rule is subject to broad and sometimes poorly defined
exceptions, partly because real world controversies often do not fall into the
neat categories the rule might suggest. The true extent of controversies may
be blurry. Moreover, judicial opinions must be conveyed through the
inherently inexact medium of human language, and sometimes it is useful
for judges to forecast directions the law is likely to take. Forecasting can
give people throughout the state some degree of guidance on unresolved
questions of law.
There is established precedent, for example, for judges to write what
often are called "scholarly" opinions creating an entire analytic framework
to resolve particular issues. Opinions of this type almost always go beyond
the bare questions presented by the case and rest on thorough research and
reasoning contained in the text. As recent cases from the United States
Supreme Court have demonstrated, they often are admired, honored, and
come in all ideological bents.22' Thus, the rule against advisory opinions
does not apply to scholarly opinions, though such opinions sometimes are
criticized for violating the rule.
Florida law also has a long-standing tradition of obiter dicta, usually
shortened to "dicta," which by definition are statements in a court's opinion
217. See, e.g., Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Brooks, 341 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1976);
Department of Admin. v. Home, 325 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1976).
218. See Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc., 341 So. 2d at 993.
219. See id.
220. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
221. E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
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that are extraneous or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues.222
Scholarly opinions, almost by definition, are built on dicta. Moreover, dicta
are so common in opinions that a well established body of cases govern
their interpretation, and obviously, tolerate their continued use. Thus, dicta
are extraneous statements of law that are permissible, though not always
taken seriously. Here again, the rule against advisory opinions does not
reach so far as to out-and-out prohibit the use of dicta.
In any event, dicta are subject to strong limitations. Courts sometimes
say that dicta bind no one, not even the one who wrote them,223 though
this assertion may suggest too much. In actual practice, dicta can have
persuasive force in much the same way that a concurring opinion can, at
least when they are well reasoned. 24 This is most apparent in scholarly
opinions. In other words, dicta should be considered if relevant, can be
ignored if poorly reasoned or distinguishable, and gain greater force with
repetition. One district court of appeal has even suggested that a dictum
stated by the Florida Supreme Court "is not without value as preced-
ent,, 225 but this may use the word "precedent" too loosely.
Whatever border separates dicta from advisory opinions has never been
finely drawn, and there probably can be no bright line rule. Clearly, dicta
can verge into an advisory opinion and thus, may be abused. In broad terms
however, statements that illuminate or place in context any relevant issue
probably should continue to be tolerated as a useful feature of opinion
writing, especially in forecasting the law's evolution. The rule against
advisory opinions would be most applicable to attempts to address wholly
irrelevant issues, especially where the effect is legislation.
Even then, other long standing exceptions to the rule against advisory
opinions exist. In a few instances, even moot or completely abstract
questions can be answered by the Court. For example, the mootness
doctrine generally requires dismissal of a cause in which the issues have
become so fully resolved that any decision will have no actual effect.226
There is, however, an important exception for moot cases that present
important questions capable of repetition yet likely to evade review because
they are inherently fleeting in nature. This occurred in the case of T.A.C.P.
222. See Therrell v. Reilly, 151 So. 305 (Fla. 1932).
223. E.g., Hart v. Stribling, 6 So. 455 (Fla. 1889).
224. See Milligan v. State, 177 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); but see Conti-
nental Assurance Co. v. Carroll, 485 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1986) (dicta never regarded as
"ground-breaking precedent").
225. Hart v. Stribling, 6 So. 455 (Fla. 1889).
226. Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 15 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1943).
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discussed above.227 If the Court finds this situation to exist, jurisdiction
may be determined as though the controversy had never become moot.1
22
Likewise, the Florida Constitution itself expressly authorizes the Court
to consider abstract questions of law and issue advisory opinions to the
Governor and Attorney General in two narrow circumstances.229 Like all
advisory opinions, these opinions do not constitute binding precedent,
though they can be persuasive.23° They are authorized by the constitution
to deal with situations in which the Court's opinion on an abstract question
can advance public interests, discussed below.
A. Advisory Opinions Requested by the Governor
The Florida Supreme Court may issue advisory opinions to the
Governor on any question affecting the latter's constitutional powers and
duties.23' By tradition, the question or questions are posed in a simple
letter to the Court on the Governor's stationery.232 Often, the letter is
quite detailed and usually contains an in-depth briefing on the relevant
law, including reasons why the Governor believes the questions should be
answered in a particular way.
Jurisdiction is mandatory; the Court must hear the case and issue an
opinion.233 Upon receipt, the letter is immediately routed to the chief
justice, who will call a court conference to determine if the question can be
answered and if oral argument is desired.234 If the case is accepted, the
chief justice then will assign it to an office.235 In practice, oral argument
is usually granted, 236 except where at least four justices determine that the
question is unanswerable for reasons discussed below. 237  Any person
whose substantial interest may be affected by the advisory opinion may be
227. See supra text accompanying note 28.
228. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 589 n.2 (Fla. 1992) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So.
2d 217 (Fla. 1984)).
229. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ l(c), 10.
230. See Florida League of Cities, 607 So. 2d at 399.
231. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § I(c).
232. This is consistent with the applicable Rule of Court, which only requires that the
Governor's request be in writing. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.500(a).
233. Id.
234. See Sup. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § II(G)(I).
235. Id. Advisory opinions almost always fall into the "special" category of case
assignments. See supra text accompanying note 73.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
237. FLA. R. App. P. 9.500(b)(1).
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permitted to make argument, to file a brief, or both.23 Time limitations
and scheduling of argument lie within the Court's discretion. 239
An opinion is then issued on an expedited basis after argument can be
heard, subject to one exception: The constitution provides that the opinion
must be rendered "not earlier than ten days from the filing and docketing of
the request, unless in [the Court's] judgment the delay would cause public
injury."24 The opinion also is written in the form of a letter addressed to
the Governor and signed by the concurring justices, although the letter will
be published like any other court opinion and included in West Publishing
Company's Southern Second series. Any separate concurring or dissenting
views are written in the form of a separate letter to the Governor signed by
the justices agreeing with that particular viewpoint, and are appended to the
majority's letter.
Under the constitution's requirements, in the strictest sense, the Court's
discretion to answer a request for an advisory opinion is confined solely to
questions of the Governor's constitutional powers.241' Accordingly, the
first issue that must be addressed in each instance is whether the Governor's
questions can be answered as framed. If the questions stray beyond
constitutional concerns, then the Court lacks discretion and must refuse to
answer. There is precedent that an advisory opinion cannot address issues
of the Governor's purely statutory powers.242
Over the years, however, the distinction between constitutional and
statutory concerns has become fuzzy. In a number of cases the Court's
majority has answered questions about statutory matters if there was some
significant and identifiable nexus with the Governor's constitutional powers
or duties. For example, the Court has held that the Governor's constitution-
al powers are implicated by questions posed to the Court about new
statutory tax schemes. This was done on grounds that the fiscal stability of
the state was at stake, which implicated the Governor's fiscal duties under
the Florida Constitution.243
238. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.500(b)(2); SUP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCE-
DURES § II(G)(1).
239. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.500(b)(2).
240. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c).
241. Id.
242. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969).
243. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 301 (Fla. 1987)
(citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1971)).
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A similar result was reached in a case involving a statute modifying
Florida's appellate districts and creating judicial vacancies.244 There, the
Court found discretion to hear the case because "irreparable harm" otherwise
might result, and the constitutional nexus cited was the Governor's duty to
fill judicial vacancies.245 Thus, in actual practice, the Court sometimes
may find it has discretion to answer questions about statutes significantly
related to any one of the Governor's express constitutional powers or duties.
"Statutory" advisory opinions of this type, even if proper, are not
without problems. There are important limitations to advisory opinions to
the Governor beyond the fact that they are not technically binding precedent.
The Court has held that advisory opinions cannot address federal issues.
The Court has also held that they can address Florida constitutional issues
only for prima facie validity.246 . As a result, all federal questions remain
unresolved along with any challenge to the statute's constitutionality as
applied to specific individuals.24 A dissenting justice in one of the tax
cases suggested that an advisory opinion of this type can win the Governor,
at best, a fragment of a victory.248
Advisory opinions to the Governor, in other words, are most useful
when they are confined to the stricter parameters suggested by the Florida
Constitution itself: the Governor's constitutional powers and duties. The
Florida Supreme Court is the final authority on the meaning of the state
constitution, subject to the people's power of amendment.249 Advisory
opinions confined to a question of pure Florida constitutional law are thus
far more persuasive than ones that delve into the validity of statutes or into
matters regulated by federal law. A "constitutional" advisory opinion
genuinely may be able to resolve a future controversy before it can occur,
but a "statutory" advisory opinion may only mark the first of many rounds
of litigation.
244. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor Request of June 29, 1979, 374 So. 2d 959
(Fla. 1979).
245. Id. at 962.
246. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d at 301-02.
247. This restriction is self-evident. Advisory opinions deal with abstract questions of
law, not the concerns of single individuals not present in the court. "As applied" challenges,
by their very nature, require a controversy raised by individuals. See id.
248. Id. at 319-20 (Barkett, J., declining to answer questions).
249. See The Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 288; see also FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
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B. Advisory Opinions Requested by the Attorney General
The second type of advisory opinion authorized by the constitution are
requested by the Attorney General. Cases of this type are confined solely
to the question of whether a citizen's petition to amend the state constitution
is valid.25 ' This particular type of jurisdiction is of recent vintage."' It
was added to the constitution by the people of Florida to lessen the
possibility that citizens might expend considerable time and resources on a
petition drive later declared invalid on technical grounds. Previously, there
was no way for drive members to obtain an advance court ruling on the
validity of their petition.
Such a ruling is important because citizen petition drives are subject to
two requirements imposed by state law. The proposed amendment must
contain only a single subject25 2 and must include a fair and accurate ballot
summary of no more than seventy-five words.21 ' The Florida Supreme
Court has determined that it cannot consider any issue beyond these two,
including whether the amendment, if enacted, would violate the United
States Constitution. 54 Nor can the Court rewrite an unfair or inaccurate
ballot summary. 255 However, these are restrictions imposed not by the
constitution, but by the enabling legislation, which could be amended to lift
the restrictions. A bill to accomplish just that was approved by the 1993
Florida Legislature but vetoed by the Governor. 6
An action requesting an advisory opinion of this type is commenced by
the Attorney General, who is required by law to petition the Court once
250. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10; see also id art V, § 3(b)(10).
251. The relevant constitutional amendment creating this form of jurisdiction was
adopted by the voters of Florida on November 4, 1986, and enabling legislation was approved
the following year.
252. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
253. See FLA. STAT. § 101.161 (1991).
254. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Limited Political Terms in Certain
Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991). In early 1994, a case was pending before
the Florida Supreme Court in which several parties argued that advisory opinions to the
attorney general may properly address federal constitutional questions. In re Advisory
Opinion to the Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, No. 82,674 (Fla.
argued January 7, 1994). In effect, these petitions asked the Court to recede from its earlier
decision that the constitutional issues are not justiciable. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney
General-Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d at 227. At the time
this article was being finalized, no decision had yet been rendered on these petitions.
255. Smith v. American Air Lines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618, 621-22 (Fla. 1992).
256. See Fla. HB 195 (1993); Fla. SB 1278 (1993).
1994] 1207
493
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
certain threshold requirements are met.257  The enabling legislation
provides that members of the citizen petition drive must register as a
political committee; must submit the ballot title, substance, and text to the
Secretary of State; and must obtain a letter from the state Division of
Elections that a certain number of verified signatures have been obtained on
the petition. 25 ' At this juncture, the Secretary of State must submit the
petition to the Attorney General,259 who is required to petition the Court
within thirty days.260
The Court has determined that advisory opinions of this type are
handled the same as those requested by the Governor.26' By analogy to
gubernatorial advisory opinions, the Attorney General has adopted the
practice of submitting the case to the Court by means of a letter on official
stationery addressed to the justices.262 The two relevant questions must
be posed and answered, because neither the Attorney General nor the Court
has any discretion to expand or to restrict the issues, as matters presently
stand.
Beyond that, the Attorney General is not required to brief the issue nor
to take any particular side in the case. However, the Attorney General's
letter usually includes a statement outlining the facts, issues, and relevant
law in an objective manner, without advocating any particular result. Any
interested party may also brief the case, which usually is scheduled for oral
argument. There has been no need to expedite such cases, because the
enabling legislation ensures that they come well in advance of any election.
Although jurisdiction over cases of this type is recent, the Court
nevertheless decides these cases by drawing on precedent. Previously,
challenges to proposed constitutional amendments could be brought by
means of a mandamus action filed at any time prior to the date of the
election. 263 The Court has concluded that its new advisory jurisdiction is
meant to address the same issues previously considered by way of
mandamus, subject to the inherent limitations of advisory opinions.2 64
257. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
258. FLA. STAT. § 15.21 (1991). The number required is determined by a formula
contained in this statute. Id.
259. Id.
260. FLA. STAT. § 16.061 (1991).
261. SUP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § II(G)(2).
262. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General English-the Official
Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1988) (noting case was submitted by letter).
263. See Florida League of Cities, 607 So. 2d at 397.
264. Id. at 399.
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Thus, earlier cases brought as mandamus actions are relevant in
determining the applicable law. However, the fact that this new form of
jurisdiction is only advisory means that any opinion issued by the Court is
highly persuasive but not binding. The Court still can entertain a later
petition for mandamus provided that it does not attempt to relitigate issues
already addressed in the advisory opinion.265
The standard for addressing the "single-subject" requirement wavered
during the early 1980's but has become more stable recently. All that is
required is that the proposed amendment have a logical and natural oneness
of purpose, which occurs if all parts of the amendment may be viewed as
having a natural relation and connection as components or aspects of a
single dominant plan or scheme. 266 The Court also has held that it is not
necessarily relevant that the proposed amendment affects more than one
provision of the Florida Constitution or more than one branch of govern-
ment provided it meets the "oneness" standard.267 This test has been
criticized for its subjectivity but remains the applicable standard of
review.268
The standard for addressing the ballot summary issue has a more stable
history. The Court has consistently held that the summary must state in
clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure, but need
not explain every detail or ramification.269 The chief evil addressed by
this standard of review is to prevent the voters from being misled and to
allow votes to be cast intelligently.217  For example, the Court has held
ballot summaries defective for suggesting that new rights were to be given
to the people, when in fact rights were being taken away.27' Moreover,
the failure to include an adequate ballot summary cannot be cured by the
fact that public information about the amendment was widely available.27
For reasons not entirely clear, the Court has not adopted the practice
of answering the Attorney General's questions in the form of a letter signed
by the concurring justices, as happens with gubernatorial advisory opinions.
265. Id. at 398-99.
266. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Limited Political Terms in Certain
Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984,
990 (Fla. 1984)).
267. Id. (citing Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976)).
268. Id. at 231 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
269. Id. at 228 (quoting Carroll v. Firestone, 497 So. 2d 1204, 1204-1206 (Fla. 1986)).
270. Id.
271. Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984); accord People Against Tax
Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of Leon, 583 So. 2d 1373, 1376 (Fla. 1991).
272. Wadhams v. Board of County Comm'rs, 567 So. 2d 414, 416-17 (Fla. 1990).
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Instead, the Court has issued its conclusions in the form of an opinion,
possibly because this always was done in the earlier mandamus actions.
However, the letter format has the grace of emphasizing the advisory nature
of the opinion and the fact that the opinion comes from the justices as
individuals and not from the Court as a tribunal. The Court, at some point,
might wish to return to the letter format. In any event, this is a matter of
sheer form and does not alter the purely advisory nature of the opinion.273
V. MANDATORY APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Florida Supreme Court is vested with mandatory appellate jurisdic-
tion over four narrow categories of cases. These are: (1) death appeals; 27 4
(2) appeals involving the validity of public-revenue bonds; 275 (3) appeals
from the Florida Public Service Commission; 276 and (4) appeals from
opinions of a district court declaring a state statute or provision of the
Florida Constitution invalid.277 Jurisdiction in the first three subcategories
is exclusive, meaning that no other appellate court can hear the case.27
All cases brought under the Court's mandatory jurisdiction are called "ap-
peals," as distinguished from "reviews. 279
The reasons for vesting the Court with some limited forms of mandato-
ry, exclusive appellate jurisdiction are evident. In death appeals, for
example, the Court has noted that its mandatory appellate jurisdiction rests
in part on the need to ensure uniformity of the applicable law throughout
Florida.280 A lack of uniformity might occur if the various district courts
of appeal had jurisdiction subject only to discretionary review in the Florida
Supreme Court.28' Uniformity is essential in death cases because of a
variety of federal constitutional restrictions.
273. See Smith, 607 So. 2d at 399.
274. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
275. Id., § 3(b)(2).
276. Id.
277. Id. § 3(b).
278. Id.
279. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (using terms "appeal" and "review" in contradis-
tinction). The distinction apparently has a long history in Florida, where Courts sometimes
have said that the word "appeal" denotes an appellate proceeding that may be had as a matter
of right. See Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So. 2d 594, 597 (Fla. 1961).
280. Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991).
281. Id.
1210 [Vol. 18
496
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
The same reasoning applies to bond validations and appeals to the
Public Service Commission. Enormous amounts of public money and great
potential liability often are at stake in these cases. A determination by the
state's highest court is necessary to dispel questions as to whether publicly
issued bonds are valid and whether utility regulations and rates are lawful.
Without such finality, bonds might be considered a poor risk by investors
who might suddenly be cast in doubt by new Court decisions; and, utility
services might be impeded by protracted appellate litigation or unresolved
doubts in the law. Thus, the framers of the constitution vested the Florida
Supreme Court with mandatory appellate jurisdiction to resolve these
matters.282
A. Death Appeals
The Court's authority over death appeals is one of the most straight-
forward. Very, simply, the Court has exclusive, mandatory jurisdiction over
any final judgment imposing a sentence of death 283 and all other matters
arising from the same trial and sentencing.284 Moreover, jurisdiction is
automatic, meaning the Court must hear the case even if the inmate senten-
ced to death does not wish to appeal.285 This is the only type of supreme
court jurisdiction that is automatic. In all others, failure to bring an appeal
or seek review deprives the Court of jurisdiction. 286 A murder conviction
resulting in any penalty less than death is appealed to the appropriate district
court, with possible discretionary review later in the Florida Supreme Court.
The rare disputes over this form of jurisdiction often relate to the
collateral proceedings that almost always follow the conclusion of the
appeal. Nevertheless, the Court commonly cites its constitutional jurisdic-
tion over death appeals as a basis for hearing collateral challenges, 287 even
though the latter technically do not constitute "appeals" at all. This suggests
the plenary nature of the jurisdiction granted once the Court finds there is
282. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1), (2).
283. Id, § 3(b)(1).
284. See Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982).
285. Muehlman v. State, 503 So. 2d 310, 312-13 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882
(1987) (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1985)).
286. There are limited but rare exceptions when the Court exercises its administrative
jurisdiction sua sponte to make rules and regulate the Florida Bar. Moreover, administrative
acts of the court are not judicial acts, properly speaking.
287. Eg., Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2049 (1993).
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a final judgment of death in the case, a conclusion reinforced by the Court's
habeas corpus... and "all writs" jurisdiction.
Interlocutory appeals in ongoing trials that might result in a death
penalty are more problematic, and the law in this area remains unsettled.
The argument against the Court hearing these cases rests chiefly on the fact
that the constitution grants jurisdiction only where there is a final judgment
imposing the death penalty.29 Moreover, in 1979, the Court stated that
there is no reason interlocutory appeals in death cases should not go to a
district court of appeal when they involve matters routinely reviewed there,
as most do.21' The Court's 1979 analysis of this issue came prior to the
jurisdictional reforms of 1980 and can be questioned on that basis, but the
rationale remains sound.
Nevertheless, the argument against interlocutory jurisdiction cannot be
called compelling as matters now stand. In 1988, the Court appeared to
hold that interlocutory appeals to a district court in a death case become
"law of the case" perhaps even when no further appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court was possible at the time.292 This suggestion contradicted,
and thus may have overruled, a 1984 holding saying the opposite.293 The
possible result is that the Florida Supreme Court could be deprived of its
ability to consider an interlocutory issue that very well might reflect on the
validity of a later death sentence; a result obviously contrary to the principle
of automatic and full review in death cases.9 Defense counsel also might
deprive the client of a full appeal in the Florida Supreme Court simply by
exercising the right to an interlocutory appeal to the district court.
The only reasonable solutions to this problem are to recognize some
form of obligatory supreme court jurisdiction in interlocutory appeals or to
hold, once again, that the law of the case doctrine does not apply in this
context. Obligatory jurisdiction could be premised on the Court's jurisdic-
tion over judgments of death or its all writs power.295 However, either of
these approaches strains the constitution's language and risks burdening the
Florida Supreme Court's docket with interlocutory appeals from cases that
288. See discussion infra part VII.D.
289. See discussion infra part VII.E.
290. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
291. State v. Preston, 376 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1979).
292. LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925
(1989). But see Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984).
293. Preston, 444 So. 2d at 942.
294. See id.
295. See discussion infra part VIlE.
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may or may not result in a death penalty. Limiting the law of the case
doctrine seems more consistent both with the pre-1988 case law 296 and the
language of the constitution itself. Supreme Court jurisdiction requires a
final judgment of death, not mere speculation that such a judgment will be
entered.297 Moreover, interlocutory appeals in death cases rarely involve
matters the district courts do not routinely consider.
There is a separate method by which non-final orders of trial courts
sometimes are directly reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court. On rare
occasions the Court has agreed to review such matters by way of writ of
prohibition.298 However, these cases involve the trial court's effort to
restrict prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty. It is highly
unlikely that prohibition would be allowed over more routine issues.
B. Bond Validation
The second form of mandatory, exclusive appellate jurisdiction deals
with the validation of bond issues made for some public purposes.
Typically, the bonds are issued by governmental units to build infrastructure,
to finance public projects, or to advance the public welfare. This is a type
of jurisdiction authorized by the constitution but requiring enabling legisla-
tion,2 99 that has now been enacted.3 ° °
The jurisdictional grant is narrow. The Court has said that its sole
function in such cases is to determine whether the governmental agency
issuing the bonds had the power to act as it did, and whether the agency
exercised its power in accordance with the law."' Some procedural time
limits are abbreviated in bond cases to allow expedited review.
3 0 2
The determination of legality can include questions that might impugn
the bond issue, such as the propriety of an election in which voters approved
a funding source securing the issue.30 3 Moreover, many types of bonds
296. See supra note 293.
297. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
298. E.g., State v. Donner, 500 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1987); State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2
(Fla. 1986). The writ of prohibition is discussed infra part VII.C.
299. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
300. FLA. STAT. § 75.08 (1991).
301. State v. Leon County, 400 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 1981).
302. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.11 0(I)(i); id. 9.330(c).
303. People Against'Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of Leon, 583 So. 2d
1373 (Fla. 1991).
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are proper only if issued for public, municipal, or other specific purpos-
es. 304  But these restrictions are sometimes broadly construed. "Public
purpose," for instance, has been found to include even some projects of
primary benefit to relatively small segments of the public" 5 or even
private enterprise." 6 The most famous of these cases involved the
validation of bonds for reclamation and water control in the vicinity of Walt
Disney World.3"7
C. Public Service Commission Appeals
The third form of mandatory, exclusive jurisdiction governs appeals
from orders of the Florida Public Service Commission affecting rates or
services of electric, gas, or telephone utilities.3"8 Jurisdiction requires
enabling legislation, which has been enacted.309 It deserves emphasis that
the orders under appeal must relate to rates or services.310 Other types of
issues often arise in Public Service Commission cases and, therefore, do not
fall within the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction.311
The enabling legislation adds only a few insights into the Court's
jurisdiction. For instance, it specifies that appeal is obtained "upon peti-
tion. '  Additionally, one statute equates the term "telephone ser-
vice" '313 with "telecommunications company,"3 4 thus defining the Flori-
da Supreme Court's jurisdiction to reach most forms of two-way communi-
cation for hire within the state.3" 5 There appear to be no cases addressing
304. E.g., State v. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d 1315, 1316-18 (Fla. 1991), recedingfrom
State v. City of Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1988); see FLA. CONST. art. VII,
§§ 2, 10-17; FLA. STAT. § 75.01-75.17 (1991).
305. Northern Palm Beach County Water Control District v. State, 604 So. 2d 440 (Fla.
1992).
306. E.g., Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983);
State v. Osceola County Indus. Dev. Auth., 424 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1982).
307. State v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 216 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1968) (case arose
prior to adoption of the 1968 Constitution).
308. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
309. FLA. STAT. §§ 364.381, 366.10 (1991).
310. See id. § 364.381.
311. E.g., State v. Lindahl, 613 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). For a
discussion of jurisdiction in other types of cases, see Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Florida
Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 221, 230 (1981).
312. FLA. STAT. § 366.10 (1991).
313. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
314. FLA. STAT. § 364.381 (1991).
315. See id. § 364.02(7).
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whether this statutory definition comports with the strict language of the
constitution, which only uses the word "telephone."3"6
D. Statutoty/Constitutional Invalidity
The final form of mandatory jurisdiction differs from the other three
because it is not exclusive. By definition, cases involving statutory or
constitutional invalidity are appealed from a district court decision that has
stricken a provision of the Florida Statutes or state constitution.317 The
plain language of the constitution requires that this decision must actually
and expressly hold the statutory or constitutional provision invalid."' 8
Apparently, it is not enough that the opinion can merely be construed to
have reached the same result tacitly.3" 9 However, commentators have
suggested that the Florida Supreme Court might properly exercise this type
of jurisdiction in the rare event that a district court has summarily affirmed
a lower court's ruling expressly invalidating a statute.32° One possible
basis for doing so could be the Court's all writs jurisdiction, discussed
below.
321
There was some concern at one point that this form of jurisdiction
might only apply when a statutory or constitutional provision is declared
facially invalid and not where invalidity was "as applied. 322  However,
the Court has not recognized this distinction. "As applied" invalidity has
316. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
317. See id. § 3(b)(l).
318. Id. Any direct statement by a district court that a statute or constitutional provision
is invalid almost certainly would be construed as a holding and thus part of the decision, even
if unnecessary to the case. Review then could be had on that basis. However, the Florida
Supreme Court did decline review in one case with peculiar facts. In Hanfi v. Phelan, 488
So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1986), the court dismissed jurisdiction where invalidity was only one of
several alternative holdings and the district court had remanded for an evidentiary hearing to
determine which of the holdings was proper in the specific case. Id. at 532. Absent the
remand for an evidentiary hearing, it seems unlikely that Hanfi would have been dismissed
merely because there were alternative holdings. Id.
319. For a discussion of this "inherent invalidity" argument, see Arthur J. England, Jr.,
et al., Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 229 (1981).
As this article notes, the first "inherent invalidity" case in which jurisdiction was denied
apparently was Southern Gold Citrus v. Dunnigan, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1981). For a
discussion of the now-abolished inherency doctrine see infra notes 342-43 and accompanying
text.
320. Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Florida: 1980 Reforms, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147, 169-70 (1980) [hereinafter Jurisdiction].
321. See discussion infra part VILE.
322. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 170.
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been used as the basis for jurisdiction, though the Court apparently has done
so without comment by extension from earlier case law.123  Before the
1980 reforms, "as applied" jurisdiction had proven controversial, being
disallowed in 1961,324 but then authorized again in 1963 by a divided
court.125  The practice was reaffirmed in 1979 shortly before the most
recent jurisdictional reforms, again by a fragmented court. 26
Earlier criticisms may still have some merit in that an "as applied"
decision invalidates a statute or constitutional provision only in cases with
similar facts. Thus, there is a less pressing reason for mandatory review,
because the decision under appeal essentially leaves the statute or provision
in effect but subject to a fact-specific exception. However, much of the
earlier criticism arose from the fact that trial court orders declaring a statute
invalid were directly appealable to the Florida Supreme Court. 27 This is
no longer the case. In any event, "as applied" cases have been relatively
few and probably serve a useful function in settling partial doubts about a
statute's enforcement.
In this vein, it also is worth noting that the apparent purpose of
mandatory jurisdiction in these cases is to achieve some degree of finality
and uniformity of law. If the Florida Supreme Court were not required to
hear an appeal, then the district court opinions in question might remain on
the books for years without being either approved or disapproved. As a
result, statutes or constitutional provisions might be enforced in some
appellate districts but not others. Mandatory supreme court jurisdiction
greatly diminishes these possibilities.
Such problems cannot be completely eliminated, however. Any state
court opinion striking a provision of the Florida Constitution could do so
only on grounds that the provision violated the United States Constitution,
a federal statute, or a treaty binding upon the state through the Supremacy
Clause.3 2' That necessarily means that the Florida Supreme Court's
resolution of the issue would rest entirely on federal questions that would
be reviewable by the United States Supreme Court and could be decided
323. See Psychiatric Assoc. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 421-22 (Fla. 1992) (accepting
jurisdiction for "as applied" invalidity).
324. Stein v. Darby, 134 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1961).
325. Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1963).
326. Cross v. State, 374 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1979).
327. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 166.
328. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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differently by some federal courts. Thus the Florida Supreme Court's
determination of the case would not necessarily be the final word.
VI. DISCRETIONARY REVIEW JURISDICTION
The Florida Supreme Court's discretionary review jurisdiction accounts
for the largest share of the petitions that it receives. This type of jurisdic-
tion is "discretionary" because the Court, in every instance, can decline to
hear a case without reason, and in some instances must decline because the
law restricts discretion. 329 All cases brought under this type of jurisdiction
technically are called "reviews," as distinguished from "appeals," though
lawyers and justices alike sometimes use the terms interchangeably. 330
The distinction between the terms is found in the constitution itself.33 1 In
a more colloquial sense, "reviews" in this category do, in fact, constitute a
type of "appellate" jurisdiction because the Court is reviewing actions taken
by lower courts.
Jurisdiction over discretionary review cases is invoked when a party
files two copies of a notice that review is being sought, which must be done
within thirty days of rendition332 of the order in the case.333 The notice
must be filed with the clerk of the district court, must be accompanied by
the proper fee, and must be in the form prescribed by rule.334 Briefing on
jurisdiction is allowed in all cases except where the district court has
certified a question of great public importance, or has certified that the case
is in direct conflict with the decision of another district court.335
A. Declaration of Statutory Validity
The first type of discretionary review jurisdiction governs district court
decisions expressly declaring a state statute valid. 336  For jurisdiction to
329. For a discussion of "discretion" see supra part III.A.3.
330. For a discussion distinguishing reviews from appeals see supra text accompanying
note 279.
331. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
332. Rendition occurs when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower
tribunal, subject to some exceptions. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(g).
333. Id. at 9.120(b).
334. See id. at 9.200(b-c), 9.900.
335. Id. at 9.120(d). "Certified question" is discussed infra part VI.E. "Certified
conflict" is discussed infra part VI.F.
336. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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exist, the decision under review must contain some statement to the effect
that a specified statute is valid or enforceable.337 The constitution does
not directly say whether the statement must be necessary to the result
reached. In a highly analogous context, however, the Court has expressly
premised its jurisdiction on statements that were dicta.338
This conclusion is justifiable in the sense that dicta have persuasive
force. At first blush, however, it does seem somewhat at odds with the
constitution's requirement that jurisdiction be based on a "decision. 339
At least in other contexts, the decision is the result reached and is not
gratuitous dicta in the opinion. 34° However, the Florida Supreme Court
has indicated that the term "decision," as used in the constitution's jurisdic-
tional sections, encompasses not merely the result but also the entire
opinion. 41 In any event, the fact that a statute is declared valid in dicta
may lessen the desire of the Court to exercise its discretion over the case,
unless perhaps some injustice may result if the dicta are given effect by
other courts.
Historically, the 1980 jurisdictional amendments overruled the so-called
"inherency doctrine" 342 by which review might be had if the Court found
that an opinion tacitly found a statute valid.343 This might occur, for
example, where the opinion applied the statute as though it were valid but
did not directly make a finding of validity. Following the 1980 amend-
ments, the inherency doctrine has not been mentioned or used, and
obviously is no longer viable.
B. Construction of State or Federal Constitutions
The second form of discretionary jurisdiction arises when the decision
of the district court below expressly construes a provision of the state or
federal constitutions.344 The operative phrase "construes a provision" was
337. See Cantor v. Davis, 489 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1986).
338. Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1984) (involving express
and direct conflict of decisions).
339. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
340. The Court has recognized the importance of the distinction in analogous contexts.
See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980) (jurisdiction based on express and
direct conflict of decisions of different courts of appeal or the supreme court).
341. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958).
342. See Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., I I 1 So. 2d
439 (Fla. 1959).
343. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 183.
344. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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imported into the 1980 jurisdictional reforms essentially unchanged from
what had existed previously, with the word "expressly" being an addi-
tion.345 Commentators in 1980 stated their view that the new requirement
of "expressness" merely codified prior case law,346 a view the Court
apparently has neither accepted nor rejected. However, it does seem likely
that pre-1980 case law on this type of jurisdiction remains persuasive at
least to some extent.
Prior to the 1980 reforms, the Court held that the inherency doctrine
does not apply to this type of jurisdiction.347 Rather, the decision under
review had to "'explain, define or otherwise eliminate existing doubts
arising from the language or terms of the constitutional provision."'348
The key word was "doubts": The opinion under review had to contain a
statement recognizing or purporting to resolve some doubt about a
constitutional provision. Moreover, this statement had to be a "ruling" '349
that was more than a mere application of a settled constitutional princi-
ple.35° Absent the obligatory act of construction, it was not enough that
a petitioner simply alleged an unconstitutional result.35' Commentators
called this the "explain or amplify" requirement.352
On policy grounds, this entire analysis still makes good sense. The
Florida Supreme Court is the one state court that can resolve legal doubts
on a statewide basis. Resolving constitutional doubts is a highly important
function because it results in more predictable organic law. No similar
purpose is served by the Court hearing a case that has merely reiterated
settled principles. The Court's function, in other words, is to say whether
an evolution in constitutional law developed by the lower appellate courts
is proper,353 or to resolve a doubt those courts have expressly noted.354
345. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 184-85.
346. Id. at 184.
347. Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 1973).
348. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. 1958)).
349. Dykman v. State, 294 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975).
350. Rojas v. State, 288 So. 2d 234, 236 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974).
351. Carmazi v. Board of County Comm'rs, 104 So. 2d 727, 728-29 (Fla. 1958).
352. Arthur J. England, Jr. et al., Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 221, 240 (1981).
353. Any evolution in law by a lower court inherently creates a "doubt": Is the new
principle or the new application correct?
354. A district court sometimes may outline its doubts about what appears to be a settled
constitutional principle it is applying. The statement of doubt creates an issue that sometimes
may deserve resolution by the Florida Supreme Court.
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The Court's recent cases on this form of jurisdiction seem to be in accord
with the pre-1980 analysis outlined above.355
There are a few problems, however. For one thing, the line that
separates "explain or amplify" from "mere application" has sometimes been
hard to see. In the 1975 case Potvin v. Keller,356 for example, the Court's
majority reviewed a district court opinion that merely mentioned the
appellants' Fourteenth Amendment argument, and then affirmed the trial
court's order without stating whether the Fourteenth Amendment had any
bearing on the decision.357 The Florida Supreme Court's majority in
Potvin buttressed its jurisdiction with the following explanation: The district
court had "ruled" that "no constitutional infirmity" existed based on the
specific facts at hand.358
Later in the opinion's analysis, the majority also noted that the district
court's opinion "may" have overstated federal case law when talking about
constitutional and statutory rights that were not further identified.359 Thus,
the district court arguably had tried to eliminate a doubt about the Four-
teenth Amendment. A misapplication of settled law obviously can be
viewed as an evolutionary development deserving correction; but on
Potvin's peculiar facts, some straining was needed to reach so far, especially
because the lower court's result was affirmed.
The strain is especially evident when a second question is posed: How
specifically must the district court identify a constitutional provision it is
construing? The district court in Potvin did not premise its actual holding
on any specific provision, though the court probably misconstrued a federal
case dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, a reader
could not finally determine that the Fourteenth Amendment was being
construed in Potvin without reading, or having prior knowledge of, the
federal case cited therein.36
This analysis risks creating a kind of "cross-reference" jurisdiction any
time an opinion cites to materials analyzing a constitutional provision. Such
a possibility is very difficult to square with the requirement that construction
must be "express." Potvin probably is best understood as a dated and
355. E.g., Foster v. State, 613 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1993); City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So.
2d 15 (Fla. 1992); City Nat'l Bank v. Tescher, 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991).
356. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975), affg 299 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
357. Id. at 704 & n.i.
358. Id. at n.1.
359. Id. at 705 & n.4.
360. See Potvin v. Keller, 299 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citing In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
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marginal case in which the Florida Supreme Court stretched the envelope
of its jurisdiction to correct a deficient lower court analysis that, neverthe-
less, had reached a correct result. Moreover, the 1980 jurisdiction
amendments could be viewed as superseding Potvin by adding the
requirement that constitutional construction be "express."36'
The better approach is the one suggested in the Court's earlier cases.
For jurisdiction to exist, the district court's opinion must explain or amplify
some identifiable constitutional provision in a way that is an evolutionary
development in the law or that expresses doubt about some legal point.362
Misapplication of earlier law could rise to this level to the extent that it can
be considered an evolutionary development; but even then, the decision
under review should at least be grounded in the discussion of a specific
constitutional provision. Obviously, it would be needlessly bureaucratic to
require a formal method of citation. Any reference sufficient to identify
some constitutional provision ought to qualify, even a clipped reference like
"full faith and credit." 3
63
It remains to be seen whether dicta can be a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction :in cases of this type. The court has expressly used dicta to
364anthsestablish jurisdiction in analogous contexts, and thus, probably could do
so here as well. Dicta establishing some new principle of constitutional law
would have persuasive value, though perhaps not quite amounting to
"rulings. 3 65 Review might be justified on that basis, especially where the
dicta could be disruptive. But in any event, jurisdiction remains discretion-
ary and could be declined if the dicta seem harmless.
C. Opinions Affecting Constitutional or State Officers
The third basis of discretionary review jurisdiction exists when a
decision of a district court expressly affects a class of constitutional or state
officers.366 Again, the operative language here was imported nearly
unchanged fi'om the pre-1980 constitution, but with the word "expressly"
added. Commentators in 1980 noted that the "expressness" requirement had
the principle purpose of foreclosing any review of a district court decision
361. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
362. Ogle, 273 So. 2d at 391; Dykman, 294 So. 2d at 633.
363. See Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. 1971).
364. Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1984).
365. See Dykman, 294 So. 2d at 635. But cf SeaboardAir Line R.R., 104 So. 2d at 358
(term "decision" as used in the constitution's jurisdictional provisions includes the entire
written opinion).
366. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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issued without opinion. 67  The Court has adopted this view.368  Other
than that, the pre-1980 case law was largely unaffected and probably
remains persuasive.
In 1974, the Court held that a decision does not fall within this type of
jurisdiction unless it meets a very restrictive test; it must "directly and, in
some way, exclusively affect the duties, powers, validity, formation,
termination, or regulation of a particular class of constitutional or state
officers. 36 9  Thus, the decision must do more than simply modify, con-
strue, or add to the general body of Florida law. If other criteria are met,
it is not necessarily dispositive that members of a valid class were or were
not litigants in the district court.370 The Court has also said that jurisdic-
tion could exist even where no class members were parties to the action,
provided the decision affects the entire class in some way "unrelated to the
specific facts of that case."37'
Most of the cases seem to assume that the parties to the proceedings
below are the ones allowed to seek review in the Florida Supreme Court,
even though they may not be members of the "affected class." However,
this has not always been true. One case, In re Order on Prosecution of
Criminal Appeals,372 allowed jurisdiction even though review was sought
by governmental agencies not actually a party in the proceedings below.373
In any event, the case had very unusual facts, and may have been erroneous-
ly assigned to this particular subcategory of jurisdiction.
The case arose in 1990 when a district court entered a sua sponte order
prohibiting a public defender from bringing appeals arising outside his own
circuit. The incidental effect was to require public defenders in other
circuits to handle their own appeals; and because the other circuits lacked
adequate resources, county governments would be forced to pay for
court-appointed private lawyers. After the order was entered, several county
governments then filed a "motion for rehearing," which was summarily
denied. The county governments next obtained review in the Florida
Supreme Court, based not on their own constitutional status, but on the fact
367. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 187.
368. See School Bd. of Pinellas County v. District Court of Appeal, 467 So. 2d 985, 986
(Fla. 1985).
369. Spradley v. State, 293 So. 2d 697, 701 (Fla. 1974).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
373. Id.
1222 [Vol. 18
508
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
that the district court's order incidentally affected the duties of public
defenders. 74
Presumably the act of filing the "motion for rehearing" somehow made
the county governments a "party," but this is not at all clear. The summary
order of dismissal is equally consistent with the view that the district court
refused to recognize the county governments as a party. Moreover, it
appears that no one raised or argued any objections to jurisdiction when the
matter was brought to the Florida Supreme Court. It thus seems highly
unlikely that the Court was creating any form of "third-party standing."
Whatever the case, In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals
probably is better characterized as an exercise of the Court's "all writs"
jurisdiction, which is discussed in greater detail below.375 "All writs"
review previously has been allowed to bring serious governmental crises for
expedited review where some factual or procedural quirk threatens to
deprive the Court of its "ultimate jurisdiction." '376 That situation almost
certainly existed here, where a technical lack of standing might have
frustrated the Florida Supreme Court's ultimate ability to review the
case.377 On the whole, In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals
probably is better characterized as an all-writs case in which the wrong basis
of jurisdiction was cited.
Another problem in this form of jurisdiction is the definition of the
phrase "class of constitutional or state officers." The Court has held that the
word "class" at the very least means there must be more than one officer of
the type in question.37 As a result, a decision affecting only the State
Treasurer or only the Secretary of State does not establish jurisdiction.
Likewise, there is no jurisdiction over a decision affecting only a single
board with multiple members where the sole powers affected are those of
the board as a single entity.379 In such a situation, the entity constitutes
only one "officer."38 °
374. Id. at 1131-33; see Brief on Jurisdiction of Collier County, In re Order on
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990) (No. 74,574).
375. See discussion infra part VII.E.
376. E.g., Florida Senate v. Graham, 412 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1982).
377. See diScussion supra part III.A.3 for a discussion of the reasons why the lack of
standing might have frustrated the court's ultimate ability to review the case.
378. Florida State Bd. of Health v. Lewis, 149 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 1963).
379. Id.
380. Id.
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The fact that an office or board is unique, thus, almost always means
there is no jurisdiction.3"' But jurisdiction would exist, for example,
where a decision affects every board of county commissioners in the state
in some way peculiar to them as a class. At a minimum, there must be two
or more officers or entities who separately and independently exercise
identical powers of government that are peculiarly affected by the district
court's decision.382
The Court apparently has rejected the view that the "class" requirement
applies only to constitutional officers, not to state officers. 383 Indeed, the
Court has never clearly distinguished the two types of officers. It is clear
from the language of the cases that the Court considers a "constitutional
officer" to include any office of public trust actually created by the constitu-
tion itself.8 But it is apparently insufficient that the officer or entity is
merely named in the constitution in an indirect or general way.38 5
381. The opinion in State v. Bowman, 437 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1983), at first blush, seems
to reach a contrary result: The district court's opinion primarily affected the Attorney
General, a unique office. Moreover, the Attorney General was the one who brought the case
to the Florida Supreme Court. However, Bowman involved a question of whether a particular
duty fell to the Attorney General or to the various State Attorneys throughout Florida. Thus,
there was a "class" of constitutional officers whose duties were at stake. Bowman may be
significant in that sense because the district court's opinion had determined that the duty in
question fell to the Attorney General, not to the State Attorneys. Thus, Bowman tacitly
recognizes jurisdiction where the district court's decision holds that the "class" of officers has
no duty to act in a particular situation. Bowman is also significant in that it tacitly recognizes
jurisdiction even where the petition for review is not brought by a member of the affected
class-a conclusion supported by other cases. See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal
Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1130.
382. Lewis, 149 So. 2d at 43.
383. See Larson v. Harrison, 142 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1962) (Drew, J., concurring
specially).
384. Eg., Skitka v. State, 579 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1991) (stating that public defenders,
created by the Florida Constitution, article V, section 18, are constitutional officers); Ramer
v. State., 530 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1988) (stating that sheriffs, created by the Florida Constitution
article VIII, section 8(l)(d), are constitutional officers); Bystrom v. Whitman, 488 So. 2d 520
(Fla. 1986) (stating that property appraisers, created by the Florida Constitution, article VIII,
section I(d), are constitutional officers); Jenny v. State, 447 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984) (stating
that state attorneys, created by the Florida Constitution, article V, section 17, are constitution-
al officers); Taylor v. Tampa Elec. Co., 356 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1978) (stating that clerks of the
circuit court, created by the Florida Constitution, article VIII, section I(d), are constitutional
officers).
385. For example, the Florida Constitution mentions "municipal legislative bodies."
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § (2)(b). Yet, the case law indicates that a city official is not a
constitutional or state officer. Estes v. City of N. Miami Beach, 227 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla.
1969).
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The term "state officer" remains somewhat more vague. It apparently
does not include purely local entities not created by the constitution
itself.3 6 Beyond that, the Court has said little. There has been no defini-
tive statement that all local officials and entities are excluded if they fail to
qualify as constitutional officers. A good argument can be made that a
"class of state officers" should include offices of trust created by statute and
authorized to independently exercise identical powers of government as part
of some larger statewide scheme."a 7 Examples might include the govern-
ing boards of Florida's water management districts.388 However, this is
an issue that remains undecided.
Finally, dicta theoretically might constitute a basis for exercising this
type of jurisdiction. But in practice, the prerequisites for review here are so
rigorous that dicta rarely would qualify. Dicta by definition are not
binding,38 9 and a petitioner presumably would need to show some real
likelihood that the dicta could be enforced against the "affected" class. A
scholarly court opinion, for example, sometimes might pose such a threat.
Otherwise, there would be no actual effect on a class of constitutional or
state officers, and thus no discretion to hear the case.
D. Express and Direct Conflict
By far the largest and most disputatious subcategory is jurisdiction
premised on express and direct conflict,39 usually called simple "conflict
386. Estes, 227 So. 2d at 34; Hakam v. City of Miami Beach, 108 So. 2d 608 (Fla.
1959) (holding that a police officer is not a constitutional or state officer).
387. The constitution juxtaposes "constitutional officers" with "state officers." If a
constitutional office is one created by the constitution, then it is reasonable to say that a state
office is one created by statute. The "class" requirement obviously suggests that the office
must exist in more than one location throughout the state. Unique local offices would not
qualify. Finally, the rationale for exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional class of officers
applies with equal force to a statutory class of officers: A district court opinion affecting
either class could result in serious disruption of governmental services, requiring resolution
by the state's highest court. On the whole, both the language of the constitution and public
policy considerations support jurisdiction over a statutory class of officers that meet the other
criteria.
388. See Fla. Stat. §§ 373.069-373.073 (1991) (creating districts and governing boards).
389. See Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1984) (stating that
language in a previous case was simply obiter dicta and should not be relied upon as case
authority).
390. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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jurisdiction." '39  Jurisdiction of this type exists where the decision of the
district court expressly and directly conflicts with a decision 92 of another
district court of appeal or of the Florida Supreme Court on the same
question of law.3 93 This relatively straightforward statement has taken on
great complexity in practice. Conflict jurisdiction also is the subcategory
most affected by the somewhat arcane distinction between "jurisdiction" and
"discretion."
394
Historically, the 1980 jurisdictional reforms had one of the greatest
effects on this type of jurisdiction. Prior to the amendments, a much
broader form of conflict jurisdiction existed. It had come into existence in
1965 when a divided Florida Supreme Court held that conflict jurisdiction
could exist over decisions affirming the trial court without opinion, in which
the entire opinion usually said nothing but "PER CURIAM. AF-
FIRMED." '395 (These opinions often are identified by the acronym
"PCA.") 396 Obviously, the determination of "conflict" in such cases only
could be made by looking at the record, not from a review of the opinion
under review.
By definition, a PCA establishes no precedent beyond the specific case,
and Florida Supreme Court review thus, was of questionable utility.
Through the years, the ability to review PCAs grew increasingly onerous
and was sternly criticized, even by members of the Court.3 9 7 The criti-
cisms, along with the Court's overburdened docket, led directly to the 1980
constitutional reforms.
1. The Elements of Obtaining Conflict Review
As a result of the 1980 reforms and the cases construing them, the
Court potentially has conflict jurisdiction only over a district court decision
391. The term "conflict jurisdiction" is almost never used to refer to "certified conflict,"
which is a separate subcategory. See discussion infra part VIF.
392. The term "decision" has been held to include both the judgment and opinion for
purposes of the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction over "decisions." Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 104 So. 2d at 358.
393. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
394. See supra part III.A.
395. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965), overrulingLake v. Lake,
103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
396. PCAs should be distinguished from "per curiam" opinions issued by the Florida
Supreme Court, which are very different in nature. See discussion supra part ll.D.
397. E.g., Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n v. West Flagler Assocs., 347
So. 2d 408, 410-12 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring).
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containing at least a statement by a majority39 ' (however short) or a
majority citation to authority.39 9 If there is any question, petitions seeking
jurisdiction are brought to the justices and their staffs. At this point, there
must be some further examination to determine if several threshold
requirements; have been met.
This examination is constrained by the "four-comers" rule: Conflict
must "appear within the four comers of the majority decision" brought for
review.4"' There can be no examination of the record, no second-guessing
of the facts stated in the majority decision, and no use of extrinsic materials
to clarify what the majority decision means. In the vast majority of cases,
the Court strictly honors the four-corners rule, though there are rare cases
difficult to square with it.
Within the constraints of the four-corners rule, review will be allowed
only if the following questions are all answered in the affirmative: (a) does
jurisdiction actually exist?; (b) does discretion exist?; and, (c) is the case
significant enough to be heard? The three elements are easy to see in some
types of cases, harder in others.
a. Does Jurisdiction Exist?
The most obvious effect of the 1980 reforms was to eliminate
completely the Court's jurisdiction over a large number of PCAs-those
issued without statement or citation. If a PCA includes no statement by a
majority (however short) and no majority citation to authority, then the
Court completely lacks jurisdiction to review the case.4°' Statements in
a separate opinion, whether dissenting or concurring, are not sufficient if
there is no majority statement or citation.40 2
It deserves to be stressed that jurisdiction is completely absent in these
cases; it is not that the Court simply lacks discretion to hear the cause.403
398. The court has held that discussion of the "legal principles which the court applied
supplies a sufficient basis for a petition for conflict review." Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401
So. 2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981). There is no requirement that the district court opinion must
explicitly identify conflicting decisions. Id.
399. Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981).
400. Reaves v. State., 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986). Here, the court clearly is using
the term "decision" to encompass both the result and the entire opinion; accord Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 104 So. 2d at 358.
401. Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980).
402. Id.
403. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286, 288 n.3 (Fla. 1988). In other words,
any further appeal from a PCA issued without a majority statement or citation can be had
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As a result, the Clerk of the Court routinely issues a form summary denial
in most cases brought for review to the Court based on a PCA that lacks a
majority statement or citation to authority. The justices and their staffs
usually do not review these petitions, and filing them thus is a complete
waste of time, resources, and money.
The case law has established only one other category of district court
opinions over which the Court may completely lack conflict jurisdiction.4"4
These are PCAs that contain nothing but a citation to authority (called
"citation PCAs"). In 1988, the Court distilled much of its earlier law on
this question into a single formula. In The Florida Star v. B.JF.,4 °5 the
Court said that there is no jurisdiction over a citation PCA unless "one of
the cases cited as controlling authority is pending before this Court, or has
been reversed on appeal or review, or receded from by this Court, or unless
the citation explicitly notes a contrary holding of another district court."4 6
As noted earlier, the failure to meet any of these requirements strips the
Court of all jurisdiction, which can have significant consequences when
further appeal may be sought in the United States Supreme Court.407
As is apparent from the language quoted here, the citation to authority
must be to a case4 8 issued by a Florida district court of appeal or by the
Florida Supreme Court.409 A citation to a statute, administrative or court
rule, federal case, or case from another jurisdiction is insufficient in itself
to establish discretion for a review.
Citation to a case from the same district court of appeal can establish
jurisdiction only if that case is pending for review in or has been reversed
by the Florida Supreme Court.4 10 Thus, a "contra" or "but see" citation
to an opinion of the same district court would not in itself establish conflict.
This rests on a simple rationale. The fact that a district court decides to
expressly or silently depart from its own case law does not establish conflict,
because there is no such thing as "intradistrict conflict" as a basis for
only in the United States Supreme Court, in its discretion. Attempting to bring the case for
review in the Florida Supreme Court may have the effect of barring an appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, because the time to file the appeal most likely will be consumed. Id.
404. Theoretically there could be another: PCAs that contain only a statement
insufficient to establish a point of law, without citation. The Court apparently has never
addressed this question.
405. 530 So. 2d at 286.
406. Id. at 288 n.3 (citing Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981)).
407. See supra text accompanying note 206-09.
408. The Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 288 n.3 (citing Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 420).
409. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
410. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 420.
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supreme court jurisdiction. The latest inconsistent opinion is deemed to
overrule the earlier.4 '
On the other hand, jurisdiction exists if there is any notation in a
citation PCA (or any other type of opinion, for that matter) of contrary case
law issued by another district court of appeal or the Florida Supreme
Court. 2  This may be as simple as a citation beginning with the signals
"contra" or "but see,"'' because they indicate contradiction. A citation
beginning with "but cf" may be insufficient 4 4 because the signal indi-
cates contradiction only by analogy,4"5 which may not meet the constitu-
tional requirement of "direct" conflict.
4 16
Often, a citation PCA may include a parenthetical statement that
conflict exists. The statement can establish jurisdiction only if it is
accurate 417 and identifies a specific opinion of another district court or the
Florida Supreme Court as the basis for conflict. But when this happens, it
is possible that jurisdiction may exist on a completely independent
basis-the Court's "certified conflict" jurisdiction, discussed below."'
The possibility always should be considered, because "certified conflict" is
a less restrictive form of jurisdiction." 9
411. State v. Walker, 593 So. 2d 1049, 1049 (Fla. 1992).
412. See Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 34 & n.* (Fla. 1983), ajfg 408 So. 2d 634
(Fla. 5th Dist. C1. App. 1981). A district court may seem foolish recognizing contrary
authority from the Florida Supreme Court, but this sometimes happens with good reason.
In Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 435 So. 2d 950 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983), the First
District Court of Appeal noted that it was departing from dicta issued by the Florida Supreme
Court in Canal Authority v. Ocala Manufacturing, Ice & Packing Co., 435 So. 2d 950 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Canal Auth. v. Ocala Mfg., Ice & Packing Co., 332 So. 2d
321 (Fla. 1976)). The district court believed the dicta to be incorrect, and the Florida
Supreme Court later agreed. Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1984).
413. See Frederick v. State, 472 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1985), affg 472 So. 2d 463 (1985).
414. Such citations are rare. See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 618 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); Phelps v. State, 368 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). No further
review was taken in either of these cases.
415. See THE: BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION rule 1.2, at 23 (15th ed.
1991).
416. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
417. The accuracy requirement arises from the plain language of the constitution that
there must be express and direct conflict appearing on the face of the decision below. FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). The fact that the parties assert conflict in their jurisdictional briefs
will not supply this requirement, even if both parties erroneously conclude that conflict exists.
418. See discussion infra section VI.F.
419. See infra text accompanying notes 493-95.
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b. Does Discretion Exist?
Except for PCAs that fail to meet the criteria outlined above, the
Florida Supreme Court technically has jurisdiction over all other district
court opinions. However, that is not the end of the matter. The Court may
still lack discretion to hear the particular case.42° As noted earlier, the
distinction between "jurisdiction" and "discretion" is somewhat arcane and
really is relevant only in determining the time to bring appeals to the United
States Supreme Court. So, in common usage, lawyers and justices often
tend to speak of both under the rubric "jurisdiction."
Nevertheless, in 1988, the Court indicated that, apart from the special
rules governing PCAs, the problem of "conflict" involves a constitutional
limit on the Court's discretion to hear a case, not a limit on jurisdiction.42" '
If there is no conflict, then there is no discretion, and the petition for review
must be denied or dismissed on that basis.4" Thus, the existence of
conflict is an absolute prerequisite for a review.423 In addition, conflict
cannot be "derivative." It is insufficient that a decision cites as controlling
authority a completely separate decision that supposedly is in conflict with
a third decision,424 unless some other basis for jurisdiction exists. In other
words, there is no such thing as "daisy-chain" conflict.
The jurisdiction/discretion distinction has prompted "creative" efforts
to expand conflict jurisdiction, which the Court consistently has declined to
entertain. After The Florida Star established the distinction, some parties
seized upon language in that opinion to argue that conflict jurisdiction can
be merely "hypothetical." This was a misreading of the opinion of The
Florida Star and a misapprehension of the difference between "jurisdiction"
and "discretion."
In The Florida Star, the Court said that jurisdiction exists if a district
court decision contains any statement or citation that "hypothetically could
create conflict if there were another opinion reaching a contrary result." '425
However, discretion is still limited by the conflict requirement;426 a
petitioner, therefore, also must establish that discretion to hear the case
420. The Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 288-89.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial Am., S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 1980).
425. The Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 288.
426. Id.
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genuinely exists. Any petition arguing "hypothetical conflict" alone would
fail to address the discretion problem, and could be denied on that basis.
In a larger sense, the overriding purpose of conflict review remains the
elimination of inconsistent views about the same question of law.427 But
this does not necessarily mean the Court can review a case only when
necessary to resolve a conflict of holdings. Many conflict cases accepted by
the Court fall within this last grouping, but not all do. Part of the reason is
that a genuine "conflict" can be manifested in more than just a holding.
The result is that several types of conflict have been recognized. In actual
practice, the Court tends to accept cases that fall into four broad and
sometimes overlapping categories: (i) "holding" conflict, (ii) misapplication
conflict, (iii) apparent conflict, and (iv) "piggyback" conflict.
(i) "Holding" Conflict
The most obvious conflict cases involve "holding conflict": The
majority decision below contains a holding of law that is in irreconcilable
conflict with a holding of law in a majority opinion of another district court
or of the Florida Supreme Court. In other words, there is an actual conflict
of controlling, binding precedent. Where this is true, conflict jurisdiction
unquestionably exists.
For example, a district court in 1992 issued an opinion expressly
applying the doctrine of interspousal immunity in a particular case. 8
While review was pending, the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in
another case holding that the doctrine of interspousal immunity no longer
existed in Florida.429 These two opinions are in actual and irreconcilable
conflict with one another, because the holding of one cannot stand if the
other is true. Conflict jurisdiction therefore exists.
Conflict is not always so plain as this example, however. The cases in
question may be factually distinguishable to a greater or lesser extent. As
a result, the "holding conflict" category probably should not be considered
entirely discrete from other categories. "Holding conflict" sometimes may
blur into the next two kinds of conflict, which themselves are not entirely
distinct.
427. E.g., Wainwright v. Taylor, 476 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1985); see FLA. CONST. art.
V, § 3(b)(3).
428. McAdam v. Thom, 610 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed by 626
So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1993).
429. Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
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(ii) Misapplication Conflict
A separate kind of conflict occurs when the decision of the district
court misapplies controlling precedent.43° "Misapplication conflict" thus
is not precisely the same as "holding conflict," because the cases involved
are distinguishable. The conflict arises because the district court has failed
to distinguish the cases properly. In other words, no conflict would have
existed had controlling precedent been read and applied properly. Misappli-
cation conflict comes in three varieties: "erroneous reading" of precedent,
"erroneous extension" of precedent, and "erroneous use" of facts.
"Erroneous reading" cases are the most clearly justifiable of the three
because they involve a purely legal problem: Was the law properly stated?
Thus, they sometimes verge on being "holding conflict" cases. For
example, in 1982, the Court confronted a case in which the district court
first had misinterpreted controlling precedent on awards of punitive damages
and then had applied the misinterpretation to the case. The Florida Supreme
Court accepted jurisdiction expressly because of misapplication conflict.43'
This was not precisely a "holding conflict" case, however. Two dissenting
justices argued that the district court actually had read the precedent
correctly.432 In other words, misapplication was not necessarily clear until
the Court's majority decided the matter.
"Erroneous extension" cases are those in which the district court
correctly states a rule of law but then proceeds to apply the rule to a set of
facts for which it was not intended. In other words, the district court stated
the law correctly and framed the facts accurately, but it should never have
linked the two. This type of conflict is easily masked as some other type
of conflict, and for that reason is seldom expressly discussed in majority
opinions. The fact of the erroneous extension is occasionally noted in
opinions dissenting as to a denial of jurisdiction.433 Prior to 1980, the
Court expressly had recognized "erroneous extension" as a valid basis of
conflict jurisdiction.434
"Erroneous use" cases are those in which the district court misapplies
a rule of law based on its own misperception of the facts.435 This is the
most troublesome form of misapplication conflict, because it often tests the
430. E.g., Acensio v. State, 497 So. 2d 640, 641 (Fla. 1986).
431. Arab Termite & Pest Control of Florida, Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1041
(Fla. 1982).
432. Id. at 1043 (Sundberg, C.J., dissenting, joined by Adkins, J.).
433. E.g., Salser v. State, 613 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1993) (Kogan, J., dissenting).
434. Sacks v. Sacks, 267 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1972).
435. E.g., Acensio, 497 So. 2d at 640.
1232 [Vol. 18
518
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
strength of the four-corners rule. Sometimes the factual error may be
evident on the face of the opinion, but often it is not. For example, in
1985, the Court accepted jurisdiction in a case where the district court had
"overlooked" a relevant factual finding of the trial court. Although
controlling law was stated properly, the district court's opinion improperly
applied the law because of the overlooked finding.436
The discretion to review such cases really is only justifiable where the
factual error is apparent within the four comers of the opinion being
reviewed. 437  The justification becomes tenuous otherwise. In State v.
Stacey,438 for example, the district court opinion did in fact "overlook" the
relevant finding. At best, the possibility of the error could be inferred from
the district court opinion, but the facts stated therein were not complete
enough to show that error was clear. "Inferential" factual error is a very
slim reed to support a finding of express and direct conflict.439 Obviously,
the justification for a review becomes even less justifiable if the existence
of the error cannot even be inferred from material contained within the four
comers of the district court opinion. Thus, to some extent the Florida
Supreme Court violated the four-comers rule in accepting jurisdiction; and
that case is probably best understood as marginal and anomalous.
Finally, there is a possibility that a case may involve an alleged
misapplication of dicta. In 1984, the Court accepted a case based on
conflict with dicta in a prior Florida Supreme Court opinion, although the
Florida Supreme Court overruled the dicta rather than the district court.44°
If "dicta conflict" existed in that context, it probably also could exist as a
form of misapplication conflict. Dicta conflict can be justified in light of
the fact that the Florida Supreme Court elsewhere has suggested that its
jurisdiction over "decisions" can rest on anything in a written opinion, not
merely a judgment or result.441
For example, a scholarly opinion may make broad statements of law
that are actually dicta, yet these statements express an opinion about some
legal point. Later a district court conceivably could find the dicta persuasive
436. State v. Stacey, 482 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Fla. 1985).
437. The court elsewhere has said that in determining conflict there can be no
consideration of facts outside the four comers of the opinion. Hardee v. State, 534 So. 2d
706, 708 (Fla. 1988).
438. 482 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1985).
439. See Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. National Adoption Counseling Serv.,
Inc., 498 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1986) (conflict cannot be inferred or implied).
440. Watson Realty Corp., 452 So. 2d at 568.
441. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958).
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and then misapply them. In such a situation, all the reasons justifying
review of misapplication conflict also would apply: Review would be
warranted to the extent the misapplication may create confusion in the law
or reach an incorrect or unfair result.
(iii) Apparent Conflict
Another category is "apparent conflict," which arises when a district
court opinion only seems to be in conflict, though there may be some
reasonable way to reconcile it with the case law. A cramped reading of the
constitution might suggest that discretion should not be allowed here.442
However, such an approach ignores the real problem. Until the Florida
Supreme Court harmonizes cases that seem to be in conflict, for all intents
and purposes, there is an actual conflict. The mere fact that conflict can be
eliminated on review does not resolve the conflict retroactively.
Moreover, it would be bad practice to deprive the Court of discretion
merely because there is some way to harmonize cases without overruling
any of them. This amounts to saying that the Court, in conflict cases, can
review only if it negates, which will not always be desirable policy. The
Florida Supreme Court should not be forced either to decline jurisdiction or
overrule essentially sound decisional law whose relation to other cases is
simply uncertain.
In any event, review of apparent conflict cases.is now a well estab-
lished feature of Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction, and it may or may not
result in the overruling of precedent from a Florida appellate court. This
can include "receding" from the Court's own cases. 443 In 1991, for
example, the Court accepted jurisdiction to resolve an apparent conflict with
overbroad statements of law that it had made in one of its own opinions two
years earlier.4 4 The Court ultimately receded from those statements, but
without actually reversing the result it previously had reached; then the
Court approved the district court's decision, harmonizing the cases and
eliminating the apparent conflict.
45
Apparent conflict sometimes may arise from a prior district-court
opinion that simply is not very precise. In 1988, for example, the Court
accepted a case based on apparent conflict with another district court
442. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
443. "Recede" is the term of art used when the court overrules its own decisions in
whole or in part.
444. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Menendez, 584 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1991).
445. Id. at 569-70.
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opinion that had not stated sufficient facts for anyone to determine whether
the ruling was correct.446 In that sense, the earlier case could be consid-
ered overbroad, but was not necessarily so. The Florida Supreme Court
resolved the apparent conflict by disapproving the earlier case "only to the
extent that it may be inconsistent" with a correct and complete statement of
the relevant law.447 In a similar case, the Court said that conflict exists
if a rule of law is stated vaguely or imprecisely enough to create a "fair
implication" of conflict.
448
Of course, the Court need not overrule anything. In a sizable number
of apparent conflict cases, the Court harmonizes all the "conflicting" cases,
thus completely eliminating any possible conflict. 449 In 1990, for exam-
ple, the Court accepted review in a case "because of apparent conflict with
the decisions of several district courts of appeal., 450  The Court then
engaged in an extensive examination of these cases, harmonized them, and
made a holding without overruling anything.
In a sense, dicta conflict can be viewed as a type of apparent conflict
because dicta are not binding precedent; and thus, there cannot be an actual
conflict of holdings. As noted above, however, the Court has accepted
review based on dicta conflict, although these cases seem more the
exception than the rule. 45 ' Dicta conflict also may blur into the category
of misapplication conflict.
452
(iv) "Piggyback" Conflict
The final category of conflict is "piggyback" conflict. Discretion over
these cases arises because: (a) they cite as controlling precedent a decision
of a district court that is pending for review in, or has been overruled by,
the Florida Supreme Court; or (b) they cite as controlling precedent a
446. D'Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1988).
447. Id. at 1348.
448. Hardee, 534 So. 2d at 708. These examples also demonstrate applications of the
four-comers rule: The court should confine its determination to the four comers of the
conflicting district court opinions, making no attempt to review the record in the earlier
district court. The decision whether discretion exists must be made based on the facts as
stated in the four comers of the "conflicting" opinions. Id.
449. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Cestari, 569 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1990); Cross v. State, 560 So. 2d
228 (Fla. 1990); Balthazar v. State, 549 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1989); Conway Land, Inc. v. Terry,
542 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1989).
450. Fitzgerald, 569 So. 2d at 1258.
451. Watson Realty Corp., 452 So. 2d at 568.
452. See discussion supra part VI.D.l.b.ii.
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decision of the Florida Supreme Court from which the Court now has
receded.453 A considerable number of cases falling within this category
are citation PCAs, but not all are. The district courts sometimes issue
lengthy opinions resting on precedent that is pending review in the Florida
Supreme Court or precedent that is later overruled.
There are good reasons for allowing this type of discretion. For
example, the lower appellate courts often have a large number of cases
before them dealing with the same legal issue. To save both time and
resources, one case is selected as the "lead case" to be decided with a full
opinion, while the others are resolved in short opinions that often do little
more than cite to the lead case. It is illogical and unfair to say the Florida
Supreme Court has discretion to take the lead case but not the "companion"
cases. For this reason, the Court accepts the bulk of "piggyback" cases for
review, though these often are handled as no request cases.454
It is worth noting, however, that "piggyback" conflict by definition
would not exist for the "lead" case in this example. "Piggyback" conflict
exists only if a case cited as controlling precedent already has gotten into
the courthouse door on some other jurisdictional basis or the case has been
disapproved or receded from.
This leads to another problem: "Piggyback" conflict sometimes may
be only an inchoate, unrealized possibility at the time when review must be
sought. For example, the Florida Supreme Court may be uncertain for a
time whether it will accept a lead case for review. Perhaps the justices are
divided on the correctness of the lead case or they are uncertain as to
whether they have discretion to hear it. During the interim, jurisdiction
remains inchoate.
In such instances, the Court typically follows a practice of postponing
its decision on jurisdiction and sometimes permits parties to brief the
substantive issues in the interim.455 Once the lead case is accepted for
review, the companion cases may be accepted, except on some occasions
when "piggyback" cases actually reached the correct result. A denial of
jurisdiction in the lead case eliminates "piggyback" jurisdiction, meaning
that review will be declined in the companion cases unless some other basis
for jurisdiction exists.
453. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286, 288 n.3 (Fla. 1988) (citing Jollie v.
State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981)).
454. See discussion supra Section l1.B.2.
.455. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.120(e).
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c. "Is the Case Significant Enough?"
The final element in obtaining review of a conflict case is a showing
that the issues are significant enough for the Court to exercise its discretion.
Often the importance or insignificance of the case is obvious to everyone.
At other times, a case may seem trivial at first blush, yet in fact involves a
potential for serious disruption. For that reason, persons trying to invoke
the Court's conflict jurisdiction are well advised to explain why the case is
important enough to be heard. Conflict jurisdiction is discretionary. Even
if discretion exists, the Court is free to deny the petition if the issues seem
unimportant or the result essentially fair or correct, 5 6 among other
reasons.
It is worth noting that the act of accepting review based on conflict
vests the Court with power to hear every issue in the case, not merely the
conflict issues. 4 7 As a result, these "nonconflict" issues sometimes may
weigh with the Court in deciding whether to accept review. However, the
fact that these issues may seem important will not cure a lack of conflict.
Finally, the Court also has inherent authority not to address nonconflict
issues if it chooses. 458 Doing so establishes no supreme court precedent
as to these issues.
2. Briefing on Conflict Jurisdiction
For parties to .invoke the Court's conflict jurisdiction, they must file
jurisdictional briefs with the Court. The Rules of Court limit these briefs
to ten pages. 45 ' However, the best briefs on conflict jurisdiction are
shorter and make their points with direct, plain language. If conflict truly
exists, all the brief need do is quote something from the district court
opinion, show how it conflicts with a statement in another proper case, and
then explain the importance of the case. For "piggyback" jurisdiction, it is
sufficient (and imperative) to note the fact that a case cited in the district co-
urt opinion is pending review or has been disapproved or receded from.
456. See Wainwright v. Taylor, 476 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Fla. 1985) (petition dismissed
in interests ofjudicial economy where outcome would not be different and where erroneous
statement of law had been corrected by other means).
457. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 1985); Savoie
v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982).
458. See. e.g., Thom v. McAdam, 626 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1993).
459. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(a)(5).
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In many cases, the actual point of the jurisdictional brief usually can
be established in two pages or less per conflict issue46 (not including
appendices) if conflict genuinely is clear. Of course, the existence of
conflict often is not so certain, meaning that a brief must engage in a
lengthier and more convoluted argument to establish the Court's discretion
over the case. Within the ten-page limit, the Court will not reject a petition
simply because it is longer or wordy. However, the justices almost always
view lengthier petitions as a kind of tacit concession that the alleged conflict
is not clear. Attorneys who could make their points with less verbiage
should consider whether they want to handicap their case with a longer
brief.
Appendices should consist only of a copy of the decision below and a
copy of the alleged conflict cases. Anything else is irrelevant and will be
ignored, especially copies of material from the record. Under the four-
corners rule, the record cannot be used to establish conflict, and attorneys
who ignore this fact do themselves and their clients a disservice. The Court
sometimes receives voluminous appendices that obviously cost a good deal
to compile, reproduce, and bind. This is a pity, because such material has
no purpose other than adding to the Court's drive to collect recyclable
paper.46'
Except for some PCAs in which jurisdiction is clearly lacking, nearly
all jurisdictional briefs are handled and decided by the justices. Some
justices routinely have their law clerks and interns prepare a brief memoran-
dum summarizing relevant facts and holdings and making a recommenda-
tion. Other justices handle all "determinations of jurisdiction" ("DOJs") by
themselves, on the theory that a law clerk memorandum simply duplicates
effort. However, new law clerks and new interns are almost always
assigned a stack of DOJs as their first task, on the theory that jurisdiction
is the first thing a new law clerk or intern must learn. In a few offices, all
DOJs are reviewed by the law clerks and interns before going to the justices.
When the justices' staff prepares memoranda on DOJs, these necessari-
ly must focus on the three questions relevant to conflict cases: (a) does
jurisdiction exist?; (b) does the Court have discretion to hear the case?; and
(c) why should the discretion be exercised? As noted earlier, a case can be
accepted for review only upon the affirmative vote of at least four justices,
though the decision whether to grant oral argument sometimes can be deter-
mined by fewer votes or by the chief justice.
460. Sometimes multiple conflict exists.
461. The court has instituted a very successful paper recycling program in recent years.
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3. Opinion-Writing in Conflict Cases
Conflict cases are treated the same as other causes for purposes of
opinion writing. There is one important point, however. A well-written
conflict opinion should do one of three things before it concludes:
disapprove a district court decision in whole or in part, recede from a
Florida Supreme Court decision in whole or in part, or harmonize cases.
This arises from the very nature of conflict jurisdiction, which exists only
when two or more relevant cases directly or apparently are irreconcilable.
Thus, for jurisdiction to exist, something must be wrong that needs "fixing."
Fixing always requires that at least one previous statement of law be
overruled or harmonized.
E. Certified Questions of Great Public Importance
The next subcategory of discretionary review jurisdiction exists when
a decision of a district court passes upon a question certified by it to be of
great public importance.462 Commentators have noted that the operative
language essentially was unchanged by the 1980 reforms, although the
pre-1980 constitution specified that the question be one of great public
"interest., 463  This last change, however, may only have been semantic.
Even prior to 1980, certified questions routinely involved important issues
in which the general public had little "interest," generally speaking.464
Justices of the Court sometimes have argued that certified questions
should not be reviewed unless the case involves some minimum level of
immediacy. 465 That view was silently rejected when first made after the
1980 reforms. 46 6 and has never gained acceptance since. In practice, the
Court reviews the majority of certified questions properly brought for review
by the parties, even some of relatively minor importance. A large number,
however, often are summarily disposed of, and the Court has shown no
unwillingness to brand a certified question "irrelevant.
' 467
The decision to certify falls within the absolute discretion of the district
court,468 and t hus cannot be required or undone by the Florida Supreme
462. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
463. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 191-92.
464. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030 (1980 amendment committee notes).
465. Department of Ins. v. Teachers Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 735, 736-37 (Fla. 1981)
(England, I., dissenting as to jurisdiction).
466. Id. (majority opinion).
467. Fawceit v. State, 615 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1993).
468. Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1970).
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Court. Jurisdiction over cases in this subcategory is absolutely dependent
on the act of certification by a district court, which operates as a condition
precedent. Once the case is certified, the condition precedent has been fully
met, and no review or redetermination of the point is necessary or
proper.469
As a corollary, the failure to certify a question creates a binding
presumption that the case does not pass upon a matter amenable to this type
of review. Thus, once a district court opinion becomes final and is not
subject to rehearing or to clarification, the time has passed for a question to
be certified. 47" Any purported certification occurring thereafter presum-
ably would be treated as a nullity. However, the Florida Supreme Court has
indicated that "any interested person" can ask for a certification by the
district court at any time before the opinion becomes final.47'
Nevertheless, certification does not create mandatory jurisdiction. The
Florida Supreme Court has discretion to decline review, such as where the
question is irrelevant, or where answering it would serve no purpose.472
On occasion, the Court also seems to have declined to answer questions it
regarded as too insignificant. 473  However, the Court has announced that
jurisdiction is "particularly applicable" to cases of first impression,474
perhaps implying a greater presumption that review should be granted.
Under the pre-1980 constitution, the common practice for many years
was for the district courts simply to certify the case without actually framing
a question. Later, the Florida Supreme Court urged the district courts to
state the question being posed,475 though there has never been an absolute
requirement to this effect. 476  Framing the question now has become the
most common practice,477 though the district courts sometime still resort
to the earlier habit of leaving the question unstated. When questions
actually are framed, the Court sometimes rephrases them in a manner that
better suits the purposes of review.47
469. Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 834-35 (Fla. 1959).
470. Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 131 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1961).
471. Id.
472. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So. 2d 594, 597 (Fla. 1961).
473. Stein v. Darby, 134 So. 2d 232, 237 (Fla. 1961).
474. Duggan v. Tomlinson, 174 So. 2d 393, 393 (Fla. 1965).
475. Id. at 394.
476. E.g., Rupp, 238 So. 2d at 89.
477. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 470 So. 2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 1985) (quoting question as
framed); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1984) (quoting question as framed).
478. E.g., Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
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When the question is left unframed, the Florida Supreme Court
sometimes proceeds to discuss the issue without actually framing it.479 At
other times, the Court will frame the question at the start of an opinion,
though occasionally it may not be entirely clear what the question is.48
One case was accepted for review even though the district court had issued
its opinion as a summary PCA and then certified the "question." '481 This
prompted an exasperated dissent from one justice who argued that the Court
should decline to review PCAs, even if certified, because the unstated
"question" simply was not clear.482
There is a special problem that sometimes arises in cases involving
certified questions: The losing party fails to seek Florida Supreme Court
review. When this happens, the Court has ruled that the party who
prevailed on the issue embodied in a certified question cannot seek review
solely on that basis. In other words, the Court lacks jurisdiction of the case
if the losing party on the certified question does not petition for review,
unless some other basis of jurisdiction exists.483
Jurisdiction may also be lost over an otherwise valid certified question
in another way. When a certified question is properly brought by the
parties, they sometimes ask the Florida Supreme Court to relinquish
jurisdiction to the district court for some reason.484 In one such case,
upon relinquishment, the district court granted rehearing and issued a new
opinion that failed to include a certified question. The Florida Supreme
Court dismissed the case when it came back for review, apparently for want
of jurisdiction.aS5
F. Certified Conflict
Discretionary review jurisdiction also exists when the district court
certifies that its decision is in direct conflict with a decision of another
district court of appeal.48 6 This form of jurisdiction was created by the
479. E.g., Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1127-28 (Fla. 1982).
480. See, e.g., Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331
(Fla. 1983).
481. Id. at 329.
482. Id. at '332-33 (Alderman, C.J., dissenting).
483. See Petrik v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 8, 9-10 (Fla. 1981); Taggart
Corp. v. Benzing, 434 So. 2d 964, 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
484. Relinquishment is governed by rule. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110, 9.600.
485. State v. Smulowitz, 486 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 1986).
486. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
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1980 constitutional reforms and had no earlier analogue.s7
Case law on certified conflict has done little to illuminate its scope,
though (with some early exceptions) the district court opinions accepted in
this way almost uniformly meet two requirements: (1) they use the word
"certify" or some variation of the root word "certif- 4 8 in connection with
the word "conflict;" and (2) they indicate a decision from another district
court upon which the conflict is based. The Court sometimes has accepted
jurisdiction even if some study of the district court opinion is needed to find
the exact conflict case.489
The required use of the root word "certif-" has not arisen from
decisional law but from the custom of the supreme court clerk's office,
4 90
which determines the category of jurisdiction before sending the case to the
justices. Thus, strictly speaking, this form of jurisdiction effectively does
not exist if conflict is merely "acknowledged," "recognized," "noted," or
some other variation on the theme. With few exceptions,49' all of these
"acknowledged conflict" cases are treated as petitions for "express and
direct" conflict, though many are accepted for review on that basis. The
distinction between "acknowledged conflict" and "express conflict" can have
an important consequence, however, because express and direct conflict is
subject to more rigorous requirements.
In other words, to certify conflict properly, the district court must use
the root word "certif-." This requirement may seem needlessly bureaucratic,
but it serves a useful function. Any other rule would allow the categories
of certified conflict and "express and direct" conflict to blur together. Thus,
some "acknowledged" conflict cases might be accepted on one basis of
jurisdiction while a similar case might not. The Clerk's bright-line rule
avoids such arbitrariness.
Certified conflict cases differ in two important ways from the "express
and direct" conflict subcategory, discussed above.492 First, no briefing on
487. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 193.
488. One district court used the words "certificate of direct conflict." State v. Dodd,
396 So. 2d 1205, 1208 n.7 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), approved, 419 So. 2d 333, 336
(Fla. 1982).
489. E.g., Hannewacker v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 402 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), approved as modified, 419 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982).
490. The custom has not always been strictly followed. In one early case, the court
accepted "certified conflict" solely because a citation PCA contained a "Contra" cite. See
Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1981), rev'g 386 So. 2d 1297, 1298 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1980). This practice has not been observed in recent years.
491. Some cases may slip through the initial review process.
492. See discussion infra part VI.D.
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jurisdiction is permitted493 because the cases are accepted routinely.
Second, the Court has found discretion to hear them even if there is actually
no conflict, something that cannot be done for express and direct con-
flict. 49 4 In one 1993 case, for example, the Florida Supreme Court re-
viewed a certified conflict but then harmonized the cases.495 The policy
for accepting such cases, of course, is that the very act of certifying conflict
creates confusion or uncertainty in the law that should be resolved by the
Court. In sum, review is easier to obtain for certified conflict than for
"express and direct" conflict.
Finally, there is one important procedural fact that could deprive the
Florida Supreme Court of jurisdiction even where conflict is properly
certified. As with certified questions, 496 the party who prevailed on the
"certified conflict" issue cannot seek review based on this form of jurisdic-
tion. In other words, the Court lacks jurisdiction of the case if the losing
party does not petition for review, except where some independent basis for
jurisdiction exists. 497 This situation most often will arise when the party
who prevailed on the conflict issue disagrees with some other aspect of the
district court opinion.
G. "Pass- Through" Jurisdiction
The next subcategory of discretionary review jurisdiction has been
identified by the informal name "pass-through jurisdiction., 498 It essen-
tially is a variation of a certified question for very important and pressing
cases. The principle feature is that the case "passes through" the district
court without being heard and is sent directly to the Florida Supreme Court
for immediate resolution. This substantially speeds the appellate pro-
cess.
4 9 9
The Florida Supreme Court can hear such cases only if: (1) an appeal
is pending in the district court brought from a trial court's order or
judgment; (2) the district court certifies that the case is of great public
493. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.120(d).
494. Actual conflict must exist in "express and direct" cases for the Court to have
discretion to hear the case. See discussion supra part VI.D.1.
495. Harmon v. Williams, 615 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 1993).
496. See supra text accompanying note 482.
497. See Davis v. Mandau, 410 So. 2d 915, 915 (Fla. 1981).
498. For art opinion using the informal name, see Florida Patient's Compensation Fund
v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Fla. 1985).
499. For a considerable history underlying the development of this form ofjurisdiction,
see Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 193-96.
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importance or may have great effect on the proper administration of justice
throughout the state; and, (3) the district court certifies that immediate
resolution by the Florida Supreme Court is required. 00 Certification can
occur on the district court's own motion, or at the suggestion of a party if
done within ten days of appealing to the district court.'
While the three elements above appear mandatory from the constitu-
tional language, the Florida Supreme Court has been lenient in accepting
district court certifications fairly susceptible of meeting the requirements.
The root word "certif-" probably should be used by the district court, but it
is doubtful that a case of obvious importance would be refused for failure
to do so. The policy reasons for requiring a term of art in certified conflict
cases do not exist here. 2 Typically, the district courts scrupulously meet
the certification requirement. 3
The Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction over pass-through cases
attaches immediately on rendition0 4 of the district court order certifying
the case. 5 Thus, the district court loses jurisdiction at that point unless
the Florida Supreme Court relinquishes its jurisdiction. 6 In theory, a
defective certification would not actually divest the district court of
jurisdiction nor vest the supreme court with jurisdiction. For that reason,
the parties and the district court should pay some attention to insure that
certification is done properly.
500. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
501. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.125(a). The method of making and filing a "suggestion" is
heavily regulated by rule. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.125(c)-(f).
502. See supra text accompanying notes 436-40 for policy reasons which require a term
of art in certified conflict cases. "Acknowledged" conflict cases can be "mopped up" by the
"express and direct" category. There is no other category to "mop up" pass-through cases
in which the district court failed to use the root word "certif-."
503. In the "Baby Theresa" case, for example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued
the following certificate:
We hereby certify to the Florida Supreme Court that the order of the trial court
of March 27, 1992, requires immediate resolution by the Supreme Court,
because it rules on an issue of great public importance and because the relief
sought in the trial court may be mooted by the natural death of the infant child
of appellants.
In re Pearson, Case No. 92-0942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App., March 30, 1992) (unpublished
order).
504. Rendition occurs when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower
tribunal, subject to a few exceptions usually not applicable in these cases. See FLA. R. APP.
P. 9.020(g).
505. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.125(g).
506. Relinquishment is governed by rule. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.110, 9.600.
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There is no requirement that the district court frame a question,
although a minority of the courts do so."' Framing a question may be
useful, but these cases almost always involve questions that are apparent to
everyone. Where a question is framed, the Florida Supreme Court usually
quotes it.5°8 If no question is framed, the Court sometimes states the issue
to be reviewed °9 and sometimes does not.5 ' In any event, the presence
or absence of a framed question makes no difference, though it can serve a
useful purpose when the parties disagree on the exact nature of the question
being decided. 1'
Pass-through cases fall within the Court's discretionary jurisdiction and
theoretically could be refused. In practice, the cases are always heard,
frequently (but not always), on an expedited basis. The Court once
admonished the district courts not to use pass-through jurisdiction "as a
device for avoiding difficult issues by passing them through to this
Court. '5l1 2 This hints that jurisdiction might be declined if pass-through
was abused, but on the whole, the cases certified in this manner genuinely
are pressing. These cases most commonly involve urgent questions of
governmental authority, 1 3 constitutional rights that could be undermined
if the case is not expedited," 4 or personal liberties that could be jeopar-
507. See, e.g., Department of Corrections v. Florida Nurses Ass'n, 508 So. 2d 317, 317
(Fla. 1987); Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Florida Horse Council, Inc., 464 So. 2d
128, 129 (Fla. 1985).
508. See, eg., Department of Corrections, 508 So. 2d at 317.
509. E.g., In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1992).
510. Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
511. For example, In re TA.C.P. presented a situation in which some parties and amici
curiae not only disagreed about the nature of a relevant medical syndrome (anencephaly), but
also framed the issues in widely differing ways. 609 So. 2d at 589. Some saw the issue as
whether organs could be "harvested" from a living child, while others saw the issue as
whether there was a right of privacy in deciding what would happen to the body of a child
who was, for all intents and purposes, dead. Id. When the court framed the issue at the start
of the opinion, it signaled the true scope of what was being decided. Id. at 589.
512. Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 162 n.1 (Fla. 1987). The district court in
Carawan had declined to rule on the case because it found that the applicable law had
become "curiouser and curiouser." Id. at 163.
513. E.g., Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 671 (constitutionality of legislature abrogating state
employees' collective bargaining agreement).
514. State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990) (constitutionality of statute restricting
political contributions when election was nearing).
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dized by a lengthy appeal." 5 With rare exceptions," 6 all these cases
involve a significant level of immediacy.
H. Questions Certified by Federal Appellate Courts
The final subcategory of discretionary review jurisdiction is cases
involving a question of law certified by the federal appellate courts.
Jurisdiction is allowed here only if: (1) the United States Supreme Court or
a federal court of appeals certifies a question; (2) the question is determina-
tive of "the cause;" and, (3) there is no controlling precedent of the Florida
Supreme Court.5"7 This language is mandatory, and therefore, all three
elements must be present. By rule, the federal court is required to issue a
"certificate" containing the style of the case, a statement of the facts
showing the nature of the cause and the circumstances from which the
questions of law arose, and the questions to be answered. The certificate
must be certified to the Florida Supreme Court by the federal court
clerk." 8
The jurisdiction granted here was not a part of the pre-1980 constitu-
tion. However, much the same process had arisen earlier by court rule and
from decisional law.51 9 Thus, the 1980 reforms largely codified these
procedures within the constitution.52 °
Perhaps the most significant requirement, other than the detailed formal
certificate,52' is that there must be a "cause" from which the certified
questions arise.522 This means that the Florida Supreme Court cannot
accept questions in the abstract, but only if they are "determinative" of a
particular case. In practice, this means that there must be an actual suit
pending review in the federal appellate courts. Thus, certified questions do
not actually ask the Florida Supreme Court to issue an advisory opinion.
The federal courts are bound to honor and to apply the response given by
the Florida Supreme Court. All such cases involve an actual application of
Florida law, often in cases premised on federal diversity jurisdiction.5 23
515. In re TA.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 588 (right to donate organs of child soon to die,
where death would make organs undonatable).
516. See, e.g., Carawan, 515 So. 2d at 161.
517. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
518. FLA. R. App. P. 9.150(b).
519. E.g., Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326.(Fla. 1969).
520. See Jurisdiction, supra note 320, at 196.
521. For an example of a certificate see Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249 (1963).
522. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 741 (Fla. 1961).
523. E.g., Allen v. Estate of Carman, 486 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Certified questions accepted from federal courts are answered by way
of a formal opinion, a requirement that stems in part from state statute. 24
The holdings of that opinion can become precedent for future cases, on the
theory that the Florida Supreme Court's opinion actually resolves controlling
questions. In answering the questions, however, the Court does not
"remand" '25 the cause to a federal court as it would to an inferior court.
Some Florida Supreme Court opinions misuse the word "remand" in this
way, but the better practice is for the Court to "transmit" or "return" the
cause to the federal court for further proceedings. 26
The Court has obvious discretion to decline to answer a federal
certified question. However, in practice, the federal appellate courts have
been conscientious in confining certification to cases that genuinely meet the
rather strict constitutional requirements. Review might be declined, for
example, where a federal appellate court was unaware that there is
controlling precedent previously made by the Florida Supreme Court. In
that situation, the most constructive response would be for the Court to cite
the controlling precedent in the order declining review.
27
VII. DISCRETIONARY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
The Florida Supreme Court's discretionary original jurisdiction involves
a class of legal "writs" that, with some exceptions, originated centuries ago
in the English common law. Most Floridians know little about these writs,
with the possible exception of habeas corpus, and even some lawyers tend
to lose sight of the creative ways the writs can be used. In truly exceptional
circumstances, one of these so-called "extraordinary writs" may provide
jurisdiction when nothing else can.
524. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1991). There is no requirement to accept the case, only to
issue an opinion once the case is accepted. Id.
525. The term "remand" implies mandate and therefore suggests a direction to an
inferior court. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (6th ed. 1991). The federal appellate
courts are not inferior to the Florida Supreme Court.
526. E.g., Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 513 So. 2d 1265, 1270 (Fla. 1987);
Bates v. Cook, Inc,, 509 So. 2d 1112, 1115 (Fla. 1987).
527. The court probably would lack jurisdiction, not merely discretion, in this situation.
The constitution's strict language suggests that it is not enough for the federal appellate court
to certify the case; there also must be an actual lack of controlling precedent of the Florida
Supreme Court. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6). In any event, whether the case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or lack of discretion would make no difference here.
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Because most of the writs are ancient, there is a highly detailed body
of case law governing their use. The constitution itself does little more than
identify the writs and assign the court jurisdiction over them, 28 so the
Florida Supreme Court almost always gauges these cases based on
long-standing judicial precedent. As a result, these cases tend to be
analyzed under a kind of "common law" approach, although, strictly
speaking, the jurisdiction arises from the constitution itself. There are some
limitations imposed by the constitution that did not arise from the common
law, but these usually involve the specific class of persons to whom a writ
may be issued by the Court.
Technically speaking, the Florida Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
any petition that merely requests some form of relief available under this
category. The Court's discretion, however, is severely limited in some cases
by the body of case law and common law principles defining the scope of
permissible judicial action. The "jurisdiction/discretion" distinction is
usually of little real consequence here. If the Court lacks discretion to issue
a writ, it cannot grant relief as surely as if it lacked jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of the controlling case law that can be
explained only by the distinction. For example, the Court's discretion to
issue any of the extraordinary writs is defined by the applicable standard of
review, which differs with each writ. It is common (though not precise) to
use the word "jurisdiction" in its loose sense to include limitations on
discretion, in which case the Court's "jurisdiction" over the extraordinary
writs also would be determined by the standard of review.
However, there are cases where the Court expressly accepts jurisdiction,
hears the case, and issues a full opinion determining that the standard of
review has not been met and a writ cannot be issued." 9 If the Court
lacked jurisdiction of such cases, then it could not even hear them, much
less accept jurisdiction and issue a full opinion.
There is another aspect of "discretion" that deserves some mention.
The fact that the Court's discretion to issue the writs is limited by judicially
created case law leaves open the possibility of the Florida Supreme Court
refining or modifying the standards of review. Such modifications are
528. In many instances, however, jurisdiction is not exclusive. The lower courts would
also have jurisdiction to consider issuing one of the writs, except that petitioners usually are
forbidden to seek the same remedy from another court simply because they did not like the
last court's decision.
529. E.g., Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 398, 400-01 (Fla. 1992).
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unusual, but they do happen."' It would be hard to say in these cases that
the Court somehow has modified its own "jurisdiction," because this would
imply some inherent power to depart from the constitution. On the whole,
the infrequent modifications made to standards of review are best understood
as changes in discretion, not changes in jurisdiction.53'
A. Mandamus
The first extraordinary writ is "mandamus," whose name in Latin
means "We command. 532 As the name suggests, mandamus is a writ of
commandment, a fact underscored by its history. In ancient times, the writ
issued as a command from the Sovereigns of England when they sat
personally as judges; but, it later came to be a prerogative of judges of the
Court of King's Bench.533 Because of the writ's coercive nature, its use
is subject to severe restrictions developed in Florida and earlier English case
law. In broad terms, the Florida Supreme Court today may issue mandamus
only to compel state officers and state agencies to perform a purely minis-
terial action where the petitioner otherwise would suffer an injury and has
a clear and certain right to have the action done. There are a number of
concerns here.
In the Florida Supreme Court, unlike other state courts, mandamus may
issue only to state officers and state agencies.534 This limitation arises
from the constitution itself, and is the only restriction on mandamus
expressly imposed there. 35 The Court has never fully defined what the
terms "state officers" and "state agencies" mean. The cases appear to
assume that these terms include agencies and public office holders within
the three branches of state government, but nothing establishes this with any
finality. Arguably, state officers could include persons holding an office
530. E.g., Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 1991) (modifying error coram
nobis); Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1989) (modifying error coram
nobis).
531. In theory, modifications to "discretion" could be so drastic as to essentially
constitute a change in jurisdiction. In practice, it is unlikely the court would take any such
drastic step, which probably would invite efforts to curb the court's actions by way of statute
or constitutional amendment.
532. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1991).
533. See State exrel. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd. v. Graddick, 89 So. 361, 362 (Fla.
1921).
534. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court presently cannot issue a writ of mandamus to
private individuals or businesses, as it sometimes could in the past. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Ranger Realty Co. v. Lummus, 149 So. 650 (Fla. 1933).
535. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8).
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created by the Florida Constitution," 6 but the Court has never clearly said
so. Moreover, the constitution itself seems to contrast "state officers" with
"constitutional officers" elsewhere, implying they are not the same
thing. 37
Someone seeking mandamus also must establish that the action being
sought is "ministerial." An action is ministerial only to the extent that the
respondent has no discretion over the matter. There are self-evident reasons
for this requirement. No court can compel that lawful discretion be
exercised to achieve a particular result, however fair it may seem to do
so.53 Any other rule would permit judges to exercise dictatorial powers
through the simple expedient of mandamus. Thus, a respondent's lack of
discretion is an absolute prerequisite to mandamus.
However, the lack of discretion can be partial because it is possible for
an action to be partly ministerial and partly discretionary. This most
commonly arises where the law grants discretion to take some action but
specifies a particular kind of review process and factors that must be
considered when and if discretion is exercised. Sometimes a respondent
may depart from the required process. When so, mandamus can issue only
to require a proper review, not to mandate that any particular discretionary
outcome must be reached.
Thus, the Court has held that mandamus cannot compel the discretion-
ary act of granting parole to an inmate; yet, mandamus potentially could be
used to compel the Florida Parole and Probation Commission to conform its
parole review process to the clear requirements of the constitution. 39
Likewise, mandamus cannot be used to compel the Florida Department of
Corrections to perform the discretionary act of awarding "early release"
credits to inmates; yet mandamus can be used to require the Department to
employ a constitutionally required process in review of such cases.54
The person seeking mandamus also must show the likelihood that some
injury will occur if the writ is not issued. 41 If there is no possibility of
injury, then mandamus is an inappropriate remedy.5 42  Thus, mandamus
536. Examples include sheriffs, clerks of the circuit court, and property appraisers. See
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § I(d).
537. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
538. E.g., Moore v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1974).
539. Id. at 719-20.
540. Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 694 (Fla. 1990).
541. Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1992).
542. Id.
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will not be issued if doing so would constitute a useless act543 or would
result in no remedial good."' This situation might exist, for example,
where the action that would be compelled already has been done. 45
For example, the Court has found the writ inappropriate where a license
was taken away improperly but had been obtained in the first instance
through fraud or deceit. 46  In other words, a valid reason existed to
revoke the license, and, therefore, it would be a useless act to issue
mandamus merely because an improper reason had been given for revoca-
tion. Moreover, injury does not exist if petitioners are able to perform the
ministerial acts in question for themselves. 47 However, injury can include
some generalized harm, such as a disruption of governmental functions 48
or the holding of an illegal election. 49
Petitioners seeking mandamus also must establish that they have a
"clear and certain" right imposing a corresponding duty on the respondents
to take the actions sought." A right is clear and certain only if it is
already plainly established in preexisting law or precedent.5 Thus, the
opinion in which mandamus will be issued cannot be used as the vehicle for
creating a right previously uncertain or not yet extended to the situation at
hand. The right already must have come into existence through some other
legal authority.552 Moreover, the right must be "complete" and uncondi-
tional at the time the petition is brought. The existence of any unfulfilled
condition precedent renders mandamus improper.553 Likewise, mandamus
cannot be used to achieve an illegal or otherwise improper purpose, because
there is no right to break the law or violate public policy.554
On occasion, Florida courts imposed another element which a petitioner
had to show the existence of no other adequate remedy.55  This was
543. E.g., Bishoff v. State exrel. Tampa Waterworks Co., 30 So. 808, 812 (Fla. 1901).
544. E.g., McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1944).
545. E.g., State exrel. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Atkinson, 149 So. 29, 30 (Fla. 1933).
546. State ex rel. Bergin v. Dunne, 71 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1954).
547. E.g., Gallie v. Wainwright, 362 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1978).
548. E.g.. Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1971).
549. See supra note 529.
550. State ex reL. Eichenbaum v. Cochran, 114 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 1959).
551. Florita League of Cities, 607 So. 2d at 401.
552. Id.
553. State ex rel. Bergin, 71 So. 2d at 749.
554. See, e.g., State ex rel. Edwards v. County Comm'rs of Sumter County, 22 Fla. 1,
7 (1886).
555. E.g., Shevin ex rel. State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1976);
State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 164 So. 199, 205 (Fla. 1935).
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justified on the grounds that mandamus exists to correct defects in justice,
not to supersede other adequate legal remedies. The extraordinary nature
of the writ supports this rationale. However, in 1985, the Florida Supreme
Court seemed to indicate that the "no adequate remedy" requirement no
longer exists, at least in cases involving "strictly legal constitutional"
questions.556
The reasons for this conclusion are not clear, nor is the validity of the
result certain. The opinion making these statements obviously misread the
precedent on which it relied 57 and could be criticized or overruled on that
basis. The "no adequate remedy" serves a useful purpose in that it requires
petitioners to exhaust other sufficient means before burdening the Florida
Supreme Court's docket. Possibly the Court may see fit to reinstate the
requirement at some point. In any event, the writ of mandamus remains
discretionary and can be refused without reason if the Court believes a
petitioner has another good remedy.
The terms "state officers and state agencies" as used in the constitution
include judges and courts,558 though the Florida Supreme Court generally
seems to confine its "judicial" mandamus cases to petitions directed at the
district courts of appeal. In these cases, one specialized use of the writ is
to require the respondent-judges to exercise jurisdiction that has been
wrongly denied in the lower court. At earlier common law, this device was
known as the writ of procedendo,559 though today the same concept has
been subsumed under mandamus. 6° However, mandamus would be
inappropriate unless the law clearly required the lower court to exercise its
jurisdiction and it failed to do so.56'
556. Hess v. Metropolitan Dade County, 467 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1985). Contra
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Hartsfield, 399 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
557. The court cited Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984), which involved an
alleged defect in a constitutional amendment that would be put to voters. Fine did not
mention the "no adequate remedy" requirement. However, it was clear that no other adequate
remedy existed there: The right to a fair election was at stake, and a fair election would not
be possible if a defective constitutional amendment was allowed to remain on the ballot. Id.
at 985. Moreover, there was precedent that the defects in the proposed amendment would
be "cured" by the act of being approved in the election, unfair though it may be.
558. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
559. See Linning v. Duncan, 169 So. 2d 862, 866 (Fla. 1964) (citing Newport v.
Culbreath, 162 So. 340 (Fla. 1935)).
560. E.g., Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1992).
561. Id.
1252 [Vol. 18
538
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Kogan / Waters
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court has a long-standing custom-but
one not uniformly followed-regarding the actual issuance of mandamus.
As a matter of courtesy, the Court sometimes says it will withhold issuing
the writ because the justices are confident a respondent will conform to the
majority opinion.562 The practice is a sound one, if only because it may
blunt some of the sting the losing party may feel. In any event, if a
respondent later refused to conform, the Court could still issue a previously
"withheld" writ on a proper motion to enforce the mandate. The fact that
a writ is actually issued, however, never indicates any special onus.
B. Quo Warranto
The second extraordinary writ is quo warranto, whose name in Latin
poses the question, "By what right?" As the name suggests, quo warranto
is a writ of inquiry. Historically, the Crown of England developed the writ
as a means of calling upon subjects to explain some alleged abuse of an
office, franchise, or liberty within the Crown's purview.563 Today, quo
warranto continues in Florida as the means by which an interested party can
test whether any individual improperly claims or has usurped some power
or right derived from the State of Florida.
5 64
Standing to seek quo warranto can be inclusive. The Florida Supreme
Court has held that any citizen may bring suit for quo warranto if the case
involves "enforcement of a public right." '565 In practice, quo warranto
proceedings almost always involve a public right because the Florida
Supreme Court can issue the writ only to "state officers or state agen-
cies. 566 (This limitation is the only express restriction imposed by the
constitution, all others being derived from case law.) Thus, the cases taken
to the Court usually are limited to those involving some allegedly improper
use of state powers or violation of rights by these officers or agencies.
562. E.g., Caldwell v. Estate of McDowell, 507 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 1987).
563. State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 143 So. 638 (Fla. 1932).
564. Id.; Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989).
565. Martinez, 545 So. 2d at 1339 (citing State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 170 So. 736,
737 (Fla. 1936)).
566. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). For a discussion of this limitation and its likely
meaning, see supra text accompanying notes 534-37. Under earlier law, quo warranto
sometimes could be used to test the validity of a
ctions done pursuant to a franchise granted by the state, including the right to incorporate.
Thus, the writ sometimes could issue against a private concern. E.g., Davidson v. State, 20
Fla. 784 (1884). The Florida Supreme Court no longer has such authority. See FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 3(b)(8).
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One use of quo warranto is to test the outcome of a disputed election,
such as where one person has claimed the powers of the elective office but
another contends this was unlawful.567 Actions of this variety are gov-
erned in part by Florida Statutes specifying that the petition be brought by
the Attorney General or, if the latter refuses, by the person claiming title to
the office.568 If the Court grants the petition, it can issue a judgment of
ouster 69 which has the effect of vesting the claimant with title to the
office. However, if the Attorney General did not consent to the suit, the
judgment remains subject to challenge by the state.57 °
There are other uses of quo warranto. For example, quo warranto has
been used by a legislator who argued that the Governor exceeded his
constitutional authority in calling a special session of the Legislature.57'
In that instance, the petition for quo warranto was filed by the legislator as
an original proceeding in the Court.572 The writ has also been used to
decide whether a state public defender's office exceeded its statutory
authority by representing indigent clients in federal court proceedings. 73
As in the case of mandamus, the Florida Supreme Court sometimes has
"withheld" issuance of a writ of quo warranto as a matter of courtesy where
it appears the Court's decision will be honored.574 This custom has not
been followed uniformly, however, and the failure to withhold issuance has
no real significance. In any event, quo warranto is a somewhat exotic legal
device that is used only occasionally by the Court.
C. Writs of Prohibition
The third extraordinary writ is that of prohibition. Like the two writs
discussed above, the writ of prohibition has an ancient origin in English law.
It arose out of the early struggle between the royal courts controlled by the
Crown and the ecclesiastical courts controlled by the Church. Its primary
purpose was to prevent an ecclesiastical court from encroaching upon the
567. State ex rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 184 So. I (Fla. 1938).
568. FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (1991).
569. Id. § 80.032.
570. Id. § 80.04.
571. Martinez, 545 So. 2d at 1338.
572. Id.
573. State ex rel. Smith v. Jorandby, 498 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1986).
574. E.g., id. at 950; Greenbaum v. Firestone, 455 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1984).
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prerogatives of the Sovereign.575 Thus, the writ of prohibition came into
being as a preventive writ and retains that quality to this day.
In Florida, prohibition is now the process by which a higher court
prevents an inferior tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction. 576 The writ
may be obtained only by a petitioner who can demonstrate that a lower
court is without jurisdiction or is attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction
regarding a future matter, and the petitioner has no other adequate legal
remedy to prevent an injury that is likely to result. 77 There are a number
of concerns here.
The writ may only be directed to a lower court and not to state
agencies, state officers, or state commissions. This restriction is imposed by
the constitution 578 as a result of the 1980 jurisdictional reforms, which
deleted the Florida Supreme Court's authority to issue writs of prohibition
to some quasi-judicial commissions. 579 In effect, this ended the Court's
earlier jurisdiction over state administratiye agencies when they acted in
their quasi-judicial capacities.580 Under long-standing precedent, writs of
prohibition clearly cannot reach an action that is purely legislative or
executive in nature.581
However, the Florida Supreme Court's power to issue writs of
prohibition to courts is now the same for both the district courts582 and the
circuit courts.583 Prior to the 1980 reforms, the authority over trial courts
had been limited to "causes within the jurisdiction of the supreme court to
review.' 584 The restriction was deleted in 1980, effectively vesting the
Florida Supreme Court with potential prohibition jurisdiction over any cause
arising in a trial court.585  Presumably, this includes the county courts,
though in practice such cases will seldom involve matters of such gravity for
the Court to exercise its discretion.
575. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977).
576. Id.
577. Id. ai 296-97, accord Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1986).
578. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
579. Moffit v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1984).
580. For an example of this superseded form of jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Vining v.
Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973) (prohibition issued against
quasi-judicial proceedings of Florida Real Estate Commission).
581. State ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad Comm'rs, 84 So. 444 (1920).
582. See, e.g., Peltz v. District Court of Appeal, 605 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1992).
583. See, e.g., Department of Agric. v. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990).
584. ARTHUR J. ENGLAND, JR., ET AL., FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL §
2.23(a), at 57 (D & S/Butterworths 1992 Supp.).
585. Id.
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Petitioners must also show that the lower court is without jurisdiction
or is attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction. For example, prohibition
is proper to restrain a lower court that clearly lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter. 86 The Florida Supreme Court often has contrasted "lack
of jurisdiction" with those situations in which a court merely exercises
jurisdiction erroneously. In theory, a writ of prohibition is not proper for
the latter. 87 In practice, however, there is no realistic way to draw a clear
distinction between the lack of jurisdiction and the erroneous exercise of
jurisdiction as the two often blur together.
Perhaps as a result, the case law often reaches results that seem hard
to reconcile with a strict "lack of jurisdiction" element. In several cases, for
example, the Florida Supreme Court has used prohibition to prevent a lower
court from imposing restraints on a prosecutor's discretion to seek the death
penalty in a criminal trial. This has occurred even though the lower court
plainly had jurisdiction over the issues but had merely engaged in conduct
best characterized as a clear error.
5 88
On policy grounds, such a use of prohibition has some merit. It could
promote judicial economy by allowing the Florida Supreme Court to prevent
a clear error from infecting the entire proceeding. This would forestall the
likelihood of a useless trial that must inevitably be reversed on appeal.
Nevertheless, such a rule comes close to vesting the Court with a kind of
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, which could become onerous if not used
with restraint. As a practical matter, it seems unlikely the Court will extend
this particular use of prohibition much beyond the unusual factual pattern
from which it arose.
586. Crill v. State Rd. Dep't, 117 So. 795 (Fla. 1928).
587. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
588. E.g., State v. Donner, 500 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1987); State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2
(Fla. 1986). But see Peacock v. Miller, 166 So. 212 (Fla. 1936) (prohibition not proper
where inferior court has jurisdiction but commits error). The use of prohibition in the
prosecutorial discretion cases following the 1980 jurisdiction reforms apparently began with
Bloom, which cited as authority Clevelandv. State, 417 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1982). However,
this is an obvious overextension of Cleveland, which was an "express and direct conflict"
case holding only that a court could not interfere with a prosecutor's discretion to'refuse to
allow a defendant to be placed in a pretrial intervention program. Id. Clevelandhad nothing
to do with prohibition. Nevertheless, the "abuse of discretion" cases do gain some support
by analogy to the well established precedent that prohibition sometimes may be used as a
means of disqualifying biased judges even though they clearly have jurisdiction. E.g., Bundy
v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978); State ex rel. Bank of Am. v. Rowe, 118 So. 5 (Fla.
1928). Judicial disqualification comes much closer to being a question of abuse of discretion
than abuse of jurisdiction.
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The next element a petitioner must show in order to obtain a prohibi-
tion writ is that the alleged improper actions of the lower court will occur
in the future. 89 The Florida Supreme Court often has noted that prohibi-
tion is a preventive writ, not a "corrective" one.59 Thus, prohibition can
be directed only to future acts, not past ones. The cases suggest that the
future act must to some degree be "impending."59' "Past acts" can include
an order already entered or proceedings already completed. 92 Additional-
ly, prohibition has been allowed for orders previously entered if the primary
effect is on a proceeding that has not yet occurred." 3 This use is justifi-
able in that such orders are directed to the future, but the result is a blurring
of the distinction. The best interpretation probably is that a "past act" is one
involving a significant degree of finality, whereas a "future act" does not.
To obtain prohibition, a petitioner must also show that no other
adequate remedy exists.5 94 The key word is "adequate." Other remedies
may exist that are inadequate, incomplete, or unavailable to the petitioner;
if so, then prohibition is not foreclosed. 95 As a general rule, the fact that
an appeal will give the petitioner an adequate and complete remedy renders
prohibition unavailable. 96  If another extraordinary writ provides an
adequate and complete remedy, then prohibition also should be denied. 97
However, the Court still might review the case by treating the petition as
though it had requested the proper remedy.5 98
The final element is that prohibition can be issued only to prevent some
likely and impending injury.599 Prohibition is not available if the issues
have become moot by the passage of time,6"0 nor can it be used to issue
a purely advisory opinion establishing principles for future cases. 60 1
Opinions discussing the writ often describe it as being appropriate only in
589. English, 348 So. 2d at 296.
590. E.g., 3parkman, 498 So. 2d at 895.
591. E.g., Joughin v. Parks, 143 So. 145 (Fla. 1932).
592. Id.
593. E.g., Donner, 500 So. 2d at 532; Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 2.
594. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
595. E.g., Sparkman, 498 So. 2d at 892; Curtis v. Albritton, 132 So. 677 (Fla. 1931).
596. Sparkman, 498 So. 2d at 892.
597. E.g., State ex rel. Placeres v. Parks, 163 So. 89 (Fla. 1935) (if mandamus is
available, prohibition should be denied); State ex rel. Booth v. Byington, 168 So. 2d 164
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (if quo warranto is available, prohibition should be denied).
598. See, e.g., Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990).
599. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
600. Wetherell v. Thursby, 129 So. 345 (Fla. 1930).
601. English, 348 So. 2d at 293.
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emergencies,"02 implying that the likelihood of some injury must be real
and immediate.
As with many of the other extraordinary writs, the Florida Supreme
Court sometimes withholds formal issuance even when prohibition is
granted.60 3 This is a custom not uniformly followed in the cases, and is
usually done as a matter of courtesy or when the Court is confident a
respondent will adhere to the decision. Failure to withhold a writ in
particular cases thus has no real significance, because the result is the same.
D. Habeas Corpus
The best known of the extraordinary writs is habeas corpus, whose
name in Latin means "You should have the body. 6 4  The name arises
from the fact that the writ always began with these words, which were
directed to one who was detaining another person. The writ typically
required the respondent to bring the body of the detained person into court
so that the validity of the detention might be examined.65 Habeas corpus
thus arose as a writ of inquiry used to determine whether the detention is
proper 6°6 or, put more accurately, whether the restraint on liberty is
lawful.60 7 Potentially, any deprivation of personal liberty can be tested by
habeas corpus, and for that reason it is often called the Great Writ.60 8
The obvious relationship to the constitutional right of liberty60 9
explains why habeas corpus is the only writ specifically guaranteed by the
Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights, which forbids suspension of
habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion.6 " Habeas corpus
is also the most frequently used and most generously available of the
extraordinary writs. For that reason, the case law is exceedingly complex.
Entire treatises have been written addressing the writ's many nuances. A
602. Id. at 296.
603. E.g., Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3.
604. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 586 (2d ed. 1985).
605. There no longer is any absolute requirement that the detained person be brought
to court, and this earlier practice rarely occurs in the Florida Supreme Court today.
606. Allison v. Baker, II So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1943).
607. Sylvester v. Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1944).
608. See State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 152 So. 207 (Fla. 1933). In ancient times,
the writ of habeas corpus was divided into many subcategories, most of which now are
irrelevant or have been superseded by other devices such as the capias or bench warrant. Id.
609. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
610. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 13. However, habeas corpus to some extent is regulated by
statute. See FLA. STAT. §§ 79.01-79.12 (1991).
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full discussion of habeas corpus thus is not possible within the limited space
of this article.
The standard of reviewing habeas claims can also be complex. In very
broad and general terms, the Court has said that habeas cannot be issued
except where the petitioner shows reasonable grounds to believe that a
present, actual, and involuntary restraint on liberty is being imposed without
authority of law and that no other remedy exists. Habeas is improper if the
restraint has ended,6t ' if there is no actual restriction on liberty, 6 12 or if
restrictions on liberty are mere future possibilities 63 or have not been
coercively imposed.6"4 Even limited restraints on liberty can be sufficient-
ly coercive to justify habeas relief, including an unlawfully imposed
parole.6" 5
Habeas is also proper only if the restraint is without legal justifica-
tion6" 6 and no other remedy exists to correct the problem.617 It is often
said that habeas cannot substitute for remedies available by appeal, by
motion to dismiss, or by proper use of procedural devices that were
available prior to the time the restraints on liberty were imposed. 6 " Thus,
strictly speaking, habeas would not be a proper remedy where counsel failed
to make a timely motion that could have prevented the restraint on liberty,
though the matter potentially might be reviewable as a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Likewise, habeas is improper to the extent that the restraint on liberty
itself is not the true issue. This often hinges on fine distinctions. For
example, inmates alleging that "early release" credits were computed in an
unconstitutional manner would not be entitled to habeas. In that instance,
the real issue was not the self-evident restraint on liberty, but the improper
performance of a ministerial act (computing "early release" credits) that may
or may not reflect on the lawfulness of the detention; and habeas thus, was
not the proper remedy.619
In sum, habeas is not a proper remedy if some unfulfilled condition
precedent still must occur to render any further restraint on liberty unlawful
611. Rice v. Wainwright, 154 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1963).
612. Sellers v. Bridges, 15 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1943).
613. Thompson v. Wainwright, 328 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
614. See Sullivan v. State, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla, 1951).
615. Camley v. Cochran, 123 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1963), rev'don other grounds, 369 U.S.
506 (1962).
616. State ex rel. Davis v. Hardie, 146 So. 97 (Fla. 1933).
617. Brown v. Watson, 156 So. 327 (Fla. 1934).
618. Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959).
619. Waldrup. 562 So. 2d at 687.
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even if the writ were issued. But habeas would be one possible remedy at
a later date if "early release" credits were properly computed, the inmate
clearly was entitled to release, and prison officials failed to honor the law.
It is worth noting, however, that an allegedly invalid death penalty itself
constitutes a restraint on liberty even where there is no question that the
defendant will remain in prison even if the penalty is vacated. 620 But the
habeas petitioner's claim must genuinely be directed at the validity of the
penalty itself, not at some other matter.621
There are three special aspects of habeas corpus that deserve a passing
mention. The most common and obvious use of habeas corpus is by
inmates who wish to challenge the lawfulness of their present imprisonment.
Dozens of petitions to this effect come to the Florida Supreme Court every
week.622 However, habeas corpus is not strictly confined to a penal or
even a criminal-law setting. "Civil detention" of a person can potentially
be tested by the writ of habeas corpus, including matters beyond the obvious
example of involuntary commitments for psychiatric treatment.623 Even
detention imposed on someone by a private individual potentially can be
tested by habeas corpus. The most common use is where one parent alleges
that the other parent has taken custody of a child wrongfully. 624
The second point deserving mention is that the remedy available by
habeas corpus has been supplemented and modified somewhat since the
1960s by innovations in the Florida Rules of Court. Some types of habeas
claims by inmates now must be brought under Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850615 in the trial court where the matter in question originated. Rule
620. Compare Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1986) (death penalty
vacated on habeas petition, and case remanded for new proceedings), with Fitzpatrick v.
State, 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988) (death penalty ultimately reduced to life imprisonment for
same defendant).
621. The court itself sometimes overlooks the fine distinctions that can be involved in
determining whether a petition genuinely is challenging a restraint on liberty, not some other
matter. See discussion of the case of Michael Durocher infra text accompanying notes 660-
63.
622. These petitions often are in the form of handwritten notes that do not meet the
court's usual filing requirements. However, the court accepts all such "pro se" petitions if
they fairly appear to be seeking some form of relief, sometimes even assigning volunteer
counsel to assist in exceptional cases. The court has held that even informal communications
can be sufficient to petition for habeas corpus. Crane v. Hayes, 253 So. 2d 435, 442 (Fla.
1971).
623. E.g., In re Hansen, 162 So. 715 (Fla. 1935).
624. E.g., Crane v. Hayes, 253 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1971); Porter v. Porter, 53 So. 546 (Fla.
1910).
625. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850.
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3.850 was originally created by the Florida Supreme Court as an emergency
means of dealing with the substantial turmoil created by the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright.626 At the time, the
Rule's immediate purpose was to prevent the Florida Supreme Court from
being overwhelmed by habeas petitions prompted by Gideon's holding that
Florida had violated the rights of hundreds of indigent felony offenders
convicted without benefit of counsel.627
Over the years, Rule 3.850 has retained its original purpose of creating
a procedural "'channel" through which a large class of "habeas" claims must
flow. There is already a detailed body of case law interpreting the Rule, so
bulky that an adequate outline cannot be given in an article of this size.
However, the Court has not lost sight of Rule 3.850's origin as a refinement
of habeas corpus.
In a 1988 case, for example, the Court described Rule 3.850 as "a
procedural vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of
habeas corpus," one that creates a fact-finding function in the trial courts
and a uniform method of appellate review.628 In 1992, the Court further
suggested that Rule 3.850 must be construed in a manner consistent with the
Florida Constitution's stricture that habeas corpus shall be "grantable of
right, freely and without cost.
6 29
These refinements to habeas corpus again show how even the
extraordinary writs evolve over time. Obviously, further evolution will
occur in years ahead as new problems arise that are unanticipated in the
thousand years of Anglo-American precedent upon which Florida's legal
system draws. Such changes are not necessarily bad, nor do they necessari-
ly require amendment of the constitution. The upheaval caused by Gideon,
for example, was met and overcome through the Court's rule-making
powers, described more fully below. 63° The Court "channelized" habeas
corpus into an orderly procedural process that not only was consistent with
the constitution but helped ensure that fundamental rights would be honored
without delay.
The final point to note is that the Florida Constitution does something
very unusual with the habeas power it grants: The power is conferred upon
626. 372 U.S. 335 (1962). The problems Gideon caused, as well as the Florida Supreme
Court's response, are recounted in Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
627. Roy, 151 So. 2d at 827.
628. State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1988) (citing State v. Wooden, 246 So.
2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1971)).
629. Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1992) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 13).
630. See discussion infra part VIII.C.
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each justice of the Florida Supreme Court individually.63 In other words,
the constitution permits each justice to issue the writ as an individual
without the necessity of obtaining assent from a majority of the Court. The
justices' individual power of granting habeas corpus underscores that ready
access to the writ was intended as part of the constitution's protection of
liberty.
E. "All Writs"
The state constitution also grants the Florida Supreme Court authority
to issue "all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. 632
The operative constitutional language here has remained essentially
unchanged for many decades now, 6 33 although the construction placed on
that language has fluctuated almost erratically at times. As a result, the
Court's "all writs" authority remains one of the most confusing and
unsettled areas of jurisdiction, a problem worsened by the infrequency of all
writs cases. The all writs clause cannot be understood apart from its history.
Prior to 1968, the cases dealing with the all writs clause plainly stood
for two things. First, the all writs power could not be invoked unless a
cause was already pending before the Court on some independent basis of
jurisdiction. Second, the Court's authority in this regard could only be
directed at purely ancillary matters. In sum, "all writs" meant ancillary
writs in pending proceedings. 34
Then, in the 1968 case of Couse v. Canal Authority,635 the Court
suddenly and dramatically overruled its earlier standard of review. "All
writs" authority would now exist over any matter falling within the Court's
"ultimate power of review" even if no case on the matter was pending in the
Florida Supreme Court at the time. The 1968 Court, then sua sponte,
amended the Rules of Appellate Procedure to set forth its new standard: All
writs jurisdiction exists "only when it is made clearly to appear that the writ
is in fact necessary in aid of an ultimate power of review.' ' 636 In sum, the
631. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(9).
632. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7). For a discussion of the history underlying this
provision and the case law, see Robert T. Mann, The Scope of the All Writs Power, 10 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 197 (1982).
633. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7) with Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So. 2d
865, 867 (Fla. 1968) (quoting FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V (1957)).
634. E.g., State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 8 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 1942).
635. 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1968).
636. Couse, 209 So. 2d at 867 (quoting FLA. R. APP. 4.5(g)(1) (as amended)).
Apparently, the new standard merely expanded jurisdiction. The Court still continued to
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standard of review was changed from "ancillary writs" to "aiding ultimate
jurisdiction," though it was not altogether clear in Couse what this change
meant.
Two years later, the Court mentioned its all writs powers in a way that
apparently expanded them even further. In a rancorous dispute between the
Governor and the Legislature, the 1970 Court seemed to suggest that it was
exercising some form of original all writs jurisdiction because the case
"vitally affect[ed] the public interest of the State., 637 However, the case
is vague and actually may have involved the issuance of a writ of prohibi-
tion, with the Court imprecisely referring to "the all writ section" as the
basis for jurisdiction,63 ' a misreference that has also happened else-
where.639
Later cases, unfortunately, have read this same vague language quite
expansively. In 1974, the Court confronted a case involving the all writs
authority of the district courts of appeal. While deciding the case, the Court
detoured into dicta reiterating the 1968 standard of review and adding to it:
The Florida Supreme Court's original all writs jurisdiction now would
extend to "certain cases [that] present extraordinary circumstances involving
public interest where emergencies and seasonable consideration are involved
that require expedition."64  It was unclear whether this dictum was a
revision of the Couse standard or merely added an additional requirement
that must be met before all writs jurisdiction could be invoked. If the
former, "all writs" could have been converted into a form a "reach-down"
jurisdiction by which any sufficiently important case could originate in the
Florida Supreme Court, with all trial and appellate issues potentially being
resolved in one sitting.
For the next two years, the Court made little effort to explain whether
its all writs power would operate so sweepingly. 4 ' Then in 1976 another
issue ancillary writs in pending proceedings under its all writs power. See Booth v. Wain-
wright, 300 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1974).
637. State ex rel. Pettigrew v. Kirk, 243 So. 2d 147, 149 (Fla. 1970).
638. See id. The headnote says that prohibition was issued, though the text of the
opinion is vague on this point. Id.
639. E.g., City ofTallahassee v. Mann, 411 So. 2d 162, 163 (Fla. 1981) (all writs clause
cited as basis of jurisdiction in granting prohibition). The misreference also was tempted by
another fact: Both prohibition and "all writs" are authorized by the same sentence in the
constitution, though the two actually are distinct and subject to radically different standards
of review. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
640. Monroe Educ. Ass'n v. Clerk, Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 299 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1974).
641. E.g., McCain v. Select Committee on Impeachment, 313 So. 2d 722, 722 (Fla.
1975). The McCain case involved an effort by a sitting justice of the Florida Supreme Court
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dramatic reversal occurred: The Court suddenly reverted to its pre-1968
standard of review. No real reason for doing so was given,642 and the
Court did not mention or overrule the relevant cases it had issued since the
late 1960s. Nor did the Court even note that the relevant Rule of Appellate
Procedure still contained the language added sua sponte to enforce
Couse.64 3 The Court's decision was criticized as being "rightly decided
but wrongly explained." 6"
The older ancillary writs standard does seem dated in light of modem
procedural innovations. Common-law "ancillary writs" such as audita
querela have vanished from the law, replaced by procedural rules no longer
even identified by the somewhat quaint term "writ." In the Florida Supreme
Court, modern-day descendents of the old ancillary writs are sometimes still
seen, such as the writ of injunction and the related concept of a judicial
"stay." However, the Court in recent years has never attempted to use the
all writs clause as the basis of jurisdiction over such matters. Rather, the
Court routinely finds some other basis of jurisdiction.645 In this light, an
ancillary writs standard risks converting "all writs" into something
essentially meaningless, contrary to the settled rule that all constitutional
language should be construed to have an effect if at all possible.646
Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, the Court seemed to be applying the
restrictive ancillary writs standard, though it typically did so with a
minimum of explanation. 647  Then, in 1982, everything changed again:
to stop impeachment proceedings against him. When he sought relief under the all writs
clause, the court rejected it on the grounds that it failed to set forth "a claim within the
jurisdiction and responsibility of the court." Id. This statement, while vague, seemed much
more limited than the sweeping statements the court had made only a year earlier in 1974.
642. The Court only cited one case that had nothing to do with the all-writs clause and
a 1942 case that clearly had been overruled in 1968. Shevin exrel. State, 333 So. 2d 9, 12
(Fla. 1976) (citing Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975)); State v. Lee, 8 So. 2d
19 (Fla. 1942)).
643. FLA. R. App. P. 4.5(g)(I). The Rule's language was even quoted two years later
in an opinion apparently applying the pre-1968 standard of review. Besoner v. Crawford,
357 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 1978).
644. Robert T. Mann, The Scope of the All Writs Power, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 197,
212 (1982).
645. E.g., Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 912, 916 (Fla. 1991) (stay of pending
execution based on Court's jurisdiction over judgments imposing sentence of death); The
Florida Bar v. Dobbs, 508 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 1987) (writ of injunction against unlicensed
practice of law based on Court's jurisdiction to regulate practice of law).
646. Burmsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 290 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1974).
647. Id.; St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304, 1304-05 (Fla. 1980) (all
writs clause cannot confer jurisdiction over district court PCA).
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Another dispute between the Legislature and the Governor came to the
Court that was hard to pigeonhole into any particular basis of jurisdiction.
To hear the case, the Court abruptly returned to the less restrictive Couse
standard it had adopted in 1968 and apparently abandoned in 1976. Once
again, no effort was made to overrule or reconcile the inconsistent
cases.
6 48
Significantly, the 1982 Court made no mention of its earlier dicta
suggesting that all-writs jurisdiction would exist if the issue was merely
important enough. Rather, the Court applied the earlier "aiding ultimate
jurisdiction" standard that had been developed in 1968 by Couse. The Court
found that it had all-writs jurisdiction in this particular case because the
Governor had taken actions that might restrict the Legislature's ability to
reapportion the state's legislative and congressional districts. Florida's
Constitution requires the Court to review all apportionment plans for
constitutionality,649 so the Governor's actions could have limited the
Court's ultimate exercise of that jurisdiction.
Very little has happened in more recent years to illuminate the all writs
power. In 1984, the Court cited the all writs clause as the basis for hearing
a death-row inmate's request for a judicial order requiring a competency
hearing, though no relief was granted.65° Exercising jurisdiction in this
manner was consistent with the "aiding ultimate jurisdiction" standard. The
state constitution assigns the Florida Supreme Court exclusive and
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over cases involving death sentences.65
Thus, the Court has the ultimate jurisdiction to ensure that executions are
conducted lawfully. The all writs clause could be invoked, in other words,
to review any matter or to issue any order necessary to ensure the propriety
of a death sentence. An example would be ordering a judicial determination
of competency where there was a serious enough question.
Nevertheless, the only rule that can be distilled from this confusing
body of law is that the "aiding ultimate jurisdiction" standard apparently
prevails at the moment. Its true scope remains somewhat unclear, especially
since the earlier dicta about "sufficiently important" cases has never actually
been overruled.
The better view probably is that the Court rejected these dicta by
ignoring them in its more recent opinions, or else regards them as an
additional requirement above and beyond "aiding ultimate jurisdiction."
648. Florida Senate v. Graham, 412 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1982).
649. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
650. Alvord v. State, 459 So. 2d 316, 317-18 (Fla. 1984).
651. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
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There are sound reasons for this conclusion. A "sufficient importance"
standard could convert "all writs" into a broad form of reach-down jurisdic-
tion, even though the 1980 jurisdictional reformers considered and rejected
much the same thing.65 2 Moreover, sufficient importance is an inherently
subjective concept that would be hard to define in practice.
The Couse standard is probably best seen as very limited and cases
qualifying under it would be rare. The policy of "aiding ultimate jurisdic-
tion" makes most sense when confined to a class of cases over which the
Court normally would have some form of original or appellate jurisdiction,
but where the full and complete exercise of that jurisdiction seems likely to
be curtailed or defeated before the Court could otherwise hear the case.
That would mean there are two elements: the existence of "ultimate
jurisdiction" found in the text of the constitution, and some unusual and im-
pending factor likely to limit or frustrate the complete exercise of that
jurisdiction. 653  This is consistent with the constitution, which itself says
that the purpose of "all writs" is to allow a "complete exercise" of jurisdic-
tion."'
The "ultimate jurisdiction" requirement would also mean that properly
written court opinions should identify at least two constitutional provisions
establishing jurisdiction. One would be the provision creating the ultimate
basis of jurisdiction, and the other would be the all writs clause. In other
words, "all writs" as conceived in Couse has a "dual jurisdiction" require-
ment.655
The few cases already decided in this subcategory suggest another
significant conclusion: The Court's all writs power is on its firmest footing
in death cases, especially those involving pending executions, 656 and in
pressing governmental crises.657 In that vein, it is worth noting that the
case In re Order on Prosecution in Criminal Appeals,658 is probably best
understood as an all writs case mistakenly assigned to the wrong category
of jurisdiction. The case obviously involved a pressing governmental crisis,
652. See Jurisdiction supra note 320, at 193-96.
653. Obviously, this could include such traditional ancillary concerns as issuance of a
temporary injunction or the stay of lower court proceedings. See Mann, supra note 644 at
200-02.
654. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
655. AccordFlorida Senate, 412 So. 2d at 361 (citing both all writs clause and ultimate
basis of jurisdiction).
656. E.g., Alvord, 459 So. 2d at 316.
657. Florida Senate, 412 So. 2d at 360; accord Mize v. County of Seminole, 229 So.
2d 841 (Fla. 1969).
658. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
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as the Court expressly noted. 69 A strong argument existed there that the
county governments affected by the district court's sua sponte order should
have been joined as parties below under the rule of due process. Moreover,
the Florida Supreme Court had "ultimate jurisdiction" over the kind of case
involved,66° and the district court's failure to join the counties threatened
to deprive the Florida Supreme Court of the full exercise of its ultimate
jurisdiction because of a technical lack of standing. This would justify "all
writs" review under the Couse standard.
Another recent death case illustrates much the same situation. In 1993,
death-row inmate Michael Durocher, the subject of an active death warrant,
mailed a letter to the Florida Supreme Court seeking to dismiss his attorney
and announcing that he would not oppose his own pending execution. His
attorney, meanwhile, argued that Durocher was mentally incompetent and
could not make an intelligent decision. The Court accepted the case and
ordered the trial judge to hold a hearing to determine whether Durocher was
making an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.66'
As a basis of jurisdiction, the Court cited only its habeas powers.662
However, the Court elsewhere has noted that the writ of habeas corpus is
inappropriate if the actual dispute is not the lawfulness of a restraint on
liberty. 63  That certainly was the case with Durocher because the only
issue was whether his attempt to dismiss counsel was effective. The
restraint on liberty was not in question. On the whole, Durocher's case is
probably best understood as an all writs case mistakenly assigned to the
wrong category of jurisdiction. All writs authority clearly was appropriate
because of the unusual facts and the Court's ultimate jurisdiction to ensure
the lawfulness of state executions.664
A few other aspects of all writs jurisdiction deserve comment. As
noted above, the Court occasionally has cited the all writs clause as a basis
for jurisdiction over writs such as prohibition, which are actually authorized
by separate clauses or provisions of the constitution. 66s This is a practice
that promotes confusion and should be avoided. The Court's all writs
659. Id. at 1131.
660. "Ultimate jurisdiction" potentially existed here on a number of bases, including the
Florida Supreme Court authority to review cases affecting a class of state or constitutional
officers, the basis actually cited for jurisdiction in the case. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §
3(b)(3).
661. Durocher v. Singletary, No. 81,986 (Fla. Aug. 12, 1993).
662. Id. at I.
663. Waldrup, 562 So. 2d at 687.
664. AccordAvord, 459 So. 2d at 317-18.
665. See supra notes 638, 639 and accompanying text.
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authority now has evolved into a distinct concept, so it muddies the waters
to use the phrase "all writs" as a generalized reference to any or all of the
extraordinary writs. The 1970 case of Pettigrew6 66 apparently made this
mistake and was later cited as authority in a questionable effort to expand
the all-writs power. The better practice is to confine all writs jurisdiction
to those cases applying the Couse standard, at least to the extent this is
possible.
In this vein, it should be noted that there is at least one extraordinary
writ, error coram nobis, for which the Court has tended to cite the all writs
clause as a basis for jurisdiction.667 However, that is an unusual case and
in any event, error coram nobis now has been rendered largely obsolete.
Previously the writ of error coram nobis668 was the method by which a
prior conviction could be challenged on the basis of newly discovered
evidence.669 In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court essentially abolished the
writ as it applies to persons still incarcerated. Challenges by such persons
now must be presented to the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.670
Error coram nobis appears to remain available only for persons not
presently in custody. 671 Even this limited remnant is hard to justify. The
only evident reason for retaining it is that Rule 3.850 technically is available
only to prisoners in custody.672 Yet this fact alone hardly seems to justify
retaining the far more restrictive coram nobis standard673 only for persons
already released from custody. The better practice would be to allow all
persons the same remedy when newly discovered evidence is presented to
challenge a prior onviction. This would require a change in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure,674 but one that would seem worthwhile and fairer.
666. Supra note 637.
667. E.g., Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037, 1037 (Fla. 1989). Coram nobis is not
mentioned in the constitution's grant of jurisdiction. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
668. The name is a peculiar blending of English and Latin. "Coram nobis" means
"before us." The writ exists to bring an error "before us" for review, i.e. before the court.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (6th ed. 1991).
669. Richardson, 546 So. 2d at 1037.
670. For a discussion of Rule 3.850, see infra note 674.
671. Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915.
672. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(a).
673. See Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915.
674. This could be done simply by stating that persons not in custody who are
challenging a prior conviction based on newly discovered evidence may proceed under Rule
3.850 the same as a person in custody. There will be a need for some procedure of this type,
because persons released from custody sometimes do find new evidence that could exonerate
them and clear their records. It hardly seems fair to apply the liberalized Rule 3.850 remedy
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Attempts have sometimes been made to use the all writs clause as a
means of resurrecting a variety of writs that existed in earlier common law.
An example is the common-law writ of certiorari. This is an extraordinary
"writ of review" that should be distinguished from the separate "appellate
certiorari" jurisdiction previously granted to the Court by provisions of the
Florida Constitution deleted in 1980. Common-law certiorari exists to
review and correct actions by a lower tribunal that violate the essential
requirements of the law where no other adequate remedy exists.
675
However, it is now clear that the Florida Supreme Court cannot issue the
writ. The Court's authority in this regard was abolished in the 1957
jurisdictional reforms that created the district courts of appeal 676 and was
not revived by the 1980 reforms.
677
English common law at one time had developed many other legal
devices labeled "writs." In theory, any of these could be "revived" by
interpreting the Florida Constitution's all writs clause as a generalized
reference. In practice, however, such a thing is unlikely to be necessary or
wise. Most of the common-law writs dealt with problems fully covered by
a variety of modem legal practices and procedures, most of which are no
longer even considered to be "writs., 67 8 On the whole, it appears likely
that the Florida Constitution's reference to "all writs" should be understood
as creating a single highly specialized writ available in the extraordinary
circumstances contemplated by Couse, with the possible exception of the
highly limited (and questionable) form of error coram nobis that seems to
remain today.
VIII. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
The constitution assigns the Florida Supreme Court exclusive original
jurisdiction in five categories, most of which deal with regulation of
Florida's Bench and Bar. The only exception is in the case of legislative
apportionment, which is a unique concern.679 Jurisdiction is both exclu-
to those in custody, while restricting all others to the hidebound and quirky standards that
made error coram nobis virtually impossible to obtain. See id.
675. E.g., Kilgore v. Bird, 6 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1942).
676. Robinson v. State, 132 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 1961).
677. Allen v. McClamma., 500 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1987).
678. For example, the writ of audita querela now has been supplanted by the motion
for relief from judgment authorized in the Rules of Civil Procedure. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 131 (6th ed. 1991).
679. See discussion infra part VIII.E.
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sive and original because most of the topics embraced within this category
involve the Court's administrative powers over the state's judiciary and
lawyers. In the case of apportionment, jurisdiction is premised on the
necessity of a final and swift legal determination that Florida's electoral dis-
tricts are constitutionally valid each time they are altered.
A. Regulation of The Florida Bar
The state constitution assigns the Florida Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction over the discipline of persons admitted to practice law.680 As
a result, attorneys are the only profession that cannot be regulated through
agencies created by the Legislature. They fall within the exclusive purview
of the Court. Moreover, on June 7, 1949, the Florida Supreme Court
"integrated" The Florida Bar;68 that is, it designated it as an arm of the
Court for purposes of regulating the practice of law. The Bar maintains that
function to this day.682 Integration effectively means that no one can
practice law in Florida without first becoming a member of The Florida Bar.
Regulation of attorneys operates on a number of levels. For one thing,
the Court controls admissions to the Bar and promulgates rules that regulate
the profession's governance and the procedures used in court.683  The
Court's most significant power is its ability to discipline lawyers for impro-
prieties based on a detailed set of ethical rules governing attorney con-
duct,68 4 with The Florida Bar serving as primary enforcer.
Allegations of unethical conduct are investigated and, if meritorious,
may be reviewed by Bar counsel or Bar grievance committees. The matter
then may be examined by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar.
Subject to the Board of Governor's control, Bar counsel then may file a
complaint with the Florida Supreme Court, which initiates formal charges
against the lawyer in question. At this point, the chief justice usually
appoints a "referee" to resolve factual issues and make recommendations
regarding discipline. Referees ordinarily are sitting county or circuit judges,
however, retired judges also can be appointed." 5
Procedures before the referee are highly regulated by court rules and
are conducted as adversary proceedings, like a trial. After hearing the
680. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
681. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
682. FLA. R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 3-3.1.
683. See discussion infra part VIII.C.
684. See generally FLA. R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR.
685. Id. 3-7.5.
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evidence, the referee will issue a report setting down factual findings and
recommended discipline, if any. The report is then forwarded to the Court.
At this point, many attorneys decline to challenge the referee's findings and
recommendations, which the Court then summarily affirms. If attorneys
dispute the reports, their cases usually are accepted for review as a "no
request" (without oral argument), although in rare cases oral argument is
granted. The Bar also can challenge a referee's report.
Factual findings contained in the referee's report are presumptively
correct and are accepted as true by the Court unless such findings lack sup-
port in the evidence,8 6 or, stated another way, unless clearly errone-
ous.68 7 Proceedings before the Florida Supreme Court are not trials de
novo in which all matters might be revisited. 6 ' However, the referee's
purely legal conclusions (including disciplinary recommendations) are
subject to broader review,6"9 though they come to the Court with a
presumption of correctness.6 9 ° In practice, the Court will depart from
recommended discipline deemed too harsh or too lenient. However, the
Court almost never exceeds the discipline actually requested by Bar counsel.
Discipline can range from a reprimand to disbarment. Nearly all forms
of discipline result in a public record of the attorney's misconduct.
Disbarred attorneys typically cannot be readmitted to practice law unless at
least five years have passed and they prove they have been rehabilitated-a
difficult thing to do in many cases.69' Occasionally, the Court disbars
without leave to reapply, in which case readmission is possible only by
petitioning the Court for permission.692
B. Admission to The Florida Bar
The constitution also grants the Florida Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction over admitting persons to practice law. 693  To oversee Bar
admissions, the Court has created the Florida Board of Bar Examiners. This
agency reviews all applications for admission using detailed standards
included in the Rules of Court.694  Every Bar applicant must undergo a
686. The Florida Bar v. Bajoczky, 558 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1990).
687. The Florida Bar v. McKenzie, 442 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1983).
688. The Florida Bar v. Hooper, 507 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1987).
689. The Florida Bar v. Langston, 540 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1989).
690. The Florida Bar v. Poplack, 599 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1992).
691. The Florida Bar re Lawrence H. Hipsh, Sr., 586 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1991).
692. Id.
693. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
694. See FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE.
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rigorous background investigation conducted by the Bar Examiners, must
successfully complete a two-day examination on legal knowledge, and must
pass a separate examination on legal ethics.
If the background investigation reveals anything reflecting poorly on
an applicant's character or fitness, the Bar Examiners are also authorized to
conduct a series of hearings to resolve the matter. Any decision coming out
of this process can be taken to the Court by petition for further review. The
Court can then accept, reject, or modify the recommendations of the Bar
Examiners. Bar admission cases are usually confidential, though a few are
occasionally made public and published in Southern Second, often with the
applicant identified only by initials.69
C. Rules of Court
The development and issuance of all rules governing practice and
procedure before Florida Courts lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Florida Supreme Court.696 Development of rules has been delegated to
various committees of The Florida Bar, except local rules, which are
developed by the state's lower courts, reviewed by the Local Rules
Committee, and submitted to the Florida Supreme Court for approval.
Every four years these committees submit proposals for revisions,
which the Court then accepts, rejects, or modifies. This "quadrennial"
revision process is often supplemented in off-years by special proposals by
the committees, petitions for revisions filed by Bar members, and the much
rarer sua sponte revisions issued by the Court to meet some special need.
Though it seldom happens, court rules can be repealed by a two-thirds vote
in each house of the Legislature.697 The lower courts cannot ignore or
amend controlling rules.698
The Court's rule-making authority extends only to procedural law, not
substantive law. Though the boundary separating the two is not entirely
precise, the Court has said that "procedural law" deals with the course,
form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process, or steps by which
substantive rights are enforced.6 99 "Substantive law" creates, defines, and
695. E.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, Re: S.M.D., 619 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1993).
696. Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1991).
697. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
698. State v. McCall, 301 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1974).
699. Haven Fed Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 579 So. 2d at 732.
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regulates rights. In other words, "procedure" is the machinery of the
judicial process while "substance" is the product reached.00
These distinctions are important because they separate the rule-making
authority of the Court from the lawmaking authority of the Legislature.
Thus, it is possible for the Legislature to enact a "procedural" statute that
can be superseded by court rule7 11 just as it is possible for the Court to
enact a rule so substantive in nature that it violates the Legislature's
prerogative. v  Tussles between the two branches of government have
erupted in the past, most noticeably in the development of the Florida
Evidence Code. On occasion, the Court has even called for a "cooperative"
effort with the Legislature in eliminating problems between conflicting
statutes and rules. 73 The Court has also announced that it will make every
effort to harmonize rules with relevant statutes, on the theory that legislative
enactments embody the popular will. However, the Court lacks any
authority to issue rules governing administrative proceedings, which fall
within the legislature's authority.0
It is worth noting that by promulgating a rule, the Court does not
vouch for its constitutionality. A court rule could thus be challenged in a
future proceeding on any valid constitutional ground. This is because rules
are issued as an administrative function of the Court, not as an adjudicatory
function. For much the same reason, the act of promulgating a rule does
not foreclose challenges that it contains "substantive" aspects and to that
extent is invalid. Questions such as these can only be decided when
affected parties bring an actual controversy for resolution.
D. Judicial Qualifications
The next form of exclusive jurisdiction governs "judicial qualifica-
tions," which exists solely for the purpose of disciplining the state's judges
and justices for improprieties. It is analogous to Bar discipline, though
accomplished through a different administrative agency. Jurisdiction here
rests on a constitutional provision that specifies in considerable detail how
such cases are reviewed.70 5 As noted earlier, cases of this type are
commenced at the instance of the JQC, which is authorized to investigate
700. Id.
701. E.g., id.
702. E.g., State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
703. Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992).
704. Gator Freightways, Inc. v. Mayo, 328 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1976); Bluesten v. Florida
Real Estate Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1960).
705. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
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alleged impropriety by any judge or justice." 6 Upon recommendation of
two-thirds of the JQC's members, the Florida Supreme Court is then vested
with jurisdiction to consider the case.
Jurisdiction here is exclusive, however, because the findings and
proposals of the JQC are considered to be only recommendations.7 °7 The
JQC operates as an "arm of the court" much in the nature of a fact-finding
referee in a Bar discipline proceeding. The JQC's recommendations are
persuasive but not conclusive, 7 °and the Florida Supreme Court has
sometimes departed from recommended discipline.7 9 Moreover, the JQC
does not constitute a "court" in itself and thus, is not subject to the writ of
prohibition. 7 " Discipline recommended by the JQC will be imposed only
when supported by clear and convincing proof of the impropriety in
question.1
The Court has held that judicial qualification proceedings are not in the
nature of a criminal prosecution and thus are not subject to the constitutional
restraints peculiar to criminal law. 7 2 The doctrines of res judicata and
double jeopardy do not apply 713 and the JQC can, therefore, inquire into
matters previously investigated in other contexts. As noted earlier, the
constitution automatically disqualifies the sitting justices of the Florida
Supreme Court to hear a proceeding brought against one of their own
number. Instead, a panel of specially appointed "Associate Justices" will
hear the case.'
E. Review of Legislative Apportionment
In every year ending in the numeral "2," the Florida Legislature is
required to reapportion the state's legislative and congressional districts to
reflect the latest United States Census. Reapportionment must be finalized
before the fall's elections that same year, which might not be possible if
lawsuits on the question began in some lower court and wended through the
appellate system. Accordingly, the state constitution has given the Florida
706. See discussion supra part II.H.I.
707. State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1974).
708. Id.
709. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, William A. Norris, Jr., 581 So. 2d 578, 579-80
(Fla. 1991).
710. State ex rel. Turner, 295 So. 2d at 611.
711. In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1977).
712. In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 569-70 (Fla. 1970).
713. Id. at 570.
714. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
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Supreme Court exclusive, original, and mandatory jurisdiction to review
each decennial reapportionment plan approved by the Legislature. 5
The Court's authority in this regard is extraordinary. All questions
regarding validity of the reapportionment plan can be litigated to finality in
a single forum, for both trial and appellate purposes. Moreover, if the
Legislature is unable to reapportion within certain time constraints, the Court
itself has authority to impose a reapportionment plan by order.71 6 Judicial
apportionment, for example, was necessary in 1992 with respect to some of
the state's districts." 7 In that instance, the Court was swayed by argu-
ments of the United States Justice Department regarding the federal Voting
Rights Act."" Thus, federal issues are an important concern here. It
should be noted, however, that the Florida Supreme Court's determination
of validity does not necessarily bind the federal courts.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The Florida Supreme Court was created in 1845 and held its first
sessions the following year. Since that time, a considerable body of custom
and precedent has come into existence regarding the Court's operation and
jurisdiction. This body is notwidely known outside the Court, nor has there
been much previous effort to compile information about routine operations
in one more or less comprehensive collection. The present article is an
effort to fill this gap, providing information to lawyers and laypersons about
their state's highest court.
On the whole, the review of custom and precedent shows a Court that
is operating smoothly and fairly efficiently following the jurisdictional
reforms of 1980. There have been occasional cases that may be difficult to
square with the Court's limited jurisdiction, but these have been rare and are
largely confined to categories seldom entertained. The Court's docket is
manageable, and the present staff structure enables the justices to fulfill their
various duties efficiently, while also disposing of their case assignments.
Today, the Florida Supreme Court is one of the success stories in the state's
more recent efforts to modernize its constitution.
715. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 16(c).
716. Id.
717. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1992).
718. Id. at 546-47.
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L INTRODUCTION
What role does our state constitution play in appellate decision-making?
Obviously, this topic is as open-ended as the words suggest. The most
accurate answer to this question is the hackneyed and overused rejoinder "it
all depends." However, the "what" upon which "it all depends" can be
fleshed out a little further from one judge's viewpoint. What follows are
largely the ruminations of this judge as he reflects on the ebb and flow with
which state constitutional issues have been brought before him.
II. HIERARCHY OF LAWS
To begin with, when a state appellate judge raises her right hand to
take the oath of office, she promises faithfully to execute and enforce the
Constitution and laws of the United States as well as the constitution and
laws of her own state. The United States of America is a single sovereign
nation with a particular structure of government. As the pledge of alle-
giance proclaims, we are, indeed, "one nation, under God." Part of our
governmental structure is the geographic division of the nation into separate
states in a system we refer to as a federal republic. The states are not
* Judge, Fourth District Court of Appeal.
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separate sovereign entities, but are in fact component parts of a single
nation.
Why this lesson in grade school civics? Just as we regard a constitu-
tion as the basic charter and foundation of a government and the society it
serves, we must remember a state judge must be ever cognizant of the basic
principle that the Constitution and laws of the United States are at the top
of the hierarchy of laws that control and guide the judge's resolution of
legal issues brought to the court. The oath of office is not only a symbolic
reflection of this hierarchy, it is the solid rock of the judge's assumption of
her responsibilities as ajudge, and a visible sign to the public of the judge's
special pledge of allegiance. This pledge must be ever present in a judge's
consciousness (and conscience).'
III. PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF STATE LAW
Just because the constitution and laws of the state occupy a space
below the Federal Charter in this legal hierarchy, it does not mean that the
state constitution does not play an important, if not the most important, role
I. Many believe the activism of the Warren Court in enforcing the Federal Constitution
on both substantive and procedural fronts was largely the result of the failure of state court
judges to enforce the basic rights citizens enjoy under the Federal Constitution and, indeed,
the failure to enforce many provisions of their own state constitutions. This lesson must not
be forgotten.
Of course, many state courts did recognize the federal constitutional rights of their
citizens. Consider, for instance, the Florida Supreme Court's 1907 reversal of a criminal
conviction where the defendant challenged the racial composition of his jury:
We think it sufficiently appears from the language of the challenge that
there were colored men in Duval county competent to serve on the said jury.
The challenge alleges "that there are, and were at the time of executing said
venire, in Duval county, many thousand colored men of African descent of
approved integrity, fair character, and soundjudgment and intelligence, and fully
qualified for jury duty; and this fact was well known to the sheriff of our said
county."
These allegations of the challenge being admitted to be true by the
demurrer thereto, and the defendant requesting the court to allow him to
introduce witnesses to prove the truth thereof, the necessary conclusion is,
therefore, that the defendant has been denied a right duly set up and claimed by
him under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The court erred in
sustaining the demurrer. The court ought to have overruled the demurrer, and
to have permitted the state to take issue thereon. The issues so raised is [sic] to
be tried by the court on the proofs offered by the parties.
Montgomery v. State, 42 So. 894, 897 (Fla. 1907).
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in a person's life as that life is affected by the law. Consider for a moment
that currently there are 750 state judges, compared to some 29 federal
judges, dispensing civil and criminal justice in Florida. These numbers
provide a flavor of the comparative practical impact of state law compared
to federal law on the average person. From a practical standpoint, it is state
law and the state constitution which primarily determine the type of society
and quality of life that a person will have in his home state. After all, under
our Federal Constitution we have largely left it up to the states to determine
the criminal, civil and administrative law that governs our relationships and
activities. Only when state law collides with some important value
recognized in our Federal Charter, or by our national Legislature, does state
law give way.
IV. HISTORY
Someone once said (Justice Holmes, I believe) that the law is
experience. In other words, the law is what has actually happened. The
way certain things came to be strongly affects the way things are. While
our present system of federalism-the relationship between the states and
the central government-is essentially uniform throughout the country, it is
worth noting at least one distinction among many in the origins of the state
constitutions.
Many state constitutions were enacted and in place before the present
Federal Con,;titution was drafted and adopted. Those states that declared
their independence from England became small sovereign nations with their
separate basic charters of government. The constitutions enacted by those
states were, first and foremost, constitutions for separate nations. For
example, they contained extensive protections for the personal rights of their
citizens. Indeed, these constitutions and their provisions served as models
and examples for the drafters of the Constitution of the United States.
Again, in taking the liberty to generalize, the origins and purpose of the
constitutions of the original thirteen colonies (and some other states) should
be distinguished from the constitutions of those states which came into the
union much later, after the nature of the country as a single federal union
had been well established in both its identity and authority. These later
constitutions, though similar in content to their older siblings, were drafted
and adopted in a context that somewhat anticipated their role as charters for
states becoming a geographical and administrative part of an established
sovereign nation. At the same time, however, the basic provisions of the
constitutions of the earlier states were usually incorporated in these
1994] 1279
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constitutions.
While this particular difference in the origins of the various state
constitutions may have little practical significance in a present day analysis
of constitutional law, it is an important "experience" factor that should be
in our consciousness when we discuss "states' rights" or debate other issues
concerning the authority and role of the states in the federal union.
The substantial role of state government in our lives is a product of our
unique history in becoming a nation. In other countries, administrative
divisions of the central government based on geographical lines are just that:
Administrative divisions typically utilized to more efficiently carry out
government functions. At the risk of oversimplification, I cite the small
nation of Ireland as an example. There the country government, while
based on historic geographic lines, is more or less simply a subdivision of
the national government. There is no constitution for County Court.
Florida was a federally owned territory before becoming a state in the
federal union. Its first constitution was drafted by a group of settlers in
1838 at St. Joseph, Florida, some eight years before Florida was admitted
as a state. The Federal Constitution and many state constitutions were then
in existence, and these likely served as models and examples for the drafters
of Florida's charter, including the provisions protecting the personal rights
of its citizens.2 The modem version of our constitution was adopted in
1968 after substantial redrafting was done by a statewide commission.
V. DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS
A constitution performs many functions. It serves as a basic blueprint
for people who live in a particular geographic area to come together, assess
their values (especially in relation to how they will live together) and give
expression to those important values in an agreement controlling their
relationships. Many times the details are left to be worked out by the
Legislature, the courts or the Executive Branch. However, the idea is to set
aside certain fundamental and important values and give expression to them
in a charter that will be enduring. While there is a means of amending this
basic charter, the idea is not to rely on amendment as values may change
(although that is certainly done), but rather to work hard to correctly
identify fundamental values, articulate them in a written document, and
2. For an extremely valuable insight into the origins and purposes of the provisions of
Florida's Declaration of Rights, see Joseph W. Little & Steven E. Lohr, Textual History of
the Florida Declaration of Rights, 22 STETSON L. REv. 549 (1993).
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stand by them. The values articulated in a constitution often identify those
things that set apart one society or group of people from another. Similarly,
the willingness to stand by these values, once properly identified, is one
measure of the maturity and success of such a society.
The 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution represented a unique
opportunity for citizens of both "old" and "new" Florida to discover or
rediscover these important values and affirm them in their basic charter.3
For that reason alone, the 1968 action must be counted as a tremendous
success.
VI. FLORIDA'S COURTS
There are four levels of courts in Florida: county courts, with limited
civil and criminal jurisdiction; circuit courts, with general civil and criminal
jurisdiction; district courts of appeal, with general appellate jurisdiction; and
the supreme court, with broad, but well-defined, appellate and supervisory
jurisdiction over the state court system.4 Issues involving the state constitu-
tion may be raised in any of these courts. Review by the district courts,
although somewhat technically broader, usually involves review, of the
circuit courts' decisions. This review is set out in the constitution and in the
rules of appellate procedure.5
Under our adversarial system of justice, which relies heavily on
procedural fairness to accomplish its goal of a just result, an enormous
amount of control is placed in the hands of the litigants, and, in turn, in the
hands of the lawyers representing them. By and large, this means that only
issues raised by the parties are addressed by the courts.
At the appellate level, this ordinarily means that issues involving the
state constitution will not be treated unless they were raised and considered
in the trial court. Of course, there are exceptions involving fundamental
error or the patent unconstitutionality of a statute or action that may cause
an appellate court to act even though the issue was not raised in the trial
court.6 This is a very narrow exception, however, and appellate judges are
3. Such activity has continued. In 1980, a unique "right of privacy" for Florida residents
was added to the constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. Two years later, in a move in
the "other direction," an amendment was added to limit the scope of Florida's version of the
Federal Fourth Amendment to United States Supreme Court decisions construing the Fourth
Amendment. See infra note 10.
4. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1. 3-6.
5. See id. § 4; FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030.
6. PHILIP J. PADOVANO, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE §§ 5.7-5.8 (1988).
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extremely reluctant to consider issues that a trial court has not had an
opportunity to deal with, especially since a trial court is a more appropriate
forum to develop the facts that must be established to determine the
constitutional issue.
Appellate courts basically exist to review decisions made by the trial
courts. When there is no "decision" on an issue, there is nothing to
"review" in the ordinary sense. There is a wide disparity, usually depending
on the nature of the constitutional provision involved, in the practice of the
parties and their lawyers in the utilization of the state constitution to support
their legal positions.
VII. MEAT AND POTATOES
This disparity can be illustrated by comparing the routine use of state
constitutional provisions concerning homestead, a subject untreated by the
Federal Constitution, to the utilization of the provisions of the Declaration
of Rights section of the Florida Constitution.7 In many instances, these later
provisions mirror the protection of rights afforded by the Federal Constitu-
tion. The "meat and potatoes" of the state constitution are those provisions
meant to give structure to state government and control to the ordinary
social, economic, and political intercourse between us. Because there are
no duplicate or parallel provisions in the Federal Constitution, these
provisions have always been relied upon in state courts as primary authority.
This is so simply as a matter of definition. Where the state constitution
deals with issues of state concern, such as the structure of state government
and the court system or the provisions concerning homestead, those
provisions, just like the statutes enacted by the state legislature, will provide
the ordinary grist for the state courts' mills. Not much has changed on that
front. The "meat and potatoes" of the Florida Constitution has always been,
and will for the foreseeable future be, a constant subject for Florida's
appellate courts.
VIII. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Until recently, however, in this judge's tenure,' it was rare that a
7. Article I of the Florida Constitution is entitled "Declaration of Rights." FLA. CONST.
art. I.
8. Judge Anstead has been an appellate judge since 1977.
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personal right would be asserted on the basis of a provision in the Florida
Constitution. Even today, the Declaration of Rights is seldom cited in
appellate briefs. Perhaps this is due to the lack of education or emphasis on
our state constitution in the state law schools, and in the various means of
continuing legal education.
Another reason may be the visual prominence of the cases decided,
especially by the United States Supreme Court, involving the protections
afforded by the Federal Constitution. This is especially true concerning the
Bill of Rights and other amendments to that document. In recent history,
the national debate over the decisions of the Warren Court, and later the
Burger and Rhenquist Courts, on issues of federal constitutional rights, has
occupied center stage in the national and local media.9 Yes, lawyers and
their clients watch television and read newspapers, too. In contrast, state
court decisions based upon the Declaration of Rights have, until recently,
been not only rare, but even more rarely publicized.
IX. TRENDS
Undoubtedly, personal rights are usually asserted by persons, and those
persons are ordinarily under criminal prosecution by the government.
Government agents are usually alleged to have violated the defendant's
rights while investigating him for criminal conduct. The government has no
personal rights to be asserted. As a matter of fact, the Warren Court was
perceived to have been more apt to recognize and enforce a personal right
under the Federal Constitution than the succeeding Burger and Rhenquist
Courts. As a trend has developed in United States Supreme Court decisions
favoring the government and limiting personal rights under the Federal
Constitution, parties, their lawyers, and judges have "suddenly" discovered
the Florida Constitution has a Declaration of Rights.
Of course, under the federal constitutional scheme and especially the
Fourteenth Amendment, states are only prohibited from denying those
protections afforded by the Federal Constitution. States are not prohibited
from affording greater rights and protections to their citizens than the
constitutional minimum afforded by the Federal Charter. ° Recently, there
9. The Warren Court refers to Chief Justice Earl Warren's tenure; the Burger Court
refers to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's tenure; and the Rhenquist Court refers to Chief
Justice William H. Rhenquist's tenure.
10. Significantly though, in 1981, article 1, section 12 of the Florida Constitution was
amended to mandate that Florida courts construe its provisions in accord with United States
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has been a sharp increase around the nation in state court decisions
predicated upon state constitutions; a trend that has been true in Florida as
well. In fact, Florida has become something of a national trend-setter on
this subject.
But, to get back to basics, we must remember it is the parties and their
lawyers who raise the issues. With respect to personal rights, it has been
the parties and their lawyers who, finding themselves being turned away by
the federal courts, have started raising issues predicated upon rights
protected by their state constitutions. These litigants, who have increased
in numbers, have brought about the court opinions expounding upon those
state constitutional rights, and in many instances, have found those rights to
be more expansive than many federal opinions have found in similar
provisions in the Federal Charter. The interesting development in state
constitutional law, still emerging and forming, involves cases where both the
federal and state constitutions are implicated, usually with the assertion and
protection of personal rights. As noted, Florida is free to extend greater
personal rights to its residents than are provided in the Federal Charter.
X. FLORIDA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Among others, retired Justice William Brennan of the United States
Supreme Court, noting the trend of the Rehnquist Court, has been active in
calling upon lawyers and state court judges to utilize their state constitutions
to protect the rights of their citizens. There have been many articles written
on the issue, as well as state court decisions around the country, proclaiming
the independence of the state courts to invoke their own constitutions to
protect individual rights."
Perhaps the most significant and comprehensive opinion of the Florida
Supreme Court on the independent force of our state constitution was
Supreme Court's decisions construing the Fourth Amendment. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. The
effect of this amendment has been a topic of sharp debate on the Florida Supreme Court,
where a tenuous 4-3 majority has ruled that Florida courts are bound by future decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. See Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1993). 1 charac-
terize the majority as "tenuous" because one of its members has declared that he believes this
ruling is wrong, but that he is bound to follow it by stare decisis. Id. at 1258-61 (Overton,
J., concurring).
II. See PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
REPORT OF THE 1992 FORUM FOR STATE COURT JUDGES (Barbara Wolfson ed. 1993) (co-
sponsored by The Roscoe Pound Foundation and Yale Law School).
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handed down recently in Traylor v. State,12 where the court declared:
Under our federalist system of government, states may place more
rigorous restraints on government intrusion than the federal charter
imposes; they may not, however, place more restrictions on the
fundamental rights of their citizens than the federal Constitution permits.
Federalist principles recognize that although some government intrusion
into the life of the individual is inevitable, such intrusion is to be
minimized. Government encroachment is thus restricted by both the
federal and state constitution.
Federal and state bills of rights thus serve distinct but complemen-
tary purposes. The federal Bill of Rights facilitates political and
philosophical homogeneity among the basically heterogeneous states by
securing, as a uniform minimum, the highest common denominator of
freedom that can prudently be administered throughout all fifty states.
The state bills of rights, on the other hand, express the ultimate breadth
of the common yearnings for freedom of each insular state population
within our nation. Accordingly, when called upon to construe their bills
of rights, state courts should focus primarily on factors that inhere in
their own unique state experience, such as the express language of the
constitutional provision, its formative history, both preexisting and
developing state law, evolving customs, traditions and attitudes within
the state, the state's own general history, and finally any external
influences that may have shaped state law.
When called upon to decide matters of fundamental rights,
Florida's state courts are bound under federalist principles to give
primacy to our state Constitution and to give independent legal import
to every phrase and clause contained therein. We are similarly bound
under our Declaration of Rights to construe each provision freely in
order to achieve the primary goal of individual freedom and autono-
my.' 3
No Justice in Traylor took issue with these statements.
The "primacy principle" announced in Traylor is now routinely applied
by the Florida Supreme Court. For example, in Allred v. State,14 the court
took a case that had largely been decided on federal constitutional grounds
in the trial and appellate courts, and boldly declared at the outset: "We
begin our analysis with the Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights,
12. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
13. Id. at 961-63 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
14. 622 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1993).
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consonant with the primacy principle explained in Traylor v. State. Only
if allegedly self-incriminating statements pass muster under our state
constitution need we examine them under federal law."' 5 This is a clear
charge to the legal community and to all levels of Florida courts to pay
more attention to our state constitution. 6
XI. CONCLUSION
Because of the broad function served by the Florida Constitution in
many areas of the law, it has long occupied a central role as the primary
authority in the resolution of legal disputes in Florida courts. Furthermore,
since the Florida Constitution remains the primary authority in those areas,
that active role will continue.
A major change in the use of the constitution has occurred recently.
This change involves the rights set out in the Declaration of Rights that
somewhat parallel the guarantee of personal rights set out in the United
States Constitution. While these state constitutional rights have been in
place for some time, their invocation has been limited for a variety of
reasons. Since personal rights must be invoked by persons, they may have
been used infrequently by persons who perceived that state courts would
construe such rights in a narrow fashion. When the federal courts began to
strongly enforce similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, it made more
sense to invoke those provisions. As the trend changed in the federal courts
to one favoring the government, litigants have again turned to state
constitutions and the state courts.
In Florida, the state's high court has responded with a firm signal that
the Florida Constitution is a resource available to Florida residents to protect
their personal rights. As the word gets out, we can expect litigants, lawyers,
and judges, to increasingly rely on the Declaration of Rights in the Florida
Constitution as the primary protection for personal rights in Florida. Now
that the trend has started, it is doubtful that it will be easily stopped or
stalled, even if the trend in the United States Supreme Court should change.
This move presents an immediate challenge to Florida's law schools and
continuing legal education programs to do a better job of emphasizing the
15. Id. at 986.
16. Ironically though, this bold call to arms may at times amount to nothing more than
a paper tiger. For instance, as discussed in note 10, Florida courts are bound to interpret
article 1, section 12 of the Florida Constitution (our version of the Fourth Amendment)
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
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importance of the Florida Constitution in our lives.
As a state court judge, I view this trend favorably because I see it as
simply part of an overall scheme of government that was intended to operate
this way all along. Under our federal system, the states must tip their caps
and acknowledge that the central government is supreme, but the states have
been left to run the show. Let's do it right, whether we are on the bottom
or the top, or indeed, in the middle.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Leon County v. Parker' ("Emerald Acres I") and Emerald Acres
Investments, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Leon County2
("Emerald Acres H") are the stories of two parties' unsuccessful attempts
to obtain meaningful judicial review of adverse administrative actions by the
Leon County government. They are not, to say the least, pretty stories.
Neither are they, in the author's view, the finest hours of Florida's
intermediate appellate courts. The First District Court of Appeal and Leon
County effectively denied both parties access to meaningful judicial review
of adverse administrative action. Although still pending, these rulings
affected both parties' rights to use property.' On the merits, the circuit
court found this action to be a departure from the essential requirements of
law and in violation of Leon County's own ordinances.4 In a remarkable
display of legal legerdemain, the First District transformed the broad access
and remedy provisions of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning
Act5 ("LGCPA") into a legal spring gun that blew the unsuspecting parties
into a legal "twilight zone." These decisions, aside from due process
considerations, raise serious constitutional issues and create further confusion
in the post comprehensive plan legal environment.'
The constitutional issues involve both the appellate rulemaking
authority of the Florida Supreme Court and the constitutional certiorari
jurisdiction of the circuit courts. This paper will initially demonstrate that
the First District was incorrect, and that the remedy provisions are simply
cumulative to common law certiorari review. This argument allows
harmonization of the act's remedy provisions with existing precedent and
avoids the constitutional issues raised by the decisions. The second part of
1. 566 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
2. 601 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
3. The First District in Emerald Acres ! denied rehearing, but certified the following
question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Whether the right to petition for common law
certiorari in the circuit courts of the state is still available to a landowner/petitioner who seeks
appellate review of a local government development order finding comprehensive plan
inconsistency, notwithstanding section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989)?." Id. at 584.
4. Thus, the circuit court arguably found Leon County's action to be arbitrary and
capricious. See id. One commentator describes this highly deferential standard of review as
a kind ofjudicially imposed lunacy test! MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 56 (1988).
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3213, 163.3215 (1991).
6. See John E. Fennelly, Just to Cage the Tiger: Proposed Judicial Resolutions to
Consistency Challenges Under the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Act, 22 STETSON L. REv. 435 (1993).
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the discussion will be directed to the constitutional implications of the
decisions. The initial, or statutory construction, discussion will also require
a detour into the administrative law of access as contrasted with the
traditional notions of standing. In addition, it will be necessary to review
the supreme court's previous treatment of common law certiorari. With the
foregoing framework in mind, Emerald Acres I and II await.
II. THE OPENING STAGE
A. Round One. Administrative Shell Games
Emerald Acres and Parker submitted subdivision applications in
accordance with Leon County's Comprehensive Plan. The County's
Planning Commission, after review, denied the applications. The Commis-
sion's stated basis for denial was that the proposed subdivisions were "too
dense when compared with other subdivisions in the area, thus violating" the
comprehensive plan.' The petitioners then sought review of this decision
by the County Commission. The Commission, while upholding the initial
decision, remanded the applications to the Planning Commission. The stated
purpose of the remand was "to advise the respondents as to how the plats
could be corrected to make the proposed subdivisions consistent with the
county's comprehensive plan."' After unsuccessful negotiations, Emerald
Acres sought common law certiorari review in the circuit court. Leon
County, at the outset, moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that
Emerald Acres and Parker had not complied with the notice provisions of
the LGCPA." The circuit court denied the County's motion and proceeded
to a hearing on the merits. The circuit court determined that the County's
denial of the application "was a departure from the essential requirements
of law."'" The court based this determination on relevant portions of the
County's own comprehensive plan. The circuit court found "the fact that
sections 17.1-25(b) and (d) of the ordinance adopting the county's
comprehensive plan provided that zoning classifications existing on the date
of plan adoption would continue to determine allowable land uses until the
zoning was changed.""
7. Emerald Acres 1, 566 So. 2d at 1316.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Based on the foregoing plan provisions, the court determined that
"[i]nasmuch as the A-2 zoning classification for the subject properties had
never been changed, and since the proposed subdivision plats were
consistent with such zoning classification[s], . . . the subdivisions were
consistent with the comprehensive plan .... [T]herefore, . . the denials of
the proposed plats, based upon inconsistency with the comprehensive plan,
were erroneous."'
12
The circuit court, therefore, granted the requested relief. Leon County
appealed, using what would prove to be the spring gun in the LGCPA.
Ironically, the circuit court's factual determination that the County arbitrarily
violated its own plan, has never been challenged or overturned.
B. Round Two: The Spring Gun is Loaded
As indicated, Leon County argued on appeal that the trial court's denial
of its motion to dismiss was error. The County, based on its reading of the
LGCPA remedy provisions, argued that the failure to comply with the time
provisions of the remedy provisions was a complete defense to any judicial
review. The First District agreed with the County's position and reversed.
The First District, in fact, found it unnecessary to "reach the merits of this
determination [comprehensive plan compliance and arbitrary refusal by Leon
County] because we find that the trial court should have granted the
petitioner's [Leon County] motion to dismiss filed in each case for failure
of the respondents [Parker and Emerald Acres] to comply with Section
163.3 125. . ."" The First District, in reaching this conclusion, rejected
the trial court's conclusion that the statutory remedy provisions of the
LGCPA applied only when local government approved an application and
someone other than the applicant sought to challenge that decision."
The mandatory construction of the time provisions, the First District
argued, were both "reasonable and logical."'" The court reasoned "[a]
local government, such as a county commission, often proceeds in an
informal, free-form manner."" Leon County, the court observed, "[r]ather
than simply deny[ing] the respondent's requests in the cases below ...
suggested that the respondents meet further with the Planning Commission
12. Emerald Acres 1, 566 So. 2d at 1316.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1317.
15. Id.
16. Id.
1292 [Vol. 18
576
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Fennelly
in an effort to work out the differences."' 7  Mandatory reading of the
notice provisions would, therefore, have "the salutary effect of putting such
government body on notice that it should be prepared to defend its action
and will need to create a record to support that action.' Judge Nimmons,
in dissent, approved the court's interpretation of the statute's remedy
provisions. He would have found the notice provisions applicable only
when "an aggrieved or adversely affected party" institutes an action "where
the local governmental agency has granted the applicant's proposal."' 9
Emerald Acres and Parker moved for a rehearing, alleging that they
had complied with the notice provisions, but had inadvertently omitted that
fact in their certiorari petition.20 The First District, in response, denied
rehearing, but indicated that "on remand, the trial court may dismiss the
complaints with leave to amend. If the trial court does grant leave to
amend, Emerald Acres Inc., may . . . have that issue properly before the
trial court for resolution.",2' This set the stage for a judicial coup de grace
to Emerald Acres attempt to obtain meaningful judicial review of Leon
County's denial of their application.
C. Round Three. The Spring Gun is Fired
Emerald Acres dutifully returned to the trial court and filed an amended
petition for certiorari and mandamus. The trial court this time around
dismissed the complaint, finding "that the verified complaint was filed 58
days after the decision of the board, in violation of section 163.3215. "22
The First District affirmed, and rejected Emerald Acres argument that the
statutory notice period did not begin to run until the County's action was
17. EmeraldAcres 1, 566 So. 2d at 1317. It is difficult to follow the logic of the First
District on this issue. If the parties were still trying to resolve the issues, then how could the
ambivalent denial constitute final agency action and trigger the Act's time clock?
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1318 (Nimmons, J., dissenting). Judge Nimmons, in essence, adopted the
board access to non-applicants reading of the LGCPA remedy provisions. This concept will
be the subject of extended discussion. See infra part If.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. EmeraMdAcres If, 601 So. 2d at 579. As indicated in note 17, and its accompanying
text, the Commission did not simply deny the application, but suggested further meetings
between planners and the applicants. It is difficult to fathom how either applicant could have
a clue that the clock was running. As noted, if the decision was final, what exactly remained
to be worked out? Thus, Leon County's invitation could be viewed fairly as administrative
sandbagging. This makes the result reached by the First District a kind of judicial sanction
for administrative cheap shots.
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reduced to writing and sent to the applicant. "Section 163.3215," the court
noted, "contains no requirement that the 'alleged inconsistent action' be
reduced to writing."23  The court then characterized the statutory notice
provisions as a substantive "condition precedent to instituting a judicial
action .... 2' This characterization of the notice provisions enabled the
court to also reject Emerald Acres' contention that those provisions were an
unconstitutional infringement of the Florida Supreme Court's appellate
rulemaking authority. This last conclusion was an apriori result reached
without discussion or analysis that proved the truth of the old philosophy
adage that when you define the terms, you have already won the argu-
ment.25
Judge Kahn, who reluctantly concurred on stare decisis principles, was
plainly uncomfortable with the result. 26 In Judge Kahn's opinion, "suffi-
cient cause exists to question the propriety of applying the statute to bar the
present action.' '27 The remedy provisions, in his view, should be read
expansively so that "the new statutory remedy may well be seen as cumula-
tive to common law certiorari .... Judge Kahn reached this conclusion
because common law certiorari was essentially an appellate remedy in the
circuit court, and "it does not follow that the availability of a more
expansive remedy under the statute necessarily abrogates any right to
certiorari review of the local government action. 2 9  Judge Kahn, in
contrast to the majority, viewed the LGCPA remedy provisions as "legisla-
tively establishing the means by which an interested person, not a party to
the proceedings before the local government body, may seek to vindicate
rights that are arguably protected under a previously adopted comprehensive
23. Id. at 580.
24. Id.
25. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS, 42
(1960). "[C]ourts do not yet regularly and as of course face up to their job of integrating the
particular statute into the doctrinal whole;" and thus not "implementing the clear purposes
of a statute with the full resources of a court or the matter of recognizing a clear and broad
statutory policy in an apt area even though that area is not embraced by the literal language."
Id. As will be discussed in part IV.B., the First District Court's conclusion on the appellate
rulemaking issue is in direct contradiction to supreme court precedent and fails to integrate
the Act's remedy provisions into the doctrinal whole of judicial review of administrative
action.
26. Emerald Acres It, 601 So. 2d at 581 (Kahn, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 583.
29. Id.
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plan. 3°
Judge Kahn also expressed concern that the majority's treatment of the
remedy provisions of the LGCPA raised serious constitutional questions
concerning the legislature's power to limit circuit court common law
certiorari jurisdiction and the supreme court's exclusive appellate rule-
making authority.' Judge Kahn, to avoid these separation of powers
issues, expressed a preference for the approach used by the Fifth District
Court of Appeal32 in a similar case, Splash & Ski, Inc. v. Orange Coun-
ty. 3
3
The Fifth District, as will be demonstrated, employed an approach that
avoided constitutional problems and afforded the aggrieved parties relief
against another legislatively created spring gun.
D. Splash & Ski: The Spring Gun is Unloaded and Cased
Splash & Ski, Inc., sought a special exception from Orange County to
operate watercraft at "Shooters Waterfront Cafe., 3' The application was
denied, and Splash & Ski petitioned for common law certiorari in accor-
dance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3). Splash & Ski
did not, however, comply with the notice provision of the special statute that
permitted certiorari review of County Commission zoning decisions.35
Although the record is not clear, the circuit court viewed the statutory
remedy as exclusive and dismissed the petition. The circuit court's view is
similar to that of the First District in Emerald Acres I and II.
36
On appeal, Splash & Ski argued that Orange County's notice provisions
violated article V, sections 2(a) and 5(b) of the Florida Constitution.37
Splash & Ski also argued that, even if the provisions were constitutional, the
remedy provided was cumulative to common law certiorari.38
30. Id. at 582. Thus, Judge Kahn embraced Judge Nimmons' and the circuit court's
view of the intent of the access provisions in the Act enunciated in Emerald Acres I.
31. Emerala'Acres II, 601 So. 2d at 582; see also supra note 3.
32. Id. at 583.
33. 596 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
34. Id. at 493.
35. Id. An early law review article characterized Florida appellate law on certiorari as
"confusing" and that major portions of opinions consist of misleading dicta that "mislead the
Bar and afford the bench 'authority' for later decisions of questionable soundness." William
H. Rogers & Lewis Rhea Baxter, Certiorari in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 477 (1951)
(containing an excellent discussion of common law and statutory certiorari).
36. Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 495.
37. Id. at 493.
38. Id.
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Judge Griffin, writing for the court, deftly avoided the constitutional
issues raised by the appeal. She did, however, express serious reservations
concerning the validity of the statutory provision if read so as to eliminate
common law certiorari. Judge Griffin noted pointedly: "If the existence of
Orange County's statutory certiorari procedure were to preclude review by
common law certiorari, the petitioner's argument that the unique require-
ments of Orange County's special act violate the Florida Constitution would
have to be seriously considered."39
Judge Griffin also took pains to note that, "[w]e are unaware whether
any other county presently has a similar notice requirement."4  This
unique requirement, she noted, "is an effective procedural trap for those who
have not figured out that the requirements for certiorari review by a Florida
court can be found in a county ordinance instead of the Florida appellate
rules."'" The result of those hidden provisions was: "In the rest of the
state, the certiorari jurisdiction of the circuit court is invoked simply by
filing a petition in the circuit court in accordance with the appellate rules
within thirty days. In Orange County, thirty days has shrunk to ten days
",42
The court, however, resolved the apparent conflict by a straightforward
analysis of the proper relationship between statutory and common law
certiorari. That relationship, simply put, is that "[t]he remedy of statutory
certiorari is independent and cumulative to common law certiorari.
Common law certiorari is available if a statutory remedy fails. 43
In Splash & Ski, Judge Griffin also supplied an analytical framework
that can correct the deficiencies in and potential constitutional problems
raised by the First District in Emerald Acres I and 11. Judge Griffen
reasoned "certain statutory notice requirements are substantive, not
procedural, and create a valid condition precedent rather than an impermis-
sible intrusion into the court's exclusive rule making power. 44  These
requirements, however, "are not jurisdictional... [if] a condition precedent
is not met, the court does have jurisdiction of the cause; the case is simply
subject to dismissal if the condition precedent is not satisfied .. .
39. Id. at 494.
40. Id. at 494 n.9.
41. Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 495 n.12.
42. Id. at 494-95.
43. Id. at 494 (citing Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 537 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1988)).
44. Id. at 495.
45. Id. (citing Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1990)).
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In appellate review, on the other hand, a notice requirement, "is not a
condition precedent to accrual of a cause of action."46 Rather, "petitioner's
rights have been determined .. . [and] [w]hat petitioner now seeks is
appellate review of the Board's decision."47 The Judge noted: "There are
no substantive 'conditions precedent' to appellate review-the courts are
open to all who follow the appellate rules and pay the filing fee. The state
constitution specifically identifies the time for seeking appellate review to
be a matter of 'practice and procedure."' 48
The First District's analysis of the remedy provisions of the LGCPA
has, in light of Splash & Ski, created additional uncertainty in Florida land
use law.49 The district courts are now in conflict over the viability of
common law certiorari in post LGCPA litigation. The initial issue is
primarily legislative intent, while the secondary issues involve significant
constitutional questions arising under the separation of powers doctrine.
They include the constitutional subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court
and the exclusive appellate rulemaking jurisdiction of the supreme court.
Adequate discussion of the Legislature's intent concerning the remedy
provisions requires a detour into nuances of the administrative law of access
or standing. It will also be necessary to compare, contrast, and distinguish
certiorari from trial proceedings in the circuit court.
III. STANDING, ACCESS, PARTIES, AND REMEDIES:
A WALK ON THE WILD SIDE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The LGCPA remedy provisions for review of local government land
use decisions, in essence, are a curious blend of the administrative law of
standing or access and traditional notions of judicial review and remedies.
The Act's provisions in this regard might be likened to a legislatively
created witch's brew of procedural complexity. That cauldron, like
46. Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 495.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
49. The Second and Fifth Districts view common law certiorari as a cumulative remedy.
See Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, !1, Ltd. Partnership, 619 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); Splash & Ski, Inc. v. Orange County, 596 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Snyder v. County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 76 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991 )
overruled by Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 19 Fla. L. Weekly S17 (Oct. 7, 1993).
However, the Fourth District has aligned itself with the First District's approach in Emerald
Acres I and //. See Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth of the
Treasure Coast, 608 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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MacBeth's, 0 is now boiling in Florida's appellate courts. A powerful
ingredient in the brew is the question of proper parties in any proceeding
under the Act.
A. Standing or Access Under the LGCPA." Hail, Hail, the
Gang's All Here
The LGCPA judicial review provisions permit an "aggrieved or
adversely affected party"'" to seek injunctive or other relief against any
local government to prevent such local government from taking any action
on a development order.5 2 An aggrieved or adversely affected party is
defined as "any person or local government which will suffer an adverse
effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government
comprehensive plan . . . ."" Protected interests include "health and safety,
police and fire protection service systems, densities or intensities of
development, transportation facilities, . . . equipment or services, or
environmental or natural resources."54  These interests, under LGCPA
remedy provisions, "may be shared in common with other members of the
community at large, but shall exceed in degree the general interest in
community good shared by all persons."55 The Act's administrative review
provisions," in turn, allow "substantially affected persons" to challenge
land development decisions in a purely administrative forum. 7
These administrative standing or access concepts were developed to
ensure "[e]xpansion of public access to the activities of governmental
agencies."5 Under Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, these agency
activities are, for the most part, quasi-legislative rulemaking. Substantially
affected persons include trade associations,59 interest groups,6" and even
50. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, sc. I.
51. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(1) (1991).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 163.3215(2) (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. FLA. STAT. § 163.3213 (1991).
57. Id. § 163.3213(2)(a). This term is not defined in the section and has been the source
of considerable confusion under chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes Administrative Procedure
Act. See Cortese v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 425 So. 2d 554, 556 n.4 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Judith S. Kavanaugh, Administrative Standing Under Chapter
403: What Does the Jerry Case Mean, 53 FLA. B.J. 729, 730-31 (1979)).
58. Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 412 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla.
1982).
59. See id.
1298 [Vol. 18
582
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Fennelly
parents of school age children.6' The Act's access or standing definitions
are clearly borrowed and are much broader than classical judicial notions of
standing.62 Indeed, the late Professor Patricia Dore, a leading authority on
the Act and its access provisions, argued that traditional judicial notions of
standing are not applicable in the administrative law context.63 Reviewing
courts, in her view, should disregard those concepts and apply an "access
test" to administrative proceedings.64 The appropriate test employed in a
functional manner looks to the specific statute to determine who should be
granted access to agency rule making.65
The LGCPA remedy provision, viewed through the Administrative
Procedure Act's access filter, becomes much more comprehensible. It
emerges as a broad access mechanism that permits interested groups, as
defined by the Act, to mount a challenge to land use decisions of local
governments. Challenges may be mounted in either an administrative or
judicial forum, but the Act's provisions are the exclusive remedy to
interested groups or individuals. The notice provisions, as conditions
precedent to filing, serve the salutary effect of putting a local government
on notice of a possible challenge to a land use decision.66 To allow a non-
applicant to challenge a land use decision of a local government seems more
consistent with the Act's own terminology. Further, the Act apparently
would allow a legislatively defined adversely affected or aggrieved party to
bring an action or administrative proceeding against a local government
without naming the applicant as a party.67 The applicant could conceivably
intervene in the proceeding but appears not to be an indispensable party.
Judge Kahn's analysis is also supported, once again, by the remedy
terminology of the Act. The Act provides for "injunctive or other relief,"
60. See Farmworkers Rights Org. Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Scrvs.,
417 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
61. See Cortese, 425 So. 2d at 555.
62. Standing in classical terms is the right of a party to bring or defend a particular
action. As Trawick notes, "[t]o have standing a person must have a cause of action that he
can assert and personal stake in the outcome .... " HENRY P. TRAWICK, FLORIDA PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4-15 (1992) (emphasis added).
63. See Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 967, 993 (1986) (suggesting a functional analysis that will ensure broad access to
agency activity principal rulemaking).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 984-85; see also Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and
Judicial Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 779-83 (1991).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
67. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(l) (1991).
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that suit under its provision "shall be the sole action available," and that a
"condition precedent" to institution of an action shall be a "verified
complaint."6 This legislative language, together with the broad definition
of adversely affected parties, clearly envisions a trial court remedy for a
non-applicant. Extension of the exclusivity provisions to exclude constitu-
tionally based appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court in common law
certiorari is unwarranted. Indeed, as Judge Griffin persuasively argued in
Splash & Ski,69 common law certiorari is and has been viewed historically
as an appellate remedy.7° The Act's language and apparent intent makes
the First District's reading of the remedy provisions problematic at best.
IV. SNYDER AND VAILLANT REVISITED: AN EMERGING TREND
SUPPORTED BY EXISTING PRECEDENT
A. The Emerging Trend
The LGCPA, as has been noted elsewhere, has transformed the post
comprehensive plan land use decisions of local governments." The initial
adoption of the plan, which was a policy or quasi-legislative decision,
zoning or otherwise, is now a quasi-judicial function.72 The post-plan land
use decision will be measured for compliance with the criteria established
in the plan. This is the much praised and cursed concept of consistency.
Consistency necessarily requires measuring a given post-plan land use deci-
sion against a known policy standard, the plan. This fact finding process is
essentially quasi-judicial.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized this fundamental
transformation of the post-plan land use decision in a trail blazing decision,
Snyder v. Board of County Commissioners.73 Snyder was denied rezoning
68. Id. Trawick notes that actions are classified as ex contractu, ex delicto, or statutory.
TRAWICK, supra note 62, § 1-1. Common law certiorari, he notes, "is a form appellate
review but, the proceeding is an original action." Id. § 36-2. Trawick further notes that
"certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court public officer or body to
review a judicial or quasi judicial order or judgment ..... Id.; see also id. §§ 1-5, 6-20.
(supporting Judge Griffin's analysis in Splash & Ski, Inc. v. Orange County, 596 So. 2d 491
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
69. Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 491.
70. Id.
71. Fennelly, supra note 6, at 487.
72. Id. at 454.
73. 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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by the commission even though his requested land use complied with the
county's comprehensive plan. Snyder unsuccessfully sought review by
common law certiorari in the circuit court. The Fifth District reversed in
what can be fairly characterized as a sophisticated, comprehensive, and
systematic analysis of the impact of the LGCPA on zoning and land use
decisions in the post-plan context.
The Snyder court, employing what it and other courts have character-
ized as a "functional analysis,"74 first noted that "broad judicial statements
that all rezoning decisions are legislative in nature are out of step with the
realities of zoning practice and the evolvement of zoning law."75  This
process, the court held, was now a "quasi-judicial review."76  This
conceptual result flowed from the nature of the task performed in the post-
plan environment. The task, necessarily imposed by the Act, involves
application of a general rule or policy (the plan) to specific individuals,
interests or situations. The application of general policy criteria to a discrete
person, interest, or situation was inherently quasi-judicial.77 Determination
of that general policy, in contrast, is a legislative function. This preliminary
function, under the LGCPA, is performed when the plan is formulated and
then enacted.78
The Second District, in a recent decision, Lee County v. Sunbelt
Equities H, Ltd. Partnership,79 has followed the analytical framework
advanced by the Fifth District in Snyder. The Second District's opinion in
the case candidly recognized that "Florida's appellate courts are neither
unanimous nor consistent on the question whether rezonings are legislative
74. Id. at 78. Lest Professor Dore and the Fifth District be accused of making a doctrine
out of whole cloth, no less a luminary than Benjamin Cardozo found this type of analysis an
improvement in jurisprudence. In 1921, Cardozo argued, "perhaps the most significant
advance in the modem science of the law is the change from the analytical to the functional
attitude. The emphasis has changed from the content of the precept and the existence of the
remedy to the effect of the precept in action and the availability and the efficiency of the
remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was devised." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process. Lecture 11. The Methods of History, Tradition, and Sociology,
in, CARDOZO ON THE LAW 73 (Legal Classics Library 1982) (quoting Roscoe Pound "The
Administrative Application of Legal Standards," 44 A.B.A. REP. 441, 449 (1919)).
75. Id. at 75.
76. Id. at 80.
77. Id. at 77.
78. See Carl J. Peckingpaugh, Burden of Proof in Land Use Regulation: A Unified
Approach and Application to Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 504 (1980); DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 33-45 (1977).
79. 619 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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or quasi-judicial."8 Nor have they, in the Second District's view, been
"consistent about the method or scope of review."'" The court then, after
a discussion of Snyder's analytical framework, agreed that a "functional
analysis' ' 82 was appropriate and that post-plan land use decisions were
"quasi-judicial."83 This result and approach, to the Second District, led to
"a fair and workable solution"84 to issues raised by the evolving law of
property rights.., that "does not augur well for local governments who are
reluctant to justify their decisions with explicit reference to evidence and
public policy."85 Land use decisions, the court noted, "if reached under a
veil of silence . . . are vulnerable to charges of arbitrariness or improper
motive."86  Based on the foregoing, the Second District concluded "any
party adversely affected by a rezoning decision is entitled to some form of
direct appellate review."87
Applying a functional analysis to common law certiorari in the LGCPA
context leads inexorably to the conclusion that it is essentially an appellate
procedure that reviews administrative action. The scope of that review is,
as Judge Kahn noted, much more limited in nature but is nonetheless a
review."8 The circuit court is reviewing, in the consistency context, a
factual determination by a local government that a proposed land use is or
is not in compliance with the plan. This analysis of the proceeding is also
consistent with existing supreme court precedent as set forth in the seminal
case of City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant.9
B. The Established Precedent
Vaillant was terminated by the City of Deerfield Beach and unsuccess-
fully appealed to the Civil Service Board. The board, after a full hearing,
upheld his termination. He then sought and obtained a writ of common law
80. Id. at 1000.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1001 (quoting David La Croix, The Applicability of Certiorari Review to
Decisions on Rezoning, 65 FLA. B.J. 105 (June 1991).
83. Id.
84. Lee County, 619 So. 2d at 1001. The Second District also stated that it agreed "site-
specific, owner-initiated rezoning requests are sufficiently judicial in character that final
administrative orders are thereafter appropriate for appellate review." Id.
85. Id. at 1002.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Emerald Acres I, 601 So. 2d 577, 583 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also
supra notes 69, 79, 84 and accompanying text.
89. 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982).
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certiorari in the circuit court. The City then attempted a plenary appeal in
the Fourth District. Judge Letts, writing for the Court, treated the City's
attempted appeal as a petition for certiorari and denied relief.9" To Judge
Letts, regardless of the nomenclature, the relief sought in the Court was
effectually an appeal.9 The supreme court, on appeal, followed Judge
Letts' analysis noting "where full review of administrative action is given
in the circuit court as a matter of right, one appealing the circuit court's
judgment is riot entitled to a second full review in the district court."92
The supreme court, in Vaillant, also cited with approval a Third District
decision, Save Brickell Ave., Inc. v. City of Miami.93 Brickell held squarely
that a zoning review in the circuit court was appellate review. 94
The supreme court, in a more recent case, Education Development
Center, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals,95
reaffirmed Vaillant's continuing viability and expressly extended its
rationale to zoning decisions.
Factually, Education Development Center, Inc. obtained certiorari relief
in circuit court from an adverse zoning decision. On appeal, the Fourth
District reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court. The circuit
court, on remand, was to only "review the factual determination made by
the agency and determine whether there is substantial competent evidence
to support the agency's conclusion."96 On remand, the circuit court found
that there was, no substantial competent evidence to support the agency's
conclusion and again granted certiorari relief.
On review, the Fourth District, undauntedly granted certiorari and
quashed the circuit court's order. The court held:
There was substantial evidence to support denial of the application to
permit the operation of a preschool in this residential area. To find to
the contrary, we conclude that the lower tribunal either reinterpreted the
inferences which the evidence supported or reweighed the evidence; in
either event substituting itsjudgment for that of the zoning board, which
90. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
91. See Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626. Arguably, Judge Letts was also employing a
"functional analysis" to the common law certiorari proceeding in the circuit court.
92. Id.
93. 393 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
94. Id. at 1198 n.I.
95. 541 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1989).
96. City of W. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. Education Dev. Ctr., Inc., 504 So.
2d 1385, 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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it may not properly do.97
The supreme court, on review, in effect struck the Fourth District with
its own Vaillant petard. The supreme court, citing the Fourth District's own
language in Vaillant, reiterated the view that "common sense dictates that
no one enjoys three full appellate reviews . . . ."" The court then clearly
held that "[w]hen the circuit court reviews the decision of an administrative
agency under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3), there are
three discrete components of its certiorari review."99 The components are
"whether procedural due process is accorded, whether the essential require-
ments of the law have been observed, and whether the administrative
findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evi-
dence."' °  The district court, in its review, is limited to two discrete
components; "whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and
applied the correct law.'' °o
V. TOWARD SYNTHESIS
As indicated previously, the LGCPA has injected profound uncertainty
into Florida law. 0 2  Indeed the entire area of land use law has been
described as a legal fault line.0 3 Given the novel and dynamic issues that
are confronting the district courts and the evolving law of property rights it
is not surprising that there is uncertainty. On the issues presented by
Emerald Acres I and II, however, the uncertainty is a direct result of
legislative draftsmanship. The Legislature, by blending administrative law
standing law concepts with traditional common law remedies in the LGCPA,
has thrown the bench and bar a legislative knuckleball. That the First
District went down swinging is thus not the least bit surprising.
97. City of W. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. Education Dev. Ctr., Inc., 526 So.
2d 775, 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
98. Education Dev. Ctr., Inc., 541 So. 2d at 108 (citing City of Deerfield Beach v.
Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
99. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
100. Id. (citing Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626).
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 50.
103. John R. Nolon, Footprints in the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A Practical
Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 16 (1992). "We as a
society have not resolved the tension between property law and environmental rights.
Controversies abound . . . the dispute ... is a tremor running along a deep fault line in
American Society." Id.
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Emerald Acres I and II are not any less troublesome to say the least.
First, the First District has badly misconstrued legislative intent with regard
to the remedy provisions. There is, as indicated earlier, no basis for the
court's conclusion that the Legislature intended to attempt a curtailment of
common law certiorari. It is simply not there and the court was clearly
guilty of apriori reasoning. It assumed the premise and reasoned formally
to a conclusion. Professor Karl N. Llewellyn characterized this type of
decision as a formal"°4 decision making that ignored what he described as
the situation sense" 5 of a case. Holmes even more bluntly called decision
making of this nature "unconscious"'' 6 because it ignored existing supreme
court precedent as expressed in Vaillant and its progeny. Precedent clearly
viewed common law certiorari as an appellate proceeding. This in turn, has
resulted in decisions that fail to adequately distinguish between the trial and
appellate functions and jurisdiction of the circuit court. Finally, the
decisions have needlessly created separation of powers issues that potentially
threaten the constitutionality of the LGCPA's remedy provisions.
The supreme court can, in the Llewellyn sense, tidy up this area by
looking to the policy implications of the act and its own existing precedent.
Llewellyn described this as appellate judging in the grand tradition-a
Cardozo-like "drive to give clear and reasoned guidance for a whole type-
situation.., wisdom in judging where sound guidance lay... sensitivity to
equities . . . subtlety of craftsmanship . ... ""' This type of approach
should recognize that the remedy provisions of the LGCPA were intended
to permit broad access to defined groups. Access that would allow them,
in compliance with the act conditions precedent, to challenge local govern-
mental land use decisions. This reading of the Act's remedy provisions is
consistent with, as Llewellyn describes it, the situation sense of the Act.
This interpretation would also leave intact the applicant's right to challenge
104. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 38
(1960). In the formal style "[olpinions run in deductive form with an air or expression of
single-line inevitability." Id.
105. Id. at 143. "[S]tress in first instance on the problem-situation as a type, with quest
for a sound and guidesome form of rule to govern . in. " In other words, examine LGCPA
in light of the purpose of the statute as a whole and in view of existing precedent defining
and explaining certiorari. Id.
106. Perhaps of the reasons judges do not like to discuss policy or to put a decision in
terms of their views as lawmakers, is that the moment you leave the path of merely logical
deduction, you loose the illusion of certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like
mathematics. But that certainty is only an illusion nevertheless. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR.,
THE PATH OF THE LAW, IN THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 126 (1982).
107. LLEWELLYN, supra note 104, at 443.
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a land use decision by common law certiorari, and avoid the constitutional
issues raised necessarily in Emerald Acres I and I.
If, however, the supreme court accepts the First District's interpretation
of the Act's remedy provisions, then it would appear inevitable that the
constitutional issues alluded to by Judges Griffin and Kahn will have to be
addressed. The balance of this article will, therefore, address these issues.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUAGMIRE
The separation of powers doctrine is a basic principle that underlies
both the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida. The
doctrine envisions a division of sovereign power between three distinct
branches of government: Executive, Legislative and Judicial. The
placement of powers in one branch, because of constitutional supremacy,
precludes alteration of the division except by constitutional alteration. Thus,
neither Congress nor the State Legislature may alter or exercise powers
proper to a coordinate branch of government.1"8 Simply put, the Legisla-
ture can not decide a negligence case and the Supreme Court can not pass
a state budget. Nor can one branch alter the constitutional functions of
another branch.
The doctrine outlined by Madison in The Federalist Papers received
constitutional recognition in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison. °9
Congress had attempted in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to expand the court's
jurisdiction to allow the court to issue writs of mandamus. Chief Justice
Marshall and the Supreme Court, quite simply, would have none of it. The
Constitution, he argued, assigns and limits governmental power. Thus, since
the Constitution is the "paramount law,"''0 a "law repugnant to the
[C]onstitution is void."'' . Although the Constitution is paramount, the
instrument itself can still be "looked into" in cases arising under the
Constitution.
Florida's constitutional framers were even more explicit. Article II,
section 3 (branches of government) provides that "[t]he power of the state
108. Separation of powers in Madison's view was a basic bulwark against tyranny. Thus
he observed in The Federalist No. 47 that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many ... may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." MICHAEL KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 187 (1986).
109. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
110. Id. at 177.
111. Id. at 180.
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government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.
No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." '
Despite this explicit prohibition, however, the supreme court has had
to periodically grapple with legislative attempts to directly or indirectly limit
or expand the jurisdiction of the courts. 13 In each instance, the Florida
Supreme Court has resisted any legislative attempt to alter the jurisdiction
conferred by the constitution on the courts of this state.
City of Dunedin v. Bense"4 is illustrative and bears a striking resem-
blance to Marbury v. Madison. In Bense, the Legislature had attempted to
give the supreme court "'original jurisdiction ...by injunction or other
appropriate remedy' to prohibit the filing of any action attacking the validity
of a validation decree except in the manner provided in this section." ' 5
The supreme court in Bense recognized as a benchmark principle of
constitutional jurisdiction that "[n]either this court nor the Legislature has
the power to extend the jurisdiction of this court beyond the confines of the
constitutional prescription.""' 6 The court also recognized that "the Legis-
lature must function within the orbit prescribed by the Constitution.""' 7
The supreme court, in tones similar to Marshall's, flatly rejected the
attempt, holding: "jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred by the
Constitution itself. It is not endowed with any common-law prerogative
outside of the boundaries established by organic law. Certainly the appellate
jurisdiction is clearly defined. Its original jurisdiction is stated with equal
clarity." 8 The Legislature, the court held, "has no power to extend
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond that defined in the Constitu-
tion.""' 9 Any contrary conclusion, the court noted, "would necessarily
ignore the historical doctrine of separation of powers that is so fundamental
to our democratic system."'2 ° Failure to resist would "be authority to the
legislative branch of the government to regulate and control the constitu-
112. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
113. Perhaps it would be appropriate to expand the famous adage that no one's life,
liberty, or property are safe while the Florida Legislature is in session to include "nor
Constitutional form of government."
114. 90 So, 2d 300 (Fla. 1956).
115. Id. at 301. The statute in question concerned causeway and island improvement
revenue bonds. The court recognized the public interest in prompt validation. Id. at 301-02.
116. Id. at 302.
117. Id.
118. Bense, 90 So. 2d at 302.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 302-03.
19941 1307
591
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
tional jurisdiction of the judicial branch."''
The converse of the foregoing principle would appear equally valid.
If the Legislature could by simple legislative fiat disregard constitutional
limitations and expand a court's subject matter jurisdiction, it could with
equal impunity limit jurisdiction or constitutionally based remedies, such as,
injunction.
The supreme court has also resisted this latter notion as well as the
former, at least with regard to its own jurisdiction.'22 In Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 23 Chief Justice Roberts stated "it has been many
times held by this court that ... the Legislature cannot restrict or take away
jurisdiction conferred by the constitution....
Article V, section 5 of the Florida Constitution vests circuit courts with
both jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and the power of direct review
of administrative action prescribed by general law.'25  The analogy
provided by Bense and Clay therefore, would seem clear. The Legislature
must also move within its proper orbit concerning the constitutional
jurisdiction of the circuit court. The constitution, the paramount document,
precludes any legislative attempts to curtail jurisdiction, to issue writs of
certiorari. Jurisdiction, it should be added, that the supreme court has
clearly characterized as appellate in nature.
The Legislature, from a functional standpoint, can create a substantive
right and remedy. Thus, the remedy provisions of the LGCPA should be
viewed as a legislatively created cause of action. As such, as Judge Griffin
noted, it exists apart and totally separate from the circuit court's appellate
jurisdiction, i.e., the power to issue writs of certiorari and review adminis-
trative action.116  The circuit court's jurisdiction, from a functional
standpoint, can be viewed as two dimensional. The remedy provisions of
the LGCPA, it is argued, properly belong in this first dimension. The
second, equally constitutionally based dimension of jurisdiction, implicates
circuit court appellate jurisdiction. Both dimensions, it is argued, exist
121. Id. at 303.
122. Cardozo described this tendency to extend itself along the lines of logical
development as "an intellectual passion for elegantia juris, for symmetry of form and
substance." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process. Lecture I.
Introduction. The Method of Philosophy, in, CARDOZO ON THE LAW, supra note 74, at 34
n.28 (quoting W.G. Miller in THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE).
123. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
124. Id. at 742. The holding in Clay seems to conflict with the holding in Bense. In
the view of the Clay court, however, Bense was not controlling. Id. at 741.
125. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
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independently of each other and are functionally distinct. In essence the
First District, in Emerald Acres I and II, has ignored the distinction and
collapsed the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction into its trial jurisdiction.
This is a scrambled and impermissible result at variance with the constitu-
tion and supreme court precedent as expressed in Vaillant and its progeny.
A. Legislatively Established Appellate Filing Times
As discussed previously,'27 if the time requirements governing the
remedy provisions are viewed from the circuit court's trial court dimension,
then the result reached in Emerald Acres appears sound. Quite another issue
is presented if the remedy provisions' time requirements are viewed as also
controlling common law certiorari in circuit court. To reiterate, the supreme
court has consistently treated certiorari as an appellate remedy governed by
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 12  The constitution in article V, section
2(a) vests the supreme court with jurisdiction to "adopt rules for [the]
practice and procedure in all courts including the time for seeking appellate
review." 129 'The filing periods, therefore, when viewed from the second
or appellate dimension, intrude on the supreme court's rulemaking authority
and raise a clear separation of powers issue. The supreme court has histori-
cally treated appellate filing requirements as a procedural matter exclusively
within its constitutional sphere of authority.3 '
This historical treatment of legislatively imposed appellate filing
requirements continues to be followed.'3 ' The Fourth District Court of
Appeal in no uncertain terms noted "the Florida Constitution, Article V,
Section 2(a), provides that the Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure
in all courts, 'including the time for seeking appellate review.' Matters of
practice and procedure within the authority of the Supreme Court may not
be exercised by the Legislature."'3 2  The court found any explicit or
implicit attempt of the Legislature to extend the time for direct appeal would
be untimely.'33
Given the historical treatment of circuit court certiorari as an appellate
remedy and the supreme court's previous reaction to legislatively imposed
127. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying note 101.
129. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (emphasis added).
130. See Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.8 (Fla. 1978).
131. See In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 570 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990), aff'd, 593 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1991).
132. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
133. Id.
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appellate filing requirements, the result in Emerald Acres I and II appears
even more tenuous. Affirmance would require that the supreme court ignore
its own precedent concerning the nature of certiorari, and accept legislative
intrusion into its rulemaking authority. This, on separation of powers
grounds, the court has consistently refused to allow the Legislature to do.
VII. POST SCRIPT: THE FEDERAL SPECTER
Parker, one of the parties in Emerald Acres I, fared much better in the
federal court. The Estate and Parker, frustrated in their attempts for
meaningful judicial review in state court, brought an action in district court.
Parker alleged Leon County's actions were "arbitrary and capricious," and
deprived them of both due process and equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment.' The district court agreed and granted summary
judgment against the County.' The district court, in a comprehensive
and systematic opinion, noted that while a federal court's role in reviewing
zoning cases is limited, "'deprivation [of a property interest] is of constitu-
tional stature if it is undertaken for an improper motive and by means that
were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and without rational basis."" 36
It would appear, therefore, that Florida appellate courts are unwilling
or unable to provide relief to litigants who are subjected, in the LGCPA
context, to arbitrary and irrational administrative action by state and local
agencies, the federal courts are an alternative forum. This conclusion is
warranted by the district court decisions and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.'37
VIII. CONCLUSION
The recent decisions of the First District in Emerald Acres I and II are
at variance with the legislative intent of the LGCPA and of established
Florida constitutional jurisprudence. Hopefully, the supreme court will
134. Parker v. Leon County, No. TCA 91-40133-WS, 1992 WL 209626, at *2 (N.D.
Fla. March 18, 1992).
135. Id. at *5.
136. Id, at *7 (quoting Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (1 1th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 55 (1991)).
137. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
1310 [Vol. 1 8
594
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Fennelly
quickly correct the error. 3  Failure to do so could result in wholesale
federal intervention in cases of this nature. A minor correction could,
however, correct the problem and insure that Florida's courts are available
to protect all Floridians from the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of state
power.
138. Since this article was written, the Florida Supreme Court determined that common
law certiorari was available to a property owner seeking to challenge adverse administrative
action under the LGCPA. Parker v. Leon County, Nos. 80230, 80288, 1993 WL 530281, at
*4 (Fla. Oct. 7, 1993). The court further restricted access to the Act's remedy provisions to
third party non-applicants. Id. at *3. The court did not, however, reach the constitutional
issues raised in this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The court, under its constitutional authority to 'regulate the admission
of persons to the practice of law,' has the authority to require profi-
* General Counsel, Florida Board of Bar Examiners. B.A. Magna Cum Laude 1973,
University of Southern Mississippi; J.D. with honors, 1975, University of Florida. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by members
of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners or by the Supreme Court of Florida.
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ciency in the law and good moral character before it admits an applicant
to practice before the courts of this state. The sole purpose of these re-
quirements is to protect the public.'
Article V, section 15 of the Florida Constitution vests the Supreme
Court of Florida with "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of
persons to the practice of law .... "' The authority of the Florida Supreme
Court to regulate Bar membership is derived from the historical practices of
the English courts. Such practices predate the adoption of the Florida Con-
stitution by over six centuries.'
In 1955, 4 the Supreme Court of Florida established the Florida Board
of Bar Examiners ("FBOBE") pursuant to general statutory and constitution-
al authority.5 As presently constituted, the FBOBE has fifteen members;6
1. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454,458 (Fla. 1978) [hereinafter
G.W. L.].
2. FLA. CONST. art. V, §15.
3. In In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1977), the court stated:
For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the English
courts exercised the right to determine who should be admitted to the practice
of law. This authority was grounded upon the rationale that if the courts and the
judicial power were to be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law was a constituent element of that entity. This
was so because the quality of justice dispensed by the courts depended in no
small degree upon the integrity and competence of its Bar. An unfaithful or
incapable Bar could visit reproach upon the administration of justice and upon
the courts themselves.
The drafters of the Florida Constitution recognized this inherent right of
the courts to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law, imbuing
the Supreme Court with exclusive jurisdiction to direct such admissions.
Id. at 100 (citation omitted).
4. Prior to 1955, regulation of Bar membership was "governed by Chapter 10175, Laws
of Florida (1925)." This statute created the Florida Board of Law Examiners. LaBossiere
v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 279 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 1973). The statute granted a
diploma privilege to graduates of Florida law schools entitling them to a waiver of the Bar
examination. Id,
5. Id. (citing to FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V, § 23; Ch. 29796, § 1, Laws of Fla. (1955);
FLA. STAT. § 454.021(1)). Florida Statutes section 454.021 recognizes the court's exclusive
jurisdiction and states:
(1) Admissions of attorneys and counselors to practice law in the state is hereby
declared to be a judicial function.
(2) The Supreme Court of Florida, being the highest court of said state, is the
proper court to govern and regulate admissions of attorneys and counselors to
practice law in said state.
FLA. STAT. § 454.021 (1991).
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twelve members of The Florida Bar,7 and three nonlawyer members of the
general public,8 who are appointed by the court.9
Attorney members of the FBOBE serve for five years and public
members serve for three years." ° Members of the FBOBE serve without
compensation" and "devote whatever time is necessary to perform the
duties of examiner."
12
The FBOBE has its own staff 3 and maintains its administrative offices
in Tallahassee. 4 The FBOBE is granted authority to "compel by subpoena
the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and
documents."'"
The FBOBE's activities are governed by the Rules of the Florida
Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar. 6 The Florida Supreme
Court declared invalid a legislative enactment which attempted to direct the
Board to undertake particular responsibilities.'7 The court reasoned: "As
6. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art. 1, § 2.
7. Id. Article 1, section 3.a. of the Rules of the Florida Supreme Court Relating to
Admissions to the Bar, states: "Attorney members shall be practicing attorneys with schol-
arly attainments and an affirmative interest in legal education and requirements for admission
to the Bar." Id. § 3.a.
8. Id. § 2.a. Article I, section 3.a. of the Rules of the Florida Supreme Court Relating
to Admissions to the Bar, states: "Public members shall be nonlawyers and shall have an
academic Bachelor's Degree. It is desirable that public members possess educational or
work-related experience of value to the Board such as educational testing, accounting, statisti-
cal analysis, medical or psychologically related sciences." Id. § 3.a. During the 1992-93
term, the public members consisted of a psychiatrist, a certified public accountant and a
medical doctor.
9. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS..RULE, art. I, § 3.
10. Id. § 2.
11. Id. § 5.
12. Id. § 3.c. With a minimum of nine monthly meetings each year along with special
hearing panels and the twice yearly administration of the Bar examination, Board members
volunteer well in excess of 200 hours each year in the performance of their duties.
13. Id. § 9. The Board "is a state agency under the judicial branch of the government
and its employees are state employees ...." In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 268 So. 2d
371, 372 (Fla. 1972).
14. FLA. Sup. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art. 1, § 6.
15. Id. art. III, § 3.a.
16. Amendments to the rules are regularly proposed by the Board to the court. On one
occasion, a petition to amend a rule provision from an interested third party was considered
by the court. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Amendment to Rules of the Sup. Ct. of Fla.
Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 603 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1992).
17. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d at 100. In that case, the Legislature
attempted to include the Board in a statute requiring modification of examinations by state
agencies to accommodate blind or deaf persons. Id. at 99. Although the court declared the
1994] 315
599
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
an arm of this [c]ourt, the Board is answerable solely to this tribunal."' 8
II. REQUIREMENTS OF EDUCATION AND EXAMINATION
Commencing in 1955, the Supreme Court of Florida, "in an effort to
provide uniform and measurable standards by which to assess the qualifica-
tions of applicants, adopted a two-pronged system for the determination of
educational fitness .. ,,.9 This system required all Bar applicants to
graduate from an approved law school and to submit to the Bar examina-
tion."
A. Law Degree
A Bar applicant must possess the degree of Bachelor of Laws or Doctor
of Jurisprudence from a law school approved by the American Bar
Association ("ABA").2 This has been the sole educational requirement
since 1992 when the Florida Supreme Court eliminated the undergraduate
degree requirement.22
In LaBossiere v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners,23 the Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed its continuing reliance upon the accreditation of
law schools by the ABA as "an objective method of determining the quality
of the educational environment of prospective attorneys., 24  The court
acknowledged that it was unable to evaluate the many law schools due to
"financial limitations and the press of judicial business., 25
statute invalid as it applied to the Board, the court agreed with the commendable purpose of
the statute. Id. at 100. The court also pointed out "that the Board has for some time given
special consideration to the physically handicapped in administering the Bar examination."
Id. at 101.
18. Id. at 100.
19. LaBossiere, 279 So. 2d at 289.
20. Id.
21. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMIss. RULE, art. Ill, § l.a.
22. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Amendment to Rules of the Sup. Ct. of Fla.
Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 603 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1992). The court reasoned: "We
note that the majority of other states do not have such a [undergraduate degree] requirement,
and we conclude that the disputes over credentials evaluations are expensive, time-consuming,
and unnecessary." Id.
23. 279 So. 2d at 288.
24. Id. at 289.
25. Id. Other states have reached a similar conclusion. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has stated: "[w]e have neither the time nor the expertise to investigative individually the
special training of an applicant or the program offered by specified law schools, and any
1316 [Vol. 18
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In the landmark decision of In re Hale,26 the Florida Supreme Court
confronted the issue of the court's prior practice of granting waivers of the
accredited law degree requirement.27 After acknowledging that it had only
granted nine of the last fifty-five petitions for a waiver, the Hale court
concluded "that a seeming ad-hoc approach in the granting of waivers bears
within it the appearance of discrimination . *.". . " The court then ruled
that it "will no longer favorably consider petitions for waiver of section 1 .b.
[now I.a.] of the Rule. 29
The only exception to the accredited law degree requirement is the
submission of a documented abstract of practice by an individual who has
actively practiced law in another state or in the federal courts for at least ten
years.30  The compilation of work product consists of "samples of the
quality of the applicant's work, such as pleadings, briefs, legal memoranda,
corporate charters or other working papers which the applicant considers
illustrative of such applicant's expertise and academic and legal training .
. . .,33' The FBOBE is granted "broad discretion" in deciding if a submis-
sion is sufficient.32
B. The Bar Examination
The Supreme Court of Florida has mandated that "[a]ll individuals who
seek the privilege of practicing law in the State of Florida shall submit to
the Florida Bar Examination. 33  Florida has no provision for interstate
attempt by us to do so would be inefficient and chaotic." In re Application of Hansen, 275
N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. 1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Hansen v. Minnesota State Bd.
of Bar Examiners, 441 U.S. 938 (1979). The Alaska Supreme Court stated: "The ABA
system of accreditation is sophisticated and time-consuming. We can think of no effective
substitute which could be developed at the state level without diverting impractical amounts
of manpower and money into such an inquiry." Application of Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 508
(Alaska 1980) (Footnote omitted).
26. 433 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1983).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 971.
29. Id. at 972. The court observed that its nonwaiver policy "while conceivably a
hardship to some, is in the best interest of the legal profession in our state." Id.
30. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMIss. RULE, art. III, § Lb.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. art. I, § 1. An exception to such requirement appears in In re Fla. Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 339 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1976). In that case, the petitioner, Virgil Hawkins, had
previously been denied admission to the University of Florida law school during the 1950's
because of his race. Id. at 638. Based upon consideration of "the totality of circumstances,"
1994] 1317
601
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
reciprocity as to Bar admissions.
In In re Russell,34 petitioner, a member of the Massachusetts Bar and
a resident of Florida, attacked Florida's lack of reciprocity as unconsti-
tutional.35 The petitioner was offended by Florida's policy requiring her
to submit to an examination testing her knowledge of law even though she
was a licensed lawyer in Massachusetts.36
The Supreme Court of Florida in Russell found petitioner's argument
"utterly devoid of merit."'" The court observed that "the right to practice
law in State courts is not a privilege granted under the Federal Constitu-
tion."38  The court further held that its Bar examination policy did not
violate federal guarantees of due process and equal protection.3 9
The Russell court reaffirmed the intimate connection between the
practice of law and the administration of justice. The court thus concluded:
"We see it clearly as our duty to admit to this special position of obligation
and trust only those applicants, whether from Florida schools or elsewhere,
who can satisfactorily demonstrate their credentials through a test of
competence given under our supervision and control."4
The General Bar Examination is administered by the FBOBE during
the last Tuesday and Wednesday of February and July of each year.4' Part
A of the examination is developed by the FBOBE and consists of a
combination of essay and multiple choice questions.4" Part B is the
Multistate Bar Examination ("MBE") and is developed by the National
Conference of Bar Examiners.43
Part A is divided into six segments which must always include one
segment on the Florida Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure." The
the court waived the requirements for law school graduation and submission to the Bar
examination. Id. The court did impose conditions for the protection of the public should Mr.
Hawkins decide to engage in the active practice of law. Id. at 639. Mr. Hawkins was later
disciplined by the court for incompetence and misconduct and was ultimately allowed to
resign from The Florida Bar in response to a misappropriation disciplinary action pending
against him. The Fla. Bar v. Hawkins, 467 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1985).
34. 236 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1970).
35. Id. at 767-68.
36. Id. at 768.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. In re Russell, 236 So. 2d at 768-69.
40. Id. at 769.
41. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMiss. RULE, art. VI, § 4.
42. Id. § l.a.
43. Id. §§ L.a., 3.c.
44. Id. § 3.c.
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remaining segments come from the following subjects: Florida Constitu-
tional Law, Federal Constitutional Law, Business Entities, Wills and
Administration of Estates, Trusts, Real Property, Evidence, Torts, Criminal
Law, Contracts, Family Law and Chapters 4 and 5 of the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar.45
The MBE consists of 200 multiple choice questions. It tests the
following areas: Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law, Evidence,
Real Property and Torts.46
Currently, the court requires a scaled score of 131 or better on the Bar
examination under the compensatory model or under the individual parts
from different administrations.47 Both parts of the General Bar Examina-
tion along with the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination must
be successfully completed within a period of twenty-five months or the older
scores are deleted.48 If not previously done, a Bar applicant must file an
Application for Admission to The Florida Bar (which initiates the character
and fitness background investigation) within 180 days of successfully
completing the Bar examination.49
Multiple calibrated readers are used to grade the essay answers "[t]o
assure maximum uniformity in all grading."5 °  Calibration is achieved
during a conference for the readers held the weekend following the Bar
examination. Calibration is the method for aligning multiple readers to
enable them to grade answers from the same essay question utilizing the
45. Id. Prior to 1988, Florida constitutional law had to be tested on each examination.
In accepting the Board's recommendation to move the subject of Florida constitutional law
from the mandatory list to the discretionary list, the Florida Supreme Court stated:
The single comment filed in response to the publication criticized the removal
of the mandatory requirement for testing Florida constitutional law separately on
each Bar examination. We agree that it is important for Florida lawyers to have
a knowledge of Florida constitutional law. However, we accept the representa-
tion of the Board that the proposed amendment would allow the Board greater
flexibility in testing Florida constitutional law by permitting it to be included
with another area on the same essay question, thereby producing higher quality
questions on the subject.
In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners re Amendment to Rules of Sup. Ct. of Fla. Relating to
Admissions to the Bar, 524 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1988).
46. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, 1993 MBE INFORMATION BOOKLET
(1992). The MBE is "designed to be answered by applying fundamental legal principles
rather than local case or statutory law." Id. at 2.
47. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art. Vl, § 7.
48. Id. § 9.a.
49. Id. § 9.b.
50. Id. § 7.b.
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same grading criteria.
In Florida, unsuccessful examinees do not have the right to full review
of their examination papers. This rule complies with controlling law in that
Florida grants unsuccessful examinees the unlimited right to retake the
examination:" "The courts have held that if a state provides the unquali-
fied opportunity to retake the Bar examination, no other type of hearing or
review procedure is necessary to comply with due process.' 52
III. REQUIREMENTS OF CHARACTER AND FITNESS
No person shall be recommended by the Florida Board of Bar Examin-
ers to the Supreme Court of Florida for admission to The Florida Bar
unless such person first produces satisfactory evidence to the Board of
good moral character and an adequate knowledge of the standards and
ideals of the profession and that such person is otherwise fit to take the
oath and perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney. 3
In Florida Board of Bar Examiners re G. W.L., 4 the Supreme Court
of Florida confronted the issue of defining the phrase "good moral charac-
ter."" The court concluded that good moral character should not be
restricted to acts involving moral turpitude. Such a restricted definition
"would not sufficiently protect the public interest."56 After observing that
"the unscrupulous attorney ... [has] frequent opportunities to defraud the
client or obstruct the judicial process," the Florida Supreme Court held that
the appropriate standard of inquiry into good moral character should
5 1. See Jones v. Board of Comm'rs of the Ala. State Bar, 737 F.2d 996, 1005 n. I (11 th
Cir. 1984) (Hatchett, J., dissenting); cf Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1103 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976) (discussing Georgia Bar Examination).
52. Bailey v. Board of Law Examiners, 508 F. Supp. 106, 110 (W.D. Tex. 1980). As
observed by one court: "Even making the generous assumption that one out of every
hundred applicants who take the examination fail when they should have passed due to
arbitrary grading, the probability that the same individual would be the victim of error after
two reexaminations is literally one in a million." Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1104.
53. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMIss. RULE, art. II, § 2.a.
54. 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
55. Id. The historical understanding of moral turpitude was expressed in State ex rel.
Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 146 So. 660, 661 (Fla. 1933) as that which "involves the idea of
inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man
or by man to society."
56. G.W.L., 364 So. 2d at 458.
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emphasize "honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others. 57 The
court has recognized "that the standard of conduct required of an applicant
for admission to the Bar must have a rational connection to the applicant's
fitness to practice law."58
A. Ineligibility
The Supreme Court of Florida has imposed a judicial disability for a
convicted felon who desires to practice law in Florida.5 9 A convicted
felon's civil rights must be restored as "a necessary prerequisite to obtaining
the privilege of practicing law."6  As the court has reasoned: "If one is
ineligible to vote or hold public office in Florida, then he should not be
eligible for admission to The Florida Bar and thereby become an officer of
the courts of this State." 6'
Additionally, disbarred attorneys from a foreign jurisdiction are
ineligible for a minimum period of five years from. the date of their
disbarment.62 Suspended attorneys are also ineligible to seek admission until
57. Id. Justice Frankfurter expressed the legal profession's demand for moral character
among its members in the following language:
Certainly since the time of Edward I, through all the vicissitudes of seven
centuries of Anglo-American history, the legal profession has played a role all
its own. The Bar has not enjoyed prerogatives; it has been entrusted with
anxious responsibilities. One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast
of after-dinner speeches to affirm that all the interests of man that are comprised
under the constitutional guarantees given to "life, liberty and property" are in the
professional keeping of lawyers. It is a fair characterization of the lawyer's
responsibility in our society that he stands "as a shield," to quote Devlin, J., in
defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with such
responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth- speaking, of a
high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described
as "moral character."
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
58. G.W.L.: 364 So. 2d at 458.
59. See The Fla. Bar v. Clark, 359 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1978); In re Fla. Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966).
60. Clark, :359 So. 2d at 864.
61. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 350 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (Fla. 1977).
62. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art. 111, § 2.f. The minimum five-year period
of disqualification was selected to coincide with the disqualification period for disbarred
Florida attorneys. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: Amendment to Rules of the Sup. Ct. of
Fla. Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 578 So. 2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1991). If a foreign
jurisdiction indefinitely disbars an attorney, then such attorney will be prohibited from
practicing law in Florida as long as the disbarment continues. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners
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the expiration of their period of suspension.63 A person must be at least
eighteen years of age to be recommended for admission to The Florida
Bar.64
B. Background Investigation
Without exception, the FBOBE "shall conduct an investigation and
otherwise inquire into and determine the character, fitness and general
qualifications of every applicant."65 The FBOBE is authorized to obtain
by subpoena such information as necessary to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion."
In conducting its investigation, the FBOBE uses an extensive program
of contacting primary and secondary sources. An average of thirty-five to
forty written inquiries are mailed out on each application. References,
former employers, and secondary sources listed by the first two sources are
among the individuals contacted. Follow-up contacts by letter or phone are
routinely done for sources who fail to respond or who express a reluctance
to respond fully. An absolute privilege is extended to communications from
individuals solicited by the FBOBE regarding the character and fitness of
a Bar applicant.67
re R.L.V.H., 587 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1991).
63. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMiSS. RULE, art. III, § 2.g.
64. Id. § 2.c. On the one occasion for the requirement to be applicable, the Bar
applicant had graduated from law school at age sixteen, had passed the Bar examination, and
was qualified for admission at age seventeen. Upon the entry of a court order removing the
applicant's disability of non-age, the FBOBE recommended, and the Florida Supreme Court
granted, his admission.
65. Id. § 3.a.
66. Id.
67. Dugas v. City of Harahan, La., 978 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub
non. Bougere v. Ferrara, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993). In that case, Gary Bougere (a former Bar
applicant) brought suit for defamation in federal district court in Louisiana against an
individual who had responded to the Board's inquiries regarding Bougere's fitness to be a
Florida attorney. Bougere eventually obtained ajury verdict awarding him $75,000 in actual
damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. In reversing the judgment and holding that the
communications to the Board were absolutely privileged, the United States Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reasoned that if individuals responding to the Board's inquiry "were not
absolutely immune from defamation liability for statements bearing upon a Bar applicant's
character and fitness, they would shrink from the Board's request for such information. In
that event, Florida's vitally important interest in ensuring an applicant's character and fitness
would be thwarted." Id. at 198.
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1. The Bar Application
The filing of the Application for Admission to The Florida Bar initiates
the background investigation.68 The application is currently thirteen pages
and contains thirty-three inquiries, including questions regarding such
matters as past residences, employment history, financial obligations,
litigation, criminal arrests, and traffic violations.69
The Bar application also elicits information concerning whether an
applicant has ever been dependent upon drugs or alcohol or has ever
obtained mental health treatment.7' The constitutionality of the Board's
inquiries into the area of an applicant's mental health survived a legal chal-
lenge based upon an applicant's claim of right of privacy.7'
In upholding the use of mental health related questions, the Supreme
Court of Florida reasoned:
It is imperative for the protection of the public that applicants to the Bar
be thoroughly screened by the Board. Necessarily, the Board must ask
questions in this screening process which are of a personal nature and
which would not otherwise be asked of persons not applying for a
position of public trust and responsibility. Because of a lawyer's
constant interaction with the public, a wide range of factors must be
considered which would not customarily be considered in the licensing
of tradesmen and businessmen. The inquiry into the applicant's past
history of regular treatment for emotional disturbance or nervous or
mental disorder . . . furthers the legitimate state interest since mental
fitness and emotional stability are essential to the ability to practice law
in a manner not injurious to the public. The pressures placed on an
attorney are enormous and his mental and emotional stability should be
at such a level that he is able to handle his responsibilities.72
The court further found that the use of such inquiry was the least intrusive
68. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMIss. RULE, art. IV, § 6.
69. See Application for Admission to The Fla. Bar. Applicants who are admitted to
practice in another jurisdiction are required to respond to several additional inquiries. Id.
70. See id. Regarding an applicant's mental and emotional fitness to practice law, the
FBOBE recognizes the beneficial aspects of mental health treatment. A prelude to the mental
health inquiries on the Bar application states in part: "The Board assures each applicant that
the Supreme Court, consequent upon the Board's recommendation, regularly admits
applicants with a history of both mental ill-health and utilization of the services of mental
health professions .... The Board encourages applicants to seek the assistance of mental
health professionals, if needed." Id.
71. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
72. Id. at 75.
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method to achieve Florida's compelling state interest of licensing only fit
individuals in the practice of law.73
2. Confidentiality
It is undisputed that the FBOBE gains access to highly sensitive
information from disclosures by Bar applicants and from third parties.
Information maintained by the FBOBE is actually the property of the
Supreme Court of Florida.7 4 The court has declared such information to
be confidential except as otherwise authorized.75
The desire to keep confidential the personal information supplied by a
Bar applicant to the FBOBE is apparent. Such confidentiality hopefully
encourages applicants to make full and fair disclosures of all information
requested by the Bar application.
The need for confidentiality of information received from third party
sources is essential if the FBOBE is to continue to conduct a thorough
background investigation of Bar applicants. The Supreme Court of Florida
recognized such need in its unanimous decision in Florida Board of Bar
Examiners re: Interpretation of Article I, Section 14d of the Rules of the
Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar.
7 6
In that case, an interpretation was sought by the FBOBE in response
to an order by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida requiring production by the FBOBE of confidential information and
documents to a former Bar applicant.77 The federal district court had
interpreted a provision of the Florida Supreme Court's rule on confidentiali-
ty to authorize disclosure to a Bar applicant "any documents or exhibits
which are before the Board and which are used by the Board at, or as a
basis for, an investigative hearing.""
In its decision, the Supreme Court of Florida expressly rejected the
federal court's interpretation.79 The court held that the FBOBE's raw
investigative materials and staff prepared reports are not disclosable to a Bar
73. Id.
74. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMIss. RULE, art I, § 14. The Board serves as the custodian
of all the records on behalf of the Court. Id.
75. Id.
76. 581 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1991).
77. Id. The underlying federal suit was brought by former Bar applicant Gary Bougere.
See supra note 67.
78. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: Interpretation ofArticle 1, Section 14d of the Rules
of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 581 So. 2d at 896.
79. Id. at 897.
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applicant. The court reasoned "that unless the board's investigative files are
held in confidence, many of those from whom the board seeks information
concerning applicants would be unwilling to candidly respond."8
3. Truthfulness and Absolute Candor
Courts have recognized that honesty, truthfulness, and candor are
essential qualities for individuals wishing to practice law. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland observed that "no moral character qualification for Bar
membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.""1  The
Supreme Court of Delaware acknowledged that although "[g]ood moral
character has many attributes, ...none are more important than honesty
and candor."32  The Supreme Court of New Jersey enumerated the
character traits required of each Bar applicant including "honesty and
truthfulness, trustworthiness and reliability."83
Beginning in 1991, the Supreme Court of Florida has issued several
published opinions which have emphasized the importance of an applicant's
duty to be truthful and candid with the Board. 4 As the court emphatically
stated in one decision: "This Court will not tolerate a lack of candor from
Bar applicants."85 A Bar applicant's lack of veracity or candor is sufficient
grounds to warrant denial of admission to The Florida Bar.86
In addition to reflecting negatively upon a Bar applicant's character and
truthfulness, a lack of candor also adversely impacts the Board's screening
process. As observed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in In re
Application of Jenkins:7
We believe that Jenkins' pattern of nondisclosure evidences a serious
lack of fitness to practice law. Jenkins' actions go to the integrity of
the admission system. If a candidate conceals the truth or misleads the
80. Id.
81. Application of Allan S., 387 A.2d 271, 275 (Md. 1978).
82. In re Green, 464 A.2d 881, 885 (Del. 1983) (emphasis added).
83. In re Application of Matthews, 462 A.2d 165, 174 (N.J. 1983).
84. See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re R.B.R., 609 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 1992)
[hereinafter R.B.R.]; In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: J.A.F., 587 So. 2d 1309 (Fla.
1991) [hereinafter JAF.]; Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re J.H.K., 581 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1991)
[hereinafter J.H.F.]; Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re R.D.I., 581 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1991)
[hereinafter R.D.I.].
85. R.B.R., 609 So. 2d at 1304.
86. J.H.K., 581 So. 2d at 39 ("We further agree that the evidence of good character and
rehabilitation presented by petitioner did not sufficiently offset his lack of veracity.").
87. 467 A.2cd 1084 (N.J. 1983).
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Committee concerning events in his past that adversely affect his
character, the process for reviewing candidates will collapse and no
purpose will be served. The purpose of withholding certifications is not
to punish the candidate but to protect the public and preserve the
integrity of the Courts."
C. Formal Proceedings
After completing its investigation of a Bar applicant, which may
include the applicant's appearance at an investigative hearing,89 the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners can either determine that the applicant has
established the necessary qualifications for admission to The Florida Bar;
that further investigation is necessary; or file specifications charging the
applicant with matters that would preclude the applicant from admission to
The Florida Bar.9" "Specifications" is the term for the document which
contains formal allegations of misconduct which, if proven, could result in
an unfavorable recommendation by the Board.9
1. Formal Hearings
Applicants who have had specifications served upon them are entitled
to a formal hearing before a panel of no less than five members of the
FBOBE. Except with the applicant's consent, the hearing panel cannot
include any member who previously participated in an investigative hearing
for such applicant.92
Formal hearings are adversary proceedings. Applicants appearing for
a formal hearing are entitled to the following rights: representation by legal
counsel, timely release of witness and exhibit lists by the FBOBE's attorney,
access to the FBOBE's subpoena powers, cross-examination of witnesses
called by the FBOBE's attorney, and presentation of witnesses and exhibits
on the applicant's behalf.9 3 The technical rules of evidence are not
88. Id. at 1090.
89. Investigative hearings are held before at least three members of the Board.
Following an investigative hearing, the panel makes its recommendation to the full Board as
to what action should be taken. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art. Ill, § 3.a.
90. Id. §§ 3.b.(l), (2), (3). See also infranotes 121-124 and accompanying text regard-
ing conditional admissions.
91. FLA. Sup. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art 111, § 3.b.(3).
92. Id. § 3.f.
93. See Florida Bd of Bar Examiners re: Interpretation of Article I, Section 14d of the
Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 581 So. 2d at 897.
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applicable to a formal hearing before the FBOBE.94
Following the receipt of evidence and argument by the parties, the
formal hearing panel enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
panel's decision must be based upon the evidence introduced into the record.
In addition to recommendations for or against the applicant's admission, the
panel may withhold its final decision for further evidence of rehabilitation95
or petition the Supreme Court of Florida for additional time to conduct
further investigation.96
2. Burden of Proof
The controlling principles regarding the burden of proof in Bar
admission proceedings were discussed by the court in Coleman v. Watts.97
In that case, the FBOBE notified the applicant of its decision that "he did
not meet the requirements for admission to The Florida Bar."98  The
Board's notice failed to specify any grounds for its unfavorable decision.
The Coleman court recognized the burden of Bar applicants to produce
satisfactory evidence of their character'and fitness. Once an applicant makes
a prima facie showing, however, the burden of coming forward with
evidence shifts to the FBOBE.99
In holding that the procedure used by the FBOBE failed to provide due
process, the Coleman Court held:
[lit is incumbent upon the board to sustain its ruling by record evidence
and not by mere assertions that it is possessed of confidential informa-
tion which shows the applicant to be unfit; and if the record consists
only of evidence supplied by the applicant, then such evidence must
demonstrate that the board's dissatisfaction with his application rests on
valid grounds and not upon mere suspicion.'n0
Although its decision must be supported by record evidence, the
FBOBE's findings need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' The
94. FLA. SIP. CT. BAR ADMiSS. RULE, art. III, § 3.f.
95. Id. § 3.f.(4).
9 6 . Id . § 3 .1 y '
97. 81 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1955).
98. Id. at 6,51.
99. Id. at 655.
100. Id.
101. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: L.K.D., 397 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1981)
[hereinafter L.K.D.].
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standard of proof for the Board often articulated by the Florida Supreme
Court is one of "competent and substantial evidence.' 0, 2 As any other
trier of fact, the Board may rely upon circumstantial evidence," 3 and may
accept or reject the testimony of a witness or applicant."4
3. Review by the Supreme Court of Florida
A Bar applicant who receives an unfavorable recommendation has a
right of review by the Florida Supreme Court." 5 In conducting such
review, the court is not precluded "from reviewing the factual underpinnings
of [the FBOBE's] recommendation, based on an independent review of the
record developed at the hearings."' 6
The Court has also recognized differing standards applicable to Bar
admission proceedings and disciplinary proceedings. 7  Thus, a Bar
applicant is held to a higher standard of character and fitness than a
practicing attorney.'0° Furthermore, denial of admission to The Florida
Bar is not the same as disbarment." 9 After two years from the issuance
of the Board's recommendation, an applicant may reseek admission upon a
showing of rehabilitation.'
4. Rehabilitation
In response to specifications, or when seeking readmission after having
been previously denied, a Bar applicant is permitted to present evidence of
rehabilitation.' Rehabilitative evidence is permissible to address the
102. See, e.g., R.B.R., 609 So. 2d at 1304; JA.F., 587 So. 2d at 1311; Florida Bd. of
Bar Examiners re H.H.S., 373 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1979) [hereinafter H.H.S.].
103. See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re C.W.G., 617 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla.
1993) [hereinafter C.W.G.]; R.D.I., 581 So. 2d at 29.
104. See R.D.I., 581 So. 2d at 30 (The court stated, "[T]he Board did not have to
believe the petitioner's version of events.").
105. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art. III, § 4.b.
106. L.K.D., 397 So. 2d at 675 (citations omitted).
107. H.H.S., 373 So. 2d at 892.
108. Id.; Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7, 9 n.l (Fla. 1978). For
a discussion of the rationale for a higher standard for Bar applicants, see Frasher v. West
Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 408 S.E.2d 675, 680 (W. Va. 1991).
109. H.H.S., 373 So. 2d at 892.
110. See C.W.G., 617 So. 2d at 305; H.H.S., 373 So. 2d at 892; FLA. SUP. CT. BAR
ADMISS. RULE, art. III, § 4.d.
I II. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISs. RULE, art. III, § 4.e.
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issue of "an applicant's present fitness to practice law."'1 2 Evidence of
rehabilitation must be clear and convincing." 3  As observed by the
Supreme Court of Oregon:
[T]his court's primary responsibility is to the public, to see that those
who are admitted to the Bar have the sense of ethical responsibility and
the maturity of character to withstand the many temptations which they
will confront in the practice of law. If we are not convinced that an
applicant can withstand these temptations, we would be remiss to admit
the applicant. Doubt of consequence must be resolved in favor of the
protection of the public." 4
Florida provides Bar applicants with specific guidance on what is
required to establish rehabilitation." 5 Such requirements include positive
contributions to society." 6 "The requirement of positive action is appro-
priate for applicants for admission to the Bar because service to one's
community is an implied obligation of members of the Bar."
'
"
17
If the evidence of rehabilitation is convincing, then admission to the
Bar is appropriate regardless of the seriousness of the past misconduct."'
Thus, a convicted drug dealer who has demonstrated full rehabilitation
"should not be denied the privilege of practicing law solely because of a
past mistake which is no longer relevant to the issue of his admission to the
Bar."'' 9 However, as one court recognized: "[I]n the case of extremely
damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation may be virtually
impossible to make."' 2°
5. Conditional Admission
Alarmed by the growing number of applicants with psychiatric, drug
and alcohol problems, the FBOBE undertook an in-depth study of this area
during the spring and summer of 1985. The FBOBE sought and received
professional advice from experts in the area of substance abuse. The
112. Matthews, 462 A.2d at 176.
113. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. RULE, art. 111, § 4.e.
114. In re Taylor, 647 P.2d 462, 467 (Or. 1982).
115. FLA. SUP. CT BAR ADMIss. RULE, art. Ill, § 4.e.
116. See id. § 4.e.(7).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., In re Diez-Arguelles, 401 So. 2d 1347, 1350 (Fla. 1981).
119. Id.
120. Matthews, 462 A.2d at 176.
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FBOBE's efforts culminated in February, 1986 with the submission of a
proposed rule change for the court's consideration.
The FBOBE's proposal sought approval from the court to establish a
program of conditional admission to the Bar for applicants with a history of
alcohol or drug abuse, or a history of a serious psychological disorder. In
support of its proposal, the Board reasoned in part:
In dealing with applicants who have experienced drug or alcohol-related
problems or serious psychological disorders, the Board must be
conscious of both the rights of the individual applicant and the
protection of the public interest. Unrestricted admission of such an
applicant can have catastrophic consequences. A client's legal affairs,
funds and even personal liberty are all jeopardized by the actions of an
impaired attorney. However, the wholesale denial of applicants with
these problems is not an acceptable solution.' 2'
After requesting and subsequently receiving a mutually agreeable
proposal from the FBOBE and The Florida Bar, the Supreme Court of
Florida approved the conditional program on December 4, 1986.22 Since
1985, after recommendations by FBOBE, the court has approved over 135
confidential conditional admissions. 1
23
Florida has led the country with its progressive program of conditional
admission. As observed by the Chair of the National Conference of Bar
Examiners: "It is time that appropriate Bar admission authorities in other
states recognize the need for conditional licensing."' 24
IV. CONCLUSION
The Bar admissions process in Florida is not static. Members of the
FBOBE are appointed for terms of limited duration to insure that "new
views" will be presented to and considered by the full membership on a
continuing basis. 125 The inclusion of public members on the FBOBE has
121. Pet. of FBOBE for Amend. of the R., Exhibit "A" at 4, February 13, 1986, Sup.
Ct. of Fla. Case No. 68,307.
122. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiner for Amendment of the Rules of the Sup. Ct. of
Fla. Relating to Admission to the Bar, 498 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1986).
123. For a discussion of the appropriate sanction for an attorney who violates the terms
of her conditional admission, see The Florida Bar v. Roberts, 626 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1993).
124. Stuart Duhl, Letter from the Chair, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1992, at 3.
125. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMIss. RULE, art. I, § 3.b.
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expanded such views to include the perspective of the nonlawyer. The new
views of the Supreme Court of Florida and the FBOBE are reflected in the
investigative and adjudicatory functions pertaining to a Bar applicant's
character and fitness. Thus, the past issue of an applicant's sexual
orientation has been relegated to an institutional memory.'26
Other issues such as alcoholism, drug addiction, and mental illness are
no longer overlooked or minimized, but are "directly confronted" through
reasonable inquiries, professional evaluations, and conditional admis-
sions.'27 While the old issues of honesty, truthfulness, and candor have
been clarified and re-emphasized,' 28 the relatively new issue of financial
responsibility continues to evolve.' 29
On the horizon, new issues await consideration by the Florida Supreme
Court and the FBOBE. Due to advances in technology, computer testing for
professional licensure is quickly becoming a reality. It appears the question
is no longer if, but when, as to the development of a computer adaptive
version of the Bar examination. A proposal has also been made by the
former president of the American Bar Association which would permit law
students to sit for the Bar examination. 130
Throughout these changing times, the Florida Supreme Court and the
FBOBE will continue to fulfill their "constitutional responsibility to protect
the public by taking necessary action to ensure that the individuals who are
admitted to practice law will be honest and fair and will not thwart the
126. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners reN.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (Fla. 1981) (The
court stated "'[P]rivate noncommercial sex acts between consenting adults are not relevant to
prove fitness to practice law."). See also Eimers, 358 So. 2d at 9.
127. See supra notes 121-126 and accompanying text. In The Fla. Bar v. Larkin, 420
So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1982). the Florida Supreme Court "directly confronted" the issue of
alcoholism among the Bar's membership:
Too often, attorneys will recognize that a colleague suffers from alcohol abuse,
but will ignore the problem because they do not want to hurt the individual or
his or her family. This attitude can have disastrous results both for the public
and for the individual attorney. If alcoholism is dealt with properly, not only
will an attorney's clients and the public be protected, but the attorney may be
able to be restored as a fully contributing member of the legal profession. This
court has responsibility to assure that the public is fully protected from attorney
misconduct.
Id.
128. See R.B.R., 609 So. 2d at 1302; JAF., 587 So. 2d at 1309; J.H.K., 581 So. 2d at
37; R.D.I., 581 So. 2d at 27; see also supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
129. See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re S.M.D., 609 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1992).
130. Talbot D'Alemberte, Remarks. B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1992, at 28.
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administration of justice."'' As stated on the seal of the FBOBE:
"Clemens iustitiae custodia.11 3
2
131. G.W.L., 364 So. 2d at 458.
132. Closely translated, the Latin phrase means: "Compassionate and vigilant protection
of justice."
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I. INTRODUCTION
"There shall be a district court of appeal serving each appellate district
[of Florida]."'
"The laws of [Florida] ... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 2
The Rules of Decision Act,3 the principles of the Erie doctrine,4 and
the Constitution of the United States require that federal courts apply state
law in many situations. Perhaps the most familiar of these situations is one
in which federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Moreover,
1. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(a).
2. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
3. Id.
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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state property law may be applied in cases in federal courts dealing with
federal tax consequences.5 State law may determine the content of a
federal right in actions arising under bankruptcy law,6 or in copyright law,7
even though the federal courts' jurisdiction in such cases is exclusive.8
The "laws of the several states" that are to "be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply,"9 include not only state constitutions and legislative enactments
but also judicial decisions.'" The process by which a federal court deter-
mines the content of state law on a particular issue has been discussed in
numerous federal decisions and secondary commentaries." Where the
source of applicable state law is a state constitution or statute the process
may not be difficult. 2 Where the highest court of a state has spoken
clearly on a matter of state common law, the process may not be difficult.
Where the only source of state law is a decision or decisions of one or more
state intermediate appellate courts, the process is quite difficult. How does
and should a federal court proceed when attempting to ascertain "the law of
Florida" when the only source of that law is from one or more of Florida's
District Courts of Appeal? How do the structure of the Florida judiciary
and the precedential value accorded by Florida state courts to district court
decisions affect federal courts' application of Florida law? Where the
Florida district courts of appeal disagree within or among themselves, is
there a "law of Florida" on point, or is Florida comprised of several sub-
states with different laws on the same subject applying in different
geographical areas of Florida? For that matter, how are Florida trial courts
or courts of appeal to decide what is Florida law when faced with conflict-
ing precedent? Where federal courts must apply unsettled Florida law, is
certification by the eleventh circuit to the Supreme Court of Florida the final
or appropriate solution? Should the Florida Constitution be amended to
provide for more uniformity of state law?
The authors will explore these questions. We presuppose a working
5. E.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Blair v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 5, 8-10 (1937).
6. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1091-95 (7th Cir. 1987).
7. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1338 (1988).
9. Id. § 1652.
10. Erie, 304 U.S. at 64.
11. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT., THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (4th ed. 1983) and
sources cited therein.
12. Of course, state judicial decisions interpreting state constitutions or statutes may
create the same problems as pure state common law.
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knowledge of the general concept of stare decisis, used here synonymously
with precedent, as the principle that a court will stand by its own decisions
as well as by those of a higher court in a given judicial hierarchy. 13 Yet
the modem concept of stare decisis does not mean that a point of law once
decided is settled for all time. Stare decisis simply means that a decision
will be followed, distinguished, or overruled by the deciding or coordinate
court, as well as followed by lower courts in the same judicial system (until
that decision is reversed or overruled by a higher court).
Part II will explain the structure of the Florida judiciary and set forth
the status quo in terms of the precedential value accorded by Florida courts
to decisions of the Florida District Courts of Appeal. Part III will examine
the general "Erie" problem, including the early history of the doctrine and
the doctrine as it was later reformed. The choice of law and forum
shopping issues raised by the Erie doctrine will be examined not only as to
interstate choice of law issues, but also as to intrastate choice of law. We
will analyze a remarkable-debate between two federal judges in Illinois that
raised problems pertinent to Florida federal judges and litigants. Addition-
ally, the Eleventh Circuit position regarding how federal judges should
determine the content of Florida law will be discussed. Part IV will
recommend amendment of article V, section 4, of the Florida Constitution
to achieve statewide precedential effect for the decisions of the courts of
appeal.
13. The full phrase is stare decisis et non quieta movere: "[tlo adhere to precedents, and
not to unsettle things which are established." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed.
1990). "This doctrine embodies a judicial policy that a 'determination of a point of law by
a court will generally be followed by a court of the same . . . rank if a subsequent case
presents the same legal problem, although different parties are involved in the subsequent
case."' Brewer's Dairy v. Dolloff, 268 A.2d 636, 638 (Me. 1970) (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Courts § 183 (1966)).
The Supreme Court of the United States gives several reasons for the policy of
adhering to precedents:
Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the
conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against
untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication
by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and
the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of
impersonal and reasoned judgments.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
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II. STARE DECISIS: FLORIDA COURTS' TREATMENT OF DECISIONS
OF DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL
A. Structure of the Florida Judicial System
The Florida District Courts of Appeal have been constitutionally sepa-
rate, distinct courts 4 since 1956, when the constitution first authorized
appellate level of the state judiciary." In contrast to states with a unitary
system comprising a single intermediate appellate court sitting in districts,
divisions, or panels, Florida's judicial structure is analogous to the federal
judicial system, with separate courts of appeal.' 6 There are five district
courts of appeal, with headquarters in Tallahassee (First District), Lakeland
(Second District), Dade County (Third District), Palm Beach County (Fourth
District), and Daytona Beach (Fifth District). 7 Each district court of
appeal has its own chief judge," its own clerk,' 9 its own marshal, 20 and
its own official identifying seal.2' The geography of the five appellate
districts is shown on a map at appendix A to this article.
The foundation for understanding the Florida judicial system is the
recognition of its uniqueness. In many respects, the district courts of appeal
are courts of last resort, not intermediate appellate courts,22 because the
jurisdiction of the supreme court to review district court decisions is
extremely limited.23 The supreme court's mandatory jurisdiction to review
14. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(a) provides: "There shall be a district court of appeal
serving each appellate district."
15. Id. § I (amended 1956).
16. See generally MARLIN 0. OsTHus & MAYO H. STIEGLER, STATE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURTS 12-15 (1980) (discussing structure of intermediate appellate courts).
17. FLA. STAT. § 35.05 (1991).
18. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(c); FLA. STAT. § 35.12 (1991).
19. FLA. CONST, art. V, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. § 35.21 (1991).
20. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. § 35.26 (1991).
21. FLA. STAT. § 35.09 (1991). "Each district court of appeal shall have an official
identifying seal as prescribed by the supreme court." Id.
22. "The jurisdictional structure of Florida's appellate courts is unique." State v.
Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991),jurisdictionaccepted,602 So.
2d 942 (Fla. 1992).
23. Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1363 (Fla. 1980) (England, C.J., concurring
specially); Ben F. Overton, District Courts of Appeal: Courts of Final Jurisdiction with Two
New Responsibilities-An Expanded Power to Certify Questions and Authority to Sit En Banc,
35 U. FLA. L. REV. 80, 80 n.5 (1983); John M. Scheb, Florida's Courts of Appeal:
Intermediate Courts Become Final, 13 STETSON L. REV. 479, 480 (1984); see generally
Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Among and Within Florida's District Courts of Appeal, 18 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 143 (1990) [hereinafter Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida](discussing Florida's
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district court decisions is limited to decisions declaring invalid a state statute
or a provision of the state constitution.24 The supreme court's discretion-
ary jurisdiction to review district court decisions is limited by article V,
sections 3(b)(3) and (b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, which provide that
the supreme court:
(3) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly
declares valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of
the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of
constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts
with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme
court on the same question of law.
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes
upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that
is certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another
district court of appeal.2"
A district court of appeal that renders a decision in conflict with that of
another district court may prevent review by the supreme court by declining
to state or "express" in the opinion that the decision "directly" conflicts (for
(b)(3) jurisdiction), or declining to certify that the decision is in "direct
conflict" (for (b)(4) jurisdiction).26 Furthermore, a decision of a district
court creates precedent. As one district court opinion said, "[w]e are one
state with five districts, each of which is authorized to separately evaluate
the merits of various legal rules and create legal precedent."27
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized the precedent-creating
function of district courts of appeal: "[T]he decisions of the district courts
of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by
unique appellate court structure).
24. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
25. Id. § 3(b)(3), (b)(4) (emphasis added).
26. Victor Lance, Note, The District Courts of Appeal-After 1980 Jurisdictional
Amendment: A New Obligation Toward Decisional Harmony, 6 NOVA L. REV. 115 (1981);
see generally Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147 (1980) (discussing the features of the
amendment). "Section 3(b)(3) now places an increased obligation on district court judges
who again have some ability to control a party's right to supreme court review." Id. at 181.
27. Bamber, 592 So. 2d at 1132.
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this Court .. ."" The operation of district court decisions as precedent
must be examined from two perspectives: (1) because the precedent-
creating courts are multiple, not unitary, their decisions must be examined
on a horizontal plane. Is the decision of one district court of appeal binding
on another?; (2) because the precedent-creating courts sit in separate
districts, their decisions must be examined on a vertical plane. On what
courts below a district court of appeal is its decision binding?
B. Horizontal Stare Decisis
The freedom of a district court of appeal to disregard the decision of
a "sister" district court is well established among the district courts 29 and
approved in dicta by the supreme court." A refusal to accept coordinate
precedent may follow a hat-tipping statement that the coordinate court's
decision is "entitled to great weight,"'" or a less deferential statement that
the decision is "merely persuasive. 3 2 But the bottom line over the years
consistently has been that district courts are not bound and decline to follow
other district court decisions. This is not to say that one district never
follows the decisions of another. Rather, the district courts have followed
28. Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980). The Stanfill court cited Johnsv.
Wainwright, 253 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1971), and Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810
(Fla. 1958), which state that district courts were never intended to be intermediate courts and
that district court decisions are, typically, final and absolute. The Stanfill phrase in the text
was quoted in Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985), and most recently in
Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992).
29. Cases cited and discussed in Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 150
n.38. More recent cases refusing to follow a conflicting decision of a coordinate district
court include: State v. Dorian, 619 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Agee, 588 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991), decision approved, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1993); State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 199 1),] urisdiction
accepted,602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992), disagreedwith, State v. Thomas, 604 So. 2d 1277 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Pardo, 582 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991), approved in part and quashed in part, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992); Pimm v. Pimm,
568 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ("declin[ing] to follow" Third District
decision, case certified as of great public importance), decision approved, 601 So. 2d 534
(Fla. 1992); Durham v. Palm Court, Inc., 558 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Forster v. Durham, 566 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1990); Dealers Ins. Co. v. Jon
Hall Chevrolet Co., 547 So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
30. Weiman, 470 So. 2d at 684.
31. E.g., Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731, 735 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1964), modified on other grounds, 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
32. E.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Department of Transp., 535 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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cases from other districts that they deemed persuasive and have rejected
cases with which they disagreed without any suggestion that the later
decision overrules the earlier. 33 The "law of the district" notion is as en-
trenched in Florida as is the "law of the circuit" in the federal system. The
perceived safety net is the supreme court's discretionary jurisdiction to
resolve conflicts between districts, should an aggrieved party so choose and
be financially able to seek such review. A wise man once cautioned that
rules recognizing the existence of conflicts among intermediate courts as a
ground for review by a top court "were designed to eliminate conflicts, not
to stimulate them. 34
The supreme court has said little about conflicts among districts, but in
1985 the court implied that a decision of one district does not bind another.
The court said that a district court's opinion has "a binding effect on all
Florida trial courts [but] . . .a persuasive effect on sister district courts. '35
More recently, the supreme court quoted with approval a district court's
statement that "a sister district's opinion is merely persuasive. 36
C. Vertical Stare Decisis
Fundamental to the operation of a common-law judicial system is the
trial courts' understanding of what precedent they must follow. For thirty-
six years after Florida initiated a three-tiered judicial structure, no clear
statewide authority existed on the issue of which trial courts were bound by
which appellate decisions; however, in 1992, the supreme court spoke
directly and laid the matter to rest, at least partially.37 All Florida trial
courts are bound by the decision of any district court that does not conflict
with another district court decision.38 If the court of appeal of the district
in which the trial court sits has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to
follow its rule, whether or not the rule conflicts with a decision of another
district court.39 Still unanswered is what course of action a trial court
should take where other district courts are in conflict on an issue and the
33. See supra note 29.
34. Walter Schaefer, Foreword: Stare Decisis and the "Law of the Circuit," 28 DE
PAUL L. REV. 565, 566 (1979). Walter Schaefer is a former Justice of the Supreme Court
of Illinois.
35. Weiman, 470 So. 2d at 684.
36, Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 667 (quoting State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1976).
37, Id. at 665.
38. Id. at 666.
39. Id. at 666-67.
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trial court's own district is undecided.
In 1976, twenty years after the constitutional revision establishing the
district courts of appeal,40 the Fourth District Court of Appeal first
addressed the issue of vertical stare decisis. 41 In State v. Hayes,42 Chief
Judge Walden "flatly stat[ed] that a Circuit Court wheresoever situate [sic]
in Florida is equally bound by a decision of a District Court of Appeal
regardless of its appellate district," absent a conflicting decision from the
trial court's own court of appeal.43 Later that same year, the First District
Court of Appeal reached the opposite result in Smith v. Venus Condominium
Ass'n,44 holding that trial courts are bound only by decisions of the court
of appeal of the district in which the trial courts are located.45 Chief Judge
Boyer, in Venus Condominium, reasoned that requiring trial courts to follow
decisions of sister courts of appeal "could lead to utter chaos were two of
our sister courts to be in conflict on a point of law raised in a trial court in
this district."46 He further pointed out that it would be "anomalous" for
the First District Court of Appeal to reverse a trial court's decision not to
follow a decision of a sister district court with which the First District Court
disagreed.47
The opinions in Hayes and Venus Condominium reveal jurisprudential
differences about the appropriate function of trial judges. Chief Judge
Walden in Hayes emphasized that in order to preserve harmony, stability,
and predictability in the law, trial courts must follow the holdings of higher
courts.48  Chief Judge Boyer in Venus Condominium commented: "The
fact is that trial courts, as appellate courts, have the duty and obligation to
follow [determine] and apply the law."49
Interestingly, the two conflicting district courts attempted to facilitate
40. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 4.
41. Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 51.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 52-53.
44. 343 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), quashed and remanded on other
grounds, 352 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1977) (stating nothing on the stare decisis point). Venus
Condominium rejected the idea of a trial court's being bound by decisions of other district
courts as "novel, though without merit." Id. at 1285. Hayes, decided six months earlier, was
not mentioned.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 52.
49. Venus Condominium, 343 So. 2d at 1285.
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supreme court review in each of the cases." In the earlier opinion of
Hayes the court said:
Since the state suggests that there is confusion and uncertainty
abroad among the circuit courts as to whether they are bound to follow
the decision of a foreign District Court of Appeal (a suggestion which
surprises us), and since under that rationale Circuit Courts in the First,
Second and Third Appellate Districts would not feel bound by this
instant decision, we do hereby offer upon appropriate application to
certify the question contained in Point I as being one of great public
interest.5'
In the later opinion of Venus Condominium, on petition for rehearing, the
court certified that the decision passed upon a question of great public
interest.52 There is no subsequent history of the Hayes decision; however,
the supreme court did review the Venus Condominium decision without
commenting upon the stare decisis conflict with Hayes.53 It is folly to
assume that a conflict once created between or among districts will soon be
resolved by the supreme court. Some reasons for failure to resolve conflicts
are that: (1) parties run out of money or energy to litigate further; 4 (2)
they settle the dispute; or, (3) the supreme court refuses discretionary review
or does not address the pertinent conflict.
During the next sixteen years, the conflict persisted about which trial
courts were bound by which appellate decisions. The First District Court
remained firm in its position that trial courts within the first appellate district
were bound only by First District Court decisions and those of the supreme
50. Id.; Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 51.
51. Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 54.
52. Venus Condominium, 343 So. 2d at 1287 (referring to the substantive issue of the
case).
53. Smith v. Venus Condominium Ass'n, 352 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1977). The supreme
court accepted conflict jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) ofthe Florida Constitution
based on interdistrict conflict on the substantive point. Id. at 1170.
54. In his concurring opinion, Justice Adknis stated:
The district courts of appeal are frequently expressly recognizing in opinions that
a decision is in conflict with a sister district court. Unless one of the parties
brings a petition for certiorari to ... [the supreme court] the conflict remains in
the reported case law and the trial judge is faced with the dilemma of selecting
one of two conflicting district courts of appeal decisions as the proper case law.
The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d 1114, 1124 (Fla. 1984)
(Adkins, J., concurring).
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court.5  The Second5 6 and Fifth57 Districts joined the Fourth District"
in requiring trial courts to follow a decision of any district court where there
was no conflicting district decision. In 1992, the Third District joined the
First District in refusing to require trial courts to follow any but their "own"
district decisions. 9 In Pardo, the trial court concluded that it was required
to exclude a child victim's hearsay statements under the authority of a Fifth
601District decision" with which the trial court disagreed.6' Judge Cope,
writing for the Third District Court of Appeal, opined that the trial court
was under no obligation to follow decisions of districts other than the Third.
55. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1366, 1366 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985), affd, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986) (stating nothing on the stare decisis
point). The trial court sitting in the First District, where there was no decision on point, was
held to have acted correctly in rejecting recent, consistent Second and Third District cases.
Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, 497 So. 2d at 646.
56. Chapman v. Pinellas County, 423 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In
re E.B.L., 544 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); cf State v, Kopulos, 413 So.
2d 1195 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that trial courts must follow the decisions of
the district court in their territorial district where those decisions conflict with other district
decisions); State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), jurisdiction
accepted, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992); Pimm v. Pimm, 568 So. 2d 1299, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), decision approved, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
57. Dillon v. Chapman, 404 So. 2d 354, 359 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'don
other grounds, 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982); Dealers Ins. Co. v. Jon Hall Chevrolet Co., 547
So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that the trial judge acted correctly in
following a decision of the Third District, but reversing the judgment because the Fifth
District disagreed with that holding). In Jon Hall Chevrolet, the Fifth District expressly
noted a direct conflict with the Third District on a question of statutory interpretation and
constitutionality. Id. at 326-27. There is no subsequent history of the case.
58. Recent expressions of the position of the Fourth District are Durham v. Palm Court,
Inc., 558 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Forster v.
Durham, 566 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1990), which explained "[t]he Fourth District Court had not
spoken on this subject, and thus the trial court was bound by the First District's Gordon case
.... On the other hand, we are not bound by the Gordon decision and, in fact, we disagree
with it .... " and Dean v. Dean, 607 So. 2d 494, 499 n.6 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992),
review dismissed, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1993), which explained "[i]n the absence of
controlling precedent from its own district court, any trial court in Florida, irrespective of the
district in which it sits, is required to follow the decision of any other district court of appeal
in Florida."
59. State v. Pardo, 582 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), approved in part,
quashed in part, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992).
60. Kopko v. State, 577 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), quashed by Pardo
v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992). Kopko excluded the child victim's hearsay statements,
even though they satisfied Florida Statutes section 90.803(23), because the child was able to
testify fully at trial. Id. at 962.
61. Pardo, 582 So. 2d at 1226.
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[D]ecisions of other district courts of appeal should be treated by trial
courts in the same way that this court treats such decisions: as
persuasive authority, Such decisions are deserving of careful consider-
ation by trial courts in this district, but are not binding on them ....
The trial court's ultimate obligation is to ascertain and follow the
law. The interests of justice are best served where trial judges have the
opportunity and responsibility to reach a reasoned decision after
consideration of all pertinent authority. In the present case there were
sound reasons to disagree with the Kopko decision, and the trial court
was entitled to do so. 62
The Second District Court was aware that the Third District had just
freed its circuit courts to disregard precedent of other districts, when the
Second District decided Bamber.63 The Second District used Bamber to
"reaffirm [its] . . . conviction that the circuit courts within the Second
District must obey controlling precedent from the other districts."64  A
footnote following this quotation revealed how potentially divisive the issue
of vertical stare decisis had become:
Ironically, we reaffirm this belief by requiring our circuit courts to
follow a controlling precedent of the Third District, even though its
circuit courts are now free to disregard the otherwise controlling
precedent of this court. It has been suggested, perhaps facetiously, that
we should limit . . .[the Second District rule] so that circuit courts in
the Second District need only obey precedent from districts that
recognize the precedential effect of our reported cases. We decline to
create such a rule of inter-district renvoi. Hopefully, the formalized
rules governing conflicts of law can be limited to conflicts between
states.65
Judge Altenbernd, writing for Bamber, supported the decision for
broadcast vertical stare decisis on the bases of Florida's judicial structure
and the appropriate functioning of the tri-level courts within that state
structure.6 6 The judge pointed out that Florida is one state, albeit with five
districts. 67 The judge further noted that district courts do create precedent,
and if they create conflicts in the process the supreme court can resolve
62. Id. at 1227.
63. 592 So. 2d at 1129.
64. Id. at 1132.
65. Id. at 1132 n.2.
66. Id. at 1132.
67. Id.
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them.68 However, the function of trial courts is not to create precedent.69
A trial court's ruling is not
binding, even in the adjacent courtroom.... [N]o... [constitutional]
mechanism exists to resolve conflicts among hundreds of circuit court
judges. . . . [A] system in which trial courts were not bound by the
only Florida precedent on a question of law would be a system
promoting the rule of individual judges rather than the rule of law. At
best, it would tend to create five balkanized districts confederated into
a loose Floridian union.7"
The court further stated:
Floridians need to know, to the greatest extent possible, that trial courts
will apply the same law in Pensacola, Tampa, and Miami. Trial judges
are free to vigorously express their disagreement with controlling
precedent from other districts, but a workable system of jurisprudence
requires that they obey that precedent until their district creates
conflicting precedent.7'
Once again, Pardo and Bamber reveal jurisprudential differences about
the appropriate function of trial judges. Judge Altenbernd in Bamber, like
Chief Judge Walden in Hayes, emphasized that in order to preserve
harmony, stability, and predictability in the law, trial courts must follow the
holdings of higher courts. Judge Cope in Pardo, like Chief Judge Boyer in
Venus Condominium, expressed that trial judges should reach their own
reasoned decision, influenced by but without constraint from decisions of
other districts. The approach in Bamber tends toward a communitarian
model, emphasizing responsibility to the state judicial system as a whole, as
central to the realization of equal justice, even where the intellectual
proclivities of the individual judge may run contrary to a specific result.
The approach in Pardo tends toward rugged individualism, positing that the
ultimate good will result through decision-making according to the lights of
68. Bamber, 592 So. 2d at 1132. But cf supra text accompanying note 54.
69. Bamber, 592 So. 2d at 1132.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Second District Court went on to affirm the trial court's disobeying
precedent from another district because the Second District Court disagreed with the Third
District on the point of law (the validity of a no-knock search). Id. at 1131.
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each judge as a unit.72
The vertical stare decisis issue finally attracted the attention of the
supreme court when the Third District Court in Pardo certified an express
and direct conflict with Kopko on the issue of the admissibility of the child
victim's hearsay statements.73 The Pardo court further certified that it had
passed on a question of "great public importance., 74  The supreme court
accepted jurisdiction.75 Significantly, the supreme court found that in
addition to the substantive conflict about the admissibility of evidence, the
Third "[D]istrict [C]ourt's opinion conflicts with the Fourth District's
decision in State v. Hayes, and our decision in Weiman v. McHaffie" on the
stare decisis issue.76 Holding that "in the absence of interdistrict conflict,
district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts," Chief Justice Barkett
cited Weiman and quoted from Judge Walden's Fourth District opinion in
Hayes.
77
Thirty-six years after the establishment of the courts of appeal and
sixteen years after a conflict developed concerning the precedential value to
be accorded district court decisions by trial courts, the supreme court thus
resolved the conflict in favor of broadcast vertical stare decisis.7 ' The
Third District bowed to the supreme court's Pardo pronouncements a few
months later, when the Third District stated that the circuit "had no choice"
but to follow a Second District decision. 79 The Third District hastened to
add, however, that "this court is of course free to consider the issue as an
original question."8  The Third District happened to "completely agree
with . . . [the Second District decision, on the merits] and therefore . . .
[made] it a part of the law of. . . [the Third D]istrict."81 The balkanized
"law of the district" lives on.
Unanswered by the supreme court in Pardo, or otherwise in Florida
72. Cf Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9
CONST. COMMENTARY 2259 (1992) (contrasting the traditional view of property and takings
with the communitarian perspective, which emphasized the property owners' sense of
responsibility to the community for the use of their property as central to their realization of
individual freedom). The story one tells depends upon the normative theory that one applies.
73. Pardo, 582 So. 2d at 1228.
74. Id.
75. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
76. Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 666 (citations omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mazorra, 599 So. 2d 739, 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
80. Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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jurisprudence, is the question of what a trial judge should do where
decisions of two or more district courts other than her own conflict and the
trial judge's district is undecided on the issue. The likelihood of this
situation bothered the Venus Condominium court, which created the conflict
on the issue of vertical stare decisis in 1976.2 Justice Adkins also spoke
of the problem of placing a trial judge in "the dilemma of selecting one of
two conflicting district courts of appeals decisions as the proper case
law. 83
Three or four possible rules could be established for such situations:
(1) The trial court could follow the most recent appellate decision. In
effect, the most recent district court decision would overrule the earlier
district court decision in all undecided districts. In other words, assume that
the First District is first-in-time to decide a particular point of law. It
decides that the law is X. The law of X binds all trial courts in Florida.
Now the Second District Court decides that the law on that particular point
is Y. The law of X is overruled in the Second District, where Y now
becomes the law of the Second District. To the extent that trial courts
within the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts follow the last-in-time approach,
the law of X is also overruled in those districts by the Second District
decision for the law of Y.
(2) The trial court could follow the first-in-time decision. 4 A trial
court faced with the dilemma described could follow the law of X because
the first-in-time district court to decide the issue had so ruled. Thus, the
law of Y would bind only the Second District.
(3) The trial court could follow the decision that it considered the best
reasoned or that set the best policy, according to its own rights. Moreover,
it could choose and apply a rule different from that of either of the
82. Venus Condominium, 343 So. 2d at 1285. The court said that requiring a trial court
to follow other district courts "could lead to utter chaos were two of our sister courts to be
in conflict on a point of law raised in a trial court in this district," Id.
83. The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d 1114, 1124 (Fla.
1984) (Adkins, J., concurring).
84. AccordSowell v. Sowell, 92 S.E.2d 524, 526 (Ga. 1956). "Where there is conflict
existing in the decisions of this court, the correct rule must be determined from the earliest
decisions on the subject, and unless overruled, they are controlling." Id.; Richmond County
v. Sibert, 125 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). "The Court of Appeals is bound by the
principles enunciated by the oldest Supreme Court decision, and not by the latest expression
of the Supreme Court which does not overrule, modify, or distinguish its oldest case." Id.
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conflicting districts.85
(4) If there are an odd number of such decisions the trial judge could
follow the majority.
Under any of the approaches "[t]he law is unsettled" 6 so long as both
vertical and horizontal stare decisis do not apply. The irony of vertical
without horizontal stare decisis is that a trial court may be reversed for
doing the "right" thing (following another district) or affirmed for doing the
"wrong" thing (rejecting precedent from another district). This anomaly is
less serious jurisprudentially than the balkanization problem. It is nonethe-
less troubling, and it does emphasize the logical relationship that ought to
exist between vertical and horizontal stare decisis.
It is true that Floridians and other persons need to know that the same
law will be applied in Pensacola, Tampa, and Miami, not only by trial
courts but also by courts of appeal. Most litigants will not get the
opportunity to have the Supreme Court of Florida directly apply any law to
their case. 7 It is also true that potential litigants within Pensacola, Tampa,
and Miami need to know that the same law will be applied whichever panel
of the district court reviews a trial court decision. Furthermore, potential
litigants need to know that the same law of Florida will be applied
regardless of whether they wind up in state or federal court. Before
examining the latter proposition, we shall consider the avoidance and
resolution of intradistrict conflicts among panels within each of the district
courts.
D. Intradistrict Stare Decisis
Since the 1980 amendment of the Florida Constitution, the supreme
85. Accord State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (I11. 1992).
"This was not an instance in which the circuit court was faced with conflicting decisions from
the various appellate districts and, in the absence of controlling authority from its home
district, would have been free to choose between the decisions of the other appellate
districts." Id. (emphasis added). But cf Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 331
N.E.2d 634, 636 (111. App. Ct. 1975). "To apply the principle of optional selectivity by a
trial court in such situation could create an anomalous situation where the trial court one
week would follow one principle and the following week, a contrary principle." Id.
86. The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d at 1124 (Adkins,
J., concurring).
87. See supra note 54.
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court has no jurisdiction to review intradistrict conflicts.8" An en banc
process providing for the district courts to resolve conflicts within their
respective districts is deemed an essential part of this appellate structural
scheme. 9 Patterning after en banc rules of the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,9" the Supreme Court of Florida
promulgated Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331, effective in
1980.9' The rule authorizes each district court of appeal to sit en banc to
resolve intradistrict conflicts of decisions when "necessary to maintain
uniformity in the court's decisions." 92 In 1984, an additional provision for
en banc review was made for cases "of exceptional importance." 93
From its inception, the operation of the en banc rule has been trou-
bled.94 In 1990, a district judge referred to it as "an old problem." 9 In
1982, the Florida Conference of District Court of Appeal Judges petitioned
the supreme court to consider an emergency rule change to address practical
88. In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules cof Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d 1127, 1127 (Fla. 1982). Under article V,
section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, the supreme court may review a district court
decision that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court. Under
section 3(b)(4), it may review a district court decision that is certified by it to be in direct
conflict with a decision of another district court. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
89. In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d at 1130 (Commentary).
90. Id.
91. FLA. ft. App. P. 9.33 1(a). This rule was originally promulgated in In re Rule 9.33 1,
Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc, Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 374 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 1979). Rule 9.33 1(a) has been amended several times,
most recently by In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 609 So. 2d
516, 564-65 (Fla. 1992). Most of the amendments are stylistic. However, in 1984, provision
for en banc review was made for cases "of exceptional importance" in addition to en banc
review when necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions. The Florida Bar Re:
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d at 1115.
92. FLA. R. App. P. 9.331(a).
93. The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d at 1119.
94. See generally Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 163-72 (discussing the
history of intradistrict conflicts through various changes in the Florida Constitution). In State
v. Bankowski, the court "express[ed] [its] apologies" for "extreme delay in bringing [the]
matter to final disposition." 570 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
95. State v. Georgoudiou, 560 So. 2d 1241, 1248 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.) (Cowart, J.,
dissenting), review denied, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1990). Judge Cowart cited numerous
opinions of district courts. Id. at 1248. He further referred to the "vague standard for
selection of cases for en banc consideration coupled with no appellate review of the selection
decision" which could "combine to deny the litigant equal protection of the law and deprive
him of his constitutional right to have his case on appeal heard and decided by the three
judge panel to which it was duly, and constitutionally, assigned for decision." Id.
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problems that had arisen in the en banc decisional process. The chief judges
of the district courts asked whether one three-judge panel could overrule or
recede from a prior decision of a three-judge panel of the same court. The
supreme court responded that it would not by court rule prohibit overruling
or receding by a three-judge panel, but it admonished the district judges to
refrain from that action. Instead, when a three-judge panel is confronted
with its district precedent with which it disagrees, it should suggest an en
banc hearing.96
Generally, the district courts seem to have refrained from panel
overruling, expressing a commitment to the proposition that a prior panel
decision of their particular district court is binding authority absent en banc
review.9 7 When a majority of district judges in a particular district think
it is necessary or desirable to recede from or overrule a prior decision, en
banc review is usually utilized.98 Despite the supreme court's admonition,
however, conflicting panel decisions do occur.99 Inconsistent rulings by
96. In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d at 1128.
97. E.g., State v. Delasierra, 614 So. 2d 564, 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(concurring opinion expressing "grave doubts about the constitutional validity?' of the
substantive rule (search and seizure) applied, but stating that "our recent decision . . . is
binding authority on this panel" and that Rule 9.331 "compels this result"); State v. Clark,
538 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring)
(expressing continuing disagreement with a prior panel decision of which the court as a whole
denied en banc review, but stating that its holding represents "the law of this district," which
every subsequent panel is bound to follow under Rule 9.331); Holding Electric, Inc. v.
Roberts, 512 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "[in the absence of a
decision by the court en banc to overrule Mardan, the present panel is bound by that
decision"), rev'd, 530 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1988): State v. Johnson, 516 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "[b]ecause we are bound by the prior decision of this court
we must affirm").
98. E.g., State v. McKenzie, 574 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating
"[because we find it necessary to recede from the holding [in a prior Fifth District decision],
we have considered this case en banc"); Brown v. Champeau, 537 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989); Inscho v. State, 521 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); cf Fleischer
v. Hi-Rise Homes, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting case removed
from en banc calendar since there was no conflict, no need to recede, and an absence of
exceptional importance) (Glickstein, J., dissenting).
99. In McBride v. State, 604 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), the Third
District Court chose to follow a 1991 Fourth District decision (Stayer) and reject a 1992
Fourth District decision (Scott). The Third District commented: "There appears to be no
authority for Scott's departure from the earlier panel decision in Stayer without the
intervention of an en banc court." Id. at 1292 n. I.
In Johnson v. State, 568 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990), a three judge panel
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First District panels provided the supreme court with an opportunity to make
it clear that later panel decisions overrule prior panel decisions.' In State
v. Walker,'' the supreme court accepted for review a 1991 Fourth District
decision on the basis that it conflicted with a 1986 First District deci-
sion. ' 2 The supreme court then ascertained that a 1990 First District
decision ruled opposite to a 1986 First District decision.0 3 The court held
that where there is an intradistrict conflict, a subsequent decision overrules
a prior decision as the decisional law in the district.'0 4 The subsequent
First District decision was consistent with the 1991 Fourth District deci-
sion.0 5 Therefore, no direct conflict was presented to the supreme court
as required by article V, section 3(b)(3), and the court dismissed the case
since it was without jurisdiction.'0 6
Another problem that has arisen under the en banc rule is a disagree-
ment among district judges as to what constitutes intradistrict conflict
sufficient to authorize an en banc hearing or rehearing. The wording of
Rule 9.33 1(a) is hardly precise: "En banc hearings and rehearings shall not
be ordered unless the case is of exceptional importance or unless necessary
to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions."' Tests applied for what
is "necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions" vary widely
of the First District ruled contrary to the earlier First District decision in Watson v. State, 504
So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.
1987), on the issue of whether life felonies are subject to enhancement under the habitual
offender statute. The later decision did not mention the former.
In Ayares-Eisenberg Perrine Datsun, Inc. v. Sun Bank, 455 So. 2d 525, 528 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the Third District Court followed a 1980 Third District decision and
did not follow a 1976 Third District decision, thus "find[ing] ourselves in conflict with
another panel of this court ... and with other district courts of appeal." The Sun Bank court
did not purport to overrule the contrary 1976 decision. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit then had to deal with the conflicts in attempting to apply the law of
Florida in a diversity case. Peoples Bank v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 1544 (1 Ith Cir. 1986).
100. See Johnson, 568 So. 2d at 519.
101. 593 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1992).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1050. The court's citation of a 1968 supreme court case made it clear that
the rule had survived, or had been reinstated by various constitutional changes. It cited Little
v. State, 206 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 1968), decided at a time when the supreme court had no
jurisdiction to review intradistrict conflict, as is once again the case since 1980. See Mattis,
Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 163, 166 n.144.
105. Walker, 593 So. 2d at 1049.
106. Id.
107. FLA. R. App. P. 9.331(a) (emphasis added).
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among districts, panels, and judges. °8 In 1985, the supreme court an-
swered a question certified to it by the Third District Court: What is the
proper scope of review for district courts of appeal in granting rehearings
en banc?0 9 The supreme court responded that district courts are free to
develop their own concepts of decisional uniformity."' They are not
limited by the standards adopted by the supreme court in the exercise of its
discretionary conflict jurisdiction."' "[T]he district court of appeal, in
implementing the provisions of appellate procedure rule 9.33 1, has authority
to adopt the standard of conflict it believes necessary or appropriate in order
to harmonize the decisions of the court and avoid costly relitigation of
similar issues within its appellate district."' 12  Thus, standards in one
district may properly be different from standards in another, without creating
a conflict between district court decisions to activate supreme court conflict
jurisdiction.'
Not surprisingly, disagreement and uneven application of standards
persist among the district judges."4 The district judges use a variety of
tests, such as: (1) whether it would be difficult for the legal profession to
harmonize the original panel decision under review with a prior decision of
the same district;" 5 (2) whether the decisions are so inconsistent and
disharmonious that they would not have been rendered by the same panel
108. See Harvey J. Sepler, En Banc Review in Florida Appellate Courts, 62 FLA. B.J.
37, 38-39 nn.1 1-13 (1988) (citing adozen cases representing all districts utilizing what Sepler
analyzes as three parallel tests for decisional uniformity in the en banc context). Moreover,
there is no clear agreement on a test for "exceptional importance." State v. Georgoudiou,
560 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (en banc) (Cowart, J., dissenting).
109. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1160 (1986).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 94.
113. See Schreiber, 479 So. 2d at 104-05 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
114. See Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 172; Georgoudiou, 560 So. 2d
at 1241; Fleischer v. Hi-Rise Homes, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1101, 1102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (referring to "protracted debate, for which we [the court] must confessjudicial dismay"
in deciding to reconsider and not to render an en banc decision); State v. Navarro, 464 So.
2d 137, 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (granting rehearing en banc on basis of
"misapplication of a rule of law," citing the supreme court's decision in Schreiber, opinion
filed July 26, 1984) (Ferguson, J., dissenting to rehearing en banc); see also Sepler, supra
note 108, at 37-39.
115. Schreiber, 422 So. 2d at 912-13, quashed on other grounds, 479 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
1985). Judge Schwartz's "practical" test was approved by the supreme court in quashing
Schreiber, 479 So. 2d at 94-95.
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of the court;" 6 (3) whether there has been a misapplication of a well-
established rule of law of the district;".7 (4) whether the appellate court
directly recedes from its own previously announced rule of law; and, (5)
whether the court applied the same rule in two cases having indistin-
guishable facts, but nevertheless reached two different conclusions." 8
We are left, then, with different rules among district judges within a
district, among panels, and among the five district courts of appeal regarding
when en banc review is necessary to achieve uniformity of law within a
district. Even more troubling, each district is free to create conflicts with
other districts on substantive points of law and each district has done so
freely and without qualm. The question then becomes, as long as we do not
recognize horizontal stare decisis, do we have "the law of Florida" on any
particular point or do we indeed have the laws of five balkanized districts?
The answer depends only partially on how dependably and how expeditious-
ly the supreme court resolves conflicts among the districts. The answer has
an impact on even-handedness of treatment among Florida state litigants, the
equality of treatment between state court and federal court litigants, and the
constitutional underpinnings of Erie.
1II. THE ERIE OVERLAY: FEDERAL COURTS'
TREATMENT OF STATE LAW
Our system of jurisprudence comprises a dual court system containing
both state and federal courts. Often, a state court is required to apply
federal law. Similarly, a federal court is often called upon to apply state
law to a specific issue in a particular case." 9 However, if there is no
statute or recent decision by the state's highest court, the federal court faces
the problem of determining the content of the rule of state law that is to be
applied.
116. Also a "practical" test enunciated by Judge Schwartz in Schreiber, 422 So. 2d at
912 n.I.
117. Navarro, 464 So. 2d at 140. Judge Ferguson, in his dissenting opinion, labeled the
standard freewheeling and elusive. Id. at 143.
118. Extensive case citation for all of these tests is provided in Sepler, supra note 108,
at 37-39.
119. The problem arises in diversity cases as well as federal question cases whenever
the federal law Fails to supply a rule of decision, but refers to state law for an answer. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); see also supra notes 3-8 and
accompanying text.
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A. Early Erie
In the 1938 case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,120 the Supreme
Court of the United States handed down what has been characterized as one
of the most important cases in American legal history.' In that case,
Justice Brandeis indicated that when state law supplied the rule of decision,
the federal court was to apply state law whether "declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court."' 2 In 1940, the Supreme Court handed
down a series of decisions dealing with the problem of how to determine the
content of state law when state law supplied the rule of decision on an
issue."2 3 The Court held that a federal court must follow the decision of
a lower state court in the absence of any persuasive data that the highest
court of the state would decide otherwise.
124
The most troublesome of the 1940 cases was Fidelity Union Trust Co.
v. Field,2  which involved the decisions of a New Jersey trial court of
statewide jurisdiction. 126 The New Jersey Legislature had passed a statute
that clearly seemed to change prior law and permit a legal device known as
a "totten trust."'27  However, in two separate cases that came before the
New Jersey Court of Chancery, 21 two vice-chancellors held that the
statute had not changed the law and that "totten trusts" were not permitted
in spite of the statute.'29
When a similar case came before a federal court in New Jersey, the
Third Circuit recognized that under the command of Erie, it was required
to apply state law with regard to the construction of state statutes.' 30 The
120. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
121. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 352-53 (4th ed. 1983). Professor
Wright says: "It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision. It ... goes
to the heart of the relations between the federal government and the states, and returns to the
states a power that had for nearly a century been exercised by the federal government." Id.
at 355.
122. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (1938).
123. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.
124. Id. at 370-71.
125. 311 U.S. 169 (1940), rev'g 108 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1939).
126. Id.
127. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 370. A "totten trust" allows parties to deposit funds
in a bank and name themselves trustee for another, thereby creating a tentative trust revocable
at any time before death. Id.
128. A nisiprius (or trial) court.
129. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 371.
130. Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'don other
grounds, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
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question remained, however, whose interpretation of the statute the court
should use. Reading the Erie reference to the "highest court" literally, two
judges of the Third Circuit panel concluded that they were not bound to
follow a New Jersey trial court's interpretation of the statute. 131 They
stated that "[w]here that law has been determined by the courts of last resort
their decisions are stare decisis, and must be followed . . . . As to the
pronouncements of other state courts, however, we are not so bound, but
may conclude that the decision does not truly express the state law."' 32
The court refused to follow the decisions of the vice-chancellors, and
awarded the proceeds of the trust to the beneficiary.
133
The Supreme Court reversed and held that where the state law supplies
the rule of decision, it is the duty of the federal courts "to ascertain and
apply that law even though it has not been expounded by the highest court
of the State."' 3n Subsequently, when the "totten trust" issue came before
a New Jersey state court, the decision of the Third Circuit was followed,
with the notation that it had been "reversed on other grounds" by the
Supreme Court.' 35 Thus, on the question of the content of New Jersey
law, it turned out that the Third Circuit had been correct.
This was grist for the mill of legal scholarship, and leading scholars of
the day criticized the Supreme Court's Field doctrine from the academy'36
and the bench. In a brief but biting criticism, Judge Jerome N. Frank
likened federal judges, faced with questions of state law, as being forced by
the Supreme Court "to play the rule [sic, role] of ventriloquist's dummy to
the courts of some particular state.' 37 Years later, the late Judge Henry
Friendly, one of the leading legal scholars of our century, referred to the
Supreme Court's 1940 series of decisions as "the excesses of 311 U.S. [of
the United States Reports].' 38
131. Id. at 527
132. Id. at 526.
133. Id.
134. Field, 311 U.S. at 177.
135. Hickey v. Kahl, 19 A.2d 33 (1941).
136. See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipres-
ence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-95 (1946). Charles Clark, a former Dean
of the Yale Law School, was United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
when he wrote this article. Id.; see also Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States,
50 YALE L.J. 762 (194 1); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 510 (1954).
137. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
138. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common. Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 400 (1964).
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The zenith of the Field doctrine probably came in a Sixth Circuit case.
The Sixth Circuit felt bound to follow an unreported decision of an
intermediate Ohio court in the face of an Ohio statute providing that "only
such cases as are hereafter reported in accordance with the provisions of this
section shall be recognized by and receive the official sanction of any court
within the state. ' 13
9
B. Reformed Erie
It seemed inevitable that the Supreme Court would have to back down
from the furthest extremes of the Field doctrine. As Professor Wright has
pointed out, to do otherwise would be to simply substitute one kind of
forum shopping for another. He writes:
The lawyer whose case was dependent on an old or shaky state court
decision that might no longer be followed within the state would have
a strong incentive to maneuver the case into federal court, where, on the
mechanical jurisprudence that the Erie doctrine was once thought to
require [under Field], the state decision could not have been im-
peached.140
By 1967, the Second Circuit decided that it was no longer bound by the
Field holding. 4' Despite the fact that Field had not been expressly
overruled, subsequent Supreme Court decisions indicated that it had been
modified.' In its strictest sense, Field was no longer the law.' 43 Pres-
ently, the position expressed by the Second Circuit is well accepted among
the federal appellate courts. 144
However, since the Field case, the Supreme Court has given very few
instructions to the bench and bar on solving the problem of how a federal
court is to determine state law when the question has not been addressed by
the highest state court. Moreover, except for expressing a general approval
of the certification process, whereby federal courts can certify questions of
139. Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866
(1946).
140. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 374.
141. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). In Roginsky,
the court stated: "[wie do not consider ourselves as bound by the rulings of a state nisiprius
judge although we treat these with respect." Id. at 851.
142. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.
143. Id.
144. 19 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 at
88-91 (1988) [hereinafter PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].
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state law to the highest state court, 45 the Court has never touched on the
problem of conflicting decisions among state appellate courts.
The first retreat from the furthest extensions of the Field doctrine came
in 1948.146 In King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers,147 the
Court was faced with the contention that a federal court was bound by an
unreported decision of a South Carolina Court of Common Pleas that would
not have had precedential value in any other South Carolina court. 48 The
Court indicated that such a case was entitled to "some weight."'' 49 Howev-
er, the Court decided it was not controlling on the federal court. 5 '
Less than a decade later, the Court gave further instructions on this
issue. Where the highest state court had spoken, time or other events might
cast doubt on whether the previous decision would still be followed. The
issue in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America"' was whether a 1910
Vermont decision was binding on a federal court in 1956.152 The Court
held that it was, but at the same time instructed lower courts, in a round-
about way, on how they should handle such a problem.'53 The Court
stated: "[T]here appears to be no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no
developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones,
no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of the Vermont judges on the
question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the judicial
rule."' 5 4 The Court seemed to be asking the lower courts to draw the
inference that if there had been any doubts, a federal court might have been
free to disregard a holding by a state trial court, or even the 1910 decision
by the state's highest court.
Further instruction on how to handle the problems of state law content
was present in the 1967 federal tax case of Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch,'55 involving a situation where the federal court was required to
145. E.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207 (1960). Certification is discussed infra notes 241-42, 255-58 and accompany-
ing text.
146. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.
147. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
148. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.
149. King, 333 U.S. at 160.
150. Id. at 161.
151. 350 US. 198 (1956).
152. Id. at 202.
153. Id. at 204-05.
154. Id. at 205. The implications of Bernhardt are discussed in 19 PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 87-91.
155. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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apply state law in solving a federal tax question.'56 In Bosch, the Court
cited Erie cases and said that "under some conditions, federal authority may
not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling. 157
The Bosch Court held:
[W]hen the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of
a state trial court ... should afortiori not be controlling . . . . This is
not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the same
reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state
law and the State's highest court is the best authority on its own law.
If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply
what they find to be the state law after giving "proper regard" to
relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect, it may be
said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court 58
The court's holding was a far cry from the implications of the 1940
Field decision. In fact, for the last several decades, federal courts have
indicated that they are no longer absolutely bound by decisions of lower
state courts. 59 Some federal courts have even felt free, under the updated
version of Erie, to refuse to follow outdated decisions of the highest court
of the state when applying the law of that state.16
Two of the dissenters in Bosch developed the formula now being
applied "to determine state law in diversity cases-essentially, that, absent
a recent judgment of the State's highest court, state cases are only data from
which the law must be derived-is necessarily applicable without modifica-
tion in all situations in which federal courts must ascertain state law." '161
Having stated what they thought to be the majority's rule, Justices Harlan
and Fortas, disagreed with it.'62 According to them, "[t]he relationship
between the state and federal judicial systems is simply too delicate and
important to be reduced to any single standard."'63
Perhaps the standard announced by Justices Harlan and Fortas, with
156. Id. at 465.
157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. See 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 88-98.
160. Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957) (refusing
to be bound by an outdated holding of the Mississippi Supreme Court in light of recent
statements by that court indicating that it might no longer follow the old rule).
161. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 477 (Harlan, J., and Fortas, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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regard to their understanding of how the formula should be applied, is itself
a bit too simplistic. According to Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper, a
"solid statement"'64 of the method to be applied by federal judges, faced
with problems of interpreting state law, was the one announced by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.'65
As stated by the court in McKenna:
An accurate forecast of [state] law, as it would be expressed by its
highest court, requires an examination of all relevant sources of that
state's law in order to isolate those factors that would inform its
decision. The primary source that must be analyzed of course, is the
decisional law of the [state supreme court]. In the absence of authority
directly on point, decisions by that court in analogous cases provide
useful indications of the court's probable disposition of a particular
question of law. It is important to note, however, that our prediction
"cannot be the product of a mere recitation of previously decided
cases." In determining state law, a federal tribunal should be careful to
avoid the "danger" of giving "a state court decision a more binding
effect than would a court of that state under similar circumstances."
Rather, relevant state precedents must be scrutinized with an eye toward
the broad policies that informed those adjudications, and to the doctrinal
trends which they evince.
Considered dicta by the state's highest court may also provide a
federal court with reliable indicia of how the state tribunal might rule
on a particular question. Because the highest state court "enjoys some
latitude of decision in ascertaining the law applicable to a particular
dispute even where there may be dicta in point," however, a federal
court should be circumspect in surrendering its own judgment concern-
ing what the state law is on account of dicta. As Professor Charles Alan
Wright has written, "much depends on the character of the dictum." Of
somewhat less importance to a prognostication of what the highest state
court will do are decisions of lower state courts and other federal courts.
Such decisions should be accorded "proper regard" of course, but not
conclusive effect. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that although the
decision of a lower state court "should be 'attributed some weight ...
the decision (is) not controlling . . . ' where the highest court of the
State has not spoken on the point .... Thus, under some conditions,
federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state
appellate court ruling." Additionally, federal courts may consider
scholarly treatises, the Restatement of Law, and germane law review
164. 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 89 n.30.
165. 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1980).
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articles-particularly, it seems, of schools within the state whose law is
to be predicted.'66
Note, however, that even with this elaborate statement, nothing is said about
the problem of conflicting state intermediate appellate court decisions.
C. Erie Instructions-Few and Far Between
There have only been three instances since 1940 where the Supreme
Court of the United States has addressed the problem of how a federal court
is to determine the content of state law when state law provides the rule of
decision. 167 King, Bernhardt, and Bosch are the only guidelines handed
down by the Court since Field. The most recent of those three cases is now
more than a quarter century old.
At the time Erie was decided, only twelve of the then forty-eight states
had intermediate appellate courts. 61 Moreover, the entire corpus juris of
the country was far less complex than it is today. Presently, there has yet
to be a Supreme Court decision instructing the lower federal courts on how
to handle the problems of conflicting state intermediate appellate court
decisions.
Although it is true that there have been Supreme Court cases emphasiz-
ing the "twin aims of the Erie doctrine-'discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the [laws],"".169 these cases,
had nothing to do with the problem of ascertainment of state law. It seems
obvious that if the twin aims of the Erie doctrine are discouragement of
forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the law, 7 °
then the problem of conflicting state appellate court decisions is a problem
that should be addressed. As long as the law administered in the federal
courthouse is different from the law administered in the state courthouse
down the street, there will be forum shopping, and it will therefore be
166. Id. at 662-63 (footnotes omitted).
167. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153 (1948);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
at 456.
168. This number came from a count of the courts listed in the front of the West
National Reporter system in 1938. Of these 12, some had only limited jurisdiction, such as
the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals.
169. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 234 (1991) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965), on the twin aims of Erie).
170. Aren't these "twin aims" really one and the same?
1360 [Vol. 18
644
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Matts / Mattis
impossible to avoid inequitable administration of the law.' 7'
If the highest court of the state whose substantive law is applicable has
addressed the issue in a fairly recent case, the problem of what law federal
courts should apply is almost nonexistent. The federal court simply applies
the law as enunciated by the highest state court.172 If the highest court has
spoken to the issue, but time or developments in other jurisdictions have
created a doubt as to whether the previous decision would be followed
today, the Supreme Court has given instructions on how a federal court is
to handle the problem.
73
A more serious problem of applying state law occurs when there is no
decision by the highest court of the state, but there are decisions by lower
courts at either the trial or appellate level. This issue is complicated by the
Supreme Court's modification of its original position without expressly
overruling Field. However, as discussed above, it now seems clear that a
federal court is no longer absolutely bound by a decision of a lower state
court at either the trial or appellate level. 174 The only requirement is that
federal courts. give them "proper regard.' 75  Beyond this rather meager
guidance, however, very little is clear.
Perhaps the thorniest problem for the federal trial judge in this area is
the situation that exists when there are conflicting decisions among state
intermediate appellate courts. Most federal courts will handle this problem
by deciding the issue the way they think the highest court in the state would
decide it. Those who follow this policy seem to perceive it as the policy of
the Supreme Court as well. However, this method may well encourage
forum shopping.
Since several states that have distinct and different systems of appellate
courts, it seems improbable that the twin aims of Erie can be met if all state
court systems are treated the same way by federal courts deciding issues of
state law. Recall the statement of Justices Harlan and Fortas, dissenting in
Bosch: "The relationship between the state and federal judicial system is
simply too delicate and important to be reduced to any single standard."' 76
171. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). "The nub of the policy that
underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by
a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not
lead to a substantially different result." Id.
172. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
173. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956).
174. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 457.
175. Id. at 465.
176. Id. at 477.
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D. The Klaxon Overlay
After Harry Tompkins was struck by an object protruding from a train
while walking in Pennsylvania on a right-of-way belonging to the Erie
Railroad, he brought suit against the railroad in New York.'77 The
Supreme Court held that the standard of duty owed by the railroad to
Tompkins was determined by state law rather than general federal common
law. "'78 It was unclear which state's law the court should use in making
its decision: New York's, where the trial was held, or Pennsylvania's, where
the accident occurred. Everyone who read the opinion must have known
that the Court was referring to the law of Pennsylvania, but the Court was
not explicit about the method of choosing the rule of state law in a conflict
of laws situation. The oversight was corrected three years later, in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,'79 when the Court set down the
rule that:
The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware
must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise,
the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal
administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting
side by side .... And the proper function of the Delaware federal court
is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be.
80
In other words, a federal court, sitting in a particular state, should give
the same deference to that state's choice of law (or conflict of law) rules as
it would be required to give to the state's substantive law rules.' 8 ' Thus,
a New York federal judge, faced with a conflicts problem from an accident
that occurred in California, is to apply the same law that the New York
Court of Appeals would apply in solving the problem. If it is more likely
that the New York Court of Appeals would apply California substantive law,
then so must the federal judge sitting in New York. This situation led Judge
Friendly to posit:
Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to deter-
177. For a fascinating account of the story of the litigation in Erie, see Irving Younger,
What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1978).
178. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
179. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
180. Id at 496. This rule was reaffirmed by the Court in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v.
Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
181. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
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mine what the New York courts would think the California courts
would think on an issue about which neither has thought. They have
had no occasion to do so. But life, here coupled with death, casts up
new problems, and the court seised of the case is obliged, as best it can,
itself to blaze the trail of the foreign law that it has been directed to
follow. 8 ,
Facetious as this statement was, there is little doubt that it is as accurate
today as when it was first written.
Given that federal courts are under the command of Erie-with its twin
goals, preventing forum shopping and inequitable administration of the
law-and given the Klaxon overlay, should federal courts faced with a state
law problem simply decide the case the way they think the state's highest
court would decide it; or should they try to foster the twin goals of Erie and
decide the issue according to the decisions that would be binding on a state
trial judge?
E. A Changed Situation With State Intermediate Courts
As mentioned above, when Erie was decided only twelve states had
intermediate appellate courts.183 Today, there are thirty-seven states with
intermediate appellate courts.'84 Many of these have been created in the
past twenty years.'85 It seems safe to say that today, most of the new
"law" that binds state trial courts is handed down by state intermediate
appellate courts, rather than by the highest courts of the several states. And
yet, judges and legal scholars have paid little attention to the problems
raised by the question of which courts are "bound" by intermediate appellate
court decisions. This is true at both the state and the federal level.
Even in those states where it is agreed that an intermediate appellate
court decision is binding on all state trial courts, there has yet to be much
discussion about the problems raised by conflicting decisions among the
intermediate appellate courts. There can be conflicting decisions between
districts (interdistrict conflict); as well as conflicting decisions within the
same appellate district (intradistrict conflict).
182. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
183. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRAcTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2d ed. 1988).
184. Id.
185. Id. At the time Mr. Stem wrote this book, there were 38 states with intermediate
appellate courts because North Dakota had created a "temporary court of appeals" for the
period from July 1, 1987, through January 1, 1990. Id. at 7 n.14.
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As discussed above, 8 6 until the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
rule, some appellate districts in Florida were holding that the courts below
them were not bound by a decision of Florida appellate courts in other
districts. In many states with intermediate appellate courts, the highest court
has never spoken on the question. One appellate court may say that any
appellate decision is binding on all trial courts in the state, but if another
appellate court in the same state lays down a different rule, who is to say
what the law of the state is on that point? When there is a conflict between
the First and Fifth Districts, what are the trial judges in the Second, Third,
and Fourth Districts supposed to do?'87 Few authoritative answers exist.
As we have seen in the Florida cases, courts even disagree on the
question of whether there is a conflict between appellate decisions.'88 Just
as one person's freedom fighter may be another person's terrorist, one
judge's conflict may seem like perfect harmony to another judge.
In his classic book, Professor Levi described legal reasoning, or stare
decisis, as
a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a
proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and
then applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these: similarity
is seen between the cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case
is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case
. .. . The determination of similarity or difference is the function of
eachjudge. Where case law is considered, and there is no statute, he
is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior
judge even in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum, and
this means that the judge in the present case may find irrelevant the
existence or absence of facts which prior judges thought important. 89
186. See supra notes 37-81 and accompanying text.
187. Some of the possibilities are discussed supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
189. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING i-2 (1949) (emphasis
added). Professor Levi later became Dean of the University of Chicago Law School and
Attorney General of the United States.
Of course not everyone will agree with Professor Levi. He cites Professor Goodhart
as presenting a different view. See Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,
40 YALE L. J. 161 (1930); see also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1969); KARL LLEWELYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE
(1953).
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Under such a system, it is only natural that there may be disagreement
among lawyers and judges as to when a conflict between appellate decisions
exists. Certainly, most would agree that there will indeed be conflicts. That
being the case, it would seem that there should be rules, binding on all
courts within a system, instructing them on what to do in case a conflict
between decisions of appellate courts on the same level arises.
Several states have rules of precedent where it is agreed that an
intermediate appellate court is not bound by the decision of a sister
court.' 90 Other jurisdictions, however, have rules that require an interme-
diate appellate court either to adhere to previous decisions by a court or
panel on the same level, or to follow a special procedure for overruling the
case.' 9 ' It seems probable that in several states the problem has never
been addressed by either the appellate courts or the highest state court.
With all of these different court systems and rules of appellate
precedent existing among the states, federal courts have had very little
guidance from the Supreme Court on how the problem of lower court
precedent should be handled. What has been created in many states is a
forum shopper's supermarket. Because of the prevailing rules of precedent
binding on federal trial courts in Florida,'92 there will be frequent situa-
tions where a litigant, by filing in or removing to a federal court, will get
a different result on an issue of state law from that which would have
resulted had he filed in the state court down the street.
F. Judicial Debate in Chicago
The question of how a federal court should handle the problem of
ascertaining the content of state law, when there are conflicting decisions
among panels of the state's intermediate appellate courts, sparked a
remarkable debate by judicial opinion between two judges of the United
190. See, e.g., Taylor Mattis & Kenneth Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among [sic] the
Appellate Court of Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 583-592 (1979) (discussing the Illinois
rule); McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 140 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1977).
19 1. See Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Within Michigan's Court ofAppeals: Precedential
Effect of Its Decisions on the Court Itself and on Michigan Trial Courts, 37 WAYNE L. REV.
265 (1991) [hereinafter Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan] (discussing the Michigan
Administrative Order 1990-6). Among the federal courts of appeal, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits have rules under which a prior decision of the circuit (panel or en banc) cannot be
overruled by a panel, but only by the court sitting en banc. See Atlantis Dev. Corp., Ltd. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828 (5th Cir. 1967); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
1209 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
192. See infra notes 232-51 and accompanying text.
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States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.' 93 This debate
merits extensive consideration in light of participants' intuitive insights into
the general problem of Erie and state intermediate court decisions. It also
merits detailed examination for its application to Florida as well as Illinois.
The debate stage was set by a question of substantive state law: whether an
insured may, under Illinois common law, maintain a claim against an insurer
for its bad faith conduct in handling a first party claim under an insurance
policy, and if so, whether punitive damages are available.
Like the five district courts of appeal in Florida, Illinois also has five
district courts of appeal, although the latter system is unitary.194 A panel
193. The Erie doctrine presents such complex legal problems that when we see judges
examining it, we cannot help but think of the tale of the five blind men and the elephant.
Each blind man was asked to feel part of the elephant, and was then asked to describe it.
Each of the blind men touched the elephant and described it variously as a tree trunk, a
serpent, a hose, a fan, and a wall.
If a judge sees the Erie case as a constitutional command, then the judge may act
differently from the judge who sees it as merely a prudential judicial policy. Professor
Wright points out that the early commentators had a great deal to say about the constitutional
discussion in Erie, most of it critical. However, in recent years there has been substantial
scholarly support for the constitutional aspect of the case. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 363.
Articles, pro and con, by many very distinguished scholars are listed. Id. nn. 14-16; see also
John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) [hereinafter Ely,
Myth of Erie].
We like to tempt our federal court students into further understanding by reading to
them Professor Abram Chayes' comment about Professor Ely's article:
Professor Ely's full dress encounter with Erie is in every way the work of an
adept. With his overall analytic framework I have no quarrel. On the contrary,
I think his approach clarifies much that has mystified several decades of civil
procedure students-which probably means that their professors have been
mystified as well.
Abram Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1974); see also John H. Ely,
The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1974); Paul J, Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on
Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974).
Professor Ely suggests that Erie is not "a monolithic doctrine," but rather "three distinct
and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitutional interpretation." Ely, Myth of
Erie, supra at 698. He contends that the Supreme Court practice of allowing federal courts
to substitute general federal common law for state common law, as was done for almost a
century under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. I (1842), "was unconstitutional because nothing in the
Constitution provided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort
the Court had been exercising under Swift." Id. at 703.
194. See infra note 289. The population of Illinois is roughly the same as that of
Florida but is distributed much less evenly than Florida's. The Chicago/Cook County area
has by far the heaviest concentration of people. Of the five appellate districts, the one
encompassing Cook County has the most judges, and consequently the best chance for an
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of the Fifth District Appellate Court of Illinois had held that there was a
common law cause of action in tort for an insurer's bad faith refusal to
make payments under a first party policy, adding that punitive damages
were available under proper circumstances.' 95  The First and Third
Districts had held that a common law claim would not be allowed because
it had been preempted by a statute. 196 The Fourth District has held that
an earlier version of the statute had not preempted the field, and declined to
express an opinion as to the newer version of the statute.' 97 The Second
District has held that the statute bars a common law claim for punitive
damages, but leaves open the possibility of a common law recovery in tort
for compensatory damages. 9 ' Thus, within a fairly short time span,
Illinois district courts of appeal have taken several distinct approaches
regarding the interpretation of the same state statute. Review had been
sought and denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois in most of these cases.
This same substantive law problem was brought before Milton I.
Shadur and Prentice H. Marshall, judges for the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.' 99 These two judges followed differ-
ent approaches in determining the process to be used by a federal judge in
determining the content of state substantive law to be applied.
Judge Shadur had held, in previous cases involving other points of law,
that Erie requires a federal court to decide issues of substantive law in the
intradistrict conflict.
195. Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 330 N.E.2d
540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), revd on other grounds, 356 N.E.2d 75 (11. 1976). There was no
indication that the court considered the effect of the statute on the plaintiffs right to assert
a common law claim. Subsequent to this decision, the statute was amended.
196. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983); see also Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393
N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (II. App. Ct. 1979); Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 371 N.E.2d 373, 376-77
(111. App. Ct. 1978). Tobolt appears to have been based on the pre-1977 version of the
statute, but the court indicated that the present version of the statute supported its conclusion
as well. Tobolt, 393 N.E.2d at 1180.
197. Lynch v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 418 N.E.2d 421, 425 (III. App. Ct.
1981). The Fourth District has held that the statute was not applicable when the insurer is
a nonprofit health care service corporation. McCall v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 452 N.E.2d
893, 896 (III. App. Ct. 1983).
198. Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 407 N.E.2d 156, 158-59 (111. App. Ct. 1980).
199. The substantive issue was brought before several of the judges of the United States
District Courts in Illinois. For the most part, we will confine our discussion to the way the
problem was handled by two of them.
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same way as a state trial judge would sitting in the same location.2"'
Because he was sitting in Cook County, Illinois, Judge Shadur believed he
should decide substantive law questions as if he were sitting as the Circuit
Court of Cook County (the state trial court). As such, he would be required
by Illinois law to follow the decisions of the First District of the Illinois
Appellate Court.
Judge Marshall took the position that he was required to decide any
issue of Illinois law the way he believed it would be decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court.2"' On the issue before him, he did not think the Illinois
Supreme Court would follow the decision of the First District.2 2
1. The Marshall Position-Supreme Court Swami0 3
Judge Marshall, when faced with the complex problem of conflicting
intermediate appellate court decisions, resorts to what he labels the
"Supreme Court predictive approach."20 4  He admits that this approach
does not have the advantage of being a bright line rule, and that judges will
inevitably be "gazing into a crystal ball" '2 5 on some occasions. He states:
The proposition that we must act as state trial judges stems from a
misapprehension of the commands of Erie and its progeny. Erie
requires a federal court to apply the substantive law of the forum state;
200. See, e.g., Slate Printing Co. v. Metro Envelope Co., 532 F. Supp. 431, 434 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (Shadur, J.); National Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F. Supp. 147, 148-9 n.2
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (Shadur, J.).
201. Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 539-40 (N.D. 111.
1983); Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 645 (N.D. II1. 1982).
202. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 554-55. We need not be concerned here as to the reasons
why Judge Marshall believed that the First District was wrong on the issue. Suffice it to say
that he believed he had sufficient grounds to believe that the Illinois Supreme Court would
use a different method in solving the problem of statutory interpretation that was before the
court.
Ironically, anotherjudge in the same district agreed with Judge Marshall on the method
to be followed, (deciding the way he thought the Illinois Supreme Court would decide).
However, that judge agreed with Judge Shadur on the merits of the issue, i.e. reached the
same result as the First District.
203. Judge Marshall's opinions are long and quite detailed. He cites many primary and
secondary authorities to support his position. It is impractical to reproduce those opinions
in full here. At the same time there is a danger that the authors, by paraphrasing, may have
missed important points made by the judge. For those who are interested in further detail,
we suggest an examination of the original opinions discussed here.
204. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 543.
205. Id. at 545.
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we take this to mean that we must apply the law that ultimately would
be applied were the case to be litigated in the state courts. While
intermediate appellate decisions exert upon us a high degree of
persuasive force, and while they may be binding upon state trial courts,
the law we must apply is that which the state supreme court would
apply. In a given case we may choose to follow an intermediate
appellate ruling, but we may not end our analysis of state law with mere
citation 1o such rulings where we are persuaded that the state supreme
court would rule otherwise.2"6
Judge Marshall believes that it is necessary to apply the law that the
state supreme court would apply to avoid creating an incentive for forum
shopping. The "state trial court" approach, he believes, invites forum
shopping because it requires the federal courts to give more weight to state
intermediate appellate decisions than would be given in the state system.
Three examples are offered.20 7
In a case in which no supreme court decision exists and the appellate
district [court] of proper state venue has not yet taken a position on an
issue... , [Judge Shadur] would require a federal court to follow the
law as declared by the other appellate districts .... However, the very
fact that the various Illinois appellate districts sometimes conflict on an
issue of law indicates the problem inherent in the state trial court ap-
proach. The appellate districts, it appears, do not consider each others'
decisions binding; rather, they regard them as persuasive authority only.
Thus, if a litigant filed suit in a state court in the First District and the
only intermediate appellate decision on a pertinent issue was from the
Fourth District, while the trial court presumably would follow the
Fourth District ruling, on appeal the First District would not necessarily
do so, if it found persuasive reasons to do otherwise. In such a case, if
diversity of citizenship existed, the litigant favored by the Fourth
District rule could file the case in federal court (or remove it, if there
was diversity of citizenship, in the case of a non-Illinois defendant) and
thereby obtain 'insurance' that the favorable rule of law would be
applied and upheld on appeal, were ... [Judge Shadur's holding] to
apply.2
0 8
As a second example, Judge Marshall points out that even where "First
District law" exists, the First District has five divisions which do not
206. Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 540.
208. Id. at 540-41 (citations omitted).
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consider themselves bound by the holdings of other divisions. Thus,.Judge
Shadur's rule "permits a diversity litigant in whose favor the non-unanimous
but not as yet uncontradicted rule runs to obtain 'insurance' by bringing the
case in federal court or removing it there." ' 9
The third type of forum shopping Judge Shadur's rule was said to permit
is somewhat more subtle. His rule requires federal courts to give more
weight to state appellate decisions than the rendering courts themselves
would give them. According to Judge Marshall, the "state law" that Erie
requires him to follow includes the power to re-examine earlier holdings
based upon "data" not considered in the earlier decision. Erie, he believes,
permits a federal court to exercise the same authority.2"'
Judge Marshall then quotes Wright, Miller, and Cooper for the
proposition that Judge Shadur's rule would result in merely substituting one
kind of forum shopping for another. The lawyer depending on old or shaky
precedent would bring his case into federal court secure in the knowledge
that the federal court would follow the old state rule.2 ' According to
Judge Marshall, Judge Shadur's rule permits forum shopping because a
federal court is required to give state intermediate precedent more weight
that it would carry in other state appellate courts and "even in the rendering
panel itself."2 2
Besides encouraging forum shopping, Judge Shadur's rule was said to
be wasteful of both the litigants' and the courts' resources. Where a state
appellate court has ignored a critically important "datum" of state law (as
Marshall thought the state intermediate appellate courts had done in some
of the precedents being urged on him when he heard Kelly v. Stratton"3),
it has caused the state court to reach a result that was incorrect as a matter
of state law. The Shadur rule, according to Marshall, would require him to
follow the appellate court ruling and reach a similarly erroneous result,
despite the existence of persuasive reasons for believing that the state
supreme court would not so hold. The result would require the district court
to commit error and leave it to the court of appeals (which would then act
209. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 541.
210. Id. Ironically, for similar reasons Judge Shadur did not feel bound by his own
court of appeals or "even one or two bits of language in United States Supreme Court
opinions supporting that predictive approach," because the United States Supreme Court had
not considered certain data in making those early decisions. See Rizzo v. Means Serv., Inc.,
632 F. Supp. 1115, 1131 (N.D. 111. 1986); see infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
211. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 541-42 (citing 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
144, at 89-91).
212. Id. at 542.
213. 552 F. Supp. 641, 646-48 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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as the state appellate court) to correct the error. So read, Judge Shadur's
rule was said to elevate form over substance and promote the needless
expenditure of courts' and litigants' resources.214
[T]he central principle is that we must give appellate court holdings
their due where the supreme court has not spoken, but we must not give
them more than their due. This will require resort to the 'Supreme
Court predictive approach,' but to do otherwise would be to ignore the
policy of Erie and its progeny. That policy is the avoidance of forum
shopping. When we apply the law that ultimately would be applied
were the case litigated in state court, we are fully faithful to Erie. By
contrast, to act as a state trial court, following intermediate appellate
decisions that are erroneous as a matter of state law, not only would
violate the policy of Erie, but would also elevate form over substance,
as the court of appeals, assuming the role of its state counterpart, would
apply the correct rule of state law. Erie requires us, in all cases, to
apply the rule of law that the state supreme court would follow.2"'
2. The Shadur Rule.-Just Another State Trial Court
216
Judge Shadur's view is that a federal judge faced with a problem of
state law should decide the case the same way as his state court counterpart
would in the courthouse down the street. Since the state judge would be
bound by an opinion of an appellate court whose geographical territory
included the city where the state and federal courts sat, so should the federal
judge.
Why is this the duty of the federal trial judge under the Erie doctrine?
According to Judge Shadur, the answer is found in the Erie opinion,
buttressed by the opinions in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 217 and Klaxon
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.2"' Judge Shadur writes:
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent
apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of
the State. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citi-
214. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 542-43.
215. Id. at 543 (footnote omitted).
216. Judge Shadur's views are set forth in a series of opinions. One can get the essence
of his views from his opinions in Rizzo v. Means Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Abbott Laboratories v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. II1. 1983); and
Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. 111. 1982).
217. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
218. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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zens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the
state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in
which the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-citi-
zen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.
In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United
States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of
the law of the state.2t9
Shadur cites Guaranty Trust as being in accord:
The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for
the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in
a federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead
to a substantially different result.
22 °
Judge Shadur also points out that the Klaxon case treated state "choice-
of-law rule as substantive, not procedural, for Erie purposes. '22' Klaxon,
he said, required this because "[o]therwise, the accident of diversity of
citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in
coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. 222 Thus, Judge
Shadur reads Klaxon as commanding him to treat "internal" state choice of
law rules the same as Klaxon's treatment of external state choice of law
rules. This leads Judge Shadur to a position fundamentally different from
Judge Marshall. 2
3
219. Abbott, 573 F. Supp. at 197 (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1938)).
220. Id. (quoting Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109).
221. Id. at 197 (quoting Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496).
222. Id. (quoting Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496).
223. Professor Geri Yonover disagrees and contends that "not even the broadest reading
of Klaxon suggests that it embraces the stare decisis effect of [internal choice of law
decisions] on federal-as opposed to state-courts." She says that the Illinois internal choice
of law cases addressed their comments to state, not federal courts, and points out that in
1941, when Klaxon was decided, the prevailing choice of law rules used by state courts
reflected those found in the now discredited first RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. Geri
J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 1,
34-35 (1989).
While it is true that the Illinois internal choice of law cases were addressed to state
courts, so are state external choice of law cases addressed by superior state courts to inferior
state courts. Moreover, although Klaxon was decided in the era of the first RESTATEMENT,
its principles were forcefully reaffirmed well into the era of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
when the Fifth Circuit was reversed after being tempted to make some modem innovations
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As in Florida, the Illinois internal choice of law rule of stare decisis
requires that all trial courts in the state be bound by the decision of the
appellate court of any district and by their own district court if there is a
conflict.224 Also, as in Florida, the Illinois district courts do not consider
themselves bound by the decisions of other districts.225
Judge Marshall feels bound by the rule of Bosch and the Seventh
Circuit to apply the state supreme court predictive approach when confront-
ed with a litigant's claim that he is bound by an intermediate appellate court
decision.226 On the other hand, Judge Shadur considers himself free of
some of the binding effects of those cases because the courts that rendered
them did not take into consideration the internal choice of law rules that are
binding on Illinois state courts.
Judge Shadur answered the criticism of his method, in part, as follows:
This Court is of course aware of the opinions of some of its
colleagues who prefer the greater flexibility of trying to predict what the
Illinois Supreme Court would do if and when faced with the same kind
of conflict among Appellate Districts. And there are of course some
statements in opinions by our Court of Appeals (and even one or two
bits of language in United States Supreme Court opinions) supporting
that predictive approach. But not one of those statements has dealt in
terms with the situation (which may or may not be unique to Illinois)
where an integral part of Illinois substantive law-which we federal
judges are duty-bound to adhere to and follow under Erie-is a rule that
mandates every Illinois trial court to follow current opinions in its own
Appellate District, even if it might prefer the differing views of another
Appellate District (or even if it believed the Illinois Supreme Court,
on Texas' choice of law rules. See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3
(1975).
It is hard to see how Judge Shadur can be faulted, therefore, for extrapolating from
Klaxon the general principle that federal courts, applying state law, are required to follow
state choice of law rules, whether internal or external.
224. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (111. 1992). At
the time Judge Shadur wrote his opinions, this rule had been adopted by some of the state
districts, but had not been approved by the Illinois Supreme Court. Since then, the Illinois
Supreme Court has cited those intermediate appellate opinions with apparent approval. Id.
(citing People v. Thorpe, 367 N.E.2d 960 (I11. App. Ct. 1977); Garcia v. Hynes & Howes
Real Estate, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 634 (I11. App. Ct. 1975)). These were the very same cases
relied upon by Judge Shadur in formulating his rule of intrastate choice of law rules.
225. See Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 190, at 588-95, and cases cited therein.
226. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 540 (citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
456 (1967); In re Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d 1189, 1196-98 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 464 U S. 866 (1983)).
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given the opportunity, might opt for the other District's view) ....
Ordinarily the job of a state trial court, in the absence of controlling
state supreme court precedent, is to make its best effort to decide what
its supreme court would do if faced with the same problem. That task
really accounts for the opinions that express a federal court's responsi-
bilities in the same terms where state law is to provide the rule of
decision. And that is so because of Erie itself and the very reason why
it mandated federal courts' adherence to state substantive law .... But
the same principle that informs Erie and its progeny compels a wholly
different approach where the duty of the state trial court is not
Supreme-Court-prediction but Appellate-Court-adherence. After all, .
. [internal choice of law cases] express at least as binding a substantive
law principle in Erie terms as the substantive doctrines of contract or
tort law we federal judges may be asked to choose between where the
intermediate state courts differ. And, not so incidentally, the . . .
[internal choice of law] rule is one as to which there is no split of
Illinois authority and there is no reason to believe that the Illinois
Supreme Court disagrees with the rule-indeed at least as recently as
1981 that court deliberately passed up the opportunity to announce a
different rule ....
[S]o long as Erie binds us, we are not free to pick and choose which
established state law doctrines we want to follow and which we do not
- to ignore the unequivocal [state] choice-of-law mandate in favor of
giving ourselves greater latitude in essaying to predict future Illinois
Supreme Court decisions where Illinois Appellate Districts differ on
rules of law. That latter approach fosters forum shopping in precisely
the way Erie sought to eliminate: by creating the prospect of differing
results for the diversity plaintiff who has a choice between filing suit in
one of two Clerk of Court's Offices four blocks apart on Chicago's
Dearborn Street, or for the diversity defendant who must decide whether
or not to remove a case from the northernmost of those courts to the
southernmost.
227
3. Another Thrust by Marshall
In one opinion Judge Marshall had criticized Judge Shadur's position
for, among other things, failing to take into account the lack of coincidence
of the geographical territory of the federal districts in Illinois and the
geographic territory of the state appellate districts. Judge Marshall pointed
out that the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois comprises
not only Cook County but also several other counties, all of which lie in
227. Rizzo, 632 F. Supp. at 1131-32. This last "prediction" of Judge Shadur turned out
to be true. See Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d at 539.
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districts other than the First District. Moreover, in cases where all
defendants are non-residents, Illinois law permits the plaintiff to bring suit
in any county. Marshall writes:
Thus, ... [Judge Shadur's] approach is inconsistent with Erie in that it
might require a federal court to apply a rule of decision that would not
be used if plaintiff filed in state court. In fact, . . . [Judge Shadur's
rule] would enable a defendant to forum-shop by removing [actions] to
federal court ... [which are] brought in non-Cook County areas of the
Northern District of Illinois, in which ... [the defendant] wants to avail
itself of the law of the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court.228
[At this point the authors intrude into the debate to illustrate how the
lack of geographical coincidence applies also to Florida. See Appendix A].
4. The Shadur Sidestep
Judge Shadur subsequently modified his position to sidestep this
criticism of his approach. He indicated that his adherence to Illinois'
internal choice of law rules, regarding the binding effect on intermediate
appellate decisions on state trial courts,
should not be misread as automatically looking to the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District just because this Court sits (in the literal
physical sense) within that District. Such an approach could of course
lead to exactly the same kind of forum shopping [which] Erie and this
Court seek to avoid. What proper analysis calls for is a two-step
inquiry: First, the federal court must determine which is the proper
Appellate District to look to (in a case originally filed in this District
Court, that is a function of the Illinois venue provisions that would have
controlled the plaintiffs choice had the suit been filed in state court; in
a removed case, the location of the state court where suit was filed
provides the precise and obvious answer). Second, only then does the
federal court ascertain the applicable state law as in force in that
Appellate District (including, if relevant, the use of the . . . [state
internal choice-of-law] rule).229
5. Agreement on Intradistrict Conflicts
When there is a conflict between decisions of the same Illinois state
228. Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 644-45 (N.D. I1. 1982).
229. Rizzo, 632 F. Supp. at 1132-33.
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district appellate court, Judge Shadur takes the position that he should then
rule as he thinks the state supreme court would rule.23
G. Florida Federal Courts
Most federal courts agree with Judge Marshall's view that federal
courts should decide issues of state law based on the way they think those
issues would be decided by the highest court in the state-while at the same
time giving proper deference to state intermediate appellate court deci-
sions."' One commentator who recently reviewed the problem says that,
"[e]xtensive research has disclosed only two cases in which other federal
judges perceive their Erie role as somewhat akin to Judge Shadur's
view. '  However, to the extent that those two cases can be considered
"holdings," they are binding on federal courts in Florida.233
In Farmer v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,234 the Fifth Circuit panel said:
Although not all Florida District Courts of Appeal have decided the
question and the matter may be finally resolved as a matter of Florida
law by the Florida Supreme Court, the Second District Court of Appeal
has decided the matter. A state action by this Lee County plaintiff
would have been reviewed by the Second District. Undoubtedly the
trial court and the Second District would have followed the recent
Second District opinion. Thus, the same law has been applied in federal
court as would have been applied in the specific courts available to
plaintiff in the state system. 235
The Farmer court would not certify the question to the Florida Supreme
Court, warning that: "It is not the proper office of the certification procedure
to permit a party, by choosing a federal over a state forum, to get the
230. Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F. Supp. 561, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Commercial Discount
Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841, 845 (N.D. II1. 1982).
231. See generally 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 88-103.
232. Yonover, supra note 223, at 28 n.184.
233, Farmer v. Travelers Indem. Co., 539 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1976), and Peoples Bank
v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 1544 (11 th Cir. 1986), both involved federal courts applying Florida
state law. The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that Fifth Circuit cases decided before September
30, 1981, are binding on judges within the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The Bonner case also adopted the Fifth Circuit
rule that "a prior decision of the circuit (panel or en banc) could not be overruled by a panel
but only by the court sitting en banc." Id. at 1209.
234. Farmer, 539 F.2d at 562.
235. Id. at 563 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Florida Supreme Court's attention through this Court to issues which that
Court [the Florida Supreme Court] has refused to accept from state
litigants." '236
Farmer was easy; there were two intermediate appellate cases that had
both decided the same way. The only two United States Supreme Court
cases cited by the court were Erie and Hanna v. Plumer.17 Hanna had
little to do with determining the content of state law, but it did mention the
"twin aims" of Erie.
238
The Eleventh Circuit case of Peoples Bank v. Roberts2 39 presented a
slightly more: complex problem, while at the same time predicting that more
complex problems were to come. The question of state law had been
decided the same way by all five state appellate courts of appeal. Only one
case had deviated from the majority, a 1984 decision by the Third District.
An earlier Third District case, decided in 1976, had gone along with what
was then a unanimous majority. The case before the Eleventh Circuit would
have been reviewed by the Second District had it been brought in state
court, and that district went along with the majority. The Eleventh Circuit
panel said:
Although the intermediate court decisions are not unanimous, we accept
the overwhelming majority rule as controlling state law for two reasons:
First, there is no indication the Florida Supreme Court would decide the
issue otherwise, and second, it is the law that would have been applied
"in the specific courts available to plaintiff in the state system." 240
Peoples Bank was also a relatively easy case, but it began to sow the
seeds of a real dilemma. The first (Judge Marshall's view) and second
(Judge Shadur's view) reasons given in the paragraph above just happen to
be in harmony. However, the federal trial judge is faced with a dilemma
when he thinks the Florida Supreme Court would decide the case as the
majority had decided, but also believes that a different rule would be applied
in the specific courts available to plaintiff in the state system. In addition,
the Florida Supreme Court may have refused to review the issue for state
litigants.
Under the Florida certification procedure, the federal trial court cannot
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 460; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
239. 779 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1986).
240. Id. at 1546 (quoting Farmer, 539 F.2d at 563).
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certify.24' The Eleventh Circuit has said that its panels are bound by Fifth
Circuit decisions, and the Fifth Circuit said, in Farmer, that it is not proper
to certify questions on issues which the Florida Supreme Court has refused
to accept from state litigants.242
To the extent that what the Fifth Circuit said in Farmer and what the
Eleventh Circuit said in Peoples Bank can be considered holdings, the
Eleventh Circuit may have just tied itself into a Gordian knot; a knot which
could only be cut by an en banc proceeding or by a United States Supreme
Court holding. True, there is language in both Farmer and Peoples Bank
which leaves it open for a court to follow the state supreme court predictive
approach. However, the opinions taken together are at best ambiguous.
A federal trial judge hearing a case with the same legal issue as the one
in Peoples Bank would be without guidance if the state court venue had
been the Third District. 43 Which part of the Peoples Bank holding should
the judge follow when there is no reason to believe that the Florida Supreme
Court would decide one way or the other? Should the judge follow the rule
of the majority, or the rule that would bind a state judge in the Third
District? 44 Although the matter is far from certain, it appears that Judge
Shadur's viewpoint 245 has at least some vitality in the Eleventh Circuit.
In many instances Florida provides for statewide venue.246 Of the
241. Of course, the trial judge could always certify the question to the Eleventh Circuit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1992), and that court could then certify under article V, section
3(b)(6) of the Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes section 25.031 (1993), and Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.150.
242. Farmer, 539 F.2d at 563.
243. The problem raised in the substantive issue in Peoples Bank must have been fairly
common, otherwise it would not have been litigated so many times. Thus, it is not difficult
to believe that the problem arises often in Florida's most populous county, which is included
within the Third District.
244. The situation in Peoples Bank involved two Third District opinions: a 1976 case
that was in the majority, and a 1984 case that was the sole minority position among the
appellate courts. Does this provide the solution, or does it merely raise more questions?
Should the federal judge follow the later case on the theory that, as presently constituted, the
Third District today would be more likely to follow it, or should the judge follow the earlier
case, either because it was first, or because it is in the majority, or both? Although the
Supreme Court of Florida has said that the later panel overrules the former panel, State v.
Walker, 593 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1992), this does not necessarily mean that the supreme court
itself would follow the holding of the second panel.
245. See supra notes 216-30 and accompanying text.
246. The general venue statute, Florida Statutes section 47.011 (1991), does not apply
to non-residents. Thus, transitory state court actions may be brought against non-residents
in any county. Corporations, domestic and foreign, who do business on a statewide basis are
particularly vulnerable to suit in almost any of the five appellate districts under Florida
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three federal districts in Florida, only the northern is located entirely within
one state appellate district.247 What is supposed to happen, under the
Farmer and Peoples Bank holdings, when venue is properly laid in United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and the same suit
could have been filed properly in a state court in either the First, Second,
or Fifth Districts of the state appellate system? If there are conflicting
decisions among those state districts, which should be applied? Should it
matter whether the case was brought originally to the federal court, or
whether it was removed there? For example, in Farmer, the Fifth Circuit
was reviewing a case from the federal district court of the Middle District
of Florida. The federal Middle District includes counties within the venue
of the state's First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.248 The
Farmer court said that a state action by "this Lee County plaintiff would
have been reviewed by the Second District," '249 which would have fol-
lowed the recent Second District opinion that the Fifth Circuit applied. The
assumption is that the Lee County plaintiff would have filed any state action
in Lee County within the second district. The plaintiff might well have
found state 'venue proper for a suit against the corporate defendant in
Osceola County, which is within the Fifth District, and brought his
hypothetical state action there. If the Fifth District substantive rule
conflicted with the Second District rule, how would the federal Middle
District judge know which to apply, since, in fact, the Lee County plaintiff
did not actually file in any state court?
One more possibility exists, which if not a Gordian knot is at least a
jurisprudentially awkward situation. Under Judge Shadur's view the same
judge may apply the law of Florida differently to similar cases. The federal
Southern District includes counties within the venue of the state's Second,
Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal.25° Federal District Judge
Wisely, of the Southern District of Florida, has two cases on her diversity
docket on a given day. They raise identical questions of law. The "proper
venue" of the one, if it had been brought in state court, would be Dade
County in the state's Third District. The proper venue of the other would
have been in Broward County in the Fourth District. Decisions of the courts
of appeal for the Third District conflict with those of the Fourth District.
Judge Wisely rules in favor of one plaintiff and the next hour in the same
Statutes section 47.051 (1991).
247. See Appendix A.
248. See id.
249. Farmer, 539 F.2d at 563.
250. See Appendix A.
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courtroom rules against the other plaintiff. These results might be difficult
to explain to laypersons, seeking equality under "the law of Florida."25 '
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has considered these issues of applying state law where there are
intrastate conflicts.
H. Can the Dilemma be Avoided-Abstention and
Certification252
There are some instances where federal courts can avoid deciding
issues of state law, and thus avoid the problem of conflicting state appellate
court decisions. In certain cases it is appropriate for a federal court to
abstain from deciding the case. However, cases where abstention is proper
are relatively rare.2"3 The Supreme Court has held that "the difficulties
of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law
to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to
decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought
to it for decision. 254
In some instances the dilemma can be avoided through the process of
certification of questions of state law to the Florida Supreme Court.255
251. Where interstate conflicts exist, similar results could occur. For example, where
multiple parties are involved in one occurrence, different state laws may apply to different
parties. However, that situation strikes the objective observer less heavily because different
substantive rules among states are inherent in the federal system.
252. Only 12 states and the District of Columbia lack some certification procedure. Of
those that have adopted it, eight (including Florida) make certification of questions of state
law to the highest state court available only to federal circuit courts and the United States
Supreme Court. The other states and Puerto Rico allow certification by federal district
courts. Thirteen states and Puerto Rico allow certification from courts of other states. See
Yonover, supra note 223, at 16-17 (citing the various state statutes, rules, and constitutional
provisions dealing with certification).
253. For a discussion of the various abstention doctrines, see 17A PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 144, §§ 4241-47.
254. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
255. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6); FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1993); FLA. APP. R. 9.150.
On the process of certification, see generally Larry M. Roth, Certified Questions from the
Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1979); Robert B. Lillich
& Raymond T. Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18
UCLA L. REV. 888 (1971); Vincent L. McKusick, Certification: A Procedure for
Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 ME. L. REV. 33 (1964); 17A Practice and
Procedure, supra note 144, § 4248. One problem with certification is that it has the potential
for creating long delays in adjudication of private disputes. See Brian Mattis, Certification
of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U.
664
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However, Florida's federal trial courts are not permitted to certify questions
of state law to the Florida Supreme Court. Only federal appellate courts and
the United States Supreme Court have that privilege. Given the limited
jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court available to state litigants, it may
be that federal court certification is the best strategy for a litigant to get a
question answered by the Florida Supreme Court.256 This strategy may
give federal litigants an advantage over state litigants. It may further
disadvantage all state litigants by tying up the supreme court's docket with
federally certified questions. 57
Though some problems can be avoided by use of abstention and
certification., those devices are of only limited utility given the myriad of
problems surrounding conflicting state appellate decisions. Abstention is
usually inappropriate or forbidden, and certification is often impractical-if
not for the litigants," 8 then for the courts that are involved.
I. When Abstention is Unavailable and Certification
Impractical-What Then?
What should a federal judge do when faced with conflicting decisions
by state intermediate appellate courts? Is Judge Marshall correct in saying
that he is bound by Bosch and the decisions of his circuit court to follow the
state supreme court predictive approach; or, is Judge Shadur right when he
says that he is not bound by those same holdings because those courts did
MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969).
256. But see supra text accompanying note 236.
257. In Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 445 P.2d 1012 (Wash. 1968), a question of state
law had been certified by a United States District Court to the Supreme Court of Washington.
An obviously disgruntled Judge Hale dissented, and stated: "The question of speed, of
course, gives rise to another question of policy. At the time the instant case was argued in
this court .... this court had pending a backlog of approximately 700 cases, some of which
were of high precedential value and of exigent importance to the parties." Id. at 1014-15
(Hale, J., dissenting).
258. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one lawsuit,
let alone two. Shuttling-the parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure
way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not an academic
exercise. There are no foundations to finance the resolution of nice state law
questions involved in federal court litigation. The parties are entitled-absent
unique and rare situations-to adjudication of their rights in the tribunals which
Congress has empowered to act.
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not consider the problem in the context of states' internal choice of law
rules?
Since the United States Supreme Court has never addressed the
problem, it seems that the only way to solve it is to use a United States
Supreme Court predictive approach. Would the United States Supreme
Court hold that in deciding issues of state law, consideration should be
given to a state's internal choice of law rules? Should it matter whether a
state has a viable certification process whereby federal courts can certify
questions of state law to the highest state court? These and similar
questions can only be answered by the United States Supreme Court. If the
past is any guide, it may take years for the answers to come.
Meanwhile, state and federal judges (and no doubt many lawyers)
deplore the problem of conflicting intermediate appellate court decisions.
Judge Marshall has mentioned "the confusion engendered by the failure of
the various districts and divisions of the appellate court to follow each
others' rulings .... [259] While this is perhaps lamentable, it nevertheless
reflects 'state law' within the meaning of Erie and we are therefore required
to take account of it." 2
60
Similar concern was expressed by Florida Supreme Court Justice James
C. Adkins concurring in the adoption of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure. While concurring in their adoption, Justice Adkins pointed out
that
the present rules of appellate procedure fail to solve a problem which
is causing confusion in the case law of Florida. The district courts of
appeal are frequently expressly recognizing in opinions that a decision
is in conflict with a sister district court. Unless one of the parties
brings a petition for certiorari to this Court the conflict remains in the
reported case law and the trial judge is faced with the dilemma of
selecting one of two conflicting district courts of appeals decisions as
the proper case law. The law is unsettled.26'
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Florida legal system has a long history of cooperation with the
259. Roberts v. Westem-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (citing Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 190, at 571).
260. Id.
261. The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d at 1123-25 (Adkins,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
1382 [Vol. 18
666
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Mattis / Mattis
federal judiciary. Florida was the first state to have a process whereby
federal courts could certify questions of Florida law to the state supreme
court. Florida was the first state to have that process approved by the
United States Supreme Court. The Florida Legislature adopted its
certification statute in 1945.262 In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,263
Justice Frankfurter credited the Florida Legislature with "rare foresight" in
dealing with "the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state
law involved in federal litigation by [enacting] a statute which permits a
federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme
Court of Florida for its decision. 264  The statute lay dormant until the
United States Supreme Court suggested, in the Clay opinion, that Florida
adopt a procedure for its use. A procedure was adopted, 265 and the state
law question in Clay was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida.
2 66
Subsequently, the procedure was made part of the state constitution.267
Florida is a cosmopolitan state and much of the work of the relevant
federal courts is the business of Florida. Nonetheless, the burden of this
article is not to suggest changes in Florida's stare decisis approach merely
to facilitate the work of federal judges who must apply "the law of Florida."
All Florida citizens, those who litigate in state courts as well as federal
courts and those who plan transactions to which Florida law might apply,
will benefit by a greater respect for the effect of the doctrine of stare decisis
on court decisions. We recommend that horizontal precedential effect be
accorded to decisions of Florida's courts of appeal. We begin by examining
the experience of a state where that solution has been tried.
A. A Modelfor Statewide Stare Decisis
Until about three years ago, the problem of unresolved conflicts among
decisions of Michigan's intermediate appellate court had become scandal-
ous.26 Although that state has only one such court, the Michigan Court
of Appeals, '69 the twenty-four judges2.. are elected from three judicial
262. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1946).
263. 363 U.S. at 207.
264. Id. at 212 (citing FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (Supp. 1957)).
265. FLA. R. APP. P. 4.61 (current version at FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.150).
266. Sun Ins, Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1961).
267. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
268. Edward M. Wise, The Legal Culture of Troglodytes: Conflicts between Panels of
the Court of Appeals, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 313 (1991); see also Mattis, Stare Decisis
Michigan, supra note 191, at 265.
269. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
270. Micti. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.301 (Supp. 1993).
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districts27' and sit, rotating in several locations around the state, in panels
of three. 72 Before November 1, 1990, the stare decisis rules in Michigan
were: 1) all trial courts were bound by the decision of a panel of the court
of appeals (vertical stare decisis obtained), but 2) one panel of the court of
appeals was not bound by the decision of any other panel (horizontal stare
decisis was not honored). 273  The similarity between Michigan's pre-1990
approach and Florida's present approach, despite the difference in judicial
structure, is manifested in a quotation often repeated in Michigan cases that
sounds like Chief Justice Barkett's recent statement about Florida stare
decisis. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
While decisions of this Court [of appeals] are not precedent setting in
the sense that subsequent panels of this Court are bound to follow
earlier opinions, "a decision of any division of this Court is controlling
statewide until a contrary decision is reached by another division on the
identical question or until such decision is reversed by the Supreme
Court.
2 74
Not surprisingly, a chaos of conflicting decisions reigned in Michi-
gan.275  Later decisions did not purport to overrule prior inconsistent
decisions, but one panel would merely shrug off authority that it did not
271. Id. § 600.302.
272. MICH. CT. R. 7.201(D), 7.201(F).
273. Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan, supra note 191, at 272-85.
274. City of Detroit v. Recorder's Court Traffic & Ordinance Judge, 304 N.W.2d 829,
835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Hackett v. Kress, 133 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Mich. Ct. App.
1965)).
Compare the Michigan quotation with Chief Justice Barkett's statement that the
decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are
overruled by the supreme court, that in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court
decisions bind all Florida trial courts, and that "[c]ontrarily, as between District Courts of
Appeal, a sister district's opinion is merely persuasive." Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666-
67 (Fla. 1992).
275. See Wise, supra note 268, at 318; see also Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan, supra
note 191, at 274-301. For example, on the issue of whether a third party could testify about
an out-of-court identification of a criminal defendant made by another witness, the court of
appeals held such testimony inadmissible 12 times, admissible nine times, and one time it
declined to decide because of the harmless error rule. People v. Malone, 483 N.W.2d 470,
474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (Connor, J., concurring) (citing People v. Newcomb, 476 N.W.2d
749, 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 483 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. 1992)). The
conflict was ultimately resolved by the court of appeals pursuant to Administrative Order No.
1990-6. See Newcomb, 476 N.W.2d at 752.
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choose to follow.276 Then in late 1990 the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan... promulgated Administrative Order 1990-6 designed to end the cri-
sis.2" It has succeeded very well.
The most dramatic part of Administrative Order 1990-6 is its first
sentence: "A panel of the Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law
established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on
or after November 1, 1990."279 The published decision remains control-
ling authority unless reversed, modified, or overruled by the supreme court
or a special panel of the court of appeals. Provision is made for convening
a special panel where a panel indicates in the text of its opinion that it
follows a prior published decision only because it is required to do so by
Administrative Order 1990-6. In other words, the disgruntled panel may
trigger the conditions necessary for convening the special panel, but it must
follow the prior decision. The new order neatly avoids a conflict in the
appellate court. If a majority of the appellate judges believe that the issue
merits further attention, then twelve judges are selected who together with
the chief judge form the special panel. The panel decision is vacated and
the special panel resolves the matter by a decision that is binding statewide
upon the court of appeals as well as upon all lower courts, unless reversed
or modified by the Michigan Supreme Court.28°
The horizontal stare decisis rule has worked well in Michigan. Without
the convening of a special panel, conflicts existing before November 1,
1990, have been resolved in numerous cases..' by a published panel
276. Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan, supra note 191, at 274-99. Dean Wise's
observation that refusing to follow a prior decision is in fact no different from overruling it,
is highly persuasive. Wise, supra note 268, at 321.
277. The supreme court shall prescribe the rules for the practice and procedure of the
court of appeals. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 10.
278. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv (1990), was effective
November 1, 1990, and was to remain in effect until December 31, 1991. It was continued
in effect by Administrative Order No. 1991-11,439 Mich. cxliv (1991), until December 31,
1992, and by Administrative Order No. 1992-8, 441 Mich. lii (1992), until December 31,
1993. See Jennings v. Southwood, 499 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (Neff, J.,
concurring).
279. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. xxxiv (1990).
280. Id. A petition to convene a special panel is not a prerequisite to filing an
application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court from the panel decision. Id.
281. Gonyea v. Motor Parts Fed. Credit Union, 480 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(cited in Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek Michigan, 487 N.W.2d 205, 221 (Mich.
1992) (Riley, ,, concurring) as "controlling authority" and "binding precedent") (followed
in Prysak v. R.L.. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)); People v. Lannom,
480 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App.), aftj'd, 490 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Mich. 1992) (per curiam).
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decision issued after November 1, 1990, that pursuant to Administrative
Order 1990-6 binds all panels.282 Conflicts that would have been created
were it not for Administrative Order 1990-6 have been avoided in cases
where the deciding panel expressly indicated that but for Administrative
Order 1990-6 it would rule contrary to a prior decision.2"3 In many other
One justice would have denied leave to appeal to the supreme court because the split of
authority in the court of appeals was resolved by a "first out" opinion under the Administra-
tive Order. Id. at 399 (Levin, J., separate opinion). Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bronson Plating Co., 496 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appealgranted, 506 N.W.2d
877 (1993); People v. Gardner, 487 N.W.2d 515 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting case
discussed and followed in People v. Parr, 494 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(Corrigan, J., concurring) (questioning the majority analysis of Gardner), appeal denied, 505
N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1993)); Rouse v. Wesley, 494 N.W.2d 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal
denied, 503 N.W.2d 440 (Mich. 1993); Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. Frederick & Herrud, Inc.,
479 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (resolving on remand a complex ERISA issue,
according to Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rospatch Corp. Employee Benefit Plan, 489 N.W.2d
204, 207 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App.1992)), appeal granted, 491 N.W.2d 571 (Mich. 1992); Brown
v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 292 (1991 ) (seeking grandparents' visitation rights); People v. Landt,
469 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. Ct. App.), rev'd, 475 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. 1991) (noting discussion
in People v. Schollaert, 486 N.W.2d 312, 317 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 494
N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 1992)); People v. Punga, 465 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
Postema v. Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (resolving long-standing
conflict regarding postgraduate degree as a divisible marital asset); Smith v. Michigan Bell
Tel. Co., 472 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
282. The rule that a post November 1, 1990, decision of a panel binds all panels of the
court of appeals is now well accepted. In addition to the results and language of the cases
cited in notes 239-40 supra, the court of appeals sometimes notes that its decision creates a
new rule of law that will bind in the future. E.g., Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
499 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (following a pre-Administrative Order decision);
Brown v. Yousif. 499 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Rowell v. Security Steel
Processing Co., 491 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted in part, 500
N.W.2d 469 (Mich. 1993).
283. The court in Fetz Eng'g Co. v. Ecco Sys., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), vacated, 483 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1992), said that the precedent case was wrongly
decided and that it followed that case only because it was required to do so by Administrative
Order No. 1990-6. A petition to submit Fetz to a special panel pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 1990-6 was denied. The supreme court granted leave to appeal, (as explained in
Dane Constr., Inc. v. Royal's Wine & Deli, Inc., 480 N.W.2d 343, 344 n.l (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), appeal denied, 486 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. 1992)), vacated the court of appeals opinion,
and remanded to the trial court. Fetz, 483 N.W.2d at 619.
Other cases where a conflict would have been created but for Administrative Order No.
1990-6 are: People v. Hadley, 501 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (dissenting judge
believed prior decisions were distinguishable); Generou v. Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric
Hosp., 480 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 486 N.W.2d 733 (Mich.
1992); People v. Martinez, 485 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Askwith v. City of Sault
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cases the reluctant compliance of a panel in following a prior published
panel decision under Administrative Order 1990-6 indicates that a conflict
might well have been created but for the order. 84 A jurisprudentially
sound deference for stare decisis is manifested in those cases that merely
follow the horizontal precedent as required by the Administrative Order,
without further significant comment.285
Ste. Marie, 477 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (concurring judge believed that precedent
case was correctly decided); Makky v. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 309
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 508 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. 1993); Benson v. Callahan
Mining Corp., 479 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 485 N.W.2d 501
(Mich. 1992).
284. E.g., Jenerou v. Jenerou, 503 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Stein,
Nos. 142771, 88-502, 1993 WL 195679 (Mich. Ct. App. June 8, 1993); Warden v. Fenton
Lanes, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted in part, 506
N.W.2d 877 (Mich. 1993); People v. Landis, 494 N.W.2d 865 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992),
appeal denied, 505 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1993); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fisher, 481
N.W.2d 743, 746 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 496 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1993).
285. E.g., Jennings v. Southwood, 499 N.W.2d 460 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Lombardi
v. William Beaumont Hosp., 502 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that to the
extent the "suggesting" in a later 1991 decision conflicted with an earlier 1991 decision, the
earlier 1991 decision "is controlling authority under Administrative Order Nos. 1990-6 and
1992-8, since the Sobh [earlier] preceded the Bachula [later] by several months"); People v.
Cutchall, 504 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (following People v. Buck, 496
N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), without further comment; concurring opinion would rule
otherwise were it not for the prior decision); People v. Gallego, 502 N.W.2d 358 (Mich. Ct,
App. 1993); Holland v. Liedel, 494 N.W.2d 772, 775 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal
denied, 503 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 1993); Keen v. Keen, 486 N.W.2d 105, 106 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Pavlov v. Community Emergency Medical Serv., Inc., 491 N.W.2d 874, 879 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992) appeal denied, 500 N.W.2d 478 (Mich. 1993); People v. Buck, 496 N.W.2d
321, 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 498 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. 1993) (following
post-Administrative Order decisions of panels of the court of appeals on three issues, one of
which was then pending before the supreme court: "until such time as our Supreme Court
decides the issue, we are bound by Deans"); People v. Malone, 483 N.W.2d 470, 472 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted in part, 500 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. 1993); People v. Spearman,
491 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 497 N.W.2d 188 (Mich.), revd
inpart sub nom. People v. Rush 504 N.W.2d 185 (Mich. 1993); Prysak v. R.L. Polk.Co., 483
N.W.2d 629, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Reese v. County of Wayne, 483 N.W.2d 671, 672
(Mich. Ct. App.) (seeing "no reason to disagree"), appeal denied, 495 N.W.2d 382 (Mich.
1992); Richardson v. Warren Consol. School Dist., 496 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Thompson v. Fitzpatrick, 501 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 503
N.W.2d 911 (Mich. 1993); People v. Milton, 478 N.W.2d 740 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal
denied, 494 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. 1992); People v. Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), appeal denied, 479 N.W.2d 697 (Mich. 1992); People v. Williams, 473 N.W.2d 727
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (following a post-Administrative Order published panel decision that
was later overruled by special panel in People v. Hill, 480 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App.
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In the almost three years of the operation of Administrative Order
1990-6 special panels have convened only three times.286 Were it not for
Administrative Order 1990-6, the Supreme Court of Michigan would have
had the duty to resolve conflicts not only in these three cases but in the
many others that the court of appeals resolved and avoided without special
panel treatment.28
7
Even though Administrative Order 1990-6 has proved generally
1991), appeal denied, 480 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1992) in a seven to six decision), appeal
denied, 478 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. 1991); Yarrick v. Village of Kent City, 473 N.W.2d 774,
775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), vacated, 489 N.W.2d 82 (Mich. 1992).
Occasionally a panel follows horizontal precedent noting that it agrees with the prior
decision. E.g., Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rospatch Corp. Employee Benefit Plan, 489
N.W.2d 204, 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Watts, 464 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. 1991); National Indem. Co. v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Sys[s]., Inc., 489 N.W.2d 175, 177 n.I (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (agreeing with and
following what was arguably dicta).
It would be difficult to ascertain the exact number of cases that have followed prior
panel precedent because many decisions are unpublished. Of course, a panel is bound by
post-November 1, 1990, published decisions, even though the deciding panel's decision is not
to be published. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv (1990); Keen v. Keen,
486 N.W.2d 105, 106 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). Only published decisions, however, have
precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis. MICH. CT. R. 7.215(C)(1); see Makowski
v. Towles, 489 N.W.2d 133, 134 n.i (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Polus, 495 N.W.2d
402, 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
286. Maner v. Ford Motor Co., 493 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (resolving four
year old conflict regarding deduction of other benefits from worker's compensation weekly
wage loss payments), affd, 502 N.W.2d 197 (Mich. 1993); People v. Brashier, 496 N.W.2d
385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (resolving sixteen year old conflict regarding the definition of
"gross indecency"), appeal granted, 508 N.W.2d 490 (Mich. 1993); People v. Hill, 480
N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (noting justifications for sentencing judge's departure
from mandatory minimum sentences), appeal denied, 480 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1992).
287. Sometimes the supreme court must resolve a conflict among court of appeals
judges. One example is Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568 (Mich. Ct App. 1992). Panels of
the court of appeals were having difficulty interpreting whether a supreme court decision
related to the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction or the parties' lack of standing.
The later of two post-Administrative Order panel decisions distinguished the earlier one and
said that the earlier interpretation of the supreme court decision was dicta. The supreme
court then had to decide whether its prior decision rested on a lack of standing or subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
Following two post-Administrative Order panel decisions taking different viewpoints
on whether a minor's estate as well as the minor's family could recover under the dramshop
act (the latter labeling the former's interpretation dicta), the supreme court reversed both
decisions and held that neither the estate nor the family could recover. See LaGuire v. Kain,
487 N.W.2d 389 (Mich. 1992); Estate of Kuikstra v. Cheers Good Time Saloons, Inc., 489
N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 1992).
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successful, it was originally issued over the dissent of Justice Boyle. She
objected that "[s]uch a momentous change in the legal culture of this state
should be preceded by full research and study of such matters as the
experience with the conflict question in the intermediate courts of appeals
of our sister states .... ."" Florida has an opportunity for such research
and study during the years before the convening of the constitution revision
commission. ' s' The horizontal, or statewide stare decisis model may prove
useful.
The similarity between Michigan's pre-1990 approach and Florida's
present approach, despite the difference in judicial structure, has been
noted.2 90 We may now ask whether, in view of the difference in judicial
structure, the conflict avoidance technique of a state with a unitary appellate
court could be utilized in a state with multiple appellate courts. If a
horizontal stare decisis model is desirable and practicable, we must then
288. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv, lxxxvi (1990).
289. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2. Under article XI, section 2, of the Florida Constitution,
the constitution revision commission will convene in 1998.
Other states where studies have been done include Illinois and New Mexico. Illinois
is a unitary appellate court state, but unlike Michigan, it has not adopted horizontal stare
decisis. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § I. The judges of the Appellate Court of Illinois are elected
from five judicial districts and each district must have at least one division to which at least
three judges are assigned. Id. §§ 2, 5. No action has been taken to change the judge-made
rules that a decision of the appellate court is not binding on the appellate court in "other
appellate districts," and is binding on the trial courts throughout the state. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ill. 1992). The appellants in a more
recent case contended that conflicts within the appellate court constituted grounds for
reversal. See Brief for Appellant at 2, 12-15, Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246
(I11. 1993). The supreme court, however, did not mention equal protection arguments in its
opinion. See Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246 (III. 1993). Interestingly enough,
however, the Illinois Supreme Court had previously talked in clear equal protection language
a few years before when it said that "by granting these [Third District] defendants a new
trial, we would be unfairly discriminating against other similarly situated defendants.., who
happened to be tried outside the third district." People v. Harris, 526 N.E.2d 335, 341 (I11.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v. Illinois, 488 U.S. 902 (1988) (emphasis added). On
the Illinois experience, see generally Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 190, at 571 (advocating
conflict avoidance); J. Timothy Eaton. et al., Resolving Conflicts in the Illinois Appellate
Court, 78 ILL. B .J. 182 (1990) (recommending conflict resolution by a special panel ofjudges
from the appellate court); see also Taylor Mattis, Precedential Value of Decisions of the
Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico, 22 N.M. L. REv. 535, 538 (1992) (discussing
instructive dialogue between two New Mexico intermediate appellate court judges, found in
State v. Bothne, No. 13,425 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 4), cert. denied, 822 P.2d 671 (N.M.
1991)).
290. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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inquire whether the change should be by supreme court rule or precedent or
by constitutional amendment.
B. Achieving Statewide Horizontal Stare Decisis in Florida
1. The Principle
We might begin with formulating a principle and regime. For the time
being, we shall call the former the Principle. The issue to be examined in
the following subsection is whether any change should be made by supreme
court rule or precedent or by constitutional amendment. The Principle
might be stated:
Any panel of a district court of appeal must follow the holding
of [or, the rule of law established by] a prior published decision
of any district court of appeal issued on or after [the effective
date of this enactment].
A choice of wording allows for consideration of which meaning is clearer:
a "rule of law established by" a prior decision, or "the holding of' a prior
decision. Either phrase would be more specific than "maintain[ing]
uniformity in the court's decisions," under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.331, about which courts have a history of disagreement.29'
Probably, the "holding of' a prior case is the preferable terminology, even
though legal scholars from law students to supreme court justices will
disagree about what was the holding of a particular case. That inherent
defect, if it is one, of the common-law system cannot be addressed here.
Consistent with Department of Legal Affairs v. District Court of
Appeal, 5th District, only prior published decisions of district courts would
be precedent.292 Adoption of the Principle would mean that a panel of any
district would be bound by the district court decision of its own or any other
district. The "law of the district" would be replaced by "the law of
Florida." The need for resolution of intradistrict conflicts would exist no
more, with the institution of statewide horizontal stare decisis.
Vertical stare decisis would continue, so that all trial courts would be
bound by any district decision. No longer would it be said that "absent a
conflicting district court decision," a trial court is bound. The dilemmas
now facing state and federal trial judges, federal appellate judges, as well as
291. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
292. 434 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1983).
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litigants and legal counselors, would be eased.
Providing that published decisions have statewide precedential effect
only after a certain date would prevent the confusion that would otherwise
arise where conflicts presently exist. The district decision "first out" after
enactment of the Principle would resolve the old conflict and stand as
precedent for the future.
Let those who fear that uniformity of law within a particular jurisdic-
tion means stagnation in the law293 be comforted. That has not been the
case in the jurisdictions that require horizontal stare decisis.114  The
foremost argument against that fear is that there is the Supreme Court of
Florida, which this recommendation does not suggest abolishing. A decision
made by the force of the Principle could be certified as a question of great
importance, under article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution, as
decisions in direct conflict with other district court decisions now are
certified. At least since 1956, a primary motivation of constitutional
amendments has been to free the supreme court to use its discretionary
jurisdiction to decide matters of important public policy.295 This proposal
would foster that goal. Under the present system, if the supreme court
chooses not to review, the conflict persists. Under the Principle, if the
supreme court chose not to review, no conflict would have been created in
the first place.
Moreover, even absent supreme court review, a decision of a district
court of appeal would not be carved in stone. Procedures would be
provided for a special en banc panel of district appellate judges to review
rules of law to which the supreme court had not spoken.
2. Some Details
Provision should be made to implement a procedure whereby a limited
number of district appellate judges could convene in a special en banc panel
and review certain district court decisions. To trigger eligibility for such
review, the panel opinion would have to state that the court is following a
293. See, e.g., Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv, lxxxvi-vii (1990)
(Boyle, J., dissenting) (stating "[c]onflict itself is neither bad or good; it may be an agent for
change or the source of chaos"). The authors could not disagree more with the first clause.
As for conflict's being an agent for change, a "bad" law uniformly applied within a
jurisdiction may well bring change more quickly than one applied willy-nilly to some parties
while other parties get the benefit of the "good" law.
294. Compare the experiences of the United States Courts of Appeals that require
horizontal stare decisis, as well as the experience of Michigan.
295. See Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 144-45.
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prior published decision only because it is required by the Principle to do
SO.296 Upon the vote of a majority of the judges of the district courts,297
the special en banc panel would convene. Perhaps too detailed for this
article is the question of how many district judges should be on the en banc
panel, or where it should meet. However, a judge or judges from each of
the five districts should be included. Florida has already had experience
with large en banc panels. In the present system for resolving intradistrict
conflicts all the judges of each district-the thirteen judges of the First
District, the twelve of the Second, the eleven of the Third, the twelve of the
Fourth, and the nine of the Fifth-298 are included in their respective intra-
district en banc panels.299 Certainly the special en banc panel should not
include all the appellate judges. Perhaps the five chief judges might be
appropriate decision makers"' and Tallahassee an appropriate meeting
place. To the extent that convening a special en banc panel is burdensome,
serious consideration will be given to triggering the mechanism."' Under
the present system it is all too easy for a panel in one district, because of a
slight preference for a different rule of law, to create a conflict by disagree-
ing and choosing not to follow the decision of another district. The
administrative burden is a small price to pay if it will ameliorate the
problems previously discussed.
The statement that the court is following a prior published decision
only because it is required by the Principle should not automatically trigger
a vote by all appellate judges on whether en banc treatment is desirable.
Procedure could require that only an appellate judge could request the vote,
or it might allow the parties to petition for special en banc treatment.
Again, Florida could draw on its experience with intradistrict en banc
procedure to inform this decision. Under the present rule an intradistrict
hearing en banc may be ordered only by a district court on its motion, but
a rehearing en banc may be ordered by the court on its own motion or on
296. This might be called the "chopped hay" statement: The prior published decision
that we must swallow goes down like chopped hay.
297. This would mean a majority of the appellate judges who participate in the vote.
Cf In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a Dist. Court of Appeal En Banc, Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d 1127, 1129 (Fla. 1982) (interpreting Rule 9.331
to mean a majority of the appellate judges who participate in the vote).
298. FLA. STAT. § 35.06 (1990).
299. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.331.
300. The chief judge of each of the district courts of appeal is selected by the members
of the court of that district. FLA. STAT. § 35.12 (1991).
301. The special en banc panel of Michigan's Court of Appeal has convened only three
times in three years. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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motion of a party.
The authors apprehend no reason why the Principle of horizontal stare
decisis should not be obtainable merely because Florida's appellate courts
are multiple rather than unitary. Division of the state into districts should
be retained for purposes of selection and retention of judges3 3 and for the
convenience of litigants. Despite retention of appellate districts, with
statewide horizontal stare decisis, the notion of "five balkanized districts
confederated into a loose Floridian union" 34 would tend to dissipate.
C. Constitutional Amendment, Supreme Court Rule, or Precedent?
There are several choices as to how the Principle could be put into
effect on a statewide basis. It could be done by legislation, constitutional
amendment, supreme court rule, or precedent.
The powers of our state government are constitutionally allocated
among the three branches in such a way that, although it does not enjoy an
exclusive power to make substantive law, the legislative branch exercises
lawmaking power that takes precedence over the lawmaking powers
respectively exercised by the executive and judicial branches. Nevertheless,
the executive and judicial branches have a certain amount of lawmaking
power that is reserved to them under the principle of separation of
governmental power, particularly in managing the details of the business that
they are charged with managing under the constitution.
It seems to us that putting the Principle into effect by legislative act
would leave the statute open to attack on the ground that it intrudes on the
judiciary's power to manage its own affairs. We believe that the principle
should be put into effect either by constitutional amendment, supreme court
rule, or by precedent-preferably by constitutional amendment as to the
basic Principle, and by supreme court rule as to the details.
1. The Eleventh Circuit's Method
of Adopting Stare Decisis
When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was split into two circuits, the
Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, one of the first tasks undertaken by
the new Eleventh Circuit was the adoption of a rule of stare decisis. The
judges had concluded that they wanted to adopt the Fifth Circuit rule that
302. Fla. R. App. P. 9.331.
303. See FLA. STAT. §§ 35.08, 35.10 (1991).
304. State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991),jurisdiction
accepted, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992).
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a prior decision of the circuit (panel or en banc) could not be overruled by
a panel, but only by the court sitting en banc.3 °5 One problem facing the
court was the question of whether the rule should be adopted by court rule,
or by precedent (i.e., stare decisis),a 6 There had been a great deal of
discussion about this problem, a°7 and the court finally decided to adopt the
Fifth Circuit rule by precedent in Bonner v. City of Prichard,3 "8 the court's
first case.
The court rejected the idea of adopting the rule by an informal and
unrevealed consensus among the individual judges as being inconsistent with
orderly administration of justice.3" 9 It would not give fair notice to
litigants, courts, and government agencies of what to expect." ° Moreover,
without the "imprimatur" of judicial decision, such a rule could be upset by
changes in the composition of the court.3 '
Also rejected was the idea of adopting the Fifth Circuit rule of stare
decisis under the rule-making power of the court.3" 2 According to the
court, neither the authorizing statute nor the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure addresses the establishment of substantive law by the court.13
The judges of this court, when judges of the former Fifth Circuit,
maintained a distinct separation between their administrative and their
judicial functions. The substantive law of the circuit was established by
the exercise ofjudicial authority and procedural rules by administrative
action. We consider it inappropriate to decide what this circuit's
substantive law will be by any means other than judicial decision.3"4
Of course the options open to the Eleventh Circuit were not as broad
305. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
306. Id.
307. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the
Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687 (1981) (citing most of the discussion prior to the
Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the rule).
308. Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1207.
309. Id. at 1210.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. In section 2071 of title 28 of the United States Code, Congress authorizes
courts to prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1211; see 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure adopted under
authority of the statute, authorizes judges of the circuit to make rules of practice not
inconsistent with the rules. Bonner, 661 F. 2d at 1211.
313. Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1211.
314. Id.
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as the options under state law. As a practical matter, that court did not have
the choice of legislation or constitutional amendment.
2. The Problem of Adoption by Supreme Court Rule
The Florida Constitution, article V, section 2 (a), provides:
The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in
all courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the adminis-
trative supervision of all courts, the transfer to the court having
jurisdiction of any proceeding when the jurisdiction of another court has
been improvidently invoked, and a requirement that no cause shall be
dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought. These rules
may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the
membership of each house of the legislature. 15
It is arguable that by negative implication, this section forbids the
Supreme Court of Florida to use its rule-making power for the purpose of
creating substantive law. The provision speaks only of "rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts."'3 16 The Principle under discussion
would quite obviously be the creation of an entire body of substantive law,
and is itself a rule of substantive law.
In promulgating Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331, providing
for intradistrict en banc decisions, the Supreme Court of Florida carefully
considered its constitutionality.317 Nonetheless, questions have persisted.
The argument is this: because article V, section 4(a), of the Florida
Constitution specifically provides that three judges shall consider each case
heard by the district courts, a different procedure cannot be authorized by
the promulgation of a court rule.318 Similarly, and perhaps a fortiori, a
supreme court rule establishing a special en banc panel crossing district lines
might be questioned.
Most instructive is the position of the Florida Supreme Court. In 1982
the Florida Conference of District Court of Appeal Judges petitioned the
315. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
316. Id.
317. See In reRule 9.331, Determination of Causesby a Dist. Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 374 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 1979), modified, 377 So.
2d 700 (Fla. 1979).
318. See id at 995 (Boyd, J., dissenting); State v. Georgoudiou, 560 So. 2d 1241, 1247-
48 (Fla. 5th Dist, Ct. App. 1990) (Cowart, J., dissenting), reviewdenied, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla.
1990); Carroll v. State, 497 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Hubbart, J.,
dissenting), review denied, 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1987).
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supreme court to consider an emergency rule change to address practical
problems that had arisen in the en banc decisional process.3 9 The chief
judges of the district courts asked whether one three judge panel could
overrule or recede from a prior decision of a three judge panel of the same
district court.320  The supreme court responded, "[w]ithout addressing
possible constitutional problems," that it would not by court rule prohibit
overruling or receding by a three judge panel, but it admonished the district
judges to refrain from that action.2
Justice Ehrlich believed that "taking it upon ourselves [the supreme
court] to define intra-district conflict for the districts themselves would be
overreaching and presumptuous. 322 If that is so, then the supreme court's
taking it upon itself to forbid interdistrict conflicts might also be overreach-
ing. The authors suggest that adoption of the Principle of horizontal stare
decisis by supreme court rule would raise issues of constitutionality that
need not be faced. Supreme court rules for implementing the procedural
aspects, once the Principle is adopted, would be the proper use of article V,
section 2(a) of the constitution.
3. The Problem of Implementation by Decision
The Supreme Court of Florida could do what the Eleventh Circuit did
by taking an appropriate case and putting the rule into effect in the process
of deciding that case. The problem with that method is that, although it
would have "the imprimatur of judicial decision," '323 it would not carry the
same precedential weight as the Eleventh Circuit's decision did. There the
court was adopting a well established rule that had been in effect in Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama for decades (while these states were within the Fifth
Circuit). The Florida rule would be brand new, and could be more easily
upset by changes in the composition of the court simply because of its
newness.
4. The Preferred Method-Constitutional Amendment
Putting the Principle into effect and establishing the special en banc
panel by constitutional amendment would avoid many of the problems
3 19. In re Rule 9.331 Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d at 1127.
320. Id
321. Id. at 1128.
322. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90, 105 (Fla. 1985)
(Ehrlich, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160 (1986).
323. See Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1210.
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suggested above, and would remove any questions as to the power of any
particular branch of government to establish the rule. Just as a constitution-
al amendment removed any question of the power of the supreme court to
"review a question of law certified" to it by a federal court,324 so would
a constitutional amendment remove any question of the power to require the
district courts to follow prior published decisions of any district court.
The Principle under discussion should be made a part of article V, section
4, of the Florida Constitution. The statement of the Principle should be
followed by the provision for special en banc treatment by judges from each
district. The section or subsection might read:
Any panel of a district court of appeal must follow the holding of [or,
the rule of law established by] a prior published decision of any district
court of appeal issued on or after [the effective date of this amendment].
When a panel of a district court of appeal states in its opinion that it is
following a prior published decision only because it is required to do so,
a special en banc panel of the district courts of appeal may convene to
rehear the case for the purpose of resolving the conflict which would
have been created but for this provision.
The amendment could also specifically allow for supreme court rule to fix
the number of district judges to sit on the special en banc panel and to
provide for the manner of their selection from among the district judges.
As for implementing the rest of the practice and procedures, the present
article V, section 2(a) should suffice.
Since the en banc procedure suggested here would amount to the
creation of a new court, article V, section 1, should be amended to include
such a court among those named in the first sentence. The first sentence
would then read: "The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, a
special en banc panel of the district courts of appeal, district courts of
324. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6). In some early cases involving the certification
procedure and abstention, it was questioned whether a state's highest court had the power to
give what might arguably be an "advisory opinion." When the Fifth Circuit abstained from
deciding a case in order to get an answer to a state law question from the state courts, the
Supreme Court of Texas held that it was without power, under the state constitution, to
render such an advisory opinion. United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855,
863 (Tex. 1965). The Supreme Court of Maine has refused to answer a certified question
which would not have disposed of the action. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me.
1966). The Supreme Court of Washington approved the use of certification over the
objections of three of its justices who argued that it was unlawful under the state constitution.
In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 354 (Wash. 1968).
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appeal, circuit courts and county courts. 325
V. CONCLUSION
To paraphrase the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Bonner v. City of Pri-
chard:
3 26
The state and federal trial courts, the federal appellate courts, the
bar and the public are entitled to a better result than to be cast
adrift among the differing precedents of other districts, required
to examine afresh every legal principle that eventually arises in
the state. This approach is inconsistent with the virtually
wholesale adoption in this country of English common law. A
multi-district court sitting en banc would be an available forum
for pursuit of a better rule and for rejection of any precedents
that should be no longer followed.32 7
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Florida would be available, as it is
today, to supervise the administration of justice in Florida.
325. At the same time, any question about the constitutionality of intradistrict en banc
decisions, as has been raised by some judges, could be settled by amending article V, section
4(a) (the third sentence) to read: "Three or more judges shall consider each case and the
concurrence of a majority shall be necessary to a decision." Intradistrict en banc consider-
ation might still be desirable, for example, for cases of "exceptional importance."
326. 661 F.2d at 1211.
327. The Eleventh Circuit's version can be found id at 1211.
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APPENDIX "A"
STATE APPELLATE DISTRICTS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT: Alachua, Baker, Bay, Bradford,
Calhoun, Clay, Columbia, Dixie, Duval, Escambia Franklin, Gadsden,
Gilchrist, Gulf, Hamilton. Holmes, Jackson, Jefferson, Lafayette, .
Leon, Levy, Liberty, Madison, Nassau, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa .......
Suwannee, Taylor, Union, Wakulla, Walton, Washington
Comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th and 14th Circuits.
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT: Charlotte, Collier, DeSoto,
Glades. Hardee, Hendry, Highlands. Hillsborough, Lee. Manatee, --
Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, Sarasota
Comprising the 6th, 10th, 12th, 13th and 20th Circuits.
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT: Dade, Monroe
Comprising the 11th and 16th Circuits.
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT: Broward, Indian' River,
Okeechobee, Palm Beach, St. Lucie, Martin
Comprising the 15th, 17th and 19th Circuits.
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT: Brevard, Citrus, Flagler,
Hernando, Lake, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Putnam, Seminole,
St. Johns, Sumter, Volusia
Comprising the 5th, 7th, 9th and 18th Circuits. i
See FLA. STAT. §§ 35.01-043, 26.021.
FEDERAL DISTRICTS
NORTHERN DISTRICT: Court held in Gainesville, Marianna,
Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola.
MIDDLE DISTRICT: Court held in Fernandina, Ft. Myers, Jackson-
villc, Live Oak, Ocala, Orlando, St. Petersburg and Tampa.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT: Court held in Ft. Lauderdale, Ft. Pierce,
Key West, Miami and West Palm Beach.
See 28 U.S.C. § 89.
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PART V
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Although the Florida Constitution is most often thought of as a
blueprint for the State government, many of its provisions actually
deal with the running of local governments. Thus, in the fifth part of
our Symposium we consider some of the ways that the Constitution
affects county and municipal governments.
Professor Nancy Perkins Spyke begins by examining the often-
combative relationship between the state and local governments over
unfunded state mandates and the Constitution's attempt to mediate the
problem. Next, Lauderhill Mayor Ilene S. Lieberman and Florida
League of Cities General Counsel Harry Morrison, Jr. look at the
current state of municipal home rule and the prospects for its future.
Finally, practitioner Richard A. Sicking looks at the little-known
provision in the Constitution that affects the funding of public
pensions, including county and municipal pensions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The bane of every budget director's existence is the rapid increase in
unfunded state and federal mandates."1 This statement reflects the wide-
spread frustration felt by localities forced to comply with federal and state
legislation that imposes duties on them without providing funding. The
mandate era is thought to owe its existence to the Reagan/Bush administra-
tions, whose aim was to lessen the federal government's responsibilities.'
* Professor Spyke is a Professor of Legal Writing at the Nova University Shepard Broad
Law Center, where she teaches Florida Constitutional Law. During the 1993-94 academic
year, she will be a Visiting Professor of Law at Duquesne Law School. She extends her
thanks and appreciation to Craig Glasser, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center 1994
J.D. candidate, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. John R. Blinn, When Cities Go Under, MANHATTAN LAW., Dec. 1991, at 37.
2. William Tucker, Rebellion Grows Against Federal Mandates, PuB. FIN. WASH.
WATCH, Feb. 1, 1993, at 4.
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Congress, not sharing this view and eager to continue implementing social
policy, engaged in cost shifting by enacting laws that passed the cost of
program compliance along to state and local governments.
At a time when the staggering cost of federal mandates has placed
many a locality in a "financial straightjacket, ' ,4 state governments have only
added to the load by enacting their own cost shifting legislation. Florida
is no exception. Between the years of 1981 and 1990, Florida's Legislature
enacted 288 mandates, many of them unfunded.6 These mandates required
Florida's local governments to "manage growth, provide pension benefits,
protect the environment, and otherwise take action to address various
problems."7  The 1988 state mandates alone were estimated to cost
Florida's local governments close to $39 million.8 Responding to pressure
from local governments to curtail the flood of mandate legislation, the
Florida Legislature proposed an amendment to the state constitution that
would restrict mandates. In 1990, the amendment received a favorable vote
of the electorate and became section 18 of article VII of the Florida
Constitution.9
Although the amendment's initial language excuses local governments
from complying with state mandates, 0 other provisions within the amend-
ment contain numerous exceptions and exemptions," all the result of
predictable compromises. Taken together, these exceptions and exemptions
may not "swallow the rule," but they nevertheless take a few teeth out of
local government's intended goals of the provision. In the three years since
its enactment, the amendment appears to have had limited effect on
curtailing mandates. However, it has raised legislators' awareness of the
problem that results from unfunded mandates, has given local governments
3. Id.
4. Id. In early 1993, the date of Mr. Tucker's article, the annual cost of federal
mandates was estimated to be between $3 and $4 billion. Id.
5. See id.
6. Staffof Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm'y Alf., CS/HJR 139, 140 (1989) Staff Analysis
2 (April 5, 1989) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter April 5 Staff Analysis].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18. Throughout this article the amendment will be
interchangeably referred to as "the amendment" and "section 18."
10. See infra text accompanying note 39.
11. "Exception" is used to refer to an item that is excused from the operation of the
amendment, while "exemption" refers to an item that falls outside the scope of the
amendment. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 559, 571 (6th ed. 1990). As will be shown,
this may well be a distinction without a difference.
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a stronger voice in the legislative process, and has helped local governments
maintain existing funding. To a limited extent, section 18 has fulfilled its
purpose, as expressed in the legislative history. 2 While local governments
feel section 18 has not gone far enough, they nevertheless welcome it, and
now see a need to push the Legislature to enact implementing legislation.
Reasonable implementing legislation, coupled with a new generation of
mandate-conscious legislators, should further help alleviate Florida's
intergovernmental frictions.
II. BACKGROUND
The amendment's legislative history exposes the extent of the mandate
problem that existed at the end of the 1980's. The seemingly non-stop
enactment of mandates by the Florida Legislature resulted in a deepening
crisis with no apparent end in sight.13 The problem had worsened despite
action taken in the previous decade. In 1977, as a partial response to the
taxpayers' revolt and the constitutional limitations on local governments'
revenue structure, the Legislature created the Florida Advisory Council on
Intergovemnental Relations (ACIR). 4  The legislative findings and
purpose underlying the creation of ACIR acknowledged a need to study
problems with the intergovernmental aspects of state finance and interstate
relationships. 5 ACIR was required to examine proposed state programs
and "assess their impact upon Florida and its political subdivisions . ".1..'6
ACIR was also required to issue annual reports of its findings and
recommendations, and analyze all new state programs or expansion of
existing programs that increased the expenditure or lessened the revenue-
producing ability of local governments. 7
In 1978, legislation was passed requiring each bill that affected the
financial condition of local governments to include an economic impact
12. See infra text accompanying note 41.
13. See generallyKristin Conroy Rubin, Unfunded Mandates: A Continuing Source of
Intergovernmental Discord, 17FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 591,592 (1990) (discussing intergovern-
mental relations in Florida). In 1988, for example, the Legislature enacted legislation
expanding the number of people eligible to receive local government pension benefits. Id.
14. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.701-.708 (1991); see also April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6,
at 1.
15. FLA. STAT. § 163.702 (1991).
16. Id. § 163.705(1)(d).
17. Id. § 163.705(1)(g), (3).
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statement. 8 Accordingly, section 11.076 of the Florida Statutes reads as a
strong directive, not only requiring economic impact statements for all state
mandated legislation, but additionally requiring the state to provide funding
to offset certain mandated program costs.' 9 However, this facially helpful
legislation was largely ignored by subsequent legislatures, who were not
bound by the acts of their predecessors.2" Therefore, even though the
statute was not repealed, it provided no help to Florida counties and cities.
Statistics showed that the number of mandates was increasing. From
1981 to 1988, 288 mandates were enacted; forty-nine mandates were enacted
in 1987; sixty-five mandates were enacted in 1988. In 1988 alone, the
mandate price tag for local governments was $38,976,100.1 Despite the
escalation, the number of mandates was not out of proportion to the number
of general acts.2" However, the numbers alone did not reflect the full
extent of the problem. ACIR found, in its 1985 report, that bills including
mandates received less scrutiny by the Legislature than other legislation.23
Mandates were also enacted during the last three days of the legislative
session,"4 further indicating the decreased level of attention given them.
ACIR also found many of the bills did not set forth their cost to local
government. 5
The significance of the large number of mandates and the corre-
sponding cost to local governments was heightened by existing constitutional
restrictions on local governments. Under the Florida Constitution, the state
has considerable control over local government. 26  Article VIII, section
1(a) of the constitution provides that counties can be "created, abolished or
changed by law . ,. 7 Similarly, Florida "municipalities may be
established or abolished and their charters amended pursuant to general or
special law."2 8 Local governments have been given home rule power by
18. April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 11.076 (1991).
19. FLA. STAT. § 11.076 (1991).
20. Rubin, supra note 13, at 598; see also April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 2.
For the Legislature to be bound, the mandate restriction had to appear in the state's
constitution. Rubin, supra note 13, at 598.
21. April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 2.
22. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm'y Afft, CS/CS/CS/CS/HJR 139, 140 (1989)
Staff Analysis 2 (final June 2, 1989) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Final Staff Analysis].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3.
26. FLA. CONST. art VIII, § I(a).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 2(a).
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the Legislature,29 but the Legislature still retains discretionary power over
them." This discretionary power allowed the Legislature to impose
mandates as it saw fit.
This unrestrained mandate situation posed particular problems in light
of limitations on local governments' revenue generating mechanisms. The
Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o tax shall be levied except in
pursuance of law."31 Further, while the state cannot levy ad valorem taxes
on real property, all other forms of taxation are preempted to the state unless
otherwise provided by law.32 Local governments are left to rely primarily
on ad valorem taxes, service charges, and state-shared revenues for their
funding33 within the limits of the constitution.34 Although counties and
cities may have other lesser revenue sources, including utility service taxes
and local option taxes, the state determines the extent of their taxing authori-
ty. 
35
Against this bleak fiscal backdrop, the 1989 Florida Legislature
addressed the mandate problem. Relying on the 1985 ACIR Report, the
Legislature considered five methods to address unfunded mandates: 1) a
reimbursement program, requiring local governments to be paid for certain
mandates; 2) a sunset provision, requiring local mandates to expire within
a set time frame unless re-enacted; 3) a sunrise provision, requiring an
extraordinary majority vote to enact unfunded mandates; 4) a monitoring
mechanism, to identify and monitor mandate bills during the legislative
process; and. 5) a fiscal note protocol, to determine the impact of mandate
legislation.3" The final version of the amendment embraces, to an extent,
all the alternatives except the sunset provision. An earlier proposal included
both the sunset and sunrise alternatives, but gave way in committee to the
provisions that were ultimately submitted to the voters. 3' The final joint
resolution, replete with exemptions and special provisions, was finally
adopted in 1990. However, it was not readily accepted by the Legislature.
29. County and municipal home rule is authorized by chapters 125 and 166 of the
Florida Statutes, respectively. Id.
30. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 2; see also City of Boca Raton v. State, 595
So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1992).
31. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § I(a).
32. Id.
33. Rubin, supra note 13, at 594.
34. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b) (amended 1976) (limiting the millage rate for
ad valorem taxation at the county and municipal level).
35. Rubin, supra note 13, at 594.
36. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 3.
37. Rubin, supra note 13, at 603-06.
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A separate initiative petition that would have placed before the voters an
amendment prohibiting local mandates altogether unless they were funded,
proved to be the catalyst for legislative approval.38
III. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18
The mandate restriction amendment is composed of five subsections:
subsection (a) sets forth the limitation on laws requiring local governments
to spend money and provides for exceptions that will allow their passage;
subsection (b) sets forth limits on laws that reduce local government
authority to raise revenues; subsection (c) limits legislation that would
reduce local governments' share of state taxes; subsection (d) sets forth the
laws that are exempt from the first three subsections; and subsection (e)
provides that the Legislature may enact implementing legislation.39 For the
38. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Approp., tape recording ofproceedings (May 22, 1989) (on file
with author) (comments of Rep. Bloom).
39. The amendment in its entirety reads as follows:
SECTION 18. Laws requiring counties or municipalities to spend funds or
limiting their ability to raise revenue or receive state tax revenue.-
(a) No county or municipality shall be bound by any general law
requiring such county or municipality to spend funds or to take an action
requiring the expenditure of funds unless the legislature has determined that such
law fulfills an important state interest and unless: funds have been appropriated
that have been estimated at the time of enactment to be sufficient to fund such
expenditure; the legislature authorizes or has authorized a county or municipality
to enact a funding source not available for such county or municipality on
February 1, 1989, that can be used to generate the amount of funds estimated to
be sufficient to fund such expenditure by a simple majority vote of the
governing body of such county or municipality; the law requiring such
expenditure is approved by two-thirds of the membership in each house of the
legislature; the expenditure is required to comply with a law that applies to all
persons similarly situated, including the state and local governments; or the law
is either required to comply with a federal requirement or required for eligibility
for a federal entitlement, which federal requirement specifically contemplates
actions by counties or municipalities for compliance.
(b) Except upon approval of each house of the legislature by two-thirds
of the membership, the legislature may not enact, amend, or repeal any general
law if the anticipated effect of doing so would be to reduce the authority that
municipalities or counties have to raise revenues in the aggregate, as such
authority exists on February 1, 1989.
(c) Except upon approval of each house of the legislature by two-thirds
of the membership, the legislature may not enact, amend, or repeal any general
law if the anticipated effect of doing so would be to reduce the percentage of a
1408 [Vol. 18
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sake of clarity, this article's use of the word "exception" refers to those
mandates allowed under subsection (a), and "exemption" refers to the laws
that escape the reach of section 18, as listed in subsection (d).4"
The Legislature's Final Staff Analysis for section 18 clearly sets forth
its intent: 'The intent of this proposed constitutional provision is to give
local governments greater bargaining power on the subject of unfunded
mandates and to protect existing local revenue sources."4 Earlier versions
of the proposed amendment were thought to go much further than the stated
intent, and much of the language in the adopted amendment was aimed at
preserving that intent.42 This statement of intent is more restrictive than
one which would indicate an intent to curtail unfunded mandates, which is
what local governments likely desired.
Perhaps the statement of legislative purpose represents the greatest of
all the compromises between local governments and the Legislature. It
indicates that the Legislature was willing to present an amendment that
would give local governments more of a voice in the legislative mandate
process and assist them in maintaining funding. The Legislature recognized
the amendment would "affect the legislature's ability to create, reorganize,
and abolish programs" and "encourage greater cooperation between ... all
state tax shared with counties and municipalities as an aggregate on February 1,
1989. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to enhancements enacted
after February 1, 1989, to state tax sources, or during a fiscal emergency
declared in a written joint proclamation issued by the president of the senate and
the speaker of the house of representatives, or where the legislature provides
additional state-shared revenues which are anticipated to be sufficient to replace
the anticipated aggregate loss of state-shared revenues resulting from the
reduction of the percentage of the state tax shared with counties and municipali-
ties, which source of replacement revenues shall be subject to the same
requirements for repeal or modification as provided herein for a state-shared tax
source existing on February 1, 1989.
(d) Laws adopted to require funding of pension benefits existing on the
effective date of this section, criminal laws, election laws, the general appropria-
tions act, special appropriations acts, laws reauthorizing but not expanding then-
existing statutory authority, laws having insignificant fiscal impact, and laws
creating, modifying, or repealing noncriminal infractions, are exempt from the
requirements of this section.
(e) The legislature may enact laws to assist in the implementation and
enforcement of this section.
FLA. CONST, art. VII, § 18.
40. This follows legislative staff practice. See also supra note 11.
41. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 9.
42. Id. at 9-10.
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levels of government" 43 But nowhere does the legislative history indicate
that the Legislature viewed the amendment as one that would significantly
curtail its policy-implementing activity.44 This point is important in
assessing the success of section 18. A discussion of how the amendment
was crafted to reflect that intent follows.
Subsection (a) deals with spending mandates, or those mandates that
require local governments to spend money. Under its provisions, neither
counties nor municipalities are bound by general laws that require them to
spend funds unless the Legislature first determines that the law fulfills an
important state interest.45 In addition, the law must meet one of five
requirements: the Legislature must appropriate funds for the mandate based
on the estimated cost at the time of enactment; the Legislature must
authorize the local government to enact a funding source to cover the
estimated cost of the mandate; the mandate must be approved by two-thirds
of the membership in each house of the Legislature; the mandate must be
part of a law that applies to all persons similarly situated, including state and
local governments; or the mandate must be necessary to comply with a
federal requirement that contemplates local government involvement.46
The subsection sets out a two-part test that must be met by mandates that
require local government expenditures. All such mandates must fulfill an
important state interest, and must additionally meet one of the five tests
outlined above.4'
Under this subsection, only local governments are given standing to
challenge a mandate, and they are not further required to bring an action
unless the State challenges them for noncompliance.48 The limitation on
standing prevents the courts from being otherwise flooded with challenges
to general laws,49 which was one of the concerns with earlier proposals."0
It is both interesting, and perhaps significant, that the amendment does not
begin with language expressly restricting the Legislature, such as, "Notwith-
standing any other provision herein, the legislature shall not enact any law
...." Instead, the provision begins by stating that local governments are
43. Id.
44. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 5. Local governments are free to bring a
declaratory judgment action as well. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10.
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not bound by certain types of general laws.5 The latter language reads
less as a restriction on the Legislature than a right of local governments.
Further, the wording of the provision could be read to place the burden on
local governments to prove a mandate fails to comply with section 18, as
opposed to having the Legislature prove a law passes muster.
52
The legislative history makes clear that the first prong of the spending
mandate's provision, requiring an important state interest, is to be based on
a purely legislative determination, not on fact finding.53 In practice, this
prong has proved to be easily met and is seen as weakening the amend-
ment.54 How the courts will deal with "important state interest" when
confronted with a challenge is unclear." It is likely, however, that courts
will tend to defer to the legislative determination.56
The alternative second prongs to the test in subsection (a) were also the
subject of compromise. An earlier proposal was read to prohibit the
Legislature, without a two-thirds membership vote, from passing laws
pursuant to its police power if the laws affected local government. In
response, the amendment's exception for laws that apply to "all persons
similarly situated, including the state and local governments" was added.57
This provision, if interpreted liberally, could allow numerous mandates to
be enacted; indeed, it can be said that most laws apply to all similarly
situated persons and entities." Local governments view this provision as
a troublesome loophole. 9
There was also concern under an earlier amendment proposal that
legislation could be invalidated even if funding was provided in separate
legislation." The staff analysis notes that the amendment, as adopted,
allows the Legislature to appropriate funds without necessarily tying them
51. FLA. CONST. art VII, § 18(a).
52. But see Telephone Interview with Lym Tipton, Executive Assistantfor Intergovern-
mental Relations, Florida League of Cities (May 26, 1993).
53. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 5.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 195, 205.
55. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 11.
56. Florida courts have been extremely deferential to the Legislature in analogous
situations. See, e.g., Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983)
(the Legislature's determination of public purpose must be clearly wrong to be beyond the
power of the Legislature).
57. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 10.
58. Laws failing to treat those similarly situated in the same manner may raise equal
protection questions.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12.
60. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 10.
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to the mandate.61 Another feared problem was that local governments
might later challenge funded mandates, claiming that the funding was
inadequate. In response, the amendment reflects that a funded mandate will
qualify as an exception under subsection (a) as long as the sufficiency of
funding is reasonable at the time of enactment.62 As such, there should be
no danger of later rehearings.6" Further, while prior proposals would have
prohibited mandates that were enacted in response to federal mandates, or
those enacted to enable the state to be eligible for federal entitlements, the
final language in subsection (a) provided exceptions to avoid these
results.64
One perceived ambiguity was not remedied before the amendment was
adopted. Subsection (a)'s focus on laws "requiring ... [a] county or
municipality to spend funds""5 could refer to laws that both directly and
indirectly require local governments to spend money. This ambiguity may
lead to challenges brought against laws, the indirect effects of which require
the expenditure of funds. The legislative history acknowledges the
ambiguity, and notes that the phrase will likely be subject to later interpre-
66tation.
Much of the language in subsection (a) was tailored to keep the focus
of the amendment limited to.its purpose of giving local governments more
bargaining power in the Legislature and helping them maintain current
funding levels.67 The history also reveals that many of subsection (a)'s
provisions were added to preserve legislative autonomy.68 Language in the
following subsections was similarly designed with that purpose in mind.
Subsection (b)'s aim is to prevent the Legislature from reducing the
revenue sources available to local governments in the aggregate.69
Similarly, subsection (c) prevents the Legislature from passing laws that
reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties and municipalities
61. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 10. The staff analysis suggests that the
Legislature designate the use of the funds, however. Id.
62. FLA. CONST. art VII, § 18(a); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 12.
63. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 12.
64. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a).
65. Id.
66. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 11.
67. Id. at 9.
68. See generally id.
69. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(b); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 4 (this
provision is tied to aggregate revenue sources as of February 1, 1989).
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as an aggregate." Under both subsections, a vote of two-thirds of the
membership of the Legislature is required for any such legislation to be
valid." The language specifically looks to the "anticipated" effect of
legislation, making clear that the effect will be determined at the time of
enactment.72 This language, as in the case of subsection (a)'s funding
provision, seeks to limit future challenges based on inaccurate predic-
tions .
The use of the word "aggregate" is also significant, since it "clarifies
that estimates will be made on the basis of the effect on all local govern-
ments grouped together, not on the basis of the effect on one municipality
or county."7 ' The existing language appears to allow the passage of laws
that would decrease either the revenue raising authority or state-shared
revenues in a small number of counties, while at the same time increasing
funds in others. As long as the aggregate revenue-raising authority or the
percentage of state-shared tax revenues remained the same under the law,
the law would be permissible with a simple majority vote.7" Only if the
law reduced the aggregate revenue raising authority or state revenue sharing
percentage would a two-thirds vote be required.76
Earlier versions of the amendment had raised concerns that the
Legislature could be prevented from restructuring local government funding
and duties, even where the net result would be a zero decrease in funds.77
Accordingly:, the language in subsections (b) and (c) makes it clear that
existing local government revenue sources and state-shared funds are not
sacred; it is only the aggregate funds that are to be preserved." It is
interesting that the final staff analysis for the joint resolution notes that a
two-thirds vote "would allow any restructuring."79 This language suggests
that a super-majority vote would be needed to enact a law restructuring local
government revenue sharing, even where the net effect was zero. As
discussed above, a literal reading of the amendment's language suggests that
such a law would not be considered a mandate under the amendment. It is
70. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(c); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 4
(February 1, 1989, is also the pertinent date for this provision).
71. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 18(a), 18(c).
72. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 6.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 11.
75. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(c).
76. See id.
77. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 11.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 11.
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also noteworthy that subsection (c) places limits only on those laws reducing
the percentage, rather than the amount, of state tax shared with local
governments. Therefore, the Legislature is arguably free to pass laws
liberalizing state tax exemptions that would reduce revenues, but that would
keep existing percentages intact.80
Subsection (c) additionally includes a number of exceptions which
permit the enactment of laws reducing state-shared tax revenues without a
two-thirds vote.8" These exceptions include, but are not limited to, laws
enacted during a fiscal emergency, and situations "where the legislature
provides additional state-shared revenues which are anticipated to be
sufficient to replace the anticipated aggregate loss of state-shared reve-
nues."82
To pass a provision under either subsection (b) or (c), a two-thirds vote
is required. 83 The two-thirds vote is based on the membership of both
houses, rather than being based on those voting. 84 Since the Florida Senate
has forty members and the House has 120 members, votes of twenty-seven
and eighty would be required to meet the two-thirds vote in each house,
respectively. Although this may seem to be a difficult hurdle to overcome,
such a super-majority vote is not uncommon. 5
Yet another indication of compromise can be seen in subsection (d),
which lists those laws that are exempt from the amendment's requirements.
Exempt laws include those requiring "funding of pension benefits . . .
criminal laws, election laws, the general appropriations act, special
appropriations acts, laws reauthorizing but not expanding . . . existing
statutory authority, laws having insignificant fiscal impact, and laws
creating, modifying, or repealing noncriminal infractions . ". . . " Under
an earlier proposal it appeared that the mandate restrictions could prevent
the passage of appropriations acts," which accounts for its inclusion as an
exemption.
Legislators additionally felt that the amendment needed a dollar
threshold to trigger the mandate restrictions, without which lawsuits would
80. See id. However, 1992 legislation provided for several sales tax exemptions and
gave the Legislature full mandate review. They were generally determined to be exempt
under the "insignificant fiscal impact" exemption. See infra text accompanying note 150.
81. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(c).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 7.
85. See infra text accompanying note 213.
86. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(d).
87. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 13.
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flourish.8 Accordingly, the "insignificant fiscal impact" exemption was
included, which lessened the load on legislative staff, since it removed the
requirement of preparing fiscal analyses on bills with low price tags.8 9 The
exemption for laws having an insignificant impact could also prevent general
laws coming; within the provisions of the amendment if they have only an
indirect effect on local government funding. 9 This exemption has been
relied upon to enact numerous mandates, due largely in part to the
Legislature's calculation of insignificant fiscal impact.91
Finally,, subsection (e) allows the Legislature to enact implementing
legislation.92 This provision allows the Legislature to define pertinent
terms of the amendment, and also allows statutes to set venue for a
challenge under the amendment.93 Terms that would hopefully be defined
in such legislation include "insignificant fiscal impact" and "criminal laws."
When read against the background of intense anti-mandate sentiment
existing at the end of the 1980's, section 18 appears to be a weapon that
was largely dismantled by its own provisions. Local government's intended
purpose of the amendment would have simply been to stop unfunded state
mandates. However, the amendment must be read in light of its limited
legislative purpose of protecting existing local government revenues and
giving localities greater bargaining power in the Legislature.94 Bearing that
intent in mind, the amendment, on its face, appears useful. However, a
review of legislative activity in the sessions following the amendment's
adoption, as well as consideration of the current perceptions of counties and
cities, indicates that the amendment does not fully succeed, even based on
its restricted purposes.
IV. ACIR's RESPONSE
In fulfilling its statutory duties pursuant to section 163.705(3) of the
Florida Statutes, ACIR prepared a detailed report in 1991 to inform the
Governor and the Legislature about the status of the state mandates imposed
88. Id. at 10-11.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 11. Laws can indirectly impact local governments by causing them to spend
money to promulgate ordinances, or by causing them to use outside counsel more often. Id.
But see supra text accompanying note 66.
91. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
92. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(e).
93. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 7.
94. Id. at 9.
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on Florida's local governments in the 1991 legislative session.95 This
report was supplemented in both 1992 and 1993 to provide information
about the state mandates imposed by the Legislature in those years.96
These reports provide valuable and comprehensive information regarding
mandate legislation passed since the adoption of section 18." After
initially suggesting a decrease in mandate activity, the reports reveal that
mandate legislation has continued to be enacted, much of it falling within
the amendment's exceptions and exemptions.98
For the purposes of its reporting activities, ACIR has defined "man-
date" to comply with the definition it sees as implicit in section 18." This
includes laws that, previous to the amendment's passage, would not have
been considered mandates, such as laws that applied proportionately to both
the private and public sector,1"' laws applicable to a single jurisdiction,
and laws that were optional or impacted non-mandated responsibilities.10 '
Mandate reporting under section 18 has led ACIR to be more inclusive in
the laws it examines. It may be, however, that legislative staff occasionally
interprets "mandate" differently. This is evidenced by laws that appear as
mandates in ACIR's post-1990 reports that were never given mandate
consideration by legislative staff.0 2
To further help legislative staff make its determinations under the
amendment, ACIR has established the ACIR/Local Government Facsimile
Network, which allows local governments to provide input regarding
mandate legislation. 3 Known as FAXNET, this tool enables ACIR to
contact thirty-eight counties and fifty-five cities to acquire reliable
information regarding proposed mandate legislation. 4 Legislative staff,
95. FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1991 REPORT
ON MANDATES AND MEASURES AFFECTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL CAPACITY, Sept.
1991, 91-3, at i. [hereinafter 1991 REPORT] (providing a fairly detailed background of the
mandate problem, and also devoting a section to mandate restrictions and reimbursement
programs in other states).
96. FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1992
SUPPLEMENT TO THE 1991 REPORT ON MANDATES AND MEASURES AFFECTING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FISCAL CAPACITY, Oct. 1992, at 3. [hereinafter 1992 REPORT].
97. See generally id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Here, ACIR uses the example of Workers' Compensation benefits. Id. at 5.
101. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 5.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
103. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 28.
104. Id.
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local government officials, and ACIR personnel may initiate a FAXNET
transmission, to which local governments typically respond within forty-
eight hours.105
V. LEGISLATIVE STAFF PROCEDURES
The leadership of the 1991 House and Senate developed policies to
review proposed legislation for mandate issues. The ACIR Report describes
the early activity as follows:
Substantive committee staff were charged to provide initial review of
proposed legislation for mandates on counties and municipalities. Each
chamber designated a committee or ad hoc group to assist committee
staff in screening pre-filed bills. These same entities were responsible
to monitor [sic] amended bills for mandates. In the Senate, the
Committee on Community Affairs assumed this task, with assistance
from the Finance, Taxation, and Claims Committee and staff from the
Executive Office of the Senate. In the House of Representatives, the
Finance & Taxation and Appropriations Committees, together with staff
from the Speaker's Office, were given this responsibility." 6
Fiscal notes are prepared by staff members of those committees
considering the legislation. Depending on the status of the legislation under
section 18, the Speaker or the Senate President is notified so that the proper
action can be taken on the bill. 7
It was also important to the Legislature that staff members uniformly
interpret the provisions of the amendment. In response to that concern, a
"3-8-3: Local Mandate Analysis Procedure" was developed.' The
procedure institutes a flow-chart approach to be used with proposed
legislation.') Under this approach, each bill is initially reviewed to
determine if it can be classified as one of three types of bills: 1) a general
bill requiring local governments to spend money or take action requiring the
expenditure of money; 2) a general bill anticipated to reduce local govern-
ment authority to raise aggregate revenue; or 3) a general bill reducing the
aggregate local government percentage share of state-shared revenue. If the
105. Id.
106. Id. at 22.
107. Id.
108. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 22-24.
109. Id. at 23.
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bill can be classified as one of these three types of bills, staff must then
determine if any of subsection (d)'s eight exemptions apply. The exemp-
tions include: bills funding previous pension benefits, criminal laws,
election laws, general appropriations bills, special appropriations bills, bills
re-authorizing existing statutory authority, bills having insignificant fiscal
impact, and bills establishing non-criminal infractions. If any one of the
eight exemptions apply, the bill is deemed exempt.11°
Any bill that cannot be classified as exempt must meet requirements
that depend on which of the three original classifications apply. If the bill
requires the expenditure of money by local governments, the Legislature
must formally determine the bill serves an important state interest, and
additionally, one of four requirements must be met: 1) estimated funding
must be provided; 2) a local funding source must be provided; 3) the bill
must require compliance by similarly situated persons; or 4) the bill must
be required to comply with a federal mandate. If none of these exceptions
apply, the bill must receive a vote of two-thirds of the membership of each
house in addition to serving an important state interest.)
If the bill reduces the fund raising authority of local governments, there
are no substantive exceptions, and the bill must pass with the two-thirds
super-majority vote. If the bill reduces local governments' percentage share
of state-shared revenues, the bill can be excepted from the mandate
restrictions if it provides for enhancements to state tax sources, if there is
a proclaimed state fiscal emergency, or if a revenue replacement source is
included in the bill. If none of these exceptions apply, a two-thirds vote is
required. "2
The "3-8-3" legislative approach reformats the amendment's provisions
into a uniform paradigm for staff members. Bills are first considered to see
if they fall within one of the three types of mandates; they are then
considered to determine if they fall within one of the eight exemptions to
the amendment; if not, the three mandate classifications are then recon-
sidered to ensure compliance under the amendment.
Legislative guidelines from the 1991 session also reveal the Legis-
lature's interpretation of some of the amendment's terms. For example,
exempt criminal laws are interpreted by the guidelines to include laws that
define the type of behavior that will subject persons to arrest and criminal
sanction, as well as laws related to arrest and pre-trial detention."
3
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
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Additionally, laws will be considered exempt under the criminal law
exemption if they relate to defense and prosecution or deal with adjudica-
tion, sentencing, and implementation of criminal sanctions.1 4 "Insignifi-
cant fiscal impact" was defined to be any amount less than $1.4 million for
1991-92, an amount equal to ten cents or less per capita per year.'
Staff analyses, the uniform legislative history document in Florida, now
devote an entire section to municipal and county mandate restrictions. The
section typically appears as Section III, following the Bill Summary (Section
I), and the Economic Impact and Fiscal Note section (Section 11).116 Staff
first identifies whether the bill under analysis will require the expenditure
of funds by local governments, and then addresses whether any exemptions
or exceptions apply. If an accurate measure of costs to local governments
cannot be determined, the notes will explain which other exemptions or
exceptions may be applicable." 7
VI. THE 1991 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Mandate Legislation
During the 1991 legislative session, fourteen mandate bills were
114. Id. This has been interpreted liberally by legislative staff in at least one instance.
See infra text accompanying note 151.
115. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
116. Miscellaneous staff analyses in author's files.
117. By way of example, the following appears under the Mandates Restrictions section
in a 1993 Staff Analysis for a bill aimed at streamlining the environmental permitting
process:
As noted above, affected counties and municipalities will incur costs related to
reviewing applications to determine consistency with local comprehensive plans
and land use regulations. While the act provides for reimbursement of such
costs to affected reviewing agencies, such reimbursement funds must be shared
with state and regional agencies involved in the review process. If there are
insufficient funds to completely reimburse all reviewing agencies, the funds are
prorated. Thus, there may be instance in which counties and municipalities will
be required to expend funds (for which reimbursement would not be provided)
in order to comply with this act. Because the amount of any such reimbursed
costs canot readily be determined at this time, the bill may need to include a
finding of important state interest and be enacted by a vote of 2/3 of the
membership of each house in order to comply with article VII, section 18 (a),
Florida Constitution.
Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Comm'y Aff., CS/CS/SB 1606 (1993) Staff Analysis 5-6 (March
16, 1993) (on file with comm.).
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enacted."' Most of the mandates (eleven of the fourteen bills) required
local governments to either create new services or expand existing ones.
The balance of the bills reduced the revenue-generating authority of local'
governments.119 The mandate total represented a sharp decrease in the
mandate levels of the immediately preceding years. 20 Interestingly, all of
the fourteen mandates were determined to be either exempt under subsection
(d) of section 18, or excepted under subsection (a)."'
Thirteen of the fourteen mandate bills were exempt because they were
determined to have an insignificant fiscal impact. 22  Those mandates
touched on many areas, demonstrating the far reach of section 18. The laws
dealt with many subjects, including building permits, taxation, transportation
corridors, community development, and health care. In the area of health
care, a law was passed increasing the Medicaid reimbursement for out-of-
county indigent medical expenses from 80 to 100 percent. A community
development law was passed that expanded the information required on the
annual reports of local governments with enterprise zones. 123  A law
expanding the notice statement on building permits was also included as a
mandate.124 Those mandates that represented revenue reduction measures
included a law that broadened the classification of educational property for
the purposes of an ad valorem tax exemption. Another law established a
maximum amount for the total charges and fees that could be imposed on
a party who initiates civil or appellate proceedings in circuit and county
courts. 12 5
The fourteenth bill passed in response to a federal requirement, and
thus enjoyed an exception under the amendment. This bill required the
Department of Community Affairs to ensure that energy assessments are
conducted before a residence is weatherized." 6 Since this bill qualified
for an exception under subsection (a), it also required a finding that it would
fulfill an important state interest. However, the ACIR Report is silent as to
118. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 31.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 27.
121. Id. at 31. The ACIR 1991 Report notes that the 1991 session also resulted in the
passage of revenue generating legislation which, to some extent, helped offset the impact of
the new mandates. Id.
122. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 32-34.
123. Id. at 33.
124. Id. at 32.
125. Id. at 32-33.
126. Id. at 33.
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whether that finding was ever made. 1
The 1991 Legislature also passed a number of bills expanding local
government revenue sources. While a number of these bills were deemed
to have an insignificant impact on the state, other programs represented
substantial funds for local governments. One bill amended the sales tax
statute to authorize an additional $5.5 million in sales tax revenue for cities
and counties.1 28  Additional sales tax revenue was authorized for those
local governments with professional sports facilities or new spring training
facilities. 29 Laws also allocated funds to local governments to help them
prepare their comprehensive plans. 3°
The 1991 mandate legislation demonstrates how broadly section 18
touches on the legislative process. For example, one might be surprised to
find that bills dealing with the notice provisions of building permits would
require review under the amendment. The same might also be said of the
law requiring additional information on local government annual reports.
The seemingly innocuous laws that were tracked by legislative staff,
suggests that the Legislature had a heightened awareness of the cost of laws
as they were considered, even though virtually all of the laws passed
because their fiscal impact was determined to be insignificant.
ACIR's 1991 Report also provides a list of selected mandates that were
not passed in that session. While one might think that their failure was due
to the cost of the measures, some of the ill-fated mandates had been
previously determined to be excepted by the "all persons similarly situated"
language in the amendment.13  A look at those bills is telling. One
proposed bill deemed to affect all persons similarly situated dealt with
eminent domain, requiring governments to pay cash compensation to
billboard owners for the removal of billboards in certain situations. 32
Another proposed bill thought to qualify for the "similarly situated"
exception, granted law enforcement employees the same disability benefits
as fire fighters.' 33  The bills would have unquestionably required local
governments to spend significant amounts of money. The bills' broad-based
police power character, however, would have allowed their passage under
section 18, as long as they were also found to fulfill important state
127. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 33.
128. Id. at 35.
129. Id. at 36.
130. Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 38.
132. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 38.
133. Id.
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interests.
B. Implementing Legislation
Pursuant to subsection (e) of the amendment, the 1991 Legislature
passed implementing legislation that was vetoed by Governor Chiles." 4
The bill gave direction to any city or county choosing not to comply with
a law that was allegedly violative of the amendment, and further established
venue for such a challenge. The bill also defined "insignificant fiscal
impact."
Under the bill, known as Senate Bill 2000,3' a local government that
refused to comply with mandate legislation first had to pass an ordinance
declaring that the mandate violated article VII, section 18, and that the local
government was not bound by the mandate.136 Within ten days, a certified
copy of the ordinance was to be filed with the Secretary of State, who
would immediately notify the Governor, the Attorney General, the President
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House. 3 ' Within thirty days after
receiving notice of the ordinance, the Attorney General would file a petition
for a writ of mandamus to compel the local government's compliance with
the law; however, if the Attorney General determined that the law on its
face failed to meet the amendment's requirements, he or she could decide
not to file the petition for mandamus, and would then have to notify the
Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House, of that
decision. 3 ' Venue for the action was placed in the county in which the
district court of appeal, having jurisdiction over the county or municipality,
was located. All appeals were to be at the First District Court of Ap-
peal.' Finally, the implementing legislation defined "insignificant fiscal
impact" similarly to the definition in the Legislature's guidelines: "an
amount not greater than the product of the average statewide population for
the applicable state fiscal year ... multiplied by ten cents."' 4 °
The Governor found a number of problems with the bill and addressed
them in his veto message. First, he underscored the intent of the mandate
amendment which, in his view, was "to discourage the Legislature's
134. Governor's Veto Message of S.B. 2000, reprinted in 2 FLA. S. JoUR. 10 (Spec.
Sess. C 1991); see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
135. S.B. 2000, reprinted in I FLA. S. JOUR. 132 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
136. Id.; see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 26.
137. Fla. SB 2000 (1991).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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historical practice of reaping the benefit derived from enacting politically
popular programs without facing the responsibility of funding the pro-
grams." '141 The amendment, therefore, represents a strong restriction on
the Legislature's authority to pass mandates, and should not be interpreted
to frustrate the will of the electorate, who had passed the amendment by a
wide margin.142 It is notable that the governor's opinion of section 18's
purpose is more expansive and local government-friendly than the stated
purpose of the amendment.
The veto message singled out a number of the bill's provisions. For
example, the Legislature's definition of "insignificant fiscal impact," an
amount not greater than $1.4 million, seemed too high, especially when
compared to the amount used in the parallel provision applicable to the
general appropriations process. That provision defines "insignificant fiscal
impact" as an amount not greater than $50,000.1'4 The Governor was also
concerned that the legislation placed an enormous burden on any local
government that chose to challenge a mandate, since it was required to pass
an ordinance and notify the Attorney General of its decision. Further, since
the Attorney General was given very little discretion in deciding whether to
seek mandamus, the legislation, in effect, forced local governments to spend
"sorely needed" revenues to fund mandate challenges. 44 Governor Chiles
suggested that ACIR become involved in the implementing legislation
process, since it was charged to deal with intergovernmental relations. 45
The Governor's veto put an end to Senate Bill 2000, and, in the intervening
two legislative sessions, there has been no proposal for implementing
legislation that has proceeded past the committee hearing stage.
VII. THE 1992 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Mandate Legislation
The number of legislative enactments increased dramatically in
1992. Thirty-two laws, including fifty-two local government mandates,
141. Governor's Veto Message of SB 2000, reprintedin 2 FLA. S. JOUR. 10 (Spec. Sess.
C 1991); see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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were enacted.146 Of those laws, many were either exempt from the
requirements of section 18 or enjoyed one of the exceptions.147 Most of
the laws were found either to have an insignificant fiscal impact, or met the
"important state interest" test and were also funded, affected all persons
similarly situated, or passed by the needed two-thirds vote. 4 '
Laws determined to be exempt because of their insignificant fiscal
impact included, among others, laws increasing emergency medical service
license and certificate fees, and laws requiring simultaneous implementation
of Unemployment Compensation Law amendments. 49 Other laws that
passed by virtue of the insignificant fiscal impact exemption provided sales
tax exemptions. For example, laws were passed exempting non-profit
organizations from paying sales tax on equipment for pollution discharge
cleanup; exempting educational institutions from paying sales tax on works
of art; exempting the purchase of feed for ostriches from the sales tax;
exempting out-of-state publishers from sales and corporate income taxes in
certain situations; exempting Coast Guard auxiliary purchases from the sales
tax; and exempting non-profit community cemetery purchases from the sales
tax."15 The laws were identified as reducing the tax base or the sales tax
itself While not clear, the staff apparently felt that the laws represented
potential mandate problems under subsection (c), the provision limiting
mandates that "reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties and
municipalities as an aggregate . . . ." However, these sales tax exemptions
arguably decreased only the total amount of sales tax collected and did not
alter the percentage share of the state tax revenue. If this is so, these laws
were not mandates. Nevertheless, they were treated as such by legislative
staff.
One law enjoyed the criminal law exemption; it imposed a new
administrative requirement on law enforcement agencies that seize property
under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. It also provided for penalties
for noncompliance.15" ' Legislative staff determined this law qualified for
the criminal law exemption, despite the fact that it was described as an
administrative provision.
A number of the 1992 bills enjoyed exceptions under the amendment
after first being found to fulfill important state interests. Only one was
146. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 7.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 8, 10.
150. Id. at 9-10.
151. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 9-10.
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excepted because offsetting fees were authorized. That law created a new
service that required requiring that federal liens on real property to be filed
with the circuit courts rather than the federal district courts."5 2 Another
law removed a statutory prohibition against including salary incentive pay
in the calculation of police retirement benefits. 53 It passed by a two-
thirds vote. 5 4 The subject of a third law, declared to deal with an
important state interest, was "potty parity."1' 5 Under its provisions, newly
constructed public or private buildings with public rest rooms must provide
a specified ratio of water closets and urinals. This law passed muster since
it affected all persons similarly situated. 56
The 1992 Report is less enlightening in its treatment of a number of
other mandates. Eight of the laws enacted during that session were found
to raise mandate concerns but were amended in the House or Senate
chamber, so there was no accessible documentation as to the applicability
of section 18.157 Fourteen laws were found to contain mandate provisions
under the ACIR definition,5 8 but the legislative staff failed to conclusively
address the problem in the staff analysis. In ACIR's opinion, this could
mean that the staff felt either an exemption or exception applied; alterna-
tively, staff may have determined that section 18 was inapplicable. 59 This
could indicate a discrepancy between ACIR's mandate definition and that
used by legislative staff.
As in the case of the 1991 session, the 1992 session enacted various
laws that provided new or expanded revenue sources for local governments.
The fiscal impact of the vast majority of these provisions could not be
determined. 6" However, a law increasing the cost of documentary stamps
translated into an additional $18.8 million for cities and counties.161
However, these funds were earmarked for state and local affordable housing
programs"' rather than being freely available to local governments. A
law that implemented a state-wide tax amnesty program was determined to
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 9.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 8.
156. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8.
157. Id. at 8-11.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
159. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 11.
160. Id. at 13-14.
161. Id. at 14.
162. Id.
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yield local governments $3 million in 1992-93 and $8.1 million in 1993-
94.163 A law imposing additional fees for child support payments was
determined to benefit county clerks of court in the amount of $1.1
million.'64 Again, even though ACIR describes this law as one generating
extra funds for local governments, the new revenue would only benefit
clerks of court, rather than local governments in general. 6 '
Local governments were also given some leeway in how they handle
financial matters. Specifically, laws were passed allowing local govern-
ments to use certain tax revenues for expanded purposes.'66 For example,
tourist development tax revenues were authorized to be used for muse-
ums.'67 Small counties were aided by a law allowing them to use local
government infrastructure surtax revenues for operating purposes.'68 New
legislation also authorized small counties to use the local option gas tax on
motor and special fuel to pay for infrastructure projects. 6 9
B. Implementing Legislation
In response to Governor Chiles' veto of the 1991 implementing
legislation, the House of Representatives Finance and Taxation Committee
sought input from local government representatives and again introduced
similar legislation. 7
Although not enacted into law, the proposed legislation is interesting
in how it differed from the 1991 attempt. Once again, the bill required a
local government to document its determination that a mandate failed to
meet the requirements of section 18 and, therefore, the county or city was
not bound by the law. The Attorney General, as in the case of the earlier
bill, was given the opportunity to seek a writ of mandamus, and venue was
set in the circuit court having jurisdiction over the county or municipali-
ty.' The 1992 attempt differed most significantly from the 1991 version
in its definition of "insignificant fiscal impact." The 1992 bill contained
163. Id.
164. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 14.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 18.
167. Id.
168. Id. Small counties include those with populations of 50,000 or less as of April 1,
1992. Use of the tax money would be subject to conditions. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96,
at 18.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 19.
171. Id. at 19-20.
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two detailed subsections devoted to the definition.1 12
Under the proposed definition, "insignificant fiscal impact" depended
on the population of the affected local governments. The general definition
provided that if a mandate affected either counties or municipalities,
"insignificant fiscal impact" would respectively equal the product of five
cents and the total statewide population or statewide municipal popula-
tion." 3 If a mandate affected both counties and cities, "insignificant fiscal
impact" would be tied to the total of the statewide municipal population and
the statewide population. 74 However, under additional provisions of the
proposed legislation, the "insignificant fiscal impact" threshold would
apparently decrease if the mandate targeted less populated cities and
counties."' Under this population adjustment formula, the "insignificant
172. Section (2) of the proposed legislation is the relevant provision. It provided:
Section 2.. (1) As used in subsection (d) of section 18 of Article VII of the
Florida Constitution, "insignificant fiscal impact" means an amount less than:
(a) The product of multiplying by 5 cents the total statewide municipal
population, for mandates affecting only municipalities;
(b) The product of multiplying by 5 cents the total statewide population,
for mandates affecting only counties; or
(c) The sum of the amounts derived under paragraphs (a) and (b), for
mandates affecting municipalities and counties.
(2) Adjustments to insignificant fiscal impact shall be made as follows:
(a) If a mandate affecting only municipalities applies solely to municipali-
ties that have a combined total population of less than 50 percent of the total
statewidenunicipal population, insignificant fiscal impact means an amount less
than the product of multiplying by 10 cents the sum of the populations of the
affected municipalities.
(b) If a mandate affecting only counties applies solely to counties that
have a combined total population of less than 50 percent of the total statewide
population, insignificant fiscal impact means an amount less than the product of
multiplying by 10 cents the sum of the populations in the affected counties.
(c) If a mandate affecting counties and municipalities applies solely to
counties and municipalities that have a combined total population of less than
50 percent of the sum of the total statewide municipal population and the total
statewide population, insignificant fiscal impact means an amount less than the
product of multiplying by 10 cents the sum of the populations in the affected
municipalities and in the affected counties.
(3) For the purposes of this section, "population" means the latest
population estimates determined by the Demographic Estimating Conference
pursuant to s. 216.136, Florida Statutes, for the applicable state fiscal year.
id. at 20.
173. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 19-20.
174. Id. at 20.
175. Id.
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fiscal impact" exemption would be harder to meet where the affected local
governments were sparsely populated, since the dollar amount threshold
would be tied to their population, rather than to the population on a state-
wide basis. In any event, the general formula is notable since it used a five
cent multiple rather than the Legislature's ten cent figure. This adjustable
exemption was likely the result of lobbying by local government representa-
tives, since its effect would have been to remove the "insignificant fiscal
impact" exemption in certain instances. As previously mentioned, this
proposed legislation was not enacted.
VIII. THE 1993 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Mandate Legislation
In 1993, mandate legislation reached a post-amendment high. Forty-
five laws were enacted that contained a total of eighty mandate provi-
sions. 76 As were the majority of the 1992 mandates, most of the 1993
mandate provisions were classified as either exempt or excepted under the
amendment's language.
Sixteen of the exempt mandates were determined to have insignificant
fiscal impact, among them a law requiring local governments to provide
death benefits to local fire fighters, and another law creating a new program
requiring the appointment of interpreters for deaf jurors."' Other man-
dates, classified as laws that would reduce the tax base, were also found to
have an insignificant fiscal impact. One such law extends the government
leasehold exemption to airport properties. Another expands homestead
exemptions for spouses of deceased disabled veterans and spouses with life
estates.'
78
Criminal law and federal mandate exemptions were also enacted. A
law dealing with prostitution and HIV transmission was determined to be
exempt under the amendment's criminal law provisions. It requires
mandatory HIV testing for defendants charged with certain crimes. Counties
would incur the cost of the testing while the defendants are in their
176. FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1993
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, Draft Edition, Aug. 1993, at 5. [hereinafter 1993
REPORT].
177. Id. at 6, 7.
178. Id. at 9, 10.
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custody. 79 Another law, seeking to implement the Americans with
Disabilities Act in the area of public transportation, was found to be exempt
since it was passed in compliance with federal law. 80
The 1993 legislation also included a number of laws that were
determined to be excepted under the amendment. For example, one law
increased the pension subsidy paid by local government employers by $4
million. Another law requires state and local governments to spend funds
to collect and segregate certain types of batteries. Both of these laws were
found to fulfill important state interests and applied to similarly situated
persons.' One law was found to fulfill an important state interest and
was funded. It provides that local government involved in emergency
management plans must develop their plans consistent with the state's
plan. 18
2
ACIR included a number of laws in its 1993 report that the legislative
staff failed to identify as mandates. Some of these appear to require the
expenditure of funds. One law, for example, lowers the blood/breath
alcohol level to .08% for DUI's. The Report acknowledges the law will
have an impact on county jails; however, staff determined the law was not
a mandate.'83 Another law reduces the sales tax charged on milk and
juice in vending machines. Again, staff determined that the amendment's
language was not applicable to this law.'" 4
The 1993 Report acknowledges those mandate provisions that lacked
bill analyses to address the mandate problem as well as those mandate
provisions that. were added to laws within House and Senate chambers.'85
As to the former, the Report states that either an exemption or exception to
the constitution's mandate provisions "may apply, but it is not documented
in the Constitutional Restriction or Fiscal Impact sections of the staff
analyses.' 86
The 1993 legislative activity shows no decrease in mandate activity; if
anything, it demonstrates, much as the 1992 legislation, the widespread
reliance on exemptions and exceptions to enact mandates.
179. Id. at 9.
180. Id. at 8.
181. 1993 REPORT, supra note 176, at 8.
182. Id. at 9.
183. Id. at 7.
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id. at 5.
186. 1993 REPORT, supra note 176, at 5.
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B. Implementing Legislation
There were no attempts to enact implementing legislation during the
1993 legislative session.
IX. LocAL GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT
Since there have been virtually no cases construing section 18,187 we
are left to consider local government's critique of legislative activity in the
wake of the amendment. Close observers of the post-amendment legislative
activity raise questions about the effectiveness of the provision in light of
the Legislature's interpretation of section 18's language. That interpretation
will be very persuasive in the event of later challenges.188
Depending on which level of government is offering an opinion, differ-
ing views of the amendment emerge. Generally speaking, the Florida
League of Cities has been more positive about the effect of the amendment
than has been the Florida Association of Counties.189 However, each
county and municipality in the state is affected differently, depending on its
peculiarities, and accordingly, the views expressed below are not meant to
accurately reflect the views of all of Florida's local governments.
According to the League of Cities, Florida cities are generally "thrilled"
with the passage of section 18.19° The amendment is viewed as a success
because it requires the mandate issue to be faced head-on early in the
legislative process, and forces an awareness on the part of legislators.' 9'
Many freshman legislators arrive in Tallahassee with many good ideas, but
without any thought as to how they will be funded. Put another way,
187. As of the writing of this article, only one case has construed the constitutional
provision. See In re B.C., 610 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that article VII, section 18 operates prospectively).
188. See Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665,669
(Fla. 1970) ("[Wlhere a constitutional provision may well have either of several meanings,
it is a fundamental rule of constitutional construction that, if the Legislature has by statute
adopted one, its action in this respect is well-nigh, if not completely, controlling.").
189. The author spoke to representatives of both the League of Cities and Association
of Counties, and uses their views in this article to depict the general views of Florida's cities
and counties, respectively.
190. Tipton, supra note 52.
191. Id.
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govemment will run out of money before it runs out of ideas.192 The
amendment has helped to open the eyes of legislative newcomers.193
While the League of Cities is generally optimistic about the amendment
and has pledged to work closely with legislators to deal with individual
mandate issues,"' it does pinpoint a few concerns. One problem stems
from the ease with which the "important state interest" requirement can be
met. It appears that a legislator merely has to say that a bill fulfills such an
interest and the hurdle is met."' Once that simple step is taken, a man-
date will qualify for an exception under section 18 if any of subsection (a)'s
exceptions are met.196 Viewed in this manner, the exceptions to the
mandate restriction are really nothing more than additional exemptions.
A second concern raised by the League of Cities is the lack of
legislation that defines "insignificant fiscal impact." The Legislature's
current use of $1.4 million197 as the threshold below which an insignificant
fiscal impact will be found is somewhat arbitrary and leads to an easier
finding of an. exemption. However, there may be some benefit. in not
having the term defined by way of implementing legislation, since it could
give a challenging local government more leeway to argue that a mandate
under this guideline is, in fact, significant.198 Whether there is implement-
ing legislation or not, the League's position is that the state would have to
shoulder the burden of demonstrating than any mandate has an insignificant
fiscal impact or is otherwise exempt or excepted from section 18's
reach. 199
Florida's Association of Counties gives section 18 a less favorable
review. This is due, in part, to a feeling that county services are more
broad-based than those of cities, which in turn makes counties more
susceptible to mandate legislation." As are the cities, counties are
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. For example, the League has used ACIR's FAXNET. See supra text accompanying
note 103-05.
195. Tipton, supra note 52.
196. These include funding of the enactment, authorizing a funding source, approving
the law by a two-thirds vote; finding that the law applies to all persons similarly situated; or
finding that the law is required to comply with a federal mandate.
197. This figure is based on a Florida population of 14 million applied to a ten cents per
capita formula.
198. Tipton, supra note 52.
199. Id.
200. Telephone Interview with Alma Gonzalez-Neimeiser, Legislative Director, Florida
Association of Counties (May 26, 1993).
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dissatisfied with section 18's exemptions, particularly the criminal law and
"insignificant fiscal impact" exemptions.
Criminal laws are not defined in the amendment, and counties would
be pleased if the term was defined to encompass only those laws creating
criminal liability and fixing punishment. Due to the silence of the
amendment and the absence of any implementing legislation, counties point
out that a law requiring local government expenditures for prisons could be
exempt.201 This fear is not unfounded. The law passed during the 1992
session requiring law enforcement agencies to comply with new administra-
tive requirements in contraband-related seizures was determined by staff to
be exempt as a criminal law. ° Similarly, the 1993 mandatory HIV
testing law for certain criminal defendants also passed as an exempt criminal
law. 20
3
Counties further urge implementing legislation to define "insignificant
fiscal impact." The current use of a $1.4 million threshold before fiscal
significance comes into play does not correspond to the $50,000 figure the
state uses to determine whether a fiscal impact is significant.0 4 Further-
more, under current procedures, legislative staffers are left to determine the
matter themselves, sometimes in situations where reliable figures are not
available.
While the exemptions may be the largest source of the counties'
concern, the procedures for establishing the exceptions under the amendment
also raise questions. As do cities, counties point to the ease with which an
important state interest is determined. Often the language is merely inserted
in a bill with little, if any, debate or discussion.2 5 The 1992 law allowing
the inclusion of incentive pay in police retirement benefits, as well as the
law aimed at achieving "potty parity," were both determined to fulfill
important state interests.20 6 Arguably, anything the Legislature does is
201. Id. It is likely, however, that such a law could also qualify as an exception if it
applied to all counties under the "all persons similarly situated" exception.
202. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8.
203. 1993 REPORT, supra note 176, at 9.
204. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200. The Revenue Estimating Conference, created
by Florida Statutes section 216.053, uses the $50,000 figure to determine fiscal significance.
See FLA. STAT. § 216.053 (1991); see also Governor's Veto Messageof SB 2000, reprinted
in 2 FLA. S. JOUR. 10 (Spec. Sess. C 1991).
205. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
206. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8. Unfortunately, the Report fails to articulate
exactly what important state interests are involved.
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important to the state.20 7  The 1993 law increasing local government
pension subsidies and regulating battery collection also passed under this
provision."'
Counties also point to a more subtle problem. If the important state
interest determination is made, a law will be excepted from the amend-
ment's prohibition if '"the expenditure is required to comply with a law that
applies to all persons similarly situated, including the state and local
governments . "0. ,o9 This exception has been relied upon by legislative
staff and is becoming more of a concern to counties.210 Because of the
language which appears to treat local governments as "persons" for the
purposes of the exception, a law could be deemed to fall within the
exception if it equally affects all counties. Counties see this as a less
conspicuous way to bypass the amendment's provisions.2" For example,
the "potty parity" law passed under this exception.2"2
A further claim made by the counties is that the two-thirds majority
vote exception is not difficult to meet, since a two-thirds vote, even of the
full membership, is not uncommon for many laws. This appears to be true.
By way of example, of those general bills originated in the Senate during
the Regular Session of the 1992 Legislature, 138 were passed by both
houses. Of those bills, only twelve, or just less than ten percent, failed to
meet the two-thirds membership vote.213 Counties would prefer to see a
three-fourths majority vote in its place.2"4
Even though counties appear less optimistic about the impact of section
18, they are not without any favorable response. The amendment is
perceived as helping counties maintain revenues, particularly state-shared
funds such as those generated by the sales tax.25 Since any attempt by
207. The subjects determined to fulfill important state interests for the purposes of
section 18's exceptions contrast sharply with those deemed by the courts to serve an
important state interest in other constitutional law contexts. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v.
Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (preservation of life); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. State, 408
So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1981) (promoting the disclosure of campaign contributors); Kendrick v.
Everheart, 390 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1980) (protecting the welfare of children).
208. 1993 REPORT, supra note 176, at 8.
209. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18 (emphasis added).
210. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
211. Id.
212. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8.
213. LEGISLATIVE INF. Div., JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMM,, FLA. LEGIS.,
FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1992 REGULAR SESSION 5, 22-194 (1992).
214. Gonzales-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
215. Id.
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the Legislature to redistribute revenue sharing to the detriment of local
governments would bring section 18 into play, the Legislature has had to
look for other ways to improve the state's fiscal condition.216 The result
has been more of a hands-off attitude toward local governments' existing
funding. In fact, recent sessions have attempted to help local governments
by passing laws authorizing more flexibility in collecting revenues at the
local government level. 1 '
Counties do agree that the amendment institutionalizes the mandate
issue and forces the Legislature to confront it early on. While the political
realities of trade-offs between local governments and the Legislature
continue, the mandate provision seems to work more to the advantage of
local governments, who were forced to work with less leverage before the
amendment's passage. In that respect, the amendment has had significant
impact."'
Despite the limited favorable views of Florida's counties and cities, any
individual local government may be more or less pleased with the amend-
ment, depending on that locality's particular circumstances. For example,
in spite of the promise of section 18, the city of Fort Lauderdale has been
losing money because its permanent population is decreasing. Since its
share of state sales tax revenues depends on the population base,219 Fort
Lauderdale's share has decreased in recent years. Section 18 does not
prevent that type of revenue loss. 2 To a certain extent, Fort Lauderdale
does not see the amendment as necessarily helping it maintain its existing
level of funding. In fact, Fort Lauderdale is further concerned that the
amendment does not prevent the Legislature from separating large ticket
items into a number of smaller components to enable it to pass a number of
bills under the "insignificant fiscal impact exemption." ''" Cities such as
Fort Lauderdale also struggle to meet federal mandates and mandates that
pre-date the amendment's passage, which are also not implicated by section
216. Id. Ms. Gonzalez-Neimeiser used the example of a law that repealed certain sales
tax exemptions. The law resulted in more state funds. The legislative alternative would have
been to cut back on local governments' share of sales tax funds. The latter course would
have required compliance with section 18; the legislature opted for the former course of
action. Id.
217. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8-10.
218. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
219. See FLA. STAT. § 218 (1991).
220. Telephone Interview with Terry Sharp, Budget Director, City of Fort Lauderdale,
Fla. (June 8, 1993).
221. Id.
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18.2"2 In the face of these difficulties, cities such as Fort Lauderdale are
having to find help beyond section 18 to combat their fiscal problems. 23
It is fair to say that local governments see the amendment as a mixed
blessing. While it has created a legislative awareness of the mandate
problem, the amnendment's provisions nevertheless allow many mandates to
be enacted, and do not help local governments comply with pre-existing
mandates. Local governments are also awaiting almost certain mandates that
would be allowed under the amendment, including federal environmental
mandates and state mandates pertaining to the court system.2 4
X. CONCLUSION
The great expectations harbored by struggling local governments have
not been fully met by article VII, section 18, of the Florida Constitution.
This is at once made apparent by the steady and dramatic increase in
mandate legislation since the amendment's passage. At its worst, this spiral
may indicate a legislative belief that any mandate can be made to fit one of
the constitution's exemptions or exceptions. However, when considered in
light of its articulated purpose-to give local governments greater bargaining
power on the subject of unfunded state mandates and to protect local
revenue sources-section 18 reaches some level of success. Cities and
counties generally agree that the measure has institutionalized, at an early
stage of legislation, the mandate issue, and that it has helped, to a certain
extent, maintain existing funding.
Before the issue loses momentum, local governments should lobby for
implementing legislation to restrict the Legislature's reliance on both the
criminal law and "insignificant fiscal impact" exemptions.2 5 A limiting
clarification of the "similarly situated persons" exception should also be
considered. Such legislation should also assign venue for future disputes
and should expressly place the burden of demonstrating compliance with the
222. Id. For example, 85% of Fort Lauderdale'swater treatment costs stem from federal
and state mandates that pre-dated section 18.
223. For example, some older cities are finding themselves working with counties to
help maintain funding in the face of population loss to suburban areas. Telephone Interview
with George Hanbury, City Manager of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (June 4, 1993).
224. Tipton, supra note 52; Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
225. Tipton, supra note 52. Generating the legislative interest necessary to enact
implementing legislation may prove difficult. There was no effort to pass implementing
legislation in the 1993 legislative session. There is a feeling that the Legislature may believe
it has provided enough assistance to local governments by originating the amendment. Id.
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amendment on the Legislature. Other ambiguities in the amendment will
likely have to await judicial determination. In the meantime, section 18
leaves Florida's local governments better off than they were prior to its
adoption, but they are not yet where they want to be. To paraphrase the
remarks of one city official, before section 18 was adopted, local govern-
ments operated in quicksand; now they have touched bottom, but they are
still waiting for someone to throw them a rope.2"6
226. Hanbury, supra note 223.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This year, Florida's municipalities are commemorating twenty-five
years of Home Rule Authority. This celebration, however, may be short-
lived due to legislative and judicial erosion of local decision-making
authority.
Municipalities in Florida predated statehood. Pensacola and St.
Augustine existed under the civil law of Spain. The legislative council of
the territory of Florida established the incorporated areas of Tallahassee and
Quincy. After Florida's admission into the Union, these municipalities as
well as newly created municipalities, continued to exist under the laws
enacted by the General Assembly under the Florida Constitution of 1838.
New municipalities were then established by special or local law.'
Then, as now, one characteristic distinguished municipalities from all
other units of local government in Florida. Unlike other units of local
government, municipalities were organized by their citizens primarily to
promote their exclusive needs and conveniences.2 However, despite their
"citizen driven" role, the law in Florida prior to the 1968 constitutional
revisions severely restricted a city's ability to exercise the powers of local
self-governance. The control of the state's Legislature over municipalities
was plenary. Municipalities could possess and exercise only those powers
expressly granted by the Legislature or necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to the powers expressly granted, and those powers essential to the
declared purposes of the municipality.' If reasonable doubt existed as to
whether a municipality could exercise a certain power, the doubt would, as
a matter of law, be resolved against the municipality.'
I. State exrel. Atty. Gen. v. City of Avon Park, 149 So. 409, 412 (Fla.), reh'g denied,
151 So. 701 (Fla. 1933), modified, 158 So. 159 (Fla. 1934).
2. Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 134 So. 205 (Fla. 1931); see also Avon Park, 149 So.
at 412; City of Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1954).
3. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
4. Liberis v. Harper, 104 So. 853, 854 (Fla. 1925).
5. Id.; see also City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla.
1972); City of Clearwater, 75 So. 2d at 765.
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As the population of the state grew, this governance from the top down
became more and more cumbersome. As the number of local bills
increased, the limited state legislative time available was severely impacted.
By returning local decision making to municipal governments, the State
Legislature would eliminate the profusion of local bills and could therefore
concentrate on issues of statewide significance.6
II. THE HOME RULE AMENDMENT
Home Rule Authority has often been defined as the unfettered authority
of citizens to manage their own local affairs. Home Rule Authority was
given municipalities as one of the constitutional revisions ratified by
Florida's electorate on November 5, 1968.' Florida's Municipal Home
Rule Amendment to the Florida Constitution ("the Amendment"),' was first
proposed in Senate Joint Resolution 5-2X of 1968 ("SJR 5-2X").9 The
Amendment clearly reflected a fundamental change in the rules governing
the exercise of municipal power in Florida to date. "Municipalities shall
have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to
conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render
municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes
except as otherwise provided by law."'"
Furthermore, the legislative analysis of SJR 5-2X stated that under the
new article "[m]unicipalities would be given additional powers to perform
services unless specifically prohibited by law" and the municipal power
provision "gives municipalities residual powers except as provided by
law."" This was in sharp contrast to article VIII, section 8, of the 1885
Florida Constitution which stated that "[t]he Legislature shall have the
power to establish,... municipalities ... to prescribe their jurisdiction and
powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time."" Whereas the 1885
Florida Constitution restricted the independent operation of municipal
authority, the broad grant of power in the 1968 revisions to "exercise any
6. See George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of
Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 STETSON L. REV. 643, 643 (1991).
7. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
8. Id.
9. Fla. SJR 5-2X (1968) (Amendment FLA. CONST. of 1885 art. VIII, § 8).
10. Id.
I 1. Louis D. Deal, Post Mortem-Home Rule, FLORIDA MUNICIPAL RECORD, Nov. 1980.
12. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, § 8.
1994] 1439
721
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
power for municipal purposes. . .""3 clearly intended to vest the authority
for decisions with respect to appropriate municipal purposes in the municipal
governing body.
In 1972, the Florida Supreme Court had its first occasion to examine
the extent to which the rules governing the exercise of municipal power had
changed. In City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 4 the court
held the city could not adopt a rent control ordinance absent specific
legislative authorization) 5 In doing so, the court generally concluded that
the Amendment had not changed the historical rules governing the exercise
of municipal power.'6 "The powers of a municipality are to be interpreted
and construed in reference to the purposes of the municipality and if
reasonable doubt should arise as to whether the municipality possesses a
specific power, such doubt will be resolved against the City."' 7
Only the dissent, written by Justice Ervin, recognized how the
Amendment had changed the rules of construction with respect to municipal
authority.' 8 In Justice Ervin's view, no longer would the court look to
legislative authority for the validation for the ordinance. Instead, the new
article created a deference for municipal ordinances adopted for a municipal
purpose which was not prohibited or preempted by existing state law.' 9
The following year the State Legislature, in response to the court's
incorrect view, enacted the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act (the
"Act"). 0 Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution is specifi-
cally referenced in the Act and almost identical enabling language repeated
so as to eliminate any confusion as to what was intended. 2' The only
difference was in the limitations. Whereas the Florida Constitution of 1968
only limited home rule authority "except as otherwise provided by law,
22
section 166.021 (1) of the Florida Statutes only limited home rule authority
"except when expressly prohibited by law."23
The Act further provided for liberal construction to enable "broad
13. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note
6.
14. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
15. Id. at 804.
16. Id. at 803-04.
17. Id. at 803 (citing Liberis, 104 So. at 854).
18. Id. at 807-08 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
19. Fleetwood Hotel, 261 So. 2d at 807-08 (Ervin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
20, FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1973).
21. Id. § 166.021(1).
22. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b); see supra text accompanying note 6.
23. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
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exercise of the home rule powers granted" under the Florida Constitution as
evidenced by the language "and to remove any limitations, judicially
imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those
so expressly prohibited. 24 Moreover, "[a]ll existing special acts pertaining
exclusively to the power or jurisdiction of a particular municipality except
as otherwise provided" became ordinances of the municipality.25 Finally,
the Act repealed the majority of general laws that had previously authorized
the exercise of municipal power and left to the discretion of the munici-
palities the exercise of any powers previously contained in the various
repealed state statutes subject to terms and conditions the municipalities
themselves chose to prescribe.26
Thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a subsequent rent control
ordinance enacted by the City of Miami Beach relying on the Act.2" In
State v. City of Sunrise,28 the Florida Supreme Court tacitly receded from
its earlier holding in City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel,29 and ac-
knowledged the vast breath of municipal home rule power."
Article VIII, Section 2, Florida Constitution, expressly grants to every
municipality in this state authority to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions, and render municipal services. The only
limitation on that power is that it must be exercised for a valid
"municipal purpose." It would follow that municipalities are not
dependent upon the Legislature for further authorization. Legislative
statutes are relevant only to determine limitations of authority."
24. Id. (emphasis added). Remaining limitations on home rule authority: (a) annexation,
merger, and the exercise of extraterritorial powers; (b) subjects expressly prohibited by the
Constitution; (c) subjects preempted to the state or county government by constitution or
general law; and (d) subjects preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter. Id. §
166.021(3).
25. Id. § 166.021(5); see also State v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980).
Special laws or municipal charter provisions dealing with any of the following were not
subject to this general repeal: (a) the exercise of extraterritorial powers; (b) creation or
existence of the municipality, the terms of elected officers and the manner of their election,
or the distribution of powers among elected officials; or (c) matters relating to appointed
boards, any change in the form of government, and any rights of municipal employees.
Changes to any of these charter provisions require approval by referendum of the electors.
Id. § 166.021(4).
26. FLA. STAT. § 166.042(1) (1991).
27. City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
28. 354 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1978).
29. Fleetwood Hotel, 261 So. 2d at 801.
30. City of Sunrise, 354 So. 2d at 1206.
31. Id.
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To date, the Florida Supreme Court has continued to recognize the
"residual" nature of municipal home rule authority, even when specific
authority has been granted certain other entities and municipalities are not
mentioned in the enabling statute.32 Thus, the general rule is that if the
state has the authority to exercise a particular power, then a municipality,
under its home rule authority, may also exercise that power unless it is
"expressly prohibited. 33
III. LIMITATIONS ON HOME RULE AUTHORITY
Home rule powers are not unlimited. Generally speaking, municipali-
ties may exercise any power for "municipal purposes," except when
"expressly prohibited by law."'34  Initially, express limitations were
contained in the Florida Constitution, county charters and ordinances
pursuant thereto, and municipal charters and ordinances.35 Subsequently,
additional limitations have been added by the courts in construing the
application of the "expressly prohibited by law" provision contained in
section 166, of the Florida Statutes, by the Legislature by preempting home
rule authority on certain subjects, and by various state agencies in their
interpretation of statutory authority delegated to them by the state.36 All
of these entities have constricted the sphere of home rule authority to less
than what was intended by the revisions to the 1968 Florida Constitution.
A. Municipal Charter and Ordinances
A municipality's charter and ordinances, not unlike the state's
constitution and statutes, are the paramount governing instruments of the
municipality and the fundamental law of the citizens served by the
municipality. 7 Both the governing body, by ordinance, and its citizens,
by petition initiative, can require a referendum and subsequently limit their
own Home Rule Authority.38 With rare exceptions,39 this limitation on
32. See City ofOcala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992); City of Boca Raton v. State,
595 So. 2d 25, 30 (Fla. 1992).
33. Nye, 608 So. 2d at 17.
34. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(i) (1991).
35. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
36. For a state agency analysis, see infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
37. FleetwoodHotel, 261 So. 2d at 803 (citing Gontz v. Cooper City, 228 So. 2d 913
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969)).
38. FLA. STAT. § 166.031 (1991)
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a municipality's Home Rule Authority has generally been upheld by the
courts.40 However, since this is a limitation which is self-imposed, it will
not be discussed in this article.
B. County Charter and Ordinances
Non-charter counties have only the authority given them by general and
special law and cannot preempt the municipal Home Rule Authority of cities
and towns within that county's geographic boundaries.41 However, article
VIII, section I(f) of the Florida Constitution also provides for establishing
charter counties pursuant to a county-wide referendum.42 Out of sixty-
seven counties, only twelve are charter counties who can themselves
exercise home rule authority.
In the event of conflict between county and municipal ordinances, the
county's charter must state which will prevail.43 Any county ordinance
adopted by the charter county pursuant to its preemptive authority will
supersede conflicting municipal ordinances." A county's charter may
preempt to the county a sphere of regulation, but not a sphere of municipal
service;45 the municipalities could otherwise undertake under their home
rule authority.46 However, since a county-wide referendum is required for
adoption of a county charter, and any subsequent amendment thereto, it too
is a self-imposed limitation.47
C. The Constitution
Florida's Constitution places several fundamental limitations on the
exercise of municipal home rule authority. In addition to the clause "except
as otherwise prohibited by law," article VIII, section 2(c) preempts to the
State Legislature control of municipal annexation, merger, and the exercise
39. See Gaines v. City of Orlando, 450 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); West
Palm Beach Ass'n of Firefighters Local 727 v. Board of City Comm'n, 448 So. 2d 1212 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
40. Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983); see also
Gaines, 450 So. 2d at 1174.
41. FLA. CONST. art. VIll, § l(f).
42. Id.
43. Id. § I(g).
44. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3)(d) (1991).
45. Sarasota County v. Town of Longboat Key, 355 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1978).
46. Broward County v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 480 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1985).
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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of extra-territorial authority.48 While other articles of the Florida Constitu-
tion also impose limitations, the most poignant example in this area is the
taxing authority of municipalities. Without adequate revenue streams, it is
difficult at best to exercise Home Rule Authority. Article VII, section 1
requires enabling statutes before a municipality can enact a new tax, increase
an existing tax above any statutory cap, or increase a tax which had been
frozen by state statute.49 "[E]xcept for ad valorem taxes, municipalities
may be granted the power to levy any tax only by general law .... Any tax
not authorized by general law must necessarily fall by virtue of the
preemption clause of Fla. Const. Art. VII, § 1 (1968). " "5 As was the case
prior to the adoption of the Amendment, a municipality may still levy only
those taxes authorized by the constitution or by the state." Thus, any
doubts as to whether a municipality may levy a tax will be resolved against
the municipality. 2
D. The State Legislature
Unquestionably, the greatest intrusion on home rule authority has come
from the State Legislature under the "expressly prohibited by law" provision
in Florida Statute section 166.021(1)." The power of the State Legislature
over municipalities in Florida is plenary,14 and the passage of article VIII,
section 2 did not alter this relationship. The superior authority of the State
Legislature is implicit in the enumerated limitations expressed in Florida
Statutes section 166.021(1) and article VIII, section 2 of the Florida
Constitution.5  Article VIII simply changed the measure to one of
limitation rather than authorization, but the ability to limit is an all-pervasive
power. 56
The State Legislature may still restrict a municipality's home rule
48. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(c).
49. Id. art. VII, § 1.
50. City of Tampa v. Birdsong Motors Inc., 261 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1972); see also,
Belcher Oil Company v. Dade County, 271 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1972).
51. Certain Lots Upon Which Taxes Are Delinquent v. Town of Monticello, 31 So. 2d
905, 909 (Fla. 1947).
52. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 30 So. 2d 521, 524 (Fla. 1947) (Statutes authorizing a
municipality to levy a particular tax will be strictly construed and cannot be extended by
implication to include items not expressly included in the enabling statute).
53. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1991).
54. State v. City of Boca Raton, 172 So. 2d 230, 232 (Fla. 1965).
55. Lake Worth Utils. Auth. v. City of Lake Worth, 468 So. 2d 215, 217 (Fla. 1985).
56. Id.
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authority by general law.57 Municipal ordinances must give way to state
law to the extent the ordinance conflicts with state law, and a municipality's
power to regulate in a particular area may be entirely or partly preempted
by general law.5" The conflict doctrine and the preemption doctrine are
often referred to interchangeably; but, they are two fundamentally distinct
doctrines. In general, the concept of conflict may be distinguished from the
concept of preemption in that the latter effectively precludes all municipal
regulation in a given area while the former permits municipal regulation, but
only to the extent it supplements state law.59
An ominous trend has been the exercise of the state's preemptive
authority in zoning issues. Zoning has long .been considered the traditional
domain of municipal decision making. Since 1968, at least eleven statutes
have been enacted expressly preempting municipal regulation with respect
to siting.6" These statutes appear to be the result of legislators' perceptions
that the "NIMBY"'61 syndrome inhibits the location of such facilities. More
insidious are those statutes which regulate use of land,62 prescribe a myriad
of procedural requirements, 63 or remove regulatory authority, 64 and in
57. City of Miami Beach v. Frankel, 363 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1978) (the court invalidated
a municipal rent control ordinance because the City failed to comply with a state statute
regulating rent control ordinances); see also City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So. 2d 1073
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (the court invalidated a building moratorium ordinance on the
grounds that statutory notice provisions were not followed). In both cases, however, the
municipal ordinance met the municipal purpose tier of the test. See Frankel, 363 So. 2d at
557; City of Sanibel, 409 So. 2d at 1075.
58. Frankel, 363 So. 2d at 557; see also City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp., 404 So.
2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
59. Rocio Corp., 404 So. 2d at 1068-69; see also Edwards v. State, 422 So. 2d 84 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
60. Total siting preemption has occurred for juvenile facilities, FLA. STAT, § 39.074
(1991); amateur radio antennas, id. § 166.0435; family day care homes, id. § 166.0445;
electricity transmission lines, id. § 403.536; alcoholic beverage off-premise sales license, id.
§ 563.02; community residential homes, FLA. STAT. § 419.001 (1991); and prisons sitings,
id. § 944.095. Partial preemption has occurred for high speed rail, id. § 341.302; electrical
power plant siting, id. § 403.501-403.518; rezoning of mobile home parks, id. § 723.083; and
natural gas lines, FLA. STAT. § 368.041 (1992).
61. "NIMBY" is the common zoning and land use acronym for Not In My Back Yard.
62. Preemption of local government authority in: the regulation of wetlands, ch. 93-213,
§ 32, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129, 2150 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.422); and alteration of
mangroves, id., § 40, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2155 (amending FLA. STAT. § 403.931 (1992)).
63. Some examples are: how and where to conduct meetings, FLA. STAT. §§ 166.041,
286.011 (1991); purchase of real property, id. § 166.045; ad valorem tax increase notices, id.
§ 200.065.
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doing so, clearly infringe on local discretion.
Even the advance of progressive laws governing growth management
in Florida have come at the expense of municipal control over land use and
development matters. While section 163.3184 of the Florida Statutes on its
face empowers a municipality to determine its future within wide parameters
by preparing a comprehensive plan, in fact, the approval of the state through
its Department of Community Affairs is required before implementation of
the plan may occur at the local level. 61 Municipal decision-making under
this chapter is clearly contingent upon the approval of an arm of state
government. The Department of Community Affairs has the ability to find
that a local comprehensive plan fails to comply with state law and to
thereby initiate a process under which punitive sanctions may be assessed
against that municipality. 66 By adopting this top-down approach, the state
appears to have come full circle and to have rejected its original home rule
position that the state should not be interfering in matters of local concern.
E. The Courts
One substantial intrusion into municipal home rule is the judicially
created two-tier test which is used to determine whether a municipal
ordinance is a valid exercise of home rule authority.67 The first portion of
the test looks to whether the action is undertaken for a municipal pur-
pose.68 If so, the second portion of the test looks to whether that action is
expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county
municipal charter.69
64. Municipalities and counties are prohibited from enacting laws about: the possession,
use, or transportation of sources of radiation, id. § 404.166; local employment registration
or screening procedures whereas the same is permitted for business, institution, association,
profession, or occupation categories, subject to certain limitations, id. § 166.0443; possession
or sale of ammunition, FLA. STAT. § 166.044 (1991); prohibiting the installation of energy
devices based upon renewable resources, id. § 163.04; elevator accessibility for the handi-
capped, ch. 93-16, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 129, 133 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 399.045);
local licensing of building inspectors, ch. 93-166, § 24, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1057 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.606); defining solid waste, ch. 93-207, § 8, 1993 Fla. Laws
1976, 1988 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 403.703); and defining substance abuse impair-
ment and creating impairment offenses, ch. 93-39, § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 215, 215-19 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 397.305).
65. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184 (1991).
66. Id. § 163.3184(11).
67. City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1280 (Fla. 1983).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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The definition of municipal purpose is very broad and includes all
activities essential to the health, morals, protection, and welfare of the
municipality. 7° Despite a general deference to the municipal governing
body's determination of whether or not a particular activity serves a
municipal purpose, the test itself still creates a potential for courts to sit as
a super legislative body when they retroactively review and evaluate the
activities of a municipal government to determine whether the activities in
question fit the courts' definition of a municipal purpose. Municipal
decisions are based upon the individual governing body's evaluation of the
needs, concerns, issues, expectations, and perceptions of its citizens. The
courts lack this perspective when evaluating the municipal purpose tier of
the test and may therefore substitute their own judgment instead. Post 1968
case law reflects the following has been held to constitute a "municipal
purpose":
a) The provision of day care educational facilities;7
b) Issuing bonds to finance a convention center which would provide
a forum for educational, civic and commercial activities and would
increase tourism and trade; 72
c) Using public property for a sports stadium;
d) The sale of souvenir photographs; and "
e) The expenditure of funds to promote the passage of a referendum."
Thus, as a general rule, a municipality's exercise of power would have to
constitute a clear and gross abuse of discretion in order to fall within this
limitation. A municipality can even provide a service or operate a facility
that competes with a privately owned business and still effectuate a
municipal purpose. 6  The phrases "municipal purpose" and "public
purpose" have often been used interchangeably by the courts.
7
However, the courts have also found that the following activities serve
70. State v. City of Jacksonville, 50 So. 2d 532, 535 (Fla. 1951).
71. Gidman, 440 So. 2d at 1280.
72. State v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1980).
73. Rolling Oaks Homeowner's Assoc. v. Dade County, 492 So. 2d 686, 686 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
74. City of Winter Park v. Montesi, 448 So. 2d 1242, 1244-45 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
75. People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v.'County of Leon, 583 So. 2d
1373, 1378 (Fla. 1991).
76. Montesi, 448 So. 2d at 1245.
77. See id. at 1244; City of Miami, 379 So. 2d at 652.
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no "municipal purpose": borrowing money simply to reinvest the money
and thereby derive a profit on the investment;78 a municipal ordinance
opting out of an otherwise valid county road impact fee ordinance in a
charter county; 79 and the expenditure of public funds to promote the
passage of a referendum.8" These court findings show some inconsistency
even though the breadth of home rule authority under the municipal purpose
tier is quite broad.
In the area of preemption, the courts have tended to take a broad view
of the doctrine. However, immediately following the passage of the
Municipal Home Rule Powers Act,8 students of municipal law initially
believed the courts would take a very narrow view of the preemption
doctrine at least in part because the Act provided that a municipality could
enact legislation concerning any subject except on a subject "expressly
preempted to the state."82 It was thus assumed the historical doctrine of
"implied preemption" no longer applied to the exercise of municipal home
rule authority. This view initially prevailed in most Florida courts.83
The first indication the courts would apply a broad preemption doctrine
to the home rule authority of municipalities came in Tribune Co. v.
Cannella.8" The court held the Public Records Act85 preempted a munici-
pality's authority to adopt a policy providing for a delay in producing public
records for public inspection because the statute's "scheme of regulation of
the subject is pervasive and . . . further regulation of the subject by the
junior legislative body would present a danger of conflict with that pervasive
78. State v. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (Fla. 1991).
79. City of Ormond Beach v. County of Volusia, 535 So. 2d 302, 304-05 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).
80. Palm Beach County v. Hudspeth, 540 So. 2d 147, 154 (Fla, 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
81. FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1991) (originally enacted 1973)
82. See id. § 166.021(3)(c) (originally enacted 1973).
83. In State v. City of Pensacola, 397 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1981), Pace v. Board of
Adjustment, Town of Jupiter Island, 492 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), City
of Venice v. Valente, 429 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and City of Miami
Beach v. Rocio Corp., 404 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the courts
upheld municipal ordinances because the relevant statutes contained no written provisions
expressly limiting home rule authority.
84. 458 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1984). But see Pace, 492 So. 2d at 415 (where the court held
that the town's setback ordinance was not preempted by section 161 of the Florida Statutes
despite the statute's statewide comprehensive scheme for beach and shore preservation).
There is some thought that the Cannella court's holding is more a result of the court's
extremely high regard for the Public Records Law.
85. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-119.16 (1981).
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regulatory scheme . *. .. "" Since then, the Florida Supreme Court has
continued to expand the doctrine of "implied preemption," finding preemp-
tion where it appears that exclusive regulatory authority has been vested in
another entity.8 7 Generally, preemption will be found if the regulatory
scheme appears to be all inclusive, so that legislation at the municipal level
would undermine the state's interest.8 By expanding the application of
this doctrine, the courts have implied preemption despite the lack of a
specific express preemptive statement and where it may not have been
intended by the Legislature. In fact, the Legislature has hardly been shy in
stating that preemption of municipal regulation was intended when express
preemption statements appear in at least sixteen different statutes.8 9
Ironically, while the use of the preemption doctrine has been expanded
by the courts to substantially impair home rule authority, the use of the
conflict doctrine, in its present form, is more narrowly construed than when
the Home Rule Act was first adopted. Immediately prior to the onset of
municipal home rule, the conflict doctrine was often broadly applied to
invalidate municipal ordinances.9" Municipal ordinances were considered
inferior to state statutes and any reasonable doubts with re-pect to the
ordinance's effect on state statutes were resolved against the municipal
ordinance.9' Early guidelines for determining the existence of a conflict
state "[a] municipality cannot forbid what the Legislature has expressly
licensed, authorized or required, nor may it authorize what the Legislature
has expressly forbidden."92 Under the Rinzler v. Carson court's conflict
doctrine, one is simply hardput to find a set of circumstances in which an
ordinance speaking to the same subject as a statute would not conflict with
the state law. After all, is there any set of circumstances in which a
municipal ordinance does not either "forbid an activity permitted under state
law" or "permit an activity forbidden under state law"?
The incongruity of this situation was tacitly recognized but unfortunate-
ly compounded in City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp.93 The Rocio court
defined the conflict doctrine as "[a]n ordinance which supplements a
86. Cannella, 458 So. 2d at 1077 (quoting Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 438 So. 2d 516
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Lehan, J., dissenting)).
87. Florida Power Corp. v. Seminole County, 579 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991); Barragan v.
City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989).
88. Cannella, 458 So. 2d at 1078-79.
89. See supra notes 54, 56-57 and accompanying text.
90. Edwards v. State, 422 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
91. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 668 (Fla. 1972).
92. Id.
93. 404 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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statute's restriction of rights may coexist with that statute, whereas an
ordinance which countermands rights provided by statute must fail."94
While the Rocio court found ordinances and statutes could theoretically
"coexist,"95 it is extremely difficult to determine a set of circumstances in
which ordinances and statutes could in fact coexist under the court's view
of the doctrine. How can an ordinance "supplement a state's restriction of
rights," and not "countermand rights provided by statute"? For example, if
state law permits a person to dredge and fill a wetland if the person satisfies
three state established requirements, does the person not have a "right" to
dredge and fill the wetland if he satisfies the three state requirements? If an
ordinance "supplements the statute's restriction of rights" by requiring the
person to satisfy an additional criteria before he may dredge and fill a
wetland, hasn't the ordinance "countermanded rights provided by statute"?
A competing conflict analysis first emerged in Jordan Chapel Freewill
Baptist Church v. Dade County.9" In Jordan, the court stated that "the sole
test of conflict for purposes of preemption is the impossibility of co-
existence of the two laws."97  Therefore, if compliance with a local
ordinance requires violating a state statute or inhibits compliance with a
state statute, an impermissible conflict exists.
The conflict doctrine was narrowed even further in Pace v. Board of
Adjustment.98 Though the city's set back ordinance did conflict with the
general state policy of combatting beach erosion, the court did not invalidate
the city's ordinance because it did not "require the petitioner to take any
action which would violate the state law or forbid him from taking action
which the state law requires. State and local provisions reflect conflicting
policy considerations all the time, but this does not render the local
provisions unenforceable."99
The practical dilemma presented by the courts' conflicting views of the
doctrine was finally resolved in Laborers' International Union of North
America, Local 478 v. Burroughs.' The court adopted the following
conflict analysis: "In the regulatory area involved in this case, the test of
conflict is whether one must violate one provision in order to comply with
the other. Putting it another way, a conflict exists when two legislative
94. Id. at 1070 (citations omitted).
95. Id.
96. 334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
97. Id. at 664 (citations omitted).
98. 492 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
99. Id. at 415.
100. 541 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1989).
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enactments 'cannot co-exist.'"l1
The conflict analysis adopted by the court in Laborers 'International,
eschews the relatively esoteric analysis of whether an ordinance "supple-
ments state restrictions" or "countermands rights granted by statute" in favor
of a relatively straight forward and simple approach to conflict analysis. A
conflict exists if the person must violate state law in order to comply with
the ordinance or violate the ordinance in order to comply with state law.
Stated differently, no conflict exists if the person can satisfy both state law
and the local ordinance. Nor, as a general rule, will a conflict exist if an
ordinance simply requires more stringent standards than those required under
state law. °2 In the final analysis, Laborers 'International injected into the
conflict doctrine a healthy dose of respect for the residual nature of
municipal home rule authority. As a result, courts will generally attempt to
find some way for the statute and ordinance to co-exist. By narrowly apply-
ing the conflict doctrine, municipal home rule authority has made substantial
inroads into this doctrine.
One of the most imminent potential intrusions into municipal home rule
authority is the current debate over the extent to which the Local Govern-
ment Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act0 3
("The Growth Management Act") has altered the traditional zoning and
planning powers of municipalities. Under the Growth Management Act,
each municipality is required to prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan to
manage future growth and development and implement land development
regulations to fulfill the goals and objectives stated in that municipality's
adopted plan. °4 The plan consists of elements and objectives and policies
which govern each element. One element is the future land use element
which is intended to designate "proposed future general distribution,
location, and extent of the uses of land .. .
Prior to the adoption of the Growth Management Act, the rezoning of
a specific parcel of property was considered by the courts to be a legislative
function.0 6 While the rezoning decision had to bear a rational relationship
101. Id. at 1161 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
102. But see Edwards, 422 So. 2d at 85 (where a municipal ordinance conflicted with
state law because it set a greater penalty for possession of cannabis and cocaine).
103. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-163.3243 (1991).
104. Id. § 163.3177.
105. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a) (emphasis added).
106. Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 174 (Fla. 1983);
Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 838 (Fla. 1959).
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to the community's health, safety, and welfare, °7 the legislative character
of the decision granted the municipality a great deal of latitude and
discretion. So long as the decision was "fairly debateable," open to
reasonable dispute or controversy, the courts would not question the wisdom
of the rezoning decision.' 8 Thus, the courts traditionally deferred to the
local government's rezoning decision.0 9
To invalidate a presumptively valid municipal zoning decision, the
burden is on the party challenging the rezoning decision to establish that the
decision was not fairly debateable but "arbitrary, unreasonable, or confisca-
tory.,,'l" The adoption of a comprehensive plan by a municipality serves
merely as a guide to future zoning decisions and therefore has no legal
impact on the court's review of rezoning decisions."' However, recently
courts have taken the opportunity to review the entire manner in which
municipalities exercise their planning and zoning powers.
In Snyder v. Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County,"2
landowners petitioned the county to rezone their property to permit a higher
density".3 than was permitted under the existing zoning on the prop-
erty." The existing density as well as the proposed density were permit-
ted in the future land use element of the county's comprehensive plan." '
In reviewing the county's denial of the landowners' rezoning request, the
court held that the rezoning proceeding was quasi-judicial, rather than
legislative." 6  As a result, the county was required to make specific
findings of fact, giving specific reasons for denying the rezoning re-
quest." '7 Additionally, the court held that upon a showing by the applicant
that the use sought was within the density permitted in the future land use
element of the county's comprehensive plan, the burden shifted to the
107. Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1966).
108. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953), appeal
dismissed on other grounds, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
109. Id.
110. Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); cf City of Miami v. Silver, 67 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1953).
111. Metropolitan Dade County v. Brisker, 485 So. 2d 1349, 1351 (Fla. 3d.Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); City of Gainesville v. Cone, 365 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
112. 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), juris. accepted, 605 So. 2d 1262 (Fla.
1992).
113. Density is the intensity of use permitted on a particular property. Id. at 69.
114. Id. at 66-67.
115. Id.
116. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 79.
117. Id.
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county to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a specifically stated
public purpose required a more restrictive use, even if the more restrictive
use was the currently existing use of the property." 8 Under Snyder, basic
zoning ordinances and amendments of broad application are legislative acts
because they are general in nature, whereas subsequent site specific
rezonings are quasi-judicial because they involve applying the provisions of
the existing ordinance, in this case the comprehensive plan, to the request
at issue." 9 Under this court's rationale, the rezoning of a specific parcel
is but a ministerial application of previously enacted legislative policy. 2 '
Several courts have subsequently adopted the Snyder holdings to one
degree or another. In Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities,'2' which also
involved rezoning, the court concurred in part with the Snyder court when
it held a county's rezoning of specific parcels of property is a quasi-judicial
rather than a legislative function.' 22 On the other hand, the Sunbelt
Equities court rejected that portion of the Snyder court's holding governing
the burden of proof.'23 Thus, the county's zoning ordinance was presump-
tively valid and the applicant bore the burden of demonstrating the un-
reasonableness of the zoning decision.' 24 Also, in City of Melbourne v.
Puma, 25 the Snyder court's earlier holding was extended when Puma held
that amendments to a comprehensive plan are quasi-judicial in nature. In
reaching this holding, the Puma court again based its decision on the size
of the property which was the subject of the plan amendment. Overshad-
owing all of these holdings is Jennings v. Dade County,1 26 where the court
held that ex..parte communications in quasi-judicial proceedings are
presumed prejudicial and a fundamental denial of due process. 27
It is extremely difficult to believe that the State Legislature, in enacting
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development
118. Id. at 81.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 80 n.62.
121. 619 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
122. Id. at 1000-01.
123. Id. at 1005-06.
124. Id.
125. 616 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 624 So. 2d 264 (Fla.
1993).
126. 589 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 598 So. 2d 75 (Fla.
1992).
127. Id. at 1341-42.
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Regulation Act, 2 ' ever intended or envisioned the courts would use this
Act to reek havoc on the comprehensive planning, zoning, and land use
processes of municipalities. The legislative intent of the Growth Manage-
ment Act states that it "shall not be interpreted to limit or restrict the powers
of municipal or county officials, but shall be interpreted as a recognition of
their broad statutory and constitutional powers to plan for and regulate the
use of land." '129 The purpose of the Growth Management Act was to
provide broad guidelines to municipalities in the preparation of their
comprehensive plans and land development regulations, thereby enhancing
municipal decision-making. 3 ° Though the Snyder court used the Growth
Management Act's planning requirements as the basis for its holding,' 3'
clearly this Act was never intended to supplant municipal decisions on such
matters.
3 2
Municipalities have traditionally enjoyed broad home rule authority in
the areas of planning and zoning. It has long been the law of this state that
zonings and amendments to zoning ordinances, such as rezonings, are
legislative in nature. 33 A comprehensive plan is a broad policy statement
of future goals and objectives and does not necessarily establish immediate
limits on zoning.' 3' General use zones are designated in zoning codes
because the future growth of an area and appropriate uses to compliment
and enhance that future growth is not capable of being specifically
determined at the time the initial zoning ordinance was first adopted.' 35
Each property is unique and the appropriateness of a particular rezoning
may change between the time a municipality's comprehensive plan is first
adopted and the time the property is ready to be developed. Economies,
technology, community values, and demographics can all change over time
without necessitating an amendment to a city's Comprehensive Plan or
zoning ordinance.'36
128. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-163.3243 (1991), asamendedbyFLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-
163.3243 (Supp. 1992).
129. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(8) (1991).
130. Id.
131. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 65.
132. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(8) (1991).
133. Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 1959); see also Florida
Land Co. v. City of Water Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 174 (Fla. 1983).
134. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 80-81; see also FLA. STAT. § 163.3117(1) (Supp. 1992).
135. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 73.
136. The Snyder court requires the applicant to show that the rezoning request is
consistent with the city's comprehensive plan and upon such proof, the burden shifts to the
city to show by clear and convincing evidence why the rezoning should not be granted.
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The Sunbelt Equities court, while maintaining the traditional presump-
tion that a municipalities rezoning decision is valid,'37 appears to have
ignored the Legislature's intent to encourage public participation in the
comprehensive planning process. "It is the intent of the Legislature that the
public participate in the comprehensive planning process to the fullest extent
possible."' 38 The formalities associated with a quasi-judicial process will
discourage rather than encourage public participation in the comprehensive
planning process.
The Puma court seems to have ignored the fact that local government's
responsibility to legislate land use policy does not change once a compre-
hensive plan has been adopted.' 39 The same policy responsibility exists
irrespective of the size of the parcel involved in the comprehensive plan
amendment. Moreover, in adopting the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, the Legislature recognized
that changes would be needed for local land use policy to accommodate
future growth. 4°  A comprehensive plan is amended by ordinance.
Regardless of the size of the parcel covered by the plan amendment, the
amendment permanently changes the existing comprehensive plan and its
new available uses affect the entire community. It is sufficiently general in
nature to be considered an ordinance.' 4 ' Therefore, there is no basis to
treat a comprehensive plan amendment any differently than an amendment
to any other existing ordinance of the municipality on a subject other than
planning.
The Jennings holding only compounds and otherwise exasperates the
Snyder, Sunbelt Equities, and Puma holdings. Read together, these cases
stand for the proposition that the citizens of a municipality may not freely
discuss the merits of a proposed rezoning or comprehensive plan amendment
with a member of the governing body of that municipality unless the
applicant of the rezoning or comprehensive plan amendment is present at the
discussion. These cases, therefore, affect the fundamental right of private
citizens to speak to their elected officials on matters of local concern in an
Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 81. This has increased and shifted the burden of proof for municipalit-
ies. It is expected that this will also inhibit discretion in municipal decisions.
137. See Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at 996.
138. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(1) (1991).
139. See Puma, 616 So. 2d at 190.
140. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181 (1991); FLA. STAT. §§ 163.184-163.189 (Supp. 1992).
141. Florida law defines an ordinance as "an official legislative action of a governing
body which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as law."
FLA. STAT. § 166.041(l)(a) (1991).
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informal manner. Some residents, due to work schedules, child care
obligations, and the like, are unable to attend a formal hearing, yet they see
their elected officials in the course of routine, day-to-day activities. Thus,
the informal contact may be the only communication option available. These
cases substantially chill the ability of residents to freely discuss the issues
that affect the future of their municipality. Nor, can this be reconciled with
the Legislature's requirement that public participation in the comprehensive
planning process be encouraged to the maximum extent possible. Clearly,
municipal governmental decision-making should not be so stilted.
Home rule authority is limited additionally by the court's adoption of
the clear and convincing standard as the city's burden to maintain the
property's current status once the applicant shows consistency with the
municipality's comprehensive plan. The clear and convincing standard is
a much higher standard than generally accorded a legislative act. Under this
new higher standard, a municipality must show the reasonableness of its
decision while supporting that decision with substantial, specific findings of
fact, whereas a municipality enjoys greater flexibility in its decision-making
for other legislative acts. It is incomprehensible that a higher burden be
required to maintain the status quo than that required of the applicant in
requesting a change via a comprehensive plan amendment or rezoning under
Snyder and its progeny.
The inconsistencies among these cases have left municipal governments
guessing as to the status of their home rule powers. Hopefully, the Florida
Supreme Court will soon bring some semblance of order to this area of law
while permitting the municipalities and their citizens to continue to exercise
the home rule powers they have come to enjoy.'42 The governing body
of a municipality must have every opportunity to balance local interests in
reaching its ultimate decision. Municipalities, pursuant to their home rule
powers, are in the best position to conduct the necessary analysis and
balance the interests of the community and the interests of the landowner
when making development decisions that affect the community. This
historical prerogative of municipal government must not be preempted by
the courts.
F. Agency Rules
Probably the most eminent threat to municipal home rule today is the
adoption and implementation of state agency rules. Activities are increas-
ingly regulated by state agencies. Municipalities have borne the brunt of
142. See generally Puma, 616 So. 2d at 190; Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 65.
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the state's regulatory activism, again at the expense of home rule authority.
Between 1975 and 1991, agencies, on the average, proposed approximately
4,250 rules per year. The state's Department of Community Affairs alone
has averaged some 168 proposed rules per year during the same period; the
state's Department of Environmental Regulation, approximately 250 a
year."43 In 1983, agencies noticed approximately 3,500 proposed rules; by
1992, over 7,000 proposed agency rules were noticed.
14
Even more evident of the proliferation of rules is the growth-rate of
Florida's Administrative Code. It is estimated that the code is increasing by
approximately 1,000 pages per year.'45 Since 1986, the code has been
increased by eight entire volumes! 1
46
A wholly uncodified body of law also affects municipal home rule
authority. 47  Agency interpretations and directives, which form the
informal policy of the agency, are often unknown to the outsider.'4 ' Thus,
the applicant can be "blind-sided" when trying to comply in good-faith
because this informal policy is often the most difficult information to obtain
prior to entering the formal process. Many municipalities submitting
comprehensive plans found that their submission ran afoul of these informal
interpretations. This situation "is created by state law and it can only be
changed by state law."' 49
The collision between agency rulemaking authority and municipal home
rule arises primarily as a result of the substantial deference courts have
shown to both state agencies and municipalities. On the one hand, the
courts have repeatedly recognized the vast breath of municipal home rule
authority. 5 ° Broad municipal authority to manage local affairs is explicit
in the Florida Constitution and chapter 166 of the Florida Laws. On the
other hand:
The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded
wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority,
clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies'
143. JT. ADMIN. PROCS. COMM. ANNUAL REPORT (1992).
144. JT. ADMIN. PROCS. COMM. OVERVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
(1992).
145. Philip Longman, The Red Tape Tax, FLA. TREND 31, 33 (Aug. 1993).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Gaines v. City of Orlando, 450 So. 2d 1174, 1182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
150. Nye, 608 So. 2d at 15; City of Boca Raton, 595 So. 2d at 25; State v. City of
Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 1978).
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general statutory duties .... An agency's construction of the statute
it administers is to be entitled to great weight and is not to be over-
turned unless clearly erroneous ...."'
Thus, the party challenging an agency rule bears a heavy burden.'52
At least one court has gone so far as to essentially label agency
rulemaking authority a form of legislative authority. "Indeed, the principle
applied in rule challenge proceedings that an agency's interpretation of a
statute need not be the sole possible interpretation, or even the most
desirable one but need only be within the range of possible interpretations.
This broad range of authority closely resembles the deference
accorded legislative enactments under the rational basis test. Such
legislation, or rule as the case may be, will therefore not generally be
disturbed absent a finding of arbitrariness or capriciousness.54
The courts appear to have had some trouble in reconciling the broad
home rule authority granted municipalities and the broad rulemaking
authority granted state agencies. In Florida League of Cities, Inc. v.
Department of Insurance & Treasurer,'55 the Department sought, by rule,
to apply various provisions of section 175 and section 185 of the Florida
Statutes to certain local municipal fire and police officer pension plans. The
appellants argued the proposed rules unlawfully preempted municipal control
over local plans because there was no expression of preemption stated in the
relevant statutes.'5 6 The court held the Department could not, by rule,
apply the subject statutory provisions to the plans because there was no
explicit language in the statutes expressly permitting the Department to
apply the provisions to the plans. 57  In doing so, the court implicitly
recognized that something more than an agency's traditional rulemaking
authority was necessary when agencies were adopting rules that applied to
151. Department of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.
2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis in the original).
152. The challenger must show that the agency exceeded its authority, the rule
requirements are not reasonably related to the stated legislative ends, and that the
requirements are arbitrary and capricious. Grove Isle, Ltd. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Reg., 454
So. 2d 571, 573-75 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
153. Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 603 So. 2d 1363, 1369
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted).
154. Grove Isle, 454 So. 2d at 573.
155. 540 So. 2d 850, 852 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
156. Id. at 855.
157. Id. at 869.
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municipal activities."'
On the other hand, in Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Regulation,'59 the appellants challenged rules that made a
municipal wastewater treatment facility financially liable for the proper
disposal of its domestic wastewater residuals by an independent third party
unless the third party legally agreed in writing to accept responsibility for
proper disposal. 6 Appellants sought to invalidate the rules in part on the
grounds the Department had no express legislative authority to make the
municipality financially responsible for the wrongful acts of independent
third parties in disposing of the residuals. In upholding the rule, the court
applied the traditional principle of agency rulemaking authority and held that
the Department presumptively had ample authority to enact the rules because
its enabling statute "simply states that an agency may make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provision of this act...
i,6I
It's extremely hard to envision the State Legislature, by including such
"boilerplate" language, ever contemplated that state agencies, with the help
of the courts, could or would reach out and use this language to substantial-
ly erode the constitutional and statutory authority of municipalities to
manage local affairs. In fact, such language is often included by the
Legislature as an afterthought primarily because it recognizes that the
Legislature could hardly specify every minute action contemplated by the
statute or each statute would be several hundred pages long. However, the
language clearly is not meant to be authority for the state agency to engage
in micro-management and delve into every minuscule action taken by a
municipality.
If in fact the latter court's view of agency rulemaking authority
ultimately prevails, agencies will be able to increasingly dictate the activities
of municipalities. Municipal home rule in Florida would theoretically exist
but would be void of any substance. Many state agencies have adopted
rules that then could apply, to one degree or another, to most municipal
activities.
Such overreaching by state agencies would seriously undermine the
ability for local decisions to be made based upon the unique characteristics
of a particular area. Florida is too diverse in its typography, environment,
demographics, and the like, to apply the homogenized approaches often
158. Id.
159. 603 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1369.
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inherent in agency rule-making. If daily local municipal governance
decisions can be overridden by a non-elected entity, then municipal home
rule authority would be but a shell.
IV. FUTURE MUNICIPAL ISSUES
It is ironic that at the same time the Legislature and the courts have
been looking to curtail home rule powers, the municipalities are looking to
expand them. A significant event in the area of municipal home rule
occurred in November, 1990, when Florida's voters approved the "Mandates
Amendment". 62  A mandate is a obligatory requirement by one gov-
ernmental entity of another separate governmental entity to perform an
activity, provide a service, facility, or benefit, or erodes the local tax
base. 163 It is an unfunded mandate to the extent costs are imposed on the
other governmental entity. Municipalities cannot respond to the needs and
conveniences of their citizens if municipal revenues are diverted to pay for
unfunded programs mandated by the state.
164
Under this amendment, counties and municipalities are excused from
complying with state laws that require the expenditure of county or
municipal funds unless the state law fulfills an important state interest and
the law meets one of five exceptions.' 65 This amendment also requires a
two thirds vote of both houses for the State Legislature to enact, amend, or
repeal any general law, if the anticipated effect of the Legislature's action
would reduce the authority of counties or municipalities to raise revenues
in the aggregate, as that authority existed on February 1, 1989, or would
reduce the percentage of state tax revenues shared with the counties or
municipalities as an aggregate on February 1, 1989.166
The following laws are exempted from the purview of the amendment:
laws adopted to fund existing pension benefits; criminal laws; election laws;
162. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18 (amended 1990).
163. 1993 INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, Jt. Advis. Council on Intergovtl Rel.
(draft edition) (Aug. 1993).
164. What Amendment #3 Will Do For Florida, QUALITY CITIES 5, (June 1990).
165. The five exceptions are: (1) the law is passed by at least a two-thirds vote of the
membership of both the House and Senate; (2) sufficient state funds have been appropriated
to fund the program; (3) the state authorizes the counties or cities to enact a sufficient
funding source for the program; (4) the law applies to all persons similarly situated; or (5)
the law is required to comply with a federal mandate or to maintain eligibility for federal
entitlement programs. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18 (amended 1990).
166. Id.
1460 [Vol. 18
742
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Lieberman / Morrison
general and special appropriations acts; reauthorization laws; laws creating,
modifying, or repealing non-criminal infractions; and laws having an
insignificant fiscal impact.
61
While a careful reading of the Mandates Amendment reveals a number
of ambiguities, and the Amendment to date has not been judicially
construed, it's clear that it has had its intended affect. In 1983, there were
twenty-eight fiscally significant 6 8 state mandates for local governments;
by 1987, the number had risen to fifty.'69 In 1992, the number of state
mandates on local governments had dropped to thirty-two, and most, at least
colorably, fell within the Amendment's exemptions.7 7 However, as of the
1993 legislative session, it appears that the state legislators have found the
loophole in this amendment, because forty-five of the laws passed during the
1993 session contained mandates for local governments. 171 Of those forty-
five new mandates, twenty-one fell under amendment's exemption provi-
sions and three were exceptions.'72 The estimated statewide fiscal impact
on local governments for only six of these mandates is $5,243,642.173
The Amendment has also had a substantial impact on the legislature's
general operating procedures. Procedural changes have subtly discouraged
the introduction and passage of legislation that likely falls within the
purview of the Amendment. Then Senate President Gwen Margolis and
House Speaker T. K. Wetherell issued a set of guidelines on March 21,
1993 which both houses have used to date to determine whether proposed
legislation falls within the purview of the Mandates Amendment. Generally,
the guidelines require a relatively extensive analysis of each general bill to
determine if it will trigger the Mandates Amendment. All staff analyses of
proposed general bills must specifically disclose the extent if any to which
the Amendment applies to proposed general bills. Finally, under the
Senate's Rules, any proposed general bill that might trigger the Mandates
Amendment must be referred to and heard by the Senate Committee on
167. Id.
168. According to the Florida House and Senate guidelines, insignificant is defined as
an amount not exceeding ten cents times the average statewide population for the applicable
fiscal year. Cover Memorandum, Senate President Gwen Margolis and House Speaker T.K.
Wetherall, County and Municipal Mandates Analysis (Mar. 21, 1991).
169. Jt. Advis. Council on lntergovtl Rel., 1988 Catalogue of State Mandates XV (Oct.
1988).
170. Jt. Advis. Council on Intergovt'l Rel., 1991 Report on Mandates and Measures
Affecting Local Gov't Fiscal Capacity 3, 8-11 (1992 Supp. Oct. 1993).
171. 1993 INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, supra note 163 at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 16.
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Community Affairs.' 74 Even on good days, the state legislative process
is generally not conducive to passing bills: if a proposed bill gets caught in
the legislative apparatus established to ferret out potential state mandates, its
passage becomes very unlikely.
Municipalities are also expected to lobby for a federal "no unfunded
mandates" provision. Increasing federal mandates also affect municipal
revenue sources due to the exception provision in Florida's mandates
amendment for laws required to comply with a federal mandate.'75 Thus,
a "spillover" effect occurs when the state is forced to adopt a law to
implement the federal act. For example, Florida's law implementing the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") imposed additional parking
space and public transportation accessibility requirements on municipalities.
More state mandates under this exception can be expected with the
implementation of the National Voter Registration Act, the Federal Highway
Administration's interpretation of the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Enhancement Act ("ISTEA"), and the Environmental Protection Agency's
interpretation of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
Another emerging area of municipal concern is diminishing municipal
revenue sources due to state imposed caps or restrictions on funding
sources.' 76 While municipalities have the home rule authority to levy fees
to fund various services to its citizens, 7 they have no home rule authority
to tax. 78 Recognizing the need for greater diversity and flexibility in the
development and implementation of appropriate municipal revenue streams,
municipalities have conscientiously lobbied the Legislature for fiscal home
rule over the past two years. During the 1993 Legislative Session, SJR 78
(Dudley) and HJR 445 (Goode) proposed an amendment to Florida's
Constitution, commonly known as "Voter Control of City Taxes".
179
Under these proposals, a municipality would be permitted, upon the
adoption of a charter amendment by referendum of its voters, to levy
virtually any tax authorized in the charter amendment, regardless of whether
the tax was authorized by general law. Municipalities would not have been
permitted to levy estate or inheritance taxes, personal or corporate income
taxes, or tangible personal property sales taxes under the proposed amend-
174. FLA. S. RULE 4.8 (1992-1994).
175. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18 (amended 1990).
176. Ken Small, The State of Cities, QUALITY CITIES, 18 (June/July, 1992).
177. Contractors' & Builders' Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976);
City of Boca Raton, 595 So. 2d at 25.
178. City of Tampa v. Birdsong Motors, 261 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972).
179. Fla. SJR 78 (1993); Fla. HJR 445 (1993).
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ment. 80  However, these proposals would have eliminated the state
Legislature's exclusive constitutional authority over the area of municipal
non-ad valorem taxing authority. More importantly, they would have
returned local decision making on a vital component of municipal govern-
ment, financing, to the local level. 8 ' The proposed amendment is sorely
needed because Florida's municipalities, without adequate authority to raise
sufficient revenues, have found it difficult to respond in a timely manner to
the needs of their residents. While these proposals failed to pass the
Legislature so far, like proposals are expected to surface in future legislative
sessions because of the severe revenue shortfalls municipalities are expected
to encounter in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
Municipal home rule authority undoubtedly has many advantages.
State involvement with local issues should be minimized. Individual
municipalities are better situated to determine the needs and conveniences
of their citizens and legislate accordingly because local government is the
government closest to the people served. With full responsibility and
accountability resting upon the citizens, there is a significant opportunity for
education about the principles and methods of municipal government and
involvement in the development of common community interests and
solutions for local concerns.
State government is simply unable to provide the type of open
participatory forum inherent in municipal government. If municipalities are
free to manage their own affairs, they can respond more promptly to the
needs and conveniences of their citizens, and deal quickly with new
problems as they arise. Strengthening home rule authority will relieve the
State Legislature of the micro-management responsibility for municipal
government. Then and only then will the state truly be free to concentrate
on the pressing affairs of state.'82
180. Tell Me More About Voter Control of City Taxes, QUALITY CITIES, 27 (Mar.
1992).
181. Sharon G. Berrian, Why We Must Have Voter Control of City Taxes, QUALITY
CITIES, 4 (May 1992).
182. 1 MCQUILLEN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.43 (3d ed. 1987).
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I. HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Section 14 of article X is entitled "State retirement systems benefit
changes."' It provides:
A governmental unit responsible for any retirement or pension system
supported in whole or in part by public funds shall not after January 1,
1977, provide any increase in the benefits to the members or beneficia-
ries of such system unless such unit has made or concurrently makes
provision for the funding of the increase in benefits on a sound actuarial
basis.2
This peculiar constitutional provision first appeared on April 8, 1975,
when it was introduced as House Joint Resolution 291 in the Florida House
of Representatives by Jerry G. Melvin of Fort Walton Beach.3 On that day,
* Richard A. Sicking practices law in Miami, Florida. He is general counsel for the
Florida Professional Firefighters and represented this organization as an intervenor in Florida
Ass'n of Counties, Inc. v. Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 580 So. 2d 641 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 595 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1992). Mr. Sicking received his
undergraduate education at the University of Michigan and the University of Miami. He
received his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Miami in 1963.
1. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 14.
2. Id.
3. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 34, 177, 445 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
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the resolution was read for the first time and referred to the Committees on
Retirement, Personnel & Claims, and Appropriations, which later reported
it favorably.4
The House passed the bill, by a vote of 110 to 1, and sent it to the
Senate, which adopted the measure by a vote of 29 to 7.' The bill was
then submitted for approval by the voters at the general election scheduled
for November 1976.6 The proposed amendment was described on the ballot
as follows: "Proposing to add Section 14 to Article X of the State Constitu-
tion to provide that increases in the benefits payable under any governmental
supported retirement system after January 1, 1977, be fully funded by the
governmental unit." 7
In response to a question submitted by Representative Barry Richard,
the Assistant Attorney General, David K. Miller, rendered opinion 78-34.'
He concluded that the words "fully funded" appearing on the ballot proposal
cannot mean that a system is required to maintain reserves sufficient to
cover all potential claims to a mathematical certainty. Rather, it means that
"a system is required to maintain reserves sufficient to cover its probable
claims, as prudently determined with reference to risk based on statistical
and demographic computations." 9 Therefore, the phrase "fully funded" on
the ballot question "is not substantially different in meaning from the
constitutional . . . [provision requiring funding on a] sound actuarial
basis."
This constitutional provision applies to all Florida governmental units,
which includes local governmental units, as well as the state itself." This
section of the Florida Constitution does not require that benefits provided
by law, prior to January 1, 1977, be funded on a sound actuarial basis, only
that increases in benefits after that date be so funded.'2 There is, however,
a requirement elsewhere in the law that benefits existing prior to January 1,
1977 be funded on a sound actuarial basis, 3 but this is required by statute,
not by the Florida Constitution.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 597; FLA. S. JOUR. 457-58 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
6. See Fla. HJR No. 291C (1975); FLA. S. JOUR. 457 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
7. Fla. HJR 291 (1975); FLA. S. JOUR. 457 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
8. 1978 FLA. AW'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 78.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 14.
12. See id.
13. FLA. STAT. § 112.64(2), (3) (1991).
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II. STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION
In 1978, Florida enacted part VII of chapter 112 of the Florida Statutes,
which is entitled "ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS OF RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS.' The statute has the short title "Florida Protection of Public
Employee Retirement Benefits Act."' 5  Section 112.61 of the Florida
Statutes, contains a statement of legislative intent which implements section
14 of article X of the state constitution. 6 The 1978 statute contained the
following statement of legislative intent:
It is the intent of the Legislature in implementing the provisions of s.
14 of Art. X of the State Constitution, relating to governmental
retirement systems, that such retirement systems or plans be managed,
administered, operated, and funded in such a manner as to maximize the
protection of public employee retirement benefits. 7
In 1983, this statement of legislative intent was changed by amendment
to add the following:
Inherent in this intent is the recognition that the pension liabilities
attributable to the benefits promised public employees be fairly, orderly,
and equitably funded by the current, as well as future, taxpayers.
Accordingly, except as herein provided, it is the intent of this act to
prohibit the use of any procedure, methodology, or assumptions the
effect of which is to transfer to future taxpayers any portion of the costs
which may reasonably have been expected to be paid by the current
taxpayers. This act hereby establishes minimum standards for the
operation and funding of public employee retirement systems and
plans."8
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),
among other things, requires adequate pension funding by private employ-
ers.'9 ERISA was not imposed upon state or local governments. Thus, it
was left to the state and local governments to enact appropriate provisions
14. Ch. 78-170, §1, 1978 Fla. Laws 566 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 112.60-112.67
(1979)).
15. FLA. STAT. § 112.60 (1991).
16. Id. § 112.61.
17. FLA. STAT. § 112.61 (1979).
18. Ch. 83-37, § 1, 1983 Fla. Laws 105 (amending FLA. STAT. § 112.61 (1983)).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
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of their own. ° Part VII of Florida Statutes chapter 112 applies to the state
and to local governments, which had been exempted from the requirements
of the federal statute.2'
Part VII of Florida Statutes chapter 112 applies to any employee
pension benefit plan supported in whole or in part by public funds.
22
Indeed, the statute specifically applies to the state for the Florida Retirement
System.23 This system includes those counties which are compulsory
members, and municipalities and special districts which are voluntary
members.24
Section 112.64(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that after October 1,
1980, a plan then in existence
shall be sufficient to meet the normal cost of the retirement system or
plan and to amortize the unfunded liability, if any, within 40 years..
. . For a retirement system or plan which .. .[came] into existence
after October 1, 1980, the unfunded liability, if any, shall be amortized
within 40 years of the first plan year.25
The Florida statute requires a plan to amortize any unfunded liability
using acceptable actuarial cost methods, subject to the approval of the
Division of Retirement.26 Local governments are required to submit plans
for approval by the Division of Retirement in a statement of an enrolled
actuary.
27
Part VII of chapter 112 of the Florida Statutes sets forth what are
acceptable funding methods in an unusual fashion. The chapter incorporates
by reference not only those methods provided for in ERISA, but also those
permitted under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Section 112.63(1) of the Florida Statutes, provides, "[t]he actuarial cost
methods utilized for establishing the amount of the annual actuarial normal
cost to support the promised benefits shall only be those methods approved
20. See id. §§ 1002(32), 1003.
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.60-112.67 (1991); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003 (1988).
22. See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.60-112.67 (1991).
23. See id. §§ 112.62, 112.625(5).
24. See id. §§ 112.62, 121.051.
25. Id. § 112.64(2), (3). A longer period of time is allowed to those systems already
having a sound actuarial plan for amortization of unfunded liability. Id. § 112.64(2).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 112.63 (1991).
27. See id. § 112.63(1)(f). An "[e]nrolled actuary means an actuary who is enrolled
under ... [ERISA] and who is a member of the Society of Actuaries or the American
Academy of Actuaries." Id. § 112.625(3).
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in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and as permitted
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury."28
The methods approved in the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 are stated as follows: "Acceptable actuarial cost methods shall
include the accrued benefit cost method (unit credit method), the entry age
normal cost method, the individual level premium cost method, the
aggregate cost method, the attained age normal cost method, and the frozen
initial liability cost method."' 9 It further provides that, "[t]he Secretary of
the Treasury shall issue regulations to further define acceptable actuarial cost
methods."3 °
The Secretary of the Treasury has issued Treasury Regulation 1.412-
(c)(3)-1 entitled "Reasonable funding methods in implementation of section
3(31) of ERISA.' It describes acceptable and unacceptable actuarial cost
methods.
In addition to requiring a plan of funding on a sound actuarial basis for
any unfunded liability that existed on October 1, 1980 for amortization over
40 years, 32 part VII of chapter 112 implements article X, section 14 of the
Florida Constitution with regard to increases in benefits by requiring a plan
of funding over 30 years.33
III. THE TURLINGTON CASE
The first case discussing the phrase "an increase in the benefits" is
Turlington v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement.34 In
Turlington, a taxpayer 5 challenged the validity of chapter 83-76, section
7, of the Laws of Florida. The law provided that an elected official covered
by the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), who was also employed in a
non-elected position covered by FRS, could retire from the non-elected
position while continuing employment in the elected office, but without
28. Id. § 112.63(1).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(31) (1988).
30. Id.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(3)-l (1993).
32. FLA. STAT. § 112.64 (1991).
33. The statute provides: "The net increase, if any, in unfunded liability under the plan
arising from significant plan amendments adopted, changes in actuarial assumptions, changes
in funding methods, or actuarial gains or losses shall be amortized within 30 plan years."
Id. § 112.64(4).
34. 462 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
35. The plaintiff was also the Commissioner of Education.
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additional service credit.36 The taxpayer contended that this violated article
X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution because there was admittedly no
actuarial study done regarding the possible effect of chapter 83-76, section
7 on FRS.37
The First District Court of Appeal held that section 7 of chapter 83-76
was not an increase in benefits. Hence, article X, section 14 was not
involved. In dicta, the court said, "[t]he absence of an actuarial study does
not, per se, render the statute invalid.
3 8
This analysis was correct. Even if no actuarial study accompanied the
legislation in question, it does not necessarily violate article X, section 14.
It could still be demonstrated that no funding plan was required, or that the
funding plan employed was on a sound actuarial basis.
Turlington did not really deal with an increase in benefits, but rather,
it dealt with a change in the circumstances in which retirement can be taken.
The case illustrates that article X, section 14 presents a different kind of
question about a constitutional requirement. It is not a question of facial
invalidity, or whether the enactment contains constitutionally impermissible
language or provisions. Nor is it a question of being unconstitutional as
applied in the sense that the legislative language produces an unconstitution-
al result for a particular person or group of persons. Rather, the question
is whether the governmental body properly performed an act in connection
with legislation increasing pension benefits for public employees. It is a
new kind of constitutional question: Did the government fund the increase
on a sound actuarial basis or provide a plan of such funding? The question
for the courts is not what did the legislative body enact, but rather, what
provision for funding on a sound actuarial basis did the legislative body
make for that enactment. Having said this, the next question must be:
What is the remedy for the failure to fund on a sound actuarial basis?
The term "funding on a sound actuarial basis" is not one of ordinary
understanding.39 Indeed, part VII of chapter 112 requires that the funding
plan be accompanied by "[a] statement by the enrolled actuary that the
report is complete and accurate and that in his opinion the techniques and
assumptions used are reasonable and meet the requirements and intent of
36. Ch. 83-76, § 7, 1983 Fla. Laws 247, 251 (amending FLA. STAT. § 121.091(9)(b)7
(1983)). Chapter 83-76 was later repealed and modified by Florida Laws chapter 84-I I,
section 1. Turlington, 462 So. 2d at 66 n.I.
37. Turlington, 462 So. 2d at 66-67.
38. Id. at 67.
39. Florida Ass'n of Counties v. Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 580 So. 2d
641, 643-44 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); affd, 595 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1992).
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this act."4 This means that whether or not the legislative body performed
the act (funding on a sound actuarial basis), which is constitutionally
required in connection with legislation increasing pension benefits for public
employees, is a question of opinion to be answered by expert witnesses.
This is an unusual test of a constitutional requirement.
IV. THE FLORIDA ASS'N OF COUNTIES CASE
Florida Ass 'n of Counties v. Department of Administration, Division of
Retirement"' clearly illustrates this constitutional requirement. In 1970,
Florida consolidated its retirement benefits into FRS. 2 FRS contains a
"special risk" category of retirement, which is for police officers, firefight-
ers, and correction officers.43 The statute provides that they have an earlier
retirement date than other employees." When chapter 112 of the Florida
Statutes was originally enacted in 1970, employees in the "special risk"
category had a two percent per year service credit, which was generally a
higher benefit than other employees received.4" The retirement benefit was
calculated by a percent per year of creditable service times average monthly
compensation.46 The service credit was increased to three percent per year
for service after September 30, 1974. 47 Effective October 1, 1978, the
Legislature reduced the three percent service credit to two percent. 8
In Florida Sheriffs Ass'n v. Department of Administration,49 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the reduction was valid5 The court
stated that a retired employee has a vested right in the amount of his
pension and a subsequent enactment could not change that. However, active
employees had no such vested right. 1 Therefore, the Legislature could
change benefits for active employees, even reduce them, for given years of
40. FLA. STAT. § 112.63(l)() (1991) (emphasis added).
41. 580 So. 2d at 641.
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 121.011(2), 121.045 (1991).
43. Id. § 121.0515.
44. Id. § 121.021(29).
45. Id. § 121.091(1)(a).
46. Id. § 121.091(1).
47. FLA. STAT. § 121.091(1)(a)2 (1991).
48. Ch. 78,308, §6, 1978 Fla. Laws 875, 883 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 121.091 (1)(a)3
(1979)).
49. 408 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 1981).
50. Id. at 1037.
51. Id. at 1036.
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service prior to retirement.52
In 1988, there was a proposal to restore the service credit from two
percent per year to three percent." It was considered by the Senate as the
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 150."4 The original bill would have
increased the service credit from two percent per year to three percent
immediately, and it would have required immediate funding for the increase
by the state, counties, and cities involved."
On June 6, 1988, the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 150 came
to the floor of the Senate.56 Senator Hollingsworth offered an amendment
which would increase the service credit from two percent per year to three
percent over a five year period, together with a five year phase-in of
contributions." Senator Girardeau raised a point of order that pursuant to
Senate Rule 3,13, the amendment was out of order, since the actuarial report
was for an increase from two percent per year to three percent in the same
year, not phased-in over five years. 8 The Chair requested Senator Baron
and Senator Langley to make a recommendation to the Senate on the point
of order. 9 Senator Baron reported:
The question is whether Senator Hollingsworth's amendment complies
with the requirement that changes to the state retirement system be
studied by an actuary. An actuarial study was presented to the Senate
in April of [1988] which studied the increase in special risk retirement
from 2 percent per year of service to 3 percent per year of service. The
increased employer contribution which was determined to be actuarially
required for that change was 7.4 percent. Senator Hollingsworth's
amendment divides both the increased benefit, and the increased
employer contribution into five portions. The amendment is a modifica-
tion of the original proposal, the basis of the study, and therefore
protects the soundness of the Florida Retirement System, which is the
underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the point is not well taken.
The presiding officer ruled the point was not well taken.6"
The amendment, which was adopted June 7, 1988, provided for the
52. Id.
53. FLA. S. JOUR. 1083, 1136 (Reg. Sess. 1988) (CS for SB 150).
54. Id. at 1136.
55. See id. at 1135-36.
56. Id. at 1136.
57. Id. at 1034 (amendment 1).
58. FLA. S. JOUR. 1035, 1083 (Reg. Sess. 1988) (point of order).
59. Id. at 1035.
60. Id. at 1083 (ruling on the point of order by Senator Girardeau on Rule 3.13).
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"phasing-in" of the increased benefit, and the funding of it, over a five-year
period.6 Senator Hair, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Person-
nel, Retirement and Collective Bargaining, explained his vote in regard to
this amendment:
The amendment offered by Senator Hollingsworth would "phase in" this
increased benefit over a five-year period which would have the effect
of reducing the immediate fiscal impact upon Special Risk employers.
Nonetheless, the ultimate fiscal impact associated with increasing the
retirement benefit of Special Risk members is still present, albeit spread
over a longer period of time. I am further concerned about the
precedent of "phasing in" new benefits; this is a concept never tried in
the FRS before and one that is specifically not recommended by the
FRSs' actuaries ... 62
The bill passed in the Senate, and the House concurred. 63  The measure
became law as chapter 88-238 of the Laws of Florida.64
Following enactment, the Florida Association of Counties and the
Florida League of Cities, along with two taxpayers, brought suit in Leon
County against the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement.
They sought a declaration. that chapter 88-238 was:
an improper exercise of the state's taxing and spending authority
because it funded the costs of increased benefits to special risk
members, composed of fire fighters and law enforcement officers, by
assertedly shifting the burdens [of payment] from current to future
taxpayers in violation of article X, section 14 of the state constitu-
61tion.
The Florida Police Benevolent Association and the Florida Professional
Firefighters intervened as defendants,66 and after the circuit court held that
the statute did not violate the Florida Constitution, the plaintiffs appealed.67
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the circuit
61. Id. at 1136.
62. Id.
63. FLA. S. JOUR. 1136, 1272 (Reg. Sess. 1988).
64. Ch. 88-238, § 1, 1988 Fla. Laws 1327 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 121.071 (1989)).
65. Florida Ass'n of Counties v. Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 580 So. 2d
641, 643 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 595 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1992).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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court.68 On further review, the Supreme Court of Florida approved of and
adopted the decision of the First District Court of Appeal.69
The First District Court of Appeal described the phase-in of contribu-
tions and benefits as follows:
% Increase in % Increase
Period Contributions in Benefits
1989 1.6 2.2
1990 3.2 2.4
1991 4.8 2.6
1992 6.4 2.8
1993- 8.0 3.070
The First District Court of Appeal stated that it found no case which
had definitively considered the meaning of the phrase "sound actuarial
basis.",7' It further noted that after hearing a diversity of expert opinions
at the trial that indicated the phrase "sound actuarial basis" is not precisely
defined in actuarial science, the trial court had accepted a consensus
definition that "a retirement program must be funded in such a way that the
retirement fund is able to meet its continuing obligations as and when they
mature., 72  The trial court held that chapter 88-238 met that test, 73 and
the Supreme Court of Florida later approved of the definition adopted by the
trial judge. 74
68. Id. at 646.
69. Florida Ass 'n of Counties, 595 So. 2d at 44.
70. Florida Ass 'n of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 643 (footnotes omitted). The dates for the
phase-in after 1989, as described in chapter 88-238 of the Laws of Florida, were impossible.
This was corrected in a subsequent revisor's ("glitch") bill, chapter 89-220 of the Laws of
Florida, which now appears in Florida Statute, sections 121.071 and 121.091. The First
District Court of Appeal did not consider this error significant: "Appellants also assert that
technical flaws in the original legislative bills ... all render the plan unsound, and therefore
constitutionally deficient. Assuming the validity of appellants' criticisms, the record does not
convincingly support the conclusion that asserted defects, if corrected, are constitutionally
mandated." Id. at 645.
71. Id. at 644.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Florida Ass 'n of Counties, 595 So.2d at 43-44. Approving Judge Hall's definition,
the court opined:
First, we have never addressed the meaning of the phrase "sound actuarial
basis," as contained in article X, section 14. We agree with the trial court and
district court of appeal that "sound actuarial basis" means that "a retirement
program must be funded in such a way that the retirement fund is able to meet
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The district court observed that the phase-in scheme selected by the
Legislature clearly departed from plans used to fund benefit increases in the
past. Customarily, increases in benefits have been paid for by amortizing
the associated costs at a single rate over a thirty year period. The appellants
conceded that article X, section 14 did not dictate such a plan. 5
The appellants argued that the Legislature determined the controlling
meaning of article X, section 14 by its statement of legislative intent
contained in chapter 83-37 of the Laws of Florida, the 1983 amendment to
section 112.61 of the Florida Statutes. 6 The First District Court of Appeal
described that amendment in the following manner:
The legislature there declared that liabilities required to fund public
retirement system benefits must be funded equitably by current and
future taxpayers alike, and expressly prohibited the "transfer to future
taxpayers [of] any portion of the costs which may reasonably have been
expected to be paid by the current taxpayers. 77
In addition, the appellants argued that the legislative interpretation of
article X, section 14 contained in chapter 83-37 is entitled to a presumption
of correctness. The district court of appeal concluded that, under the
circumstances, chapter 83-37 is not entitled to such presumptive weight."
Those "circumstances," the court explained, are that article X, section 14
was adopted in 1976. The 1978 statement of legislative intent contained in
chapter 78-170 "merely required that governmental retirement systems or
plans be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such a manner as
to maximize the protection of public employee retirement benefits."7 9 The
court pointed out that "[n]ot until 1983 did the legislature express its intent
in implementing the provisions of Article X, section 14 to require that a
plan be equitably funded by the current, as well as future, taxpayers."8
The court reasoned that chapter 78-170 of the Laws of Florida is more
contemporaneous with the constitutional provision than chapter 83-37.
Therefore, chapter 83-37 is not entitled to any presumptive weight that it is
its continuing obligations as and when they mature."
Id. (quoting Florida Ass 'n of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 644).
75. Florida Ass'n of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 644 n.7.
76. Id. at 644.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at n.9.
80. Florida Ass' of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 644 n.9.
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a contemporaneous legislative interpretation of article X, section 14.81
The appellants also advanced a statutory argument that chapter 88-238
conflicted with the statement of intent contained in chapter 83-37. The First
District Court of Appeal decided that a "sounder position is to harmonize
the legislature's intent for the amendment with its intent for the original
law.",12  Thus, rather than prohibiting the taxing of future taxpayers,
chapter 83-37 requires that costs associated with chapter 88-238 are passed
on to future taxpayers in a reasonable manner.8 3 The court noted that a
consulting actuary had testified that the amendment assessed the cost to the
appropriate generation of taxpayers; "those who are being served by the
generation of special risk members who are receiving the particular
benefit.
84
This is an example of harmonizing one provision of the Florida Statutes
with another. The court's obligation to do that does not apply to any
conflict between the Florida Statutes and an ordinance of municipal
government.8 5 Whether local government could, by ordinance, have
accomplished the same phase-in of benefits and contributions poses a
different question. It should be noted that article X, section 14 is now to be
read in conjunction with article VII, section 18 of the Florida Constitution,
adopted in 1990, which imposes limitations upon the Legislature to pass
laws requiring counties or municipalities to spend funds or limit their ability
to raise revenue. Article VII, section 18(d) specifically provides, "[I]aws
adopted to require funding of pension benefits existing on the effective date
of this section ... are exempt from the requirements of this section.'86
Florida Ass 'n of Counties was significant because it involved not only
the state and all the counties in Florida, but the cities that were voluntary
members of the State Retirement System as well. It also involved all law
enforcement officers, firefighters, and correction officers employed by the
state, the counties, and the city members of FRS. Quite plainly, it involved
a large number of people, many governmental units, and large sums of
money.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 645.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3)(a) (1987); Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075
(Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed, 471 U.S. 1096 (1985).
86. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(d).
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V. THE BRANCA CASE
In contrast, Branca v. City of Miramar17 involved one man and a
small city. Frank Branca was the mayor of the City of Miramar for nearly
sixteen consecutive years.8" Section 112.048 of the Florida Statutes, which
predates article X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution, requires that cities
provide a retirement benefit of half-pay to elective officers who retire
voluntarily after holding office in that city twenty consecutive years.89 No
retirement benefits are required for officials who serve less than twenty
consecutive years.90
In 1988, the City of Miramar passed Ordinance 88-16 which created a
pension plan. 91 Under the ordinance, "[a]n elected official retiring after
twenty years would receive annually [fifty] percent of his or her average
annual salary for the preceding five years. 9 2 The ordinance also provided
for reduced benefits in the event of earlier retirement,93 and for the elected
official to contribute five percent of his or her salary. The employee's
pension benefits were to be paid first from employee contributions, and once
those were exhausted, the balance was to be paid from the city's general
funds.94
In 1989, Mayor Branca took an early retirement under this ordinance
at the reduced benefit.9  His own contributions were exhausted two
months after he retired, 96 and thereafter, the pension benefits were paid to
him by the city.97
On May 15, 1989, a new City Commission repealed the ordinance, but
payments Were continued to Mayor Branca from a budget item entitled
"disputed benefits payable."98 The City Clerk submitted the ordinance to
the Florida Department of Administration, Division of Retirement for
review. The Division's counsel gave an opinion that the ordinance violated
article X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution and part VII of chapter 112
87. 602 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Id. at 1376 n.5.
89. Id. at 1376.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1375.
92. Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375 n.L
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id
97. Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375.
98. Id.
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of the Florida Statutes.99 Upon receipt of the Division's legal opinion, the
city filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 88-16 was
unconstitutional.' 0 Payments, however, were continued to Mayor Branca
until the ordinance was declared invalid.' 0'
The circuit judge, ruling in the city's favor, held that the pension
benefit was unlawful and should not be paid.0 2 The circuit court found
that City of Miramar Ordinance 88-16 "was an increase in benefits as
contemplated in article X, section 14, because no such pension benefits
existed for elected officials prior to the enactment of Ordinance 88-16 apart
from those mandated in section 112.048" of the Florida Statutes.0 3 The
circuit judge found that the ordinance violated article X, section 14 of the
Florida Constitution.0 4 The trial judge also found that the city was not
estopped to deny the payment of pension benefits. Mayor Branca subse-
quently appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in a 2 to 1 decision written by
Judge Polen, concluded that the trial court was correct in denying the
continuation of the pension benefit on an estoppel basis. The majority held
that the ordinance in question was not a deferred compensation plan exempt
from funding requirements. The majority then turned to the constitutional
question posed by article X, section 14. The majority stated:
The trial court found, and certainly an argument can be made, that the
creation and establishment of a retirement plan for Miramar elected
officials under Ordinance 88-16 was an increase in benefits as contem-
plated in Article X, Section 14, because no such pension benefits existed
for elected officials prior to the enactment of Ordinance 88-16 apart
from those mandated in section 112.048, Florida Statutes. As such,
Ordinance 88-16 would be subject to the requirements of Article X,
Section 14. ...
Notwithstanding, we need not resolve the issue of whether the Ordi-
nance's enactment constituted an "increase" in benefits under Article X,
Section 14, Florida Constitution. Rather, we certify the following
question:
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1376.
102. Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375.
103. Id. at 1376.
104. Id. at 1375.
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WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 14, AND THE REQUIREMENTS
THEREOF APPLY ONLY TO EXISTING COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL
PENSION PLANS, OR WHETHER THE REQUIREMENTS ALSO
APPLY TO COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL PENSION PLANS THAT
INCREASE OTHER EXISTING GOVERNMENTAL [i.e., STATE]
PENSION PLAN BENEFITS.10 5
Judge Farmer dissented, pointing out that when the benefit is not
funded on a sound actuarial basis, the remedy is not to obliterate the benefit,
but rather to require the funding of it by the governmental unit. Judge
Farmer wrote:
The essential rationale for the constitutional and statutory provisions
cited by the city, from which I deduce public policy, is not that, if a
particular plan is unsound, no one should get paid their retirement.
Rather, the policy is to ensure that all retirees actually get paid by
making the plans financially trustworthy and capable of meeting
reasonably foreseeable obligations. To deny benefits to a retiree where
the plan is unsound but the city is able to pay is to shoot the patient
rather than to find the cure. 6
The majority decision, holding that the case did not present either a
factual or legal basis for estoppel, disagreed with Judge Farmer's dissent
that there was a contractual obligation on the part of the city to pay the
promised benefit and that the city was estopped from denying the benefit.
The real question, however, is suggested in Judge Farmer's dissent.
Essentially, the majority decision does not resolve the question of what is
the proper remedy. Specifically, what remedy is appropriate when a
beneficiary claims entitlement to a pension benefit that was otherwise
lawfully enacted, but was not funded on a sound actuarial basis within the
meaning of article X, section 14? Should the court order the governmental
unit to fund the benefit on a sound actuarial basis, as required by article X,
section 14, or should the court declare the benefit non-existent for the failure
to comply with article X, section 14?
The trial court's decision on this point could work mischief. There are
a number of possibilities. The government could create a new benefit or
increase an existing benefit. The government could provide no funding or
some funding, but not on an actuarially sound basis. The government could
also initially provide funding on a sound actuarial basis, but discontinue
105. Id. at 1376-77.
106. Id. at 1379 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
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such funding at a later time. Finally, the government could even provide
funding and experts could disagree as to whether such funding was on a
sound actuarial basis.
A member or beneficiary of a pension system may bring a civil action
to recover benefits due to him, to enforce his rights, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits."0 7 Under the trial judge's decision in Branca, if a
member or beneficiary brought suit to complain that an increase in benefits
was not adequately funded, the benefit would be abolished." 8 Similarly,
if the governmental unit could bring suit that the increased benefit was not
adequately funded, the benefit would be abolished. Under any scenario, an
attempt to compel the government to fund an increase on a sound actuarial
basis would result in the benefit being abolished. How then can the
government be compelled to fund an increased benefit on a sound actuarial
basis?
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of the case on the
certified question,0 9 and on January 13, 1994, the court handed down its
decision."0 The supreme court restated the certified question as follows:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 14 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTI-
TUTION APPLIES ONLY TO INCREASES IN EXISTING COUNTY
OR MUNICIPAL PENSION PLAN BENEFITS."'
On the procedural question, the court concluded that under the
circumstances, the city could seek a declaratory judgment to challenge the
constitutional validity of its own pension ordinance." 2 As to the restated
certified question, the court rejected Branca's claim that a new benefit is not
governed by article X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution, holding:
We reject Branca's contention that there can be no increase in benefits
unless there is an existing plan. When there is no plan, there are no
benefits. However, if a plan is adopted the benefits are increased. It
is unreasonable to believe that article X, section 14, requires that an
increase in benefits from a preexisting plan be actuarially sound but that
a new pension plan carries no similar requirement. We hold that article
107. FLA. STAT. § 112.66(5) (1978).
108. Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375.
109. Branca v. City of Miramar, 618 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1993).
110. Branca v. City of Miramar, 19 Fla. L. Weekly S28 (Fla. Jan. 13, 1994).
111. Id. at S28.
112. Id.
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X, section 14, applies to new plans as well as existing plans." 3
Thus, although Florida Statutes part VII, chapter 112 already required that
a new plan be funded on a sound actuarial basis, the Branca decision raises
that requirement from a statutory one to a constitutional one under article
X, section 14.
Branca did better on his estoppel argument, however. The court
concluded that the pension ordinance was properly enacted.I, 4 Although
recognizing that estoppel against the government has limited applications,
the supreme court held:
Branca relied upon the fact that ordinance 88-16 had been duly enacted
by the city commission. He irrevocably changed his position in reliance
upon the ordinance when he retired. The city should not be permitted
to unilaterally terminate his pension benefits ....
However, the City of Miramar had the statutory authority under
section 112.048(3), Florida Statutes (1987), to provide a pension plan
for elected officials. The fact that the city created a program which was
found to be improperly funded does not preclude relief under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel." 5
The certified question as presented by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal and as rephrased by the Florida Supreme Court, is not exactly
correct. The question posed was whether article X, section 14 of the Florida
Constitution applies only to increases in existing county or municipal
pension plans. The holding, however, applies article X, section 14 both to
increases in existing plans and new benefits in newly created plans. The
certified question, however, refers to existing county or municipal plans and
does not mention the existing state plan. Since the case involved the City
113. Id.
114. Id. at S29.
115. Branca, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at S29. The court then quoted, with approval, Judge
Farmer's dissenting opinion:
The city looks for its authority to cancel this plan in certain state constitutional
and statutory provisions relating to the actuarial soundness of public employer
retirement plans in Florida. But I do not understand how the fact that this plan
may violate these provisions yields the conclusion that the city can just stop
paying one of its retirees. I should have thought that the remedy for the
constitutional/statutory violation would be to order the city to make the plan
actuarially sound out of its own pockets (whether from tax increases or other
revenues) but not to order it to stop paying retirement income.
Id. (quoting Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1378 (Farmer, J., dissenting)).
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of Miramar, the reference to municipal pension plans is appropriate. The
reference to county pensions plans is dicta." 6  Although, the more
interesting question is whether the omission of any reference to "state
pension plan benefits" was inadvertent or intentional.
In a case involving the State Retirement System, the court would have
another constitutional provision to consider in ordering the Legislature to
fund the promised benefit; specifically, the separation of powers require-
ment." '7 In such a case, the court would have to balance a separation of
powers consideration with the specific mandate of article X, section 14 that
increases in pension benefits in an existing plan, or new benefits in a newly
created plan per the Branca decision, be funded on a sound actuarial basis.
Wages and pensions are not the same. There are differences among
wages, leave benefits, and pensions, particularly as to funding over a short
versus a long period of time." 8
State v. Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n..9 and Chiles v. United
Faculty of Florida20 involve the funding of wages and leave benefits that
were provided for in collective bargaining agreements. These cases give an
indication of how the supreme court might address the problem of requiring
the Legislature to fund a promised pension benefit in accordance with article
X, section 14.
In PBA, the Governor had entered into collective bargaining agreements
with several unions which were to be effective between 1987 and 1990.121
The agreements incorporated by reference certain provisions of the Florida
Administrative Code governing annual leave (vacation) and sick leave for
public employees. In 1988, the Legislature enacted its General Appropria-
tions Act, which altered the annual leave and sick leave, and which in the
aggregate may have had the effect of reducing the bargained-for benefits.
The unions contended that the Legislature's actions abridged the right to
bargain collectively, as guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution. Therefore, the revisions to the collective bargaining agree-
ments contained in the appropriations act were invalid. The trial court
116. It is also inappropriate dicta, since counties do not have pension plans. They are
compulsory members of the FRS, the state plan. FLA. STAT. § 121.021(10) (1991); FLA.
STAT. § 121.051(1) (1991).
117. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 2.
118. Pensions and wages of public employees are subject to collective bargaining. City
of Tallahassee v. Public Employees Relations Comm., 410 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1981).
119. 613 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992) [hereinafter PBA].
120. 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
121. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 416.
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granted summary judgment in favor of the unions, and the district court of
appeal affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court discussed the differences
between collective bargaining in the private sector and the public sector.
The court also discussed separation of powers with respect to the Executive
branch's ability to enter into collective bargaining agreements calling for
additional appropriations versus the Legislature's exclusive right to
appropriate funds. The court did admit, however, that "[t]he facts of the
present case are somewhat unique, in that the legislature did not simply
under fund or refuse to fund certain benefits, but rather unilaterally changed
them. Accordingly, we must determine whether the proviso language at
issue here falls under the exclusive domain of the legislature's appropria-
tions power."' 2 The court adopted the following test:
We find this test to be a reasonable accommodation of both the right to
collectively bargain and the legislature's exclusive control over the
public purse. Where the legislature provides enough money to
implement the benefit as negotiated, but attempts to unilaterally change
the benefit, the changes will not be upheld, and the negotiated benefit
will be enforced. This result would not impede upon the legislature's
exclusive power over public funds, because the funds would already be
there to enforce the benefit. Where the legislature does not appropriate
enough money to fund a negotiated benefit, as it is free to do, then the
conditions it imposes on the use of the funds will stand even if
contradictory to the negotiated agreement. Any other result would
necessarily entail impeding on the right to appropriate, since enforcing
the negotiated agreement would necessitate additional funding under this
scenario.'23
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the declaration that the appropria-
tions act was unconstitutional and remanded the cause for further proceed-
ings. The trial court was directed to determine whether the legislative
appropriation was sufficient to fund the bargained-for benefit: "If it was,
these provisions to the collective bargaining agreement must be enforced.
If these provisions were underfunded, the legislative determination shall
control."'24
Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida'25 involved wages, specifically
pay raises, which the Legislature had authorized. Later, however, the
122. Id. at 420.
123. Id. at 421 (footnotes and citation omitted).
124. Id.
125. 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
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Legislature convened in special session and among other measures,
postponed the pay raises involved. During the 1992 regular session, it
eliminated them altogether. The unions involved filed suit, and the trial
court ruled in their favor, on the grounds that the Legislature's actions
violated article I, section 6 and section 10.126 The State appealed, and the
district court of appeal, without deciding the matter, certified the case to the
Florida Supreme Court for immediate review as a "throw up."' 27  The
court stated that the case was different from PBA2 1 in which no final
agreement had been reached by the parties. In United Faculty, an
agreement had been reached, funded, unilaterally modified by the Legisla-
ture, and finally, unilaterally abrogated by the Legislature.
The supreme court described the problem in a nutshell. "Separation of
powers does not allow the unilateral and unjustified legislative abrogation
of a valid contract."'2 9 The trial court decision was affirmed. However,
on clarification, the decision was limited to the year in which the contracts
were funded. 3 '
Both of these cases deal with the Legislature's appropriation powers,
viewed by its co-equal partner, the Judicial branch, within the framework of
the constitutional protection of contracts of a general kind and collective
bargaining agreements specifically. These cases do involve the question of
the ability of the Florida Supreme Court to order the Legislature to
appropriate money to pay for the performance of a contract.
VI. CONCLUSION
As already suggested by the comment on Florida Ass 'n of Counties v.
Department of Administration, Division of Retirement,'3' the courts may
treat the Legislature's funding of increases in public employee pensions
differently from that of funding by municipalities.'32 The courts' ability
to order the Legislature to fund a contract may be more limited than the
courts' ability to order a city to fund a promised benefit. When the case
involves a city, separation of powers considerations simply do not exist. If
126. Id.
127. Id. at 672; FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i).
128. 613 So. 2d at 415.
129. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d at 673.
130. Id at 677-78.
131. 580 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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the court was willing in United Faculty to require the Legislature to fund a
promised benefit because it had already been funded and then unfunded, and
was willing in PBA to remand the cause to determine whether there was
sufficient funding so as to require enforcement of the contract, then it should
not be the least reluctant to formulate a remedy by which the judicial branch
is capable of directing the Legislative branch to fund a promised benefit.
Thus, Judge Farmer's question recurs: Should we shoot the patient or find
the cure? What is the remedy for the failure of the legislative body
(whether state or local government) to fund on a sound actuarial basis, a
promised pension benefit to an employee who has already retired?'33
Under Florida Sheriffs Ass 'n v. Department ofAdministration, Division
of Retirement,'34 such a retiree has a vested property right. This property
right cannot be taken away from him because of the failure of the govern-
ment to provide for funding. The promised benefit must be funded by the
government in compliance with article X, section 14 of the Florida
Constitution.' In Branca, however, the supreme court was not confront-
ed with any consideration of separation of powers that might exist when the
government involved is the State of Florida itself. Thus, a case against the
state rather than a city would involve the balancing of several constitutional
considerations: the employee's contract and property rights; the specific
requirement that the government appropriate money as expressed in article
X, section 13; and the ability of the judicial branch to appropriate money.
133. Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1377-79.
134. 408 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. 1981).
135. Branca, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at S28.
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PART VI
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
Unlike the Federal Constitution, Florida's Constitution is
constantly being amended. As a result, in the final part of our
Symposium we look at some past as well as some possible future
changes.
Attorneys Steven J. Uhlfelder and Robert A.McNeely begin by
recalling the activities of the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission.
Although often described as a failure, the authors explain why this
historical perception of the Commission's work is inaccurate. Next,
Florida Secretary of State Jim Smith provides a primer on initiative
petitions, the method of amendment that places power directly in the
hands of the people. Finally, Professor Thomas C. Marks, Jr. and
attorney Alfred A. Colby conclude by setting out six specific changes
that they would like to see made in the Constitution.
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Florida's Blueprint for Change
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I. INTRODUCTION
TALLAHASSEE-The chilly gray sky that hung over this capital
city Wednesday fit Steven Uhlfelder's mood.
Winter was coming, and the 32-year-old special counsel to retiring
Gov. Reubin Askew felt like leaving .... [A]fter the voters' crushing
rejection of the constitution revision package that had occupied him for
the last 15 months, Uhlfelder didn't know Wednesday whether he even
wanted to continue in Florida government.
Returning to his Capitol office after lunch, he ran into 3 1-year-old
Tampa Rep. George Sheldon, one of the few state lawmakers who had
worked for the proposed revisions.
Sheldon shrugged his shoulders.
Uhlfelder shrugged in reply.
* Partner, Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, Fla.; B.S., 1968, University of Florida; J.D.,
1971, University of Florida. Mr. Uhlfelder was the executive director of the first Florida
Constitution Revision Commission in 1977 and 1978.
** Associate, Steel Hector & Davis, Miami, Fla.; B.S., 1981, University of Kansas;
J.D., 1993, Florida State University.
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"What do we do now?" Sheldon asked.
"Try again in 20 years," Uhlfelder said ...
Change often comes slowly in a democracy. In 1978, Florida voters
rejected all of the recommendations of the first Florida Constitution Revision
Commission ("CRC").2 Since that time, however, many of the major
recommendations of the CRC have been adopted by voters or enacted by the
Florida Legislature.3 Thus, in many ways, the CRC was simply ahead of
its time as it set the stage for dramatic changes in Florida.
The willingness of the electorate and its elected representatives to
subscribe ultimately to so many of the CRC's recommendations is not
surprising. A tremendous amount of study and debate preceded each of the
eight proposed amendments.4 For two months the CRC traveled the state
and listened to more than 600 witnesses discuss more than 800 issues during
ten public hearings.5 The CRC held additional public hearings after the
proposed draft amendments were prepared.6 In January of 1978, after
twenty-five meetings, the CRC considered 257 proposed changes to the
constitution and adopted eighty-seven of them.7 Subsequently, the CRC
held additional hearings throughout the state in which it solicited and
received testimony from another 200 witnesses.8  The result was a
document consisting of numerous changes grouped into eight separate
constitutional amendments.9
1. Don Pride, The Unmaking of Constitution Revision, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,'Nov. 12,
1978, at Al.
2. The 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution created the unique internal mechanism
for constitutional review, the Constitution Revision Commission. See FLA. CONST. art. XI,
§ 2; see also TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 146-47 (1991). The CRC, with members appointed by the Governor, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the supreme
court, and the Attorney General, first convened in 1977 and proposed constitutional changes
for the 1978 general election ballot. A new commission will convene in 1997 to consider
changes for the 1998 general election.
3. See infra notes 16-148 and accompanying text.
4. The CRC developed eight amendments containing 87 proposals which were placed
on the 1978 general election ballot. See Florida CRC Proposed Revision of the Florida
Constitution (1978) [hereinafter Proposed Revision].
5. Steven J. Uhlfelder, The Machinery of Revision, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 575, 579
(1978).
6. Id. at 583.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Proposed Revision, supra note 4.
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In those eight proposed amendments to the constitution, the CRC
recommended forty-seven substantive and forty procedural changes.1"
More than forty percent of the substantive recommendations are now law in
Florida, either by voter approval at subsequent general elections or by
legislative enactment." Twenty percent of the procedural recommenda-
tions have similarly been adopted or enacted.' 2
This article reviews the CRC proposals that voters ultimately adopted,
or that the Legislature substantially enacted. In so doing, this article
demonstrates that the 1978 CRC's success should not be measured by the
short-term gloomy analysis of that morning after the 1978 ballot, because
proponents of the CRC's work did not have to wait 20 years to see the fruits
of their labor. Instead, the proper measure is the CRC's long-term
continuing positive effect on public policy and the workings of government
in Florida.
II. SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS
A. Proposals Affecting Individual Rights
The late Pat Dore,'3 a renowned scholar in Florida constitutional law,
wrote in 1978 that "[t]he commission was intensely concerned about the
protection of individual rights."' 4  She observed that the Commission
convened in the afterglow of the nation's bicentennial celebration, and
"pride and good feelings . . . were still running high[,]" noting that this
reality contributed to the commission's "commitment to the preservation of
human liberty and individual freedom."' 5 Several of the CRC's proposals
regarding individual rights were ultimately adopted, and are now law in
Florida.
10. For the purposes of this article, a substantive recommendation fundamentally affects
the exercise of individual rights and liberties, the process of democracy, or the raising and
spending of revenues. A procedural recommendation affects the methods by which state or
local government operates.
1. See infra notes 16-128 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 129-148 and accompanying text.
13. Professor Dore taught a generation of students at The Florida State University
College of Law from 1970 until her death in 1992. In 1978, she served on the staff of the
CRC.
14. Patricia A. Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 610, 611
(1978).
15. Id.
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Privacy. The CRC recommended the adoption of a privacy amendment
to the Florida Constitution which read: "Every natural person has the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life
except as otherwise provided herein."' 6  Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte 7
described this provision as an important protection "against governmental
intrusion into purely private matters."'" He noted the "tendencies of other
industrial societies toward the superstate and abuses by government officials
in this country" as reasons for the "constant vigilance" the amendment
would provide.' 9  Among the arguments raised by opponents of this
provision was one asserting that government officials would "use it as an
excuse for failing to produce public records .. ". . " The Legislature
addressed this concern in 1980, adding to the CRC's language the following:
"This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to
public records and meetings as provided by law."'" Voters adopted this
amendment, including the CRC's text word-for-word in 1980.22
Pretrial Release. The CRC proposed an amendment to provide a
presumption in favor of nonmonetary bail,23 in order to change the existing
constitutional requirement that a person charged with a crime be "release[d]
on reasonable bail with sufficient surety."'24 Then-Governor Reubin Askew
once characterized the monetary bail system as one that "discriminates
against the poor, and burdens the taxpayers with the cost of detaining those
awaiting trial who need not be in jail."25 Chairman D'Alemberte noted
16. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at I (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
17. Mr. D'Alemberte served as chairman of the CRC. He is a past president of the
American Bar Association, former partner of Steel Hector & Davis, and is currently the
president of Florida State University.
18. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Revision 1: The Pros and Cons, FLA. TIMES UNION,
Oct. 28, 1978, at B7.
19. Id.
20. Dan Paul, Con, THE LAKELAND LEDGER, Oct. 22, 1978, at 2.
21. Fla. CS for HJR 387, at 1788 (1980) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
22. FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, TABULATION OF OFFICIAL VOTES, FLA.
GEN. ELECTION 34 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 GEN. ELECTION]. For a comprehensive analysis
of the 1978 CRC proposal, see Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed
Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 671 (1978).
23. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at I (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14).
24. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (amended 1982) (emphasis added).
25. As quoted in Bennet H. Brummer and Bruce S. Rogow, An End to Ransom: the
Case for Amending the Bail Provision of the Florida Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
775, 775 n.1 (1978).
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that the bail provision was being "updated to reflect modem practice.""
Opponents cited recidivist criminals and condemned this "absolute right to
bail .... .2" Despite its rejection in 1978, by 1982 a combination of
legislation and voter action made this recommendation part of Florida law.
Voters amended the constitution to allow "pretrial release on reasonable
conditions."2 The Legislature enacted section 907.041 of the Florida Stat-
utes 29 which declared its intent "to create a presumption in favor of release
on nonmonetary conditions for any person who is granted pretrial re-
lease."3
Grand Jury Counsel. The CRC also recommended guaranteeing grand
jury witnesses the right to be accompanied by, and to receive the advice of,
counsel during grand jury proceedings.3 While supporters argued the
guarantee would bring fairness to grand jury proceedings, opponents warned
it would "destroy the secrecy and investigatory function of the grand jury
....32 In 1992, the Legislature passed a law allowing one attorney to be
present to provide a witness advice and counsel.33
Accessible Polls. Finally, in an effort to make government more
accessible to the public, the CRC suggested an amendment to article VI,
section 1, to require that elections be held in "places accessible to the
public."34  By the time this provision was before voters, the Legislature
had enacted it statutorily.35
26. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Pro, THE LAKELAND LEDGER, Oct. 22, 1978, at 2.
27. Paul, supra note 20.
28. FLA. DEPT. OF ST., Div. OF ELECTIONS, TABULATION OF OFFICIAL VOTES, FLA.
GEN. ELECTION 27 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 GEN. ELECTION] (adopting Fla. HJR 43-H, at
2201 (1982), amending FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14).
29. Ch. 82-398, 1982 Fla. Laws 2150 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 907.041 (1982)).
30. Id.
31. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 1 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15).
32. Dore, supra note 14, at 645.
33. Ch. 92-154, 1992 Fla. Laws 1633 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 905.17 (Supp. 1992)).
The Legislature stressed that it was not creating a right to grand jury counsel, as the CRC
proposed. Section 905.17 says, in part, "[t]his provision is permissive only and does not
create a right to counsel for the grand jury witness." FLA. STAT. § 905.17 (Supp. 1992).
34. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 7 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1). The
CRC considered other alternatives besides the quoted language that was eventually proposed,
all in an effort to make polling places accessible to voters. See Alaine S. Williams, A
Summary and Background Analysis of the Proposed 1978 Constitutional Revisions, 6 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1115, 1148-50 (1978).
35. Ch. 78-188, 1978 Fla. Laws 594 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 101.71 (1991)).
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One That Got Away. Far and way, the most controversial individual
rights proposition was the one which had the least verbiage. The CRC
proposed adding the word "sex" to the basic declaration of rights in article
1, section 2, prohibiting the deprivation of any right because of sex.36
Opposition to this proposal ranged from the reasoned to the emotional. For
example, commission member Sen. Dempsey Barron, D-Panama City,
argued against the proposal by saying it was unnecessary and open to
uncertain interpretations. Senator Barron said he believed it was unneces-
sary because of the state constitutional declaration, "All natural persons are
equal before the law and have inalienable rights. . .;" and open to uncertain
interpretations, because no one knew what a court would do with such a
broad term in the future.37 Others argued that the proposal would allow
homosexuals to marry and adopt children, invalidate state laws requiring
husbands to support wives, and invalidate state laws prohibiting rape and
prostitution.38 Supporters argued that the amendment was necessary to
ensure that women were not discriminated against by virtue of their
gender. 39
This recommendation of the 1978 CRC has never been adopted.
Legislative protections remain in many areas, such as wage and lending
discrimination,4" but an express constitutional protection of the type
envisioned by the CRC is still absent from the Florida Constitution.41
36. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at I (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2).
37. Sen. Dempsey Barron, Against Revision No. 2, FLA. TIMES UNION, Oct. 30, 1978,
at A7 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1).
3 8. See generally Advertisement, You should vote NO to Revision No.2, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Nov. 6, 1978.
39. See, e.g., Dr. Freddie L. Groomes, For Revision No. 2, FLA. TIMES UNION, Oct. 30,
1978, at A7 (arguing that statutory prohibitions on gender discrimination were "subject to
legislative change every year and varying judicial interpretations.").
40. See FLA. STAT. §§ 448.07, 725.07 (1991).
41. As further evidence that the CRC was ahead of its time, as this article was being
written, the debate over the meaning and merits of sex-based discrimination continued, with
two groups seeking signatures to place proposed constitutional amendments on the 1994
general election ballot. One group would constitutionally ban gay-rights laws; the other
would constitutionally prohibit many forms of discrimination toward gays. See Steve
Bousquet, Gay rights activists launch drive to alter Constitution, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. I,
1993, at 5B. In the furor over gay rights, efforts to provide constitutional protection against
gender-based discrimination-the general intent of the CRC-seems to have been lost. For
an analysis of CRC deliberations giving insight into this general intent, see Ruth L. Gokel,
One Small Word: Sexual Equality Through the State Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
948, 951-56 (1978).
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B. Proposals Affecting the Process of Government
In addition to impacting individual rights and liberties, the CRC also
set the stage for important changes in the process of government. Chief
among these proposals for change were ones which were "inextricably
interwoven" to the privacy amendment.42 The proposals involved opening
government records and operations to public inspection and view, giving
constitutional authority to Florida's statutory public records and government-
in-the-sunshine laws.43
Two important goals formed the foundation of the CRC's recommenda-
tions in this area. The first was to respond
to the concerns of those who worried that Florida's nationally recog-
nized devotion to 'government in the sunshine' was slowly eroding, as
well as to those who maintained that the public's right to know was a
principle of such fundamental importance in a democracy that it ought
to be included in the declaration of rights."
The second goal underlying these recommendations was "a statement of
standards against which exceptions to the principle of openness [was] to be
tested."45 The key was to establish criteria to guide lawmakers and judges
in deciding whether to allow an exception to the broad statement of
principle of openness in government. 46 Thus, the CRC proposed constitu-
tionally requiring open government, except when it was "essential to
accomplish overriding governmental purposes or to protect privacy
interests. 47  The CRC proposal allowed the Legislature to make that
determination by passing a general law.
Public Records. The CRC proposed that no one should be denied the
right to examine public records.48 While some saw this proposal as having
a "substantial effect" on government, 49 others said the proposal "invite[d]
42. Dore, supra note 14, at 657 ("Approval of the right to be let alone meant that open
government proposals also had to be approved in order to maintain a constitutional balance
between the two.").
43. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (Supp. 1992).
44. Dore, supra note 14, at 664-65.
45. Id. at 665.
46. Id.
47. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at I (proposed FLA. CONST. art. i, § 24).
48. Id.
49. Karen S. Minerva, Revision 1: The Many Basic Document Changes, THE LAKELAND
LEDGER, Oct. 22, 1978, at 1.
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the Legislature to make exceptions" to the existing open records law."
Fourteen years after the proposal by the CRC, the Legislature placed an
open records provision on the ballot,5' and voters adopted it.52 The 1992
language closely parallelled that of the CRC, especially in defining a
standard by which the Legislature could exempt records from the new
constitutional requirement of openness. The adopted language required a
specific legislative finding of a "public necessity justifying the exemption
. . . no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the
law., 53 Although this language has not yet been construed by an appellate
court, it seems to parallel Professor Pat Dore's comments on the 1978
standard: "[I]f less drastic means are available to the government through
which it can achieve that interest of overriding importance, the means
selected are not essential and the legislation fails to satisfy the standard. 54
Public Meetings. Similarly, voters in 1992 adopted a constitutional
amendment making meetings of 'public bodies open to the public when
official acts will be taken, or at which public business will be discussed. 5
The CRC proposed substantially similar language in 1978.56
Open Judiciary. In the same spirit, the 1978 CRC suggested that all
judicial hearings and records be made open to the public, except for grand
and petit jury hearings and proceedings and records closed "to accomplish
overriding governmental purposes or to protect privacy interests."57
Furthermore, the CRC expressly applied its openness requirement to judicial
nominating commissions. 8 Much of this CRC recommendation is now
part of the constitution. Judicial records are expressly open to public
inspection by the 1992 adoption of article I, section 24." All proceedings,
except for deliberations of judicial nominating commissions, are expressly
50. Paul, supra note 20.
51. Fla. CS for HJR's 1727, 863, and 2035 (1992) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24).
52. FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, TABULATION OF OFFICIAL VOTEs, FLA.
GEN. ELECTION 117 (1992) (hereinafter 1992 GEN. ELECTION).
53. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
54. Dore, supra note 14, at 666.
55. 1992 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 52, at 117.
56. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at I (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I, § 25).
57. Id. (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1).
58. Id. at 4 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, § I I(c)). For a discussion of the open
judiciary debate, see Dore, supra note 14, at 662-64.
59. See 1992 FLA. GEN. ELECTION, supra note 52, at 117.
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open to the public by amendment in 1984.60 Only judicial hearings have
escaped the constitutional requirement of openness.
Thus, it is clear that the work of the 1978 CRC, although rejected that
year, sent public policy ripples throughout Florida's future and marked the
beginning of dramatic and important changes in the way government
allowed its citizens to scrutinize government operations.
The CRC's work also influenced changes in the election process and
the structure of government.
Single-Member Districts. Commission member Bill James6 described
the CRC's proposal to create single-member legislative districts62 as "[t]he
single most important change to be recommended by the Constitution
Revision Commission for Florida voter approval .... *"63 At the time,
legislators were elected from multi-member districts, a circumstance that
James said made "it very difficult for citizens to identify their legislators or
to monitor their service ... [and tended] to deny minorities, ethnic groups
and women, the opportunity to have a voice in their government. 64
Opponents of the change worried that urban legislators would "produce
representatives and senators with such a parochial point of view that they
[would] lack perspective on statewide or even citywide or countywide
problems. '65 Within four years of the CRC recommendation, the Legisla-
ture made the change to single-member districts through a joint resolu-
tion .66
60. FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, TABULATION OF OFFICIAL VOTES, FLA.
GEN. ELECTION 39 (1984) (adopting Fla. HJR 1160 1984)) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ I I(d)) [hereinafter 1984 GEN. ELECTION].
61. In 1978, Mr. James was the Republican leader of the Florida House of Representa-
tives, representing Delray Beach.
62. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 13 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I11, § 16).
63. Rep. Bill James, R-Delray Beach, Benefits cited for single districts, FLA. TIMES-
UNION, Oct. 31., 1978, at 13.
64. Id.
65. Manning J. Dauer, It would promote narrow views, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Oct. 31,
1978, at B3.
66. Fla. SJR I-E, at 1851 (1982) (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 10.102, 10.103 (1991)).
Unfortunately, neither the voters in 1978 nor the Legislature since then has adopted a CRC
recommendation to remove the legislative reapportionment process from the Legislature,
placing it in the hands of an independent reapportionment commission. Proposed Revision,
supra note 4, at 13 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I11, § 16). The CRC's plan included
reapportionment standards and subjected the reapportionment commission's report to judicial
review. Id. Given the fiasco that results when legislators try to reapportion their own
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Term Limits. Apparently responding to what it concluded were
inequities between restrictions on the Governor and the various cabinet
officers,67 the CRC recommended that cabinet officers be limited to two
consecutive terms.18 The CRC adopted this proposal "with little debate"69
and amid a much more ambitious program for overhauling the executive
branch of government-abolishing the Cabinet outright.7 °  Even some
opponents of abolishing the cabinet system favored limiting terms of cabinet
members.7 Nonetheless, voters rejected these term limitations, apparently
because it was part of the large revision package (Revision #1).72 In 1992,
however, voters adopted an initiative petition proposal and limited terms for
most state elected officials, including all members of the Cabinet.73
Department of Health. Citing "[d]issatisfaction with the alleged low
priority given public health by [the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services], 74 the CRC recommended creating one agency with responsi-
districts after each decennial census, part of the 1992 reapportionment map is so hotly
contested by Democrats and Republicans that it is awaiting a decision by the United States
Supreme Court, see Tim Nickens, Dade redistricting battle unfolds before high court, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 5, 1993, at IA. This is an idea that remains long overdue for adoption.
67. See, e.g., Summary and Analysis, supra note 34, at 1118 and n.7 (observing that
while governors were limited to two terms, cabinet officers had no such limits, one having
served for 37 years).
68. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 2 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I1, § 5).
69. Williams, supra note 34, at 1119.
70. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 14 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4). For
arguments for and against this proposal to abolish the Cabinet, see Jon C. Moyle, Why We
Should Abolish Florida's Elected Cabinet, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 591 (1978) and Malcolm
B. Johnson, Why We Should Keep Florida's Elected Cabinet, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603
(1978).
71. Johnson, supra note 70, at 607:
There is validity to an objection that Cabinet officers now can build
separate, autocratic empires by unlimited tenure while serving under Governors
who are allowed to succeed themselves only once. They can thereby become
too powerful and develop proprietary attitudes toward their public offices.
However, the Constitution Revision Commission admirably meets this objection
with a clause ... which would limit future Cabinet officers to two successive
four-year terms if they are retained.
Id.
72. FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, TABULATION OF OFFICIAL VOTEs, FLA.
GEN. ELECTION 26 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 GEN. ELECTION].
73. 1992 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 52, at 123 (adopting Florida Initiative Petition filed
with Secretary of State July 23, 1992, amending FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4).
74. Williams, supra note 34, at 1138.
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bility for all state health care functions." In 1992, the Legislature substan-
tially enacted this recommendation.76
Governor's Authority. While Florida's antiquated and cumbersome
cabinet system remains, 77 making Florida's chief executive the weakest in
the country, some movement toward streamlining government operations and
placing more responsibility with the Governor has occurred. For example,
the Department of Natural Resources and the Department of Environmental
Regulation have been merged to create one single Department of Environ-
mental Protection with a secretary serving at the pleasure of the Gover-
nor,78 and the Department of General Services has been reorganized into
the Department of Management Services, supervised by the Governor
alone.79
C. Proposals Affecting Financing and Taxation
The CRC made numerous recommendations affecting change in
government finance and taxation.8" These suggestions represented "an
attempt to provide a more consistent constitutional structure for the
fundamental law governing local revenue bond issues, and to prevent certain
abuses in Florida which have unfortunately plagued local and state
governments elsewhere in the United States."'" Voters have adopted
several of the recommendations since 1978, and the Legislature has enacted
others.
Bond Restrictions. The CRC recommended restricting the purposes for
which state revenue bonds and bonds pledging the state's full faith and
75. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 4 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. IV, § II).
76. See ch. 92-33, 1992 Fla. Laws 238, 241 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.42 (Supp.
1992)).
77. For a discussion of the CRC's recommendation to abolish the cabinet system
entirely, see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
78. Ch. 93-213, § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129, 2133. The Department of Natural Resources
was formerly run by the Governor and the Cabinet. FLA. STAT. § 20.25(1) (1991).
79. FLA. STAT. § 20.22(1) (Supp. 1992). The Department of General Services was
formerly run by the Governor and the Cabinet. FLA. STAT. § 20.22(1) (1991).
80. See generally Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17-18 (proposed FLA. CONST. art.
VII).
81. Arnold L. Greenfield, Flexibility and Fiscal Conservatism: Provisions of the 1978
Constitutional Revision Relating to Bond Financing, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 821, 823 (1978).
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credit could be issued.8 ' The restrictions would have limited the use of
such bonds to fixed capital outlay projects and purposes incidental
thereto. 3 Thus, such bonds could not have been used to finance operation-
al costs, 4 the economic theory being that it is fiscally unwise to go into
long-term debt to finance recurring state operations.8 5 Although rejecting
this proposal in 1978,86 voters adopted it six years later.87
Water Facility Bonds. Writing that bond buyers were "seriously
concerned about the ability and commitment of the state to provide a
solution to its potentially dangerous water resource situation[,]" a CRC
committee recommended extending pledges of the state's full faith and
credit to water facilities.88 The CRC adopted the idea 9 in part to allow
"local governments to finance needed facilities at the lowest possible interest
rates because of the additional security of the state's credit."9 In 1980,
voters adopted the CRC's language.9
Housing Bonds. The CRC recommended the creation of a new bond
authorization for housing and the establishment of a state housing agency.92
The proposal was "best understood as an economic stabilizer and as a
potential source of housing capital for consumers who might be just beyond
82. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 18 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Or, put another way:
This revision is intended to make clear that long-term bonded indebtedness
should be incurred only to finance long-term improvements with a useful life
that will not be substantially less than the amortization period of the debt....
[It] is consistent with the philosophy that long-term debt should not be incurred
to fund recurring expenditures which in turn cause pyramiding principal and
interest obligations. Experiences in other states have indicated that there is just
a short step to disaster when current expenses are included in an entity's capital
budget.
Greenfield, supra note 81, at 824 (citing the "near bankruptcy of New York City" for
support).
86. 1978 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 72, at 27.
87. 1984 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 60, at 41 (adopting Fla. CS for CS for SJR 612,
at 2223 (1984), amending FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11).
88. Greenfield, supra note 81, at 828 n.18.
89. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 14).
90. Greenfield, supra note 8 1, at 828.
91. 1980 GEN. ELECTIONS, supra note 22, at 34 (adopting Fla. HJR 1471, at 1790
(1980), amending FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 14).
92. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 16).
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the limits of' the supply of mortgage money at reasonable interest rates
without this additional source of funding."93  Even an opponent of other
finance and taxation changes supported this provision.94 Nonetheless,
voters rejected this proposal,95 as they did to a similar proposal in 1976.96
In 1980, however, a substantially similar proposal was adopted.97
Homestead Exemption/Natural Person. In 1978, only property owners
who were "the head of a family" could claim a constitutional homestead
protection from forced sale.98 The CRC recommended expanding the
exemption provision to include all "natural persons" who owned property. 99
One commissioner urged that the change was required by "the facts of life"
which included "an enormous number of divorces," "full recognition that the
sociological foundations of society have changed," and that "many single
women . . . are heads of households .... , Voters adopted this change
in 1984.'0'
Solar Energy Exemption. The CRC also recommended allowing the
Legislature to exempt from property taxes for ten years any increases in
assessed valuation which were due to the installation of solar energy
systems."°2 Coming less than five years after the OPEC oil crisis, the
proposal was seen as "an incentive for the use of solar energy."' 3  One
proponent of the change spelled out its benefits clearly:
Since 88 percent of Florida's energy needs are supplied by oil and
natural gas, Florida is extremely vulnerable to energy shortages and
93. Greenfield, supra note 81, at 832-33.
94. Jon Moyle, Against, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 4, 1978, at B7 ("A housing finance
agency is certainly needed.").
95. 1978 GEN. ELECTION., supra note 72, at 27.
96. Greenfield, supra note 81, at 830 n.23.
97. 1980 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 22, at 34 (adopting Fla. SJR 6-E, at 1776 (1980),
creating FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 16).
98. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) (1977).
99. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 8 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. X, § 3(a)).
100. Dennis J. Wall, Homestead and the Process of History: The Proposed Changes in
ArticleX, Section 4, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 877, 905 (1978) (quoting Commissioner Yvonne
Burkholz).
101. 1984 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 60, at 38 (adopting Fla. HJR 40, at 2369 (1983),
amending FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)).
102. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(b)(3)).
103. Williams, supra note 34, at 1156 (citing Transcript of Florida CRC proceedings 295
(Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of Commissioner Ware)).
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increasing costs. These energy sources are also potential polluters of air
and water, and Florida should encourage the development of solar
energy industries and technology as soon as possible."°4
Following the CRC's lead, the 1980 Legislature enacted a partial tax
exemption for renewable energy sources.0 5
Historic Property Valuation. The CRC also recommended authorizing
the Legislature to give preferential tax treatment to historic property in order
to encourage its preservation.'0 6  While this provision has not been
expressly adopted, in 1992 voters approved a constitutional amendment that
allows counties and municipalities to exempt historic properties from ad
valorem taxation and authorizes the Legislature to determine the duration of
such exemptions. 107
"Widower" Exemption. Also in 1978, the Florida Constitution
provided for a $500 personal property tax exemption for widows of persons
who were blind or disabled.0 8 Citing "the interests of fairness and
consistency,"'0 9 the CRC recommended including widowers."0  Voters
finally made this change in 1988."'
Inventory Classification. Furthermore, the CRC suggested granting the
Legislature the power to classify inventories for tax purposes and allowing
the Legislature to exempt inventories from taxation completely, if it so
chose." 2 The main purpose of this provision was to provide constitutional
authority to the legislative practice of classifying different inventories
differently for tax purposes." 3  Although the provision was rejected in
104. Sen. Ken Plante, R-Winter Park, For, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 4, 1978, at B7.
105. Ch. 80-163, 1980 Fla. Laws 525, 529 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 196.175 (1991)).
106. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e)).
107. 1992 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 52, at 118 (adopting Fla. SJR 152, at 3310
(1992), creating FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e)).
108. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(b) (amended 1988).
109. Williams, supra note 34, at 1153.
110. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V1I, § 3(b)).
IlI. FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, TABULATION OF OFFICIAL VOTES,
FLA. GEN. ELECTION 54 (1988) (adopting Fla. CS for SJR 318, 356, at 2430, amending FLA.
CONST. art. VII, § 3(b)) [hereinafter 1988 GEN. ELECTION].
112. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VI1, § 4(b)(1)).
113. Williams, supra note 34, at 1154 ("The new language would legitimize differential
assessment levels for inventory.").
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1978,14 voters adopted identical language two years later.'5
"Second Gas Tax ". The CRC also made two recommendations related
to the "second gas tax""' 6 that were ultimately adopted. The CRC sug-
gested allowing the tax to be used for the maintenance of roads, instead of
only for acquisition and construction." 7  The CRC also recommended
allowing the pledging of funds from the tax and "other legally available
pledged revenues" to retire road bonds.' 18 This road bond provision was
considered "very significant" to help cover the debt service for road
projects." 9  Voters amended the constitution in 1980 to adopt both of
these changes.
120
Thus, although it was unsuccessful in persuading voters to adopt
numerous taxation and finance reforms in 1978, much of the CRC's work
in the area ultimately became law.
Another One That Got Away. Hoping to reform a system "fraught with
confusion and inequity,"'' 21 the CRC recommended allowing the Legisla-
ture to exempt leasehold interests in governmentally owned property from
ad valorem taxes.' 22 To qualify for the exemption, the property had to be
used "for a public purpose in connection with providing air, ground or water
transportation or in providing services to the public in connection with such
transportation, whether or not operated for profit."'' 23  Opponents of this
measure labelled it a tax break for special interests, namely, big businesses
that happened to lease government property for private purposes. 124 These
opponents supported judicial and legislative decisions "which, in the interest
114. 1978 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 72, at 28.
115. 1981) GEN. ELECTION, supra note 22, at 34 (adopting Fla. SJR 12-E, at 1779
(1980), amending FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(b)).
116. The constitution describes this "second gas tax" as, "[a] state tax ... of two cents
per gallon upon gasoline and other like products of petroleum and an equivalent tax upon
other sources of energy used to propel motor vehicles ...." FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 9(c)(1).
117. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at I I (proposed FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 9(c)(5)).
118. Id.
119. Greenfield, supra note 81, at 838.
120. 1980 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 22, at 34 (adopting Fla. SJR 824, at 1762 (1980),
amending FLA. CONST. art. XI1, § 9(c)(5)).
121. Bonnie Roberts, Ad Valorem Taxation of Leasehold Interests in Governmentally
Owned Property, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1085, 1085 (1978).
122. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(d)).
123. Id. For an analysis of the history of and arguments supporting and opposing the
leasehold issue, see Roberts, supra note 121.
124. See, e.g., Moyle, supra note 94 at B7.
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of fairness, have restricted tax exemptions for leasehold interests to those
instances where the government property is used by the leaseholder for a
'public purpose."" 25  The opponents prevailed in 1978, 26 and again in
1992 when the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission placed a similar
issue before voters. 1
27
III. PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS
The CRC sought not only to secure clearer and fairer rights for Florida
citizens, but also to produce a government that was more efficient and
responsive. To that end, it recommended numerous procedural changes,
many of which were ultimately adopted. 128  Generally, these proposals
were aimed at various degrees of reform in the three branches of govern-
ment.
A. Proposals Affecting Legislative Procedures
Two of the CRC's proposals directly affecting legislative procedures
ultimately became incorporated into Florida law.
First Reading by Publication. Before a bill could be considered by the
Legislature, the clerk of each house had to read the bill aloud on three
separate days, either by title or in its entirety if requested by one-third of the
members present."' It took a supermajority (two-thirds) of the members
present to waive this constitutional requirement. 3 ' The CRC suggested
allowing the first reading to be accomplished by publication in a legislative
journal, largely as a "timesaving measure."'' Voters adopted this recom-
mendation when the Legislature placed it on the ballot again in 1980.132
125. Id.
126. 1978 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 72, at 28.
127. Letter from Tom Rankin, Florida Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, to Jim
Smith, Secretary of State (May 7, 1992) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3) (on file with
the Secretary of State).
128. See infra notes 129-47 and accompanying text.
129. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7 (amended 1980).
130. Id.
131. Williams, supra note 34, at 1124.
132. 1980 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 22, at 34 (adopting Fla. SJR 1349 at 34 (1980),
amending FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 7).
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February Session. School officials, who relied heavily on state funding
for their budgeting, complained to the CRC that regular legislative sessions
under the 1968 constitution-beginning in April and concluding in
June' 33-failed to give them adequate time to prepare for the school
year.'34  The CRC accordingly recommended sessions beginning in
February.135 In 1990, the Legislature once again placed the issue before
voters, and it was adopted.
3 6
B. Proposals Affecting Judicial Procedures
Like proposals affecting legislative procedures, those relating to the
operation of the judiciary were adopted after the CRC's work.
County Court Impeachments. Article III, section 17(a) provided that
certain state officers, including all justices and judges except for county
court judges, could be impeached "for misdemeanor in office."'31 In order
to "provide equal treatment with respect to impeachment for county and
circuit court judges[,]"'38 the CRC recommended applying this impeach-
ment section to county court judges.'39 Voters did just that ten years after
rejecting the CRC's recommendation. 40
Jurisdiction Over the Public Service Commission. The CRC proposed
that action of the Public Service Commission be reviewable by writ of
certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court.141 Voters substantially adopted
this recommendation in 1980.142
133. FLA. CONST. art. I11, §§ 3(b), (d) (amended 1990).
134. Williams, supra note 34, at 1122.
135. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 2 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 3(b))
136. FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, TABULATION OF OFFICIAL VOTES,
FLA. GEN. ELECTION 85 (1990) (adopting Fla. SJR 1990, 2, (1990), amending FLA. CONST.
art. III, § 3).
137. FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 17(a) (amended 1988). The constitution provided discipline
for county court judges only by suspension by the Governor. Williams, supra note 34, at
1130.
138. Williams, supra note 33, at 1130.
139. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 3 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. Il, § 17(a)).
140. See 1988 GEN. ELECTION, supra.note 11, at 53.
141. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 16 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)).
For a listing of CRC records reflecting discussions about this change, see Williams, supra
note 34, at 1141 nn.17-21.
142. 1980 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 22, at 34 (adopting Fla. SJR 20-C (1979),
amending FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3). The procedure for review was changed, however, from
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Judicial Nomination Procedures. The CRC concluded that it was
important that the twenty-six judicial nominating commissions in the state
be constitutionally required to operate under a set of uniform rules of
procedure.'43 Accordingly, it proposed that the supreme court be required
to prescribe those uniform rules.' This recommendation was partially
adopted in 1984.'
C. Proposals Affecting Executive and General Government
Procedures
Finally, in addition to legislative and judicial procedures, the CRC set
the stage for some changes in the procedures of the executive branch of
government. Among them was one affecting the Public Service Commis-
sion. The CRC recommended providing constitutional authority for the
Public Service Commission and making its membership consist of five
commissioners appointed by the Governor instead of three elected commis-
sioners.146 The 1978 Legislature made the latter change before the issue
went on the ballot.
147
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1978 CRC succeeded, although not as it had intended.148  The
CRC hoped for a quick change to the Florida Constitution. Instead, the
change has been gradual, with some recommendations being statutorily
enacted rather than constitutionally adopted. Thus, despite the original
appearance of failure on that bleak winter morning after the 1978 general
election, the CRC has had a continuing, tremendous impact on Florida law
certiorari to direct appeal. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
143. Williams, supra note 34, at 1146.
144. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 4 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3).
145. 1984 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 60, at 39 (adopting Fla. HJR 1160 (1984),
amending FLA. CONST. art. V, § I 1(d)). The resolution, proposed by the Legislature and
ultimately adopted, removed the requirement that the supreme court prescribe the rules,
allowing the JNC's themselves to do so, with legislative and supreme court oversight. See
FLA. CONST. art. V, § I I(d).
146. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 16 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10).
147. Ch. 78-426, §§ 2-3, 1978 Fla. Laws 1419, 1420-23 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
350.01, 350.031 (1991)).
148. Florida voters may have intuitively understood this truth when, in 1980, they
overwhelmingly rejected a ballot proposal to eliminate the CRC and its bidecennial review
of the state constitution. See 1980 GEN. ELECTION, supra note 22, at 34.
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and public policy in the last fifteen years. It turned out that waiting twenty
years was not necessary.
Under the leadership of Sandy D'Alemberte, the CRC highlighted many
significant public policy issues that had not been discussed or considered in
Florida before. For this reason, the CRC continues to have a substantial
impact on Florida law today. Some of the fifteen-year-old CRC recommen-
dations remain current topics of debate. For example, the meaning of sexual
equality is still unresolved.'49 Similarly, the CRC recommended guberna-
torial appointment and merit retention, rather than election, for circuit and
county court judges. 5 ' This idea, too, remains a topic of contemporary
debate.''
Thus, the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission truly was ahead of
its time. The work that served as a model since 1978 will continue to do
so as Floridians prepare for the work of the 1998 Constitution Revision
Commission and its suggested revisions to the state's most basic document
of self-governance.
149. See supra note 41.
150. Proposed Revision, supra note 4, at 16-17 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, § § 10,
11).
15 1. For a persuasive argument favoring merit retention instead of election at the circuit
and county court levels, see Leander Shaw, Jr., Florida's Judicial Merit Selection and
Retention System: The Better Alternative, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 283 (1992).
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So You Want to Amend the Florida Constitution?
A Guide to Initiative Petitions
Jim Smith*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................... 1509
II. A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO AMENDING FLORIDA'S
CONSTITUTION BY INITIATIVE ................ 1511
IIl. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS .............. 1513
I. INTRODUCTION
Residents of Florida have a specific right that citizens of many other
states do not have.' They have the power to amend their state constitution
by gathering a set number of signatures on petitions calling for an amend-
ment to be placed on a statewide ballot for ratification. 2
This is called the initiative method.' Prior to the 1968 revision of the
Florida Constitution, amendments could be proposed only by Constitutional
Convention4 or in resolutions adopted by the Florida Legislature.' The
* Jim Smith was elected Florida's 21st Secretary of State on November 8, 1988, after
serving 15 months as interim secretary by appointment of the governor. He was re-elected
to a full term on November 6, 1990, becoming one of the few officials in state history elected
to a different Cabinet post. Smith previously served two terms as Attorney General.
A native Floridian, he was born on May 25, 1940, in Jacksonville and attended public
schools there until his father's work took the family to North Africa and Spain. le
completed high school at an American school in Zaragosa, Spain and upon his return to the
states attended Florida State University, earning a degree in Government and Public
Administration. Commissioned in the Army Reserve in 1962, Smith served two years as a
tank officer and then returned to Florida to earn a law degree at Stetson University.
Before being elected Attorney General in 1978, Smith spent 10 years in private and high
level government service, including posts as Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of
Commerce, Senior Executive Assistant to the Governor and member of the Board of Regents
of the State University System.
1. See generally TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 146-52 (1991).
2. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
3. Id.
4. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XVII, § 2 (1966).
5. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XVII, § 4 (1964).
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1968 revision added an automatic meeting of the Constitution Revision
Commission (the "Commission") ten years after the adoption of the revised
constitution and every twenty years thereafter.6 The first Commission was
organized in 1977 and submitted eight amendments to voters. All were
rejected. The next Commission is scheduled to begin deliberations in 1997.
Still another way to amend the constitution was adopted by the voters
in 1988 when they created the Florida Tax and Budget Reform Commission
to review taxation and budget issues decennially. 7 The Commission was
given authority to put amendments on the ballot.'
The Commission met for the first time in 1990' and, after two years
of public hearings, placed four amendments on the 1992 general election
ballot. One amendment was removed by the Supreme Court of Florida prior
to the election;' ° two of the three that appeared on the ballot were adopted.
Earlier Florida Constitutions provided for a referendum to amend or
revise the constitution." A referendum is first proposed by the Legislature
and then decided by the voters at a general election.' 2  Initiatives, by
contrast, originate with the people and do not require legislative approval. 3
Amendments by the initiative process are increasingly popular. As of
January 1994, there were nineteen constitutional initiative committees at
work collecting signatures around the state.' 4 However, this is not an easy
task. Since 1976, only ten of some sixty-five attempts have accrued the
required number of signatures. Of them, two were removed by the Supreme
Court of Florida prior to the general election for not meeting the legal
requirements for initiatives."' Five of the remaining eight were adopted.
6. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a).
7. Id. § 6(a).
8. See id. § 6(c).
9. Id. § 6(a).
10. Smith v. American Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618, 622 (Fla. 1992).
II. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XVII, § 4 (1964).
12. See id.
13. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
14. American Dream in Florida, American Family Political Committee of Florida, The
Campaign for Florida's Future, Committee to Elect the Public Service Commission, Citizens
for a Safe Florida, Citizens Protecting Their Rights to Elect Florida Sheriffs, Education First
Committee, Enough is Enough, Fair Ballot Access Committee, Florida Pension Reform
Committee, Florida State Lodge - Fraternal Order of Police, Home Rule Committee, The
Human Rights Task Force, Save Our Everglades Political Action Committee, Save Our
Sealife Committee, SOS Foundation, Inc., Take Back America, Tax Cap Committee (filed
three separate petitions), Taxpayer Association.
15. Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1355 (Fla. 1984); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.
2d 984, 993 (Fla. 1984).
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The following made ballot position:
1976 Ethics in Government: Adopted
16
1978 Casino Gambling: Not adopted
1984 Citizens' Choice on Government Revenue: Removed from
ballot by court7
1984 Citizens' Rights on Civil Actions: Removed from ballot by
court
18
1986 State Operated Lotteries: Adopted 9
1986 Casino Gambling: Not adopted
1988 Limitation of Non-Economic Damages: Not adopted
1988 English is the Official Language of Florida: Adopted"
1992 Eight is Enough: Adopted
1992 Save Our Homes: Adopted
II. A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO AMENDING FLORIDA'S
CONSTITUTION BY INITIATIVE
1. Contact the Department of State's Division of Elections 2' and
request a free packet of information. You will receive a packet which
includes the 1994 initiative petition information, a handbook for committees,
all pertinent laws and rules, and necessary forms for filing as a political
committee.
2. Sponsors must register as a political committee with the Division
of Elections, 22 before circulating a petition. 23 The division will furnish
the sponsors with all necessary information on how to form a committee and
the duties of a committee.
Committees are advised to begin work at least four years before the
election in order to have sufficient time to gather the necessary signatures
16. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
17. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 993.
18. Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1355.
19. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 15.
20. Id. art. II, § 9.
21. The Division of Elections' address is 1801 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-
0250; telephone (904) 488-7690; fax (904) 488-1768.
22. As required by section 106.03 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 106.03
(1991).
23. Id. § 106.03(1).
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and deal with any legal challenges that might arise. However, some
committees have made ballot position in less than two years.
3. Sponsors must submit the text of the proposed amendment to the
Secretary of State2" for review. 5 The Secretary approves the form of the
petition, but not its legal sufficiency.26 The form will be checked for com-
pleteness,27 for the correct number of words in the ballot title (fifteen or
less) and in the summary (seventy-five or less), 28 and for correct size and
format of the petition.29 Once approved, the petition can be circulated to
obtain signatures of registered voters.3"
4. When at least ten percent of the required number of signatures from
one-quarter of the congressional districts is collected, the Secretary of State
shall submit the petition language to the Attorney General, who will then
forward the petition to the Supreme Court of Florida for an advisory opinion
on whether the text conforms to the requirements of article XI, section 3 of
the Florida Constitution."' The court will also determine if the ballot title
and summary of the amendment comply with section 101.161 of the Florida
Statutes.32
5. Sponsors must deliver the petitions to the supervisors of elections
in order for the signatures to be verified,33 a process that can take several
weeks or longer if the supervisor's staff is extremely busy. Verification will
usually take less time if signature cards are submitted as they are collected
and the final group is submitted several months before the deadline.
Once certified as having obtained the necessary number and distribution
of signatures of registered voters, certification is sent to the Division of
Elections by the supervisor of elections. The actual petitions are retained
24. The Secretary of State's responsibilities for initiatives are handled by the Division
of Elections of the Department of State.
25. FLA. STAT. § 100.371(3) (1991); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.009(1) (1990).
26. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.009(1) (1990).
27. See id. r. I S-2.009.
28. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (1991).
29. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.009(2) (1990).
30. See id.
31. FLA. STAT. § 16.061(1) (1991); see also FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (listing the
requirements).
32. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
33. FLA. STAT. § 15.21(3) (1991); see also id. § 99.097 (detailing the process by which
signatures are verified).
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by the supervisor of elections. Any initiative which receives the required
number of signatures no later than ninety-one days prior to the general
election will appear on the ballot, unless successfully challenged in court.34
If an initiative comes under legal challenge, it is up to the sponsor or
other interested persons to defend it in court. The deadline for the
supervisors 10 submit signature verification to the Division is 5:00 p.m.,
August 9, 1994, for the November 1994 general election.
III. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
The following are frequently asked questions regarding the initiative
process in Florida:
How are political committees formed?
A political committee is defined as two or more persons or individuals
supporting or opposing candidates, issues, or political parties and which
accepts contributions or makes expenditures of more than $500 a year.3"
Furthermore, a sponsor of an amendment must always register as a political
committee regardless of the number of persons involved and regardless of
the amount of money raised or spent.36
Under section 106.03(2) of the Florida Statutes, a political committee
must furnish the following information when it files a statement of
organization with the Division of Elections:
(a) The name and address of the committee;
(b) The names, addresses, and relationships of affiliated or connected
organizations;
(c) The area, scope, or jurisdiction of the committee;
(d) The name, address, and position of the custodian of the books and
accounts;
(e) The name, address, and position of other principal officers, including
officers and members of the finance committee, if any;
(g) Any issue or issues such organization is supporting or opposing;
(i) A statement of whether the committee is a continuing one;
(j) Plans for the disposition of residual funds which will be made in the
34. FLA. ('ONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
35. FLA. STAT. § 106.011(l) (1991).
36. Id.
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event of dissolution [of the committee];
(k) A listing of all banks, safe-deposit boxes, or other depositories used
for committee funds; and
(1) A statement of the reports to be filed by the committee with federal
officials, if any, and the names, addresses, and positions of such
officials.3 7
How many signatures must be collected?
The number of signatures must equal eight percent of the voters in the
most recent presidential election.38 Currently, the number is 429,428. To
assure statewide coverage, the signatures must be from at least half the
congressional districts, 39 currently twelve of the twenty-three districts.
How do I know how many votes are required from each district and how
many registered voters are in each district?
That information is part of the initial informational packet provided by
the Division of Elections..
How long are the signatures valid?
Every signature must be dated when made and is valid for four years
from that date.40
What appears on an initiative petition?
The Division of Elections has a rule providing the format of the
constitutional amendment petition form. 41  The minimum size of the
petition is 3" x 5", the maximum size 8 /2" x 11". The form must contain
the signature of the voter, the date signed, and the printed name of the voter
including address, precinct number, congressional district and county.
However, if the voter does not know the precinct number, congressional
district and county, the supervisor of elections will certify the signature if
the supervisor is able to ascertain that the person is a registered voter. The
form must contain the ballot title, the ballot summary and the full text of the
proposed amendment. There are no specifications on what kind of paper the
petition should be on, but many sponsors have used card stock since the
forms will be handled several times by various people. Only one signature
37. Id. § 106.03(2).
38. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
39. Id.
40. FLA. STAT. § 100.371(2) (1991); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.009(1), (2)
(1990).
41. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.009 (1990).
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can be on each form.42
Does the Secretary of State's office assist in writing the petition
language?
No. Anyone considering sponsoring an amendment should consult an
attorney for assistance in wording the proposal.
May the petitions be in a language other than English?
Some petitions have been circulated with English on one side of the
form and Spanish on the other. In 1988, voters adopted a constitutional
initiative proclaiming English as the official language of Florida.43
However, there have been no judicial decisions indicating whether a petition
must be in English.
How are the signatures verified?
Employees in the local supervisor of elections' office compare the
signatures, names and addresses to voter rolls.44 In some counties, they
must be compared by hand. Other counties have voter information on
computer file. Signatures of persons who are not registered voters of the
county, who were purged from the voter rolls for not voting in two years45
or who have signed the petition more than once are rejected. People who
did not furnish complete information (missing an address, for example),
whose signatures do not match those on file or who have illegible handwrit-
ing may prevent the supervisor from being able to determine the person's
voter registration status.
When verification is completed, the supervisor sends the Division of
Elections a certificate detailing how many signatures were submitted, how
many were valid and the distribution by congressional district. If committee
members want to know how many signatures have been verified, it must
contact the Division of Elections. The supervisor of elections will explain
why signatures were rejected if requested.
How much does it cost to have the signatures verified?
Either the actual cost to the supervisor or ten cents per name,
whichever is less. 46 If a political committee states that it is unable to pay
42. See id.
43. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9.
44. FLA. STAT. § 99.097 (1991).
45. Op. Div. Elect. Fla. 91-04, 91-01, 88-38, 88-10, 87-16.
46. FLA. STAT. § 99.097(4) (1991).
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for the verification due to financial hardship, payment is waived after
certification of this is made to the supervisor.47
How long does it take to verify signatures?
It varies, but committees should keep in mind that as the election date
approaches, the supervisor's office becomes increasingly busy. If petitions
are submitted too close to the deadline, it is possible that there will not be
sufficient time to check them all. Several weeks lead time is recommended
at a minimum.
On what basis are most constitutional initiatives challenged in court?
Some initiatives have encountered court challenges alleging that they
do not comply with the single-subject requirements of article XI, section 3
of the Florida Constitution"8 and the ballot title and summary requirements
of section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes.49
In 1972 the constitution was amended to limit initiative amendments
to "one subject and matter directly connected therewith," better known as
the single-subject requirement, and to provide that such an amendment or
revision could be made to any "portion or portions" of the constitution
rather than to a section. In addition, section 101.161 of the Florida
Statutes requires that any constitutional amendment or other public measure
submitted to the vote of the people must:
1. Be answered by a yes or no response. A yes vote indicates
approval of the proposal; a no vote indicates rejection of the
proposal.
2. Along with the actual wording of the amendment, have a summa-
ry of no more than seventy-five words and a title of no more than
fifteen words.
3. The summary must be in "clear and unambiguous language."'
How can an amendment be protected from a court challenge?
Prior to 1987, there was no way to get any type of court review before
an initiative made ballot position. The Legislature then amended chapters
15 and 16 of the Florida Statutes, relating to the Secretary of State and
Attorney General, to provide that when ten percent of the necessary
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Fine, 448 So. 2d at 985.
49. See, e.g., Smith, 606 So. 2d at 621.
50. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
51. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(l) (1991).
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signatures is obtained from twenty-five percent of the congressional districts
required, the Secretary will submit the petition to the Attorney General. 2
Within thirty days after receipt, the Attorney General petitions the Supreme
Court of Florida requesting an advisory opinion on the initiative's conformi-
ty with article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and with section
101.161 of the Florida Statutes. 3 In addition, the Attorney General may
enumerate any specific factual issues that require a judicial determination.54
52. Id. § 15.21.
53. Id. § 16.061(1).
54. Id.
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VII. ARTICLE XI, SECTION 3: THE REHABILITATION
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
PROPOSE CHANGES TO THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION-
UNDOING THE MALIGNANT EFFECT OF FINE V.
FIRESTONE ........................... 1572
I. INTRODUCTION
It may be said that each generation should possess the right to construe
or interpret our Constitution in the light of his daily needs in a complex
society rather than in the light of now obsolete conditions and circum-
stances of the past. It is unjust to chain modem society to the views
and opinions of eminent jurists of former generations not acquainted
with our present day problems.
In spite of this ability to informally amend the constitution by interpre-
tation, there are situations when formal amendments are needed to ratify
these interpretations. There are other situations when the constitution needs
to be formally changed to correct either a deficiency that has surfaced in the
document itself or in its interpretation by the judiciary. The changes
proposed below address each of these situations.
II. ARTICLE 1, SECTION 11: SUGGESTED CHANGES
REGARDING IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
Florida has constitutionally prohibited imprisonment for debt since
1868.2 Such prohibitions were added to the constitutions of several states
as a reaction to the common abuses of debtor's prisons during the early and
middle 1800's.3 However, a number of exceptions to the prohibition have
been recognized over the years. In Florida, cases involving fraud are
expressly excepted. 4 In addition, Florida courts have generally allowed
1. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Util. Bd., 40 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. 1949).
2. "No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud." FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 11; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 16; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. I § 16.
3. See Shidlowsky v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 344 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Hubbart, J., concurring); Vermont Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 445 A.2d
1122, 1124 (N.H. 1982); Brantley v. Brantley, 344 P.2d 731, 733 (Wash. 1959).
4. FLA. CONST. art I, § 11; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 16; FLA. CONST. of 1868,
art. I, § 16.
1520 [Vol. 18
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imprisonment to enforce payment of domestic relations support obligations5
and tax obligations,6 even though each can easily be characterized as a
"debt."7 This section of this article will outline the historical background
of each of the court-developed exceptions," and then recommend changes
to article I, section 11. 9 This article will not address issues involving
imprisonment for debts which arise from criminal acts,'" nor imprisonment
for acts which relate to debts, but do not constitute a per se failure to pay
the underlying obligation.1"
A. Domestic Relations Support Obligations
It is almost axiomatic that Florida court orders awarding alimony or
child support 3 may be enforced by civil contempt, whereby the non-paying
party is confined to the county jail until he or she pays the ordered
support. 4  The rationale for allowing imprisonment for failing to pay
5. See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
7. "A fixed and certain obligation to pay money or some other valuable thing or things,
either in the present or in the future." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 363 (5th ed. 1979).
Florida courts have yet to precisely define "debt" as it is used in article I, section ii.
Instead, they seemingly prefer to define it by pointing out what obligations are not a "debt."
See infra text accompanying notes 15 and 30.
8. See infra notes 12-28, 29-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
10. For example, imprisonment imposed for failing to pay fines or penalties. See
generally State ex rel. Lanz v. Dowling, 110 So. 522 (Fla. 1926) (prohibition applies only
to obligations which arise ex contractu); State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1978)
(requiring payment into victim's compensation fund as a condition of probation does not
violate article 1, section II).
11. The classic example is imprisonment for writing bad checks, which does not
implicate the prohibition of imprisonment for debt because "the purpose [of the Legislature]
was not for the collection of debts. The purpose was to penalize the evil of putting into
circulation certain kinds of worthless commercial paper and thus causing mischief to banks
and to trade and commerce." Ennis v. State, 95 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1957); State v. Berry,
358 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1978).
12. Bronk v. State, 31 So. 248 (Fla. 1901); State exrel. Krueger v. Stone, 188 So. 575
(Fla. 1939).
13. Exparte J.C.H., 17 Fla. 362 (1879); Spencer v. Spencer, 311 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
14. Of course, since imprisonment is involved, observance of various procedural
safeguards is necessary. First, when civil contempt is used to obtain compliance with a court
order, the person to be held in contempt must have the ability to comply, or else imprison-
ment will not serve its coercive purpose. On the other hand, criminal contempt, which is
used to punish willful violation of a court order, carries with it the procedural safeguards of
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support, in the face of the constitutional prohibition, is that domestic support
"is not a debt, within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. It is regarded more in the light of a personal duty
due not alone from the husband to the wife, but from him to society...
1515 In addition, imprisonment for failing to pay support obligations has
occasionally been based upon the failure of the non-paying party to obey a
lawful court order. 16 Regardless, the fact remains that alimony and child
support orders have always been, and continue to be, enforceable by
contempt.
Since the early 1980's, Florida has expanded the contempt power of the
courts beyond enforcement of domestic support orders contained in the
dissolution decree proper. Imprisonment is now available to enforce. money
judgments arising from unpaid support obligations17 and child support
any criminal proceeding. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1985).
A second, and equally important, prerequisite for imposition of contempt is that the
party to be held in contempt must be in violation of an express order of the court, and not
simply in violation of a provision in an agreement between the parties. See Solomon v.
Solomon, 5 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1942) (court has no power to find former husband in contempt
for failing to pay alimony, since the court did not expressly order the former husband to
comply with the terms of the settlement agreement); Holmes v. Coolman, 401 So. 2d 895
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court order can not hold spouse in civil contempt for violation
of a private agreement).
15. Bronk, 31 So. at 252.
16. See Orr v. Orr, 192 So. 466 (Fla. 1939); Murphy v. Murphy, 370 So. 2d 403 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979.) However, such a rationale ignores the fact that a court's ability to
enforce its own orders is also limited by the prohibition contained in article 1, section 11.
Otherwise, rather than enter a money judgment in a non-domestic civil case, a court could
order payment, and then hold the debtor in contempt and imprison him for failing to pay the
ordered amount.
17. FLA. STAT. § 61.17(3) (1985); Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1990).
Traditionally, enforcement of money judgments by contempt has been prohibited by article
I, section 11. See Tabas v. Hudson, 175 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). However,
since as early as 1944, Florida allowed foreign money judgments arising from domestic
support orders to be domesticated and enforced by contempt. McDuffie v. McDuffie, 19 So.
2d 511 (Fla. 1944) (Georgia judgment); Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1950) (New
York judgment). The basis for this exception to the general rule was that:
ajudgment for alimony rests largely on public policy in that the husband should
be required to support his wife and children, that they should not become
derelicts and a charge on the public, that a judgment in equity is more
efficacious than a judgment at law in that it may be enforced by attachment or
contempt ....
McDuffie, 19 So. 2d at 513 (citing Fanchier v. Gammill, 114 So. 813 (Miss. 1927)).
However, in spite of the availability of equitable remedies to enforce foreign judgments,
Florida continued to recognize that an enforcing spouse had to choose between equitable and
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arrearages that are sought to be enforced after the supported child attains
legal remedies. Haas v. Haas, 59 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1952).
Florida courts continued to follow the traditional rule in cases involving Florida money
judgments which were based upon domestic support arrearages, see State ex rel. Clark v.
Muldrew, 308 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), although there were some signs that
the courts recognized the inconsistency inherent in distinguishing foreign and domestic
judgments. See Grotnes v. Grotnes, 338 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (receding
from State ex rel. Clark). Nevertheless, in two cases in the early 1980's, the Florida
Supreme Court hinted that equitable remedies in general, and the contempt power in
particular, would not be available to enforce domestic money judgments arising from
domestic support orders. See Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1981) (money
judgment for child support arrearages is not enforceable by equitable remedy of garnishment
because a money judgment does not trigger the domestic support order exception to the
general prohibition on garnishment of wages); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 61.12, 222.11 (1979);
Lamm v. Chapman, 413 So. 2d 749, 753 (Fla. 1982). In Lamm, the court reasoned that:
In the event that such a [money] judgment is obtained, it constitutes ajudgment
debt upon which execution may issue and for which traditional enforcement
remedies, including liens and levies, may be utilized. The contempt power of
the court is no longer available to enforce the child support obligation for those
arrearages which have been reduced to ajudgment debt for which execution may
issue ....
Id. The Legislature addressed the choice of remedies problem raised by Lamm by amending
section 61.17 of the Florida Statutes to provide that "[tlhe entry of ajudgment for arrearages
for child support, alimony, or attorney's fees and costs does not preclude a subsequent
contempt proceeding . . . for failure of an obligor to pay the child support, alimony, and
attorney's fees, or cost for which the judgment was entered." Ch. 86-220, § 125, 1986 Fla.
Laws 1603, 1710 (amending Fla. Stat. § 61.17(3) (1987)).
Passage of chapter 86-220, section 125 did not resolve the constitutional issue,
however. That was accomplished by the Florida Supreme Court in its decision in Gibson,
in which the court relied upon the McDuffie and Sackler line of cases in holding that the use
of the contempt power to enforce payment or money judgments based upon domestic support
arrearages does not violate article I, section 11. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 565. The court
dismissed the language of Lamm as dicta, and found that neither Lamm nor Sokolsky
addressed the issue directly. Instead, the court, per Justice Kogan, held that:
[e]stablishing a support decree as a money judgment does not destroy the decree
as an order to pay support nor is the obligation reduced to an ordinary judgment
debt enforceable only at law .... The purpose of the award remains the
payment of support to the former spouse or the children regardless of its form
or the location of the parties. A decree for support is different than a judgment
for money or property: It is a continuing obligation based on the moral as well
as legal duty of a parent to support his or her children. Because of this
difference, a judgment for support should be enforced by more efficient means
than ordinary execution at law.
Id. at 569 (citations omitted). Not only did Gibson resolve the constitutional issue, it also
resolved the choice of remedies issue originally raised in Haas by effectively abrogating the
doctrine in cases involving domestic support. Id. at 572 (Overton, J., concurring).
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majority.' 8  Furthermore, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services may seek contempt to compel reimbursement of welfare expendi-
tures from non-paying spouses. 9 The justification for each of these
18. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 565. Prior to Gibson, Florida courts uniformly followed the
rule that contempt was not available to enforce child support arrearages once the supported
child reached majority. See Heath v. Killian, 556 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(question certified due to pendency of Gibson in the Florida Supreme Court); State ex rel.
Sipe v. Sipe, 492 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 492 So. 2d 1331
(Fla. 1986) (URESA enforcement action); Smith v. Morgan, 379 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1980); Gersten v. Gersten, 281 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Wilkes
v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970). The rationale for such a rule was
that the supported children were no longer in need of support when they attained majority,
and therefore, the justification for allowing the use of the extraordinary remedy of contempt
in the face of article I, section 11, no longer existed. Wilkes, 245 So. 2d at 898; Heath, 556
So. 2d at 412.
The Gibson court, while acknowledging a split on the issue among other states, chose
to align itself with those which allow contempt to be used to enforce child support arrearages
post-majority. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 572. The court relied mainly upon a public policy
argument:
Upon emancipation of a minor child, the support-dependent parent is not
magically reimbursed for personal funds spent nor debts incurred due to nonpay-
ment of child support. Hardships suffered by a family do not disappear. A
family's feelings of indignation from abandonment by the nonpaying parent or
from past reliance on public assistance are not forgotten. Society's interest in
ensuring that a parent meets parental obligations must not be overlooked simply
because the child has attained the age of majority. The support obligation does
not cease; rather it remains unfulfilled. The nonpaying parent still owes the
money.
Today, support-dependent parents and the courts often experience great
difficulty obtaining compliance with support orders while a child is a minor even
though the remedy of contempt is available. If the courts lack the power to
enforce child support orders through contempt proceedings after the child
reaches majority, a nonpaying parent may escape his or her support obligation
entirely, especially a parent with little or no property subject to attachment in an
action at law. If a parent dependent on support is left with less effective civil
action, the non paying parent may be encouraged to hide assets our purposefully
elude the court until the child attains age eighteen, preferring the civil action on
a debt rather than a contempt proceeding. As this court has previously stated,
we have no desire to make this state a haven for those who wish to avoid their
support obligations.
Id. (citation omitted). The court also relied to a lesser extent upon the provision of the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which allows the post-majority
enforcement of child support arrearages by contempt. Id. at 572 n.6 (citing FLA. STAT. §
881.101 (1989)).
19. Lamm, 413 So. 2d at 749. Traditionally, Florida courts have recognized "the basic
principle that only obligations of the parties to the marriage relationship, owed to each other,
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expansions of the contempt power is the state's vital interest in the efficient
enforcement of support obligations, regardless of the form such obligations
take.20  As a result, there can be little doubt that Florida now allows
enforcement by contempt of any obligation related to domestic support,2'
are to be treated differently from 'debts' for which imprisonment may not be imposed under
the constitution." Price v. Price, 382 So. 2d 433, 437, (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(footnote omitted). However, in 1976, the Legislature enacted chapter 76-220, section 4, of
the Laws of Florida, which provided that upon the payment of public assistance moneys for
the benefit of a support-dependent child, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("HRS") became subrogated to the rights of the custodial parent to the extent of the
public assistance, and that such payment created a "debt due and owing" to HRS from the
non-paying supporting parent, but made no provision for the use of contempt by HRS. FLA.
STAT. § 409.2561 (1977) (the Legislature revised section 409.2561 in 1982, changing "debt"
to "obligation", and providing expressly for the use of contempt in enforcement actions.) The
main issue raised by section 409.2561 as it was originally enacted was whether contempt is
a remedy available to HRS to obtain reimbursement from a nonpaying parent, and the Second
and Third District Courts of Appeal split on the issue, creating a conflict. Chapman v. Lamm,
388 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (the state has no greater right to enforce a
debt as a third party assignee than does a private litigant); Andrews v. Walton, 400 So. 2d
790 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (the fact that the state, rather than the supported parent,
prosecutes an action to enforce support does not change the support nature of the obligation).
In Lamm, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the rationale of the Second District
in Andrews, holding that HRS could seek enforcement of a reimbursement action by contempt
without violating article 1, section I I of the constitution. Lamm, 413 So. 2d at 750. First the
court found no legislative intent to prohibit the use of contempt in its use of the word "debt"
in the statute. The court then turned to the public policy argument.
[T]he state has historically occupied two roles with respect to family matters:
that of an interested party in matters pertaining to the custody, support, and
welfare of children and that of the sovereign having a parens patriae interest in
the well-being of the minor child .... While it is true that ... a private third
party cannot use civil contempt to enforce a debt which is grounded in an
assignment of a financial obligation resulting from a marriage dissolution or
child support order, the state is not the same as a third party bank. The state is
acting both as an interested party and as parens patriae to further the best interest
of the dependent child.
Id. at 753.
20. See Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 565; Lamm, 413 So. 2d at 749; see generally supra notes
17-19.
21. Florida law provides for the award of attorney's fees and court costs ("suit money")
in domestic cases where the requesting party can show need and the other party's ability to
pay. FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1991). Such awards are considered "support" for purposes of
determining whether they may be enforced by contempt, since such fees and costs are a
necessity to the spouse receiving the award. Orr, 192 So. 2d at 466. Of course, many types
of property arrangements between parties to a divorce may be considered "necessities" as
well. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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even if the obligation is not an order in a dissolution decree. Further, such
enforcement does not implicate the prohibition on imprisonment for debt.
However, even with the expansion of contempt power described above,
property settlements are not generally subject to enforcement by con-
tempt.22 Yet, the courts have, on occasion, used their contempt power to
enforce provisions of property settlements where the provision is an action
required of one of the parties23 or where the property provision may be
characterized as support.24  Furthermore, with the adoption of equitable
22. See State ex rel. Cahn v. Mason, 4 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1941); Finney v. Finney, 603
So. 2d 92 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Marks v. Marks, 457 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Carlin v. Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State ex rel.
Gillham v. Phillips, 193 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). Whether a payment
required by a dissolution decree involves support or property is to be determined based on
the function served by the payment, and not only upon the labels used in the decree. Howell
v, Howell, 207 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
23. See Riley v. Riley, 509 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (failure to name
former spouse beneficiary of a life insurance policy); Pennington v. Pennington, 390 So. 2d
809 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (failure to convey interest in marital home); Firestone v.
Ferguson, 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (failure to sign sale papers on
property); Burke v. Burke, 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (failure to execute
documents). The justification for the use of contempt in these situations is that the party
failing to act is in willful disobedience of a court order requiring such action. Riley, 509 So.
2d at 1366. Of course, if the action required is the payment of money, then traditional
concerns involving imprisonment for debt are implicated and should be raised. See supra
note 16. But see Murphy v. Murphy, 370 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (former
husband could be held in contempt for failing to pay wife $108,000 as a special equity upon
a showing by the former wife that such failure was willful and that the former husband had
the ability to make the payment); Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 345 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (former husband held in contempt for failing to pay former wife for her
interest in intangible marital property).
24. See Pabian v. Pabian, 480 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The
Pabian court stated:
We believe that the husband's obligation to pay the wife's automobile payments
is in the nature of support rather than a settlement of property rights because of
the prominent role which an automobile plays in our everyday life. Like food,
clothing and shelter it has become a virtual necessity and thus falls within the
penumbra of support and maintenance.
Id.; Cobb v. Cobb, 399 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (failure to make ordered
payments on household furnishings). In addition, Florida courts have generally held that
"lump sum alimony," which is often used as a means to equitably distribute property, is
supportive in nature, and therefore enforceable by contempt. See McCombes v. McCombes,
440 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (lump sum alimony awarded in lieu of award
of marital home enforceable by contempt, even though the decree expressly provided for
alimony); Zuccarello v. Zuccarello, 429 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (payments
of $20,000 lump sum alimony in 120 installments of $222 is support, even though agreement
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distribution principles in Florida," an argument can be made that all
property arrangements ought to be considered supportive in nature,26 since
property determinations during a dissolution are no longer independent of
support obligations, but instead are part of an integrated whole. 27 Never-
theless, since the Florida courts have yet to make an unequivocal pronounce-
ment on this issue, and also because the distinction between property and
support is important in other areas 28 any changes to article I, section 11
should be limited to support obligations only.
B. Tax Obligations
As with alimony and child support orders, Florida courts have long
held that imprisonment for non-payment of taxes does not violate the
waived alimony). But see Viega v. State, 561 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(contempt is not available to enforce payment of lump sum alimony if it is for the purpose
of effectuating an equitable distribution of marital assets).
25. FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (1991); Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1991)
(starting point of equitable distribution is an equal division of marital assets.); Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (use of lump sum alimony to allow equitable
distribution); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980) (companion case to Canakaris).
26. In fact, the suggestion that property settlement provisions be enforceable by
contempt has been made at least twice. See Marks v. Marks. 457 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Joanos, J., concurring); Schminkey v. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d 121
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (follows general rule regarding property provisions, but
certifies the question).
27. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1197. In Canakaris, the Florida Supreme Court empha-
sized its intent that the overall result of the dissolution process be equitable, and that courts
not be hampered in achieving that result by inflexible rules.
The Judge possesses broad discretionary authority to do equity between the
parties and has available various remedies to accomplish this purpose, including
lump sum alimony, permanent periodic alimony, rehabilitative alimony, child
support, a vested special equity in property, and an award of exclusive
possession of property. As considered by the trial court, these remedies are
interrelated; to the extent of their eventual use, the remedies are part of one
overall scheme.
Id. at 1202. The intent of Canakaris was carried into the statutory scheme, wherein one of
the factors which a trial court must consider in awarding alimony is "the financial resources
of each party, the non-marital and marital assets distributed to each [party]." FLA. STAT. §
61.08(2)(d) (1991).
28. See, e.g., I I U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1993) (support obligations not dischargeable in
bankruptcy); 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215 (1988) (alimony considered income to supported party,
and is deductible to paying party).
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prohibition on imprisonment for debt.29 The rationale used to justify
imprisonment for non-payment of taxes is similar to that used in domestic
support cases.
The act of paying a constitutionally levied tax is nothing more (nor less)
than a bearing of the taxpayer's share of the necessary expenses of
government. It is a contribution toward the governmental machinery of
our democratic way of life and is essential to its preservation. Such
payment or contribution does not amount to the satisfaction of a civil
debt in the legal significance of that term. It is more in the nature of
a privilege, or the fulfillment of a moral obligation, of citizenship.
Such privilege, or obligation, if not voluntarily enjoyed or discharged,
may be enforced by the will of the majority through the exercise of
inherent sovereign power.3"
Although the exception for tax obligations is clear, what constitutes a tax
obligation may not be. At least one Florida court has distinguished between
a tax and a service fee, holding that the latter is not subject to enforcement
by imprisonment."
C. Recommendation
The Florida courts have clearly carved out exceptions to the constitu-
tional prohibition on imprisonment for debt contained in article I, section I I
in cases involving payment of domestic support obligations32 and payment
of tax obligations.33 In each case, the courts justified the exception by
distinguishing the obligation owed from a "debt" as contemplated by section
11.1 4 A more modern approach to the problem might be to justify the
exceptions on the basis of a compelling governmental interest in the
payment of domestic support or payment of taxes. 5 However, regardless
29. Gaulden v. Kirk, 47 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1950) (broad-based constitutional challenge
to the state sales tax).
30. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
31. Turner v. State ex rel. Gruver, 168 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(imprisonment for failure to pay county garbage collection fees violates constitutional
prohibition on imprisonment for debt because fee is in the nature of a contractual obligation
due for services rendered).
32. See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 15 and 30.
35. All rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights, article I of the Florida
Constitition, are considered to be fundamental. Hillsborough County Governmental
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of the justification, the exceptions have been created and should be
accounted for in the express language of the constitutional provision.
Therefore, article 1, section 11 should be formally amended to expressly
allow imprisonment for failing to pay domestic support obligations and tax
obligations. 6
III. ARTICLE III, SECTION 8(A): A SUGGESTED CHANGE
REGARDING THE GOVERNOR'S VETO POWER
Under the 1968 Florida Constitution, the Governor has seven days in
which to veto a bill following its presentment to him by the Legislature. 7
In the absence of an express veto, a bill without the Governor's signature
becomes law seven days after presentment.3" The only express exceptions
to the seven clay time frame are when the Legislature adjourns sine die, or
takes a recess of greater than thirty days, within the seven day period
following presentment.39 In such a situation, the Governor is allowed an
additional eight days to veto the bill.4 ° If the Governor fails to sign or
Employees Ass'n v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 522 So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla. 1988).
Thus, any government action which runs counter to the prohibition on imprisonment for debt
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and must achieve its means through
the use of the least intrusive means. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477
So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
36. As revised, article 1, section I I would read: "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt, except in cases involvin k , domestic support or taxes."
37. Article Il1, section 8(a) states:
Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor for his
approval and shall become a law if he approves and signs it, or fails to veto it
within seven consecutive days after presentation. If during that period or on the
seventh day the legislature adjourns sine die or takes a recess of more than thirty
days, he shall have fifteen consecutive days from the date of presentation to act
on the bill.
FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 8(a). The purpose for allowing the Governor time to deliberate is to
"safeguard the executive's opportunity to consider all bills presented to him." Florida Soc'y
of Ophthalmology v. Florida Optometric Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119-20, (Fla. 1986) (citing
Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 486 (1932)).
38. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
39. Id.
40. Id. The additional time granted affords the Governor the opportunity to sufficiently
handle the annual flood of bills passed in the waning hours of a legislative session. Florida
Soc 'y of Ophthalmology, 489 So. 2d at 1120.
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veto the bill during the additional time allotted, the bill becomes law.4
Article III, section 8(a), does not give the Governor additional time to
sign bills which are presented after adjournment," even though a signifi-
cant number of the bills passed at the end of the legislative session are
presented to the Governor after adjournment.43 In spite of this express
constitutional language, Governors used the expanded time period in such
situations without challenge until 1983." 4
In May of 1983, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 168, which, inter
alia, allowed board certified optometrists to administer and prescribe certain
prescription drugs.45 The bill was presented to the Governor on June 14,
one day after the Legislature had adjourned sine die, and the Governor
vetoed the bill fifteen days later, on June 29.46 The Florida Optometric
Association filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the publishing
of Senate Bill 168 as a law, based on its contention that the Governor's
authority to veto the bill under the express language of article III, section
8(a) expired on June 21, seven days after presentment. 47 The circuit court
dismissed the petition with prejudice, construing article Ii, section 8(a) as
providing the Governor with the extended fifteen day time period to veto
bills presented after adjournment. 48 The district court, basing its decision
upon the express language of article III, section 8(a), reversed the trial court
and ordered the Secretary of State to publish Senate Bill 168 as a law.49
However, recognizing the potential impact of the decision on the legislative
41. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, which provides the President the power to
veto a bill by not signing it if the Congress, by adjourning, has prevented the president from
returning the bill to the Congress. The Florida Constitution affords the Governor no such
"pocket veto" power.
42. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a). The only exception to the seven day period is for bills
which are pending before the Governor when the Legislature adjourns or takes a recess.
43. See Florida Soc 'y of Ophthalmology, 489 So. 2d at 1120 ("It is evident from the
record that in a typical session of the Florida Legislature some 60 percent of all bills passed
during the session are presented to the Governor just before or immediately after adjourn-
ment, with the bulk submitted after adjournment.").
44. In fact, in at least one instance, the Florida Supreme Court tacitly approved the
Governor's use of the extended time period where the Legislature adjourned prior to
presentment. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 374 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla. 1979).
45. Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Firestone, 465 So. 2d 1319, 1320 n. I (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Florida Socy of Ophthalmology, 489 So. 2d at 1118.
46. Florida Optometric Ass n, 465 So. 2d at 1320.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. One judge dissented and would have upheld the trial court's decision. Id. at 1323
(Zehmer, J., dissenting).
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and executive branches, the district court certified the question to the Florida
Supreme Court,5" which accepted jurisdiction and reversed.51
Although faced with plain and unambiguous language requiring
application of a seven day period, Justice Barkett, writing for the majority,
nevertheless construed article III, section 8(a), so as to allow the Governor
fifteen days to veto bills presented after adjournment.52  While the
suitability of constitutional construction as a means of reaching this result
is open to debate,53 it is clear that the result reached was appropriate,54
given the volume of last minute bills presented to the Governor.55
Therefore, the next Revision Commission should consider amending article
Il1, section 8(a) to expressly allow the Governor fifteen days to veto bills
presented after the Legislature adjourns sine die or after it takes a recess of
more than thirty days.56
50. Id. The question certified was: "Whether Article 111, Section 8(a), Florida
Constitution, allows the Governor seven or fifteen consecutive days to act on a bill presented
to him after the Legislature adjourns sine die, and, if he is allowed only seven days
thereafter, should the effect of an opinion so holding have only prospective application?" Id.
Clearly, even though not comfortable with the potential difficulties its decision would
engender, the majority of the district court panel nevertheless felt compelled to uphold the
language of article 111, section 8(a).
51. Florida Soc 'y of Ophthalmology, 489 So. 2d at 1120.
52. Id. Rather than viewing article Ill, section 8(a), as an explicit rule with an explicit
exception, Justice Barkett's analysis viewed the provision as one which merely failed to
account for a particular circumstance, thus removing it from the plain language rule of
construction. This having been accomplished, Justice Barkett then relied upon the underlying
purpose of the extended veto period, and upon the long-standing construction given article
Ill, section 8(a) by the Executive branch, to justify reading an expanded veto period into
article Ill, section 8(a) in those situations when the Legislature presents a bill to the Governor
after adjournment.
53. Justice Boyd, dissenting from the majority opinion in Florida Soc 'y of Ophthal-
mology, held to the view that the language of article Ill, section 8(a) was precise, certain, and
unambiguous, and therefore not amenable to judicial interpretation. Florida Soc 'y of
Ophthalmology, 489 So. 2d at 1124 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
54. Even Justice Boyd agreed that the result reached by the majority in Florida Soc'y
of Ophthalmology was "reasonable and logical." Id. at 1124.
55. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
56. As revised, article 1, section 8(a) would read:
Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor for his
approval and shall become a law if he approves and signs it, or fails to veto it
within seven consecutive days after presentation. If during that period or on the
seventh day the legislature adjourns sine die or takes a recess of more than thirty
days, or if the bill is presented to the governor after the legislature adjourns sine
die or during a recess of more than thirty days, he shall have fifteen consecutive
days from the date of presentation to act on the bill.
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IV. ARTICLE V, SECTION 3(B)(3): THE CONTINUING
PROBLEM OF THE CITATION P.C.A.5
7
The problem of the citation P.C.A. began in 1956 with the creation of
the district courts of appeal by constitutional amendment. These courts were
intended to be "error correcting courts," while the basic role of the supreme
court was changed to that of a "law declaring court."58 The district courts
of appeal were, except for the specific instances of supreme court jurisdic-
tion set out in the constitution, to be the appellate courts of last resort.5 9
Because the district courts of appeal were not required by the
constitution to write an opinion explaining why they had affirmed judgments
of the circuit courts6° and because the supreme court was a "law making
57. The phrase "citation P.C.A." means a decision of a district court of appeal that in
its entirety states, "per curiam, affirmed" and then references one or more cases.
58. See State v. Grawien, 362 N.W.2d 428 (Wis. 1985) where these terms are used. See
also the following from Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958) as quoted in
Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
The new [article VI embodies throughout its terms the idea of a Supreme Court
which functions as a supervisory body in the judicial system for the State,
exercising appellate power in certain specified areas essential to the settlement
of issues of public importance and the preservation of uniformity of principle
and practice ....
Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1357-58.
59. In Ansin, again as quoted in Jenkins, this jurisdiction was described as "review by
the district courts in most instances being final and absolute." 101 So. 2d at 810. The reader
should, of course, recognize that, in most instances, the circuit courts exercise appellate
jurisdiction over judgments of county courts. See FLA. STAT. § 26.012 (1) (1992).
60. Although the author has been able to discover no supreme court rule covering the
matter, the court has from time to time taken the position that it has authority to require, or
at least request, a district court of appeal to write an opinion in a case it had earlier affirmed
without one. See, e.g., Hoisington v. Kulchin, 172 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1965). The district court
of appeal had issued a per curiam affirmance "on the authority of' a series of earlier cases.
The supreme court, having waded through the "record proper" under the Foley doctrine, was
still unsure of its jurisdiction based on direct conflict of decisions, Foley v. Weaver Drugs,
177 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965). It therefore decided that its "final decision in this cause would
be greatly facilitated by an expression of the district court of appeal upon the theory and
reasoning upon which its judgment is bottomed and a request by this court is not unreason-
able or improper." Hoisington, 172 So. 2d at 588 (citation omitted).
The supreme court went on to state: "request is respectfully made to the [district court
of appeal] that it reconsider the cause and render an opinion setting forth the basis and
reasoning upon which its decision in the cause is reached. ... Id. (Emphasis added).
Interestingly enough, the district court "respectfully declined at this late date, to
reconsider the cause and set forth the basis and reasoning for [their] decision," and then
proceeded to tell the supreme court what it apparently wanted to know. Hoisington v.
Kulchin, 178 So. 2d 349, 351-52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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court,"61 the issue of what purpose could be served by supreme court
review of a simple "per curiam affirmed" decision, not accompanied by an
explanatory opinion was bound to arise. Put somewhat differently, what
"law" would be made by the supreme court's review, pursuant to conflict
jurisdiction, of a decision with no language? 62  Such decisions have no
precedential value in the law of Florida, except perhaps for the circuit judge
whose judgment had been affirmed and the lawyers in the case. Even then,
these participants to the proceedings in the trial court might not know on
what basis the affirmance had come about.63
As was suggested above, the issue arose in the context of the supreme
court's conflict jurisdiction.64  Although the supreme court in that case,
Lake v. Lake, 65 purported to find that, as a "law making c , 66Lak v.Lak, r t to in tha,  court, it had
no business looking for conflict in a case where the district court wrote no
opinion, it, most unwisely as it turned out, "left room for the camel to get
its nose into the tent.
67
There may be exceptions to the rule that this court will not go behind
See also infra text following note 131 for further discussion of the supreme court's
power to request or require that a district court write an opinion when it has not chosen to
do so.
61. See supra note 58.
62. From its inception in 1956, the supreme court's discretionary review jurisdiction,
which is where "conflict" is located, was "by certiorari." With the 1980 amendment, the
words "by certiorari" have been dropped. One now merely petitions for review. See FLA.
R. APP. P. 9.120 and 9.900.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83. At times, a district court of appeal may
attempt to enlighten the circuit judge and the lawyers involved as to the basis of their
affirmance by citing one to perhaps two or three cases from which the basis for their decision
can perhaps be gleaned. See infra text accompanying note 96 for a discussion of these
"counsel advising" citations to authority.
64. Since the creation of the district courts of appeal in 1956, one of the bases of the
supreme court's "law making" function was to resolve conflicts, or at least important
conflicts, in the law enunciated by different district courts of appeal or between a district
court of appeal and the supreme court. Between 1972 and 1980 the supreme court had
jurisdiction to review intradistrict conflict, i.e., conflict between panels of the same district
court. Since 1980, intradistrict conflict is a basis for an en banc review by a district court
of appeal. See Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1985); see
also FLA. R. APP. P. 9.331.
65. 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
66. See supra note 58.
67. It is an Arabic proverb that "[i]f the camel once get [sic] his nose in the tent, his
body will soon follow." TRIPP, THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 114
(1970).
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a [decision] per curiam, consisting only of the word 'affirmed' which
[therefore] does not reflect a decision that would interfere with settled
principles of law rendered by a district court of appeal .... Conceiv-
ably [however] it could appear from the restricted examination required
in proceedings in certiorari that a conflict had arisen with resulting
injustice to the immediate litigant. In that event the exception, not the
rule, would apply.68
This statement clearly appears to ignore the conceded role of the
supreme court, subsequent to the creation of the district courts of appeal, as
a "law making" court.69 Justice Thomas, the author of the Lake opinion,
apparently realizing the opening the above statement created, attempted
damage control of sorts.
But if the supreme court undertakes to go behind a [decision] on the
tenuous theory that it must see that justice is done instead of giving to
the judgment the verity it deserves and assuming that justice has been
done the system that has been overwhelmingly approved by the people
will be undermined and weakened.70
The attempted damage control did not work, not in the least because
the language "assuming that justice has been done,"7 1 is diametrically
opposed to the role of the district courts of appeal as "error correcting"
courts.72 Within seven years, not just the camel's nose, but the entire
camel was in the tent.73
Upon reconsideration of this entire matter, we have concluded that our
appellate court decisions may be kept truly harmonious and uniform
only by giving to the per curiam decisions without opinion of such
courts the same 'verity' that we give to their decisions supported by an
opinion. By subjecting such per curiam decisions to the same scrutiny
on the 'record proper'-that is the written record of the proceedings in
the court under review except the report of the testimony-as we give
to the opinion upon which a district court of appeal decision is based,
it may be concluded that a direct conflict exists which may forthwith be
resolved by this court; or such scrutiny may show "the probable
68. Lake, 103 So. 2d at 643.
69. See supra note 58.
70. Lake, 103 So. 2d at 643 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. See supra note 58.
73. See supra note 67.
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existence of a direct conflict between the two decisions" which can
definitely be determined only by remanding the cause to the appellate
court with the request that a supporting opinion be written. [14 ] This
is what we have, in fact, been doing heretofore. And we think the
jurisprudence of this state will be best served by modifying the policy
as to per curiam decisions [without opinion] announced in Lake v. Lake.
. . . We hereby do so, and we hold that this court may review by
conflict certiorari,["5 ] a per curiam judgment of affirmance without
opinion where an examination of the record proper discloses that the
legal effect of such a per curiam affirmance is to create conflict with a
decision of this court or another district court of appeal.7 6
It is appalling that the supreme court failed to understand that its Foley
decision had distorted its role as a "law making" court7 and had in fact
allowed it to assume the role of an "error correcting" court. 8 Remember
the words in Lake about "injustice to individual litigants" caused by a per
curiam affirmance without an opinion.7 9 To the extent that the supreme
court assumed this role that it was not intended to play, it diluted that very
error correcting role which the 1956 Amendment to article V intended for
the newly created district courts of appeal. This is illustrated by Justice
Drew's total misunderstanding of the precedential value of the words "per
curiam, affirmed" when there is no district court opinion to give the court's
reason for the affirmance.
We must assume, in the absence of something in the record to indicate
a contrary view, that an affirmance of a decision of a trial court by a
decision of the District Court of Appeal makes the trial court decision
the decision of the district court. So far as the trial judge is concerned
and so far as the Bench and Bar who are familiar with the decision of
the trial judge are concerned, such a judgment is the law of that
jurisdiction."0
To this misunderstanding, Justice Thornal in his dissent in Foley, gave
an irrefutable rebuttal. "How can one word 'affirmed' be a decision on the
74. See supra note 60.
75. See supra note 62.
76. Foley, 177 So. 2d at 225.
77. See supra note 58.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
80. Foley, 177 So. 2d at 230 (Drew, J., concurring specially.). See supra text
accompanying note 63.
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same 'point of law' in conflict with some other decision? If it can be, what
'point of law' does the one word 'affirmed' decide?' 's  An even more
devastating critique of Justice Drew's concurrence has subsequently been
81written.
It [referring to the Foley majority, but more directly to Justice Drew's
concurring opinion] is based on the indefensible assumption that trial
judges assume that district courts issue per curiam affirmances [without
opinion] only when they agree with the trial judge's reasons for ruling
a certain way. That assumption is not only fallacious as a matter of
simple logic, but it has, since Foley, been expressly rejected by the
district courts themselves. Both the Second and Third District Courts
of Appeal have expressly stated that trial judges can make no assump-
tions as to the basis on which a per curiam affirmance without opinion
is rendered. 3
Even if there were a scintilla of accuracy to the view that a per curiam
affirmance of a trial court judgment unaccompanied by an opinion would or
could create conflict of a precedential nature, 84 the supreme court, by
allowing itself to go behind the decision and into the "record proper,"
destroyed the finality with which most decisions of district courts of appeal
were supposed to be vested.85 As chronicled in Jenkins v. State,86 opposi-
81. Foley, 177 So. 2d at 231 (Thomal, J., dissenting).
82. See supra text accompanying note 80.
83. Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n, v. West Flagler Assoc., 347 So. 2d
408, 410-11 (1977) (England, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
84. "To my mind, there is no possible way that a district court's affirmance without
opinion can create decisional disharmony in the jurisprudence of this state sufficient to
warrant our attention." Id. at 411 (England, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
85. Justice Thomal, in his dissenting opinion in Foley, stated:
All of this simply means that the district court decisions are no longer final
under any circumstances. It appears to the author that the majority view is an
open invitation to every litigant who loses in the district court, to come up to the
supreme court and be granted a second appeal-the very thing that many feared
would happen-the very thing which we assured the people of this state would
not happen when the judiciary article was amended in 1956.
If I were a practicing lawyer in Florida, I would never again accept with finality
a decision of a district court. Under the majority decision today, there is always
the potential opportunity to obtain another examination of the record by the
supreme court with the hope that it will in some way differ with the district
court.
Foley, 177 So. 2d at 234 (Thomal, J., dissenting).
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tion to the Foley rule began to grow as the membership of the supreme
court changed. The overturning of Foley became one of the chief reasons
for the 1980 Amendment to the judicial article of the Florida Constitu-
tion. 7 Specifically to deal with the juxtaposition of the supreme court's
conflict jurisdiction88 and per curiam affirmances of the trial court where
the district court chooses not to write an opinion, the word "expressly" was
added to the constitutional language so that conflict review of decisions of
district courts of appeal could be had only if they "expressly and direct-
ly"'89 conflicted with the decision of another district court or the supreme
court. The six justices9" of the supreme court who joined in the Jenkins
decision clearly envisioned no exceptions to the rule that the supreme court
under the 1980 Amendment, could not review a per curiam affirmance if it
was not accompanied by an opinion.
[O]pponents of the [19801 amendment broadcast from one end of this
state to the other that access to the Supreme Court was being "cut off,"
and that the district courts of appeal would be the only and final courts
of appeal in this state. With regard to review by conflict certiorari
[sic.]9 of per curiam decisions rendered without opinion, they were
absolutely correct.92
86. 385 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 1980); see also Arthur J. England, Jr. et al.,
Constitutional .Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L.
REV. 147 (1980).
87. Foley, 385 So. 2d at 1358.
88. See supra note 64.
89. The requirement that decisions directly conflict is discussed in Neilson v. City of
Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1969) and Wale v. Barns, 278 So 2d 601, 604 (Fla.
1973).
90. Only Justice Adkins dissented, 385 So. 2d at 1363-66 (Akdins, J., dissenting).
91. See supra note 62.
92. Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1359. The court further stated:
The pertinent language of section 3(b)(3), as amended April 1, 1980, leaves no
room for doubt. This court may only review a decision of a district court of
appeal that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district
court of appeal or the Supreme Court on the same question of law. The
dictionary definitions of the terms "express" include: "to represent in words"; "to
give expression to." "Expressly" is defined: "in an express manner." The
single word "affirmed" comports with none of these definitions.
Id. (citation omitted).
The supreme court went on to exclude from its constitutional powers of review those
per curiam affirmances that did not have a majority opinion, but did contain concurring
and/or dissenting opinions. "Furthermore, the language and expressions found in a dissenting
or concurring opinion cannot support jurisdiction under section 3(b)(3) because they are not
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Jenkins did not consider the so called "Citation PCA," that is to say,
a per curiam affirmance by a district court of appeal that, although not
accompanied by an opinion, cites one or more cases. It has generally been
thought, although the author knows of only anecdotal evidence of this, that
the purpose of the district court in citing cases was to let the appellants
know the basis for the decision against them.93 The question of the
citation P.C.A. arose in Dodi Publishing Company v. Editorial America.
94
The supreme court, with great emphasis95 and apparently without excep-
tion, refused to accept the argument that if the cited case or cases conflicted
with a decision of the supreme court or another district court of appeal,
reviewable conflict was created.
We reject the assertion that we should reexamine a case cited in a per
curiam decision to determine if the contents of that cited case now
conflict with other appellate decisions. The issue to be decided from a
petition for conflict review is whether there is express and direct conflict
in the decision of the district court before us for review, not whether
there is conflict in a prior written opinion which is now cited for
authority.9"
This rule was extended slightly in Robels Del Mar, Inc. v. Town of
Indian Shores97 to include the situation where the referenced case is "filed
contemporaneously with the citation P.C.A."' 9  In the Robels Del Mar
situation, however, the case had not been reversed by, and was not pending
review in, the supreme court. 99
The drafters of the 1980 Amendment had apparently not considered the
the decision of the district court of appeal." Id. Perhaps it was this rationale that sowed the
seeds of Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981).
93. On rare occasions, district courts will per curiam reverse the decision of a trial court
and cite one or more cases. It is the author's opinion that this practice should be stopped by
a rule issued by the supreme court. If a trial court decision is to be reversed by a district
court of appeal, the judge and the parties are owed the courtesy and utility of an opinion
explaining the reversal.
94. 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980).
95. Only Justice Adkins dissented, id. at 1369 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
96. Dodi, 385 So. 2d at 1369 (Emphasis added).
97. 385 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1980).
98. Id.
99. "[T]he cited ... decision, which was filed the same day as the instant per curiam
opinion, is a final decision of the district court." Id. (citing Epifano v. Town of Indian River
Shores, 379 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979). In other words, it was not pending
review in, nor had it been reversed by. the supreme court.
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problem of what to do if a case cited in a per curiam affirmance was
pending review in the supreme court or had been reversed by it. The
opinion in Robels Del Mar,'0 it can be argued, hints at this problem when
the court describes the cited case as a final decision of the district court.
The opinion in Dodi0' fails to mention the problem at all. However,
should review by the supreme court of a citation P.C.A. be denied when the
case upon which it is predicated" 2 has been reversed by the supreme court
or is pending review there with reversal as a possible outcome? To
unthinkingly follow the Jenkins - Dodi - Robels Del Mar rule would be
morally intolerable in the event of the ultimate reversal of a predicate case.
This issue arose in Jollie v. State.'0 3 Although the facts are some-
what unique and it was bitterly criticized by Justice Boyd"4 as being in
violation of the clear import of the Jenkins - Dodi - Robels Del Mar rule,
Jollie vividly illuminated the problem referred to above.
Very simply stated, the Fifth District Court of Appeal had before it four
cases involving an identical issue, whether the supreme court's rule on
requested jury instructions was mandatory. 105 It wrote an opinion in one
of the cases affirming the trial court's ruling, because even though it found
the supreme court rule regarding requested jury instructions was mandatory,
the failure of the trial court to follow the rule was found to be harmless
error.0 6  It then issued per curiam affirmances in the other three cases,
and tied them to the opinion case with a citation to that case.0 7 Conflict
review was sought by the appellant in the case in which the opinion was
written.' 8 Two of the three citation P.C.A.'s were able to seek conflict
review before the effective date of the 1980 Amendment0 9 to article V of
the Florida Constitution which, of course, cut off review by the supreme
100. Id. at 1371.
101. 385 So. 2d at 1361.
102. At this point in the discussion, P.C.A. citations that are merely cited for counsel
advisory purposes are to be considered distinguishable. See infra text accompanying notes
124, 126-27.
103. 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981).
104. Id. at 421-25 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
105. The issue was whether the supreme court's rule on requested instructions was
mandatory. Id. at 419.
106. Id. (discussing Murray v. State, 378 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
quashed by Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1981)).
107. Id.
108. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 419 (describing Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1981)).
109. Id.
15391994]
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court of per curiam affirmances in which no opinion was written."'
Because of "delayed processing through the district court,""' the third
citation P.C.A., Jollie 's, did not reach the supreme court until after the
effective date of the 1980 Amendment.' 2  With that one exception,
Jollie's situation was the same as the other two citation P.C.A.'s which had
beat the deadline. For this reason, and because Murray v. State,"3 the
case in which the opinion was written, was pending review in the supreme
court and thus, might be, and indeed was, reversed, the supreme court
simply created an exception to the clear meaning of the 1980 Amend-
ment 4 and agreed to hear Jollie's petition for review."' Thus, there
was presented the classic circumstance where hard cases can make bad
law." '6 Jollie's three companion cases were reversed, but Jollie's case
would have been allowed to stand unless the supreme court did something.
But did this hard case really make bad law or did it call attention to a flaw
in the operation of the 1980 Amendment?
The supreme court got around the rule by finessing it in an extralegal
manner. The court applied an earlier rule" 7 which should have been
modified by the 1980 Amendment. The supreme court conveniently ignored
this fact.
We thus conclude that a district court of appeal per curiam opinion
110. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
11l. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 419.
112. Id.
113. 378 So. 2d III (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
114. See the perfectly correct dissent of Justice Boyd. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 421-25
(Boyd, J., dissenting.)
115. It is interesting to note that by the time the court got around to considering Jollie's
problem, it had already reversed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Murray and
the other two citation P.C.A.'s on the ground that, although the Fifth District was correct in
holding the supreme court's rule regarding requested jury instructions was mandatory, it had
erred in considering the trial court's refusal to give instructions harmless error. See Id. at
419.
116. Northern Sec. Co., v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904).
117. The Jollie court stated:
Prior to the 1980 Amendment, a PCA decision which referenced another district
court decision that this Court had reversed or quashed, was prima facie grounds
for conflict jurisdiction. This long-standing policy decision was in effect well
before the "record proper" doctrine was conceived and adopted in Foley. ...
The reasoning behind that policy decision continues to have validity. Common
sense dictates that this Court must acknowledge its own public record actions in
dispensing with cases before it.
Jollie. 405 So. 2d at 420.
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which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending
review in or has been reversed by this Court continues to constitute
prima facie express conflict and allows this Court to exercise its
jurisdiction.'"
The supreme court might have added "In this context, the 1980
Amendment to the Judicial Article does not apply." The court, however,
clearly envisioned this exception in light of the Jollie problem alone.
The situation presented in this cause ordinarily applies only to a limited
class of cases. The problem arises from the practical situation which
faces all appellate courts at one time or another - that is, how to dispose
conveniently of multiple cases involving a single legal issue without
disparately affecting the various litigants. Traditional practice in dealing
with a common legal issue in multiple cases, both in district courts and
here, has been to author an opinion for one case and summarily
reference that opinion on all the others. Being time - [sic] and
laborsaving for a court, that practice should not be discouraged." 9
The problem was, and still is, broader than the supreme court
envisioned when it created the Jollie exception. First, a district court of
appeal in affirming without opinion a judgment of a trial court need not be
faced with the multiple case - single issue Jollie situation. It can simply
decide that one of its own earlier decisions is controlling, or indeed, an
earlier decision of another district court of appeal is persuasive and should
be followed. An example of the first situation is Hamman v. Worling2 °
where the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance not
accompanied by an opinion on the authority of one of its earlier decisions
in which an opinion was written. 2 '
An example of the second is Stupak v. Winter Park Leasing, Inc.
122
where the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed without opinion, "on the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 525 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988), approved by Hamman v. Worling,
549 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989).
121. McCullough v. Central Florida Y.M.C.A., 523 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 5th Dist..Ct. App.
1988) reviewed sub nom. Shearer v. Central Florida YMCA, 546 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1989).
McCullough was pending review in the supreme court and was ultimately approved. This
lead to the approval of Hamman, the citation P.C.A. Hamman v. Worling, 549 So. 2d 188
(Fla. 1989).
122. 563 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), quashed by Stupak v. Winter Park
Leasing, Inc., :585 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1991).
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authority of Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,' '  a
Second District Court of Appeal decision decided with a written opinion the
year before. This evolution of cases obviously goes beyond the limited
situation envisioned by the supreme court in Jollie. It also blurs the
distinction between the "on the authority of' citation P.C.A. and the more
common "counsel advising" citation P.C.A.'
24
Obviously, the more time that elapses after the opinion case cited by
the P.C.A. is decided, the less likely it is that the opinion case will be
pending review in the supreme court. It is also far more likely that if the
case the district court of appeal wishes to cite has been reversed by the
supreme court, the district court would be aware of that fact.
The second scenario is admittedly highly unlikely, but there is at least
one example known to the author where the supreme court overruled one of
its own prior decisions and, years later, relied on the overruled decision as
controlling precedent.'25
Given these possibilities together with the rigid "expressly" lan-
guage 26 regarding conflict review, no matter how it arises, where a
citation P.C.A., whether the "on the authority of' variety or the mere
"counsel advising" variety 27 (assuming that a clear distinction can be
drawn) cites a case that is pending review in or has been reversed by the
supreme court, that citation P.C.A. should be reviewable. The same rule
should obviously hold true in the much rarer situation where the cited case
123. Id. (discussing Kraemer v. Gerneral Motors Acceptance Corp., 556 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). There is an interesting twist in this situation since the supreme
court described Kraemer as being "subsequently accepted for review." Stupak, 585 So. 2d
at 283. This could mean subsequent to the decision in Kraemer being made or subsequent
to the Fifth District Court of Appeal's reliance on it in Stupak. The former seems more
likely but this situation clearly suggests that the supreme court follow its own suggestion in
Jollie; that the mandates in citation P.C.A.'s should be withheld until the cited case is either
accepted for review by the supreme court and affirmed or reversed, or time has run out for
seeking review in the cited case. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 420.
124. See supra text accompanying note 93.
125. In Cause v. Canal Authority, 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1968), the supreme court
overruled, State ex rel Watson v. Lee, 8 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1942), to the extent that it held that
the supreme court's all writs power (currently article V, section 3(b)(7)) may not be invoked
until the supreme court obtained jurisdiction over the case at issue on another basis. In
Shevin ex rel State v. Public Service Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1976), State ex rel
Watson v. Lee was cited as controlling authority for the very proposition that was overruled
in Canal Authority.
126. See supra text accompanying note 92.
127. The distinction between the "on the authority of' P.C.A. and the "counsel advising"
P.C.A. is not always clear.
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is pending review in or has been reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. That citation P.C.A. should also be made clearly reviewable by the
supreme court.
Thus I suggest that the following italicized language be placed in article
V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly
... and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of
appeal, or of the Supreme Court of Florida or of the Supreme Court of
the United States on the same question of law. The supreme court may
review district court of appeal decisions rendered without opinion when
a case is cited as authority for the decision, or merely to advise counsel
as to the basis for the decision, and that case is either pending review
in the supreme court or has been reversed by the supreme court. The
same rule will apply if the cited case is pending review in, or has been
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.'28
A second aspect of the citation P.C.A. problem, which can only arise
in a .Jollie type context, deserves different treatment. This problem, and the
supreme court's proposed solution, is succinctly set out in the Jollie
opinion.29
We recognize that no litigant can guide the district court's selection of
the lead case, and that the randomness of the district court's processing
would control the party's right of review unless the citation PCA is
itself made eligible for review by this Court. 30
What the supreme court was apparently concerned about was the
situation where the lead case, the one in which the opinion was written, was
never taken to the supreme court. Thus, it would never be pending review
or reversed by that court. Such a situation seems superficially unfair
because the party may feel: "If only the district court had selected my case
as the opinion case, I'd have sought review." The fact remains, however,
that under the 1980 Amendment, the district court decision was supposed to
become final. That was the point of the amendment. The district courts
were intended to be the courts of last resort in most instances, and this
128. Such an amendment would alleviate Justice Boyd's very valid complaint in his
Jollie dissent; that the word "expressly" in article V, section 3(b)(3) meant exactly what it
said. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 421-25 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
129. 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981).
130. Id. at 421.
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situation should be one of those instances. Under article V, the supreme
court is given no opportunity to review such a case unless the aggrieved
party seeks review. The supreme court should abandon what it describes as
this "second aspect of the [Jollie] problem."'' No change in constitution-
al language should be necessary to accomplish this.
Finally, to insure that the supreme court does not drift back to its old
bad habits, I recommend that a section be added to article V of the Florida
Constitution, that will prohibit the supreme court from asking or directing
a district court of appeal to write an opinion in a case where it has not done
SO.
V. ARTICLE VII, SECTION I(B): AD VALOREM
TAXATION OF MOBILE HOMES
Florida has traditionally been a haven for mobile homes'32 which
provide relatively inexpensive shelter 33 for many, and in particular, for
Florida's large population of retirees.' A majority of mobile homes in
131. Id.
132. As of 1990, occupied mobile homes accounted for 575,455, or 11.2% of the
5,134,869 occupied housing units in Florida. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS
RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 1992 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, tbls. 2.06, 2.35
at 69, 88. By comparison, in 1987, mobile homes accounted for 5,267,000, or only 5.8% of
the 90,888,000 occupied housing units nationally. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, tbl.
1230, at 721 (1992).
133. As of 1991, the median sales price of a mobile home in the United States was
$27,800, which represented a 162% increase over the 1975 average sales price of $10,600.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1992, tbl. 1216, at 712 (1992). By comparison, over the same time period,
the median sales price of a new single family home increased 184% from $39,300 to
$120,000, and the median sales price of an existing single family home increased 205% from
$35,300 to $100,300. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, tbls. 1215, 1217, at 712 (1992).
134. As of 1991, persons over the age of 65 made up 18.3% of Florida's population, as
compared to a national figure of 12.6%. Compare BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS
RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 1992 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, tbl. 1.36, at
24 (1992) with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, tbl 12, at 14 (1992). One mobile home advocate
estimates that as many as 75% of all retirees coming to Florida move into mobile homes.
Steve Garbarino, Mobile They Aren't, and with 20 Percent of Florida Residents Under Their
Roofs They're Here to Stay, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, June 28, 1987, at I H [hereinafter
Mobile They Aren't].
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the state are located in rental parks,'35 in which the owner of the mobile
home rents space from the owner of the park. Although mobile homes in
rental parks are subject to sales tax and an annual license tax, they are
exempt from ad valorem taxation as personal or real property under current
Florida law. 3 6 Mobile homes outside of rental parks do not benefit from
the ad valorem tax exemption.'37
This section of this article will trace the history of the mobile home
exemption,' 3' and describe some of the problems currently caused by
it.139 We will then look at justifications commonly advanced in support
of the exemption, 4 ' and recommend a substantial revision to article VII,
section l(b) of the Florida Constitution.' 4 ' Finally, we will briefly discuss
the anticipated impact of the proposed revision. 2
A. Historical Development of the Mobile Home Exemption
Florida's organic law has always allowed the ad valorem taxation of
135. In 1990, there were 5388 rental parks for mobile homes in Florida, accounting for
approximately 544,367 mobile homes, Did You Know?, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Mar.
21, 1993, Hemando Times, at 8, or 71.4% of the 762,855 mobile homes (occupied and
unoccupied) in the state. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA, 1991 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, tbl. 2.36, at 18 (1991) ("MH"
registration stickers normally should be sold only to mobile homes located in rental parks).
136. FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. VII, § i(b) ("Motor vehicles, boats, airplanes, trailers,
trailer coaches and mobile homes, as defined by law, shall be subject to a license tax for their
operation in the amounts and for the purposes prescribed by law, but shall not be subject to
ad valorem taxes."); see FLA. STAT. ch. 212 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (tax on sales, use, and
other transactions); FLA. STAT. ch. 320 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (motor vehicle licenses).
137. The mobile home exemption does not apply to mobile homes which are
permanently affixed to land owned by the owner of the mobile home. FLA. STAT. §§
193.075(1), 320.015(I) (1991). Ownership of the underlying land need not be legal
ownership. See Mikos v. King's Gate Club, Inc., 426 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (equitable ownership through share ownership in non-profit corporation which held
legal title to the underlying land). Furthermore, a mobile home need only be tied down and
connected to the "normal and usual" utilities to be considered permanently affixed. FLA.
STAT. § 193.075(!) (1991) (minimum tie-down requirements are provided for in FLA. STAT.
§ 320.8325 (1991)). The only exception to the ownership rule is for mobile home dealers
who use the mobile home for display purposes at their sales location. Ch. 93-132, § 6, 1993
Fla. Laws 761, 763 (amending FLA. STAT. § 193.075(1) (1991)).
138. See infra notes 143-65 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 166-88 and accompanying text.
140. See ijfra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
141. See iufra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 215-32 and accompanying text,
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real and tangible personal property. 141 Over the years, a number of
exemptions to ad valorem taxation have been adopted,' and, in 1930, the
voters of the state adopted an exemption for motor vehicles. 4 ' Over time,
the motor vehicle exemption was expanded to cover other transportation-
related property, such as airplanes,'46 boats, 47 and trailers.148 In each
case, it was the transportation-related purpose of the property which justified
its classification as a "motor vehicle.' ' 149  At the outer limit of the motor
vehicle exemption was a legislatively granted exemption from ad valorem
143. Originally, the constitution provided no limitation on the types of taxation available
to the Legislature for state purposes. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. VIII, § 1; FLA. CONST. of
1861, art. VII, § I; FLA, CONST. of 1865, art. VIII, § I; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 2;
FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 2 (amended 1940). The early constitutions also required the
Legislature to authorize local governments to levy for local purposes those types of taxes
available to the state. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. VIII, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. VII,
§ 4; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. VIII, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 6; FLA. CONST.
of 1885 art. IX, § 5. In 1940, the Constitution of 1885 was amended to provide that "after
December 31st A.D. 1940, no levy of ad valorem taxes upon real or personal property except
intangible property, shall be made for any State purpose whatsoever." FLA. CONST. of 1885,
art. IX, § 2 (1940). Thus, after 1940, local governments had the exclusive authority to levy
taxes on real and tangible personal property. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a) ("No state ad
valorem taxes shall be levied upon real estate or tangible personal property.").
144. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (homestead exemption of $25,000); FLA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 3(a) (exemption for those portions of property which are used "predominantly for
educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes"); FLA. CONST. art. VII, §
3(b) (minimum exemption of $1000 for "household goods and personal effects").
145. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 13 (1930, amended 1965, revised 1968). The
purpose of the amendment was to prevent the "double taxation" of motor vehicles both as
vehicles and as tangible personal property. See McLin v. Florida Auto. Owner's Protective
Ass'n, 141 So. 147, 148 (1932) ("The amount of the 'license tag' tax ...is not only
collected as an excise tax on the privilege of using the roads, but as a property tax in
substitution of the previously levied ad valorem taxes which were applicable to motor
vehicles prior to the constitutional amendment.").
146. L.B. Smith Aircraft Corp. v. Green, 94 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1957) (approving
legislative classification of aircraft as motor vehicles).
147. 1962 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 97 (approving legislative classification of boats
as motor vehicles).
148. Wood v. Club Transp. Serv., Inc., 196 So. 843, 843 (1940). The case involved
"aerocars," two wheeled semi-trailers which were used to transport baggage and passengers
between hotels and passenger stations. The Florida Supreme Court held such trailers to be
within the motor vehicle exemption because their function was to increase the capacity of a
motor vehicle for carrying passengers and baggage. Id.
149. Wood, 196 So. at 843 ("it would not be logical to conclude that the people meant
to relieve a car of ad valorem taxes but to leave subject to that burden a vehicle purely
auxiliary to it and dependent upon it for useful operation."); see also infra notes 151-52 and
accompanying text.
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taxation for trailers used for housing accommodations. 5 ' However, in
1965, the Florida Supreme Court, relying upon the transportation-related
purpose rationale of its previous decisions, held that the statutory exemption
was unconstitutional to the extent that it applied to trailers which were not
used primarily for transportation purposes.' 5 ' Thus, trailers used primarily
for housing purposes would be subject to ad valorem taxation as tangible
personal property for the first time in eighteen years."52 As a result, the
mobile home lobby immediately went to work in Tallahassee.'53 Before
150. The law expressly limited its scope to "trailers and vehicles not self-propelled used
for housing accommodations and known as trailer coaches." Ch. 23969, § 1, 1947 Fla. Laws
741, 741 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.081(1) (1949)). It provided for a $10 annual license
fee "in lieu of all other taxes". Ch. 23969, § 2, 1947 Fla. Laws 741, 741 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 320.081(2) (1949)). The fee was increased to $15 in 1963, Ch. 63-528, § 2, 1963
Fla. Laws 1353, 1356 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.081 (1963)).
151. Palethorpe v. Thomson, 171 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965). In Palethorpe, the tax
assessor of St. Johns county made personal property assessments for 1963 against trailers
used exclusively for housing purposes, even though the owners had paid their annual license
tag tax on the trailers. The trailer owners challenged the assessment as a violation of Florida
Statutes section 320.081, which provided an exemption for trailers used as housing
accommodations. Id at 528. In response, the tax assessor argued that by specifically
exempting trailers used for housing, the Legislature created a tax exemption not expressly
allowed by the constitution. Id. at 529. The resolution of the issue thus turned upon whether
trailers used primarily for housing purposes were "motor vehicles" as contemplated by the
constitutional exemption. In relying upon the rationale of Wood, 196 So. at 843, and placing
substantial weight upon the use to which the trailers were put, the supreme court held that
they were not motor vehicles.
[A] trailer, . . . when it is drawn or is capable of being drawn by an automobile
or other motor vehicle primarily to carry persons or property over the public
highways should be classified as a motor vehicle, even though it is incidentally
and occasionally used to house persons over night while in transit or to house
them for short periods on holidays or vacations. But where to all intents and
purposes the actual primary use of such a trailer bears no reasonable relation to
customary motor travel or carriage and the trailer is found to be used over
longer periods than those above stated, for housing accommodations or for other
non-transportation purposes, the exemption does not apply. The reason being
that under such circumstances a trailer loses its primary character as a unit of
motor vehicle transport and serves, for example, as an apartment or residence,
and is no longer within the exempt class.
Palethorpe, 171 So. 2d at 531.
152. Id. (Classification as tangible personal property was to be made "regardless of
whether or not a Florida license tag is purchased for [the mobile home] .. ").
153. For example, as a part of its campaign to reverse the Palethorpe decision, the
Florida Mobile Home and Recreational Vehicle Association opened a private restaurant in
Tallahassee, which served free liquor and meals to legislators and their guests. Martin
Dyckman, The "Good Old Days" Weren't, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, June 2, 1991, at
1994] 1547
825
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
the end of the next session 5 4 the Legislature passed an emergency joint
resolution to amend the constitutional motor vehicle exemption to specifical-
ly include mobile homes.'55 In a special off-year election the following
November,'56 Florida voters approved the amendment by a narrow
5D.
154. The Florida Supreme Court decided Palethorpe on January 26, 1965, and denied
a motion for rehearing on March 5, 1965. Palethorpe, 171 So. 2d at 526. On May 3, 1965,
Senator Ryan of Martin county introduced Senate Joint Resolution 751, a proposed
amendment to the constitution which would overrule Palethorpe by expressly exempting
mobile homes from ad valorem taxation. FLA. S. JOUR. 254 (Reg. Sess. 1965); see infra note
155. The resolution passed the Florida Senate on May 25, 1965, FLA. S. JOUR. 634 (Reg.
Sess. 1965), and the Florida House of Representatives on May 31, 1965, FLA. H.R. JOUR.
1298 (Reg. Sess. 1965). The Governor approved the resolution on June 24, 1965. Fla. S.J.R.
751, at 1826 (1965).
155. As originally offered, Senate Joint Resolution 751 (SJR 751) proposed that the
motor vehicle exemption be amended to include the following language:
"Motor vehicles" as that term is used herein also includes mobile homes, trailer
coaches, house trailers, camper type mobile homes mounted and transported
wholly upon the body of a self-propelled vehicle, or any type of trailer or
vehicle body without independent motive power drawn by or carried upon a self-
propelled vehicle designed for and used either as a means of transporting persons
or property over the public streets and highways of this state or for furnishing
housing accommodations, or both ....
FLA. S. JOUR. 634 (Reg. Sess. 1965). By erasing the distinction between transportation and
housing uses of mobile homes, this language was obviously intended to undo the damage of
the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Palethorpe. The broad sweep of the original language
was narrowed in committee by the appending of the following language to SJR 751:
provided, however, any included vehicle herein shall be subject to a license tax
as an operable motor vehicle regardless of its actual use unless the included
vehicle is permanently affixed to the land, in which case it shall be taxable as
real property.
Id. This additional language seems to indicate a desire on the part of the Legislature to treat
mobile homes as vehicles only until such time as they were no longer mobile, i.e. until a
mobile home was "permanently affixed". However, this limitation on the exemption was
revised significantly only seven years later. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
The Senate passed SJR 751 by a vote of 39-0, FLA. S. JOUR. 634 (Reg. Sess. 1965), and the
House of Representatives by a vote of 100-3, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1298 (Reg. Sess. 1965). In
addition, both houses determined the existence of an emergency so as to allow a vote on the
amendment at a special election on November 2, 1965. Fla. SJR 751, at 1826 (1965); see
infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
156. The statewide ballot for the special election held on November 2, 1965, consisted
only of five referendum questions. Voters Face 5 Key Issues on Tuesday, ST. PETERSBURG
(FLA.) INDEPENDENT, Nov. 1, 1965, at I (other than the referendum on mobile home taxation,
the questions involved a $300 million highway bond issue, the creation of an additional
district court of appeal, and creation of lower courts in Lake and Palm Beach counties).
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margin.'57
The lesson of 1965 was not lost on those legislators who helped to
draft the 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution. Article VII, section 1(b),
of the Florida Constitution continued the express mobile home exemp-
tion' but gave the Legislature the power to define "mobile home."' 59
In addition, the 1968 Constitution failed to include a provision of the 1965
Amendment which classified as real property any mobile home which was
permanently affixed to the ground. 6° This effectively granted the Legisla-
ture the power to determine when, and if, mobile homes would be
considered real property for purposes of ad valorem taxation. 6' Clearly,
the intent of the drafters in adopting article VII, section l(b), in 1968 was
to provide the Legislature with unfettered discretion in the granting and
application of the constitutionally granted exemption for mobile homes. 62
Since 1968, the Legislature has made almost constant adjustments to
the statutory scheme which supports the mobile home exemption. On one
hand, the Legislature expanded the scope of the exemption by requiring
ownership of the ground upon which the mobile home is located before the
mobile home can be taxed as real property.'63 This had the effect of
precluding mobile homes located in rental parks from treatment as real
157. The final margin of approval was 347,349 to 330,493, or 51.2% to 48.8%.
Telephone Interview with Joel Mynard, Records Administrator, Division of Elections, Florida
Secretary of State's Office (Aug. 26, 1993).
158. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(b).
159. Id. The exemption applies to "mobile homes, as defined by law ......
160. Compare FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX. § 13 (1965) with FLA. CONST. art. VII, §
I(b).
161. The real property provision contained in article IX, section 13 of the 1885
Constitution, as amended in 1965, became a part of Florida's statutory law with the adoption
of the 1968 Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 10; see FLA. STAT § 320.015(l) (1969).
Subsequently, the Legislature has amended section 320.015 several times. See infra note 163.
162. The nominal reason for the changes to the constitution was to provide the
Legislature "flexibility" in determining the scope of the exemption. See Commentary to
article XII, section I of the Florida Constitution of 1968, 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. 3 (West
1970). Florida courts have acknowledged the Legislature's plenary power in this regard. See
Nordbeck v. Wilkinson, 529 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
163. Originally, mobile homes were considered real property so long as they were
permanently affixed to the ground, without regard to ownership of the underlying property.
FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 13 (1965); FLA. STAT. §320.015 (1969). However, since
such a definition would likely subject mobile homes in rental parks to ad valorem taxation,
see 1971 FLA. ATir'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 304 (owner of mobile home need not own underlying
property for mobile home to be considered a fixture and subject to ad valorem taxation), the
Legislature added the ownership requirement in 1972. Ch. 72-339, § 2, 1972 Fla. Laws
1225, 1226 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 320.01 (Supp. 1972)). See generally supra note 137.
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property for purposes of ad valorem taxation. On the other hand, the
Legislature also narrowed the reach of the exemption by numerous revisions
of the statutory definition of "mobile home. '  As a result, the mobile
164. Originally, the constitutional definition of mobile home, see supra note 155, was
included within the statutory definition of"motor vehicle". FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1) (1965).
Interestingly, Session Law chapter 65-446, which made this change, was adopted by the
Legislature prior to its approval of the constitutional amendment. Ch. 65-446, 1965 Fla.
Laws 1573. Since then, the Legislature has made sometimes fine distinctions between types
of mobile housing units, usually based upon the purpose for which the unit was designed.
The first of these changes occurred in 1970, with the division of motor vehicles into
two distinct categories: those units "used as a means of transporting persons or property over
the public streets and highways", and those "designed and equipped to provide living and
sleeping facilities ... and for operation over the streets and highways of the state . . . ." Ch.
70-391, § 1, 1970 Fla, Laws 1209 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1) (Supp. 1970)). The
following year, the break between "motor vehicle" and "mobile home" was finalized when
the latter was defined as follows:
"Mobile home" includes any type of trailer or vehicle body, regardless of any
appurtenances, additions, or other modification thereto, without independent
motive power, manufactured upon an integral chassis or undercarriage and
designed either for travel over the highways or for housing accommodations or
both.
Ch. 72-339, § I, 1972 Fla. Laws 1225 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.01(I)(b) (Supp. 1972)).
The 1972 definition excluded a significant number of vehicle/housing accommodation
combinations, which were instead defined as "recreational vehicle-type units" ("RV units").
These were treated strictly as motor vehicles and not as mobile homes. Id. Over the years,
RV units have given the Legislature some difficulty because of the various kinds of such
units, and because of their similarity to mobile homes. Since 1972, the Legislature has
statutorily defined each of the following kinds of RV units: travel trailers, camping trailers,
slide-in and chassis-mount truck campers, and motor homes, FLA. STAT. § 320.01(I)(b)1-4
(Supp. 1972); fifth wheel recreation trailers, FLA. STAT. § 320.01 (1)(b)5 (1977); park trailers,
FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1)(b)5 (Supp. 1984); van conversions, FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1)(b)5
(Supp. 1988); and private motor coaches, FLA. STAT. § 320.01(I)(b)5 (1989).
The next major change to the statutory definition of mobile home was made in 1978.
"Mobile home" means a structure, transportable in one or more sections, which
is 8 body feet or more in width and which is built on an integral chassis, and
designed to be used as a dwelling when connected to the required utilities, and
includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems contained
therein.
Ch. 78-221, § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 662 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.01(2) (Supp. 1978)).
The removal of the prior language regarding travel over the highways marked the abandon-
ment by the Legislature of any pretense that a mobile home was anything more than "a
structure ... designed to be used as a dwelling." Id. In addition, the removal of the prior
language including fixtures as a part of the mobile home provides a basis for the current
practice of taxing such fixtures as carports and enclosed porches as tangible personal
property. Interview with G. Prentice Dort, Director, Mobile Home Division, Pinellas County
Property Appraiser's Office, Clearwater, Florida (June 2, 1993) [hereinafter Dort Interview].
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home exemption now applies only to transportable residential structures on
an integral chassis, and not to other types of structures or vehicles.'65
Requiring ownership of the underlying land, combined with the adjustments
to the definition of mobile home, leaves little doubt that the ultimate intent
of the Legislature since 1968 has been to limit the scope of the exemption
to those existing mobile homes located in rental parks.
B. Problems Caused by the Exemption
166
The exemption from the ad valorem taxation enjoyed by mobile homes
in rental parks has resulted in three major problems. First and foremost is
the loss of revenue to local government inherent in the exemption itself' 67
Rather than taxing mobile homes in rental parks as tangible personal
property, 68 local governments instead receive an annual license tax which
is collected by the Division of Motor Vehicles. 9  Given the disparity
Since 1978, the definition of mobile home has not changed, although the Legislature
has twice amended the statute to clarify certain license tax issues. See ch. 83-318, § 1, 1983
Fla. Laws 1951, 1954 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.01(2) (1983)) (defining mobile home
length for license tax purposes); ch 85-155, § 5, 1985 Fla. Laws 1072, 1074 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 320.01(2) (1985)) (providing a rebuttable presumption as to mobile home length
where drawbar has been removed). In addition, in 1992, the Legislature created a sub-
category of mobile homes called "manufactured homes", which are defined as "mobile
home[s] fabricated on or after June 15, 1976. in an off-site manufacturing facility for
installation or assembly at the building site, with each section bearing a seal certifying that
it is built in compliance with the Federal Manufactured Home Construction and Safety
Standard Act." Ch. 92-148, § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws 1380, 1383 (codified at FLA. STA'r. §
320.01(2)(b) (Supp. 1992)).
165. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(b); FLA. STAT. § 320.01(2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
166. The problems outlined in this subdivision are based upon interviews with Pinellas
County officials, and thus reflect those areas of difficulty in that jurisdiction. However, since
the mobile home taxation scheme is statewide in scope, the problems discussed are likely to
be widespread, although there are sure to be some differences between counties.
167. This loss is mitigated to some extent by the taxation as tangible personal property
of fixtures attached to the mobile home. See supra note 164.
168. Tangible personal property is normally taxed at a rate slightly lower than is real
property. For example, in Pinellas County, tangible personal property is taxed on average
at roughly 19 mills, whereas real property is taxed at closer to 21 mills. Telephone Interview
with G. Prentice Dort, Director, Mobile Home Division, Pinellas County Property Appraiser's
Office (Sept. 9, 1993) [hereinafter Dort Telephone Interview].
169. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § I(b); FLA. STAT. § 320.015(l) (1991). An annual license
tax is collected when the owner of the mobile home first registers the mobile home and each
year when the registration is renewed. FLA. STAT. § 320.081 (1991). The amount of the tax
depends upon the length of the mobile home. FLA. STAT. § 320.08(i1) (1991) ($20 for the
first 35 feet, and $5 for each additional 5 foot increment, with a maximum of $80 for mobile
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between the license and personal property taxes for most mobile homes, 7'
it is obvious that the exemption costs local governments significant amounts
of money each year.17
A second problem related to the exemption is the misallocation of
revenue between state and local governments due to the current sales tax
distribution scheme for mobile homes. All mobile homes are currently
subject to both state 72 and county'73 sales taxes when purchased.174
However, although sales tax proceeds are shared with local governments by
the state, 175 the local government which receives such funds may not be
homes 65 feet in length or longer). Since each integral section of a mobile home is
considered separately for purposes of taxation, see FLA. STAT. § 320.01(2) (a) (Supp. 1992),
the owner of a mobile home which consists of two sections (commonly referred to as a
"double wide") would pay twice the amount specified by section 320.08(1 1). See also infra
notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
170. For example, for a 60 foot long "double wide" mobile home located in Pinellas
County with an appraised value of $30,000, the annual tangible personal property tax would
be approximately $570. See supra note 168. By comparison, the annual license tax paid on
the same mobile home would be only $90. See supra note 169.
171. Since mobile homes are exempt from assessment, and not just taxation, see FLA.
STAT. § 192.001(1 l)(d) (1991), there are no estimates of lost revenue available. However,
the discrepancy between potential property tax revenue and current license tax revenues
speaks for itself. See supra note 170.
172. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 212 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (sales tax). All mobile
home sales are subject to the state-wide sales tax of six percent on the sales price of the
mobile homes. FLA. STAT. § 212.06(I)(a) (Supp. 1992).
173. Florida allows counties to levy discretionary local option sales taxes for a variety
of purposes, with a rate which varies between one-half of one percent and one percent,
depending upon the purpose. FLA. STAT. § 212.055 (Supp. 1992) (valid purposes include
charter county transit systems, local government infrastructure, operating expenses of counties
with populations less than 50,000, indigent health care and county public hospitals).
However, only the first $5000 of the sales price of the mobile home is subject to these local
sales taxes. See FLA. STAT. § 212.054(2)(b) (1991).
174. Both state and local sales taxes are collected on sales of mobile homes between
dealers and non-dealers as well as sales between non-dealers. See FLA. STAT. § 21.2.06(10)
(Supp. 1992) (title certificates may not be issued without proof of payment of sales tax); FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12A-1.037(l)(a), (b)(3) (1993).
175. Funds collected from the statewide sales tax are distributed mostly to the General
Revenue Fund and various state trust funds, but approximately nine and one-half percent of
proceeds collected from within qualified counties are returned to those counties to be shared
between the county and any municipalities therein. FLA. STAT. § 212.20(6)(g) (Supp. 1992);
see FLA. STAT. §§ 218.60-218.65 (1991) (proceeds disbursed to counties which qualify for
revenue sharing pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§ 218.20-218.26 (1991)). Funds collected by the
state from discretionary local option sales taxes are disbursed back to the county in which
they were collected, minus an administrative fee not to exceed three percent. FLA. STAT. §
212.054(4) (1991).
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the jurisdiction in which the mobile home will ultimately be situated. 76
As a result, local governments with significant concentrations of mobile
homes often do not receive their intended share of the revenue produced by
sales taxes on mobile home sales.
A third problem caused by the mobile home exemption is misallocation
of license tax revenues between local governments.' 77 Proceeds from the
license tax are divided evenly between local school boards and either county
or municipal governments. 78 Allocation of such proceeds often depend
upon where the mobile home was originally registered, however, and not
where the mobile home is located.'7 9 As with the misallocation of sales
tax revenues, 8° local governments often do not receive a share of license
tax proceeds commensurate with the number of mobile homes within their
jurisdiction."8 '
The final problem with the mobile home exemption is the administra-
tive contortions required of local officials to properly locate, classify, and
tax mobile homes. Because mobile homes evolved from travel trailers
which were pulled behind automobiles,8 2 the Division of Motor Vehicles
("DMV") has traditionally had jurisdiction over issues regarding mobile
176. This is because the statewide sales tax funds are disbursed to the county in which
the sales tax dealer, i.e., the mobile home dealer, is located. FLA. STAT. § 212.20(6)(g)
(Supp. 1992). Furthermore, discretionary local option sales tax funds resulting from mobile
home sales are disbursed to the county identified as the residence of the purchaser on the
registration or title certificate. FLA. STAT. § 212.054(3)(a) (1991). Thus disbursement of
both state and local sales tax revenues does not depend upon the ultimate location of the
mobile home.
177. All mobile homes not categorized as real property are subject to an annual license
tax. FLA. STAT. § 320.015(1) (1991).
178. FLA. STAT. § 320.081(5) (1991) ("one-half to the district school board and the
remainder either to the board of county commissioners, for units which are located within the
unincorporated areas of the county, or to any city within such county, for units which are
located within its corporate limits"). The state retains $1.50 of the license tax collected for
each mobile home and places it in the General Revenue Fund. FLA. STAT. § 320.081(4)
(1991).
179. The registeration contains a "location code", which, once entered, is unlikely to be
changed because DMV personnel are not trained to modify it. Dort Telephone Interview,
supra note 168.
180. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
181. Pinellas County officials estimate an annual shortfall of 15-45% of expected
disbursements from license taxes. Dort Interview, supra note 164.
182. See Wilma Norton, Crude Trailer Evolves into Museum Piece, ST. PETERSBURG
(FLA.) TIMES, Sept. 5, 1989, Largo-Seminole Times, at 1 (describing a home-made travel
trailer dating from the 1930's).
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homes."8 3 Unfortunately, although the DMV has jurisdiction over mobile
homes, it has no vested interest in exercising that jurisdiction efficiently. 8 4
Several problems result. First, pinpointing the actual location of a newly
purchased mobile home may be difficult because the address shown on the
original registration is often not the actual location of the mobile home.'85
Second, determining whether a mobile home owner has failed to properly
renew the mobile home's registration is hampered by the lack of formalized
sharing of such data between the DMV and local property appraisers.'86
Finally, local officials end up bearing the burden of proper enforcement of
the license tax laws because the DMV allocates only minimal resources to
such enforcement.'87 In fact, only by forging relationships at the local
level are local officials able to obtain needed data regarding mobile homes
from the DMV.' 88
183. See generally FLA. STAT. chs. 319-320 (1991 & Supp. 1992). The DMV's
responsibilities include issuance of title certificates, see FLA. STAT. §§ 319.21-319.29 (1991),
collection and disbursement of annual license taxes, see supra note 165, issuance of mobile
home stickers, see FLA. STAT. § 320.0815(2) (1991) (mobile homes are issued stickers for
placement in the window of the mobile home rather then license plates), enforcement of
mobile home safety standards, see FLA. STAT. §§ 320.823-320.8325 (1991 & Supp. 1992),
and regulation of mobile home -manufacturers and dealers, see FLA. STAT. §§ 320.77,
320.8225 (1991).
184. The only benefit to the DMV for collecting the annual mobile home license tax is
the indirect benefit derived from the $1.50 allocation from each registration which goes to
the General Revenue Fund. FLA. STAT. § 320.081 (1991); see supra note 178.
185. Interview with Robert J. Joplin, Property Appraiser, Mobile Home Division,
Pinellas County Property Appraiser's Office, in Clearwater, Florida (July 19, 1993)
[hereinafter Joplin Interview]. Locating mobile homes is made more difficult by the common
practice of installing mobile homes without obtaining proper permits. Id., see Bruce
Vielmetti, Illegally Set Up Mobile Homes May Cost County Millions, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.)
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1987, Pasco Times, at 1.
186. Dort Interview, supra note 164.
187. For example, in 1988, the DMV had only one inspector allocated for collection of
delinquent license taxes for the entire Tampa/St. Petersburg/Clearwater area. Amelia Davis,
City Seeking Late Fees for Mobile Homes, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Sept. 2, 1988,
Largo-Seminole Times, at 1. As a result, local officials are effectively required to conduct
an annual park by park audit in order to ensure full compliance with the license tax laws. Id.
(City of Largo); Amelia Davis, Police to Cite Mobile Home Decal Violators, ST. PETERS-
BURG (FLA.) TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, City Times, at I (City of Largo); Amelia Davis, Mobile
Homes Targetted, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, North Pinellas Times, at I
(Pinellas County); Matthew Sauer, Mobile Home Tag Money Rolls In, ST. PETERSBURG
(FLA.) TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, Largo-Seminole Times, at I (Pinellas County).
188. Joplin Interview, supra note 185. For example, the Pinellas County Property
Appraiser's Office is allowed limited access to the County Tax Collector's motor vehicle
renewal system in order to allow verification of mobile home registrations, Id.
1554 [Vol. 18
832
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Marks / Colby
C. Justifications for the Exemption
Over the years, a number of justifications for the continued existence
of the mobile home exemption have been advanced. The original justifica-
tion was that mobile homes were just that, mobile, and therefore more akin
to motor vehicles than to structures. 89  However, the decision of the
Florida Supreme Court in Palethorpe v. Thomson, 9 ' which distinguished
between the transportation and housing uses of "house trailers,"' 9 ' sig-
nalled the end of the mobility argument. Any such argument which
survived Palethorpe has been further eroded by the treatment of some
mobile homes as real property and thus not subject to the exemption. 92
Indeed, the idea that modem mobile homes are mobile has been abandoned
by the Legislature'93 as well as by some of the most ardent advocates of
the exemption.'94 By now it is beyond dispute that mobile homes are
structures designed for human habitation, and not mere trailers for general
use on the roadways of the state.
A second argument advanced in support of the mobile home exemption
is that owners of mobile homes in rental parks are already fully taxed
because they pay sales taxes, license taxes, and property taxes on fixtures
and on the rented ground as a part of their rent.' 95 However, the argu-
189. The "mobility" of mobile homes was central to the argument of the mobile homes
owners in Palethorpe.
It is clear in the case at bar, that the trailer coaches' design was such that they
were intended to be used in conjunction with a self-propelled motor vehicle. If
not, then what is the purpose of the wheels, axles, brakes, running lights, and
trailer hitches, not to mention the fact that the width was confined to that legally
permissible to operate over the highways of the state. Obviously if the [trailer
owners] did not desire mobility as well as living accomodations, they could have
purchased identical living quarters without the mobile apparatus at a much
cheaper cost and probably in much better locations.
Appellee's Answer Brief at 11-12, Palethorpe v. Thomson, 171 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965) (No.
33474).
190. 171 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965)
191. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 137.
193. FLA. STAT. § 320.01(2)(a) (Supp. 1992) (mobile home defined as "a structure..
designed to be used as a dwelling ...."). See generally supra note 164.
194. Fred Younteck, former president of the Federation of Mobile Home Owners of
Florida, a mobile home owners' advocacy group, has estimated that 95% of the mobile homes
in Florida are never moved. Mobile They Aren't, supra note 134.
195. Typical is the following reaction to a letter to the editor taking the position that
mobile home owners do not pay their share of taxes:
I am sick and tired of being put down for living in a mobile home by
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ment fails because the mobile home exemption allows owners of mobile
homes in rental parks to avoid paying ad valorem taxes on the value of the
structure in which they live. Instead, such mobile home owners pay an
annual license tax, which, on average, is much lower than the property tax
levy would be.' 9 6 While the license tax has not been increased once since
voters adopted the exemption in 1965,'9 the personal property levy has
reflected the inflation of property values and increased cost of government
generally since then. The fact is that of all types of housing structures, only
mobile homes in rental parks are totally exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion. 198 It cannot be said that such a discrepancy was intended by Florida
voters. 199
A third justification for the continued existence of the mobile home
exemption is that it is analogous to the homestead exemption available for
owners of real property in Florida.2"' However, such reasoning ignores
people who don't know what they are talking about. First of all, let me tell you
the taxes we pay.
1. Sales tax when we purchase our mobile home.
2. License tag fees each year.
3. Intangible tax.
4. Real property tax.
The people who live in rental parks receive no tax exemptions. All in all, a
mobile home in a rental park pays taxes comparable to a home valued at
$39,500.17. As I see it, we are paying more than our fair share of taxes. I hope
this explains to the man from Hudson that we are not freeloaders. We pay our
share and then some.
Mobile Home Owners Pay Taxes, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Jan. 6, 1988, Pasco Times,
at 2.
196. See supra note 170.
197. Compare ch. 65-466, § 2, 1965 Fla. Laws 1574 with FLA. STAT. § 320.08(11)
(1991).
198. All permanent housing structures, whether rented or owner occupied, are subject
to ad valorem taxation as real property. FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. VII, § 9(b) (1976)
(authorizing levy of ad valorem taxes on real property by local governments); FLA. STAT. §
192.001(12) (1991) (defining "real property" for purposes of ad valorem taxation as "land,
buildings, fixtures, and all other improvements to land."). Furthermore, mobile homes
permanently affixed to land owned by the owner of the mobile home are also subject to ad
valorem taxation as real property. FLA. STAT. § 193.075(1) (1991).
199. In fact, at the time, the expectation was that the exemption would save the owner
of a typical mobile home approximately $36.25 per year in personal property taxes, compared
to an estimated average license tax of $25.00. Trailer Tax Probably Validfor This Year, ST.
PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Nov. 4, 1965, at BI.
200. The 1968 Constitution, as amended, provides a $25,000 exemption to every person
who owns real estate and maintains thereon their permanent residence. FLA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 6 (1980).
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the fact that the mobile home exemption applies to all mobile homes in
rental parks, and not just those used as a permanent residence." 1  In
addition, other types of renters do not enjoy any benefit from the homestead
exemption, even where those renting are permanent residents of Florida. 2
Finally, the mobile home exemption extends to the entire value of the
mobile home, and not just to the first $25,000 of assessed value covered by
the homestead exemption."0 3 Thus, the mobile home exemption is not
analogous to the homestead exemption, because it applies whether or not the
mobile home owner is a permanent resident of Florida, and because it
exempts the full value of mobile homes in rental parks.
D. Recommendation
By now it is apparent that the exemption from ad valorem taxation
currently enjoyed by owners of mobile homes located in rental parks is not
defensible on any rational ground outside of the obvious concern legislators
have for well organized special interest groups.2 4  The exemption costs
local governments significant revenue each year,2 5 and the current
statutory scheme for the collection and disbursement of sales and license
taxes on mobile homes leaves much to be desired.20 6 In addition, adminis-
tration of mobile home taxation is left mainly to the ingenuity of local
officials who rely on mobile home taxation, but have no jurisdiction over
it.2°7 Therefore, we recommend that the Revision Commission amend
article VII, section 1(b), to revoke the ad valorem tax exemption for mobile
homes.0 8  Furthermore, in order. to maintain a consistent approach
between taxation of mobile homes and other types of housing structures, we
also recommend that the Revision Commission expressly exempt mobile
201. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(b) and FLA. STAT. § 320.015(1) (1991) with
FLA. CONST. ail. VII, § 6(a).
202. The 1968 Constitution, as amended, allows the Legislature to provide by general
law a homestead exemption for renters who are permanent residents of the state. FLA.
CONST. art. VII, § 6(e) (1980). To date, the Legislature has made no such provision.
203. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(b) with FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1980).
204. See supra note 153; infra note 230.
205. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 182-188 and accompanying text.
208. As revised, article VII, section 1(b) would read: "Motor vehicles, boats, airplanes,
trailers, and trailer coaches and mboile hom@. , as defined bylaw, shall be subject to a license
tax for their operation in the amounts and for the purposes prescribed by law, but shall not
be subject to ad valorem taxes."
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homes from sales taxation."'
As a result of this amendment, mobile homes would generally be
subject only to ad valorem taxation,21° either as tangible personal property
or as real property, depending on the circumstances."' This reflects the
undeniable fact that today's mobile homes are used for housing, not for
transportation.212 Such a shift in emphasis would be consistent with both
the policy underlying the original motor vehicle exemption granted in
193023 and with the rationale of the Palethorpe decision.
21 4
E. Anticipated Impact of Recommendation
The proposed amendments would have a differing impact on each of
the various groups which have an interest in mobile homes located in rental
parks. First, county and municipal governments would clearly benefit both
as to administration of mobile home taxation25 and as to receipt of funds
derived from such taxation.21 6 On the other hand, the state government
would lose its sales tax revenue, 217 but would likely be able to mitigate
such losses by reducing expenditures required under the current system,
209. The revision would read: "The Legislature shall impose no sales or use tax upon
tangible personal property which is designed and used primarily for housing accommoda-
tions."
210. The proposed amendment should not preclude the levying of appropriate license
taxes when a mobile home is transported on public street and highways.
211. Mobile homes located in rental parks should be treated as tangible personal
property, since the mobile home owner does not own the land underlying the mobile home.
However, if the mobile home is owned by the owner of the land, then it should continue to
be taxed as real property. See FLA. STAT. § 193.075(1) (1991); Ch. 93-132, § 6, 1993 Fla.
Laws 565 (exempting mobile homes used by mobile home dealers exclusively for display
purposes).
212. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text. The change in the physical
appearance of mobile homes over the years supports this contention. Older homes were truly
"trailers", measuring roughly l0 x 60 feet. More typical today is a "double wide," measuring
24 x 50 feet. The newest mobile homes measure 28 x 56 feet, and even have pitched roofs,
a far cry from their flat-topped trailer ancestors. Telephone Interview with Dort, supra note
168.
213. See supra note 145.
214. Palethorpe v. Thomson, 171 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965); See supra note 151.
215. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 174-75.
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which would no longer be needed under the amendment.18
Mobile home dealers would be impacted positively, if at all, by the
proposed amendment. They would no longer be required to collect sales
taxes on mobile home sales, 2 9 nor, hopefully, would they be required to
perform other mobile home related administrative functions. 22' Further-
more, so long as the dealer actually owns a particular mobile home for the
purpose of selling it, the mobile home would not be subject to ad valorem
221taxation.
Two other groups which would be impacted by enactment of the
proposed amendment are lien holders and holders of security interests
against mobile homes. The dual nature of mobile homes as both vehicles
and fixtures under the current system often forces lien and interest holders
to resort to duplicative filings of their interest in order to be fully protect-
ed.222 Under the proposed amendment, the need for separate filing would
no longer exit. 223 Thus, both lien holders and holders of security interests
would only be required to record their interest once, providing a level of
certainty to an area of the law which is currently quite confused.224
Clearly, the group which would be most heavily impacted by the
proposed amendment are the current owners of mobile homes located in
218. For example, expenditures related to mobile home registration and license tax
collection and disbursement. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(b); FLA. STAT. § 320.01(2)(a)
(Supp. 1992). In addition, since mobile homes are not mobile, the current treatment of
mobile homes as motor vehicles regarding title certification should be removed. See FLA.
STAT. § 319.21 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
219. See FLA. STAT. § 212.06 (Supp. 1992).
220. Forexample, handling title certification of new mobile homes. See supra note 218.
221. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(b) ("Pursuant to general law tangible personal property
held for sale as stock in trade ... may be valued for taxation at a specified percentage of its
value, may be classified for tax purposes, or may be exempted from taxation."); FLA. STAT.
§ 196.185 (1989) (exempting inventory from ad valorem taxation).
222. Encumbrances and liens against mobile homes currently should be filed with both
the Division of Motor Vehicles, see FLA. STAT. §§ 319.24-319.27 (1991) (title certificates),
and the Florida Secretary of State, see FLA. STAT. § 679.301-679.318 (1991) (UCC financing
statements).
223. See supra note 218.
224. Compare FLA. STAT. § 320.015(2) (1991) (providing that a mobile home remains
personal property for purposes relating to a security interest so long as the interest was
created while the mobile home was considered personal, and not real, property) with General
Elec. Capital Corp. v. Sohn, 566 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (tax deed
forecloses security interest in mobile home permanently affixed to the land covered by the
deed).
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rental parks.225 The extent of the impact would depend upon the value of
the mobile home,226 but on average, the amendment would result in
significantly higher tax payments. 27  However, higher payments could
have the positive benefit of accelerating the current trend toward conversion
of rental mobile home parks to ownership parks.228
In conclusion, it is clear that revocation of the mobile home exemption
provided by article VII, section l(b), of the Florida Constitution would have
a sweeping impact upon the way mobile homes are taxed in Florida. It is
equally clear that the group with the greatest stake in the amendment are the
current owners of mobile homes in rental parks, since they would be asked
to shoulder a greater tax burden than they do today.2 9 This higher tax
burden would be the single greatest barrier to enactment of the amend-
ment. 230  However, the increased burden of the amendment could be
225. An argument can be made that the trade-off between sales taxes paid up-front and
personal property taxes paid over time is essentially a wash. If this is the case, then future
buyers of mobile homes to be located in rental parks will not be effected by the proposed
amendment.
226. See supra note 168. For example, assuming a tangible personal property tax rate
of 19 mills, older single-wide mobile homes assessed at less than $3000 would likely break
even or benefit from annual ad valorem tax payments of $57.
227. See supra note 170.
228. Significant numbers of mobile home owners within rental parks are purchasing the
rental parks and converting them into condominiums or cooperatives. See FLA. STAT. § 718
(1991 & Supp. 1992) (condominiums); FLA. STAT. § 719 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (coopera-
tives); Betty Jean Miller, Home Sweet Home Mobile Home Park Is Theirs, ST. PETERSBURG
(FLA.) TIMES, Mar. 24, 1992, City Times, at I. Some rental parks are also subdivided, and
individual lots sold to the mobile home owner. Dort Interview, supra note 164. Ownership
of the underlying land, regardless of form, allows the mobile home owners to exercise more
control over the services provided in the park, and, more importantly, allows many owners
to take advantage of the homestead exemption. See supra note 200. This, of course, raises
the potential for lost revenue due to the homestead exemption. Dort Interview, supra note
164 (one conversion resulted in the exemption of 60% of assessed value). However, such
is the nature of the homestead exemption generally, and as such is beyond the scope of this
discussion.
229. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
230. Not only are mobile home manufacturers well represented in Tallahassee, but
240,000 mobile home owners are represented by the Federation of Mobile Home Owners of
Florida (FMO). See supra note 153; see also Federation Can Help Keep Owners Informed,
ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at 3H. The FMO is an aggressive advocate
for mobile home owners generally, and for those in rental parks in particular. Kendra Brown,
ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Jan. 12, 1990 (as of the end of 1989, FMO was involved in
65 court cases, most involving rent increases). Its activities go beyond applying pressure on
the Legislature, and have included opposing judges who rule against mobile home owners,
Bruce Vielmetti, Mobile-Home Owners Group Campaigns Against Judge, ST. PETERSBURG
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lessened either by some kind of phased tax credit scheme,"' or by
conversion of the mobile home from personal property to real property.232
Regardless, we believe that our proposal is fair to all parties involved. We
strongly urge the Revision Commission to seriously consider action in this
area.
VI. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10C: CHANGES IN THE
PLEDGING OF PUBLIC CREDIT
Article VII., section 10(c) of the Florida Constitution has been so
thoroughly changed by judicial decision that it should be modified to reflect
those changes. In order to understand the scope of the change, it is useful
to look at the pertinent part of the forerunner provision in the 1885 Con-
stitution.
The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned to any individual,
company, corporation, or association. . . . The legislature shall not
authorize any county, city, borough, township or incorporated district
to become a stockholder in any company, association or corporation or
to obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any
corporation, association, institution or individual.233
(FLA.) TIMES, Aug. 27, 1990, Brandon Times, at 1, and flooding the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development with letters opposing increased safety
standards in the face of Hurricane Andrew, Laurie McGinley, Storm Rages Over Mobile-
Home Safety, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23., 1993, at BI.
231. For example, by allowing a credit against ad valorem taxation for sales taxes
previously paid by the mobile home owner, the impact of the amendment on current owners
would be lessened. Of course, no such credit has ever been offered for owners of mobile
homes who also own the underlying land, even though they also pay ad valorem taxes.
232. See supra note 228.
233. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 10 (1875) (quoting State v. Jacksonville Port
Auth., 204 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1967)). The rationale for this provision in the 1885
Constitution was found to be two-fold. First:
This section was first adopted in 1875 as an amendment to the Constitution of
1868. Its purpose was to stop the practice of public bodies becoming stockhold-
ers or bond holders and in other ways loaning their credit to and becoming
interestled] in the organization and operation of railroads, banks and other com-
mercial institutions. Many of these enterprises were poorly managed and failed,
resulting in such government entities as were interested therein in becoming
responsible for their debts and other obligations, which obligations fell ultimately
on the taxpayers.
Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d at 882.
19941 1561
839
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
The modem view of the effect of this provision of the 1885 Constitu-
tion has been set out in Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development
Authority."'
The Constitution of 1885, article IX, section 10, prohibited government
bodies from obtaining money for, or pledging the public credit to, any
private entity. Under case law, revenue bonds payable solely from
capital project revenues (non-recourse bonds) were held to be pledges
of public credit and were prohibited unless it could be shown that the
capital project served a predominately or paramount public purpose
.... (For example in State v.1 Town of North Miami, the trial court
ruled that the non-recourse bonds for the construction of a private plant
were valid because they did not involve a pledge of the public credit.
Implicit in our decision overruling the circuit court was a determination
that the bonds involved either obtaining money for, or pledging the
public credit to, a private entity.
Town of North Miami, and its progeny, began to have a significant
effect on Florida's economic development in the 1960's because of a
ruling by the Internal Revenue Service, later codified, which made the
interest on industrial revenue bonds exempt from federal income tax.
As a result of this ruling, Florida was placed at a competitive disadvan-
tage with other states which could offer tax exempt, non-recourse
revenue bonds to private entities for capital projects. 35
As pointed out in Linscoll,236 the reaction of the drafters of article
VII of the 1968 Florida Constitution to North Miami and Jacksonville Port
Authority was to write exceptions to the rule carried over from the 1885
Constitution against pledging credit. The exceptions were directed at the
Second, such government involvement with business and commerce was seen as an
interference with the free enterprise system. "Perhaps the modem trend of government
encroachment on the free enterprise system is the wise road to follow. So long however, as
the Constitution reads as it does now, it seems clear that we have no choice in the matter."
ld. at 883. "[uln 1966 this state added 397 new plants and 156 major plant expansions
yielding 33,223 new jobs. These facts establish that Florida has prospered and continues to
grow and prosper under the free enterprise system. It confirms the wisdom of our fbrefathers
nearly a hundred years ago in writing into the Constitution one provision which to this date
remains unchanged." ld. at 886 (footnote omitted).
234. 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983).
235. Id. at 98-100 (citing Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d at 881 wherein non
recourse bonds for a major port expansion were held invalid).
236. Id. at 97.
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North Miami and Jacksonville Port Authority situations. 237
The basic limitation remained in article VII, section 10:
Neither the state nor any county, school district, municipality, special
district, or agency of any of them, shall become a joint owner with, or
stockholder of., or give, lend or use its taxing power or credit to aid any
231corporation, association, partnership, or person ....
The reader will note that the ban on "obtaining money for" a "corpora-
tion, association, partnership or person 2 39 found in the 1885 Constitution
has been deleted. More on this anon. As alluded to above, 40 the 1968
version contained an exception aimed directly at the North Miami and
Jacksonville Port Authority problems:
But this [the ban on pledging public credit] shall not prohibit laws
authorizing:
(c)[2 4 ] the issuance and sale by any county, municipality, special
district or any other local governmental body of (1) revenue bonds to
237. The Linscott court stated:
Concurrently, in August 1967, each house [of the Florida legislature] adopted
joint resolutions proposing revisions to the constitutional provisions prohibiting
the pledge of the public credit to private entities. In pertinent part, the thrust of
the Senate version was to overturn Jacksonville Port Authority [(disapproval of
use of revenue bonds to improve port facilities for a private entity)]; that of the
house version to overturn Town of North Miami [(disapproval of the use of
revenue bonds to build a warehouse for the private sector)].
Id. at 100 (footnotes omitted).
As the reader can easily see, when approved by the electorate, these become the
"airport and port facilities" and "industrial and manufacturing plant" exceptions in article VII,
section 10(c) of the 1968 Florida Constitution.
238. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
239. See supra text accompanying note 233.
240. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
241. Also excluded from the ban on pledging credit are:
I) "the investment of public trust funds," FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(a);
2) "the investment of other public funds in obligations of, or insured by, the
United States or any of its instrumentalities," FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (b); and
3) "a municipality, county, special district, or agency of any of them, being a
joint owner of, giving, lending or using its taxing power or credit for the joint
ownership, construction and operation of electrical energy generating or
transmission facilities with any corporation, association, partnership on person,"
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(d). The author has no difficulty with these and suggest they
remain unchanged with the following possible exception; that there be added to section 10(d)
those projects found in FLA. CONST, art. VII, §§ 14-17.
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finance or refinance the cost of capital projects for airport or port
facilities[2 421] or (2) revenue bonds to finance or refinance the cost of
capital projects for industrial or manufacturing plants to the extent that
the interest thereon is exempt from income taxes under the then existing
laws of the United States, when, in either case, the revenue bonds are
payable solely from revenue derived solely from revenue derived from
the sale, operation or leasing of the projects . *.. 243
Read literally, except for the four exceptions244 contained in this provision,
the rigid restrictions on revenue bond financing of projects for the private
sector would apparently still apply. The first major case to interpret this
constitutional section may or may not have so held. The court stated:
All other proposed public revenue bond projects not falling into the
exempted class described in section 10(c) of article VII would, of
course, have to run the gauntlet of prior case decisions to test whether
the lending or use of public credit for any of them was contemplated
....,It will be noted that under similar language in the 1885 Constitu-
tion ... the cases hold that the validity of each proposed public revenue
bond financing project depends upon the circumstances, e.g., whether
the purpose serves a paramount public purpose, although there might be
an incidental private benefit, and other criteria.24
At this point in the supreme court's opinion, it appeared to be on the
verge of a glaring oversight. The applicable provision regarding revenue
bonds in the 1885 Constitution had included the words "obtaining money
for" '46 as a means of pledging the public credit. Those words are conspic-
uously left out of the 1968 Constitution. Thus, since a change in language
from an earlier to a later constitution is to be accorded meaning,2 47 it
could clearly be argued, as was ultimately done in Nohrr, that revenue
242. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
243. FLA. CoNsr. art. VII, § 10(c) (emphasis added).
244. The exceptions are "airports and port facilities" and "industrial and manufacturing
plants." Id.
245. Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 308-09 (Fla.
1971) (emphasis added); see, e.g., State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla.
1967) (presenting an index to decisions of the supreme court of both sides of the subject),
and referenced in that regard in Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 309.
246. See supra text accompanying note 239.
247. See State v. City of St. Augustine, 235 So. 2d I (Fla. 1970); Gray v. Bryant, 125
So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960).
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bonds, frequently called "non recourse revenue bonds, ',24 are simply not
pledges of the public credit at all since the bondholder can look for payment
from the revenues generated by the project and not to any other revenue
sources belonging to the government entity involved.249
In this opinion, even after saying that the rigid strictures of the 1885
Constitution (paramount public purpose) would apply, the court then found
that the non recourse revenue bonds involved in this case, did not pledge the
public credit:
Under the foregoing construction of Section 10(c), Article VII, the
dormitory-cafeteria projects involved here are not revenue projects that
contemplate the lending or use of the credit of the county or its
commissioners. The word 'credit' as used in Fla. Const., art. VII,
section 1 0 (1968), implies the imposition of some new financial liability
on the part of the State or political subdivision which in effect results
in the creation of a State or political subdivision debt for the benefit of
private enterprises.
In order to have a gift, loan or use of public credit, the public must
be either directly or contingently liable to pay something to somebody.
Neither the full faith and credit nor the taxing power of the State of
Florida or any political subdivision thereof is pledged to the payment
of the principal of, or interest on, these revenue bonds. The purchasers
of the revenue bonds may not look to any legal or moral obligation on
the part of the state, county, or authority to pay any portion of the
bonds.2"'
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court appeared to be saying that since non
recourse revenue bonds are involved,2"1 there is no pledge of public credit
and the no pledging of public credit provision in article VII, section 10 of
the 1968 Constitution should not even apply. Such a conclusion would be
bolstered by the deletion of the "obtaining money for" language that had
appeared in the 1885 Constitution.252
However, the court then appeared to return in part to its original view,
that except for "airports and port facilities" and "industrial and manufactur-
248. Linscott, 443 So. 2d at 101.
249. See infra text accompanying note 250.
250. Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 309.
251. See ,upra text accompanying note 246.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 239, 246.
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ing plants," the rule under the cases interpreting the 1885 Constitution which
required a paramount public purpose would still apply. The supreme court
found that even though the school was private, a public purpose was served
by aiding it to acquire a dormitory-cafeteria. The court stated that
"[c]ertainly, the financing of college dormitories and dining facilities as an
aid in providing for the education of the youth of this State is a public
purpose.
253
It would thus appear that the Nohrr court had, albeit in a roundabout
way, created an interpretation of the pledging credit provision of the 1968
Florida Constitution which required only a "public purpose" and not a
"paramount public purpose" if no pledge of the public credit was involved,
even if the project involved was not an "airport or port facility" or
"industrial or manufacturing plant."
This interpretation was not immediately followed and, indeed, it can be
argued that Nohrr was misread. In Orange County Industrial Development
Authority v. State,254 the supreme court found that Nohrr:
establish[ed] a two-prong test for determining whether revenue bonds
for . . . projects [other than for "airport and port facilities" and
"industrial and manufacturing plants"] would be validly authorized
pursuant to the constitution. The two criteria are (1) whether the
revenue bonds contemplate a pledge of the credit of the state or political
subdivision and (2) whether the funded project serves a paramount
public purpose, although there might be an incidental private bene-
fit. 25
5
This reading of Nohrr, of course, ignores the fact that in the end, the Nohrr
court found the necessity for only a public benefit, not a paramount
one.256 This difference will at once become significant. This significance
253. Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 309. The reader will note that the court gave great deference
to the legislative determination that a public purpose was served by the project. The court
stated Florida Statute, "section 243.19 .. contains a finding by the legislature that projects
financed under the Educational Facilities Law [as was the project in Nohrr] are, in effect, for
a public purpose .... The finding of legislature is determinative .... 5" Id. (citations
omitted).
254. 427 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1983). Involved were industrial development revenue bonds.
Id. at 176. They were clearly non recourse bonds. Id. at 179.
255. Id. at 178. The court, thus, emphasized the need for a paramount public purpose
rather than merely a public purpose as Nohrr had suggested would be the case when non
recourse revenue bonds were involved.
256. See supra text accompanying note 253.
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occurs in Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority.257
With the adoption of the Constitution of 1968, the "paramount public
purpose" test developed by case law under the Constitution of 1885 lost
much of its viability. The test is still applicable when a pledge of
public credit is involved, but where such pledge is not involved, . . . it
is enough to show that a public purpose is served.2"8
This, of course, is the other reading of Nohrr2 5 9 and apparently super-
sedes the interpretation of Nohrr found in Orange County Industrial
Development Authority v. State.260
Based on the foregoing, it is suggested that article VII, section 10(c)
of the 1968 Florida Constitution be amended to read:
(c) the issuance and sale by any county, municipality, special district or
other local governmental body of non recourse revenue bonds for any
project if any public purpose is served thereby. The term "non recourse
revenue bond" means revenue bonds that are payable solely from
revenue derived from the sale, operation or leasing of the projects. If
any projects so financed, or any part thereof, are occupied or operated
by any private corporation, association, partnership or person pursuant
to contract or lease with the issuing body, the property interest created
by such contract shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as other
privately owned property.
The reader will note three major changes from the present 10(c). First, the
special status of "airport and port facilities" and "industrial and manufactur-
ing plants" is removed. It is assumed that (1) that such projects could easily
pass the "any public purpose" test in the proposed change, and (2) that it
was never the intent of the drafters of the current 10(c) that such projects
257. 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983).
258. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
259. See supra text accompanying note 253.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 254-55. It should be noted, however, that
Justices Overton and Ehrlich concurred in the result in Linscot, but not in the opinion of the
majority. They did not write an opinion, so one is left to guess what they intended. Linscott,
443 So. 2d at 101. (Overton, J. & Ehrlich, J., concurring in decision only). it is, however,
possible to conclude that they continued to believe that a paramount public purpose is
required, even in non recourse revenue bond situations, but that such a purpose existed in
Linscott. If this supposition is correct, then counting Justice Boyd's dissent in Linscott, its
major shift in emphasis was supported by a bare majority of the court. However, it has
subsequently been followed. See Northern Palm Beach County Water Control Dist. v. State,
604 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1992).
19941 1567
845
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
be supported by anything other than non resource revenue bonds and the
present 10(c) says exactly that.26'
Second, any hint of a limitation of the use of revenue bonds to capital
projects was removed along with the removal of the "airports and port
facilities" and "industrial and manufacturing plants language." That should
also make it easier for the proposed change in 10(c) to support the issuance
of arbitrage bonds by municipal corporations as discussed below.
Third, the limitation regarding the interest on such bonds being exempt
from federal income taxation, which my proposal leaves out, seems to be
more of a recognition of a then existing62 and very malleable practice1
61
which serves little practical purpose except that such bonds would be
desirable at lower interest rates because no federal income tax would have
to be paid on such interest. The author claims no expertise in bond finance,
but can see no other purpose for this provision which he proposes to delete.
Indeed, it appears that this practice now may be the case anyway. The
bonds in State v. City of Orlando, below, were not limited to tax exempt
obligations. While the supreme court refused to affirm the circuit courts
validation of the bond issue, no comment was made by the court on the fact
that some of the bonds were not tax exempt. Perhaps this was because the
bond issue was seemingly held to be invalid on grounds other than a
violation of article VII, section 10. It is impossible to say for sure.
In any event, as changed, section 10(c) seems to otherwise state the
existing law as indicated in Nohrr6 and Linscott.265
The purposed change to section 10(c) might, if a legislative history of
such a change so indicates, also overturn the pernicious effect of the
supreme court decision in State v. City of Orlando,266 which is both
meddlesome and poorly reasoned.267 There, the court held, in effect, that
261. "The revenue bonds ... [must be] payable solely from revenue derived from the
sale, operation or leasing of the projects." FLA. CONST. art VII, § 10(c) (emphasis added).
262. See supra text accompanying note 235.
263. See State v. Broward County, 468 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1985) (discussing the cap and
other limitations on tax exempt bonds issued by a state caused by the Federal Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984).
264. See supra text accompanying note 253.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
266. 576 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1991). Orlando proposed to sell revenue bonds and use the
proceeds to invest at a profit with other local government entities. Id. at 13 16. The city
might also borrow some of the money itself. Id.
267. The bonds involved were clearly non recourse revenue bonds. "[T]he bonds would
be payable only from the funds derived from repayment of the loans by the local agencies."
City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1316. Nevertheless, the court mentioned the "paramount
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a municipal corporation could not issue a type of non recourse revenue bond
known as an arbitrage bond, that is, where the revenue raised from the bond
issue is invested at an interest rate greater than that attached to the bond
issue, thus rasing money for the municipal corporation.268
After thorough review and discussion, the court approved the sale and
issuance of arbitrage bonds by a municipal corporation in State v. City of
Panama City Beach.169  Then in City of Orlando, when faced with an
arbitrage scheme more complex than the one in City of Panama City
Beach,27 the court retreated from its holding in the latter case. 2 1  It did
so without significant reference to article VII, section 10. Rather, it found
that "borrowing money for [the] primary purpose of reinvestment is not a
valid municipal purpose as contemplated by article VIII, section 2(b) [of the
Florida Constitution]. 272 This provision requires that municipal power be
public purpose" test. Id. at 1317. This is incorrect unless the court intended to sub silentio
overrule Linscott v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority. See supra text
accompanying notes 257-58. Yet this can hardly be the case since that test was reaffirmed
in North Palm Beach County Water Control Dist. v. State, 604 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1992),
decided subsequent to Orlando. Justice Grimes, the author of the Orlando opinion, joined
the majority opinion in the latter case. Id. at 443. In any event, the case did not apparently
turn on the issue of article VII, section 10 of the Florida Constitution.
268. See State v. City of Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d 250, 250-51 (Fla. 1988).
269. Id.
270. The difference in investment schemes is discussed supra note 266 and infra note
271.
271. The bond issue in City of Panama City Beach was relatively simple compared to
the one in Orlando. The proceeds from the sale of what were clearly non recourse revenue
bonds, or at least the "bulk" of such proceeds, was to be invested at a higher interest rate
than the bonds paid. The profit was to be used for such municipal purposes as parks and
recreational facilities. City of Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d at 250. Therefore, it was not
entirely clear whether the Orlando court actually overruled City of Panama City Beach or
limited it to its lcts, i.e. straight forward investment of the proceeds from the bond issue as
opposed to the complicated Orlando scheme. The court stated "faiccordingly we recede from
State v. City of Panama City Beach to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion." City of
Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1318. Subsequently, it has become clear that City of Panama City
Beach was totally receded from, and effectively overruled. "State v. City of Orlando...
held 'that borrowing money for the primary purpose of investment is not a valid municipal
purpose . . . . ' Washington Shores Homeowners' Ass'n v. City of Orlando, 602 So. 2d
1300, 1302 n.3 (Fla. 1992). This conclusion is not surprising since the Orlando court relied
almost entirely on Justice McDonald's dissent in City of Panama Beach, which argued that
borrowing money in order to invest it at a higher interest rate in order to make money is not
a valid municipal purpose.
272. Article VII, section 10 issue was thoroughly discussed in City of Panama City
Beach, 529 So. 2d at 253-54. The only reference to it in Orlando is the statement that, "[bly
allowing the city council to later decide how to spend the profits, the city has deprived this
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exercised for municipal purposes.
To explain why the investing of non recourse revenue bond money in
order to use the profit is not a municipal purpose, the court relied on the
following reasoning of Justice McDonald 27  in his dissent in City of
Panama City Beach. Justice McDonald saw "no valid public [municipal?]
purpose in investing for investing's sake. Making a profit on an investment
is an aspect of commerce more properly left to commercial and business
entities. 2 74 What was ignored by the court, of course, is the fact that the
profit from the investment would have to be used for a municipal purpose
because of article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution. To city
governments already struggling to find additional sources of revenue to meet
ever increasing demands for services and to a tax weary public, the court's
reasoning must seem, relatively speaking, to have come from out of the
middle ages. 75
This line of reasoning also undermines the Legislature's attempt to
restore broad municipal home rule power subsequent to the supreme court's
disastrous decision in City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc. 276 As
Court of the ability to determine whether the expenditures will meet a paramount [sic] public
purpose." City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1317. This did not however turn out to be the
issue on which the case was decided. Id.
273. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1315. Justice McDonald was Chief Justice at the
time.
274. City of Panana City Beach, 529 So. 2d at 257. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting, and
Overton & Ehrlich. J.J., concurring with dissent). Justice McDonald also argued that the
arbitrage bonds served no public purpose. Id. at 252-58.
275. Sometimes words or phrases I have read in books or heard in movies come to mind
and find themselves used in my writings because the movie or book context and the article
context in which they are used seem somehow related. I recall this phrase from the
Twentieth Century Fox movie on the life of the World War II German Field Marshal, Erwin
Rommel, The DesertFox. The phrase occurs when Rommel and General Fritz Bayerlein are
discussing Hitler's no retreat order during the Battle of El Alamein, when the Afrika Korps
and its Italian allies were faced with the overwhelming quantitative and, in some instances,
qualitative, superiority of the British Eighth Army. Bayerlein, speaking to Rommel: "It's
[Hitler's order] out of the Middle Ages. This is an order to throw away an entire army.
Nobody has said 'victory or death' since people fought with bows and arrows." Justice
McDonald's argument is not an order "to throw away an entire army" and certainly there is
absolutely no intent on my part to equate Justice McDonald or away other justice, with
Hitler, but the argument is an argument to throw away a unique, valuable source of non tax
municipal revenue at a time when new sources of that type are almost impossible to find.
276. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972). This case gutted article VIII, section 2(b) of the then
new 1968 Constitution by placing an artificially narrow interpretation on the term "municipal
purpose" This caused the Legislature to undo Fleetwood by enacting chapter 73-129 of the
Laws of Florida 1973, which restored the term "municipal purpose" to its intended meaning.
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was previously stated, the question of whether or not the issuance of non
recourse revenue bonds for arbitrage purposes was a valid municipal purpose
was thoroughly discussed in City of Panama City Beach and arbitrage bonds
were found to constitute both a public and a municipal purpose.277
Hopefully, the proposed change in 10(c) would restore the law as it
was before Orlando. Should any doubt exist on this score, the author
recommends that another section be added to article VII specifically stating
that non recourse revenue arbitrage bonds serve both a public and municipal
purpose.
This discussion has caused the author to also make the following
suggestions when changes to the bond provisions of article VII of the 1968
Florida Constitution are being considered. As far as I can determine, there
does not exist any consistent definition of the types of bonds based on their
funding. I suggest that the constitution define three basic type of bonds.
1) Non recourse revenue bonds as defined above. 78
2) Special obligation bonds279 which pledge some"' but not all"'
See generally the discussion of this subject in 1973 Fla. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 450 (1973);
see also City of Panama City Beach, which ignored Fleetwood and appears to adopt the
original view of"municipal purpose." 529 So. 2d at 250. Alarmingly, the dissent of Justice
McDonald in City of Panama City Beach relied almost entirely on Fleetwood for its
municipal purpose argument, id. at 257 (McDonald, C.J. dissenting and Overton & Ehrlich,
J.J., concurring with dissent.) Even more alarming, it is this argument upon which the
court's opinion in Orlando is based. See supra text accompanying note 272.
277. City of Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d at 254-56.
278. See supra text accompanying note 250.
279. This term was directly used in State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla.
1976) and indirectly in Town of Medley v. State, 162 So. 2d 257, 258-259 (Fla. 1964).
280. See Town of Medley, 162 So. 2d at 257; Alachua County, 335 So. 2d at 554. In
the former, the Town of Medley pledged the following toward the payment of "Public
Improvement Revenue Bonds": "the revenues from a proposed water system, [p]roceeds of
the cigarette tax, franchise tax on electric power, utility taxes and occupational license taxes."
Town of Medley, 162 So. 2d at 257. "No ad valorem taxes were pledged and the form of the
proposed bond and the ordinance authorizing the issue specifically provides that the Town
is not 'directly or indirectly or contingently' obligated to levy ad valorem taxes for the
payment thereof." Id. at 257-58. In spite of the fact that
[iun any instance in which a municipality has been using funds from special non-
ad valorem sources of revenue to meet its operating costs and then diverts those
funds by pledging them to payment of a specific indebtedness as done here, the
result will probably be that ad valorem taxes will have to be increased to make
up the deficiency in funds available for operating expenses,
the bonds were held not to be a pledge of ad valorem taxes so as to trigger the constitutional
requirement for a referendum. Id. at 258. The Alachua County case is to the same effect.
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local government sources of revenue but exclude the direct or indi-
rect.82 pledge of ad valorem taxes on ad valorem tax increments.2 3
3) General obligation bonds which pledge the full taxing power of the
taxing entity including ad valorem taxes on real property and tangible
personal property at the local government level. These would continue
to require referendum approval2. 4 with the exceptions now found in
the constitution.2 5
VII. ARTICLE XI, SECTION 3: THE REHABILITATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO PROPOSE
CHANGES TO THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION-UNDOING THE
MALIGNANT EFFECT OF FINE V. FIRESTONE2"6
In the 1968 Florida Constitution, the people of this state for the first
time, were given the right to propose amendments to the constitution
281. In Volusia County v. State, 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982), the Florida Supreme Court
distinguished Medley and Alachua and held that where a local government pledged "all
legally available, unencumbered sources of county revenue including all money derived from
regulatory fees and user charges assessed by the county." 1d. at 969. This amounted to a
pledge of ad valorem tax revenues which would obviously be required to take up the slack,
thus triggering the referendum requirement of article VII, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution. Id. at 972. The fact that the county had also "convenant[ed] to do all things
necessary to continue receiving the various revenues pledged . . . to fully maintain the
programs and services which generate the service fees and user charges." Id. at 969, 971.
282. Volusia County, 417 So. 2d at 968.
283. See State v. City of Daytona Beach, 484 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1986).
284. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 11, 12.
285. See id. §§ 14, 17.
286. 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984). Regrettably, the author of this section has deemed it
necessary to levy very harsh criticism at the Fine opinion. This will undoubtedly be read by
some to reflect poorly on the author of this opinion, Justice Overton and all of the remaining
justices, since there were no dissents. However, the author has a very high regard for the
court, Justice Overton and each of the other justices who participated in the Fine decision.
Nevertheless, he believes that they fell into the common judicial trap of legislating in this
case by misapplying the clear meaning of the constitution to avoid a result which may be
seen as harmful or even disastrous to the body politic. This is certainly not the first time a
court has done this or something like it nor will it be the last. See, e.g., Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Many other state and federal cases could be cited. I also
respectfully confess that it is far easier to play "Monday morning quarterback" as I am doing
than to have to reach a decision in a factual situation where an unusually hard case may very
well make, as here, what 1 believe to be bad law. I do hope, however, that from the
perspective of the time that has passed since Fine v. Firestone was decided that my criticisms
will be seen as having a respectable validity.
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through a process called "initiative '28 7. At first, the scope of changes
proposed through this process288 was very narrow, and limited to changing
only sections of the constitution at a time.289 The first case to interpret
this provision, Adams v. Gunter,29 held that an amendment proposed by
initiative could not remain on the ballot because its effect would be to
change more than one section of the constitution.
Obviously being dissatisfied with the narrow interpretation of the
peoples' right to propose changes through the initiative process,"' the
Legislature placed on the ballot a change in this process that would give the
people "the power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or
portions of this constitution" so long as it "embraces but one subject and
matter directly connected therewith. 292  Early cases interpreted this
provision broadly. The majority opinion in the first case to interpret the
changed initiative provision, Weber v. Smathers,293 is exceedingly short on
explanation2 " and is much better described in a subsequent case, Floridi-
ans Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Florida:
295
287. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (amended 1972).
288. There are four other ways by which proposed changes to the constitution can be
placed on the ballot. See id. § I (proposal by Legislature); id. § 2 (revision commission);
id. § 4 (constitutional convention); id. § 6 (taxation and budget reform commission).
289. As pointed out in Fine v. Firestone, the original initiative provision provided in
pertinent part that "[t]he power to propose amendments to any section of this constitution by
initiative is reserved to the people." Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989 n.2 (emphasis added).
290. 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970).
291. "As I construe the 1972 change in light of what was present in the Constitution
before, what was retained in other sections, and Adams, it seems to me obvious that the 1972
change was designed to enlarge the right to amend the Constitution by initiative petition."
Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819, 823 (1976) (England, J., concurring).
See also the following:
In response to [Adams v. Gunter] which narrowly interpreted the original
"single section" initiative provision, the people adopted a legislatively-proposed
amendment to article XI, section 3, to provide for revision or amendment of
"any portion or portions" of the constitution by initiative, upon the condition that
the proposal embrace a single subject and matter directly connected therewith
H.J.R. no. 2835, pp. 1665., Laws of Florida (1972).
Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Lets Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 340 (Fla. 1978),
receded from by Fine, 448 So. 2d at 984.
292. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
293. 338 So. 2d at 819.
294. Id. The case is however greatly enhanced by Justice England's concurring opinion
which is here drawn upon rather heavily. See Weber, 338 So. 2d at 822-24, (England J.,
concurring).
295. 363 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1978).
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In this first decision to deal with the initiative process subsequent to the
1972 amendment several principles evolved which, to our mind, settled
the standard of review by the judiciary when confronted by an assault
upon a particular initiative proposal. First, "the 1972 change was
designed to enlarge the right to amend the Constitution by initiative
provision." [Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d at 823 (England, J.,
concurring).] Second, the burden upon the opponent is to establish that
the initiative proposal "is clearly and conclusively defective." [Id. at
822.] Third, "the 'one subject' limitation was selected to place a
functional, as opposed to a locational, restraint on the range of
authorized amendments." [Id. at 823 (England, J., concurring).] Last,
in applying the foregoing principles to the amendment there under
consideration, which arguably embraced at least five "subjects" ranging
from financial disclosure by public officials to limitations on lobbyists
and civil penalties on nongovernmental employees, the philosophy
emerged that the one subject limitation should be viewed broadly rather
than narrowly. The narrow view would have compelled a finding that
at least five "subjects" were embraced within the proposal. The broad
view accepted, in fact, by the Court led to the upholding of the proposal
as a single subject-"ethics in government." '296
The Florida Supreme Court in Floridians Against Casino Takeover was
perhaps even more generous in applying the approach it had gleaned from
Weber to the facts before it, an approach it described as possessing a
"pragmatic and common sense judicial philosophy." '29 7
The present proposal [at issue] (1) authorizes state regulated, privately
operated casino gambling in a specific geographical area and (2) directs
the anticipated tax revenues from that source to education and local law
enforcement. . . . [T]he generation and collection of taxes, and the
distribution thereof [are] part and parcel of the single subject of
legalized casino gambling. In both instances [Weber and the present
case] the various elements serve to flesh out and implement the
initiative proposal, thereby forging an integrated and unified whole.298
The court in Floridians Against Casino Takeover also relied on a
suggestion Justice England had made in his concurring opinion in Weber.
Furthermore, as perceived by Justice England in Weber, it seems
296. Id. at 340 (footnotes omitted).
297. Id.
298. Id.
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appropriate to draw a parallel between Article XI, Section 3, and Article
III, Section 6, Florida Constitution, because each utilizes the restraining
phrase "shall embrace but one subject." The former applies to the
constitutional initiative process while the latter deals with enactment of
laws by the legislature. However, the need for germanity is common
to both. Noting that there "is gloss aplenty on the 'one subject'
limitation for legislation" [Justice England] concluded "that widely
divergent rights and requirements can be included without challenge in
statutes covering a single subject area.
Thus, the 1972 amendment overturning the narrow "one section"
limitation was to be given broad effect, fulfilling what had been said much
earlier by Justice Terrell: "[W]e are dealing with a constitutional democracy
in which sovereignty resides in the people. It is their Constitution we are
construing. They have a right to change, abrogate or modify it in any
manner they see fit so long as they keep within the confines of the Federal
Constitution. 3 °°
Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the "Citizens'
Choice Amendment on Government Revenue" which was placed on the
ballot by initiative.301  It proposed to place a cap on most government
sources of revenue. 3 2  The First District Court of Appeal upheld the
validity of the proposed amendment.30 3
[T]he proposed amendment in this case contains various elements within
the ambit of the single subject of revenue limitation, and the petitioner
[Fine] has not established that the proposal is 'clearly and conclusively
defective' within the purview of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitu-
tion. TM
It is beyond cavil that the adoption of this revenue limiting proposal
would have had a profound effect on government at all levels in the State
of Florida. It is certainly arguable that the supreme court decided that the
proposed amendment would be bad for the state and thus set out to find that
it violated the single subject rule. In this it succeeded. However, it also
299. Id. at 340-41.
300. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 821 (quoting Gray v. Golden, 89 So. 2d 785, 790 (Fla.
1956)); see also infra note 339.
301. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 986.
302. Id. at 986-87.
303. Id. at 985.
304. Id. at 987 (quoting Fine v. Firestone, 443 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
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succeeded in inflicting exceedingly severe injury on the right of the people,
themselves, to effectively place an amendment on the ballot because the
liberality of Weber v. Smathers3 °5 and Floridians Against Casino Takeover
v. Let's Help Florida0 6 was substantially impaired if not destroyed. The
Fine opinion is arguably thinly veiled judicial legislation.
The court began its attack on the revenue cap proposal, and thus on the
interpretational structure erected by Weber. 7 and Floridians Against
Casino Takeover,3" 8 by placing great emphasis on the fact that a proposal
placed on the ballot by initiative did not, of necessity, go through a process
of hearings and debate which it described as "filtration.""3 9  The other
means3"' by which amendments may be placed on the ballot do have such
processes.31" ' In reading the court's discussion of the initiative method of
placing a proposal on the ballot as compared to the other methods, the
reader could be led to believe that this subject had never been addressed by
the court before. Quite the contrary is true.
The issue of "filtration" was thoroughly discussed in Justice England's
concurring opinion in Weber.312
[B]ut surely in light of 1968 concerns over populist overhauls by non-
deliberative petitions [referring to Justice Robert's dissent] we can
deduce an intention to restrain initiative in a manner comparable to
restraints on the legislature. The same term, of course, appears in
Article Ill, Section 6, which states that laws developed in the legislature
"shall embrace but one subject."3"3 It makes a great deal of sense to
me to view the same phraseology in the Constitution, operating in both
cases as a functional limitation on our written laws (one statutory, the
other organic), as having the same meaning. At least no justification
for a differentiation is here made to appear.3"
305. 338 So. 2d at 819; see supra text accompanying notes 293-96.
306. 363 So. 2d at 337; see supra text accompanying notes 297-99.
307. See supra note 305.
308. See supra note 306.
309. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
310. See supra note 288. The Fine court did not include the Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission (art. XI, section 6) which was added later, but without doubt would
have considered that it provided "filtration."
311. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
312. 338 So. 2d at 819.
313. See infra text accompanying note 320.
314. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 823 (England, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); see infra
text accompanying note 318.
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As was pointed out earlier,15 Justice England's equation of the two
single subject limitations3"6 was accepted by the court in Floridians
Against Casino Gambling.3t7 The Fine court receded from this equation
between the two.
We find it is proper to distinguish between the two. First, we find the
language "shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith" in article Ill, section 6, regarding statutory change by the
legislature is broader than the language "shall embrace but one subject
and matter directly connected therewith," in article XI, section 3,
regarding constitutional change by initiative .... [W]e find that we
should take a broader view of the legislative provision because any
proposed law must proceed through legislative debate and public
hearing. Such a process allows change in the content of any law before
its adoption. [This is sophistry because the "change" could as easily
add additional subjects as delete them. This observation makes the next
sentence in this quote from the court's opinion nonsensical and
contrived if one is talking about the single subject requirement.] This
process is, in itself, a restriction on the drafting of a proposal which is
not applicable to the scheme for constitutional revision or amendment
by initiative. . . . [M]ost important, we find that we should require
strict compliance with the single-subject rule in the initiative process for
constitutional change because our constitution is the basic document that
controls our governmental functions, including the adoption of any laws
by the legislature."'
The Fine court's distinction between "properly" and "directly," had
already been demolished by Justice England in Weber.319 He stated that
"[t]his distinction is not critical here, however, since the debate between the
parties involves the number of 'subjects' in the proposal before us and not
its peripheral 'matters.', 320 It would seem that as in Weber, at issue in
Fine was the number of subjects, not "peripheral matters."
The court in Fine set-up a strawman only to knock it down.
315. See supra text accompanying note 299.
316. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 823.
317. 363 So. 2d at 340-41.
318. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988-89 (emphasis added). It is uncertain how one should take
the implication in the last sentence that perhaps the single subject limitation on the
Legislature does not "require strict compliance."
319. See supra text accompanying notes 315-17.
320. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 823 n.4 (England, J., concurring).
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The problem of conflicting provisions resulting from the adoption of an
initiative proposal cannot be satisfactorily addressed by the application
of the principle of constitutional construction that the most recent
amendment necessarily supersedes any existing provisions which are in
conflict. We recede from Floridians [Against Casino Takeover] to the
extent that it conflicts with this view. 2'
The court in Fine then went on to bemoan the fact that this problem
would place upon its shoulders the burden of harmonizing conflicting
provisions without its having the benefit of any legislative history or similar
indicia of meaning or intent of the drafters of the proposal.322 Further-
more, the court offered no clear explanation, or arguably no explanation at
all, how its narrow interpretation of the words "directly connected" would
solve the problem of conflicting provisions.
323
Then, perhaps most damaging of all to the ability of the people of
Florida to change their constitution,324 the Fine court receded from its
holding in Floridians Against Casino Takeover325
that the question of whether an initiative proposal conflicted with
other articles or sections of the constitution had "no place in
assessing the legitimacy of an initiative proposal." We recede
from that language and find that how an initiative proposal affects
other articles or sections of the constitution is an appropriate
factor to be considered in determining whether there is more than
one subject included in an initiative proposal.3 2b
There can be little doubt that lurking in that one sentence is the spectre
of the court's drifting back to the "one section" limitation on initiative
proposals. The 1972 change that was intended to excise that limit.32 7 If
321. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989.
322. Id.
323. It should not be all that difficult to determine how the new proposal would have
affected the existing constitution. Certainly it would not appear to have been that difficult
under the facts of Fine.
324. See supra text accompanying note 300.
325. 363 So. 2d at 337.
326. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990 (citation omitted).
327. See supra note 291; see also Justice Kogan's concurring and dissenting opinion,
in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, 592 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991). There, Justice
Kogan suggested that the single subject rule is violated "[i]f the proposed initiative contains
more than one separate issue about which the voters might differ." Id. at 23 1. (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.) He explained further in a footnote.
1578 [Vol. 18
856
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Marks / Colby
the court can now measure the number of subjects in an initiative proposal
by its effect on "other articles or sections" '328 of the constitution there is
little or nothing to stop the court from finding such "effect" creates
additional subjects and thence travel back down the road to the discredited
and changed "one section" rule.
The court, not surprisingly, found that rather than one subject,
"government revenue," '329 the initiative proposal actually contained three:
1) "restrict[ions on] all types of taxation utilized for general governmental
operations;" 3 ' 2) "restriction on the operation and expansion of all user-
fee services:,"33 ' and 3) "the substantial effect it [would have] on the
constitutional scheme for the funding of capital improvements with revenue
bonds. 3 32  There can be little, if indeed any, doubt that these three
"subjects," as the court found them to be, would, under the prior case
law333 which the court "trashed," '334 have been found to be matters "di-
rectly connected" to the single subject of limitations on government revenue.
There can be little, indeed no, doubt that the court's probable objective
in preventing the people from voting on a proposal it deemed harmful to the
State of Florida had been achieved. However, it was achieved at a terrible
cost to the right of the people to control their constitutional destiny33
without recourse to the Legislature, revision commission, constitutional
I do not suggest that an initiative contains multiple subjects if reasonable voters
might disagree with some integral component by which the initiative achieves
its purposes. Rather, such disagreement must be about matters that, if severed,
would leave at least two complete and workable proposals. If so, the component
is discrete and not integral. If the disagreement is about a matter that cannot be
severed without rendering the remainder absurd, then the initiative must stand
or fall as a unit when put to the voters.
Id. at 231 n.5 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, the court found a single subject, even
when applying the Fine test. "The sole subject of the proposed amendment is limiting the
number of consecutive terms that certain elected public officers may serve." Id. at 227. The
question of how proposed change would "affect other articles or sections of the constitution,"
Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990, was given little weight. Advisory Opinion, 592 So. 2d at 225.
Indeed, Weber rather than Fine was cited. Id. The reader can reach whatever conclusions
he or she wishes from this.
328. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 991.
332. Id.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 293-99.
334. The reader will forgive the slang. Somehow its use seemed appropriate.
335. See supra note 291.
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convention or taxation and budget reform commission.33 6 Once again the
reader needs to be reminded of the words of Justice Terrell as quoted by
Justice Overton in one of the latter's earlier opinions. "[W]e are dealing
with a constitutional democracy in which sovereignty resides in the people.
It is their Constitution we are construing. They have a right to change,
abrogate or modify it in any manner they see fit so long as they keep within
the confines of the Federal Constitution." '337 And, "neither the wisdom of
the provision nor the quality of its draftsmanship is a matter for our re-
view. 338
In light of this earlier disclaimer by Justice Overton, the following
language from Fine reads like overdone protest.339
We are mindful that it is not our responsibility to address the wisdom
or merit of this proposed initiative amendment and we have not done
so. Solely on the basis of the legal issue presented to this court, we
find that the Citizens' Choice proposal is clearly and conclusively
defective because it fails to meet the intent and purpose of the single-
subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitu-
tion.34
To remedy this judicial dismantling of the initiative provision, we
propose that the word "directly" in article XI, section 3 be changed to
"properly" to bring it in line with the single subject limitation on legislation
found in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. Then, in the
words of Justice England: "There is gloss aplenty on the 'one subject'
336. Id.
337. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 821 (quoting Gray v. Golden, 89 So. 2d 785, 790 (Fla.
1956)). The reader should note that although Justice Terrell was talking about a legislatively
proposed amendment to the constitution, Justice Overton used the quote in the context of an
amendment proposed by initiative in Weber.
338. Id. at 822 (citing Gray v. Childs, 156 So. 274 (1934)).
339. "[He] doth protest too much, me thinks." Shakespeare, Hamlet, act III, scene 2,
Line 242. John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 94 (Christoper Morely & Lovella D. Everett
eds., 12th ed. 1951) (1948).
340. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 992-93. It is disingenuous at best for the court to include the
following words from Justice Thomal's concurring opinion in Adams v. Gunter when they
were directed at the earlier discredited constitutional provision which limited change by
initiative to one section of the Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 289, 290.
"The single subject rule of restraint is a provision 'which the people themselves have incorpo-
rated in our Constitution to protect it against precipitous and spasmodic changes in organic
law.' Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 832 (Fla. 1970) (Thornal, J., concurring);" Fine,
448 So. 2d at 993.
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To remedy this judicial dismantling of the initiative provision, we
propose that the word "directly" in article XI, section 3 be changed to
"properly" to bring it in line with the single subject limitation on legislation
found in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. Then, in the
words of Justice England: "There is gloss aplenty on the 'one subject'
limitation for legislation, and we know that widely divergent rights and
requirements can be included without challenge in statutes covering a single
subject area. ' :14 1
To deal with an issue that could cause a real problem, we also propose
that the following sentence be added to the end of article XI, section 3, the
initiative provision: Such revision or amendment shall not contain proposed
changes in the Constitution that conflict with each other.
341. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 823 (England, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). See also
supra text accompanying note 299.
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The materials listed in this Bibliography reflect on either a particular
portion or issue of Florida constitutional law or on the Florida Constitution
in general. Even a cursory review of these materials provides a "snapshot"
of the issues and events that shape the State of Florida. The sources are
organized under the Article(s) upon which they most bear. The most
comprehensive of sources are included under "General Coverage." Names
of periodicals are abbreviated in accordance with The Bluebook: A Uniform
System of Citation, Fifteenth edition.
As a supplement to the articles contained within this issue, an excellent
source on post-1968 revision matters can be found in Florida State
University Law Review 6, no. 3 (1978). That issue was solely dedicated to
the 1978 Constitutional Revision Commission and many of the articles
contained therein are useful to this date.
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PART VIII
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA
The Nova Law Review has reproduced the Florida Constitution
in full, including the 1992 amendments, to further enhance this
Symposium as a resource tool. We would like to thank Phil Herron,
ChiefAnalyst with the Division of Statute Revision, for his assistance.
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Constitution of the State of Florida
THE
CONSTITUTION
of the
STATE OF FLORIDA
as revised in
1968
and subsequently amended
The Constitution of the State of Florida as revised in 1968 consisted of
certain revised articles as proposed by three joint resolutions which were
adopted during the special session of June 24-July 3, 1968, and ratified by
the electorate on November 5, 1968, together with one article carried
forward from the Constitution of 1885, as amended. The articles proposed
in House Joint Resolution 1-2X constituted the entire revised constitution
with the exception of Articles V, VI, and VIII. Senate Joint Resolution 4-2X
proposed Article VI, relating to suffrage and elections. Senate Joint
Resolution 5-2X proposed a new Article VIII, relating to local government.
Article V, relating to the judiciary, was carried forward from the Constitu-
tion of 1885, as amended.
Sections composing the 1968 revision have no history notes. Subsequent
changes are indicated by notes appended to the affected sections. The
indexes appearing at the beginning of each article, notes appearing at the
end of various sections, and section and subsection headings are added
editorially and are not to be considered as part of the constitution.
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PREAMBLE
We, the people of the State of Florida, being grateful to Almighty God
for our constitutional liberty, in order to secure its benefits, perfect our
government, insure domestic tranquility, maintain public order, and guaran-
tee equal civil and political rights to all, do ordain and establish this
constitution.
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Sec.
1. Political power.
2. Basic rights.
3. Religious freedom.
4. Freedom of speech and press.
5. Right to assemble.
6. Right to work.
7. Military power.
8. Right to bear arms.
9. Due process.
10. Prohibited laws.
11. Imprisonment for debt.
12. Searches and seizures.
13. Habeas corpus.
14. Pretrial release and detention.
15. Prosecution for crime; offenses committed by children.
16. Rights of accused and of victims.
17. Excessive punishments.
18. Administrative penalties.
19. Costs.
20. Treason.
21. Access to courts.
22. Trial by jury.
23. Right of privacy.
24. Access to public records meetings.
25. Taxpayers' Bill of Rights.
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Constitution of the State of Florida
SECTION 1. Political power.-AII political power is inherent in the
people. The enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or impair others retained by the people.
SECTION 2. Basic rights.-Ail natural persons are equal before the
law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and
defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and
to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership,
inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible
for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be
deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap.
History.-Am. SIR. 917, 1974; adopted 1974.
SECTION 3. Religious freedom.-There shall be no law respecting
the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise
thereof. Religious freedom shall notjustify practices inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision
or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or
indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of
any sectarian institution.
SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.-Every person may
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects but shall be
responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and
civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter
charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the
party shall be acquitted or exonerated.
SECTION 5. Right to assemble.-The people shall have the right
peaceably to assemble, to instruct their representatives, and to petition for
redress of grievances.
SECTION 6. Right to work.-The right of persons to work shall not
be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any
labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through
a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged.
Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
SECTION 7. Military power.-The military power shall be subordi-
nate to the civil.
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SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.-
(a) The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of
themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed,
except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.
(b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding
weekends and legal holidays, between the purchase and delivery at retail of
any handgun. For the purposes of this section, "purchase" means the transfer
of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and "handgun"
means a firearm capable of being carried and used by one hand, such as a
pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in
Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
(c) The legislature shall enact legislation implementing subsection (b)
of this section, effective no later than December 31, 1991, which shall
provide that anyone violating the provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty
of a felony.
(d) This restriction shall not apply to a trade in of another handgun.
History.-Am. C.S. for S.JR. 43, 1989; adopted 1990.
SECTION 9. Due process.-No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness
against himself.
SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.-No bill of attainder, ex post facto
law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.-No person shall be impri-
soned for debt, except in cases of fraud.
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.-The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be
issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing
or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature
of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation
of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or informa-
tion would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme
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Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 31-H, 1982; adopted 1982.
SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.-The writ of habeas corpus shall be
grantable of right, freely and without cost. It shall be returnable without
delay, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
suspension is essential to the public safety.
SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.-Unless charged with
a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the
proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged
with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled
to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can
reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons,
assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the
judicial process, the accused may be detained.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 43-H, 1982; adopted 1982.
SECTION 15. Prosecution for crime; offenses committed by chil-
dren.-
(a) No person shall be tried for capital crime without presentment or
indictment by a grand jury, or for other felony without such presentment or
indictment or an information under oath filed by the prosecuting officer of
the court, except persons on active duty in the militia when tried by courts
martial.
(b) When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be
charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of crime
and tried without a jury or other requirements applicable to criminal cases.
Any child so charged shall, upon demand made as provided by law before
a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in an appropriate court as an adult.
A child found delinquent shall be disciplined as provided by law.
SECTION 16. Rights of accused and of victims.
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and shall be
furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have the right to have compulsory
process for witnesses, to confront at trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in
person, by counsel or both, and to have a speedy and public trial by
impartial jury in the county where the crime was committed. If the county
is not known, the indictment or information may charge venue in two or
more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was committed in that
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area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused may elect in which
of those counties he will be tried. Venue for prosecution of crimes
committed beyond the boundaries of the state shall be fixed by law.
(b) Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next
of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be
present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal
proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the
constitutional rights of the accused.
History.-Am. S.J.R. 135, 1987; adopted 1988.
SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.-Excessive fines, cruel or
unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment,
and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden.
SECTION 18. Administrative penalties.-No administrative agency
shall impose a sentence of imprisonment, nor shall it impose any other
penalty except as provided by law.
SECTION 19. Costs.-No person charged with crime shall be com-
pelled to pay costs before a judgment of conviction has become final.
SECTION 20. Treason.-Treason against the state shall consist only
in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and
comfort, and no person shall be convicted of treason except on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open
court.
SECTION 21. Access to courts.-The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial or delay.
SECTION 22. Trial by jury.-The right of trial by jury shall be
secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of
jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.
SECTION 23. Right of privacy.-Every natural person has the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to
limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law.
History.-Added, C.S. for H.J.R. 387, 1980; adopted 1980.
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SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.-
(a) Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record
made or received in connection with the official business of any public
body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf,
except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or
specifically made confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically
includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and
each agency or department created thereunder; counties, municipalities, and
districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity
created pursuant to law or this Constitution.
(b) All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch
of state government or of any collegial public body of a county, municipali-
ty, school district, or special district, at which official acts are to be taken
or at which public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed,
shall be open and noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall
be open and noticed as provided in Article III, Section 4(e), except with
respect to meetings exempted pursuant to this section or specifically closed
by this Constitution.
(c) This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may
provide by general law for the exemption of records from the requirements
of subsection (a) and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of
subsection (b), provided that such law shall state with specificity the public
necessity justifying the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to
accomplish the stated purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws
governing the enforcement of this section, including the maintenance,
control, destruction, disposal, and disposition of records made public by this
section, except that each house of the legislature may adopt rules governing
the enforcement of this section in relation to records of the legislative
branch. Laws enacted pursuant to this subsection shall contain only
exemptions from the requirements of subsections (a) or (b) and provisions
governing the enforcement of this section, and shall relate to one subject.
(d) All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access
to records or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records
of the legislative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. Rules of
court that are in effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit
access to records shall remain in effect until they are repealed.
History.-Added, C.S. for C.S. for H.J.R.'s 1727, 863, 2035, 1992; adopted 1992.
'SECTION 25. Taxpayers' Bill of Rights.-By general law the
legislature shall prescribe and adopt a Taxpayers' Bill of Rights that, in
clear and concise language, sets forth taxpayers' rights and responsibilities
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and government's responsibilities to deal fairly with taxpayers under the
laws of this state. This section shall be effective July 1, 1993.
History.-Proposed by Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, Revision No. 2, 1992, filed with
the Secretary of State May 7, 1992; adopted 1992.
'Note.-This section, originally designated section 24 by Revision No. 2 of the Taxation and
Budget Reform Commission, 1992, was redesignated section 25 by the editors in order to avoid
confusion with section 24 as contained in H.J.R.'s 1727, 863, 2035, 1992.
ARTICLE II
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec.
1. State boundaries.
2. Seat of government.
3. Branches of government.
4. State seal and flag.
5. Public officers.
6. Enemy attack.
7. Natural resources and scenic beauty.
8. Ethics in government.
9. English is the official language of Florida.
SECTION 1. State boundaries.-
(a) The state boundaries are: Begin at the mouth of the Perdido River,
which for the purposes of this description is defined as the point where
latitude 30016'53" north and longitude 87031'06" west intersect; thence to
the point where latitude 30017'02" north and longitude 8703 1'06" west
intersect; thence to the point where latitude 30018'00" north and longitude
87027'08" west intersect; thence to the point where the center line of the
Intracoastal Canal (as the same existed on June 12, 1953) and longitude
87027'00 west intersect; the same being in the middle of the Perdido River;
thence up the middle of the Perdido River to the point where it intersects the
south boundary of the State of Alabama, being also the point of intersection
of the middle of the Perdido River with latitude 31000'00" north; thence
east, along the south boundary line of the State of Alabama, the same being
latitude 3 1°00'00 '' north to the middle of the Chattahoochee River; thence
down the middle of said river to its confluence with the Flint River; thence
in a straight line to the head of the St. Marys River; thence down the middle
of said river to the Atlantic Ocean; thence due east to the edge of the Gulf
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Stream or a distance of three geographic miles whichever is the greater
distance; thence in a southerly direction along the edge of the Gulf Stream
or along a line three geographic miles from the Atlantic coastline and three
leagues distant from the Gulf of Mexico coastline, whichever is greater, to
and through the Straits of Florida and westerly, including the Florida reefs,
to a point due south of and three leagues from the southernmost point of the
Marquesas Keys; thence westerly along a straight line to a point due south
of and three leagues from Loggerhead Key, the westernmost of the Dry
Tortugas Islands; thence westerly, northerly and easterly along the arc of a
curve three leagues distant from Loggerhead Key to a point due north of
Loggerhead Key; thence northeast along a straight line to a point three
leagues from the coastline of Florida; thence northerly and westerly three
leagues distant from the coastline to a point west of the mouth of the
Perdido River three leagues from the coastline as measured on a line bearing
south 001'00'' west from the point of beginning; thence northerly along
said line to the point of beginning. The State of Florida shall also include
any additional territory within the United States adjacent to the Peninsula of
Florida lying south of the St. Marys River, east of the Perdido River, and
south of the States of Alabama and Georgia.
(b) The coastal boundaries may be extended by statute to the limits
permitted by the laws of the United States or international law.
SECTION 2. Seat of government.-The seat of government shall be
the City of Tallahassee, in Leon County, where the offices of the governor,
lieutenant governor, cabinet members and the supreme court shall be
maintained and the sessions of the legislature shall be held; provided that,
in time of invasion or grave emergency, the governor by proclamation may
for the period of the emergency transfer the seat of government to another
place.
SECTION 3. Branches of government.-The powers of the state
government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.
No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.
SECTION 4. State seal and flag.-The design of the great seal and
flag of the state shall be prescribed by law.
SECTION 5. Public officers.-
(a) No person holding any office of emolument under any foreign
government, or civil office of emolument under the United States or any
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other state, shall hold any office of honor or of emolument under the
government of this state. No person shall hold at the same time more than
one office under the government of the state and the counties and munici-
palities therein, except that a notary public or military officer may hold
another office, and any officer may be a member of a constitution revision
commission, taxation and budget reform commission, constitutional con-
vention, or statutory body having only advisory powers.
(b) Each state and county officer, before entering upon the duties of
the office, shall give bond as required by law, and shall swear or affirm:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, protect, and defend
the Constitution and Government of the United States and of the State of
Florida; that I am duly qualified to hold office under the Constitution of the
state; and that I will well and faithfully perform the duties of (title of office)
on which I am now about to enter. So help me God.",
and thereafter shall devote personal attention to the duties of the office, and
continue in office until his successor qualifies.
(c) The powers, duties, compensation and method of payment of state
and county officers shall be fixed by law.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 1616, 1988; adopted 1988.
SECTION 6. Enemy attack.-In periods of emergency resulting from
enemy attack the legislature shall have power to provide for prompt and
temporary succession to the powers and duties of all public offices the
incumbents of which may become unavailable to execute the functions of
their offices, and to adopt such other measures as may be necessary and
appropriate to insure the continuity of governmental operations during the
emergency. In exercising these powers, the legislature may depart from
other requirements of this constitution, but only to the extent necessary to
meet the emergency.
SECTION 7. Natural resources and scenic beauty.-It shall be the
policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic
beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air
and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise.
SECTION 8. Ethics in government.-A public office is a public trust.
The people shall have the right to secure and sustain that trust against abuse.
To assure this right:
(a) All elected constitutional officers and candidates for such offices
and, as may be determined by law, other public officers, candidates, and
employees shall file full and public disclosure of their financial interests.
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(b) All elected public officers and candidates for such offices shall file
full and public disclosure of their campaign finances.
(c) Any public officer or employee who breaches the public trust for
private gain and any person or entity inducing such breach shall be liable
to the state for all financial benefits obtained by such actions. The manner
of recovery and additional damages may be provided by law.
(d) Any public officer or employee who is convicted of a felony
involving a breach of public trust shall be subject to forfeiture of rights and
privileges under a public retirement system or pension plan in such manner
as may be provided by law.
(e) No member of the legislature or statewide elected officer shall
personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the
government body or agency of which the individual was an officer or
member for a period of two years following vacation of office. No member
of the legislature shall personally represent another person or entity for
compensation during term of office before any state agency other than
judicial tribunals. Similar restrictions on other public officers and employees
may be established by law.
(f) There shall be an independent commission to conduct investiga-
tions and make public reports on all complaints concerning breach of public
trust by public officers or employees not within the jurisdiction of the
judicial qualifications commission.
(g) This section shall not be construed to limit disclosures and
prohibitions which may be established by law to preserve the public trust
and avoid conflicts between public duties and private interests.
(h) Schedule-On the effective date of this amendment and until
changed by law:
(1) Full and public disclosure of financial interests shall mean filing
with the secretary of state by July 1 of each year a sworn statement showing
net worth and identifying each asset and liability in excess of $1,000 and its
value together with one of the following:
a. A copy of the person's most recent federal income tax return; or
b. A sworn statement which identifies each separate source and
amount of income which exceeds $1,000. The forms for such source
disclosure and the rules under which they are to be filed shall be prescribed
by the independent commission established in subsection (f), and such rules
shall include disclosure of secondary sources of income.
(2) Persons holding statewide elective offices shall also file disclosure
of their financial interests pursuant to subsection (h)(1).
(3) The independent commission provided for in subsection (f) shall
mean the Florida Commission on Ethics.
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History.-Proposed by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State July 29, 1976; adopted
1976.
SECTION 9. English is the official language of Florida.-
(a) English is the official language of the State of Florida.
(b) The legislature shall have the power to enforce this section by
appropriate legislation.
History.-Proposed by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State August 8, 1988; adopted
1988.
ARTICLE III
LEGISLATURE
Sec.
1. Composition.
2. Members; officers.
3. Sessions of the legislature.
4. Quorum and procedure.
5. Investigations; witnesses.
6. Laws.
7. Passage of bills.
8. Executive approval and veto.
9. Effective dates of laws.
10. Special laws.
11. Prohibited special laws.
12. Appropriation bills.
13. Term of office.
14. Civil. service system.
15. Terms and qualifications of legislators.
16. Legislative apportionment.
17. Impeachment.
18. Conflict of interest.
19. State Budgeting, Planning and Appropriations Processes.
SECTION 1. Composition.-The legislative power of the state shall
be vested in a legislature of the State of Florida, consisting of a senate
composed of one senator elected from each senatorial district and a house
of representatives composed of one member elected from each representative
district.
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SECTION 2. Members; officers.-Each house shall be the sole judge
of the qualifications, elections, and returns of its members, and shall
biennially choose its officers, including a permanent presiding officer
selected from its membership, who shall be designated in the senate as
President of the Senate, and in the house as Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The senate shall designate a Secretary to serve at its
pleasure, and the house of representatives shall designate a Clerk to serve
at its pleasure. The legislature shall appoint an auditor to serve at its
pleasure who shall audit public records and perform related duties as
prescribed by law or concurrent resolution.
SECTION 3. Sessions of the legislature.-
(a) ORGANIZATION SESSIONS. On the fourteenth day following
each general election the legislature shall convene for the exclusive purpose
of organization and selection of officers.
(b) REGULAR SESSIONS. In 1991, a regular session of the
legislature shall convene on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
March. In 1992 and thereafter, a regular session of the legislature shall
convene on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in February of each
odd-numbered year, and on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
February, or such other date as may be fixed by law, of each even-num-
bered year.
(c) SPECIAL SESSIONS.
(1) The governor, by proclamation stating the purpose, may convene
the legislature in special session during which only such legislative business
may be transacted as is within the purview of the proclamation, or of a
communication from the governor, or is introduced by consent of two-thirds
of the membership of each house.
(2) A special session of the legislature may be convened as provided
by law.
(d) LENGTH OF SESSIONS. A regular session of the legislature
shall not exceed sixty consecutive days, and a special session shall not
exceed twenty consecutive days, unless extended beyond such limit by a
three-fifths vote of each house. During such an extension no new business
may be taken up in either house without the consent of two-thirds of its
membership.
(e) ADJOURNMENT. Neither house shall adjourn for more than
seventy-two consecutive hours except pursuant to concurrent resolution.
(f) ADJOURNMENT BY GOVERNOR. If, during any regular or
special session, the two houses cannot agree upon a time for adjournment,
the governor may adjourn the session sine die or to any date within the
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period authorized for such session; provided that, at least twenty-four hours
before adjourning the session, he shall, while neither house is in recess, give
each house formal written notice of his intention to do so, and agreement
reached within that period by both houses on a time for adjournment shall
prevail.
History.-Am. C.S. for S.J.R. 380, 1989; adopted 1990.
SECTION 4. Quorum and procedure.-
(a) A majority of the membership of each house shall constitute a
quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and compel the
presence of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as it
may prescribe. Each house shall determine its rules of procedure.
(b) Sessions of each house shall be public; except sessions of the
senate when considering appointment to or removal from public office may
be closed.
(c) Each house shall keep and publish ajournal of its proceedings; and
upon the request of five members present, the vote of each member voting
on any question shall be entered on the journal. In any legislative committee
or subcommittee, the vote of each member voting on the final passage of
any legislation pending before the committee, and upon the request of any
two members of the committee or subcommittee, the vote of each member
on any other question, shall be recorded.
(d) Each house may punish a member for contempt or disorderly
conduct and, by a two-thirds vote of its membership, may expel a member.
(e) The rules of procedure of each house shall provide that all
legislative committee and subcommittee meetings of each house, and joint
conference committee meetings, shall be open and noticed to the public. The
rules of procedure of each house shall further provide that all prearranged
gatherings, between more than two members of the legislature, or between
the governor, the president of the senate, or the speaker of the house of
representatives, the purpose of which is to agree upon formal legislative
action that will be taken at a subsequent time, or at which formal legislative
action is taken, regarding pending legislation or amendments, shall be
reasonably open to the public. All open meetings shall be subject to order
and decorum. This section shall be implemented and defined by the rules of
each house, and such rules shall control admission to the floor of each
legislative chamber and may, where reasonably necessary for security
purposes or to protect a witness appearing before a committee, provide for
the closure of committee meetings. Each house shall be the sole judge for
the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of this section.
History.-Am. S.R.'s 1990, 2, 1990; adopted 1990.
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SECTION 5. Investigations; witnesses.-Each house, when in session,
may compel attendance of witnesses and production of documents and other
evidence upon any matter under investigation before it or any of its
committees, and may punish by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or
imprisonment not exceeding ninety days, or both, any person not a member
who has been guilty of disorderly or contemptuous conduct in its presence
or has refused to obey its lawful summons or to answer lawful questions.
Such powers, except the power to punish, may be conferred by law upon
committees when the legislature is not in session. Punishment of contempt
of an interim legislative committee shall be by judicial proceedings as
prescribed by law.
SECTION 6. Laws.-Every law shall embrace but one subject and
matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly
expressed in the title. No law shall be revised or amended by reference to
its title only. Laws to revise or amend shall set out in full the revised or
amended act, section, subsection or paragraph of a subsection. The enacting
clause of every law shall read: "Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State
of Florida:".
SECTION 7. Passage of bills.-Any bill may originate in either house
and after passage in one may be amended in the other. It shall be read in
each house on three separate days, unless this rule is waived by two-thirds
vote; provided the publication of its title in the journal of a house shall
satisfy the requirement for the first reading in that house. On each reading,
it shall be read by title only, unless one-third of the members present desire
it read in full. On final passage, the vote of each member voting shall be
entered on the journal. Passage of a bill shall require a majority vote in each
house. Each bill and joint resolution passed in both houses shall be signed
by the presiding officers of the respective houses and by the secretary of the
senate and the clerk of the house of representatives during the session or as
soon as practicable after its adjournment sine die.
History.-Am. SIR. 1349, 1980; adopted 1980.
SECTION 8. Executive approval and veto.-
(a) Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the
governor for his approval and shall become a law if he approves and signs
it, or fails to veto it within seven consecutive days after presentation. If
during that period or on the seventh day the legislature adjourns sine die or
takes a recess of more than thirty days, he shall have fifteen consecutive
days from the date of presentation to act on the bill. In all cases except
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general appropriation bills, the veto shall extend to the entire bill. The
governor may veto any specific appropriation in a general appropriation bill,
but may not veto any qualification or restriction without also vetoing the
appropriation to which it relates.
(b) When a bill or any specific appropriation of a general appropri-
ation bill has been vetoed by the governor, he shall transmit his signed
objections thereto to the house in which the bill originated if in session. If
that house is not in session, he shall file them with the secretary of state,
who shall lay them before that house at its next regular or special session,
and they shall be entered on its journal.
(c) If each house shall, by a two-thirds vote, re-enact the bill or
reinstate the vetoed specific appropriation of a general appropriation bill, the
vote of each member voting shall be entered on the respective journals, and
the bill shall become law or the specific appropriation reinstated, the veto
notwithstanding.
SECTION 9. Effective date of laws.-Each law shall take effect on
the sixtieth day after adjournment sine die of the session of the legislature
in which enacted or as otherwise provided therein. If the law is passed over
the veto of the governor it shall take effect on the sixtieth day after
adjournment sine die of the session in which the veto is overridden, on a
later date fixed in the law, or on a date fixed by resolution passed by both
houses of the legislature.
SECTION 10. Special laws.--No special law shall be passed unless
notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the
manner provided by general law. Such notice shall not be necessary when
the law, except the provision for referendum, is conditioned to become
effective only upon approval by vote of the electors of the area affected.
SECTION 11. Prohibited special laws.-
(a) There shall be no special law or general law of local application
pertaining to:
(1) election, jurisdiction or duties of officers, except officers of
municipalities, chartered counties, special districts or local governmental
agencies;
(2) assessment or collection of taxes for state or county purposes,
including extension of time therefor, relief of tax officers from due
performance of their duties, and relief of their sureties from liability;
(3) rules of evidence in any court;
(4) punishment for crime;
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(5) petit juries, including compensation ofjurors, except establishment
of jury commissions;
(6) change of civil or criminal venue;
(7) conditions precedent to bringing any civil or criminal proceedings,
or limitations of time therefor;
(8) refund of money legally paid or remission of fines, penalties or
forfeitures;
(9) creation, enforcement, extension or impairment of liens based on
private contracts, or fixing of interest rates on private contracts;
(10) disposal of public property, including any interest therein, for
private purposes;
(11) vacation of roads;
(12) private incorporation or grant of privilege to a private corporation;
(13) effectuation of invalid deeds, wills or other instruments, or change
in the law of descent;
(14) change of name of any person;
(15) divorce;
(16) legitimation or adoption of persons;
(17) relief of minors from legal disabilities;
(18) transfer of any property interest of persons under legal disabilities
or of estates of decedents;
(19) hunting or fresh water fishing;
(20) regulation of occupations which are regulated by a state agency;
or
'(21) any subject when prohibited by general law passed by a three-fifths
vote of the membership of each house. Such law may be amended or
repealed by like vote.
(b) In the enactment of general laws on other subjects, political
subdivisions or other governmental entities may be classified only on a basis
reasonably related to the subject of the law.
'Note.-See the following for prohibited subject matters added under the authority of this
paragraph:
s. 112.67, F.S. (Pertaining to protection of public employee retirement benefits).
s. 121.191, FS. (Pertaining to state-administered or supported retirement systems).
s. 145.16, F.S. (Pertaining to compensation of designated county officials).
s. 189.404(2), F.S. (Pertaining to independent special districts).
s. 190.049, F.S. (Pertaining to the creation of independent special districts having the powers
enumerated in two or more of the paragraphs of s. 190.012, F.S.).
s. 215.845, FS. (Pertaining to the maximum rate of interest on bonds).
s. 235.26(10), F.S. (Pertaining to the "State Uniform Building Code for Public Educational
Facilities Construction").
s. 236.014, F.S. (Pertaining to taxation for school purposes and the Florida Education Finance
Program).
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s. 298.76(1), F.S. (Pertaining to the grant of authority, power, rights, or privileges to a water
control district formed pursuant to ch. 298, F.S.).
s. 370.083, F.S. (Pertaining to the sale or purchase of speckled sea trout or weakfish).
s. 370.172(4), F.S. (Pertaining to spearfishing in salt waters and saltwater tributaries).
s. 373.503(2)(b), F.S. (Pertaining to allocation of millage for water management purposes).
SECTION 12. Appropriation bills.-Laws making appropriations for
salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the state shall
contain provisions on no other subject.
SECTION 13. Term of office.-No office shall be created the term
of which shall exceed four years except as provided herein.
SECTION 14. Civil service system.-By law there shall be created
a civil service system for state employees, except those expressly exempted,
and there may be created civil service systems and boards for county,
district or municipal employees and for such offices thereof as are not
elected or appointed by the governor, and there may be authorized such
boards as are necessary to prescribe the qualifications, method of selection
and tenure of such employees and officers.
SECTION 15. Terms and qualifications of legislators.-
(a) SENATORS. Senators shall be elected for terms of four years,
those from odd-numbered districts in the years the numbers of which are
multiples of four and those from even-numbered districts in even-numbered
years the numbers of which are not multiples of four; except, at the election
next following a reapportionment, some senators shall be elected for terms
of two years when necessary to maintain staggered terms.
(b) REPRESENTATIVES. Members of the house of representatives
shall be elected for terms of two years in each even-numbered year.
(c) QUALIFICATIONS. Each legislator shall be at least twenty-one
years of age, an elector and resident of the district from which elected and
shall have resided in the state for a period of two years prior to election.
(d) ASSUMING OFFICE; VACANCIES. Members of the legislature
shall take office upon election. Vacancies in legislative office shall be filled
only by election as provided by law.
SECTION 16. Legislative apportionment.-
(a) SENATORIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS. The
legislature at its regular session in the second year following each decennial
census, by joint resolution, shall apportion the state in accordance with the
constitution of the state and of the United States into not less than thirty nor
1624 [Vol. 18
900
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Constitution of the State of Florida
more than forty consecutively numbered senatorial districts of either
contiguous, overlapping or identical territory, and into not less than eighty
nor more than one hundred twenty consecutively numbered representative
districts of either contiguous, overlapping or identical territory. Should that
session adjourn without adopting such joint resolution, the governor by
proclamation shall reconvene the legislature within thirty days in special
apportionment session which shall not exceed thirty consecutive days,
during which no other business shall be transacted, and it shall be the
mandatory duty of the legislature to adopt a joint resolution of apportion-
ment.
(b) FAILURE OF LEGISLATURE TO APPORTION; JUDICIAL
REAPPORTIONMENT. In the event a special apportionment session of
the legislature finally adjourns without adopting a joint resolution of
apportionment, the attorney general shall, within five days, petition the
supreme court of the state to make such apportionment. No later than the
sixtieth day after the filing of such petition, the supreme court shall file
with the secretary of state an order making such apportionment.
(c) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF APPORTIONMENT. Within fifteen
days after the passage of the joint resolution of apportionment, the attorney
general shall petition the supreme court of the state for a declaratory
judgment determining the validity of the apportionment. The supreme court,
in accordance with its rules, shall permit adversary interests to present their
views and, within thirty days from the filing of the petition, shall enter its
judgment.
(d) EFFECT OF JUDGMENT IN APPORTIONMENT; EXTRAOR-
DINARY APPORTIONMENT SESSION. A judgment of the supreme
court of the state determining the apportionment to be valid shall be binding
upon all the citizens of the state. Should the supreme court determine that
the apportionment made by the legislature is invalid, the governor by
proclamation shall reconvene the legislature within five days thereafter in
extraordinary apportionment session which shall not exceed fifteen days,
during which the legislature shall adopt a joint resolution of apportionment
conforming to the judgment of the supreme court.
(e) EXTRAORDINARY APPORTIONMENT SESSION; REVIEW
OF APPORTIONMENT. Within fifteen days after the adjournment of an
extraordinary apportionment session, the attorney general shill file a
petition in the supreme court of the state setting forth the apportionment
resolution adopted by the legislature, or if none has been adopted teporting
that fact to the court. Consideration of the validity of a joint resolution of
apportionment shall be had as provided for in cases of such joint resolution
adopted at a regular or special apportionment session.
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(f) JUDICIAL REAPPORTIONMENT. Should an extraordinary
apportionment session fail to adopt a resolution of apportionment or should
the supreme court determine that the apportionment made is invalid, the
court shall, not later than sixty days after receiving the petition of the
attorney general, file with the secretary of state an order making such
apportionment.
SECTION 17. Impeachment.-
(a) The governor, lieutenant governor, members of the cabinet,
justices of the supreme court, judges of district courts of appeal, judges of
circuit courts, and judges of county courts shall be liable to impeachment
for misdemeanor in office. The house of representatives by two-thirds vote
shall have the power to impeach an officer. The speaker of the house of
representatives shall have power at any time to appoint a committee to
investigate charges against any officer subject to impeachment.
(b) An officer impeached by the house of representatives shall be
disqualified from performing any official duties until acquitted by the
senate, and unless the governor is impeached he may by appointment fill
the office until completion of the trial.
(c) All impeachments by the house of representatives shall be tried by
the senate. The chief justice of the supreme court, or another justice
designated by him, shall preside at the trial, except in a trial of the chief
justice, in which case the governor shall preside. The senate shall determine
the time for the trial of any impeachment and may sit for the trial whether
the house of representatives be in session or not. The time fixed for trial
shall not be more than six months after the impeachment. During an
impeachment trial senators shall be upon their oath or affirmation. No
officer shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the senate present. Judgment of conviction in cases of
impeachment shall remove the offender from office and, in the discretion
of the senate, may include disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust
or profit. Conviction or acquittal shall not affect the civil or criminal
responsibility of the officer.
History.-Am. S.J.R. 459, 1987; adopted 1988.
SECTION 18. Conflict of interest.-A code of ethics for all state
employees and nonjudicial officers prohibiting conflict between public duty
and private interests shall be prescribed by law.
SECTION 19. State Budgeting, Planning and Appropriations
Processes.-
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(a) ANNUAL BUDGETING. Effective July 1, 1994, general law
shall prescribe the adoption of annual state budgetary and planning processes
and require that detail reflecting the annualized costs of the state budget and
reflecting the nonrecurring costs of the budget requests shall accompany
state department and agency legislative budget requests, the governor's
recommended budget, and appropriation bills. For purposes of this
subsection, the terms department and agency shall include the judicial
branch.
(b) APPROPRIATION BILLS FORMAT. Separate sections within
the general appropriation bill shall be used for each major program area of
the state budget; major program areas shall include: education enhancement
"lottery" trust fund items; education (all other funds); human services;
criminal justice and corrections; natural resources, environment, growth
management, and transportation; general government; and judicial branch.
Each major program area shall include an itemization of expenditures for:
state operations; state capital outlay; aid to local governments and nonprofit
organizations operations; aid to local governments and nonprofit organiza-
tions capital outlay; federal funds and the associated state matching funds;
spending authorizations for operations; and spending authorizations for
capital outlay. Additionally, appropriation bills passed by the legislature
shall include an itemization of specific appropriations that exceed one
million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in 1992 dollars. For purposes of this
subsection, "specific appropriation," "itemization," and "major program
area" shall be defined by law. This itemization threshold shall be adjusted
by general law every four years to reflect the rate of inflation or deflation
as indicated in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, U.S.
City Average, All Items, or successor reports as reported by the United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics or its successor.
Substantive bills containing appropriations shall also be subject to the
itemization requirement mandated under this provision and shall be subject
to the governor's specific appropriation veto power described in Article III,
Section 8. This subsection shall be effective July 1, 1994.
(c) APPROPRIATIONS REVIEW PROCESS. Effective July 1, 1993,
general law shall prescribe requirements for each department and agency of
state government to submit a planning document and supporting budget
request for review by the appropriations committees of both houses of the
legislature. The review shall include a comparison of the major issues in the
planning document and budget requests to those major issues included in the
governor's recommended budget. For purposes of this subsection, the terms
department and agency shall include the judicial branch.
(d) SEVENTY-TWO HOUR PUBLIC REVIEW PERIOD.
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Effective November 4, 1992, all general appropriation bills shall be
furnished to each member of the legislature, each member of the cabinet, the
governor, and the chief justice of the supreme court at least seventytwo
hours before final passage thereof, by either house of the legislature.
(e) FINAL BUDGET REPORT. Effective November 4, 1992, a final
budget report shall be prepared as prescribed by general law. The final
budget report shall be produced no later than the 90th day after the
beginning of the fiscal year, and copies of the report shall be furnished to
each member of the legislature, the head of each department and agency of
the state, the auditor general, and the chief justice of the supreme court.
(f) TRUST FUNDS.
(1) No trust fund of the State of Florida or other public body may be
created by law without a three-fifths (3/5) vote of the membership of each
house of the legislature in a separate bill for that purpose only.
(2) State trust funds in existence before the effective date of this
subsection shall terminate not more than four years after the effective date
of this subsection. State trust funds created after the effective date of this
subsection shall terminate not more than four years after the effective date
of the act authorizing the creation of the trust fund. By law the legislature
may set a shorter time period for which any trust fund is authorized.
(3) Trust funds required by federal programs or mandates; trust funds
established for bond covenants, indentures, or resolutions, whose revenues
are legally pledged by the state or public body to meet debt service or other
financial requirements of any debt obligations of the state or any public
body; the state transportation trust fund; the trust fund containing the net
annual proceeds from the Florida Education Lotteries; the Florida retirement
trust fund; trust funds for institutions under the management of the Board
of Regents, where such trust funds are for auxiliary enterprises and
contracts, grants, and donations, as those terms are defined by general law;
trust funds that serve as clearing funds or accounts for the comptroller or
state agencies; trust funds that account for assets held by the state in a
trustee capacity as an agent or fiduciary for individuals, private organiza-
tions, or other governmental units; and other trust funds authorized by this
Constitution, are not subject to the requirements set forth in paragraph (2)
of this subsection.
(4) All cash balances and income of any trust funds abolished under
this subsection shall be deposited into the general revenue fund.
(5) The provisions of this subsection shall be effective November 4,
1992.
(g) BUDGET STABILIZATION FUND. Beginning with the 1994-
-1995 fiscal year, at least 1% of an amount equal to the last completed fiscal
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year's net revenue collections for the general revenue fund shall be retained
in a budget stabilization fund. The budget stabilization fund shall be
increased to at least 2% of said amount for the 1995-1996 fiscal year, at
least 3% of said amount for the 1996-1997 fiscal year, at least 4% of said
amount for the 1997-1998 fiscal year, and at least 5% of said amount for
the 1998-1999 fiscal year. Subject to the provisions of this subsection, the
budget siabilization fund shall be maintained at an amount equal to at least
5% of the last completed fiscal year's net revenue collections for the general
revenue fund. The budget stabilization fund's principal balance shall not
exceed an amount equal to 10% of the last completed fiscal year's net
revenue collections for the general revenue fund. The legislature shall
provide criteria for withdrawing funds from the budget stabilization fund in
a separate bill for that purpose only and only for the purpose of covering
revenue shortfalls of the general revenue fund or for the purpose of
providing funding for an emergency, as defined by general law. General law
shall provide for the restoration of this fund. The budget stabilization fund
shall be comprised of funds not otherwise obligated or committed for any
purpose.
(h) STATE PLANNING DOCUMENT AND DEPARTMENT AND
AGENCY PLANNING DOCUMENT PROCESSES. The governor shall
recommend to the legislature biennially any revisions to the state planning
document, as defined by law. General law shall require a biennial review
and revision of the state planning document, shall require the governor to
report to the legislature on the progress in achieving the state planning
document's goals, and shall require all departments and agencies of state
government to develop planning documents consistent with the state
planning document. The state planning document and department and
agency planning documents shall remain subject to review and revision by
the legislature. The department and agency planning documents shall include
a prioritized listing of planned expenditures for review and possible
reduction in the event of revenue shortfalls, as defined by general law. To
ensure productivity and efficiency in the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, a quality management and accountability program shall be
implemented by general law. For the purposes of this subsection, the terms
department and agency shall include the judicial branch. This subsection
shall be effective July 1, 1993.
History.-Proposed by Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, Revision No. 1, 1992, filedwith
the Secretary of State May 7, 1992; adopted 1992.
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ARTICLE IV
EXECUTIVE
Sec.
1. Governor.
2. Lieutenant governor.
3. Succession to office of governor; acting governor.
4. Cabinet.
5. Election of governor, lieutenant governor and cabinet members;
qualifications; terms.
6. Executive departments.
7. Suspensions; filling office during suspensions.
8. Clemency.
9. Game and fresh water fish commission.
10. Attorney General.
11. Department of Veterans Affairs.
12. Department of Elderly Affairs.
13. Revenue Shortfalls.
SECTION 1. Governor.-
(a) The supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor. He
shall be commander-in-chief of all military forces of the state not in active
service of the United States. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, commission all officers of the state and counties, and transact all
necessary business with the officers of government. He may require
information in writing from all executive or administrative state, county or
municipal officers upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
offices. The governor shall be the chief administrative officer of the state
responsible for the planning and budgeting for the state.
(b) The governor may initiate judicial proceedings in the name of the
state against any executive or administrative state, county or municipal
officer to enforce compliance with any duty or restrain any unauthorized act.
(c) The governor may request in writing the opinion of the justices of
the supreme court as to the interpretation of any portion of this constitution
upon any question affecting his executive powers and duties. The justices
shall, subject to their rules of procedure, permit interested persons to be
heard on the questions presented and shall render their written opinion not
earlier than ten days from the filing and docketing of the request, unless in
their judgment the delay would cause public injury.
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(d) The governor shall have power to call out the militia to preserve
the public peace, execute the laws of the state, suppress insurrection, or
repel invasion.
(e) The governor shall by message at least once in each regular
session inform the legislature concerning the condition of the state, propose
such reorganization of the executive department as will promote efficiency
and economy, and recommend measures in the public interest.
(f) When not otherwise provided for in this constitution, the governor
shall fill by appointment any vacancy in state or county office for the
remainder of the term of an appointive office, and for the remainder of the
term of an elective office if less than twenty-eight months, otherwise until
the first Tuesday after the first Monday following the next general election.
History.-Am. proposed by Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, Revision No. I, 1992, filed
with the Secretary of State May 7, 1992; adopted 1992.
SECTION 2. Lieutenant governor.-There shall be a lieutenant
governor. He shall perform such duties pertaining to the office of governor
as shall be assigned to him by the governor, except when otherwise
provided by law, and such other duties as may be prescribed by law.
SECTION 3. Succession to office of governor; acting governor.-
(a) Upon vacancy in the office of governor, the lieutenant governor
shall become governor. Further succession to the office of governor shall be
prescribed by law. A successor shall serve for the remainder of the term.
(b) Upon impeachment of the governor and until completion of trial
thereof, or during his physical or mental incapacity, the lieutenant governor
shall act as governor. Further succession as acting governor shall be
prescribed by law. Incapacity to serve as governor may be determined by
the suprene court upon due notice after docketing of a written suggestion
thereof by four cabinet members, and in such case restoration of capacity
shall be similarly determined after docketing of written suggestion thereof
by the governor, the legislature or four cabinet members. Incapacity to serve
as governor may also be established by certificate filed with the secretary
of state by the governor declaring his incapacity for physical reasons to
serve as governor, and in such case restoration of capacity shall be similarly
established.
SECTION 4. Cabinet.-
(a) There shall be a cabinet composed of a secretary of state, an
attorney general, a comptroller, a treasurer, a commissioner of agriculture
and a commissioner of education. In addition to the powers and duties
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specified herein, they shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as
may be prescribed by law.
(b) The secretary of state shall keep the records of the official acts of
the legislative and executive departments.
(c) The attorney general shall be the chief state legal officer. There is
created in the office of the attorney general the position of statewide
prosecutor. The statewide prosecutor shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
the state attorneys to prosecute violations of criminal laws occurring or
having occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related
transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or has affected two or
more judicial circuits as provided by general law. The statewide prosecutor
shall be appointed by the attorney general from not less than three persons
nominated by the judicial nominating commission for the supreme court, or
as otherwise provided by general law.
(d) The comptroller shall serve as the chief fiscal officer of the state,
and shall settle and approve accounts against the state.
(e) The treasurer shall keep all state funds and securities. He shall
disburse state funds only upon the order of the comptroller. Such order may
be in any form and may require the disbursement of state funds by
electronic means or by means of a magnetic tape or any other transfer
medium.
(f) The commissioner of agriculture shall have supervision of matters
pertaining to agriculture except as otherwise provided by law.
(g) The commissioner of education shall supervise the public education
system in the manner prescribed by law.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 435, 1983; adopted 1984; Am. H.J.R. 386, 1985; adopted 1986.
SECTION 5. Election of governor, lieutenant governor and cabinet
members; qualifications; terms.-
(a) At a state-wide general election in each calendar year the number
of which is even but not a multiple of four, the electors shall choose a
governor and a lieutenant governor and members of the cabinet each for a
term of four years beginning on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
January of the succeeding year. In the general election and in party
primaries, if held, all candidates for the offices of governor and lieutenant
governor shall form joint candidacies in a manner prescribed by law so that
each voter shall cast a single vote for a candidate for governor and a
candidate for lieutenant governor running together.
(b) When elected, the governor, lieutenant governor and each cabinet
member must be an elector not less than thirty years of age who has resided
in the state for the preceding seven years. The attorney general must have
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been a member of the bar of Florida for the preceding five years. No person
who has, or but for resignation would have, served as governor or acting
governor for more than six years in two consecutive terms shall be elected
governor for the succeeding term.
SECTION 6. Executive departments.-AII functions of the executive
branch of state government shall be allotted among not more than twenty-
five departments, exclusive of those specifically provided for or authorized
in this constitution. The administration of each department, unless otherwise
provided in this constitution, shall be placed by law under the direct
supervision of the governor, the lieutenant governor, the governor and
cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer or board appointed by and serving
at the pleasure of the governor, except:
(a) When provided by law, confirmation by the senate or the approval
of three members of the cabinet shall be required for appointment to or
removal from any designated statutory office.
(b) Boards authorized to grant and revoke licenses to engage in
regulated occupations shall be assigned to appropriate departments and their
members appointed for fixed terms, subject to removal only for cause.
SECTION 7. Suspensions; filling office during suspensions.-
(a) By executive order stating the grounds and filed with the secretary
of state, the governor may suspend from office any state officer not subject
to impeachment, any officer of the militia not in the active service of the
United States, or any county officer, for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect
of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform his
official duties, or commission of a felony, and may fill the office by
appointment for the period of suspension. The suspended officer may at any
time before removal be reinstated by the governor.
(b) The senate may, in proceedings prescribed by law, remove from
office or reinstate the suspended official and for such purpose the senate
may be convened in special session by its president or by a majority of its
membership.
(c) By order of the governor any elected municipal officer indicted for
crime may be suspended from office until acquitted and the office filled by
appointment for the period of suspension, not to extend beyond the term,
unless these powers are vested elsewhere by law or the municipal charter.
SECTION 8. Clemency.-
(a) Except in cases of treason and in cases where impeachment results
in conviction, the governor may, by executive order filed with the secretary
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of state, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not
exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of three members of the
cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute
punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses.
(b) In cases of treason the governor may grant reprieves until
adjournment of the regular session of the legislature convening next after the
conviction, at which session the legislature may grant a pardon or further
reprieve; otherwise the sentence shall be executed.
(c) There may be created by law a parole and probation commission
with power to supervise persons on probation and to grant paroles or
conditional releases to persons under sentences for crime. The qualifications,
method of selection and terms, not to exceed six years, of members of the
commission shall be prescribed by law.
SECTION 9. Game and fresh water fish commission.-There shall
be a game and fresh water fish commission, composed of five members
appointed by the governor subject to confirmation by the senate for
staggered terms of five years. The commission shall exercise the regulatory
and executive powers of the state with respect to wild animal life and fresh
water aquatic life, except that all license fees for taking wild animal life and
fresh water aquatic life and penalties for violating regulations of the
commission shall be prescribed by specific statute. The legislature may enact
laws in aid of the commission, not inconsistent with this section. The
commission's exercise of executive powers in the area of planning,
budgeting, personnel management, and purchasing shall be as provided by
law. Revenue derived from such license fees shall be appropriated to the
commission by the legislature for the purpose of management, protection
and conservation of wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life.
History.-Am. C.S. for H.J.R. 637, 1973; adopted 1974.
SECTION 10. Attorney General.-The attorney general shall, as
directed by general law, request the opinion of the justices of the supreme
court as to the validity of any initiative petition circulated pursuant to
Section 3 of Article XI. The justices shall, subject to their rules of
procedure, permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented
and shall render their written opinion expeditiously.
History.-Added, H.R. 71, 1986; adopted 1986.
SECTION 11. Department of Veterans Affairs.-The legislature, by
general law, may provide for the establishment of the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
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History.-Added, C.S. for HJR. 290, 1988; adopted 1988.
SECTION 12. Department of Elderly Affairs.-The legislature may
create a Department of Elderly Affairs and prescribe its duties. The
provisions governing the administration of the department must comply with
Section 6 of Article IV of the State Constitution.
History.-Added, C.S. for H.J.R. 290, 1988; adopted 1988.
SECTION 13. Revenue Shortfalls.-In the event of revenue short-
falls, as defined by general law, the governor and cabinet may establish all
necessary reductions in the state budget in order to comply with the
provisions of Article VII, Section l(d). The governor and cabinet shall
implement all necessary reductions for the executive budget, the chief justice
of the supreme court shall implement all necessary reductions for the
judicial budget, and the speaker of the house of representatives and the
president of the senate shall implement all necessary reductions for the
legislative budget. Budget reductions pursuant to this section shall be consis-
tent with the provisions of Article III, Section 19(h).
History.-roposed by Taxation and Budget Reform Commission Revision No. 1, 1992, filed with
the Secretary of State May 7, 1992; adopted 1992.
ARTICLE V
JUDICIARY
Sec.
1. Courts.
2. Administration; practice and procedure.
3. Supreme court.
4. District courts of appeal.
5. Circuit courts.
6. County courts.
7. Specialized divisions.
8. Eligibility.
9. Determination of number of judges.
10. Retention; elections and terms.
11. Vacancies.
12. Discipline; removal and retirement.
13. Prohibited activities.
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14. Judicial salaries.
15. Attorneys; admission and discipline.
16. Clerks of the circuit courts.
17. State attorneys.
18. Public defenders.
19. Judicial officers as conservators of the peace.
20. Schedule to Article V.
SECTION 1. Courts.-The judicial power shall be vested in a
supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No
other courts may be established by the state, any political subdivision or any
municipality. The legislature shall, by general law, divide the state into
appellate court districts and judicial circuits following county lines.
Commissions established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may
be granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the functions of
their offices. The legislature may establish by general law a civil traffic
hearing officer system for the purpose of hearing civil traffic infractions.
History.-S.JR. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972; Am. H.J.R. 1608, 1988; adopted 1988.
SECTION 2. Administration; practice and procedure.-
(a) The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure
in all courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the administra-
tive supervision of all courts, the transfer to the court having jurisdiction of
any proceeding when the jurisdiction of another court has been improvident-
ly invoked, and a requirement that no cause shall be dismissed because an
improper remedy has been sought. These rules may be repealed by general
law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the
legislature.
(b) The chief justice of the supreme court shall be chosen by a
majority of the members of the court. He shall be the chief administrative
officer of the judicial system. He shall have the power to assign justices or
judges, including consenting retired justices or judges, to temporary duty in
any court for which the judge is qualified and to delegate to a chief judge
of a judicial circuit the power to assign judges for duty in his respective
circuit.
(c) A chief judge for each district court of appeal shall be chosen by
a majority of the judges thereof or, if there is no majority, by the chief
justice. The chief judge shall be responsible for the administrative supervi-
sion of the court.
(d) A chief judge in each circuit shall be chosen from among the
circuit judges as provided by supreme court rule. The chief judge shall be
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responsible for the administrative supervision of the circuit courts and
county courts in his circuit.
History.--S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 3. Supreme court.-
(a) ORGANIZATION.-The supreme court shall consist of seven
justices. Of the seven justices, each appellate district shall have at least one
justice elected or appointed from the district to the supreme court who is a
resident of the district at the time of his original appointment or election.
Five justices shall constitute a quorum. The concurrence of four justices
shall be necessary to a decision. When recusals for cause would prohibit the
court from convening because of the requirements of this section, judges
assigned to temporary duty may be substituted for justices.
(b) JURISDICTION.-The supreme court:
(1) Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing
the death penalty and from decisions of district courts of appeal declaring
invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution.
(2) When provided by general law, shall hear appeals from final
judgments entered in proceedings for the validation of bonds or certificates
of indebtedness and shall review action of statewide agencies relating to
rates or service of utilities providing electric, gas, or telephone service.
(3) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly
declares valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of the
state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of constitutional
or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of
another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question
of law.
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes
upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is
certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district court
of appeal.
(5) May review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the
district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public
importance, or to have a great effect on the proper administration of justice
throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by the
supreme court.
(6) May review a question of law certified by the Supreme Court of
the United States or a United States Court of Appeals which is determinative
of the cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the supreme
court of Florida.
(7) May issue writs of prohibition to courts and all writs necessary to
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the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
(8) May issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers
and state agencies.
(9) May, or any justice may, issue writs of habeas corpus returnable
before the supreme court or any justice, a district court of appeal or any
judge thereof, or any circuit judge.
(10) Shall, when requested by the attorney general pursuant to the
provisions of Section 10 of Article IV, render an advisory opinion of the
justices, addressing issues as provided by general law.
(c) CLERK AND MARSHAL.-The supreme court shall appoint a
clerk and a marshal who shall hold office during the pleasure of the court
and perform such duties as the court directs. Their compensation shall be
fixed by general law. The marshal shall have the power to execute the
process of the court throughout the state, and in any county may deputize
the sheriff or a deputy sheriff for such purpose.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972; Am. C.S. for SIR.'s 49, 81, 1976; adopted 1976;
Am. SIR. 20-C, 1979; adopted 1980; Am. H.JR. 71, 1986; adopted 1986.
SECTION 4. District courts of appeal.-
(a) ORGANIZATION.-There shall be a district court of appeal
serving each appellate district. Each district court of appeal shall consist of
at least three judges. Three judges shall consider each case and the
concurrence of two shall be necessary to a decision.
(b) JURISDICTION.-
(1) District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that
may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial
courts, including those entered on review of administrative action, not
directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court. They may review
interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules adopted by
the supreme court.
(2) District courts of appeal shall have the power of direct review of
administrative action, as prescribed by general law.
(3) A district court of appeal or any judge thereof may issue writs of
habeas corpus returnable before the court or any judge thereof or before any
circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. A district court
of appeal may issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo
warranto, and other writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdic-
tion. To the extent necessary to dispose of all issues in a cause properly
before it, a district court of appeal may exercise any of the appellate
jurisdiction of the circuit courts.
(c) CLERKS AND MARSHALS.-Each district court of appeal shall
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appoint a clerk and a marshal who shall hold office during the pleasure of
the court and perform such duties as the court directs. Their compensation
shall be fixed by general law. The marshal shall have the power to execute
the process of the court throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
and in any county may deputize the sheriff or a deputy sheriff for such pur-
pose.
History.--SJ.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 5. Circuit courts.-
(a) ORGANIZATION.-There shall be a circuit court serving each
judicial circuit.
(b) JURISDICTION.-The circuit courts shall have original juris-
diction not vested in the county courts, and jurisdiction of appeals when
provided by general law. They shall have the power to issue writs of
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and all
writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the circuit court shall be uniform throughout the state. They
shall have the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by
general law.
History.--S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 6. County courts.-
(a) ORGANIZATION.-There shall be a county court in each county.
There shall be one or more judges for each county court as prescribed by
general law.
(b) JURISDICTION.-The county courts shall exercise thejurisdiction
prescribed by general law. Such jurisdiction shall be uniform throughout the
state.
History.--S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 7. Specialized divisions.-AII courts except the supreme
court may sit in divisions as may be established by general law. A circuit
or county court may hold civil and criminal trials and hearings in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court as designated by the chief
judge of the circuit.
History.--S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 8. Eligibility.-No person shall be eligible for office of
justice or judge of any court unless he is an elector of the state and resides
in the territorial jurisdiction of his court. No justice or judge shall serve after
attaining the age of seventy years except upon temporary assignment or to
complete a term, one-half of which he has served. No person is eligible for
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the office of justice of the supreme court or judge of a district court of
appeal unless he is, and has been for the preceding ten years, a member of
the bar of Florida. No person is eligible for the office of circuit judge unless
he is, and has been for the preceding five years, a member of the bar of
Florida. Unless otherwise provided by general law, no person is eligible for
the office of county court judge unless he is, and has been for the preceding
five years, a member of the bar of Florida. Unless otherwise provided by
general law, a person shall be eligible for election or appointment to the
office of county court judge in a county having a population of 40,000 or
less if he is a member in good standing of the bar of Florida.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972; Am. H.J.R. 37, 1984; adopted 1984 (effective July
1, 1985).
SECTION 9. Determination of number of judges.-The supreme
court shall establish by rule uniform criteria for the determination of the
need for additional judges except supreme court justices, the necessity for
decreasing the number of judges and for increasing, decreasing or redefining
appellate districts and judicial circuits. If the supreme court finds that a need
exists for increasing or decreasing the number of judges or increasing,
decreasing or redefining appellate districts and judicial circuits, it shall, prior
to the next regular session of the legislature, certify to the legislature its
findings and recommendations concerning such need. Upon receipt of such
certificate, the legislature, at the next regular session, shall consider the
findings and recommendations and may reject the recommendations or by
law implement the recommendations in whole or in part; provided the
legislature may create more judicial offices than are recommended by the
supreme court or may decrease the number of judicial offices by a greater
number than recommended by the court only upon a finding of two-thirds
of the membership of both houses of the legislature, that such a need exists.
A decrease in the number of judges shall be effective only after the
expiration of a term. If the supreme court fails to make findings as provided
above when need exists, the legislature may by concurrent resolution request
the court to certify its findings and recommendations and upon the failure
of the court to certify its findings for nine consecutive months, the
legislature may, upon a finding of two-thirds of the membership of both
houses of the legislature that a need exists, increase or decrease the number
of judges or increase, decrease or redefine appellate districts and judicial
circuits.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 10. Retention; election and terms.-
(a) Any justice of the supreme court or any judge of a district court
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of appeal may qualify for retention by a vote of the electors in the general
election next preceding the expiration of his term in the manner prescribed
by law. If a justice or judge is ineligible or fails to qualify for retention, a
vacancy shall exist in that office upon the expiration of the term being
served by the justice or judge. When a justice of the supreme court or a
judge of a district court of appeal so qualifies, the ballot shall read
substantially as follows: "Shall Justice (or Judge) (name of justice or judge)
of the (name of the court) be retained in office?" If a majority of the
qualified electors voting within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vote
to retain, the justice or judge shall be retained for a term of six years
commencing on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January
following the general election. If a majority of the qualified electors voting
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vote to not retain, a vacancy
shall exist in that office upon the expiration of the term being served by the
justice or judge.
(b) Circuit judges and judges of county courts shall be elected by vote
of the qualified electors within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective
courts. The terms of circuit judges shall be for six years. The terms of
judges of county courts shall be for four years.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972; Am. C.S. for SIR.'s 49, 81, 1976; adopted 1976.
SECTION 11. Vacancies.-
(a) The governor shall fill each vacancy on the supreme court or on
a district court of appeal by appointing for a term ending on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in January of the year following the next
general election occurring at least one year after the date of appointment,
one of three persons nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating
commission.
(b) The governor shall fill each vacancy on a circuit court or on a
county court by appointing for a term ending on the first Tuesday after the
first Monday in January of the year following the next primary and general
election, one of not fewer than three persons nominated by the appropriate
judicial nominating commission. An election shall be held to fill that judicial
office for the term of the office beginning at the end of the appointed term.
(c) The nominations shall be made within thirty days from the
occurrence of a vacancy unless the period is extended by the governor for
a time not to exceed thirty days. The governor shall make the appointment
within sixty days after the nominations have been certified to him.
(d) There shall be a separate judicial nominating commission as
provided by general law for the supreme court, each district court of appeal,
and each judicial circuit for all trial courts within the circuit. Uniform rules
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of procedure shall be established by the judicial nominating commissions at
each level of the court system. Such rules, or any part thereof, may be
repealed by general law enacted by a majority vote of the membership of
each house of the legislature, or by the supreme court, five justices
concurring. Except for deliberations of thejudicial nominating commissions,
the proceedings of the commissions and their records shall be open to the
public.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972; Am. C.S. for S.J.R.'s 49, 81, 1976; adopted 1976;
Am. H.J.R. 1160, 1984; adopted 1984.
SECTION 12. Discipline; removal and retirement.-
(a) There shall be a judicial qualifications commission vested with
jurisdiction to investigate and recommend to the Supreme Court of Florida
the removal from office of any justice or judge whose conduct, during term
of office or otherwise occurring on or after November 1, 1966, (without
regard to the effective date of this section) demonstrates a present unfitness
to hold office, and to investigate and recommend the reprimand of a justice
or judge whose conduct, during term of office or otherwise occurring on or
after November 1, 1966 (without regard to the effective date of this section),
warrants such a reprimand. The commission shall be composed of:
(1) Two judges of district courts of appeal selected by the judges of
those courts, two circuit judges selected by the judges of the circuit courts
and two judges of county courts selected by the judges of those courts;
(2) Two electors who reside in the state, who are members of the bar
of Florida, and who shall be chosen by the governing body of the bar of
Florida; and
(3) Five electors who reside in the state, who have never held judicial
office or been members of the bar of Florida, and who shall be appointed
by the governor.
(b) The members of the judicial qualifications commission shall serve
staggered terms, not to exceed six years, as prescribed by general law. No
member of the commission except a justice or judge shall be eligible for
state judicial office so long as he is a member of the commission and for a
period of two years thereafter. No member of the commission shall hold
office in a political party or participate in any campaign for judicial office
or hold public office; provided that a judge may participate in his own
campaign for judicial office and hold that office. The commission shall elect
one of its members as its chairman.
(c) Members of the judicial qualifications commission not subject to
impeachment shall be subject to removal from the commission pursuant to
the provisions of Article IV, Section 7, Florida Constitution.
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(d) The commission shall adopt rules regulating its proceedings, the
filling of vacancies by the appointing authorities, the disqualification of
members, and the temporary replacement of disqualified or incapacitated
members. The commission's rules, or any part thereof, may be repealed by
general law enacted by a majority vote of the membership of each house of
the legislature, or by the supreme court, five justices concurring. Until
formal charges against a justice or judge are filed by the commission with
the clerk of the supreme court of Florida all proceedings by or before the
commission shall be confidential; provided, however, upon a finding of
probable cause and the filing by the commission with said clerk of such
formal charges against a justice or judge such charges and all further
proceedings before the commission shall be public. The commission may
with seven members concurring recommend to the supreme court the
temporary suspension of any justice or judge against whom formal charges
are pending.
(e) The commission shall have access to all information from all
executive, legislative and judicial agencies, including grand juries, subject
to the rules of the commission. At any time, on request of the speaker of the
house of representatives or the governor, the commission shall make
available all information in the possession of the commission for use in
consideration of impeachment or suspension, respectively.
(f) Upon recommendation of two-thirds of the members of the judicial
qualifications commission, the supreme court may order that the justice or
judge be disciplined by appropriate reprimand, or be removed from office
with termination of compensation for willful or persistent failure to perform
his duties or for other conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary
demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office, or be involuntarily retired
for any permanent disability that seriously interferes with the performance
of his duties. Malafides, scienter or moral turpitude on the part of a justice
or judge shall not be required for removal from office of a justice or judge
whose conduct demonstrates a present unfitness to hold office. After the
filing of a formal proceeding and upon request of the commission, the
supreme court may suspend the justice or judge from office, with or without
compensation, pending final determination of the inquiry.
(g) The power of removal conferred by this section shall be both
alternative and cumulative to the power of impeachment and to the power
of suspension by the governor and removal by the senate.
(h) Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions of this section, if
the person who is the subject of proceedings by the judicial qualifications
commission is a justice of the supreme court of Florida all justices of such
court automatically shall be disqualified to sit as justices of such court with
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respect to all proceedings therein concerning such person and the supreme
court for such purposes shall be composed of a panel consisting of the seven
chief judges of the judicial circuits of the state of Florida most senior in
tenure of judicial office as circuit judge. For purposes of determining
seniority of such circuit judges in the event there be judges of equal tenure
in judicial office as circuit judge the judge or judges from the lower
numbered circuit or circuits shall be deemed senior. In the event any such
chief circuit judge is under investigation by the judicial qualifications
commission or is otherwise disqualified or unable to serve on the panel, the
next most senior chief circuit judge or judges shall serve in place of such
disqualified or disabled chief circuit judge.
(i) SCHEDULE TO SECTION 12.-
(1) The terms of office of the present members of the judicial
qualifications commission shall expire on January 1, 1975 and new members
shall be appointed to serve the following staggered terms:
a. Group I.-The terms of five members, composed of two electors
as set forth in s. 12(a)(3) of Article V, one member of the bar of Florida as
set forth in s. 12(a)(2) of Article V, one judge from the district courts of
appeal and one circuit judge as set forth in s. 12(a)(1) of Article V, shall
expire on December 31, 1976.
b. Group II.-The terms of four members, composed of one elector
as set forth in s. 12(a)(3) of Article V, one member of the bar of Florida as
set forth in s. 12(a)(2) of Article V, one circuit judge and one county judge
as set forth in s. 12(a)(1) of Article V shall expire on December 31, 1978.
c. Group III.-The terms of four members, composed of two electors
as set forth in s. 12(a)(3) of Article V, one judge from the district courts of
appeal and one county judge as set forth in s. 12(a)(1) of Article V, shall
expire on December 31, 1980.
(2) The 1976 amendment to section 12 of Article V, if submitted at
a special election, shall take effect upon approval by the electors of Florida.
History.-S.JR. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972; Am. HIR. 3911, 1974; adopted 1974; Am. HJR.
1709, 1975; adopted 1976.
SECTION 13. Prohibited activities.-AII justices and judges shall
devote full time to their judicial duties. They shall not engage in the practice
of law or hold office in any political party.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 14. Judicial salaries.-All justices and judges shall be
compensated only by state salaries fixed by general law. The judiciary shall
have no power to fix appropriations.
History.-S.JR. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
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SECTION 15. Attorneys; admission and discipline.-The supreme
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons
to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 16. Clerks of the circuit courts.-There shall be in each
county a clerk of the circuit court who shall be selected pursuant to the
provisions of Article VIII section 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of
the constitution, the duties of the clerk of the circuit court may be divided
by special or general law between two officers, one serving as clerk of court
and one serving as ex officio clerk of the board of county commissioners,
auditor, recorder, and custodian of all county funds. There may be a clerk
of the county court if authorized by general or special law.
History.-S.JR. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 17. State attorneys.-In each judicial circuit a state
attorney shall be elected for a term of four years. Except as otherwise
provided in this constitution, he shall be the prosecuting officer of all trial
courts in that circuit and shall perform other duties prescribed by general
law; provided, however, when authorized by general law, the violations of
all municipal ordinances may be prosecuted by municipal prosecutors. A
state attorney shall be an elector of the state and reside in the territorial
jurisdiction of the circuit. He shall be and have been a member of the bar
of Florida for the preceding five years. He shall devote full time to his
duties, and he shall not engage in the private practice of law. State attorneys
shall appoint such assistant state attorneys as may be authorized by law.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972; Am. HIR. 386, 1985; adopted 1986.
SECTION 18. Public defenders.-In each judicial circuit a public
defender shall be elected for a term of four years. He shall perform duties
prescribed by general law. A public defender shall be an elector of the state
and reside in the territorial jurisdiction of the circuit. He shall be and have
been a member of the Bar of Florida for the preceding five years. Public
defenders shall appoint such assistant public defenders as may be authorized
by law.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 19. Judicial officers as conservators of the peace.-All
judicial officers in this state shall be conservators of the peace.
History.-S.JR. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 20. Schedule to Article V.-
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(a) This article shall replace all of Article V of the Constitution of
1885, as amended, which shall then stand repealed.
(b) Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this article,
all provisions of law and rules of court in force on the effective date of this
article shall continue in effect until superseded in the manner authorized by
the constitution.
(c) After this article becomes effective, and until changed by general
law consistent with sections 1 through 19 of this article:
(1) The supreme court shall have the jurisdiction immediately
theretofore exercised by it, and it shall determine all proceedings pending
before it on the effective date of this article.
(2) The appellate districts shall be those in existence on the date of
adoption of this article. There shall be a district court of appeal in each
district. The district courts of appeal shall have the jurisdiction immediately
theretofore exercised by the district courts of appeal and shall determine all
proceedings pending before them on the effective date of this article.
(3) Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals from county courts
and municipal courts, except those appeals which may be taken directly to
the supreme court; and they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all
actions at law not cognizable by the county courts; of proceedings relating
to the settlement of the estate of decedents and minors, the granting of
letters testamentary, guardianship, involuntary hospitalization, the determina-
tion of incompetency, and other jurisdiction usually pertaining to courts of
probate; in all cases in equity including all cases relating to juveniles; of all
felonies and of all misdemeanors arising out of the same circumstances as
a felony which is also charged; in all cases involving legality of any tax
assessment or toll; in the action of ejectment; and in all actions involving
the titles or boundaries or right of possession of real property. The circuit
court may issue injunctions. There shall be judicial circuits which shall be
the judicial circuits in existence on the date of adoption of this article. The
chief judge of a circuit may authorize a county court judge to order
emergency hospitalizations pursuant to Chapter 71-131, Laws of Florida, in
the absence from the county of the circuit judge and the county court judge
shall have the power to issue all temporary orders and temporary injunctions
necessary or proper to the complete exercise of such jurisdiction.
(4) County courts shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal
misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts, of all violations of
municipal and county ordinances, and of all actions at law in which the
matter in controversy does not exceed the sum of two thousand five hundred
dollars ($2,500.00) exclusive of interest and costs, except those within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Judges of county courts shall be
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committing magistrates. The county courts shall have jurisdiction now
exercised by the county judge's courts other than that vested in the circuit
court by subsection (c)(3) hereof, the jurisdiction now exercised by the
county courts, the claims court, the small claims courts, the small claims
magistrates courts, magistrates courts, justice of the peace courts, municipal
courts and courts of chartered counties, including but not limited to the
counties referred to in Article VIII, sections 9, 10, 11 and 24 of the
Constitution of 1885.
(5) Each judicial nominating commission shall be composed of the
following:
a. Three members appointed by the Board of Governors of The
Florida Bar from among The Florida Bar members who are actively engaged
in the practice: of law with offices within the territorial jurisdiction of the
affected court, district or circuit;
b. Three electors who reside in the territorial jurisdiction of the court
or circuit appointed by the governor; and
c. Three electors who reside in the territorial jurisdiction of the court
or circuit and who are not members of the bar of Florida, selected and
appointed by a majority vote of the other six members of the commission.
(6) No justice or judge shall be a member of a judicial nominating
commission. A member of a judicial nominating commission may hold
public office other than judicial office. No member shall be eligible for
appointment to state judicial office so long as he is a member of a judicial
nominating commission and for a period of two years thereafter. All acts of
a judicial nominating commission shall be made with a concurrence of a
majority of its members.
(7) The members of a judicial nominating commission shall serve for
a term of four years except the terms of the initial members of the judicial
nominating commissions shall expire as follows:
a. The terms of one member of category a. b. and c. in subsection
(c)(5) hereof shall expire on July 1, 1974;
b. The terms of one member of category a. b. and c. in subsection
(c)(5) hereof shall expire on July 1, 1975;
c. The terms of one member of category a. b. and c. in subsection
(c)(5) hereof shall expire on July 1, 1976;
(8) All fines and forfeitures arising from offenses tried in the county
court shall be collected, and accounted for by clerk of the court, and
deposited in a special trust account. All fines and forfeitures received from
violations of ordinances or misdemeanors committed within a county or
municipal ordinances committed within a municipality within the territorial
jurisdiction of the county court shall be paid monthly to the county or
1994] 1647
923
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
municipality respectively. If any costs are assessed and collected in
connection with offenses tried in county court, all court costs shall be paid
into the general revenue fund of the state of Florida and such other funds
as prescribed by general law.
(9) Any municipality or county may apply to the chief judge of the
circuit in which that municipality or county is situated for the county court
to sit in a location suitable to the municipality or county and convenient in
time and place to its citizens and police officers and upon such application
said chief judge shall direct the court to sit in the location unless he shall
determine the request is not justified. If the chief judge does not authorize
the county court to sit in the location requested, the county or municipality
may apply to the supreme court for an order directing the county court to
sit in the location. Any municipality or county which so applies shall be
required to provide the appropriate physical facilities in which the county
court may hold court.
(10) All courts except the supreme court may sit in divisions as may be
established by local rule approved by the supreme court.
(11) A county court judge in any county having a population of 40,000
or less according to the last decennial census, shall not be required to be a
member of the bar of Florida.
(12) Municipal prosecutors may prosecute violations of municipal
ordinances.
(13) Justice shall mean a justice elected or appointed to the supreme
court and shall not include any judge assigned from any court.
(d) When this article becomes effective:
(1) All courts not herein authorized, except as provided by subsection
(d)(4) of this section shall cease to exist and jurisdiction to conclude all
pending cases and enforce all prior orders and judgments shall vest in the
court that would have jurisdiction of the cause if thereafter instituted. All
records of and property held by courts abolished hereby shall be transferred
to the proper office of the appropriate court under this article.
(2) Judges of the following courts, if their terms do not expire in 1973
and if they are eligible under subsection (d)(8) hereof, shall become
additional judges of the circuit court for each of the counties of their
respective circuits, and shall serve as such circuit judges for the remainder
of the terms to which they were elected and shall be eligible for election as
circuit judges thereafter. These courts are: civil court of record of Dade
county, all criminal courts of record, the felony courts of record of Alachua,
Leon and Volusia Counties, the courts of record of Broward, Brevard,
Escambia, Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee and Sarasota Counties, the civil and
criminal court of record of Pinellas County, and county judge's courts and
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separate juvenile courts in counties having a population in excess of 100,000
according to the 1970 federal census. On the effective date of this article,
there shall be an additional number of positions of circuit judges equal to
the number of existing circuit judges and the number of judges of the above
named courts whose term expires in 1973. Elections to such offices shall
take place at the same time and manner as elections to other state judicial
offices in 1972 and the terms of such offices shall be for a term of six
years. Unless changed pursuant to section nine of this article, the number of
circuit judges presently existing and created by this subsection shall not be
changed.
(3) In all counties having a population of less than 100,000 according
to the 1970 federal census and having more than one county judge on the
date of the adoption of this article, there shall be the same number of judges
of the county court as there are county judges existing on that date unless
changed pursuant to section 9 of this article.
(4) Municipal courts shall continue with their same jurisdiction until
amended or terminated in a manner prescribed by special or general law or
ordinances, or until January 3, 1977, whichever occurs first. On that date all
municipal courts not previously abolished shall cease to exist. Judges of
municipal courts shall remain in office and be subject to reappointment or
reelection in the manner prescribed by law until said courts are terminated
pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. Upon municipal courts being
terminated or abolished in accordance with the provisions of this subsection,
the judges thereof who are not members of the bar of Florida, shall be
eligible to seek election as judges of county courts of their respective
counties.
(5) Judges, holding elective office in all other courts abolished by this
article, whose terms do not expire in 1973 including judges established
pursuant to Article VIII, sections 9 and 11 of the Constitution of 1885 shall
serve as judges of the county court for the remainder of the term to which
they were elected. Unless created pursuant to section 9, of this Article V
such judicial office shall not continue to exist thereafter.
(6) By March 21, 1972, the supreme court shall certify the need for
additional circuit and county judges. The legislature in the 1972 regular
session may by general law create additional offices of judge, the terms of
which shall begin on the effective date of this article. Elections to such
offices shall take place at the same time and manner as election to other
state judicial offices in 1972.
(7) County judges of existing county judge's courts and justices of the
peace and magistrates' court who are not members of bar of Florida shall
be eligible to seek election as county court judges of their respective
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counties.
(8) No judge of a court abolished by this article shall become or be
eligible to become a judge of the circuit court unless he has been a member
of bar of Florida for the preceding five years.
(9) The office of judges of all other courts abolished by this article
shall be abolished as of the effective date of this article.
(10) The offices of county solicitor and prosecuting attorney shall stand
abolished, and all county solicitors and prosecuting attorneys holding such
offices upon the effective date of this article shall become and serve as
assistant state attorneys for the circuits in which their counties are situate for
the remainder of their terms, with compensation not less than that received
immediately before the effective date of this article.
(e) LIMITED OPERATION OF SOME PROVISIONS.--
(1) All justices of the supreme court, judges of the district courts of
appeal and circuit judges in office upon the effective date of this article shall
retain their offices for the remainder of their respective terms. All members
of the judicial qualifications commission in office upon the effective. date of
this article shall retain their offices for the remainder of their respective
terms. Each state attorney in office on the effective date of this article shall
retain his office for the remainder of his term.
(2) No justice or judge holding office immediately after this article
becomes effective who held judicial office on July 1, 1957, shall be subject
to retirement from judicial office because of age pursuant to section 8 of this
article.
(f) Until otherwise provided by law, the nonjudicial duties required
of county judges shall be performed by the judges of the county court.
'(g) All provisions of Article V of the Constitution of 1885, as
amended, not embraced herein which are not inconsistent with this revision
shall become statutes subject to modification or repeal as are other statutes.
(h) The requirements of section 14 relative to all county court judges
or any judge of a municipal court who continues to hold office pursuant to
subsection (d)(4) hereof being compensated by state salaries shall not apply
prior to January 3, 1977, unless otherwise provided by general law.
(i) DELETION OF OBSOLETE SCHEDULE ITEMS.--The
legislature shall have power, by concurrent resolution, to delete from this
article any subsection of this section 20 including this subsection, when all
events to which the subsection to be deleted is or could become applicable
have occurred. A legislative determination of fact made as a basis for
application of this subsection shall be subject to judicial review.
(j) EFFECTIVE DATE.-Unless otherwise provided herein, this
article shall become effective at 11:59 o'clock P.M., Eastern Standard Time,
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January 1, 1973.
History.-S.J.R. 52-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
'Note.-All provisions of Art. V of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, considered as statutory
law, were repealed by ch. 73- 303, Laws of Florida.
ARTICLE VI
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS
Sec.
1. Regulation of elections.
2. Electors.
3. Oath.
4. Disqualifications.
5. General and special elections.
6. Municipal and district elections.
SECTION 1. Regulation of elections.-All elections by the people
shall be by direct and secret vote. General elections shall be determined by
a plurality of votes cast. Registration and elections shall, and political party
functions may, be regulated by law.
SECTION 2. Electors.-Every citizen of the United States who is at
least twenty-one years of age and who has been a permanent resident for
one year in the state and six months in a county, if registered as provided
by law, shall be an elector of that county. Provisions may be made by law
for other bona fide residents of the state who are at least twenty-one years
of age to vote in the election of presidential electors.
SECTION 3. Oath.-Each eligible citizen upon registering shall
subscribe the following: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of Florida, and that I am qualified to register as an elector under the
Constitution and laws of the State of Florida."
SECTION 4. Disqualifications.-
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any
other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold
office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability.
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to any of the
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following offices:
(1) Florida representative,
(2) Florida senator,
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor,
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet,
(5) U.S. Representative from Florida, or
(6) U.S. Senator from Florida
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or,
but for resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive
years.
History.-Am. by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State July 23, 1992; adopted 1992.
SECTION 5. General and special elections.-A general election shall
be held in each county on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
November of each even-numbered year to choose a successor to each
elective state and county officer whose term will expire before the next
general election and, except as provided herein, to fill each vacancy in
elective office for the unexpired portion of the term. A general election may
be suspended or delayed due to a state of emergency or impending
emergency pursuant to general law. Special elections and referenda shall be
held as provided by law.
History.-Am. S.J.R. 162, 1992; adopted 1992.
SECTION 6. Municipal and district elections.-Registration and
elections in municipalities shall, and in other governmental entities created
by statute may, be provided by law.
ARTICLE VII
FINANCE AND TAXATION
Sec.
1. Taxation; appropriations; state expenses.
2. Taxes; rate.
3. Taxes; exemptions.
4. Taxation; assessments.
5. Estate, inheritance and income taxes.
6. Homestead exemptions.
7. Allocation of pari-mutuel taxes.
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8. Aid to local governments.
9. Local taxes.
10. Pledging credit.
11. State bonds; revenue bonds.
12. Local bonds.
13. Relief from illegal taxes.
14. Bonds for pollution control and abatement and other water facilities.
15. Revenue bonds for scholarship loans.
16. Bonds for housing and related facilities.
17. Bonds for acquiring transportation right-of-way or for constructing
bridges.
18. Laws requiring counties or municipalities to spend funds or limiting
their ability to raise revenue or receive state tax revenue.
SECTION 1. Taxation; appropriations; state expenses.-
(a) No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law. No state ad
valorem taxes shall be levied upon real estate or tangible personal property.
All other forms of taxation shall be preempted to the state except as
provided by general law.
(b) Motor vehicles, boats, airplanes, trailers, trailer coaches and mobile
homes, as defined by law, shall be subject to a license tax for their operation
in the amounts and for the purposes prescribed by law, but shall not be
subject to ad valorem taxes.
(c) No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance
of appropriation made by law.
(d) Provision shall be made by law for raising sufficient revenue to
defray the expenses of the state for each fiscal period.
SECTION 2. Taxes; rate.-All ad valorem taxation shall be at a
uniform rate within each taxing unit, except the taxes on intangible personal
property may be at different rates but shall never exceed two mills on the
dollar of assessed value; provided, as to any obligations secured by
mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien on real estate wherever located, an
intangible tax of not more than two mills on the dollar may be levied by
law to be in lieu of all other intangible assessments on such obligations.
SECTION 3. Taxes; exemptions.-
(a) All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it
for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation. A
municipality, owning property outside the municipality, may be required by
general law to make payment to the taxing unit in which the property is
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located. Such portions of property as are used predominantly for education-
al, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by
general law from taxation.
(b) There shall be exempt from taxation, cumulatively, to every head
of a family residing in this state, household goods and personal effects to
the value fixed by general law, not less than one thousand dollars, and to
every widow or widower or person who is blind or totally and permanently
disabled, property to the value fixed by general law not less than five
hundred dollars.
(c) Any county or municipality may, for the purpose of its respective
tax levy and subject to the provisions of this subsection and general law,
grant community and economic development ad valorem tax exemptions to
new businesses and expansions of existing businesses, as defined by general
law. Such an exemption may be granted only by ordinance of the county or
municipality, and only after the electors of the county or municipality voting
on such question in a referendum authorize the county or municipality to
adopt such ordinances. An exemption so granted shall apply to improve-
ments to real property made by or for the use of a new business and
improvements to real property related to the expansion of an existing
business and shall also apply to tangible personal property of such new
business and tangible personal property related to the expansion of an
existing business. The amount or limits of the amount of such exemption
shall be specified by general law. The period of time for which such
exemption may be granted to a new business or expansion of an existing
business shall be determined by general law. The authority to grant such
exemption shall expire ten years from the date of approval by the electors
of the county or municipality, and may be renewable by referendum as
provided by general law.
'(d) By general law and subject to conditions specified therein, there
may be granted an ad valorem tax exemption to a renewable energy source
device and to real property on which such device is installed and operated,
to the value fixed by general law not to exceed the original cost of the
device, and for the period of time fixed by general law not to exceed ten
years.
(e) Any county or municipality may, for the purpose of its respective
tax levy and subject to the provisions of this subsection and general law,
grant historic preservation ad valorem tax exemptions to owners of historic
properties engaging in the rehabilitation or renovation of these properties in
accordance with approved historic preservation guidelines. This exemption
may be granted only by ordinance of the county or municipality. The
amount or limits of the amount of this exemption and the requirements for
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eligible properties must be specified by general law. The period of time for
which this exemption may be granted to a property owner shall be
determined by general law.
History.-Am. SIR.'s 9-E, 15-E, 1980; adopted 1980; Am. C.S. for SIR.'s 318, 356, 1988;
adopted 1988; Am. SIR. 152, 1992; adopted 1992.
'Note.-This subsection, originally designated (c) by S.JR. IS-E, 1980, was redesignated (d) by
the editors in order to avoid confusion with subsection (c) as contained in S.J.R. 9-E, 1980.
cf-s. 19, Art. XI! Schedule.
SECTION 4. Taxation; assessments.-By general law regulations
shall be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad
valorem taxation, provided:
(a) Agricultural land, land producing high water recharge to Florida's
aquifers or land used exclusively for non-commercial recreational purposes
may be classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis of
character or use.
(b) Pursuant to general law tangible personal property held for sale
as stock in trade and livestock may be valued for taxation at a specified
percentage of its value, may be classified for tax pusposes, or may be
exempted from taxation.
(c) All persons entitled to a homestead exemption under Section 6 of
this Article shall have their homestead assessed at just value as of January
1 of the year following the effective date of this amendment. This assess-
ment shall change only as provided herein.
1. Assessments subject to this provision shall be changed annually on
January 1st of each year; but those changes in assessments shall not exceed
the lower of the following:
(A) three percent (3%) of the assessment for the prior year.
(B) the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for all urban
consumers, U.S. City Average, all items 1967= 100, or successor reports
for the preceding calendar year as initially reported by the United States
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2. No assessment shall exceed just value.
3. After any change of ownership, as provided by general law,
homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of January 1 of the
following year. Thereafter, the homestead shall be assessed as provided
herein.
4. New homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of
January 1st of the year following the establishment of the homestead. That
assessment shall only change as provided herein.
5. Changes, additions, reductions or improvements to homestead
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property shall be assessed as provided for by general law; provided,
however, after the adjustment for any change, addition, reduction or
improvement, the property shall be assessed as provided herein.
6. In the event of a termination of homestead status, the property
shall be assessed as provided by general law.
7. The provisions of this amendment are severable. If any of the
provisions of this amendment shall be held unconstitutional by any court of
competent jurisdiction, the decision of such court shall not affect or impair
any remaining provisions of this amendment.
History.-Am. S.J.R. 12-E, 1980; adopted 1980; Am. H.J.R. 214, 1987; adopted 1988; Am. by
Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State August 3, 1992; adopted 1992.
SECTION 5. Estate, inheritance and income taxes.-
(a) NATURAL PERSONS. No tax upon estates or inheritances or
upon the income of natural persons who are residents or citizens of the state
shall be levied by the state, or under its authority, in excess of the aggregate
of amounts which may be allowed to be credited upon or deducted from any
similar tax levied by the United States or any state.
(b) OTHERS. No tax upon the income of residents and citizens other
than natural persons shall be levied by the state, or under its authority, in
excess of 5% of net income, as defined by law, or at such greater rate as is
authorized by a three-fifths (3/5) vote of the membership of each house of
the legislature or as will provide for the state the maximum amount which
may be allowed to be credited against income taxes levied by the United
States and other states. There shall be exempt from taxation not less than
five thousand dollars ($5,000) of the excess of net income subject to tax
over the maximum amount allowed to be credited against income taxes
levied by the United States and other states.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. This section shall become effective immedi-
ately upon approval by the electors of Florida.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 7-B, 1971; adopted 1971.
SECTION 6. Homestead exemptions.-
(a) Every person who has the legal or equitable title to real estate and
maintains thereon the permanent residence of the owner, or another legally
or naturally dependent upon the owner, shall be exempt from taxation
thereon, except assessments for special benefits, up to the assessed valuation
of five thousand dollars, upon establishment of right thereto in the manner
prescribed by law. The real estate may be held by legal or equitable title, by
the entireties, jointly, in common, as a condominium, or indirectly by stock
ownership or membership representing the owner's or member's proprietary
interest in a corporation owning a fee or a leasehold initially in excess of
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ninety-eight years.
(b) Not more than one exemption shall be allowed any individual or
family unit or with respect to any residential unit. No exemption shall
exceed the value of the real estate assessable to the owner or, in case of
ownership through stock or membership in a corporation, the value of the
proportion which his interest in the corporation bears to the assessed value
of the property.
(c) By general law and subject to conditions specified therein, the
exemption shall be increased to a total of twenty- five thousand dollars of
the assessed value of the real estate for each school district levy. By general
law and subject to conditions specified therein, the exemption for all other
levies may be increased up to an amount not exceeding ten thousand dollars
of the assessed value of the real estate if the owner has attained age
sixty-five or is totally and permanently disabled and if the owner is not
entitled to the exemption provided in subsection (d).
(d) By general law and subject to conditions specified therein, the
exemption shall be increased to a total of the following amounts of assessed
value of real estate for each levy other than those of school districts: fifteen
thousand dollars with respect to 1980 assessments; twenty thousand dollars
with respect to 1981 assessments; twenty-five thousand dollars with respect
to assessments for 1982 and each year thereafter. However, such increase
shall not apply with respect to any assessment roll until such roll is first
determined to be in compliance with the provisions of section 4 by a state
agency designated by general law. This subsection shall stand repealed on
the effective date of any amendment to section 4 which provides for the
assessment of homestead property at a specified percentage of its just value.
(e) By general law and subject to conditions specified therein, the
Legislature may provide to renters, who are permanent residents, ad valorem
tax relief on all ad valorem tax levies. Such ad valorem tax relief shall be
in the form and amount established by general law.
History.-Am. S.J.R. I-B, 1979; adopted 1980; Am. S.R. 4-E, 1980; adopted 1980.
SECTION 7. Allocation of pari-mutuel taxes.-Taxes upon the
operation of pari-mutuel pools may be preempted to the state or allocated
in whole or In part to the counties. When allocated to the counties, the
distribution shall be in equal amounts to the several counties.
SECTION 8. Aid to local governments.-State funds may be
appropriated to the several counties, school districts, municipalities or
special districts upon such conditions as may be provided by general law.
These conditions may include the use of relative ad valorem assessment
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levels determined by a state agency designated by general law.
History.-Am. S.J.R. 4-E, 1980; adopted 1980.
SECTION 9. Local taxes.-
(a) Counties, school districts, and municipalities shall, and special
districts may, be authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be
authorized by general law to levy other taxes, for their respective purposes,
except ad valorem taxes on intangible personal property and taxes prohibited
by this constitution.
(b) Ad valorem taxes, exclusive of taxes levied for the payment of
bonds and taxes levied for periods not longer than two years when
authorized by vote of the electors who are the owners of freeholds therein
not wholly exempt from taxation, shall not be levied in excess of the
following millages upon the assessed value of real estate and tangible
personal property: for all county purposes, ten mills; for all municipal
purposes, ten mills; for all school purposes, ten mills; for water management
purposes for the northwest portion of the state lying west of the line
between ranges two and three east, 0.05 mill; for water management
purposes for the remaining portions of the state, 1.0 mill; and for all other
special districts a millage authorized by law approved by vote of the electors
who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation. A
county furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorized by law,
levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal purposes.
History.-Am. S.J.R. 1061, 1975; adopted 1976.
SECTION 10. Pledging credit.-Neither the state nor any county,
school district, municipality, special district, or agency of any of them, shall
become a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or give, lend or use its taxing
power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person;
but this shall not prohibit laws authorizing:
(a) the investment of public trust funds;
(b) the investment of other public funds in obligations of, or insured
by, the United States or any of its instrumentalities;
(c) the issuance and sale by any county, municipality, special district
or other local governmental body of (1) revenue bonds to finance or
refinance the cost of capital projects for airports or port facilities, or (2)
revenue bonds to finance or refinance the cost of capital projects for
industrial or manufacturing plants to the extent that the interest thereon is
exempt from income taxes under the then existing laws of the United States,
when, in either case, the revenue bonds are payable solely from revenue
derived from the sale, operation or leasing of the projects. If any project so
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financed, or any part thereof, is occupied or operated by any private
corporation, association, partnership or person pursuant to contract or lease
with the issuing body, the property interest created by such contract or lease
shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as other privately owned
property.
(d) a municipality, county, special district, or agency of any of them,
being a joint owner of, giving, or lending or using its taxing power or credit
for the joint ownership, construction and operation of electrical energy
generating or transmission facilities with any corporation, association,
partnership or person.
History.-Am. HIR. 1424, 1973; adopted 1974.
SECTION 11. State bonds; revenue bonds.-
(a) State bonds pledging the full faith and credit of the state may be
issued only to finance or refinance the cost of state fixed capital outlay
projects authorized by law, and purposes incidental thereto, upon approval
by a vote of the electors; provided state bonds issued pursuant to this
subsection may be refunded without a vote of the electors at a lower net
average interest cost rate. The total outstanding principal of state bonds
issued pursuant to this subsection shall never exceed fifty percent of the
total tax revenues of the state for the two preceding fiscal years, excluding
any tax revenues held in trust under the provisions of this constitution.
(b) Moneys sufficient to pay debt service on state bonds as the same
becomes due shall be appropriated by law.
(c) Any state bonds pledging the full faith and credit of the state
issued under this section or any other section of this constitution may be
combined for the purposes of sale.
(d) Revenue bonds may be issued by the state or its agencies without
a vote of the electors to finance or refinance the cost of state fixed capital
outlay projects authorized by law, and purposes incidental thereto, and shall
be payable solely from funds derived directly from sources other than state
tax revenues.
(e) Each project, building, or facility to be financed or refinanced with
revenue bonds issued under this section shall first be approved by the
Legislature by an act relating to appropriations or by general law.
History.-Am. C.S. for C.S. for S.J.R. 612, 1984; adopted 1984.
SECTION 12. Local bonds.-Counties, school districts, municipalities,
special districts and local governmental bodies with taxing powers may issue
bonds, certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certifi-
cates, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve
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months after issuance only:
(a) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and only
when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein
not wholly exempt from taxation; or
(b) to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption premium
thereon at a lower net average interest cost rate.
SECTION 13. Relief from illegal taxes.-Until payment of all taxes
which have been legally assessed upon the property of the same owner, no
court shall grant relief from the payment of any tax that may be illegal or
illegally assessed.
SECTION 14. Bonds for pollution control and abatement and other
water facilities.-
(a) When authorized by law, state bonds pledging the full faith and
credit of the state may be issued without an election to finance the
construction of air and water pollution control and abatement and solid
waste disposal facilities and other water facilities authorized by general law
(herein referred to as "facilities") to be operated by any municipality,
county, district or authority, or any agency thereof (herein referred to as
"local governmental agencies"), or by any agency of the State of Florida.
Such bonds shall be secured by a pledge of and shall be payable primarily
from all or any part of revenues to be derived from operation of such
facilities, special assessments, rentals to be received under lease-purchase
agreements herein provided for, any other revenues that may be legally
available for such purpose, including revenues from other facilities, or any
combination thereof (herein collectively referred to as "pledged revenues"),
and shall be additionally secured by the full faith and credit of the State of
Florida.
(b) No such bonds shall be issued unless a state fiscal agency, created
by law, has made a determination that in no state fiscal year will the debt
service requirements of the bonds proposed to be issued and all other bonds
secured by the pledged revenues exceed seventy-five per cent of the pledged
revenues.
(c) The state may lease any of such facilities to any local govern-
mental agency, under lease-purchase agreements for such periods and under
such other terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon. The local
governmental agencies may pledge the revenues derived from such leased
facilities or any other available funds for the payment of rentals thereunder;
and, in addition, the full faith and credit and taxing power of such local
governmental agencies may be pledged for the payment of such rentals
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without any election of freeholder electors or qualified electors.
(d) The state may also issue such bonds for the purpose of loaning
money to local governmental agencies, for the construction of such facilities
to be owned or operated by any of such local governmental agencies. Such
loans shall bear interest at not more than one-half of one per cent per annum
greater than the last preceding issue of state bonds pursuant to this section,
shall be secured by the pledged revenues, and may be additionally secured
by the full faith and credit of the local governmental agencies.
(e) The total outstanding principal of state bonds issued pursuant to
this section 14 shall never exceed fifty per cent of the total tax revenues of
the state for the two preceding fiscal years.
History.-C.S. for H.J.R.'s 3853, 4040, 1970; adopted 1970; Am. H.J.R. 1471, 1980; adopted
1980.
SECTION 15. Revenue bonds for scholarship loans.-
(a) When authorized by law, revenue bonds may be issued to establish
a fund to make loans to students determined eligible as prescribed by law
and who have been admitted to attend any public or private institutions of
higher learning, junior colleges, health related training institutions, or
vocational training centers, which are recognized or accredited under terms
and conditions prescribed by law. Revenue bonds issued pursuant to this
section shall be secured by a pledge of and shall be payable primarily from
payments of interest, principal, and handling charges to such fund from the
recipients of the loans and, if authorized by law, may be additionally
secured by student fees and by any other moneys in such fund. There shall
be established from the proceeds of each issue of revenue bonds a reserve
account in an amount equal to and sufficient to pay the greatest amount of
principal, interest, and handling charges to become due on such issue in any
ensuing state fiscal year.
(b) Interest moneys in the fund established pursuant to this section, not
required in any fiscal year for payment of debt service on then outstanding
revenue bonds or for maintenance of the reserve account, may be used for
educational loans to students determined to be eligible therefor in the
manner provided by law, or for such other related purposes as may be
provided by law.
History.-Added, HIR. 46-D, 1971; adopted 1972.
SECTION 16. Bonds for housing and related facilities.-
(a) When authorized by law, revenue bonds may be issued without an
election to finance or refinance housing and related facilities in Florida,
herein referred to as "facilities."
(b) The bonds shall be secured by a pledge of and shall be payable
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primarily from all or any part of revenues to be derived from the financing,
operation or sale of such facilities, mortgage or loan payments, and any
other revenues or assets that may be legally available for such purposes
derived from sources other than ad valorem taxation, including revenues
from other facilities, or any combination thereof, herein collectively referred
to as "pledged revenues," provided that in no event shall the full faith and
credit of the state be pledged to secure such revenue bonds.
(c) No bonds shall be issued unless a state fiscal agency, created by
law, has made a determination that in no state fiscal year will the debt
service requirements of the bonds proposed to be issued and all other bonds
secured by the same pledged revenues exceed the pledged revenues available
for payment of such debt service requirements, as defined by law.
History.-Added, SIR. 6-E, 1980; adopted 1980.
cf-s. 18, Art. XII Schedule.
SECTION 17. Bonds for acquiring transportation right-of-way or
for constructing bridges.-
(a) When authorized by law, state bonds pledging the full faith and
credit of the state may be issued, without a vote of the electors, to finance
or refinance the cost of acquiring real property or the rights to real property
for state roads as defined by law, or to finance or refinance the cost of state
bridge construction, and purposes incidental to such property acquisition or
state bridge construction.
(b) Bonds issued under this section shall be secured by a pledge of
and shall be payable primarily from motor fuel or special fuel taxes, except
those defined in Section 9(c) of Article XII, as provided by law, and shall
additionally be secured by the full faith and credit of the state.
(c) No bonds shall be issued under this section unless a state fiscal
agency, created by law, has made a determination that in no state fiscal year
will the debt service requirements of the bonds proposed to be issued and
all other bonds secured by the same pledged revenues exceed ninety percent
of the pledged revenues available for payment of such debt service
requirements, as defined by law. For the purposes of this subsection, the
term "pledged revenues" means all revenues pledged to the payment of debt
service, excluding any pledge of the full faith and credit of the state.
History.-Added, C.S. for C.S. for S.J.R. 391, 1988; adopted 1988.
SECTION 18. Laws requiring counties or municipalities to spend
funds or limiting their ability to raise revenue or receive state tax reve-
nue.-
(a) No county or municipality shall be bound by any general law
requiring such county or municipality to spend funds or to take an action
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requiring the expenditure of funds unless the legislature has determined that
such law fulfills an important state interest and unless: funds have been
appropriated that have been estimated at the time of enactment to be
sufficient to fund such expenditure; the legislature authorizes or has
authorized a county or municipality to enact a funding source not available
for such county or municipality on February 1, 1989, that can be used to
generate the amount of funds estimated to be sufficient to fund such
expenditure by a simple majority vote of the governing body of such county
or municipality; the law requiring such expenditure is approved by
two-thirds of the membership in each house of the legislature; the expendi-
ture is required to comply with a law that applies to all persons similarly
situated, including the state and local governments; or the law is either
required to comply with a federal requirement or required for eligibility for
a federal entitlement, which federal requirement specifically contemplates
actions by counties or municipalities for compliance.
(b) Except upon approval of each house of the legislature by
two-thirds of' the membership, the legislature may not enact, amend, or
repeal any general law if the anticipated effect of doing so would be to
reduce the authority that municipalities or counties have to raise revenues
in the aggregate, as such authority exists on February 1, 1989.
(c) Except upon approval of each house of the legislature by
two-thirds of the membership, the legislature may not enact, amend, or
repeal any general law if the anticipated effect of doing so would be to
reduce the percentage of a state tax shared with counties and municipalities
as an aggregate on February 1, 1989. The provisions of this subsection shall
not apply to enhancements enacted after February 1, 1989, to state tax
sources, or during a fiscal emergency declared in a written joint proclama-
tion issued by the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of
representatives, or where the legislature provides additional state-shared
revenues which are anticipated to be sufficient to replace the anticipated
aggregate loss of state-shared revenues resulting from the reduction of the
percentage of the state tax shared with counties and municipalities, which
source of replacement revenues shall be subject to the same requirements for
repeal or modification as provided herein for a state-shared tax source
existing on February 1, 1989.
(d) Laws adopted to require funding of pension benefits existing on
the effective date of this section, criminal laws, election laws, the general
appropriations act, special appropriations acts, laws reauthorizing but not
expanding then-existing statutory authority, laws having insignificant fiscal
impact, and laws creating, modifying, or repealing noncriminal infractions,
are exempt from the requirements of this section.
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(e) The legislature may enact laws to assist in the implementation and
enforcement of this section.
History.-Added, C.S. for C.S. for C.S. for C.S. for H.J.R.'s 139, 40, 1989; adopted 1990.
ARTICLE VIII
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Sec.
I. Counties.
2. Municipalities.
3. Consolidation.
4. Transfer of powers.
5. Local option.
6. Schedule to Article VIII.
SECTION 1. Counties.-
(a) POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS. The state shall be divided by law
into political subdivisions called counties. Counties may be created,
abolished or changed by law, with provision for payment or apportionment
of the public debt.
(b) COUNTY FUNDS. The care, custody and method of disbursing
county funds shall be provided by general law.
(c) GOVERNMENT. Pursuant to general or special law, a county
government may be established by charter which shall be adopted, amended
or repealed only upon vote of the electors of the county in a special election
called for that purpose.
(d) COUNTY OFFICERS. There shall be elected by the electors of
each county, for terms of four years, a sheriff, a tax collector, a property
appraiser, a supervisor of elections, and a clerk of the circuit court; except,
when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of the
electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner
therein specified, or any county office may be abolished when all the duties
of the office prescribed by general law are transferred to another office.
When not otherwise provided by county charter or special law approved by
vote of the electors, the clerk of the circuit court shall be ex officio clerk of
the board of county commissioners, auditor, recorder and custodian of all
county funds.
(e) COMMISSIONERS. Except when otherwise provided by county
charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of county
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commissioners composed of five or seven members serving staggered terms
of four years. After each decennial census the board of county commission-
ers shall divide the county into districts of contiguous territory as nearly
equal in population as practicable. One commissioner residing in each
district shall be elected as provided by law.
(f) NON-CHARTER GOVERNMENT. Counties not operating under
county charters shall have such power of self-government as is provided by
general or special law. The board of county commissioners of a county not
operating under a charter may enact, in a manner prescribed by general law,
county ordinances not inconsistent with general or special law, but an
ordinance in conflict with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective
within the municipality to the extent of such conflict.
(g) CHARTER GOVERNMENT. Counties operating under county
charters shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with
general law,, or with special law approved by vote of the electors. The
governing body of a county operating under a charter may enact county
ordinances not inconsistent with general law. The charter shall provide
which shall prevail in the event of conflict between county and municipal
ordinances.
(h) TAXES; LIMITATION. Property situate within municipalities
shall not be subject to taxation for services rendered by the county
exclusively for the benefit of the property or residents in unincorporated
areas.
(i) COUNTY ORDINANCES. Each county ordinance shall be filed
with the secretary of state and shall become effective at such time thereafter
as is provided by general law.
(j) VIOLATION OF ORDINANCES. Persons violating county
ordinances shall be prosecuted and punished as provided by law.
(k) COUNTY SEAT. In every county there shall be a county seat at
which shall be located the principal offices and permanent records of all
county officers. The county seat may not be moved except as provided by
general law. Branch offices for the conduct of county business may be
established elsewhere in the county by resolution of the governing body of
the county in the manner prescribed by law. No instrument shall be deemed
recorded in the county until filed at the county seat according to law.
History.--Am. H.J.R. 1907, 1973; adopted 1974; Am. H.J.R. 452, 1984; adopted 1984.
SECTION 2. Municipalities.-
(a) ESTABLISHMENT. Municipalities may be established or
abolished and their charters amended pursuant to general or special law.
When any municipality is abolished, provision shall be made for the
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protection of its creditors.
(b) POWERS. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and
proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by
law. Each municipal legislative body shall be elective.
(c) ANNEXATION. Municipal annexation of unincorporated territory,
merger of municipalities, and exercise of extra-territorial powers by
municipalities shall be as provided by general or special law.
SECTION 3. Consolidation.-The government of a county and the
government of one or more municipalities located therein may be consol-
idated into a single government which may exercise any and all powers of
the county and the several municipalities. The consolidation plan may be
proposed only by special law, which shall become effective if approved by
vote of the electors of the county, or of the county and municipalities
affected, as may be provided in the plan. Consolidation shall not extend the
territorial scope of taxation for the payment of pre-existing debt except to
areas whose residents receive a benefit from the facility or service for which
the indebtedness was incurred.
SECTION 4. Transfer of powers.-By law or by resolution of the
governing bodies of each of the governments affected, any function or
power of a county, municipality or special district may be transferred to or
contracted to be performed by another county, municipality or special
district, after approval by vote of the electors of the transferor and approval
by vote of the electors of the transferee, or as otherwise provided by law.
SECTION 5. Local option.-Local option on the legality or prohibi-
tion of the sale of intoxicating liquors, wines or beers shall be preserved to
each county. The status of a county with respect thereto shall be changed
only by vote of the electors in a special election called upon the petition of
twenty-five per cent of the electors of the county, and not sooner than two
years after an earlier election on the same question. Where legal, the sale of
intoxicating liquors, wines and beers shall be regulated by law.
SECTION 6. Schedule to Article VIII.-
(a) This article shall replace all of Article VIII of the Constitution of
1885, as amended, except those sections expressly retained and made a part
of this article by reference.
(b) COUNTIES; COUNTY SEATS; MUNICIPALITIES; DISTRICTS.
[Vol. 181666
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The status of the following items as they exist on the date this article
becomes effe'ctive is recognized and shall be continued until changed in
accordance with law: the counties of the state; their status with respect to the
legality of the sale of intoxicating liquors, wines and beers; the method of
selection of county officers; the performance of municipal functions by
county officers; the county seats; and the municipalities and special districts
of the state, their powers, jurisdiction and government.
(c) OFFICERS TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE. Every person holding
office when this article becomes effective shall continue in office for the
remainder of the term if that office is not abolished. If the office is
abolished the incumbent shall be paid adequate compensation, to be fixed
by law, for the loss of emoluments for the remainder of the term.
(d) ORDINANCES. Local laws relating only to unincorporated areas
of a county on the effective date of this article may be amended or repealed
by county ordinance.
(e) CONSOLIDATION AND HOME RULE. Article VIII, Sections
19, 210, '11 and '24, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, shall remain
in full force and effect as to eacfi county affected, as if this article had not
been adopted, until that county shall expressly adopt a charter or home rule
plan pursuant to this article. All provisions of the Metropolitan Dade County
Home Rule Charter, heretofore or hereafter adopted by the electors of Dade
County pursuant to 3Article VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution of 1885,
as amended, shall be valid, and any amendments to such charter shall be
valid; provided that the said provisions of such charter and the said
amendments thereto are authorized under said 3Article VIII, Section 11, of
the Constitution of 1885, as amended.
(f) DADE COUNTY; POWERS CONFERRED UPON MUNICI-
PALITIES. To the extent not inconsistent with the powers of existing
municipalities or general law, the Metropolitan Government of Dade County
may exercise all the powers conferred now or hereafter by general law upon
municipalities.
(g) DELETION OF OBSOLETE SCHEDULE ITEMS. The
legislature shall have power, by joint resolution, to delete from this article
any subsection of this Section 6, including this subsection, when all events
to which the subsection to be deleted is or could become applicable have
occurred. A legislative determination of fact made as a basis for application
of this subsection shall be subject to judicial review.
'Note.-Section 9 of Art. VIII of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION 9. Legislative power over city of Jacksonville and Duval County.--The Legislature shall
have power to establish, alter or abolish, a Municipal corporation to be known as the City of
Jacksonville, extending territorially throughout the present limits of Duval County, in the place of any
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or all county, district, municipal and local governments, boards, bodies and officers, constitutional or
statutory, legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative, and shall prescribe the jurisdiction, powers,
duties and functions of such municipal corporation, its legislative, executive, judicial and administrative
departments and its boards, bodies and officers; to divide the territory included in such municipality into
subordinate districts, and to prescribe ajust and reasonable system of taxation for such municipality and
districts; and to fix the liability of such municipality and districts. Bonded and other indebtedness,
existing at the time of the establishment of such municipality, shall be enforceable only against property
theretofore taxable therefor. The Legislature shall, from time to time, determine what portion of said
municipality is a rural area, and a homestead in such rural area shall not be limited as if in a city or
town. Such municipality may exercise all the powers of a municipal corporation and shall also be
recognized as one of the legal political divisions of the State with the duties and obligations of a county
and shall be entitled to all the powers, rights and privileges, including representation in the State
Legislature, which would accrue to it if it were a county. All property of Duval County and of the
municipalities in said county shall vest in such municipal corporation when established as herein
provided. The offices of Clerk of the Circuit Court and Sheriff shall not be abolished but the Legislature
may prescribe the time when, and the method by which, such offices shall be filled and the compensation
to be paid to such officers and may vest in them additional powers and duties. No county office shall
be abolished or consolidated with another office without making provision for the performance of all
State duties now or hereafter prescribed by law to be performed by such county officer. Nothing
contained herein shall affect Section 20 of Article Ill of the Constitution of the State of Florida, except
as to such provisions therein as relate to regulating the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers,
to summoning and impanelling grand and petit jurors, to assessing and collecting taxes for county
purposes and to regulating the fees and compensation of county officers. No law authorizing the
establishing or abolishing of such Municipal corporation pursuant to this Section, shall become operative
or effective until approved by a majority of the qualified electors participating in an election held in said
County, but so long as such Municipal corporation exists under this Section the Legislature may amend
or extend the law authorizing the same without referendum to the qualified voters unless the Legislative
act providing for such amendment or extension shall provide for such referendum.
History.-Added, S.J.R. 113, 1933; adopted 1934.
2Note.-Section 10, Art. VIII of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION 10. Legislative power over city of Key West and Monroe county.--The Legislature shall
have power to establish, alter or abolish, a Municipal corporation to be known as the City of Key West,
extending territorially throughout the present limits of Monroe County, in the place of any or all county,
district, municipal and local governments, boards, bodies and officers, constitutional or statutory,
legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative, and shall prescribe the jurisdiction, powers, duties and
functions of such municipal corporation, its legislative, executive, judicial and administrative departments
and its boards, bodies and officers; to divide the territory included in such municipality into subordinate
districts, and to prescribe ajust and reasonable system of taxation for such municipality and districts; and
to fi:c the liability of such municipality and districts. Bonded and other indebtedness, existing at the time
of the establishment of such municipality, shall be enforceable only against property theretofore taxable
therefor. The Legislature shall, from time to time, determine what portion of said municipality is a rural
area, and a homestead in such rural area shall not be limited as if in a city or town. Such municipality
may exercise all the powers of a municipal corporation and shall also be recognized as one of the legal
political divisions of the State with the duties and obligations of a county and shall be entitled to all the
powers, rights and privileges, including representation in the State Legislature, which would accrue to
it if it were a county. All property of Monroe County and of the municipality in said county shall vest
in such municipal corporation when established as herein provided. The offices of Clerk of the Circuit
Court and Sheriff shall not be abolished but the Legislature may prescribe the time when, and the method
by which, such offices shall be filled and the compensation to be paid to such officers and may vest in
them additional powers and duties. No county office shall be abolished or consolidated with another
office without making provision for the performance of all State duties now or hereafter prescribed by
law to be performed by such county officer. Nothing contained herein shall affect Section 20 of Article
III of the Constitution of the State of Florida, except as to such provisions therein as relate to regulating
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the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers, to summoning and impanelling grand and petit juries,
to assessing and collecting taxes for county purposes and to regulating the fees and compensation of
county officers. No law authorizing the establishing or abolishing of such Municipal corporation pursuant
to this Section shall become operative or effective until approved by a majority of the qualified electors
participating in an election held in said County, but so long as such Municipal corporation exists under
this Section the Legislature may amend or extend the law authorizing the same without referendum to
the qualified voters unless the Legislative Act providing for such amendment or extension shall provide
for such referendum.
History.-Added, S.J.R. 429, 1935; adopted 1936.
3Note.-Section I I of Art. VIII of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION II. Dade County, home rule charter.-(I) The electors of Dade County, Florida, are
granted power to adopt, revise, and amend from time to time a home rule charter of government for
Dade County, Florida, under which the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County shall be the
governing body. This charter:
(a) Shall fix the boundaries of each county commission district, provide a method for changing
them from time to time, and fix the number, terms and compensation of the commissioners, and their
method of election.
(b) May grant full power and authority to.the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County to
pass ordinances relating to the affairs, property and government of Dade County and provide suitable
penalties for the violation thereof; to levy and collect such taxes as may be authorized by general law
and no other taxes, and to do everything necessary to carry on a central metropolitan government in
Dade County.
(c) May change the boundaries of, merge, consolidate, and abolish and may provide a method for
changing the boundaries of, merging, consolidating and abolishing from time to time all municipal
corporations, county or district governments, special taxing districts, authorities, boards, or other
governmental units whose jurisdiction lies wholly within Dade County, whether such governmental units
are created by the Constitution or the Legislature or otherwise, except the Dade County Board of County
Commissioners as it may be provided for from time to time by this home rule charter and the Board of
Public Instruction of Dade County.
(d) May provide a method by which any and all of the functions or powers of any municipal
corporation or other governmental unit in Dade County may be transferred to the Board of County
Commissioners of Dade County.
(e) May provide a method for establishing new municipal corporations, special taxing districts, and
other governmental units in Dade County from time to time and provide for their government and pre-
scribe their jurisdiction and powers.
(f) May abolish and may provide a method for abolishing from time to time all offices provided
for by Article VIII, Section 6, of the Constitution or by the Legislature, except the Superintendent of
Public Instruction and may provide for the consolidation and transfer of the functions of such offices,
provided, however, that there shall be no power to abolish or impair the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
or to abolish any other court provided for by this Constitution or by general law, or the judges or clerks
thereof although such charter may create new courts and judges and clerks thereof with jurisdiction to
try all offenses against ordinances passed by the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County and
none of the other courts provided for by this Constitution or by general law shall have original
jurisdiction to try such offenses, although the charter may confer appellate jurisdiction on such courts,
and provided further that if said home rule charter shall abolish any county office or offices as authorized
herein, that said charter shall contain adequate provision for the carrying on of all functions of said office
or offices as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by general law.
(g) Shall provide a method by which each municipal corporation in Dade County shall have the
power to make, amend or repeal its own charter. Upon adoption of this home rule charter by the electors
this method shall be exclusive and the Legislature shall have no power to amend or repeal the charter
of any municipal corporation in Dade County.
(h) May change the name of Dade County.
(i) Shall provide a method for the recall of any commissioner and a method for initiative and
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referendum, including the initiation of and referendum on ordinances and the amendment or revision of
the home rule charter, provided, however, that the power of the Governor and Senate relating to the
suspension and removal of officers provided for in this Constitution shall not be impaired, but shall
extend to all officers provided for in said home rule charter.
(2) Provision shall be made for the protection of the creditors of any governmental unit which is
merged, consolidated, or abolished or whose boundaries are changed or functions or powers transferred.
(3) This home rule charter shall be prepared by a Metropolitan Charter Board created by the
Legislature and shall be presented to the electors of Dade County for ratification or rejection in the
manner provided by the Legislature. Until a home rule charter is adopted the Legislature may from time
to time create additional Charter Boards to prepare charters to be presented to the electors of Dade
County for ratification or rejection in the manner provided by the Legislature. Such Charter, once
adopted by the electors, may be amended only by the electors of Dade County and this charter shall
provide a method for submitting future charter revisions and amendments to the electors of Dade County.
(4) The County Commission shall continue to receive its pro rata share of all revenues payable by
the state from whatever source to the several counties and the state of Florida shall pay to the
Commission all revenues which would have been paid to any municipality in Dade County which may
be abolished by or in the method provided by this home rule charter; provided, however, the Commission
shall reimburse the comptroller of Florida for the expense incurred if any, in the keeping of separate
records to determine the amounts of money which would have been payable to any such municipality.
(5) Nothing in this section shall limit or restrict the power of the Legislature to enact general laws
which shall relate to Dade County and any other one or more counties in the state of Florida or to any
municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities of the State of Florida, and the
home rule charter provided for herein shall not conflict with any provision of this Constitution nor of
any applicable general laws now applying to Dade County and any other one or more counties of the
State of Florida except as expressly authorized in this section nor shall any ordinance enacted in
pursuance to said home rule charter conflict with this Constitution or any such applicable general law
except as expressly authorized herein, nor shall the charter of any municipality in Dade County conflict
with this Constitution or any such applicable general law except as expressly authorized herein, provided
however that said charter and said ordinances enacted in pursuance thereof may conflict with, modify
or nullify any existing local, special or general law applicable only to Dade County.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature to
enact general laws which shall relate to Dade County and any other one or more counties of the state
of Florida or to any municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities of the State
of Florida relating to county or municipal affairs and all such general laws shall apply to Dade County
and to all municipalities therein to the same extent as if this section had not been adopted and such
general laws shall supersede any part or portion of the home rule charter provided for herein in conflict
therewith and shall supersede any provision of any ordinance enacted pursuant to said charter and in
conflict therewith, and shall supersede any provision of any charter of any municipality in Dade County
in conflict therewith.
(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the power and jurisdiction of the
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission or of any other state agency, bureau or commission now or
hereafter provided for in this Constitution or by general law and said state agencies, bureaus and
commissions shall have the same powers in Dade County as shall be conferred upon them in regard to
other counties.
(8) If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or provisions of this section is held invalid as
violative of the provisions of Section I Article XVII of this Constitution the remainder of this section
shall not be affected by such invalidity.
(9) It is declared to be the intent of the Legislature and of the electors of the State of Florida to
provide by this section home rule for the people of Dade County in local affairs and this section shall
be liberally construed to carry out such purpose, and it is further declared to be the intent of the
Legislature and of the electors of the State of Florida that the provisions of this Constitution and general
laws which shall relate to Dade County and any other one or more counties of the State of Florida or
to any municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities of the State of Florida
enacted pursuant thereto by the Legislature shall be the supreme law in Dade County, Florida, except
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as expressly provided herein and this section shall be strictly construed to maintain such supremacy of
this Constitution and of the Legislature in the enactment of general laws pursuant to this Constitution.
llistory.-Added, H.J.R. 858, 1941; adopted 1942; Am. S.J.R. 1046, 1955; adopted 1956.
'Note.-Section 24 of Art. Vill of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION 24. Hillsborough County, home rule charter.-
(1) The electors of Hillsborough county are hereby granted the power to adopt a charter for a
government which shall exercise any and all powers for county and municipal purposes which this
constitution or the legislature, by general, special or local law, has conferred upon Hillsborough county
or any municipality therein. Such government shall exercise these powers by the enactment of ordinances
which relate to government of Hillsborough county and provide suitable penalties for the violation
thereof. Such government shall have no power to create or abolish any municipality, except as otherwise
provided herein.
(2) The method and manner by which the electors of Hillsborough county shall exercise this power
shall be set forth in a charter for the government of Hillsborough county which charter shall be presented
to said electors by any charter commission established by the legislature. The legislature may provide
for the continuing existence of any charter commission or may establish a charter commission or
commissions subsequent to any initial commission without regard to any election or elections held upon
any charter or charters theretofore presented. A charter shall become effective only upon ratification by
a majority of the electors of Hillsborough county voting in a general or special election as provided by
law.
(3) The number, qualifications, terms of office and method of filling vacancies in the membership
of any charter commission established pursuant to this section and the powers, functions and duties of
any such commission shall be provided by law.
(4) A charter prepared by any commission established pursuant to this section shall provide that:
(a) The governments of the city of Tampa and the county of Hillsborough shall be consolidated,
and the structure of the new local government shall include:
I. An executive branch, the chief officer of which shall be responsible for the administration of
government.
2. An elected legislative branch, the election to membership, powers and duties of which shall be
as provided by the charter.
3. A judicial branch, which shall only have jurisdiction in the enforcement of ordinances enacted
by the legislative branch created by this section.
(b) Should the electors of the municipalities of Plant City or Temple Terrace wish to consolidate
their governments with the government hereinabove created, they may do so by majority vote of the
electors of said municipality voting in an election upon said issue.
(c) The creditors of any governmental unit consolidated or abolished under this section shall be
protected. Bonded or other indebtedness existing at the effective date of any government established
hereunder shall be enforceable only against the real and personal property theretofore taxable for such
purposes.
(d) Such other provisions as might be required by law.
(5) The provisions of such charter and ordinances enacted pursuant thereto shall not conflict with
any provision of this constitution nor with general, special or local laws now or hereafter applying to
Hillsborough county.
(6) The government established hereunder shall be recognized as a county, that is one of the legal
political subdivisions of the state with the powers, rights, privileges, duties and obligations of a county,
and may also exercise all the powers of a municipality. Said government shall have the right to sue and
be sued.
(7) Any government established hereunder shall be entitled to receive from the state of Florida or
from the United States or from any other agency, public or private, funds and revenues to which a
county is, or may hereafter be entitled, and also all funds and revenues to which an incorporated
municipality is or may hereafter be entitled, and to receive the same without diminution or loss by reason
of any such government as may be established. Nothing herein contained shall preclude such government
as may be established hereunder from receiving all funds and revenues from whatever source now
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received, or hereinafter received provided by law.
(8) The board of county commissioners of Hillsborough county shall be abolished when the
functions, duties, powers and responsibilities of said board shall be transferred in the manner to be
provided by the charter to the government established pursuant to this section. No other office provided
for by this constitution shall be abolished by or pursuant to this section.
(9) This section shall not restrict or limit the legislature in the enactment of general, special or local
laws as otherwise provided in this constitution.
History.-Added, C.S. for H.J.R. 1987, 1965; adopted 1966.
ARTICLE IX
EDUCATION
Sec.
1. System of public education.
2. State board of education.
3. Terms of appointive board members.
4. School districts; school boards.
5. Superintendent of schools.
6. State school fund.
SECTION 1. System of public education.-Adequate provision shall
be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the
establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning
and other public education programs that the needs of the people may
require.
SECTION 2. State board of education.-The governor and the
members of the cabinet shall constitute a state board of education, which
shall be a body corporate and have such supervision of the system of public
education as is provided by law.
SECTION 3. Terms of appointive board members.-Members of
any appointive board dealing with education may serve terms in excess of
four years as provided by law.
SECTION 4. School districts; school boards.-
(a) Each county shall constitute a school district; provided, two or
more contiguous counties, upon vote of the electors of each county pursuant
to law, may be combined into one school district. In each school district
there shall be a school board composed of five or more members chosen by
vote of the electors for appropriately staggered terms of four years, as
1672 [Vol. 18
948
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/1
Constitution of the State of Florida
provided by law.
(b) The school board shall operate, control and supervise all free
public schools within the school district and determine the rate of school
district taxes within the limits prescribed herein. Two or more school
districts may operate and finance joint educational programs.
SECTION 5. Superintendent of schools.-In each school district
there shall be a superintendent of schools. He shall be elected at the general
election in each year the number of which is a multiple of four for a term
of four years; or, when provided by resolution of the district school board,
or by special law, approved by vote of the electors, the district school
superintendent in any school district shall be employed by the district school
board as provided by general law. The resolution or special law may be
rescinded or repealed by either procedure after four years.
SECTION 6. State school fund.-The income derived from the state
school fund shall, and the principal of the fund may, be appropriated, but
only to the support and maintenance of free public schools.
ARTICLE X
MISCELLANEOUS
Sec.
1. Amendments to United States Constitution.
2. Militia.
3. Vacancy in office.
4. Homestead; exemptions.
5. Coverture and property.
6. Eminent domain.
7. Lotteries.
8. Census.
9. Repeal of criminal statutes.
10. Felony; definition.
11. Sovereignty lands.
12. Rules of construction.
13. Suits against the state.
14. State retirement systems benefit changes.
15. State operated lotteries.
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SECTION 1. Amendments to United States Constitution.-The
legislature shall not take action on any proposed amendment to the
constitution of the United States unless a majority of the members thereof
have been elected after the proposed amendment has been submitted for
ratification.
SECTION 2. Militia.-
(a) The militia shall be composed of all ablebodied inhabitants of the
state who are or have declared their intention to become citizens of the
United States; and no person because of religious creed or opinion shall be
exempted from military duty except upon conditions provided by law.
(b) The organizing, equipping, housing, maintaining, and disciplining
of the militia, and the safekeeping of public arms may be provided for by
law.
(c) The governor shall appoint all commissioned officers of the militia,
including an adjutant general who shall be chief of staff. The appointment
of all general officers shall be subject to confirmation by the senate.
(d) The qualifications of personnel and officers of the federally
recognized national guard, including the adjutant general, and the grounds
and proceedings for their discipline and removal shall conform to the
appropriate United States army or air force regulations and usages.
SECTION 3. Vacancy in office.-Vacancy in office shall occur upon
the creation of an office, upon the death of the incumbent or his removal
from office, resignation, succession to another office, unexplained absence
for sixty consecutive days, or failure to maintain the residence required
when elected or appointed, and upon failure of one elected or appointed to
office to qualify within thirty days from the commencement of the term.
SECTION 4. Homestead; exemptions.-
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court,
and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the
payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house,
field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned
by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one
hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which
shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent
inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent
of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be
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limited to the residence of the owner or his family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of
the owner.
(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is
survived by spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to
the owner's spouse if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real
estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by
mortgage, sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an
estate by the entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is incompetent,
the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.
History.-Am. H.JR. 4324, 1972; adopted 1972; Am. H.J.R. 40, 1983; adopted 1984.
SECTION 5. Coverture and property.-There shall be no distinction
between married women and married men in the holding, control, disposi-
tion, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal; except that
dower or curtesy may be established and regulated by law.
SECTION 6. Eminent domain.-
(a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and
with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in
the registry of the court and available to the owner.
(b) Provision may be made by law for the taking of easements, by like
proceedings, for the drainage of the land of one person over or through the
land of another.
SECTION 7. Lotteries.-Lotteries, other than the types of pari-mutuel
pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this constitution, are
hereby prohibited in this state.
SECTION 8. Census.-
(a) Each decennial census of the state taken by the United States shall
be an official census of the state.
(b) Each decennial census, for the purpose of classifications based
upon population, shall become effective on the thirtieth day after the final
adjournment of the regular session of the legislature convened next after
certification of the census.
SECTION 9. Repeal of criminal statutes.-Repeal or amendment of
a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime
previously committed.
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SECTION 10. Felony; definition.-The term "felony" as used herein
and in the laws of this state shall mean any criminal offense that is
punishable under the laws of this state, or that would be punishable if
committed in this state, by death or by imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary.
SECTION 11. Sovereignty lands.-The title to lands under navigable
waters, within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated,
including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by
virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of such lands may
be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use of
portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not
contrary to the public interest.
History.-Am. HIR. 792, 1970; adopted 1970.
SECTION 12. Rules of construction.-Unless qualified in the text the
following rules of construction shall apply to this constitution.
(a) "Herein" refers to the entire constitution.
(b) The singular includes the plural.
(c) The masculine includes the feminine.
(d) "Vote of the electors" means the vote of the majority of those
voting on the matter in an election, general or special, in which those
participating are limited to the electors of the governmental unit referred to
in the text.
(e) Vote or other action of a legislative house or other governmental
body means the vote or action of a majority or other specified percentage
of those members voting on the matter. "Of the membership" means "of all
members thereof."
(f) The terms "judicial office," "justices" and "judges" shall not
include judges of courts established solely for the trial of violations of
ordinances.
(g) "Special law" means a special or local law.
(h) Titles and subtitles shall not be used in construction.
SECTION 13. Suits against the state.-Provision may be made by
general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now
existing or hereafter originating.
SECTION 14. State retirement systems benefit changes.-A govern-
mental unit responsible for any retirement or pension system supported in
whole or in part by public funds shall not after January 1, 1977, provide any
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increase in the benefits to the members or beneficiaries of such system
unless such unit has made or concurrently makes provision for the funding
of the increase in benefits on a sound actuarial basis.
History.-Added, H.R. 291, 1975; adopted 1976.
SECTION 15. State operated lotteries.-
(a) Lotteries may be operated by the state.
(b) If any subsection or subsections of the amendment to the Florida
Constitution are held unconstitutional for containing more than one subject,
this amendment shall be limited to subsection (a) above.
(c) This amendment shall be implemented as follows:
(1) Schedule--On the effective date of this amendment, the lotteries
shall be known as the Florida Education Lotteries. Net proceeds derived
from the lotteries shall be deposited to a state trust fund, to be designated
The State Education Lotteries Trust Fund, to be appropriated by the
Legislature. The schedule may be amended by general law.
History.-Proposed by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State June 10, 1985; adopted
1986.
ARTICLE XI
AMENDMENTS
Sec.
1. Proposal by legislature.
2. Revision commission.
3. Initiative.
4. Constitutional convention.
5. Amendment or revision election.
6. Taxation and budget reform commission.
SECTION 1. Proposal by legislature.-Amendment of a section or
revision of one or more articles, or the whole, of this constitution may be
proposed by joint resolution agreed to by three-fifths of the membership of
each house of the legislature. The full text of the joint resolution and the
vote of each member voting shall be entered on the journal of each house.
SECTION 2. Revision commission.-
(a) Within thirty days after the adjournment of the regular session of
the legislature convened in the tenth year following that in which this
constitution is adopted, and each twentieth year thereafter, there shall be
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established a constitution revision commission composed of the following
thirty-seven members:
(1) the attorney general of the state;
(2) fifteen members selected by the governor;
(3) nine members selected by the speaker of the house of represen-
tatives and nine members selected by the president of the senate; and
(4) three members selected by the chief justice of the supreme court
of Florida with the advice of the justices.
(b) The governor shall designate one member of the commission as its
chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the commission shall be filled in
the same manner as the original appointments.
(c) Each constitution revision commission shall convene at the call of
its chairman, adopt its rules of procedure, examine the constitution of the
state, except for matters relating directly to taxation or the state budgetary
process that are to be reviewed by the taxation and budget reform commis-
sion established in section 6, hold public hearings, and, not later than one
hundred eighty days prior to the next general election, file with the secretary
of state its proposal, if any, of a revision of this constitution or any part of
it.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 1616, 1988; adopted 1988.
SECTION3. Initiative.-The power to propose the revision or amend-
ment of any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved
to the people, provided that, any such revision or amendment shall embrace
but one subject and matter directly connected therewith. It may be invoked
by filing with the secretary of state a petition containing a copy of the
proposed revision or amendment, signed by a number of electors in each of
one half of the congressional districts of the state, and of the state as a
whole, equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of such districts
respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election in
which presidential electors were chosen.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 2835, 1972; adopted 1972.
SECTION 4. Constitutional convention.-
(a) The power to call a convention to consider a revision of the entire
constitution is reserved to the people. It may be invoked by filing with the
secretary of state a petition, containing a declaration that a constitutional
convention is desired, signed by a number of electors in each of one half of
the congressional districts of the state, and of the state as a whole, equal to
fifteen per cent of the votes cast in each such district respectively and in the
state as a whole in the last preceding election of presidential electors.
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(b) At the next general election held more than ninety days after the
filing of such petition there shall be submitted to the electors of the state the
question: "Shall a constitutional convention be held?" If a majority voting
on the question votes in the affirmative, at the next succeeding general
election there shall be elected from each representative district a member of
a constitutional convention. On the twenty-first day following that election,
the convention shall sit at the capital, elect officers, adopt rules of proce-
dure, judge the election of its membership, and fix a time and place for its
future meetings. Not later than ninety days before the next succeeding
general election, the convention shall cause to be filed with the secretary of
state any revision of this constitution proposed by it.
SECTION 5. Amendment or revision election.-
(a) A proposed amendment to or revision of this constitution, or any
part of it, shall be submitted to the electors at the next general election held
more than ninety days after the joint resolution, initiative petition or report
of revision commission, constitutional convention or taxation and budget
reform commission proposing it is filed with the secretary of state, unless,
pursuant to law enacted by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the
membership of each house of the legislature and limited to a single
amendment or revision, it is submitted at an earlier special election held
more than ninety days after such filing.
(b) Once in the tenth week, and once in the sixth week immediately
preceding the week in which the election is held, the proposed amendment
or revision, with notice of the date of election at which it will be submitted
to the electors, shall be published in one newspaper of general circulation
in each county in which a newspaper is published.
(c) If the proposed amendment or revision is approved by vote of the
electors, it shall be effective as an amendment to or revision of the
constitution of the state on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
January following the election, or on such other date as may be specified in
the amendment or revision.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 1616, 1988; adopted 1988.
SECTION 6. Taxation and budget reform commission.-
(a) Beginning in 1990 and each tenth year thereafter, there shall be
established a taxation and budget reform commission composed of the
following members:
(1) eleven members selected by the governor, none of whom shall be
a member of the legislature at the time of appointment.
(2) seven members selected by the speaker of the house of repre-
1994] 1679
955
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
sentatives and seven members selected by the president of the senate, none
of whom shall be a member of the legislature at the time of appointment.
(3) four non-voting ex officio members, all of whom shall be members
of the legislature at the time of appointment. Two of these members, one of
whom shall be a member of the minority party in the house of representa-
tives, shall be selected by the speaker of the house of representatives, and
two of these members, one of whom shall be a member of the minority
party in the senate, shall be selected by the president of the senate.
(b) Vacancies in the membership of the commission shall be filled in
the same manner as the original appointments.
(c) At its initial meeting, the members of the commission shall elect
a member who is not a member of the legislature to serve as chairman and
the commission shall adopt its rules of procedure. Thereafter, the commis-
sion shall convene at the call of the chairman. An affirmative vote of two
thirds of the full commission and the concurrence of a majority of the
members appointed by the governor pursuant to paragraph (a)(1), a
concurrence of a majority of the members appointed by the speaker of the
house of representatives pursuant to paragraph (a)(2), and a concurrence of
a majority of the members appointed by the president of the senate pursuant
to paragraph (a)(2) shall be necessary for any revision of this constitution
or any part of it to be proposed by the commission.
(d) The commission shall examine the state budgetary process, the
revenue needs and expenditure processes of the state, the appropriateness of
the tax structure of the state, and governmental productivity and efficiency;
review policy as it relates to the ability of state and local government to tax
and adequately fund governmental operations and capital facilities required
to meet the state's needs during the next ten year period; determine methods
favored by the citizens of the state to fund the needs of the state, including
alternative methods for raising sufficient revenues for the needs of the state;
determine measures that could be instituted to effectively gather funds from
existing tax sources; examine constitutional limitations on taxation and
expenditures at the state and local level; and review the state's comprehen-
sive planning, budgeting and needs assessment processes to determine
whether the resulting information adequately supports a strategic decision-
making process.
(e) The commission shall hold public hearings as it deems necessary
to carry out its responsibilities under this section. The commission shall
issue a report of the results of the review carried out, and propose to the
legislature any recommended statutory changes related to the taxation or
budgetary laws of the state. Not later than one hundred eighty days prior to
the general election in the second year following the year in which the
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commission is established, the commission shall file with the secretary of
state its proposal, if any, of a revision of this constitution or any part of it
dealing with taxation or the state budgetary process.
History.-Added, H.J.R. 1616, 1988; adopted 1988.
ARTICLE XII
SCHEDULE
Sec.
1. Constitution of 1885 superseded.
2. Property taxes; millages.
3. Officers to continue in office.
4. State commissioner of education.
5. Superintendent of schools.
6. Laws preserved.
7. Rights reserved.
8. Public debts recognized.
9. Bonds.
10. Preservation of existing government.
11. Deletion of obsolete schedule items.
12. Senators.
13. Legislative apportionment.
14. Representatives; terms.
15. Special district taxes.
16. Reorganization.
17. Conflicting provisions.
18. Bonds for housing and related facilities.
19. Renewable energy source property.
20. Access to public records.
SECTION 1. Constitution of 1885 superseded.-Articles I through
IV, VII, and IX through XX of the Constitution of Florida adopted in 1885,
as amended from time to time, are superseded by this revision except those
sections expressly retained and made a part of this revision by reference.
SECTION 2. Property taxes; millages.-Tax millages authorized in
counties, municipalities and special districts, on the date this revision
becomes effective, may be continued until reduced by law.
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SECTION 3. Officers to continue in office.-Every person holding
office when this revision becomes effective shall continue in office for the
remainder of the term if that office is not abolished. If the office is
abolished the incumbent shall be paid adequate compensation, to be fixed
by law, for the loss of emoluments for the remainder of the term.
SECTION 4. State commissioner of education.-The state superin-
tendent of public instruction in office on the effective date of this revision
shall become and, for the remainder of the term being served, shall be the
commissioner of education.
SECTION 5. Superintendent of schools.-
(a) On the effective date of this revision the county superintendent of
public instruction of each county shall become and, for the remainder of the
term being served, shall be the superintendent of schools of that district.
(b) The method of selection of the county superintendent of public
instruction of each county, as provided by or under the Constitution of 1885,
as amended, shall apply to the selection of the district superintendent of
schools until changed as herein provided.
SECTION 6. Laws preserved.-
(a) All laws in effect upon the adoption of this revision, to the extent
not inconsistent with it, shall remain in force until they expire by their terms
or are repealed.
(b) All statutes which, under the Constitution of 1885, as amended,
apply to the state superintendent of public instruction and those which apply
to the county superintendent of public instruction shall under this revision
apply, respectively, to the state commissioner of education and the district
superintendent of schools.
SECTION 7. Rights reserved.-
(a) All actions, rights of action, claims, contracts and obligations of
individuals, corporations and public bodies or agencies existing on the date
this revision becomes effective shall continue to be valid as if this revision
had not been adopted. All taxes, penalties, fines and forfeitures owing to the
state under the Constitution of 1885, as amended, shall inure to the state
under this revision, and all sentences as punishment for crime shall be
executed according to their terms.
(b) This revision shall not be retroactive so as to create any right or
liability which did not exist under the Constitution of 1885, as amended,
based upon matters occurring prior to the adoption of this revision.
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SECTION 8. Public debts recognized.-AII bonds, revenue certifi-
cates, revenue bonds and tax anticipation certificates issued pursuant to the
Constitution of 1885, as amended by the state, any agency, political
subdivision or public corporation of the state shall remain in full force and
effect and shall be secured by the same sources of revenue as before the
adoption of this revision, and, to the extent necessary to effectuate this
section, the applicable provisions of the Constitution of 1885, as amended,
are retained as a part of this revision until payment in full of these public
securities.
SECTION 9. Bonds.-
(a) ADDITIONAL SECURITIES.
(1) 'Article IX, Section 17, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended,
as it existed immediately before this Constitution, as revised in 1968,
became effective, is adopted by this reference as a part of this revision as
completely as though incorporated herein verbatim, except revenue bonds,
revenue certificates or other evidences of indebtedness hereafter issued
thereunder may be issued by the agency of the state so authorized by law.
(2) That portion of 2Article XII, Section 9, Subsection (a) of this
Constitution, as amended, which by reference adopted 'Article XII, Section
19 of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, as the same existed immediately
before the effective date of this amendment is adopted by this reference as
part of this revision as completely as though incorporated herein verbatim,
for the purpose of providing that after the effective date of this amendment
all of the proceeds of the revenues derived from the gross receipts taxes, as
therein defined, collected in each year shall be applied as provided therein
to the extent necessary to comply with all obligations to or for the benefit
of holders of bonds or certificates issued before the effective date of this
amendment or any refundings thereof which are secured by such gross
receipts taxes. No bonds or other obligations may be issued pursuant to the
provisions of' 3Article XII, Section 19, of the Constitution of 1885, as
amended, but this provision shall not be construed to prevent the refunding
of any such outstanding bonds or obligations pursuant to the provisions of
this subsection (a)(2).
Subject to the requirements of the first paragraph of this subsection
(a)(2), beginning July 1, 1975, all of the proceeds of the revenues derived
from the gross receipts taxes collected from every person, including
municipalities, as provided and levied pursuant to the provisions of chapter
203, Florida Statutes, as such chapter is amended from time to time, shall,
as collected, be placed in a trust fund to be known as the "public education
capital outlay and debt service trust fund" in the state treasury (hereinafter
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referred to as "capital outlay fund"), and used only as provided herein.
The capital outlay fund shall be administered by the state board of
education as created and constituted by Section 2 of Article IX of the
Constitution of Florida as revised in 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "state
board"), or by such other instrumentality of the state which shall hereafter
succeed by law to the powers, duties and functions of the state board,
including the powers, duties and functions of the state board provided in this
subsection (a)(2). The state board shall be a body corporate and shall have
all the powers provided herein in addition to all other constitutional and
statutory powers related to the purposes of this subsection (a)(2) heretofore
or hereafter conferred by law upon the state board, or its predecessor created
by the Constitution of 1885, as amended.
State bonds pledging the full faith and credit of the state may be issued,
without a vote of the electors, by the state board pursuant to law to finance
or refinance capital projects theretofore authorized by the legislature, and
any purposes appurtenant or incidental thereto, for the state system of public
education provided for in Section 1 of Article IX of this Constitution
(hereinafter referred to as "state system"), including but not limited to
institutions of higher learning, community colleges, vocational technical
schools, or public schools, as now defined or as may hereafter be defined
by law. All such bonds shall mature not later than thirty years after the date
of issuance thereof. All other details of such bonds shall be as provided by
law or by the proceedings authorizing such bonds; provided, however, that
no bonds, except refunding bonds, shall be issued, and no proceeds shall be
expended for the cost of any capital project, unless such project has been
authorized by the legislature.
Bonds issued pursuant to this subsection (a)(2) shall be primarily
payable from such revenues derived from gross receipts taxes, and shall be
additionally secured by the full faith and credit of the state. No such bonds
shall ever be issued in an amount exceeding ninety percent of the amount
which the state board determines can be serviced by the revenues derived
from the gross receipts taxes accruing thereafter under the provisions of this
subsection (a)(2), and such determination shall be conclusive.
The moneys in the capital outlay fund in each fiscal year shall be used
only for the following purposes and in the following order of priority:
a. For the payment of the principal of and interest on any bonds due
in such fiscal year;
b. For the deposit into any reserve funds provided for in the proceed-
ings authorizing the issuance of bonds of any amounts required to be
deposited in such reserve funds in such fiscal year;
c. For direct payment of the cost or any part of the cost of any
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capital project for the state system theretofore authorized by the legislature,
or for the purchase or redemption of outstanding bonds in accordance with
the provisions of the proceedings which authorized the issuance of such
bonds, or for the purpose of maintaining, restoring, or repairing existing
public educational facilities.
(b) REFUNDING BONDS. Revenue bonds to finance the cost of
state capital projects issued prior to the date this revision becomes effective,
including projects of the Florida state turnpike authority or its successor but
excluding all portions of the state highway system, may be refunded as
provided by law without vote of the electors at a lower net average interest
cost rate by the issuance of bonds maturing not later than the obligations
refunded, secured by the same revenues only.
(c) MOTOR VEHICLE FUEL TAXES.
(1) A state tax, designated "second gas tax," of two cents per gallon
upon gasoline and other like products of petroleum and an equivalent tax
upon other sources of energy used to propel motor vehicles as levied by4Article IX, Section 16, of the Cohstitution of 1885, as amended, is hereby
continued. The proceeds of said tax shall be placed monthly in the state
roads distribution fund in the state treasury.
(2) 4Article IX, Section 16, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended,
is adopted by this reference as a part of this revision as completely as
though incorporated herein verbatim for the purpose of providing that after
the effective date of this revision the proceeds of the "second gas tax" as
referred to therein shall be allocated among the several counties in
accordance with the formula stated therein to the extent necessary to comply
with all obligations to or for the benefit of holders of bonds, revenue
certificates and tax anticipation certificates or any refundings thereof secured
by any portion of the "second gas tax."
(3) No funds anticipated to be allocated under the formula stated in
4Article IX, Section 16, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, shall be
pledged as security for any obligation hereafter issued or entered into,
except that any outstanding obligations previously issued pledging revenues
allocated under said 4Article IX, Section 16, may be refunded at a lower
average net interest cost rate by the issuance of refunding bonds, maturing
not later than the obligations refunded, secured by the same revenues and
any other security authorized in paragraph (5) of this subsection.
(4) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (2) of this subsection and
after payment of administrative expenses, the "second gas tax" shall be
allocated to the account of each of the several counties in the amounts to be
determined as follows: There shall be an initial allocation of one-fourth in
the ratio of county area to state area, one-fourth in the ratio of the total
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county population to the total population of the state in accordance with the
latest available federal census, and one-half in the ratio of the total "second
gas tax" collected on retail sales or use in each county to the total collected
in all counties of the state during the previous fiscal year. If the annual debt
service requirements of any obligations issued for any county, including any
deficiencies for prior years, secured under paragraph (2) of this subsection,
exceeds the amount which would be allocated to that county under the
formula set out in this paragraph, the amounts allocated to other counties
shall be reduced proportionately.
(5) Funds allocated under paragraphs (2) and (4) of this subsection
shall be administered by the state board of administration created under said
4Article IX, Section 16, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, and which
is continued as a body corporate for the life of this subsection 9(c). The
board shall remit the proceeds of the "second gas tax" in each county
account for use in said county as follows: eighty per cent to the state agency
supervising the state road system and twenty per cent to the governing body
of the county. The percentage allocated to the county may be increased by
general law. The proceeds of the "second gas tax" subject to allocation to
the several counties under this paragraph (5) shall be used first, for the
payment of obligations pledging revenues allocated pursuant to 'Article IX,
Section 16, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, and any refundings
thereof; second, for the payment of debt service on bonds issued as provided
by this paragraph (5) to finance the acquisition and construction of roads as
defined by law; and third, for the acquisition and construction of roads and
for road maintenance as authorized by law. When authorized by law, state
bonds pledging the full faith and credit of the state may be issued without
any election: (i) to refund obligations secured by any portion of the "second
gas tax" allocated to a county under 4Article IX, Section 16, of the Constitu-
tion of 1885, as amended; (ii) to finance the acquisition and construction of
roads in a county when approved by the governing body of the county and
the state agency supervising the state road system; and (iii) to refund
obligations secured by any portion of the "second gas tax" allocated under
paragraph 9(c)(4). No such bonds shall be issued unless a state fiscal agency
created by law has made a determination that in no state fiscal year will the
debt service requirements of the bonds and all other bonds secured by the
pledged portion of the "second gas tax" allocated to the county exceed
seventy-five per cent of the pledged portion of the "second gas tax"
allocated to that county for the preceding state fiscal year, of the pledged net
tolls from existing facilities collected in the preceding state fiscal year, and
of the annual average net tolls anticipated during the first five state fiscal
years of operation of new projects to be financed, and of any other legally
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available pledged revenues collected in the preceding state fiscal year. Bonds
issued pursuant to this subsection shall be payable primarily from the
pledged tolls, the pledged portions of the "second gas tax" allocated to that
county, and any other pledged revenue, and shall mature not later than forty
years from the date of issuance.
(d) SCHOOL BONDS.
(1) 5Article XII, Section 9, Subsection (d) of this constitution, as
amended, (which, by reference, adopted 6Article XII, Section 18, of the
Constitution of 1885, as amended) as the same existed immediately before
the effective date of this amendment is adopted by this reference as part of
this amendment as completely as though incorporated herein verbatim, for
the purpose of providing that after the effective date of this amendment the
first proceeds of the revenues derived from the licensing of motor vehicles
as referred to therein shall be distributed annually among the several
counties in the ratio of the number of instruction units in each county, the
same being coterminus with the school district of each county as provided
in Article IX, Section 4, Subsection (a) of this constitution, in each year
computed as provided therein to the extent necessary to comply with all
obligations to or for the benefit of holders of bonds or motor vehicle tax
anticipation certificates issued before the effective date of this amendment
or any refundings thereof which are secured by any portion of such revenues
derived from the licensing of motor vehicles.
(2) No funds anticipated to be distributed annually among the several
counties under the formula stated in 'Article XII, Section 9, Subsection (d)
of this constitution, as amended, as the same existed immediately before the
effective date of this amendment shall be pledged as security for any
obligations hereafter issued or entered into, except that any outstanding
obligations previously issued pledging such funds may be refunded by the
issuance of refunding bonds.
(3) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection (d)
beginning July 1, 1973, the first proceeds of the revenues derived from the
licensing of motor vehicles (hereinafter called "motor vehicle license
revenues") to the extent necessary to comply with the provisions of this
amendment, shall, as collected, be placed monthly in the school district and
community college district capital outlay and debt service fund in the state
treasury and used only as provided in this amendment. Such revenue shall
be distributed annually among the several school districts and community
college districts in the ratio of the number of instruction units in each school
district or community college district in each year computed as provided
herein. The amount of the first motor vehicle license revenues to be so set
aside in each year and distributed as provided herein shall be an amount
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equal in the aggregate to the product of six hundred dollars ($600)
multiplied by the total number of instruction units in all the school districts
of Florida for the school fiscal year 1967-68, plus an amount equal in the
aggregate to the product of eight hundred dollars ($800) multiplied by the
total number of instruction units in all the school districts of Florida for the
school fiscal year 1972-73 and for each school fiscal year thereafter which
is in excess of the total number of such instruction units in all the school
districts of Florida for the school fiscal year 1967-68, such excess units
being designated "growth units." The amount of the first motor vehicle
license revenues to be so set aside in each year and distributed as provided
herein shall additionally be an amount equal in the aggregate to the product
of four hundred dollars ($400) multiplied by the total number of instruction
units in all community college districts of Florida. The number of instruc-
tion units in each school district or community college district in each year
for the purposes of this amendment shall be the greater of (1) the number
of instruction units in each school district for the school fiscal year 1967-68
or community college district for the school fiscal year 1968-69 computed
in the manner heretofore provided by general law, or (2) the number of
instruction units in such school district, including growth units, or communi-
ty college district for the school fiscal year computed in the manner
heretofore or hereafter provided by general law and approved by the state
board of education (hereinafter called the state board), or (3) the number of
instruction units in each school district, including growth units, or communi-
ty college district on behalf of which the state board has issued bonds or
motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates under this amendment
which will produce sufficient revenues under this amendment to equal one
and twelve-hundredths (1.12) times the aggregate amount of principal of and
interest on all bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certifi-
cates issued under this amendment which will mature and become due in
such year, computed in the manner heretofore or hereafter provided by
general law and approved by the state board.
(4) Such funds so distributed shall be administered by the state board
as now created and constituted by Section 2 of Article IX of the State
Constitution as revised in 1968, or by such other instrumentality of the state
which shall hereafter succeed by law to the powers, duties and functions of
the state board, including the powers, duties and functions of the state board
provided in this amendment. For the purposes of this amendment, said state
board shall be a body corporate and shall have all the powers provided in
this amendment in addition to all other constitutional and statutory powers
related to the purposes of this amendment heretofore or hereafter conferred
upon said state board.
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(5) The state board shall, in addition to its other constitutional and
statutory powers, have the management, control and supervision of the
proceeds of the first motor vehicle license revenues provided for in this
subsection (d). The state board shall also have power, for the purpose of
obtaining funds for the use of any school board of any school district or
board of trustees of any community college district in acquiring, building,
constructing, altering, remodeling, improving, enlarging, furnishing,
equipping, maintaining, renovating, or repairing of capital outlay projects for
school purposes to issue bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation
certificates, and also to issue such bonds or motor vehicle license revenue
anticipation certificates to pay, fund or refund any bonds or motor vehicle
license revenue anticipation certificates theretofore issued by said state
board. All such bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation
certificates shall bear interest at not exceeding the rate provided by general
law and shall mature not later than thirty years after the date of issuance
thereof. The state board shall have power to determine all other details of
the bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates and to
sell in the manner provided by general law, or exchange the bonds or motor
vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates, upon such terms and
conditions as the state board shall provide.
(6) The state board shall also have power to pledge for the payment
of the principal of and interest on such bonds or motor vehicle license
revenue anticipation certificates, including refunding bonds or refunding
motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates, all or any part from
the motor vehicle license revenues provided for in this amendment and to
enter into any covenants and other agreements with the holders of such
bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates at the time
of the issuance thereof concerning the security thereof and the rights of the
holders thereof, all of which covenants and agreements shall constitute
legally binding and irrevocable contracts with such holders and shall be fully
enforceable by such holders in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(7) No such bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation
certificates shall ever be issued by the state board, except to refund
outstanding bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates,
until after the adoption of a resolution requesting the issuance thereof by the
school board of the school district or board of trustees of the community
college district on behalf of which the obligations are to be issued. The state
board of education shall limit the amount of such bonds or motor vehicle
license revenue anticipation certificates which can be issued on behalf of
any school district or community college district to ninety percent (90%) of
the amount which it determines can be serviced by the revenue accruing to
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the school district or community college district under the provisions of this
amendment, and shall determine the reasonable allocation of the interest
savings from the issuance of refunding bonds or motor vehicle license
revenue anticipation certificates, and such determinations shall be conclu-
sive. All such bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certifi-
cates shall be issued in the name of the state board of education but shall be
issued for and on behalf of the school board of the school district or board
of trustees of the community college district requesting the issuance thereof,
and no election or approval of qualified electors shall be required for the
issuance thereof.
(8) The state board shall in each year use the funds distributable
pursuant to this amendment to the credit of each school district or communi-
ty college district only in the following manner and in order of priority:
a. To comply with the requirements of paragraph (1) of this sub-
section (d).
b. To pay all amounts of principal and interest due in such year on
any bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates issued
under the authority hereof, including refunding bonds or motor vehicle
license revenue anticipation certificates, issued on behalf of the school board
of such school district or board of trustees of such community college
district; subject, however, to any covenants or agreements made by the state
board concerning the rights between holders of different issues of such
bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates, as herein
authorized.
c. To establish and maintain a sinking fund or funds to meet future
requirements for debt service or reserves therefor, on bonds or motor vehicle
license revenue anticipation certificates issued on behalf of the school board
of such school district or board of trustees of such community college
district under the authority hereof, whenever the state board shall deem it
necessary or advisable, and in such amounts and under such terms and
conditions as the state board shall in its discretion determine.
d. To distribute annually to the several school boards of the school
districts or the boards of trustees of the community college districts for use
in payment of debt service on bonds heretofore or hereafter issued by any
such school boards of the school districts or boards of trustees of the
community college districts where the proceeds of the bonds were used, or
are to be used, in the acquiring, building, constructing, altering, remodeling,
improving, enlarging, furnishing, equipping, maintaining, renovating, or
repairing of capital outlay projects in such school districts or community
college districts and which capital outlay projects have been approved by the
school board of the school district or board of trustees of the community
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college district, pursuant to the most recent survey or surveys conducted
under regulations prescribed by the state board to determine the capital
outlay needs of the school district or community college district. The state
board shall have power at the time of issuance of any bonds by any school
board of any school district or board of trustees of any community college
district to covenant and agree with such school board or board of trustees
as to the rank and priority of payments to be made for different issues of
bonds under this subparagraph d., and may further agree that any amounts
to be distributed under this subparagraph d. may be pledged for the debt
service on bonds issued by any school board of any school district or board
of trustees of any community college district and for the rank and priority
of such pledge. Any such covenants or agreements of the state board may
be enforced by any holders of such bonds in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
e. To pay the expenses of the state board in administering this
subsection (d), which shall be prorated among the various school districts
and community college districts and paid out of the proceeds of the bonds
or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates or from the funds
distributable to each school district and community college district on the
same basis as such motor vehicle license revenues are distributable to the
various school districts and community college districts.
f. To distribute annually to the several school boards of the school
districts or boards of trustees of the community college districts for the
payment of the cost of acquiring, building, constructing, altering, remod-
eling, improving, enlarging, furnishing, equipping, maintaining, renovating,
or repairing of capital outlay projects for school purposes in such school
district or community college district as shall be requested by resolution of
the school board of the school district or board of trustees of the community
college district.
g. When all major capital outlay needs of a school district or
community college district have been met as determined by the state board,
on the basis of a survey made pursuant to regulations of the state board and
approved by the state board, all such funds remaining shall be distributed
annually and used for such school purposes in such school district or
community college district as the school board of the school district or board
of trustees of the community college district shall determine, or as may be
provided by general law.
(9) Capital outlay projects of a school district or community college
district shall be eligible to participate in the funds accruing under this
amendment and derived from the proceeds of bonds and motor vehicle
license revenue anticipation certificates and from the motor vehicle license
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revenues, only in the order of priority of needs, as shown by a survey or
surveys conducted in the school district or community college district under
regulations prescribed by the state board, to determine the capital outlay
needs of the school district or community college district and approved by
the state board; provided that the priority of such projects may be changed
from time to time upon the request of the school board of the school district
or board of trustees of the community college district and with the approval
of the state board; and provided, further, that this paragraph (9) shall not in
any manner affect any covenant, agreement or pledge made by the state
board in the issuance by said state board of any bonds or motor vehicle
license revenue anticipation certificates, or in connection with the issuance
of any bonds of any school board of any school district or board of trustees
of any community college district.
(10) The state board shall have power to make and enforce all rules and
regulations necessary to the full exercise of the powers herein granted and
no legislation shall be required to render this amendment of full force and
operating effect. The legislature shall not reduce the levies of said motor
vehicle license revenues during the life of this amendment to any degree
which will fail to provide the full amount necessary to comply with the
provisions of this amendment and pay the necessary expenses of administer-
ing the laws relating to the licensing of motor vehicles, and shall not enact
any law having the effect of withdrawing the proceeds of such motor vehicle
license revenues from the operation of this amendment and shall not enact
any law impairing or materially altering the rights of the holders of any
bonds or motor vehicle license revenue anticipation certificates issued
pursuant to this amendment or impairing or altering any covenant or
agreement of the state board, as provided in such bonds or motor vehicle
license revenue anticipation certificates.
(11) Bonds issued by the state board pursuant to this subsection (d)
shall be payable primarily from said motor vehicle license revenues as
provided herein, and if heretofore or hereafter authorized by law, may be
additionally secured by pledging the full faith and credit of the state without
an election. When heretofore or hereafter authorized by law, bonds issued
pursuant to 6Article XII, Section 18 of the Constitution of 1885, as amended
prior to 1968, and bonds issued pursuant to Article XII, Section 9,
subsection (d) of the Constitution as revised in 1968, and bonds issued
pursuant to this subsection (d), may be refunded by the issuance of bonds
additionally secured by the full faith and credit of the state.
(e) DEBT LIMITATION. Bonds issued pursuant to this Section 9 of
Article XII which are payable primarily from revenues pledged pursuant to
this section shall not be included in applying the limits upon the amount of
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state bonds contained in Section 11, Article VII, of this revision.
History.-Am. H.J.R. 1851, 1969; adopted 1969; Am. C.S. for S.J.R. 292, 1972, and Am. C.S. for
H.J.R. 3576, 1972; adopted 1972; Am. C.S. for H.J.R.'s 2289, 2984, 1974; adopted 1974; Am. S.J.R.
824, 1980; adopted 1980; Am. S.J.R. 1157, 1984; adopted 1984 Am. proposed by Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission, Revision No. 1, 1992, filed with the Secretary of State May 7, 1992; adopted 1992;
Am. S.J.R. 2-H, 1992; adopted 1992.
'Note,-Section 17 of Art. IX of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION 17. Bonds; land acquisition for outdoor recreation development.-The outdoor
recreational development council, as created by the 1963 legislature, may issue revenue bonds, revenue
certificates or other evidences of indebtedness to acquire lands, water areas and related resources and to
construct, improve, enlarge and extend capital improvements and facilities thereon in furtherance of
outdoor recreation, natural resources conservation and related facilities in this state; provided, however,
the legislature with respect to such revenue bonds, revenue certificates or other evidences of indebtedness
shall designate the revenue or tax sources to be deposited in or credited to the land acquisition trust fund
for their repayment and may impose restrictions on their issuance, including the fixing of maximum
interest rates and discounts.
The land acquisition trust fund, created by the 1963 legislature for these multiple public purposes,
shall continue from the date of the adoption of this amendment for a period of fifty years.
In the event the outdoor recreational development council shall determine to issue bonds for
financing acquisition of sites for multiple purposes the state board of administration shall act as fiscal
agent, and the attorney general shall handle the validation proceedings.
All bonds issued under this amendment shall be sold at public sale after public advertisement upon
such terms and conditions as the outdoor recreational development council shall provide and as otherwise
provided by law and subject to the limitations herein imposed.
History.-S.J.R. 727, 1963; adopted 1963.
'Note.-Prior to its amendment by C.S. for H.J.R.'s 2289, 2984, 1974, subsection (a) read as
follows:
(a) ADDITIONAL SECURITIES. Article IX, Section 17, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended,
as it existed immediately before this Constitution, as revised in 1968, became effective, is adopted by
this reference as a part of this revision as completely as though incorporated herein verbatim, except
revenue bonds, revenue certificates or other evidences of indebtedness hereafter issued thereunder may
be issued by the agency of the state so authorized by law.
Article XII, Section 19, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, as it existed immediately before
this revision becomes effective, is adopted by this reference as a part of this revision as completely as
though incorporated herein verbatim, except bonds or tax anticipation certificates hereafter issued
thereunder may bear interest not in excess of five percent (5%) per annum or such higher interest as may
be authorized by statute passed by a three-fifths (3/5) vote of each house of the legislature. No revenue
bonds or tax anticipation certificates shall be issued pursuant thereto after June 30, 1975.
'Note.-Section 19 of Art. XII of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Institutions of higher learning and junior college capital outlay trust fund bonds.-
(a) That beginning January 1, 1964, and for fifty years thereafter, all of the proceeds of the
revenues derived from the gross receipts taxes collected from every person, including municipalities,
receiving payment for electricity for light, heat or power, for natural or manufactured gas for light, heat
or power, for use of telephones and for the sending of telegrams and telegraph messages, as now
provided and levied as of the time of adoption of this amendment in Chapter 203, Florida Statutes
(hereinafter called "Gross Receipts Taxes"), shall, as collected be placed in a trust fund to be known as
the "Institutions of Higher Learning and Junior Colleges Capital Outlay and Debt Service Trust Fund"
in the State Treasury (hereinafter referred to as "Capital Outlay Fund"), and used only as provided in
this Amendment.
Said fund shall be administered by the State Board of Education, as now created and constituted by
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Section 3 of Article XII [now s. 2, Article IX] of the Constitution of Florida (hereinafter referred to as
"State Board"). For the purpose of this Amendment, said State Board, as now constituted, shall continue
as a body corporate during the life of this Amendment and shall have all the powers provided in this
Amendment in addition to all other constitutional and statutory powers related to the purposes of this
Amendment heretofore or hereafter conferred by law upon said State Board.
(b) The State Board shall have power, for the purpose of obtaining funds for acquiring, building,
constructing, altering, improving, enlarging, furnishing or equipping capital outlay projects theretofore
authorized by the legislature and any purposes appurtenant or incidental thereto, for Institutions of Higher
Learning or Junior Colleges, as now defined or as may be hereafter defined by law, and for the purpose
of constructing buildings and other permanent facilities for vocational technical schools as provided in
chapter 230 Florida Statutes, to issue bonds or certificates, including refunding bonds or certificates to
fund or refund any bonds or certificates theretofore issued. All such bonds or certificates shall bear
interest at not exceeding four and one-half per centum per annum, and shall mature at such time or times
as the State Board shall determine not exceeding, in any event, however, thirty years from the date of
issuance thereof. The State Board shall have power to determine all other details of such bonds or
certificates and to sell at public sale, after public advertisement, such bonds or certificates, provided,
however, that no bonds or certificates shall ever be issued hereunder to finance, or the proceeds thereof
expended for, any part of the cost of any capital outlay project unless the construction or acquisition of
such capital outlay project has been theretofore authorized by the Legislature of Florida. None of said
bonds or certificates shall be sold at less than ninety-eight per centum of the par value thereof, plus
accrued interest, and said bonds or certificates shall be awarded at the public sale thereof to the bidder
offering the lowest net interest cost for such bonds or certificates in the manner to be determined by the
State Board.
The State Board shall also have power to pledge for the payment of the principal of and interest on
such bonds or certificates, and reserves therefor, including refunding bonds or certificates, all or any part
of the revenue to be derived from the said Gross Receipts Taxes provided for in this Amendment, and
to enter into any covenants and other agreements with the holders of such bonds or certificates
concerning the security thereof and the rights of the holders thereof, all of which covenants and
agreements shall constitute legally binding and irrevocable contracts with such holders and shall be fully
enforceable by such holders in any court of competent jurisdiction.
No such bonds or certificates shall ever be issued by the State Board in an amount exceeding
seventy-five per centum of the amount which it determines, based upon the average annual amount of
the revenues derived from said Gross Receipts Taxes during the immediately preceding two fiscal years,
or the amount of the revenues derived from said Gross Receipts Taxes during the immediately preceding
fiscal year, as shown in a certificate filed by the State Comptroller with the State Board prior to the
issuance of such bonds or certificates, whichever is the lesser, can be serviced by the revenues accruing
thereafter under the provisions of this Amendment; nor shall the State Board, during the first year
following the ratification of this amendment, issue bonds or certificates in excess of seven times the
anticipated revenue from said Gross Receipts Taxes during said year, nor during each succeeding year,
more than four times the anticipated revenue from said Gross Receipts Taxes during such year. No
election or approval of qualified electors or freeholder electors shall be required for the issuance of bonds
or certificates hereunder.
After the initial issuance of any bonds or certificates pursuant to this Amendment, the State Board
may thereafter issue additional bonds or certificates which will rank equally and on a parity, as to lien
on and source of security for payment from said Gross Receipts Taxes, with any bonds or certificates
theretofore issued pursuant to this Amendment, but such additional parity bonds or certificates shall not
be issued unless the average annual amount of the revenues derived from said Gross Receipts Taxes
during the immediately preceding two fiscal years, or the amount of the revenues derived from said
Gross Receipts Taxes during the immediately preceding fiscal year, as shown in a certificate filed by the
State Comptroller with the State Board prior to the issuance of such bonds or certificates, whichever is
the lesser, shall have been equal to one and one-third times the aggregate amount of principal and interest
which will become due in any succeeding fiscal year on all bonds or certificates theretofore issued
pursuant to this Amendment and then outstanding, and the additional parity bonds or certificates then
proposed to be issued. No bonds, certificates or other obligations whatsoever shall at any time be issued
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under the provisions of this Amendment, except such bonds or certificates initially issued hereunder, and
such additional parity bonds or certificates as provided in this paragraph. Notwithstanding any other
provision herein no such bonds or certificates shall be authorized or validated during any biennium in
excess of fifty million dollars, except by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house of the
legislature; provided further that during the biennium 1963-1965 seventy-five million dollars may be
authorized and validated pursuant hereto.
(c) Capital outlay projects theretofore authorized by the legislature for any Institution of Higher
Learning or Junior College shall be eligible to participate in the funds accruing under this Amendment
derived from the proceeds of bonds or certificates and said Gross Receipts Taxes under such regulations
and in such manner as shall be determined by the State Board, and the State Board shall use or transmit
to the State Board of Control or to the Board of Public Instruction of any County authorized by law to
construct or acquire such capital outlay projects, the amount of the proceeds of such bonds or certificates
or Gross Receipts Taxes to be applied to or used for such capital outlay projects. If for any reason any
of the proceeds of any bonds or certificates issued for any capital outlay project shall not be expended
for such capital outlay project, the State Board may use such unexpended proceeds for any other capital
outlay project for Institutions of Higher Learning or Junior Colleges and vocational technical schools,
as defined herein, as now defined or as may be hereafter defined by law, theretofore authorized by the
State Legislature, The holders of bonds or certificates issued hereunder shall not have any responsibility
whatsoever for the application or use of any of the proceeds derived from the sale of said bonds or
certificates, and the rights and remedies of the holders of such bonds or certificates and their right to
payment from said Gross Receipts Taxes in the manner provided herein shall not be affected or impaired
by the application or use of such proceeds.
The State Board shall use the moneys in said Capital Outlay Fund in each fiscal year only for the
following purposes and in the following order of priority:
(I) For the payment of the principal of and interest on any bonds or certificates maturing in such
fiscal year.
(2) For the deposit into any reserve funds provided for in the proceedings authorizing the issuance
of said bonds or :ertificates, of any amounts required to be deposited in such reserve funds in such fiscal
year.
(3) After all payments required in such fiscal year for the purposes provided for in (I) and (2)
above, including any deficiencies for required payments in prior fiscal years, any moneys remaining in
said Capital Outlay Fund at the end of such fiscal year may be used by the State Board for direct
payment of the cost or any part of the cost of any capital outlay project theretofore authorized by the
legislature or for the purchase of any bonds or certificates issued hereunder then outstanding upon such
terms and conditions as the State Board shall deem proper, or for the prior redemption of outstanding
bonds or certificates in accordance with the provisions of the proceedings which authorized the issuance
of such bonds or certificates.
The State Board may invest the moneys in said Capital Outlay Fund or in any sinking fund or other
funds created for any issue of bonds or certificates, in direct obligations of the United States of America
or in the other securities referred to in Section 344.27, Florida Statutes.
(d) The State Board shall have the power to make and enforce all rules and regulations necessary
to the full exercise of the powers herein granted and no legislation shall be required to render this
Amendment of full force and operating effect on and after January 1, 1964. The Legislature, during the
period this Amendment is in effect, shall not reduce the rate of said Gross Receipts Taxes now provided
in said Chapter 203, Florida Statutes, or eliminate, exempt or remove any of the persons, firms or
corporations, including municipal corporations, or any of the utilities, businesses or services now or
hereafter subject to said Gross Receipts Taxes, from the levy and collection of said Gross Receipts Taxes
as now provided in said Chapter 203, Florida Statutes, and shall not enact any law impairing or
materially altering the rights of the holders of any bonds or certificates issued pursuant to this
Amendment or impairing or altering any covenants or agreements of the State Board made hereunder,
or having the effect of withdrawing the proceeds of said Gross Receipts Taxes from the operation of this
Amendment.
The State Board of Administration shall be and is hereby constituted as the Fiscal Agent of the State
Board to perform such duties and assume such responsibilities under this Amendment as shall be agreed
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upon between the State Board and such State Board of Administration. The State Board shall also have
power to appoint such other persons and fix their compensation for the administration of the provisions
of this Amendment as it shall deem necessary, and the expenses of the State Board in administering the
provisions of this Amendment shall be paid out of the proceeds of bonds or certificates issued hereunder
or from said Gross Receipts Taxes deposited in said Capital Outlay Fund.
(e) No capital outlay project or any part thereof shall be financed hereunder unless the bill
authorizing such project shall specify it is financed hereunder and shall be approved by a vote of
three-fifths of the elected members of each house.
History.-S.J.R. 264, 1963; adopted 1963.
'Note.-Section 16 of Art. IX of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION 16. Board of administration; gasoline and like taxes, distribution and use; etc.--(a) That
beginning January 1st, 1943, and for fifty (50) years thereafter, the proceeds of two (20) cents per gallon
of the total tax levied by state law upon gasoline and other like products of petroleum, now known as
the Second Gas Tax, and upon other fuels used to propel motor vehicles, shall as collected be placed
monthly in the 'State Roads Distribution Fund' in the State Treasury and divided into three (3) equal
parts which shall be distributed monthly among the several counties as follows: one part according to
area, one part according to population, and one part according to the counties' contributions to the cost
of state road construction in the ratio of distribution as provided in Chapter 15659, Laws of Florida, Acts
of 1931, and for the purposes of the apportionment based on the counties' contributions for the cost of
state road construction, the amount of the contributions established by the certificates made in 1931
pursuant to said Chapter 15659, shall be taken and deemed conclusive in computing the monthly amounts
distributable according to said contributions. Such funds so distributed shall be administered by the State
Board of Administration as hereinafter provided.
(b) The Governor as chairman, the State Treasurer, and the State Comptroller shall constitute a
body corporate to be known as the 'State Board of Administration,' which board shall succeed to all the
power, control and authority of the statutory Board of Administration. Said Board shall have, in addition
to such powers as may be conferred upon it by law, the management, control and supervision of the
proceeds of said two (20) cents of said taxes and all moneys and other assets which on the effective date
of this amendment are applicable or may become applicable to the bonds of the several counties of this
state, or any special road and bridge district, or other special taxing district thereof, issued prior to July
1st, 1931, for road and bridge purposes. The word 'bonds' as used herein shall include bonds, time
warrants, notes and other forms of indebtedness issued for road and bridge purposes by any county or
special road and bridge district or other special taxing district, outstanding on July 1st, 1931, or any
refunding issues thereof. Said Board shall have the statutory powers of Boards of County Commissioners
and Bond Trustees and of any other authority of special road and bridge districts, and other special
taxing districts thereof with regard to said bonds, (except that the power to levy ad valorem taxes is
expressly withheld from said Board), and shall take over all papers, documents and records concerning
the same. Said Board shall have the power from time to time to issue refunding bonds to mature within
the said fifty (50) year period, for any of said outstanding bonds or interest thereon, and to secure them
by a pledge of anticipated receipts from such gasoline or other fuel taxes to be distributed to such county
as herein provided, but not at a greater rate of interest than said bonds now bear; and to issue, sell or
exchange on behalf of any county or unit for the sole purpose of retiring said bonds issued by such
county, or special road and bridge district, or other special taxing district thereof, gasoline or other fuel
tax anticipation certificates bearing interest at not more than three (3) per cent per annum in such
denominations and maturing at such time within the fifty (50) year period as the board may determine.
In addition to exercising the powers now provided by statute for the investment of sinking funds, said
Board may use the sinking funds created for said bonds of any county or special road and bridge district,
or other unit hereunder, to purchase the matured or maturing bonds participating herein of any other
county or any other special road and bridge district, or other special taxing district thereof, provided that
as to said matured bonds, the value thereof as an investment shall be the price paid therefor, which shall
not exceed the par value plus accrued interest, and that said investment shall bear interest at the rate of
three (3) per cent per annum.
(c) The said board shall annually use said funds in each county account, first, to pay current
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principal and interest maturing, if any, of said bonds and gasoline or other fuel tax anticipation
certificates of such county or special road and bridge district, or other special taxing district thereof,
second, to establish a sinking fund account to meet future requirements of said bonds and gasoline or
other fuel tax anticipation certificates where it appears the anticipated income for any year or years will
not equal scheduled payments thereon; and third, any remaining balance out of the proceeds of said two
(20) cents of said taxes shall monthly during the year be remitted by said board as follows: Eighty (80%)
per cent to the State Road Department for the construction or reconstruction of state roads and bridges
within the county, or for the lease or purchase of bridges connecting state highways within the county,
and twenty (20%) per cent to the Board of County Commissioners of such county for use on roads and
bridges therein.
(d) Said board shall have the power to make and enforce all rules and regulations necessary to the
full exercise of the powers hereby granted and no legislation shall be required to render this amendment
of full force and operating effect from and after January 1st, 1943. The Legislature shall continue the
levies of said taxes during the life of this Amendment, and shall not enact any law having the effect of
withdrawing the proceeds of said two (20) cents of said taxes from the operation of this amendment. The
board shall pay refunding expenses and other expenses for services rendered specifically for, or which
are properly chargeable to, the account of any county from funds distributed to such county; but general
expenses of the board for services rendered all the counties alike shall be prorated among them and paid
out of said funds on the same basis said tax proceeds are distributed among the several counties;
provided, report of said expenses shall be made to each Regular Session of the Legislature, and the
Legislature may limit the expenses of the board.
History.-Added, S.J.R. 324, 1941; adopted 1942.
5Note.-Prior to its amendment by C.S. for H.J.R. 3576, 1972, subsection (d) read as follows:
(d) SCHOOL BONDS. Article XII, Section 18, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, as it
existed immedialely before this revision becomes effective is adopted by this reference as part of this
revision as completely as though incorporated herein verbatim, except bonds or tax anticipation
certificates hereafter issued thereunder may bear interest not in excess of five per cent per annum or such
higher interest as may be authorized by statute passed by a three-fifths vote of each house of the
legislature. Bonds issued pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be payable primarily from revenues as
provided in Article XII, Section 18, of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, and if authorized by law,
may be additionally secured by pledging the full faith and credit of the state without an election. When
authorized by law, bonds issued pursuant to Article XII, Section 18, of the Constitution of 1885, as
amended, and bonds issued pursuant to this subsection (d), may be refunded by the issuance of bonds
additionally secured by the full faith and credit of the state only at a lower net average interest cost rate.
'Note.-Section 18, Art. XII of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, reads as follows:
SECTION 18. School bonds for capital outlay, issuance.-
(a) Beginning January I, 1965 and for thirty-five years thereafter, the first proceeds of the revenues
derived from the licensing of motor vehicles to the extent necessary to comply with the provisions of
this amendment, shall, as collected, be placed monthly in the county capital outlay and debt service
school fund in the state treasury, and used only as provided in this amendment. Such revenue shall be
distributed annually among the several counties in the ratio of the number of instruction units in each
county in each year computed as provided herein. The amount of the first revenues derived from the
licensing of motor vehicles to be so set aside in each year and distributed as provided herein shall be an
amount equal in the aggregate to the product of four hundred dollars multiplied by the total number of
instruction units in all the counties of Florida. The number of instruction units in each county in each
year for the purposes of this amendment shall be the greater of (1) the number of instruction units in
each county for the school fiscal year 1951- 52 computed in the manner heretofore provided by general
law, or (2) the number of instruction units in such county for the school fiscal year computed in the
manner heretofore or hereafter provided by general law and approved by the state board of education
(hereinafter called the state board), or (3) the number of instruction units in each county on behalf of
which the state board of education has issued bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates under
this amendment which will produce sufficient revenues under this amendment to equal one and one-third
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times the aggregate amount of principal of and interest on such bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation
certificates which will mature and become due in such year, computed in the manner heretofore or
hereafter provided by general law and approved by the state board.
Such funds so distributed shall be administered by the state board as now created and constituted by
Section 3 of Article XII [now s. 2, Article IX] of the Constitution of Florida. For the purposes of this
amendment, said state board, as now constituted, shall continue as a body corporate during the life of
this amendment and shall have all the powers provided in this amendment in addition to all other
constitutional and statutory powers related to the purposes of this amendment heretofore or hereafter
conferred upon said board.
(b) The state board shall, in addition to its other constitutional and statutory powers, have the
management, control and supervision of the proceeds of the first part of the revenues derived from the
licensing of motor vehicles provided for in subsection (a). The state board shall also have power, for the
purpose of obtaining funds for the use of any county board of public instruction in acquiring, building,
constructing, altering, improving, enlarging, furnishing, or equipping capital outlay projects for school
purposes, to issue bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates, and also to issue such bonds or
motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates to pay, fund or refund any bonds or motor vehicle tax
anticipation certificates theretofore issued by said state board. All such bonds shall bear interest at not
exceeding four and one-half per centum per annum and shall mature serially in annual installments
commencing not more than three years from the date of issuance thereof and ending not later than thirty
years from the date of issuance or January 1, 2000, A.D., whichever is earlier. All such motor vehicle
tax anticipation certificates shall bear interest at not exceeding four and one-half per centum per annum
and shall mature prior to January 1, 2000, A.D. The state board shall have power to determine all other
details of said bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates and to sell at public sale after public
advertisement, or exchange said bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates, upon such terms and
conditions as the state board shall provide.
The state board shall also have power to pledge for the payment of the principal of and interest on
such bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates, including refunding bonds or refunding motor
vehicle tax anticipation certificates, all or any part from the anticipated revenues to be derived from the
licensing of motor vehicles provided for in this amendment and to enter into any covenants and other
agreements with the holders of such bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates at the time of
the issuance thereof concerning the security thereof and the rights of the holders thereof, all of which
covenants and agreements shall constitute legally binding and irrevocable contracts with such holders and
shall be fully enforceable by such holders in any court of competent jurisdiction.
No such bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates shall ever be issued by the state board
until after the adoption of a resolution requesting the issuance thereof by the county board of public
instruction of the county on behalf of which such obligations are to be issued. The state board of
education shall limit the amount of such bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates which can
be issued on behalf of any county to seventy-five per cent of the amount which it determines can be
serviced by the revenue accruing to the county under the provisions of this amendment, and such
determination shall be conclusive. All such bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates shall be
issued in the name of the state board of education but shall be issued for and on behalf of the county
board of public instruction requesting the issuance thereof, and no election or approval of qualified
electors or freeholders shall be required for the issuance thereof.
(c) The State Board shall in each year use the funds distributable pursuant to this Amendment to
the credit of each county only in the following manner and order of priority:
(1) To pay all amounts of principal and interest maturing in such year on any bonds or motor
vehicle tax anticipation certificates issued under the authority hereof, including refunding bonds or motor
vehicle tax anticipation certificates, issued on behalf of the Board of Public Instruction of such county;
subject, however, to any covenants or agreements made by the State Board concerning the rights between
holders of different issues of such bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates, as herein
authorized.
(2) To establish and maintain a sinking fund or funds to meet future requirements for debt service,
or reserves therefor, on bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates issued on behalf of the Board
of Public Instruction of such county, under the authority hereof, whenever the State Board shall deem
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it necessary or advisable, and in such amounts and under such terms and conditions as the State Board
shall in its discretion determine.
(3) To distribute annually to the several Boards of Public Instruction of the counties for use in
payment of debt service on bonds heretofore or hereafter issued by any such Board where the proceeds
of the bonds were used, or are to be used, in the construction, acquisition, improvement, enlargement,
furnishing, or equipping of capital outlay projects in such county, and which capital outlay projects have
been approved by the Board of Public Instruction of the county, pursuant to a survey or surveys
conducted subsequent to July 1, 1947 in the county, under regulations prescribed by the State Board to
determine the capital outlay needs of the county.
The State Board shall have power at the time of issuance of any bonds by any Board of Public
Instruction to covenant and agree with such Board as to the rank and priority of payments to be made
for different issues of bonds under this Subsection (3), and may further agree that any amounts to be
distributed under this Subsection (3) may be pledged for the debt service on bonds issued by any Board
of Public Instruction and for the rank and priority of such pledge. Any such covenants or agreements of
the State Board may be enforced by any holders of such bonds in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(4) To distribute annually to the several Boards of Public Instruction of the counties for the
payment of the cost of the construction, acquisition, improvement, enlargement, furnishing, or equipping
of capital outlay projects for school purposes in such county as shall be requested by resolution of the
County Board of Public Instruction of such county.
(5) When all major capital outlay needs of a county have been met as determined by the State
Board, on the basis of a survey made pursuant to regulations of the State Board and approved by the
State Board, all such funds remaining shall be distributed annually and used for such school purposes
in such county as the Board of Public Instruction of the county shall determine, or as may be provided
by general law.
(d) Capital outlay projects of a county shall be eligible to participate in the funds accruing under
this Amendment and derived from the proceeds of bonds and motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates
and from the motor vehicle license taxes, only in the order of priority of needs, as shown by a survey
or surveys conducted in the county under regulations prescribed by the State Board, to determine the
capital outlay needs of the county and approved by the State Board; provided, that the priority of such
projects may be changed from time to time upon the request of the Board of Public Instruction of the
county and with the approval of the State Board; and provided further, that this Subsection (d) shall not
in any manner affect any covenant, agreement, or pledge made by the State Board in the issuance by said
State Board of any bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates, or in connection with the issuance
of any bonds of any Board of Public Instruction of any county.
(e) The State Board may invest any sinking fund or funds created pursuant to this Amendment in
direct obligations of the United States of America or in the bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation
certificates, matured or to mature, issued by the State Board on behalf of the Board of Public Instruction
of any county.
(0 The State Board shall have power to make and enforce all rules and regulations necessary to
the full exercise of the powers herein granted and no legislation shall be required to render this
Amendment of full force and operating effect from and after January 1, 1953. The Legislature shall not
reduce the levies of said motor vehicle license taxes during the life of this Amendment to any degree
which will fail to provide the full amount necessary to comply with the provisions of this Amendment
and pay the necessary expenses of administering the laws relating to the licensing of motor vehicles, and
shall not enact any law having the effect of withdrawing the proceeds of such motor vehicle license taxes
from the operation of this Amendment and shall not enact any law impairing or materially altering the
rights of the holders of any bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates issued pursuant to this
Amendment or impairing or altering any covenant or agreement of the State Board, as provided in such
bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates.
The State Board shall have power to appoint such persons and fix their compensation for the
administration of the provisions of this Amendment as it shall deem necessary, and the expenses of the
State Board in administering the provisions of this Amendment shall be prorated among the various
counties and paid out of the proceeds of the bonds or motor vehicle tax anticipation certificates or from
the funds distributable to each county on the same basis as such motor vehicle license taxes are distrib-
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utable to the various counties under the provisions of this Amendment. Interest or profit on sinking fund
investments shall accrue to the counties in proportion to their respective equities in the sinking fund or
funds.
History.-Added, S.J.R. 106, 1951; adopted 1952; (a), (b) Am. S.R. 218, 1963; adopted 1964.
'SECTION 10. Preservation of existing government.- All provi-
sions of Articles I through IV, VII and IX through XX of the Constitution
of 1885, as amended, not embraced herein which are not inconsistent with
this revision shall become statutes subject to modification or repeal as are
other statutes.
'Note.-See table in this volume tracing various provisions of the Constitution of 1885, as
amended, into the Florida Statutes.
SECTION 11. Deletion of obsolete schedule items.-The legislature
shall have power, by joint resolution, to delete from this revision any section
of this Article XII, including this section, when all events to which the
section to be deleted is or could become applicable have occurred. A
legislative determination of fact made as a basis for application of this
section shall be subject to judicial review.
SECTION 12. Senators.-The requirements of staggered terms of
senators in Section 15(a), of Article III of this revision shall apply only to
senators elected in November, 1972, and thereafter.
SECTION 13. Legislative apportionment.-The requirements of
legislative apportionment in Section 16 of Article III of this revision shall
apply only to the apportionment of the legislature following the decennial
census of 1970, and thereafter.
SECTION 14. Representatives; terms.-The legislature at its first
regular session following the ratification of this revision, by joint resolution,
shall propose to the electors of the state for ratification or rejection in the
general election of 1970 an amendment to Article III, Section 15(b), of the
constitution providing staggered terms of four years for members of the
house of representatives.
SECTION 15. Special district taxes.-Ad valorem taxing power
vested by law in special districts existing when this revision becomes
effective shall not be abrogated by Section 9(b) of Article VII herein, but
such powers, except to the extent necessary to pay outstanding debts, may
be restricted or withdrawn by law.
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SECTION 16. Reorganization.-The requirement of Section 6, Article
IV of this revision shall not apply until July 1, 1969.
SECTION 17. Conflicting provisions.-This schedule is designed to
effect the orderly transition of government from the Constitution of 1885,
as amended, to this revision and shall control in all cases of conflict with
any part of Article I through IV, VII, and IX through XI herein.
SECTION 18. Bonds for housing and related facilities.-Section 16
of Article VII, providing for bonds for housing and related facilities, shall
take effect upon approval by the electors.
History.-Added, S.J.R. 6-E, 1980; adopted 1980.
'SECTION 19. Renewable energy source property.-The amendment
to Section 3 of Article VII, relating to an exemption for a renewable energy
source device and real property on which such device is installed, if adopted
at the special election in October 1980, shall take effect January 1, 1981.
History.-Added, SIR. 15-E, 1980; adopted 1980.
'Note.-This section, originally designated section 18 by SIR. 15-E, 1980, was redesignated
section 19 by the editors in order to avoid confusion with section 18 as contained in SIR. 6-E, 1980.
SECTION 20. Access to public records.-Section 24 of Article I,
relating to access to public records, shall take effect July 1, 1993.
History.-Added, C.S. for C.S. for H.J.R.'s 1727, 863, 2035, 1992; adopted 1992.
1994] 1701
977
: Nova Law Review 18, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
